Eugene Thacker is the author of a number of books, including In The Dust Of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1 (Zero Books, 2011) The Sight of a and After Life (University of Chicago Press, 2010). His most recent is the forthcoming Excommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and Me Mangled Corpse diation, co-authored with Alexander Galloway and McKenzie Wark (University of Chicago Press, 2013). Thacker also writes an online col- umn for Mute Magazine called “Occultural Studies,” and he teaches at The New School in New York. As consummate fans of horror and avid readers of Eugene’s writing, Scapegoat asked the author to engage our issue on Excess by respond- —An Interview ing to a series of questions that address the philosophical lineage of horror and its relation to speculative thought. What follows is an ed- with ited version of our correspondence. Scapegoat Says In his Confessions, Roger Corman, Mario Bava, and Teruo St. Augustine poses the rhetorical Ishii. But what I find interesting about question, “What pleasure can there the horror genre is not any of the elements Eugene Thacker be in the sight of a mangled corpse, that make it a genre—the characters, plot, which can only horrify?” As if to take setting, or style, nor the gore, the mon up and pervert this very point, your sters, or the genre conventions. What I find work as a philosopher, especially in interesting are the ideas embedded in your recent book In the Dust of This these stories. These are stories that are Planet, takes a certain pleasure in concept-driven, rather than being driven the horror of thought.1 In fact, the by character, plot, or genre expectations. “horror of philosophy”—a phrase Bat- Lovecraft is a great example, though he aille used to characterize the fear felt took much of what he learned from the by specialists when making more ab- likes of Poe, Machen, Blackwood, and stract claims of thought—is a concept Dunsany. In a Lovecraft story you rarely entangled in many of your recent get fully developed, well-rounded char- essays. What, in your estimation, is acters; in fact, you rarely give a damn the horror of philosophy in contem- about the characters at all. But at the core porary thought? of these stories you find a fundamental question about the fabric of reality and Eugene Thacker Well, yes, the phrase the impossibility of ever fully knowing “horror of philosophy” is meant to be taken or comprehending it. Supernatural hor- in a couple of ways. Initially, I set out to ror moves away from human-centric con write a book about the horror genre, and cerns over psychology, desire, motive, in particular about what H.P. Lovecraft free will, and the like, and towards a view called “supernatural horror.” But very of a world that is either against the human, quickly the book became something else. or in many cases indifferent to the human. In asking myself why I found the horror So what was a philosophical question then genre so interesting I was eventually led becomes a religious question... to consider philosophical questions, which Augustine’s words are especially apt in is a bit odd, since the horror genre has his- that he assumes that pleasure cannot be torically been very low-brow and unintel said of something for which we feel horror, lectual. It is only recently that we now dread, or fear. And yet that almost exact- see the likes of Lovecraft enshrined in ly describes what the horror genre is all the Penguin Classics or Modern Library about—and it extends back to the earlier editions. The origins of genre horror have fascination with gothic novels, graveyard always been low, from the sensationalism poetry, and the like. Ultimately, for me, it of the gothic novel to pulp magazines like extends back to pre-modernity, to mysti- Weird Tales and cult film directors like cal texts that discuss shadows and dark-
379 ness, to the political theology of demonic contradictions inherent in the concept of of the unceasing creativity of nature, or the language breaks down and you get possession, to the sanctified grotesque of “life” in philosophy and theology. Many they may be taken as curiosities and enter lost in it, as if Proust were a systems engi the suffering body in religion, to “divine of the twists and turns of the concept de- tainment (today we should also add the neer. At other times he is enamoured of darkness;” there is a religious intuition rive from Aristotle, for whom the issue of interpretation of monsters as “errors” in the poetics of technical language—of here that I have always found fascinating, “form” was all-important. Form-giving biological information). There is one view what most of us call jargon—and it almost and it connects modern genre horror with is not only part of the life-principle for which argues that monsters are a threat becomes an exercise in sculpting nonsense philosophy, and in particular religious and Aristotle, but forming and in-forming are to the status quo; another view could (which is why I think the diagram works mystical philosophy. also part of life processes, and this led argue that monsters are precisely what well within the context of his writing). But going back to the “horror of philo him to his natural philosophy work. But hold up the status quo, and the moment The thing that I don’t understand is the sophy”—this also means, in a more banal there is also de-forming, and even un- the monster appears it is recuperated reception of his work. Many readers seem sense, the sort of allergic reaction many forming as well. In much supernatural and designated, given a name—even if to forget that so-called theory-fiction has of us have to philosophy with a capital P. horror—particularly in the weird fiction that name is “the unnameable.” A great always been a part of the philosophically I include myself in this group. I did not of Lovecraft and his circle—you get “mon case study is the now-forgotten field of fringe anti-tradition. What is the bulk of major in philosophy as a student, in part sters” that are atypical in that they defy teratology, which was influenced by bio- Kierkegaard’s works if not theory-fiction, because I was utterly bored with the not only existing categories of life, but logical classification and natural history, with his fake professors writing treatises analytical logic-chopping that seemed they seem to defy conceptual thought but attempted a classification system for that footnote each other? To say nothing to constitute most of the discipline. It is and language, as well. You either have to monsters—those beings that, by definition, of Nietzsche, who has, if nothing else, also quite intimidating, what with mas- question the more basic presuppositions could not be classified. Geoffroy Saint- mapped out the stylistic terrain of theory- sive Germanic tomes of systematic theo- (for instance, about the division between Hilaire’s Histoire générale et particulière fiction, from the aphorism to the fable to ries-of-everything filled to the brim with the organic and inorganic), or you can des anomalies de l’organisation chez the prophecy. And the literary examples obscure French jargon, complete with just ignore it and invent a new category, l’homme et les animaux (ca. 1832–37) is a are innumerable, not to mention the way good-old American pragmatic applica- a new name. Interestingly, we can still fascinating exercise in futility. that early-twentieth century thinkers tion (usually to politics or ethics). I also see this today in the sciences, with so- like Bataille, Blanchot, and Klossowski SS never bought the big claims philosophy called “extremophiles,” organisms liv- It seems that a common trajectory blurred the line between philosophy and often made (and makes) to know every- ing in conditions in which life was not among the various lines of inquiry literature. I’ve also always admired Pierre thing, to figure everything out. There is thought to be possible. that comprise the philosophical ten- Guyotat’s unreadable en lange novels. a bit of the know-it-all in philosophy that Monsters are, of course, everywhere dency known as speculative real- Closer to our time, a whole group of post- I am always skeptical of. in the horror genre. But they also have a ism is the movement toward a non- structuralist experiments in textuality So the phrase reflects the ways in which way of becoming quite tame and domes- anthropomorphic philosophical are important to recognize here, from the horror genre interrogates philosophy, ticated within the confines of the genre perspective. The specificity of this Derrida’s Glas to Irigaray’s Marine Lover just as much as the way that philosophy through sheer repetition. There was a trajectory is, of course, quite various, to Barthes’ experiments in autobiogra comes in to “explain” or help us under- time when I was interested in the figure from object-oriented ontologies, to phy. And in the 1990s we had the “hyper stand the horror genre. I often teach Noel of the zombie, but at this point we have a new Naturphilosophie, to the more stition” of Warwick anti-philosophers Carroll’s book The Philosophy of Horror, all been so inundated with zombies every radical anti-genre of horror fiction, like Nick Land (an influence on Reza), a book I admire very much, and the simple where (a perfect example of allegory) that as in the work of Reza Negarestani. the Virtual Futures anthology, the Ctheory reversal came to me as an apt title for the last thing I want to read about or Notwithstanding the innovative journal, and the hyper-theory of Arthur the series. write about is yet another example of the philosophical contribution of these and Marilouise Kroker (one colleague de living dead as metaphor for otherness or other threads of speculative real- scribed Kroker’s writing to me as “Adorno SS Near the conclusion of “Clouds of the multitude. The same has happened ism, it seems your own work is most on speed,” but I don’t think it was a com Unknowing,” your preface to In the with other monsters, many of which have closely aligned with the excessive pliment). This is all to say that Reza’s Dust of This Planet, you explain how been repeated so often and with such lit- strangeness of Negarestani.3 Was Cyclonopedia is amazing, but that it also the genre of horror takes aim at some tle imagination that the only avenue left this a motive behind the Leper participates in a broader anti-tradition. of the central presuppositions of open is snarkiness and satire (e.g. the tir- Creativity symposium and publica- Actually, I also like Reza’s earlier works, philosophical inquiry, noting that ing reiterations of the vampire in pop tion?4 Can you say a little about the like GAS (on the corpse of Deleuze), as horror “makes of those blind spots culture). “conceptual persona” of Negarestani well as the various Warwick experiments its central concern, expressing What is interesting is that, arguably, and his role in the development of from the 1990s like the CCRU (Cyber- them not in abstract concepts but this is what happens in the history of the the horror of philosophy, and a phi- Culture Research Unit). in a whole bestiary of impossible natural sciences surrounding monsters. losophy of horror? I think it is safe to say that “speculative life forms—mists, ooze, blobs, slime, A monster is never just a monster, never realism” is more an act of branding, or self- ET clouds, and muck. Or, as Plato once just a physical or biological anomaly. It is I have always liked Reza’s works and promotional historicizing, than anything put it, ‘hair, mud, and dirt.’”2 How, for always accompanied by an interpretive his particular way of doing “theory-fiction.” else. Don’t get me wrong—I do find the “spe- you, does this collection of impos- framework within which the monster is There is always a tenuous balance in his culative turn” interesting, I love the job sible life forms relate to the practice able to be monstrum, literally “to show” prose between, on the one hand, being Robin MacKay is doing with Urbanomic of thinking the world-without-us? or “to warn.” Monsters are always a mat- articulate and precise, and, on the other and Collapse, and I often find myself re- ter of interpretation. They may be taken hand, developing a poetics of technical turning to books like Nihil Unbound. But ET Well, the idea was drawn from After as manifestations of religious prophecy, language. This is part of the play of Reza’s it has also become so self-absorbed that Life, where I was interested in tracing the or they may be taken as a demonstration prose. Sometimes he is so precise that you feel like the speculative blogosphere
380 Scapegoat 381 The Sight of a Mangled... has eclipsed or become equivalent to the step further, where he suggests that the that every little bit we do makes a differ- our individual dynamics of hope, fear, activity of “doing philosophy.” Maybe it thought of the end of all thought is really ence, according to some kind of self-help desire, and such to larger scale of envi- has. But then again, isn’t that how “The the pinnacle of humanism, in which even version of the butterfly effect. The more ronmental and planetary, and ultimately History of Philosophy” is written? People the possibility of human extinction is we know about the planet and its ecology, cosmic, dynamics of the same order. Ba in certain positions simply enact, by divine recuperated by the heroic capacity of the more we become aware of exactly taille’s insight is that this connection to a fiat, a movement, a program, and a pedi human beings to think it, to comprehend how insignificant we are, no matter how scaled-up non-human world is not simply gree. I find the works associated with Spe- it, to understand it, maybe even to accept many “footprints” we excitedly make a way of making us feel cozy and more culative Realism interesting, but I also it. Thus the speculative opportunity of upon its shores. This is the “planetary friendly with the world “out there”—quite think it’s important to note that it’s not extinction becomes, ironically, a form paradox.” The more we learn, the more the opposite. It incites in us a kind of fas- the only game in town—there is a whole of therapy. This is what we see happen- we learn that it doesn’t matter. What cinated dread, a recognition of the stark world of philosophy out there beyond the ing in culture today, where speculation becomes more and more apparent is the differences between our everyday world narrow confines of four or five books. We about extinction is rampant, from pop indifference of the planet to us. This is of “discontinuity” of individuals, mine are just beginning to examine the space science books about “the world without what is so alarming about our new, cha- and thine, and so on, and an anonymous, between analytical and continental phi us” or science documentaries on “life otic order of extreme weather and natu- indifferent world of “continuity” (these losophy (an unfortunate split largely the after people.” Even the discourse around ral disasters—the seeming arbitrariness are Bataille’s terms). That sense of a result of the academy), and we have yet to climate change and sustainability plays of it all, in spite of our attempts to be pre- fascinated dread Bataille connected to seriously explore the question of a com- into this. It’s been interesting to see it pared, to safeguard our lives, to make mystical traditions, particularly those parative philosophy (beyond an Oriental- shift in subtle ways. At one point not so meaning out of the persistence of the that culminate in self-abnegation, and izing relation to Zen or Sufi mysticism). long ago, the rhetoric was about chang human. It’s as if we’re living in two par- the ambivalent sense of this continuity ing our habits so as to change the planet— allel worlds, one which is the world “for He sometimes referred to as “divinity.” SS To return to your bestiary of the little changes resulting in big changes. us,” a human-centric world for human Now, whether this scaled-up conscious- impossible, I would like to ask about Now it seems that it’s too late. We’ve pretty beings, blissfully deaf to the silent caco ness of the non-human is “helpful” in another aspect of the horror of much fucked things up, and watched our phony of the non-human world around any way is another question. True, it may philosophy in relation to specula- selves do it. So the rhetoric has changed us, a world “without us.” help us see things differently, but to me tion and extinction. You take up the from “saving the planet” (a ridiculous that’s far from being helpful. SS scientific concept of extinction, as and naive proposition—that the planet In your commentary on “The Subhar- SS explicated by Georges Cuvier and needs to be saved by us is the height of monic Murmur of Black Tentacular To come back to your image of the the Comte de Buffon, noting that Cu- human presumptuousness), and more Voids,” you take up Bataille’s estima- “bestiary of the impossible” once vier’s advocacy for “catastrophism”— towards a new rhetoric of minimizing tion, from The Accursed Share as again, I’d like to ask about The Global “the theory that the Earth is periodi- the negative effects, doing the least well as (somewhat more poetically) Genome, which remains, to my know- cally visited by sudden, cataclysmic amount of damage, living in the “least from his lesser known essay “The ledge, one of the most comprehen- events that not only radically alter worst” of all possible worlds. A strange, Congested Planet,” that the problem sive political economic analyses of the Earth’s geological composi- compromised pessimism. Arguably we’re of scarcity is a false problem; or, bioinformatics out there.7 While it tion, but the organisms living on the even moving into a further stage of the perhaps more accurately, scarcity is is clear that there is a political and Earth as well”—leads to a strange discourse, where it’s not just that we’ve a human problem, and thus indicates ethical motivation behind the work, problem, namely, how to conceive of destroyed the planet (for ourselves), and the weakness of an anthropocentric what specifically led you to this re- extinction.5 As you note, Kant’s take not just that we try, in our neo-hippie conception of the universe.6 Does search? Since its publication in 2005, on the problem in “The End of All artisanal ways, to do the least amount of Bataille’s cosmic libidinal material- have you continued to follow the vicis Things” is to insist that any postula- damage, but a real confrontation with ism suggest, in your view, ways we situdes of the biotech industry and tion about absolute negation can the possibility that it just doesn’t matter. might begin to think about clima- its cataloguing of genetic informa- only be speculative. How would you This is the question of nihilism, and it’s tological chaos, or, more recently, tion? Has the industry developed as characterize the “value”—in terms a question that Nietzsche posed over a the geological reformation of the you anticipated, or are there areas of ethics, philosophy, pleasure, or century ago. Of course, this isn’t to advo- Anthropocene? of unexpected new research? For anything else—of such a speculative cate anything in particular. It’s not to say example, in the innovation by John ET enterprise? we should all participate in a mass, col- The first thing I should say is that Gurdon and Shinya Yamanaka to de- lective suicide. It’s not to say we should the discussion about Bataille is not meant velop re-programmable adult stem- ignore the science and pretend like noth- to suggest a solution to a problem as mud cells (for which they won the 2012 ET I am tempted to say that the “value” ing has changed. And therein lies the dif dy and complex as that of climate change. Nobel Prize in medicine), it seems is absolutely null. Not only because such ficulty. There’s nothing to do. And yet we The question of whether Bataille himself that the potential for bio-informatic a thought—the thought of the end of all keep on doing stuff, we wake up and go thought so is open to interpretation. His industrial applications is mutating; thought, as it were—entails the foreclosure to sleep, we write books and occasionally late turn to the questions of ecology and and, it seems that the public, in a of any value “for us” as human beings, but read them, we talk and sometimes listen, the planet are fascinating to me, in part broad sense, is quite comfortable also because the very endeavour of such a we eat food and shit it out, we make plans because they are an extension of his earlier with the notion of biological life as a speculation is, at best, a speculative fail and try not to think of the disappoint- interests in eroticism, mysticism, and “platform” for a scientific reprogram- ure. Kant seems aware of this in his short ment that might follow—all of it mostly corporeality. And Bataille does highlight ming. piece, which has a bit of satire, even sar- out of habit, perhaps out of conviction the problem with anthropocentric think ET casm, about it. Nietzsche takes this one or belief, perhaps out of the need to feel ing, the way we routinely fail to connect Thank you for saying so. I had a
382 Excess 383 ...Corpse: Correspondence... great conversation with Arthur Kroker artifacts at once biological and techno- ested in being that kind of academic that ing this historical account? Do you once, and he nailed it when he told me logical. Foucault’s genealogy of “popula- milks one idea for the rest of one’s life, think, from this historical perspec- that The Global Genome was really a tion” as a proto-informatic entity was and I’ve realized I’m also not the kind of tive, that we need to reconceive of book about death, and in particular, the one way into this, as was Marx’s insight scholar that does that really deep work “life” within the context of contempo- political economy of death. That’s spot that the “natural” was natural precisely on a single, specific topic that writers rary political economic regimes? on, and I very much had Baudrillard’s through its ability to be instrumental- like me rely on. I think I got a lot of this ET Symbolic Exchange and Death, as well ized. While I was, at the time, interested from my background in philosophy and Well there is a clear through-line as Bataille’s work, in mind when I was in autonomist thinkers like Lazzarato comparative literature, at a time when from Biomedia to After Life, and that is writing it. Both Biomedia and The Global and Negri, this was not something I found I was especially interested in writing the way that life—and more importantly Genome are the result of my own, perhaps accounted for in their theories of “im- that combined experimentation in form the concept of “life itself”—is variously peculiar, science fictional approach to material labour” and biopolitics. All this with experimentation in content. I was defined, redefined, and deployed in dif- science. I remember feeling that, in some is reflected in the book’s over-arching reading Plato and Kant, but also, on my ferent ways. But with After Life, I wanted ways, the best science fiction was being structure, based on political economy— own, Breton and Soupault’s Les Champs to address the question head-on, and done in the sciences, and they were doing production, exchange, consumption; en magnétiques, Burroughs and Gysin’s The for a long time I had been wanting to it in very material, artifactual ways, by coding, recoding, decoding. Third Mind, Bataille, Blanchot, Cioran, do a more straight-up philosophy book. building DNA chips, molecular databases, and Lautréamont. And my first publica- Although, I consider each book I have SS vat-grown organs, and so on. The very If we were to distinguish the horror tions in college were more in the vein of written “philosophy,” even though I’m existence of these strange entities seemed of philosophy from the horror of “experimental fiction” or “theory-fiction,” probably the only one who does. At any to call into question all sorts of concep- already-existing political economies published in various now-forgotten ’zines— rate, one of the interesting problems tual and philosophical dichotomies—the of bioinformatics, how would you when ’zines were actually in print. To me surrounding “life” is that it is never clear boundary between life and death, the describe the latter? In his project this notion of experiment applies as much if we are talking about a concept or the natural and the artificial, the organic The Center for Postnatural History to nonfiction as it does to fiction. One thing itself. “Life” has a strange status in and the inorganic, “data” and “flesh.” (CPNH), Rich Pell explains that the should utilize the form of the expository philosophy; it is not quite a foundational Of course, it is not only in our era that scale of genetic manipulation (spe- essay only if it makes sense for the proj metaphysical concept, like “substance” this has happened. This is arguably the cifically as it is imposed by humans ect. So for me, Biomedia, The Global or “cause,” but it is also not simply a sec history of the life sciences itself, going onto animal species) exponentially Genome, and the essays from that period ondary concept relegated to ethics, poli back to Aristotle’s first attempts to stratify exceeds our assumptions, but his formed part of one project—at one point tical philosophy, or logic. In fact, even in and classify the flora and fauna around work, including the design of the I was going to call it all “The Question Aristotle there is this slippage. Aristotle him on the island of Lesbos. But in order museum portion of the CPNH, is, at Concerning Biotechnology” and assem feels compelled to use one term when to undertake this project, it seemed that least in part, about encouraging a ble a third volume with that title. There describing animal life, and then another I needed to do more than simply rely on confrontation with this reality. Do I was doing “close readings” of science term to describe the life that is common critical theorists and their general claims you see The Global Genome as a pro artifacts and adopting the science fic to animals, plants, and human beings. about science. It seemed that I needed to ject about “making things public,” to tional view of science. And then The “Life” seems to be one of those concepts actually understand, to the best of my borrow from Bruno Latour’s lexicon? Exploit, the “Networks, Swarms, Multi that disappears when you look at it di- ability, what the sciences were doing, in tudes” essays, and some other bits are rectly. What philosophers typically do is ET addition to considering them from the Well, this goes back to the previous part of another project (borrowing from simply swap out one concept for another. more distanced, critical standpoint of question a bit. The short answer is, no, Deleuze, I was referring to this project The question “what is life?” usually sup- theory, media studies, science studies, I haven’t really kept up with developments as “The Life of Ensembles”). There the plants some other concept—form, time, and so on. So both of those books contain in science and technology since The Global writings are more in a modular form of spirit—for “life” and thereby just begs relatively little “theory” and a lot more Genome and The Exploit. And no, I do not “nodes” and “edges.” There’s another the question. The modern variants of close attention was paid to the material- really have any illusions about those books group of writings on biopolitics, the body pantheism, vitalism, Lebensphilosophie, ity of the artifacts. The artifacts them- being part of some imagined public politic, and zombies, which was a project process, becoming, information, and so selves seemed to defy these conceptual sphere—which to me really means iso- that never really coalesced into a book. on, simply repeat this same move. I was categories, and I wanted to stay true to lated academic conferences and publica- And then the more recent work around also struck by the pervasiveness of the that. The “theoretical” arguments were tion of anthologies that even libraries After Life and the question of the ontol- problem in contemporary theory, with actually embedded in the artifacts them- don’t purchase. If people happen upon ogy of life, and the Horror of Philosophy... all the talk of “bare life,” “precarious selves. That said, the real theoretical the books, read them, and find them in Anyways, it goes on. Plenty of ideas, little life,” “liquid life,” etc. It seemed to be experiment in The Global Genome was teresting, then I’m glad to hear it. But time to carry them out. a place-holder for so many things that to create some type of hybrid of Foucault I don’t feel the need to imagine a non- the term itself was buried beneath them. SS and Marx—specifically Foucault’s later existent community of readers in civil In After Life, you turn your attention To me this is precisely the moment one lectures on biopolitics and Marx’s early conversation because of that. I suppose to the history of philosophy, from should undertake a serious investigation writings on “species being.” It seemed to if I were a different kind of writer, I Aristotle to Kant (and Bataille), in of a concept, that is, at the moment when me that if there was something unique would leverage the work I did in these order to investigate the philosophi- it is eclipsed by other concerns, and there about the current moment, it was the early books and stay with it. But I’m not. cal problem of life as such. You write, fore is taken for granted. way in which the technical concept of As a writer I tend to work on discrete “‘Life’ is not only a problem of philos- Such a project is ridiculously ambi- “information” was mobilized and made projects and then move on. There is con- ophy, but a problem for philosophy.”8 tious, so I had to make a number of deci flesh, as it were, in a range of scientific tinuity to be sure, but I’m just not inter- What led to your interest in develop- sions to make it workable. I had to stay
384 Scapegoat 385 ...With Eugene Thacker ET within the Western philosophical tradi- I don’t know. I just don’t think of Endnotes 7 Eugene Thacker, The Global Genome: Biotechnology, tion, although I tried to at least gesture it in those terms. Certainly reading a Politics, and Culture (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, toward the need for a comparative philo philosopher or a book of philosophy can 1 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of 2005). Philosophy Vol. 1 (Winchester and Washington: Zero 8 Eugene Thacker, After Life (Chicago: University of sophical approach. I also decided to help a person understand something. I Books, 2011). Chicago Press, 2012), x; also see Eugene Thacker, begin with Aristotle rather than, say, don’t deny that at all. But to me the most 2 Ibid., 9. “After Life: Swarms, Demons and the Antinomies of Linnaeus, Darwin, or the modern life interesting books are those that are un 3 Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Immanence,” in Theory After “Theory,” eds. Jane sciences. This was because I think the helpful, if only because they operate in Anonymous Materials (Melbourne: re.press, 2008). Elliott and Derek Attridge (London and New York: 4 Ed Keller, Nicola Masciandaro and Eugene Thacker, Routledge, 2011), 181–193. problem is identified as aphilosophical a different register or in a different key. eds., Leper Creativity (Brooklyn: punctum, 2012). 9 E.M. Cioran, The Temptation to Exist, trans. Richard problem by Aristotle, not only in his Recently I had the opportunity to write 5 Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet, 9. Howard (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times term psukhê (which might be translated the forewords to the Arcade editions of 6 Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet, 133–159; see also Book Co., 1968), 222. as “life-principle”), but in the way he Cioran’s works, and it gave me the ex- Eugene Thacker, “Spiritual Meat: Resurrection and Religious Horror in Bataille,” Collapse VII (2011). stratifies particular instances of psukhe. cuse to dive back into his writings, which The way Aristotle frames the problem I have always found fascinating. I don’t can still be seen today in discussions of think Cioran would put the question in biopolitics, neo-vitalism, and the post- terms of being helpful. Not simply be secular turn in philosophy. Aristotle was, cause he is being a misanthrope, or be of course, central for medieval and early cause it is not cool to help. But there is modern thinkers; what they do is extend something in Cioran’s work that miti his categories, blending them with a whole gates against philosophy in the key of host of influences, from Neo-Platonism philosophy. That is a good definition of to Scholastic theology to Christian mys- “pessimism” to me—the philosophy of ticism, or life conceived in terms of form, the futility of philosophy. Cioran takes time, and spirit. This passage is necessary up this thread from other thinkers to be because it sets the stage for Kant’s articu sure—Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Lichten lation of a contradiction at the core of berg, Leopardi, Pascal, the French moral thinking “life itself,” forever split between ists. His writing itself works against the a thinking human subject that is “living” presuppositions of grand, systematic phi- and a background continuity of “Life” losophy, composed as it is of fragments, that is never itself lived. And that was aphorisms, stray thoughts. It is refresh- where I was really interested in going, ing to read his work today, especially toward the notion that in order to think against the mania for systematicity in “life” philosophically one has to also think philosophy textbooks or the so-called it through a logic of contradiction. This speculative realist treatises. But Cioran’s is, of course, also the terrain of horror writing is not without rigour, quite the authors like Lovecraft... opposite. There is a subtractive rigour to this kind of pessimism, what Nietzsche SS If there is one figure with whom we called the rigour of the “unfinished could associate the most emphatic thought.” Cioran appeals to the secret horror of existence, and one who voice inside all our heads when we read pushes the hardest against any philosophy, or science, or psychology, resolution to the problem of “life,” it or self-help: “Really? You really think might be E.M. Cioran. By way of a we can just figure it all out?” Cioran’s conclusion, then, in his magisterial works call the bluff on philosophy, and essay, “The Temptation to Exist,” he in particular on philosophy’s three main offers the following lines: “We must functions: a therapeutic function (philo learn to think against our doubts and sophy is there to help us live our lives); a against our certitudes, against our descriptive function (philosophy’s job is omniscient humors, we must above to provide an accurate, truthful account all, by creating for ourselves another of the state of things); and a hermeneutic death, one that will be incompatible function (philosophy’s job is to make with our carrion carcasses, consent meaning of it all for us as human be - to the undemonstrable, to the idea ings). I have never believed any of this, that something exists.”9 Does Cioran’s and the books of philosophy I like are not estimation of “another death” suggest, because of these reasons. Perhaps, in spite for you, a way of approaching the of all the books that have been published, excess of horror, and life, today? we still lack an unhuman philosophy. Whe- ther we require it is another question. Sam Leach, The Thinking Object, 2011, Oil and resin on wood, 35 × 27cm 386 Excess Courtesy the artist and Sullivan+Strumpf