A MONERGISTIC THEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF MORAL EVIL

by

C. Elmer Chen

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

PROVIDENCE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

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While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada Copyright © 2008 by Chu-en Elmer Chen All rights reserved ABSTRACT

The problem of evil is not only a hotly debated question among philosophers but also one that intrigues and perplexes many Christians. The undeniable reality of evil in our world presents a challenge to the Christian belief in the Creator God who is all- powerful and perfectly good.

This thesis addresses the problem of evil from a monergistic theological

perspective. As a context for treating the problem, it begins by defining and defending a

specific sovereignty view of providence. A critical examination of the biblical material

and the relevant logical arguments leads to the monergistic conclusion that God is

absolutely sovereign over the specific events that occur in the world. This is followed

by an exploration of the doctrine of the goodness of God and its implications for divine

moral obligation and divine freedom. A survey and analysis of major existing proposals

yields valuable insights for the task of theodicy.

Having defined a theological framework and a strategy for addressing the

problem of evil, the thesis proceeds to offer a proposal for a monergistic account of evil.

The proposal is composed of three basic theses, each of which is grounded in the

available scriptural data. The first is that God intentionally permits moral evil for

purposes that will one day be universally acknowledged as wise. The second is that in

spite of the presence of evil in the world, God is morally blameless in all his works. The

third is that it is possible for evil to originate apart from divine causation within a world

that, as originally created, contained neither evil nor the seed of evil.

Within the framework of theological monergism and a non-consequentialist

account of ethics, this thesis presents a justification of God without minimizing evil. It also presents reason for confidence and hope in a God who is fully sovereign and perfectly good while holding to a realistic account of evil. CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose and Importance Statement of the Problem Definition of Terms Statement of Delimitations List of Assumptions State of the Question Outline of the Following Chapters

2. PROVIDENCE 10

Theological Options A Case for Specific Sovereignty The Nature of Human Freedom Divine Temporality and Foreknowledge Conclusion

3. THE GOODNESS AND FREEDOM OF GOD 72

Theological Distinctions Scriptural Affirmations of God's Goodness The Freedom of God Conclusion

4. ANALYSIS OF SOME MAJOR APPROACHES 93

Best Possible World Theodicy - G. W. Leibniz Free Will Defence - St. Augustine, Alvin Plantinga Open Theist Defences Soul-Making Theodicy - John Hick Greater Good Defence - Keith Yandell Greater Glory Defence - Jonathan Edwards Integrity of Humans Defence - John Feinberg General Analysis: Sovereignty and Theodicy

5. TOWARD A MONERGISTIC ACCOUNT OF EVIL 125

The Question of Divine Purpose Evil and the Moral Justification of God The Origin of Moral Evil Conclusion

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 181

VI APPENDIX 1 - BURNING HOUSE STORY 184

APPENDIX 2 - ASEITY, ONTOLOGY, AND FREEDOM 187

APPENDK 3 - MUST GOD CREATE THE BEST POSSIBLE WORLD? 190

BIBLIOGRAPHY 195

vn CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose and Importance

The purpose of this study is to construct a theological account of moral evil within a monergistic framework. The basic problem of evil may be stated as follows: If

God is all powerful and perfectly good, why does evil exist? That moral evil exists is an undisputed fact in the vast majority of existent worldviews. The reality of evil stands in tension against the traditional Christian doctrines of the omnipotence and the goodness of God, a tension that presents itself as both an intellectual and an existential problem.

Many Christians live with nagging doubts about whether their faith would stand the test of serious intellectual examination. They live with unexamined doubt either because they lack accessible resources to address such questions, or because they fear that such probing will cause their much cherished belief system to crumble. As a result,

sincere inquirers and antagonistic opponents alike are often dismissed with simplistic

answers that are neither satisfying nor inviting. To a large extent, Christians have

deferred the question to professional apologists without engaging in sustained

theological reflection in pursuit of a better understanding of the God they worship.

The majority of contemporary discussion takes place among analytic philosophers utilizing highly technical arguments and often formal logic in the context

of philosophy of religion and apologetics. Although there are some systematic and biblical theological treatments, there have been few extended treatments of the subject

1 2 in terms of a monergistic systematic theology.1 This thesis is an attempt to address the problem of evil from a monergistic theological perspective.

A theological exploration of providence and evil will build the confidence of believers in their Christian faith and alleviate the dissonance caused by the intellectual problem of evil. It will also provide a theological foundation from which to develop a more specialized apologetic from a monergistic perspective. Furthermore, it will reinforce a theological worldview that informs the praxis of the church as we continue

living in this world and responding to evil. Most importantly, a study of this theological

issue can lead believers into a deeper understanding of God and his ways, thereby aiding

them in living a life of faith, hope, and love in the presence of evil.

Statement of the Problem

The problem addressed in this study is: How can the monergistic understanding

of the character and providential workings of God be reconciled with the presence of

moral evil in the world? This problem divides into the following sub-problems. First,

to what extent is God in control of the occurrences of moral evil in our world? Second,

to the extent that God is in control of such occurrences of moral evil, for what possible

reasons would he permit them? Third, how is God morally justified in his contributions

to the present state of affairs in which moral evil is a reality?

' To my knowledge, Henri Blocher's Evil and the Cross (Vancouver: Regent College, 2003) is the only recent text in this class. John S. Feinberg's The Many Faces of Evil, Revised and Expanded Edition (Wheaton: Crossway, 2004) is an excellent text, but is basically a philosophical treatment. Jay E. Adams' The Grand Demonstration (Santa Barbara: EastGate Publishers, 1991) is written in popular style. D. A. Carson's How Long, O Lord? (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990) is a biblical theology. The vast majority of other contributions are from a synergistic perspective. 3

Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this thesis, 'theism' refers to Christian monotheism, the belief in the existence of one God as described in the Bible and traditionally held by the church. The logical problem of evil is the claim that the propositions of theism,

specifically those of divine omnipotence and goodness, are logically inconsistent with the existence of evil. The evidential problem of evil is the claim that the existence of

evil makes it improbable that God exists. An existential problem of evil is a personal

crisis of faith that arises from particular instances of evil or suffering in someone's life,

as opposed to an intellectual problem arising from evil in general.

A distinction is made between moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil refers to

the desires, motives, thoughts, words, or acts of a moral agent that violate the perfect

moral standards of God. Natural evil and natural suffering refer to adverse conditions or

events in the created order, such as diseases, earthquakes, fires, floods, pestilences,

hurricanes, and famine, which do not directly result from the acts of moral agents.4

While there are many varieties of moral theories and ways to classify them, I

shall follow John Feinberg in dividing them into two broad categories.

Consequentialism refers to the category of moral theories that ground the Tightness of an

act in its consequences. Non-consequentialism refers to the category of moral theories

that ground the Tightness of an act in something other than consequences, such as divine

command.5

2 Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 59.

3 Feinberg, 21.

4 Ibid., 22.

5 Ibid., 496n. 2. 4

Theological accounts of providence can be classified as either monergistic or synergistic. Monergism refers to the position that the fulfillment of God's specific intentions in history is not contingent on human cooperation. "Human freedom in no sense limits God's ability to bring about the specific events he desires."6 Synergism refers to the position that the fulfillment of God's specific intentions in history is contingent on human cooperation. While God's overarching purposes cannot be thwarted, human freedom indeed limits God's control over specific events.

'Counterfactuals' refers to truths about what would have happened or what

specific agents would have done if significant conditions had been different. 'Middle'

and 'counterfactual' knowledge synonymously refer to God's knowledge of counterfactuals. 'Hypotheticals' refers to truths about what would happen if a particular

set of imagined conditions should obtain.7 Although there is a subtle difference, the term 'hypothetical knowledge' can often be used interchangeably with counterfactual or

middle knowledge in theological and philosophical dialogue.

Statement of Delimitations

While existential issues are necessarily a concern in addressing the problem of

evil, this study will give primary emphasis to theoretical issues. Second, this thesis is

primarily theological rather than philosophical in nature. While a theological treatment

John Feinberg et al., Predestination & Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove: Inter Varsity Press, 1986), 10-11.

71 derived the term 'hypotheticals' from a conversation with Terrance Tiessen. It conveys the same concept as 'counterfactuals', but more accurately reflects the status of such propositions prior to their non-occurrence or, in the case of divine atemporality, logically prior to God's choice not to decree and actualize them. Technically, hypotheticals include the sum of factuals (what has happened or will happen) and counterfactuals. Obviously, 'hypothetical knowledge' refers to the knowledge of hypotheticals. For more definitions of theological terms, refer to chapters 2 and 3. 5 carries implications for both logical and evidential problems of evil it does not formally

Q address either. There is no attempt to employ formal logic, Bayes's theorem, or similar

analytical methods. It treats philosophical dialogues only as they contribute to theological understanding. Third, it addresses the problem of moral, not natural evil.

Lastly, it is intended for a Christian audience and will not address specific concerns of

atheists or non-Christian theistic systems.

List of Assumptions

The following assumptions are integral to this thesis. 1. Scripture, as the primary source of specific divine revelation, provides authoritative though not comprehensive insight into theological questions. 2. Although human reason is finite, there is a level of humanly accessible logic that demands serious consideration. 3. Theological monergism and compatibilist human freedom will be assumed and defended. 4. A non-consequentialist account of ethics will be assumed.

5. The reality of evil will be assumed.

State of the Question

The problem of evil was first propounded by Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) and

provocatively stated by David Hume (1771-1776) as follows: "Is he willing to prevent

evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is

malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?"9 J. L. Mackie

developed a formalized statement of the logical problem of evil as follows:

(1) God is omnipotent. (2) God is wholly good. Bayes's theorem is a method of assigning conditional probabilities to events based on their relationship to other events (Richard Jeffrey, "Bayes's theorem," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., gen. ed. Robert Audi [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 74-5). It is often used in philosophical debate on the evidential problem of evil.

9 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in Focus, Routledge Philosophers in Focus Series, ed. with an introduction by Stanley Tweyman (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 157. 6

(3) Evil exists.

In an attempt to demonstrate the contradiction, he adds the premises:

(4) Good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can. (5) There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.11

In his refutation of Mackie's logical problem of evil, Alvin C. Plantinga challenges Mackie's (4) and (5) and amends them as follows:

(19c) An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate.

(20) There are no nonlogical limits to what an omnipotent being can do.1

Plantinga's free will defence proceeds to challenge (20) by introducing the concept of transworld depravity. He suggests the possibility that in every possible world, a significantly free moral agent will commit at least one evil act. Consequently, (30) God is omnipotent, and it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil.14

It is generally acknowledged that Plantinga's defence against the logical problem of evil succeeds.15

J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 25. Mackie's article was first published in Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200-212.

11 Ibid., 26.

12 Plantinga, 21. The qualifier 'nonlogical' in Plantinga's (20) is a denial that omnipotence entails the ability to actualize logically contradictory states of affairs. If these amended premises hold true, Mackie's deductive argument stands. Theism is successfully defended if either of these premises is defeated. Note also that (19c) and (20) correspond to two possible approaches to solving the logical problem of evil. It would seem that monergists should concentrate their efforts on challenging (19c) and that both options are open to synergists, though they generally challenge (20). See my general analysis in Chapter 4.

13 By "significantly free," Plantinga means libertarian freedom. He also assumes the truth of counterfactuals. See my discussion of these concepts in Chapter 2.

14 Ibid., 48.

15 E.g. William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," in Philosophy 7

Both Feinberg and Eleonore Stump have argued that in order to be successful, the logical problem must address specific positions held by a particular theological system.16 To demonstrate an inconsistency using terms defined by the atheist only proves that the imagined 'god' of the atheist cannot possibly exist.

Atheists have also developed the evidential problem of evil as an alternative attack against theism. While some concede that the existence of evil is logically consistent with theism, they argue that "evil in our world offers strong evidence against the probability that there is a God."17 This argument has been put forth by William L.

Rowe, James Cornman and Keith Lehrer, and Paul Draper, among others.

In addressing Draper's statement of the problem, Plantinga demonstrates that the evidential problem essentially challenges the coherence of theism and that the apparent incoherence disappears in light of the entire system of beliefs held by theists, such as sin, incarnation, atonement, and eternal life.19 He also points out that the evidential problem raises the question of whether the theist's belief in God is warranted, which

of Religion: Selected Readings, 3r edition, ed. William L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 242n. 1; cf. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York: Macmillan Co., 1969), 340-349, cited in Plantinga, 59.

16 Feinberg, 20; Eleonore Stump, "The Problem of Evil," in Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions, ed. Eleonore Stump and Michael J. Murray (Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 230.

17 Feinberg, 24.

18 Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism"; Cornman and Lehrer, Philosophical Problems; Paul Draper, "Pain and Pleasure: an Evidential Problem for Theists," in Stump and Murray, 164-175. Rowe is perhaps the most noted proponent of this argument.

19 In other words, apparent evidence against theism can be better explained in other ways besides rejecting theism. Although he is addressing a different problem, Plantinga's strategy here works together with Stump's and Feinberg's point. It is far more difficult for an atheistic argument from evil to succeed against a specific theological system. For this reason, a consistent and plausible systematic theology of evil (some refer to this as a story about why evil exists) can effectively address both the logical and the evidential problem. would require considerations larger than the problem of evil.20 Other theistic responders to the evidential problem include Stephen Wykstra, Peter van Inwagen, William P.

Alston, and Richard Swinburne.21

Gregory Boyd's Satan and the Problem of Evil is perhaps the most extensive theological treatment of evil to date. Like other openness23 theologians, Boyd's express

intent is to produce what he considers to be a biblically based account of providence and

evil. He explains evil as the fallout of a cosmic war between God and Satanic forces.24

Essentially, this is a version of free will theodicy that pays special attention to the

demonic realm. John Sanders' The God Who Risks25 is another openness contribution,

but addresses evil only as a sub-problem in the context of his account of providence.

The reduction of divine providential control in open theology offers a considerable

advantage in addressing the problem of evil. This and other models of providence and

evil will be further defined and evaluated in Chapters 2 and 4.

20 Plantinga, in Stump and Murray, 189. This can include the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, other forms of personal religious experience, or considerations raised by arguments for theism, for instance. He also discusses the' nature and relevance of evidence and the transferability of epistemic situations between persons.

21 For a collection of articles from both sides of the argument, see Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). Also see Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991).

22 Gregory A. Boyd, Satan & the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove: Inter Varsity Press, 2001).

23 Open theology denies the traditional doctrine of divine foreknowledge.

24 Ibid., 30, 35.

John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998). 9

Outline of the Following Chapters

In Chapter 2,1 provide a brief outline of the major views of providence followed by an exposition and defence of a Calvinist monergistic view in contrast to competing

systems. I discuss the nature of divine sovereignty, human freedom, and divine

foreknowledge.

Chapter 3 explores the doctrine of the goodness of God in preparation for

addressing the problem of evil. I begin by making a distinction between moral purity

and benevolence. This is followed by a brief statement of my account of ethics in which

moral goodness is ultimately grounded in the nature of God. Lastly, I examine the

implications of this position for divine obligation and freedom.

Chapter 4 provides a survey and evaluation of some major proposals in search of

useful insights for constructing my own proposal. This is followed by an analysis of the

compatibility between the general approaches to the problem of evil and the models of

providence.

Chapter 5 is an exposition of my own account of evil within the theological

framework I have outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 based on the guidelines I proposed in

Chapter 4. In this chapter, I propose an explanation for why God permits evil, present a

case for the moral justification of God, and offer some speculative suggestions regarding

the origin of evil in the world. CHAPTER 2

PROVIDENCE

In discussing the problem of evil, one of the basic theological questions to be addressed is: To what extent does God exercise control over the events that occur in the world? Alternatively stated: To what extent could God have prevented the evil that occurs? The close relationship between providence and the problem of evil is

demonstrated by the fact that theological works generally include the treatment of evil,

if at all, under their expositions of the doctrine of providence. We may also observe that both of these topics are highly contentious. Providence has been a hotly debated topic

through the centuries among Christian theologians, as also the nature of human free will

among philosophers. Likewise, the problem of evil has been discussed and debated

since well before the time of Christ.

In view of such contentions, this chapter aims to both describe and support my

view of providence as part of a theological framework for addressing the problem of

evil. Particularly, it will deal with the closely interrelated topics of divine sovereignty,

human freedom, and divine foreknowledge.

Theological Options

Theological systems may be divided into the two broad categories of monergism

and synergism. Monergistic systems are characterized by specific sovereignty and hold

that "human freedom in no sense limits God's ability to bring about the specific events

he desires." Not only is God able to achieve his general purposes in history, but every

John Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 10-11.

10 11 specific event is subject to God's control. God takes no risk in creating the world since the achievement of his specific intentions is not contingent on human cooperation.

For these monergistic systems, the challenge is to propose explanations of why

God would choose to allow moral evil to exist in a world that is fully under his control.

Monergists must also demonstrate that God is not culpable for the evil in the world.

Synergistic systems are characterized by general sovereignty and the belief that

while God's overarching purposes cannot be thwarted, human freedom does limit God's

control over specific events. Synergists typically hold that humans have been given

libertarian freedom. For many synergists, God is able to override human freedom or

intervene in the natural order when it is necessary to accomplish his purposes. But

because of his prior concern to grant libertarian freedom to his creatures, God has

chosen to limit his control over their free actions.4 As a result, the accomplishment of

his specific intentions in history is contingent on human cooperation. Thus God takes a

risk in granting humans libertarian freedom.

Synergistic explanations of evil seek to demonstrate that God is for some reason

unable to properly eliminate evil and therefore not culpable. Some synergists deny that

God possesses the power to control world events5 but, more commonly, they propose

that God has chosen to limit his control in order to facilitate the free response of

21 am not aware of any synergists who hold to a determinist view of the human will. See below for a definition and discussion of libertarian freedom.

3 Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 13. Some synergists, notably Process theists, hold that God is limited in power and therefore unable to exercise such control over the world.

4 Bruce Reichenbach, in Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 106.

5 This position has been referred to as 'finitism' and is characteristic of process theologies. See Norman L. Geisler, The Roots of Evil (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, for Probe Ministries International, 1978), 26. 12 humans. Synergists should also be prepared to address the question of whether such decisions are wise on God's part.

Closely related to the issue of divine sovereignty is the question of the nature of human freedom. Determinists hold that human choices are a result of antecedent causal factors. Factors such as external circumstances, character, and current internal

conditions can decisively incline the will toward a particular decision.6 Compatibilists

or soft determinists hold that even though human choices are determined, such

determination is compatible with freedom and responsibility.7 Furthermore, theological

determinists believe that since God has control over all the events and circumstances

that precede any human decision, it is God who controls all human actions.

Unlike determinists, libertarians hold that humans possess the power of contrary

choice.9 No combination of antecedent factors can decisively incline the will toward a

particular decision.

Real freedom requires a type of control over one's action - and, more importantly, over one's will - such that, given a choice to do A.. .or B..., nothing determines that either choice is made. Rather, the agent himself must simply exercise his own causal powers and will to do one alternative, say A.. .When this happens, the agent either could have refrained from willing to do A or he could have willed to do B without anything else being different inside or outside of his being. He is the absolute originator of his own actions.10

6 Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 21.

7 Hard determinists deny that humans have free will in any real sense. But since few contemporary theologians are hard determinists, and since Scripture clearly affirms human freedom and responsibility, that position will not be addressed here.

8 Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 11.

9 Libertarians have been referred to as indeterminists and self-determinists, though compatibilists also claim the latter term for their own position. For example, see John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001), 629. For sake of clarity, we will use the term 'libertarian'.

10 J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 270. 13

Naturally, monergists are more likely to hold to a determinist account of human free will while virtually all synergists hold to libertarianism. However, some monergists such as Norman L. Geisler follow Thomas Aquinas in combining specific sovereignty with libertarian freedom.

In constructing my proposal I approach the problem of evil from a monergistic or specific sovereignty perspective and hold to a compatibilist view of human freedom.

In the remainder of this chapter I argue the case for this position in light of critiques and alternatives from competing positions.

A Case for Specific Sovereignty

The specific sovereignty model assumed in this thesis holds that God's rule is comprehensive. All that he sets out to do he will accomplish. God's will is never frustrated, though we may not always understand the details of his plan or why he has ordained a certain course of events. This is not to say that every event is directly caused by God, or that he is the author of every action. But it does mean that God is fully in control of every specific occurrence or turn of events. All events that actually occur in our world may be divided into two categories. There are some events that God actively causes, whether immediately or through 'secondary causes', which may include human or angelic agents, animals, or forces and laws of the physical universe.12 There are other events that he deliberately permits, though he could have prevented them if he had so chosen. Conversely, there are also possible events that God has either prevented or

11 Feinberg refers to this view as "paradox indeterminism" (Feinberg, No One Like Him, 647).

12 Ibid., 651-2.

13 Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 101. 14 chosen not to bring about. Excluded are regrettable events that occur due to God's ignorance or his inability to prevent them.14 Thus, all things have been ordained or decreed by God, though he brings about some of those decrees by withholding his

intervention.

Calvin's Doctrine of Meticulous Providence

This is in agreement with Calvin's doctrine of providence in which every event

is meticulously and purposefully ordained by God: "Therefore we must prove God so

attends to the regulation of individual events, and they all so proceed from his set plan,

that nothing takes place by chance."15 In Calvin's view, God directs all creation and all

events to fulfill his intents and purposes:

Consequently, what pagans and the illiterate attribute to fortune we must assign to the providence of God.. .because of a special ordinance by which He guides all things in accordance with what he deems to be expedient.. .creatures who constitute second causes are only means by which He fulfills His will; and consequently He commands and uses them as it pleases Him in order to bring them to that end which He has ordained should come to pass.16

A widespread misunderstanding of Calvin denies that he held a doctrine of

divine permission.17 Although Calvin was at times hesitant to use the term 'permission',

this is due to the fact that much of his exposition of providence was polemical in

14 Ibid.

15 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. McNeill, vol. 20, 21, The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 1.16.4.

16 John Calvin, Against the Libertines, in John Calvin: Treatises Against the Anabaptists and Against the Libertines, trans, and ed. Benjamin Wirt Farley (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1982), 243-4. The majority of Reformed theologians have consistently followed Calvin in affirming meticulous providence. E.g. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 1:542-3.

E.g. Marguerite Shuster, The Fall and Sin: What We Have Become as Sinners (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 93. 15 nature.18 He asserted meticulous providence against the Sophists and Epicureans who pictured God as passive and inactive. But in his refutation of Pighius, who charged that

Calvin's providence makes God the author of sin, he wrote, "Though I affirm that He ordained it so, I do not allow that He is properly the author of sin.. .what was done contrary to His will was yet not done without His will.. .So He permitted it not unwillingly but willingly."19 In the case of sinful human actions, Calvin spoke of a

'willing' or voluntary permission on God's part.

This leads to another point of confusion regarding Calvinist monergism.

Typically, synergists complain that specific sovereignty necessarily means that

everything that happens, including sin and suffering, is according to the will of God.

This objection is properly the topic of a later chapter in this thesis. For now, it should be

sufficient to mention that Calvin made a distinction between God's decrees and

90

precepts, both of which fall within the semantic range of the word 'will'. God may

decree to permit an evil act, such as Pharaoh's refusal to release the Israelites from

slavery. But he may still justly punish such an act, which violates his preceptive will,

expressed in his command, "let my people go" (Exod 5:1).21

Scripture on Sovereignty

The Scriptures contain many statements about God's sovereignty. God created

all things and everything belongs to him (Gen 1:1; Ps 148:5; Isa 42:5; Col 1:16). God

reigns from his throne in heaven over all things (Ps 103:19; 1 Chr 29:11-12). God is the 18 Calvin, Institutes, 1.16-18; see especially 1.16.3-4.

John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, trans, with introduction by J. K. S. Reid (London: James Clark, 1961), 123.

20 See Calvin, Institutes, 1.18.4.

21 All Scripture quotations will be from the English Standard Version, unless otherwise noted. 16 only Ruler, the King of kings and Lord of lords (1 Tim 6:15; Rev 19:16). He is the only

God (Isa 45:5-6; 46:9). These statements may be accepted by proponents of both

general and specific sovereignty. However, many other scriptures assert that divine

sovereignty is comprehensive. They teach that God will accomplish his purposes and do

what he pleases (Job 23:13-14; Pss 33:10-11; 115:3; 135:6; Isa 46:10-11; Dan 4:35; Eph

1:4-5, 9). He is sovereign over the political realm and the rise and fall of kings and

kingdoms (Dan 4:17, 25, 34-35; 5:21; 7:14; Isa 45:1, 14; 14:22, 24-27, etc.). In Acts

17:26, Paul says of the nations that God had "determined allotted periods and the

boundaries of their dwelling place." These verses speak of God's mastery over specific

events of history.

Ephesians 1:11 states that God "works all things according to the counsel of his

will..." The most natural way to read the verse is that God's sovereignty is such that he

is able to accomplish his intentions in 'all things.' Bruce Ware points out that since Paul

uses 'all things' in a comprehensive sense in verse 10, it is likely that 'all things' bears

the same concept in verse ll.22 Some interpreters may apply this statement exclusively

to salvific predestination. But such an interpretation still requires that God exercises

specific sovereignty in saving those predestined.

When Jesus sent out his disciples to preach the gospel, he assured them that the

Father meticulously cares for believers as he does for all his creatures: "And not one of

[the sparrows] will fall to the ground apart from your Father. But even the hairs of your

head are all numbered" (Matt 10:29-31). This promise immediately follows the

22 Bruce Ware, God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (Wheaton: Crossway, 2000), 153.

23 Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 3 In. 33. 17 exhortation, "And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul" (v. 28).

He was speaking of God's sovereign protection as the basis for their confidence.

Although persecution may come, it comes only with the express permission of the

Father. Even a loss as insignificant as a strand of hair is subject to God's providential

control. If it were not so, we would be at the mercy of sinners. This passage rules out a

general sovereignty in which God has abandoned such events to human choices. Jesus

was clearly affirming meticulous providence in light of morally evil acts.

In his examination of many Old Testament scriptures, D. A. Carson noted that

the OT people discerned God's sovereign hand behind virtually all events, though they

may otherwise be ascribed to nature, human decision, or chance.24 The following are

some of the examples he offers: Psalm 139:16; Proverbs 20:24; Exodus 15:10; Isaiah

54:16; Jeremiah 47:7; Amos 3:5f; Lamentations 3:37-9; Psalm 65:10; Job 36:27; 38:26;

14:5; 28:24-27; 38:8-11, 33; Genesis 4:1, 25; 18:13f; 25:21; 30:lf; Deuteronomy 10:22;

Ruth 4:13; Genesis 42:28; Exodus 14:25; 2 Samuel 16:10f; Ruth 1:20; the Book of

Esther.25 "The crucial point is that his activity is so sovereign and detailed that nothing

can take place in the world of men without at least his permission; and conversely, if he

sets himself against some course, then that course cannot develop."26

Scriptures That Appear To Deny Specific Sovereignty

Synergists argue that there are biblical passages that appear to indicate that

God's will was frustrated. How should we understand such passages? In approaching

D. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1981), 27.

25 Ibid., 25-27.

26 Ibid., 28. 18 these scriptures it would be helpful to remember Calvin's distinction between decrees and precepts. Scripture gives many examples of God's precepts being violated, as well

as God's reaction to such violations. Yet it also states that his purposes cannot be

thwarted (Job 23:13-14; Ps 33:10-11; Isa 46:10-11; etc.). Just because an evil event

occurs does not mean that it is beyond God's sovereign control. It could have been a

matter of divine permission.

Genesis 6:6 is often cited by open theists to show that God's will can be

frustrated. John Sanders writes,

The Bible, however, repeatedly says that God is disappointed with sin and human rejection of the divine love (for example, Gen 6:6). Creation has miscarried and is not what God wanted it to be. Sin and evil do thwart God's will and disappoint him.28

Although Sanders cites the passage eight times in his book as a proof text, he offers no

exegesis to support his interpretation. Regarding the same passage, Boyd writes,

The genuineness of his regret is evidenced by the fact that the Lord immediately took measures to destroy humanity and start over. But how could the Lord possibly be sorry for making humankind if he was eternally certain they would turn out exactly this way when he created them?29

The Hebrew word in question is niham, which can mean 'to be sorry' or 'to

repent,' as interpreted by Sanders and Boyd, or 'to be grieved,' which supports the

traditional view. Parunak favours the latter reading for two reasons. First, he

It matters little at this point whether or not these are anthropomorphic. But I believe, against the traditional doctrine of impassibility, that God is in some way 'affected' by human actions.

John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 230.

Gregory A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 102.

Other possible meanings (e.g. 'to be comforted') are irrelevant to the present discussion. 19 identifies a parallelism here indicating that it should be understood as equivalent to the latter part of the verse, "he was grieved at his heart." Second, the idiomatic use of niham with ki parallels its use in Judges 21:15 in which the meaning is clearly 'to grieve'. Besides the parallel between the two verbs in verse 6, the latter of which clearly means 'to grieve,' Kenneth Matthews also sees an implicit reference to "the painful consequences of sin for the man and woman in 3:16-17 and 5:29." He argues that the passage refers to God's emotional anguish caused by human sin, and is not "an abstract

statement about God's decision making."

Is it possible for God to grieve over something he had planned and could have

prevented? Yes, if he permitted the grievous incident in order to achieve his purpose.

God certainly could have prevented Jesus from being crucified. But that does not mean

the grief is not real as Jesus suffers on the cross. And it certainly does not mean that

God has made a regrettable mistake.

Consider what Genesis 6:6 would mean if we accept the openness interpretation.

If God was literally sorry and repentant that he created, and if he regretted his creation,

it would mean that God has genuinely made an error because of his limited

foreknowledge. We cannot soften the implications by saying that he anticipated the

failure of his first creation and was prepared to destroy it and start over. Rather, the

31 H. Van Dyke Parunak, "A Semantic Survey of NHM" Biblica, vol. 56, no. 4 (1975), 519, cited in Millard J. Erickson, What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?: The Current Controversy over Divine Foreknowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 19.

32 Kenneth A. Matthews, cited in Erickson, What Does God Know, 19.

33 Ibid.

34 Although this constitutes a denial of the doctrine of impassibility, I can still affirm the biblical doctrine of immutability, which refers to God's unchanging metaphysical nature, moral character, and covenant faithfulness. 20 openness interpretation commits us to saying that the failure of God's project genuinely took him by surprise. It also casts doubt on God's competence to guide the history of the world to fulfill his ultimate purposes.

Sanders cites Mark 6:5-6, in which Jesus was unable to do more miracles in

Nazareth due to the unbelief of the people.35 Admittedly, this text could be read

synergistically. But the main point of the narrative was to condemn the unbelief of the

Nazarenes. The statement that Jesus "could not" perform miracles must be read not as a

limit to his power; rather, it would have been inappropriate to perform more miracles in

light of his concern for faith. That God chose not to perform miracles for the

unbelieving is fully consistent with his sovereignty. Since God was able to perform

miracles before unbelieving Pharaoh and his court, there is no reason to think that he

was unable to do so in the present case. Moreover, the gospel narratives should be read

from the perspective of Jesus' earthly ministry, which is to be distinguished from God's

overall providential perspective. Not only is Jesus bringing God's kingdom, he is also

on his way to the cross. His rejection is a necessary part of his achieving his mission.

There is no indication in the text that God wanted to perform more miracles or that he

wanted all to believe. Although space does not permit treatment of all the passages used

to deny specific sovereignty, such passages can generally be explained in light of the

distinction between God's sovereign decrees and his precepts.

Sanders, 228.

See William L. Lane, The Gospel of Mark, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1974), 204. 21

Concurrence and Preservation

Scripture also gives many examples in which God uses human agents to achieve his specific purposes. In Judges 14:4a, God uses Samson to judge the Philistines. Isaiah

10:5f affirms God's use of Assyrians to punish Israel. In John 19:11, Jesus reminds

Pilate that his powers are given by God. Acts 2:23 and 4:27-28 declare that the

crucifixion of Jesus occurred according to God's sovereign decree. The last passage is

particularly clear in affirming that in spite of the deliberation and free actions of sinful

men, God was sovereignly working out his preordained plans: "For truly in this city

there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both

Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do

whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place."

These scriptures are suggestive of the Reformed doctrine of divine concurrence

according to which God makes use of secondary causes, including human agents, to

achieve his specific intentions. Louis Berkhof defines concurrence as "the cooperation

of the divine power with all subordinate powers, according to the pre-established laws of

their operation, causing them to act and to act precisely as they do." He later states,

"In every instance the impulse to action and movement proceeds from God."38 Contrary

to Berkhof, other Reformed theologians have taught "that sinful acts are under divine

Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, revised and enlarged edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1953), 171.

Ibid., 173. 22 control and occur according to God's pre-determination and purpose, but only by divine permission, so that He does not efficiently cause men to sin."

In the section on divine preservation, Berkhof writes, ".. .their active powers have a real, and not merely an apparent, efficiency as second causes, so that they are

able to produce the effect proper to them."40 Thus while God continually sustains all

created things in their existence and properties, those properties do function. Human

agents are divinely sustained in their capacity to think, make decisions, and act. But

these are truly human actions. It would be false to claim that every thought and action is

dependent on God's initiative.

I propose that God is able to determine human actions by concurrence. Free

human choices are fully subject to God's control, and he can use them to achieve his

specific purposes. However, sinful human actions occur by divine permission, without

God "causing them to act.. .precisely as they do." God permits their sin by choosing not

to intervene.41 Because these are genuinely human actions, God is not responsible for

them.

Ibid., 174. This position is also supported among contemporary monergists. See for example, Terrance L. Tiessen, Providence and Prayer: How Does God Work in the World? (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 291-2.

40 Ibid., 170.

41 In this regard, it may be pointed out that the idea of divine permission of evil is consistent only with monergistic models, since permission entails that God willingly allowed a specific occurrence which he could have chosen to prevent. While synergists may posit a general permission in God's choosing to grant libertarian freedom, one of the essential components of the free will defence consists of God's inability to properly prevent the occurrence of moral evil without violating his commitment to preserve human freedom. To speak of God's permitting something he was unable to prevent seems incoherent. See Jonathan Edwards, Remarks on Important Theological Controversies, chap. 3, sect. 10, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, (Christian Classics Ethereal Library), 2:1293, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/works2.html (accessed July 17, 2006). 23

Joseph and His Brothers

Sold into slavery by his brothers, Joseph attributes the actions of his brothers ultimately to God's design. "For God sent me before you to preserve life.. .As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today" (Gen 45:5-8; 50:20). The verb 'meant' implies planning on God's part.42 Without denying their responsibility, Joseph affirmed that

God was working through his brothers to bring about his sovereign plans.43

In his treatment of the Joseph story, Sanders not only reads his own theology

into the text, but he also sets up a straw man of hard determinism, which few, if any,

contemporary theologians advocate. His first objection is that "the text explicitly

ascribes responsibility for selling Joseph into Egypt to the brothers."44 But this is hardly

an objection to the compatibilist reading, which holds that even though God specifically

permits sinful actions, his doing so does not absolve humans of their responsibility for

those actions. The very idea of compatibilism is that although human actions are

determined by various factors, such actions are free and human agents are responsible

for their actions.

Sanders' second objection is twofold: that Joseph charges his brothers with

committing evil (Gen 50:19-21) and that it was the brothers' decisions that resulted in

the act, "whereas God is absent from the text" (Gen 42:22).45 This again misses the

42 Leon J. Wood, "HDfl," in Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 1:330.

43 Carson, Divine Sovereignty, 9-10.

44 Sanders, 54.

45 Ibid., 55. 24 point, since compatibilists would agree that Joseph's brothers are culpable for the act and God is not. We must also remember that biblical narratives often give the human perspective. 45:5-8 and 50:20 give Joseph's theological interpretation of the event, revealing that God was in fact not absent. He was actively working through the brothers' decisions.

Thirdly, Sanders reinterprets 50:20: "I take this to mean that God has brought

something good out of their evil actions."46 Unfortunately, he simply states this

interpretation and does not give any exegetical justification for this reading. That God's use of the event for good was an afterthought seems highly unlikely when we compare it

with Joseph's words in 45:5, 7, in which he specified a divinely premeditated purpose in

sending him to Egypt. Sanders ultimately dismisses Joseph's words in 50:20 as an

emotional attempt to "vanquish his brother's [sic] fears."47 The problem with that

approach is that there is nothing in either text to indicate that Joseph's theology is

unusual. Even if Joseph is presenting some well-intentioned but deceptive theological

innovation, the idea that God was working through the brothers' evil actions to achieve

some good purpose must fit their worldview in order to be effective. It would seem that

when Joseph attributes the course of events to God, his statement reflects theological

beliefs held by all.

47 Ibid. 25

Denial of Specific Sovereignty Threatens General Sovereignty

Synergists posit that although God is sovereign, he has granted some degree of autonomy to humans so that he is limited in his ability to bring about his will.

Although God will accomplish his general purposes, his specific intentions are subject to being frustrated by the free actions of humans. In fact, the prevalence of evil in the world is evidence that God's will is continually frustrated. But because of his commitment to preserve human freedom, God refrains from intervening "to make them act as he desires."

Given this view of providence, it seems uncertain whether God can bring about his general purposes for the world. If God is losing so many battles, how can we be sure that he will win the war? If he has entrusted the details of his program to people,50 is there any assurance that his overarching purposes will be accomplished? Reichenbach

admits that "Even God's ultimate purpose that all persons will acknowledge him as Lord

seems to be unrealized.. .Thus God at different times must adopt different plans and

stratagems so that his ultimate purpose, the unification of the cosmos under Christ, can be achieved."51 Unfortunately, according to Reichenbach's scheme, the different plans

God adopts would still involve human contingencies. This position seems irreconcilable

with the scriptures that affirm God's ability to accomplish his purposes. If God's previous projects were subject to failure, as noted in the discussion of Genesis 6, there is no assurance that he will succeed in the future.

48 Reichenbach in Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 105.

49 Ibid., 106.

50 Ibid., 117.

51 Ibid., 118. 26

We may also observe that advocates of general sovereignty sometimes use language that reflects a specific sovereignty position. In addressing a case study involving Mary, who was denied entrance to several medical schools, Reichenbach affirms that "God opens and shuts doors."52 This kind of deterministic expression is not uncommon among synergists. But given libertarian freedom, God cannot always determine whether doors are 'open' or 'shut.' Mary's 'shut door' was contingent on the free choices of human agents. Given libertarian freedom, we can never be certain that a particular 'door' was 'open' or 'shut' according to God's intent. We are ultimately at the mercy of other free agents.

Summary

I conclude that the relevant biblical data supports the specific sovereignty position rather than general sovereignty. While specific sovereignty is clearly taught in some scriptures, general sovereignty must be inferred from sinful human actions. Yet such actions are easily accommodated within a monergistic framework. It also seems that divine sovereignty in the details of history is necessary to ensure the fulfillment of

God's general purposes. To deprive God of the ability to control the specific events of history or to suggest that God may perform actions that he later regrets is a high price to pay for an explanation of evil, throwing doubt on whether God is sovereign at all. But the question of God's control is not complete without a treatment of the related question of human free will, to which we now turn.

Ibid., 123. 27

The Nature of Human Freedom

Scriptural Support for Compatibilism

Scripture is limited in its treatment of the question of free will. While it assumes that humans beings as moral agents are capable of making decisions and responsible for their decisions, it does not give any extended discussion of the question at hand.

Libertarians typically appeal to scriptural affirmations of human freedom and responsibility as evidence for their position. For instance, Bruce Reichenbach refers to

Adam and Eve's option to obey or disobey (Gen 2-3), Moses calling Israel to decision

(e.g. Exod 32, 33), Joshua doing the same (Josh 24), and Jesus presenting his hearers

with the broad and narrow ways (Matt 7:13-14).53 However, such scriptures pose no

problems for the compatibilist position, which agrees that humans are capable of making

genuinely free choices and that they are responsible for their choices. Reichenbach's

arguments only prove his case if incompatibilism is first established. As noted above,

Sanders also reads Scripture with an incompatibilist presupposition. But

incompatibilism is a purely philosophical idea about which Scripture is silent at best. In

fact, a better case can be made from Scripture for compatibilism, as I seek to

demonstrate in the following discussion.

As a compatibilist, I would affirm that human beings are responsible agents who

possess the capacity to make free choices. But as with many other aspects of the human

constitution, the human will is finite. It is ultimately subject to God's control. Proverbs

21:1 states, "The king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of the LORD; he turns it

wherever he will." This verse is a clear statement of God's ability to determine human

Ibid., 104. 28 behaviour, and even suggests that God is able not only to do so through external circumstances, but also through direct manipulation of the subject's internal dynamics.

The phrase "wherever he will" suggests absolute control, unlike the subtle persuasion posited by process theology. Proverbs 16:9 and 20:24 also support theological determinism: "The heart of man plans his way, but the Lord directs his steps" (16:9);54

"A man's steps are from the LORD; how then can man understand his way?" (20:24).

This does not necessarily mean that God directly causes all human decisions. The

author of Proverbs is not implying that human agency is illusory. The many

exhortations in Proverbs would guard against a hard determinist interpretation. These

proverbs reveal that God possesses the power, which he sometimes uses, to decisively

incline human choices according to his will, whether directly or indirectly, actively or

passively.

The Hardening of Pharaoh

Scripture does not give instances in which God violates the will of an individual,

causing them to act contrary to their wishes, so that their psychological integrity is

compromised. But there are times when God clearly determines human actions. In

Exodus 4:21 (cf. 7:3), he tells Moses of his intention to harden Pharaoh's heart "so that

he will not let the people go." It is clear that Pharaoh had his own reasons and motives

for not releasing the Israelites. He wanted his slaves to continue their work for him

(Exod 4:4-5). Pharaoh was not forced to act contrary to his own desires. However, it is

also clear that God would make sure Pharaoh does not acquiesce to his command

54 This translation is from Roland E. Murphy, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 22: Proverbs (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 117. Murphy sees divine determinism in this verse as well as 16:1, 19:21 and 20:24 (ibid., 119-21, 153). 29 without a conflict. It was divinely ordained that Pharaoh would resist God and fall victim to the demonstration of God's power (Exod 7:3-5; 9:16; cf. Rom 9:17). God accomplished this by withholding his grace and abandoning Pharaoh to his sinful ways.

It was determined, yet free.

Libertarians generally argue that Pharaoh first hardened his own heart. God was initially attempting to change Pharaoh's mind, but finally gave up and began to harden him. But the expression of God's intention to harden Pharaoh (4:21) occurs prior to any statement of Pharaoh's self-hardening, which does not begin until 8:15. Paul's brief treatment of Pharaoh's case in Romans 9:17-18 emphasizes God's absolute sovereignty in the matter. The hardening of Pharaoh was a means of displaying God's power and glory: ".. .he hardens whomever he wills."

Sanders offers an alternative interpretation:

Pharaoh is steadfast in his course of action, and God strengthens his resolve. But why, it may be asked, would God do such a thing, especially when Pharaoh is on the verge of letting the people go? I think that God is trying to push Pharaoh out of his comfort zone in the attempt to get Pharaoh to come to his senses and repent. Pharaoh has positioned himself in a sinful state, so God "gives him over" to further judgment. God ups the ante in the increasing destruction of the Egyptian economy.56

Sanders essentially argues that God prevents Pharaoh from repenting so that he would come to his senses and ultimately repent. If Pharaoh was in fact "on the verge" of repenting, why would God bother to harden him? By simply allowing Pharaoh to

To avoid confusion, we must make a distinction between Pharaoh's resistance, which was freely chosen, and his release of his slaves, which was constrained to some extent by the plagues.

Sanders, 60. 30 repent, God would have easily accomplished his goal.57 Furthermore, God's stated purpose in hardening Pharaoh was not to bring him to repentance, but "so that he will not let the people go" (Exod 4:21; 7:3-4; 14:4).

Sanders argues that the Hebrew terms used in the narrative means "to make something strong or heavy or to encourage (reinforce) someone" and denies that the term carries deterministic nuances.58 The idea that God was encouraging or reinforcing the stubborn rebellion already present in Pharaoh supports my point rather than his.

God permitted Pharaoh to continue in his sinful ways in order to punish him and ultimately display his glory through the miraculous acts of judgment. Exodus 4:21 clearly indicates that God intends to determine Pharaoh's response, "so that he will not

let the people go." God was after a specific result. In any case, to 'reinforce' Pharaoh's

self-hardening can hardly mean that God was trying to bring him to repentance as

suggested by Sanders.59

Sanders then quotes Gowan in saying that "all this destructive activity seems to have failed to accomplish the purpose that is emphasized so strongly throughout the

passage." This complicates Sanders' story even further. Pharaoh was on the verge of repenting. Although God could have had his way, he chose to play a game on Pharaoh

and raise the ante by hardening his heart. But his game backfired and he fails to get

One could suggest that, according to Sanders, God wanted Pharaoh to repent and worship him, rather than simply letting the people go. But the quote from Gowan (see below) eliminates this possibility.

58 Ibid., 59.

59 Ibid., 60.

60 Ibid. 31

Pharaoh to repent. Even if we grant the openness proposal that God did not know the outcome, Sanders' story makes God appear rather foolish.

Romans 9

In Romans 9, Paul is trying to make sense of the unbelief of the Jews in light of

their election as the covenant people of God. He denies that election is a matter of

physical descent (vv. 6-9) or human effort (vv. 11-12, 16). Rather, it is determined by

the sovereign purpose of God (vv. 11, 15-18). This is confirmed by the kind of

objections Paul anticipates. In verse 14, Paul anticipates the objection that God is

unjust. In verse 19, he anticipates the objection that humans are then exempt from

responsibility. These objections would be entirely out of place if Paul was arguing from

a libertarian perspective. But they are identical with the objections libertarians typically

bring against compatibilism. Paul's argument was that even though God determines

human destiny and uses people to accomplish his purposes, whether it results in mercy

or wrath for individuals (vv. 22-24), he is just in doing so and humans are still

responsible for their actions. This is so because God is sovereign and retains the

prerogative to do as he pleases with his creatures (vv. 18, 20-21) in order to accomplish

his purposes and demonstrate his power and glory (vv. 11, 17, 22, 23).61 The thesis that

human choices are determined, yet the choosing agents are free and responsible, is

precisely the claim of compatibilism.

One may object that the passage addresses the issue of election, not the will. But

Paul's presupposition, which he argues throughout Romans, is that the elect are those

who believe (e.g. Rom 9:30-33). Most Christians agree that believing involves an act of

61 See John Piper, The Justification of God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 9:1-23 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), 204. 32 the will. Otherwise, libertarians would have no ground for justifying God's

condemnation of unbelievers.

Some Other Examples

In 2 Samuel 24:1, God 'incites' David to take a census of Israel and Judah.

David's action is, at one level, attributed to God (cf. 1 Sam 26:19). Yet David was also

moved by his own motives: ".. .that I may know the number of the people" (v. 2).

When David repented, he recognized the deed as his own (v. 10). He was also held

responsible for his actions (vv. 12-17). It would seem that God is able to determine the

course of human action while maintaining human agency and responsibility. That the

parallel passage in 1 Chronicles 21 names Satan as the instigator poses no problems.

First, it confirms, against libertarianism, that the human will can be decisively

influenced by powerful spiritual beings. Second, it is entirely plausible in light of Job 1-

2 that God was using Satan as an instrument to accomplish his purposes. There is no

need to infer that God actively incited David to take the census.

John's gospel names Satan as the one who "put it into the heart of Judas

Iscariot.. .to betray [Jesus]" (13:2). That Satan entered into Judas (v. 27) implies that

Judas' actions from that point on were in some sense directed by Satan. Yet Judas'

volitional agency remained intact, as indicated by Jesus' words, "What you are going to

do, do quickly." As noted in the previous section, Jesus' death occurred according to

divine decree. Both Satan and Judas were instruments by which God achieved his

purpose.

See Carson, Divine Sovereignty, 131. 33

In Isaiah 37:7, God says of the king of Assyria, "Behold, I will put a spirit in him, so that he shall hear a rumor and return to his own land, and I will make him fall by

the sword in his own land." By manipulating both the circumstances (i.e. hearing the

report) and the internal conditions ("put a spirit in him") God was able to determine the

king's actions ("he shall.. .return"). Similarly, God used "a lying spirit in the mouth of

all his prophets" to lead Ahab to attack Ramoth Gilead, resulting in his death (1 Kings

22:22).63 Other examples include Ezra 1:1, in which the Lord moved King Cyrus to

release the exiles and Ezra 7:6, 27-28 in which the Lord moved King Artaxerxes. None

of these scriptures negate human freedom and responsibility. Yet they reveal that God

ultimately determines these free human decisions, either directing or permitting them to

fulfill his intentions. They do not seem to involve a dialogue in which God instructs the

individuals to act a certain way. Rather, God was providentially determining human

choices from behind the scene.

Philippians 2:12-13 applies this principle to the sanctification and obedience of

believers. Paul exhorts the Philippians to "work out [their] own salvation with fear and

trembling." This clearly makes them responsible for their actions. But he continues

with the assurance "For it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his

good pleasure." How can it be that God is working in his people 'to will' and 'to

work'? Paul is specifically speaking about the will and actions. In a general

sovereignty/libertarian freedom scheme, Paul's theological statement would make no

sense. A typical synergistic interpretation would make human responsibility in verse 12

the controlling principle and accommodate verse 13 to it. But that is exegetically

unsound given that verse 12 is an exhortation and verse 13 is a doctrinal assertion. The

63 This does not implicate God since the lying spirit was a separate moral agent. 34 assurance given in 1:6 also supports the monergism of verse 13. A compatibilistic reading fits very nicely here. God is concurrently at work in our willing and acting, cultivating desires that are in keeping with his preceptive will. Yet we are fully responsible for that same willing and acting. Thus, while we actively 'work out our salvation', we can do so with confidence that the God who is at work in us will certainly complete the work of sanctification he has begun. Given libertarian freedom, God can only hope that we will obey, since he is unable to determine our choices. 1:6 would have to be amended to read, ".. .that you who began a good work in you will hopefully bring it to completion..."

Hebrews 13:20-21 likewise supports the idea of concurrence. "Now may the

God of peace.. .equip you with everything good that you may do his will, working in us

that which is pleasing in his sight..." Our acts and his acts are working in concurrence.

If libertarianism was true, this would be a misguided blessing, to which the recipients of

Hebrews should respond, "What do you mean by 'may he work in us'? It is our

responsibility to do his will!" A compatibilist reading sees no discrepancy here.

It is evident from these scriptures that God is intimately at work in the human heart to bring about his intended results, whether actively or permissively.65 In the case

of sanctification and good works, his grace plays an active role. In the case of the sinful

acts required to fulfill his purposes, he simply withdraws his grace and allows depravity

to run its course. In either case, there are times when God works very specifically

Phil 1:6 reads: "And I am sure of this, that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ."

Also see 1 Sam 10:6, 9. 35 through human agents to accomplish his purposes. Yet his determinations negate neither human freedom nor human responsibility.

The Question of Determinism by Causal Factors

As previously stated, determinists hold that human choices are a result of antecedent causal factors, which may include external circumstances, character, and current internal conditions. Feinberg points out that the determinism under discussion is not the same as physical determinism found in natural sciences. Physical determinism

explains events as the result of a set of antecedent events combined with a set of causal

laws.66 The human will should not be reduced to a mere conglomeration of events and

laws. With the inclusion of character and internal conditions as factors, it should be

clear that there is a complexity to human volition that cannot be reduced to mechanistic

terms. Feinberg notes that the antecedent conditions to human choices are "so complex

that one could never write all the sentences to specify them. Moreover, there does not

appear to be general laws covering actions so that one could say 'in instances of type A

an agent will always choose action x.'" Thus libertarian portrayals of the compatibilist

perspective in reductive mechanistic terms are misleading caricatures.68 Compatibilism

does not rule out the mystery of human agency. Rather, it affirms that this mystery is

not mysterious to God, the omniscient Creator of the human personality (Ps 139). While

reasons for human behaviour are at times beyond our ability to discern, they are not beyond his.

66 Feinberg, No One Like Him, 632.

67 Cf. Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 23.

68 See for example, Moreland and Craig, 273. 36

Criteria of Freedom

Compatibilists and libertarians differ in their criteria of freedom. Compatibilists generally consider an act free if the agent acts according to her character and desires.69

According to Jonathan Edwards, freedom, as used in common speech, "is power, opportunity, or advantage, that anyone has, to do as he pleases."70

Consider Smith, an extremely virtuous man working for a government agency.

His superior offers him a bribe to slander a fellow employee who happens to be his close friend. He immediately refuses. In a subsequent conversation, Smith says, "I could never bring myself to do such an evil thing." He certainly had the physical and intellectual ability to slander his friend. But it may well be that given his moral character and the circumstances, it is absolutely certain that Smith would not want to do so. His consistency of character does not constitute any lack of freedom. He was free because he was able to do what he truly wants.

Consider a simpler example. Jack loves cheesecake but hates pudding. Having finished dinner, he is offered a choice of the two desserts. He chooses cheesecake. It is

safe to say that unless some extraordinary circumstances obtain, Jack would unfailingly choose the cheesecake. Given the exact same conditions, and given his preference, there

is a zero percent probability of his choosing otherwise. Yet his choice is free because he acts according to his desires.

Edwards specifies two conditions under which one's behaviour is not free. "One is constraint; the same is otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a

69 John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 2002), 136.

70 Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, vol. 1, The Complete Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed. Perry Miller (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1957), 163. 37 person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint;

71

which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will."

Feinberg offers two examples of constraint. One involves physical constraint, in

which he achieves his goal of removing his student from the classroom by physically

picking up the student and placing him outside. The other example involves threatening

the student with a gun, so that the student's decision to leave the room is constrained

and not free.72 Similarly, in a hostage situation, individuals may be restrained from

leaving a room by being tied with ropes or threatened with a gun. External factors

encroach upon the person in such a way that they are not free to do what they desire to

do, such as leaving the room.

A basic objection to compatibilism is that it denies that the agent "can do

otherwise," which libertarians claim is an indispensable criterion of freedom. But as

Feinberg has observed, there are many different meanings of can or could. At issue in

the free will debate is the contra-causal sense of 'can': whether a "cause or set of causes

is sufficient to produce any particular choice on the agent's part." Although

compatibilists deny contra-causal freedom, they can still assert freedom in the many

other senses of 'can'. Taking the above example of Smith, who was offered a bribe, we

observe that he was able to slander his friend in the sense of possessing the capacity and

the opportunity. But he was not able to do so in the contra-causal sense, since doing so

would have been contrary to his character and desires. Regarding the opportunity, he

71 Ibid., 164, emphasis in original.

72 Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 25.

73 Ibid., 27. 38 may say, "I could have done that." Regarding the factors involved in his decision, he

may say, "I could never do that to my friend." Thus, while denying contra-causal

freedom, it is still valid to say that an agent "could have done otherwise."

In contrast, libertarians define freedom as the power of contrary choice.

Consider again the words of Moreland and Craig:

Real freedom requires a type of control over one's action - and, more importantly, over one's will - such that, given a choice to do A.. .or B..., nothing determines that either choice is made. Rather, the agent himself must simply exercise his own causal powers and will to do one alternative, say A.. .When this happens, the agent either could have refrained from willing to do A or he could have willed to do B without anything else being different inside or outside of his being. He is the absolute originator of his own actions.

Libertarians acknowledge various factors or reasons that influence human

choices. But they insist that agents possess the categorical ability to act, or at least, to

will to act, contrary to all antecedent conditions.75 That is, given the exact same

conditions, the agent contra-causally could have chosen a different course of action.

This is because the ultimate determining factor is the 'self. For this reason, Geisler

refers to his own libertarian position as 'self-determinism', thus avoiding the charge of

irrationality levelled against the label 'indeterminism'.76 The agent is the efficient cause

of the free acts.77

Moreland and Craig, 270.

75 Ibid.; also see Reichenbach in Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 102.

76 Geisler in Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 75. The term 'indeterminism' is problematic because it suggests that there are events without causes.

77 Ibid., 76. 39

Self-Determinism and Freedom

Geisler seems to equate self-determinism with the power of contrary choice. But is this valid? The term 'self-determinism' is problematic since compatibilists also claim to be self-determinists. According to Feinberg, self-determinism simply means that the agent causes and controls her own actions, a notion that both libertarians and compatibilists can affirm.78 Implicitly at stake is the reality of freedom. If self- determinism is true in some sense, there is ground for asserting freedom and responsibility.

Compatibilists agree that the individual does play a decisive role, though they construe that role differently from libertarians. In a particular set of circumstances, Bob, being the kind of person he is, would determinately choose to do A. Given the exact

same set of circumstances, Jack, being the kind of person he is, determinately chooses to

do B. Such factors as character, motives, beliefs, and other internal conditions that

determine choices in a given set of circumstances are certainly part of the 'self.

Because the 'self is a determining factor in compatibilism, there is a legitimate sense in

which self-determinism is true of the compatibilist position. Compatibilism views the

decision as determined by the particular combination of the 'self (internal factors) and

the circumstance (external factors). Compatibilists also view the essence of the self as a

defined character. By 'defined character' I do not mean that one's character does not

develop over time, but that at any given time, it is so defined that it causally contributes to a choice in a determined way.

78 Feinberg, No One Like Him, 629.

79 See Tiessen, Providence, 313: "I want to assert that people are se//-determining, but I also recognize that the self which decides and acts has a character out of which she acts." 40

While libertarianism acknowledges that circumstances and internal antecedent factors affect the probability of a choice, it views the choice as ultimately and exclusively determined by the 'self. Libertarians seem to define the 'self more narrowly, locating the ultimate determining factor in a particular exercise of the will rather than in the whole character of the agent. I would object that if the ultimate determining factor is an intrapersonal event rather than the person as a whole, this position is technically choice-determinism rather than self-determinism, where 'choice' is the act of choosing, the exercise of one's will. This sets in motion the perpetual regression Edwards referred to:

Therefore, if the will determines all its own free acts, the soul determines all the free acts of the will in the exercise of a power of willing and choosing; or, which is the same thing, it determines them of choice; it determines its own acts by choosing its own acts. If the will determines the will, then choice orders and determines the choice: and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act.. .Which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free act of the will, before the first free act of the will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the will is not self- determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom.81

Compare Edwards' analysis with the words of Moreland and Craig: "Real freedom

requires a type of control... over one's will."82

See Moreland and Craig: "the agent himself must simply exercise his own causal powers and will to do one alternative" (Moreland and Craig, 270); also quoted above. Cf. Edwards: "And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self-determining power in the will: wherein, according to the Arminians, does most essentially consist the will's freedom; and shall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that the will itself determines all the free acts of the will" (Edwards, Freedom, 171).

81 Edwards, Freedom, 172.

Moreland and Craig, 270; also quoted above. 41

Alternatively, libertarians can locate the ultimate determining factor in a particular component within the person called the 'will'. In this case, the will must be an undetermined determinant, the "absolute originator" of choice, in contrast to the compatibilist notion of a defined 'character'. Compatibilists view will and character as integrated and defined, and refer to the whole as the 'self. It is the 'self that chooses.

Libertarians view character as impenetrably complex and the will as mysterious and therefore ultimately unpredictable. For compatibilists, the seed of action is within the character. It grows out of what is already within (cf. Matt 12:33-35). For libertarians, the will is distinct and ultimately independent from the rest of the person. It is ultimately an "undetermined variable." The critical question is whether an

individual's character at a given time is a fixed or determined factor, or whether there is necessarily an undetermined variable in the self.

The Undetermined Variable and Rationality

Mark Bernstein observes that "Grounding the thesis of determinism is the

intuitive idea that the world works in ways that continually reflect regularities."85

Although principles of physical determinism cannot be readily transferred to determinism of the will, there is a parallel concept that can be identified in our position.

Francis Turretin specifies two characteristics of free will. In addition to the freedom from compulsion we have already identified, he also refers to "the choice (he

The idea of an "undetermined variable" was contributed by Jakub Hron (personal conversation, April 2005).

85 Mark Bernstein, "Fatalism," in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 68. 42 proairesis), so that what is done is done by a previous judgment of reason." Likewise,

Jonathan Edwards writes, "because every act of the will is some way connected with the understanding.. .the soul always wills or chooses that which, in the present view of the

mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most

agreeable."87 Compatibilists assume that humans are created in such a way that our

choices reflect some sort of rationality. There is a kind of internal 'logic' that governs

free choices. Feinberg expresses this assumption when he argues that free choices are

always based on reasons or motives that decisively incline a person to choose a

particular course of action over another.88 Implicit in the argument is the notion that to

choose against such reasons in the absence of overwhelming opposing reasons would be

irrational.

This is not to say that all of our actions are calculated by a type of hard logic

comparable to the actions of a computer program. Rather, there is a deliberation

process, however brief or protracted, that occurs in the mind before a voluntary action is

performed. The exact way in which a person thinks and chooses, or is affected and

motivated, is reflective of that person's unique character. Thus, if one knows a person's

character exhaustively and also knows all the other conditions exhaustively, and is

capable of assessing such knowledge, it would be possible to infallibly predict those

choices.89

86 Francis Turretin, Institutes ofElenctic Theology, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1992), 1:662.

87 Edwards, Freedom, 217.

88 Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 127.

89 The assumption here is that this is possible for God, but not for humans. 43

Surprisingly, Gregory Boyd appeals to the predictability of character as a means by which God can know some future behaviours of a person. He writes,

The person's character, combined with the Lord's perfect knowledge of all future variables, makes the person's future behaviour certain.. .This does not mean that everything we will ever do is predictable, for our present character doesn't determine all of our future. But it does mean that our behaviour is predictable to the extent that our character is solidified and future circumstances that will affect us are i 90

in place.

There is some ambiguity in Boyd's words regarding what it means for character to be 'solidified.' It would appear that he is referring to the tendency for character to change over time, rendering it impossible to predict future actions exhaustively, even if circumstances are in place. But his wording in the first part of the quote definitely

suggests that the character is such that, when combined with a particular set of variables, will determinately act in a certain way. Thus he explains Jesus' accurate prediction of

Peter's denial. It is most remarkable that Boyd, a libertarian, would resort to a

compatibilist interpretation of character to explain the prediction.91 If the combination

of character and 'variables' would render behaviour 'certain,' was Peter's denial not thereby determined? If libertarianism were true, Peter would have been contra-causally

able to refrain from denying Jesus. His behaviour would have been probable, but not

certain.

In contrast to this rational predictability of character, the libertarian position

assumes that there is a part of the human nature that is independent of every other part,

Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 35; emphasis mine.

91 Erickson notes this inconsistency in Erickson, What Does God Know, 171. 44 and which can "make a decision contrary to every motivation." Even when all the

external and internal conditions are given, there is still an undetermined variable which

libertarians call the 'self or 'agent', so that antecedent conditions do not determine the

act. Thus, even though God has exhaustive insight into all the conditions, he would still be unable to infallibly predict a particular course of action by means of this insight.

This is because the agent in question possesses the categorical ability to choose contrary

to every existing factor, including circumstance, personal character, motive, and state of

mind.93 Philosophers generally refer to this as 'agent causation', where the 'agent' is

distinct from and significantly independent of such factors as reasons and motives.94

Geisler expresses this position in a response to Feinberg: "But how can God

decisively guarantee the result without forcing or coercing the individual? What if

individuals reject the non-coercive impulse God gives? What if they decide not to allow

this new desire to rule them?"95 Implicit in Geisler's questions is the claim that

individuals have the unconditional ability to act against their desires and impulses.

Compatibilists assume that people can act against particular desires only if there are

stronger opposing desires. Peter denied Jesus because, at the time, he was more

motivated to preserve his life than he was to be faithful to Jesus. A father runs into a

Frame, Doctrine of God, 138.

93 See Moreland and Craig, 271 on 'categorical ability'.

94 See for example, Timothy O'Connor, "Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories," in Kane, Free Will.

95 Geisler in Feinberg et al., Predestination and Free Will, 47. 45 burning house against his desire for self-preservation because he wants to save his child.

To act against desires without sufficient motivation is simply irrational.96

It seems that the existence of an undetermined variable which gives agents contra-causal freedom is the central issue in the debate. I would argue that the libertarian distinctive of the independent 'agent' or the 'undetermined variable' ultimately reduces to an irrational element, or at least the possibility of irrationality. It represents a categorical ability to choose against the reasons that should logically lead one to choose otherwise. Compatibilism, on the other hand, includes reasons and motives as part of the integrated self.

Two Objections

Libertarians may object to this in two ways. First, they may object that in the majority of scenarios, the choices to be made are not so clear cut. Often, there are not clear reasons why one should choose one way or another. In fact, we are often faced with very difficult situations in which we are quite ambivalent. We may even flip back

and forth between two options. It would seem that we could go either way. How are we to understand such situations?

In cases involving a moral or consequentially significant decision, we usually

weigh our reasons very carefully. Such cases, though ambivalent, may be more easily reconciled to compatibilism than trivial cases. Let us begin by considering a more trivial example, the principles of which may also apply to more significant cases.

Suppose Anne was standing at the counter of a fast food restaurant, trying to decide

what flavour of milk shake she wants. Since she dislikes strawberry, she is left with the

See Appendix 1: Burning House Story. 46

Q7 choice between chocolate and vanilla, which she likes equally. She is struggling with the decision because, at that very moment, they appear to be equally appealing. If there is some hesitation, it is likely because Anne is trying to discern which flavour she prefers over the other at that moment. She asks herself, "What flavour do I really want right now?" The default process in her decision making is likely that of discerning her desires rather than simply choosing or exercising her causal powers. If Anne

concludes, "I feel like having a vanilla shake," but then chooses chocolate, we would

deem her to be either lying or insane. Suppose she is unable to discern any preference at

all and says, "I really can't decide. But since I must choose, I'm just going to pick

chocolate." Is her choice of chocolate ultimately independent of decisive factors, as

libertarians claim? Perhaps there were subtle reasons for her choosing chocolate of

which she was unaware. Perhaps the word 'chocolate' on the menu caught her eye at

the right moment, resulting in her choice. Or perhaps, rather than choosing chocolate,

she had simply chosen to make a random choice, based on her desire to escape

embarrassment and insult from customers in the line behind her.

It would appear that decisions generally involve a discernment of one's strongest

preference rather than a sheer exercise of the will. In more significant decisions, that

strongest preference may be determined by various reasons or value judgments

involved. The agent asks questions such as "What is the right thing to do?" "What is

more important?" or "What would happen if...?" etc. It would also appear that the more

ambivalent a person is at the point of decision, the less it is truly an exercise of the will.

7 We could label this as an issue of 'character', broadly speaking, or simply, 'preference', which is a part of her personality.

98 In the case of a moral decision, a person who wants to do the right thing may be asking, "What would be the right thing to do in this difficult dilemma?" 47

Conversely, the more passionate a person is about a particular choice, the more 'wilful' and deliberate that choice is. This is why the courts of law distinguish between first and second degree murder and manslaughter. Premeditation and motivation to commit the crime heighten rather than diminish responsibility.

This analysis concurs with that of Edwards.

In every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the mind or inclination, one way rather than another; and the soul had rather have or do one thing than another, or than not to have or do that thing; and that there, where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.

This raises a question about decisions between discipline and impulse. Suppose

Anne is trying to maintain a strict diet, but she is tempted to order a meal which she

knows she should not have. Although there may be a complexity of factors involved,

two key opposing factors may be her general desire to be healthy (or alternatively, her

desire to be disciplined, etc.) and her immediate desire for the meal. Her character is

certainly a factor here. But she may also be asking herself, "Do I want the meal, or do I

want to be healthy?" Here again, is the process of discerning her strongest preferences

at that moment. I would affirm that if one could exhaustively discern all the conditions,

such as her character, her emotional state, her preferences, her motives, the level of her

temptation, etc., one could certainly predict her course of action. The manner in which

she "exercises her sheer will power" depends on these factors.

The second objection libertarians may raise is that people in fact do irrational

things. A man may destroy a wonderful marriage and a perfectly good family for a few

minutes of sexual pleasure. A gambling addict may invest thousands of dollars and

99 Edwards, Freedom, 140. 48 countless hours at a casino, though he never receives anything back. It is not difficult to see that even though such behaviours are irrational at one level, they are controlled by

some alternate rationale. The family man, burdened with some unmet emotional needs, may, for a moment, believe that an affair can meet those needs. The gambler, rightly believing that there is always some minuscule chance of winning, may wrongly believe that he will in fact win "this time."

But what about cases of psychological disturbance in which people do truly

irrational things? What about the man who says, "I will not go out today because I

might be run over by the train," when in fact, there are no railroads in the city in which

he lives? He may even add, "The pink train is coming through today, and that kind is

particularly dangerous because of the leaves." His decisions are irrational because they

fail to conform to some common perceptions and conventional reasoning. But in his

own mind, he has perfectly legitimate reasons for his actions. Even the man who is

suicidal or self-mutilating will have some self-serving rationale for his behaviour,

however obscure that rationale may be. A moment's reflection will reveal that all of our

actions are rational to some degree and in some way.

Human Freedom in the Final State

Another consideration in the debate is the comparison of human freedom in the

present with human freedom in the final glorified state. Regarding the final state,

Augustine wrote, "So too, the first free will consisted in his being able not to sin, and the

last will consist in his being not able to sin."100 Given the libertarian definition of

100 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), bk. 22, chap. 30, 1180. 49 freedom, this would mean that we will no longer be free. If libertarian freedom is of such great value that God would, for its sake, allow his will to be thwarted and allow humans to commit the atrocious evils that occur in the world, it hardly makes sense that he would remove it from us in the final state.101 But if we have compatibilist freedom, the problem is solved. It would be possible for our character to be so transformed that we will no longer sin because we no longer desire to sin. It would also be possible for

God to place us in a state in which, while retaining our freedom, we will not sin.

Clark Pinnock sees libertarian freedom as probationary and suggests that perhaps

in the final state our "freedom may be withdrawn."103 Without committing himself to a

clear position about our ability to sin, he tentatively affirms that "we will be able not to

sin."104 But whatever the case, his incompatibilism poses a dilemma. If we are unable

to sin, then we would not be free by the libertarian definition of freedom. But if we

are able to sin in the contra-causal sense of 'able', then our second paradise could well

be lost as our first one was.1 6 How much confidence do we really have that history will

not repeat itself?

101 R. R. Nicole, "Some Comments on Hebrews 6:4-6 and the Doctrine of the Perseverance of God with the Saints," Current Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation (Grand Rapids, 1975), 357, quoted in Carson, 208.

102 This raises the question of how the fall occurred in the first place, given compatibilist freedom. I will address this in Chapter 5.

103 Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic; Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster Press, 2001), 31.

104 Ibid.

105 Unlike Pinnock, Boyd clearly states that we will have compatibilist freedom in the final state, the spiritual character of which is determined by our present actions (Boyd, Satan, 189). In doing so, he admits that compatibilist freedom is possible.

Pinnock's "able not to sin" echoes Augustine's statement about the original state. 50

The Analogy to God's Freedom

Another problem with libertarianism arises when we compare human freedom with God's freedom. Like many theologians on both sides of the free will debate, I hold that God is necessarily good. His character is so consistent and so immutably good that he is not 'free' to sin.

Likewise, Edwards held that "the holiness of his nature" is "the cause and reason of his holy determinations."107 God necessarily does what is holy because he is holy.

He necessarily does what is 'most wise' because his will is determined by 'supreme

wisdom.'108 Edwards denies that this necessity in God's acts is any disadvantage.109

Boyd similarly affirms that God is necessarily loving.

This is not to say that God must possess the capacity not to love. As church tradition has almost unanimously affirmed, God is a necessary being whose essence could not be other than it is. His character is therefore unalterable (Mai 3:6; Heb 1:12; Jas 1:17). God cannot fail to love for the same reason that he cannot lie.'10

It seems we are agreed that God does not possess the power of contrary choice in

the narrowly considered question of choosing between a morally good action and a

morally evil action. Yet according to the libertarian definition, this would mean that

God is not free. As Augustine questioned, "Certainly, God Himself cannot sin; but are

we therefore to deny that God has free will?"111

107 Edwards, Freedom, 376.

108 Ibid., 380.

109 Ibid., 377. I agree that God's actions are by necessity holy and perfectly wise, and that this imposes no disadvantage. But this does not mean that his will is determined by wisdom. In many scenarios, there may be numerous options available to God that are equally and supremely wise. This is particularly obvious in the initial 'scenario' before God chose to create. See my discussions in Chapter 3 and in Appendix 2: Aseity, Ontology, and Freedom.

110 Boyd, Satan, 53.

111 Augustine, City of God, bk. 22, chap. 30, 1180. 51

One option available to libertarians is to admit that human choices, like God's, can be limited by their moral characters, while affirming that they have the power of contrary choice within those limits. But this has severe implications for the free will defence. If humans can be morally bounded, could God not have created them with free will and such moral characters that they will not sin? The greatest proposed advantage of synergism is that evil can be blamed exclusively on human freedom because it is logically impossible to ensure that they do not commit evil while preserving libertarian freedom. Consequently, libertarians must either abandon their cherished free will defence, of which Boyd's is a variation, or else admit that God is not free.

The idea that God is necessarily loving also causes problems for open theism.

Boyd begins his trinitarian warfare theodicy by affirming as the "first condition of love"

that "it must be freely chosen.. .Agents must possess the capacity and opportunity to

reject love if they are to possess the genuine capacity and opportunity to engage in

love."112 If this is a necessary feature of love as open theists insist, then God cannot be

necessarily loving. Boyd's simple assertion that God is a necessary being while humans

and angels are contingent beings provides no escape from this contradiction.

Summary

We have seen that Scripture assumes and at times affirms that human free will is

subject to divine control, and that God does not hesitate to exercise that control in

achieving his purposes. While Scripture affirms human freedom and responsibility, it

does not define freedom in libertarian terms. We have also offered some philosophical

and theological reasons why compatibilism is more tenable than libertarianism. We

Boyd, Satan, 52. 52 now turn to a final consideration in the doctrine of providence that affects the task of theodicy, that of divine foreknowledge.

Divine Temporality and Foreknowledge

Divine foreknowledge is another hotly debated topic in contemporary theology.

To what extent does God know the events of the future, and how does he know them?

Does he have hypothetical knowledge, the events that would occur given various conditions? Or does he only have simple foreknowledge, the events that actually will occur? The answers to these questions directly affect God's ability to control the world, and play a vital role in treatments of the problems of evil.

Scripture on Divine Foreknowledge

Scripture gives many affirmations of divine foreknowledge as a foundation for both prophecy and sovereignty. In Deuteronomy 18:21-22, accurate prediction of future events is the test for a true prophet of Yahweh. If a prediction fails to come true, God has not spoken. Excluded is the possibility that God may be wrong about the future.113

In Isaiah 40-48, as Yahweh is contrasted with the false gods, one of the distinctive features of the true God is that he is able to predict the future (Isa 41:21-23; 42:9; 43:9-

12; 44:7; 45:21; 46:10; 48:3-7). The New Testament emphasis on the fulfillment of

Scripture points to the predictive nature of prophecy, and ultimately to the foreknowledge and sovereignty of God who revealed what would take place in the future (e.g. Matt 1:22-23; 2:5-6, 14-15, 17-18, 23; 3:3; 8:17; 12:17; etc.). Scripture also

includes specific incidents in which God through his prophets foretells specific events before they occur (e.g. 1 Sam 10:1-8; 1 Kings 13:2-3, 20-26).

Frame, Doctrine of God, 487. 53

Scriptural Arguments against Divine Exhaustive Foreknowledge

Against classical theism, open theists deny that God has exhaustive knowledge of future events. They believe that there are aspects of the future that are definite and knowable because they are not contingent on free human choices. However, there are

other aspects of the future that are contingent on libertarianly free human choices and therefore unknowable. The assumption is that God is temporal and experiences time in

much the same manner as humans. Consequently, God's relation to and knowledge of

the world is dynamic rather than static.114

Since space will not allow a thorough treatment of all the scriptures used to

support the openness view, our discussion will be restricted to three of the most

commonly cited passages. The first is Genesis 22:12 in which God responds to

Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac by saying, "For now I know that you fear

God." Sanders quotes Walter Brueggemann in support of his argument, "This test 'is

not a game with God; God genuinely does not know.'"116 The problem with this

interpretation, however, is that it not only denies God's knowledge of the future, but it

also "calls into question God's present knowledge of Abraham's inner spiritual,

psychological, mental, and emotional state," a clear contradiction of such texts as 1

Chronicles 28:9 and 1 Samuel 16:7, which affirm God's knowledge of human hearts.117

Clark Pinnock et al., The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 15-16.

115 Also see the previous discussion of Gen 6 under the section on specific sovereignty.

116 Sanders, 52.

117 Ware, 67. Also see for example Ps 139:4; John 2:24-25; Acts 15:8; Heb 4:12-13; 1 Cor 14:24-25. Ware also notes that this interpretation contradicts Boyd's statement, quoted earlier, that God's knowledge of a person's character enables him to know future behaviours (Ware, 69). 54

Another problem with this interpretation is that it seems to contradict libertarian freedom. If Abraham possesses the power of contrary choice, it is conceivable that he could fear God in general, but still fail this particular test. Conversely, he could fear

God only marginally, but choose the right course of action in this particular instance.

An isolated test apart from long-term observation of Abraham's behaviour tells us very little about Abraham's character and future performance. This is significant since both

Sanders and Boyd hold that God is seeking to find out whether Abraham would be a suitable partner for the "divine project."118 Ware points out the dilemma in the openness reading of this story:

But of course, on the one hand, if Abraham's passing of this test confirms further a pattern of faithfulness Abraham had already demonstrated in his life of trust and obedience, then it could not be literally true that in this test.. .God learned now that Abraham feared him. On the other hand, if Abraham passed this test in striking contrast to a pattern of his previous unfaithfulness, why would God then conclude that Abraham would remain faithful in the future, even when he had passed this test, given his previous pattern of disobedience?119

One could infer from the openness interpretation that God does not even know

Abraham's past!

Openness proponents could argue that God was testing the extent of Abraham's fear of God by this extraordinary imperative. However, such a test demands a certain consistency between action and character that is inconsistent with libertarianism.

Another passage used to support the openness view involves God's dialogue with Moses in Exodus 3 and 4. According to Sanders, "This lengthy divine speech is usually understood to imply foreknowledge whereby God discloses precisely what will

118 Sanders, 52-53; Boyd, God of the Possible, 64. 55 happen in advance."120 Unfortunately, Sanders gives no example of such an interpretation by a classical theist. Allegedly, God 'predicts' that the elders would accompany Moses in appearing before Pharaoh in Exodus 3:18, a 'prediction' that failed since Aaron takes their place in 5:1. A closer examination of 3:18 reveals that it was not a prediction at all. Rather, it was a command, "And you and the elders of Israel shall go."121 That humans fail to carry out a divine command is hardly a significant discovery. Secondly, Sanders implies that in refuting God's assurance that the elders will listen (3:18), Moses pointed out a problem God had not anticipated. "Apparently

God thinks Moses has a legitimate point, for he gives him the signs to verify his

commission (4:2-5)."122 Does this mean that God hasn't considered the possibility that

the elders might not believe Moses? According to Sanders' reading, not only does God

lack foreknowledge, he also lacks foresight. While Moses was able to anticipate a

potential problem, God seems oblivious. This clearly contradicts scriptural affirmations

of God's wisdom and understanding (e.g. Isa 40:13-14, 28) and casts serious doubt on

whether the kind of God Sanders proposes would be competent to govern the world.

Both Sanders and Boyd suggest that God "did not foreknow with certainty

exactly how many miracles it would take to get the elders of Israel to believe Moses."123

But if that was the case, we may ask why God stopped at three. Why did God not give

120 Sanders, 58.

121 The fact that God speaks to Moses in the second person, "you," together with the context, strongly suggests a command. A prediction in the second person here is an awkward reading. Cf. NIV: "Then you and the elders are to go..." That God accommodates Moses' request to bring Aaron poses no problem for my system, as long as we bear in mind that God was able to anticipate such a request.

122 Sanders, 58.

123 Boyd, God of the Possible, 67; cf. Sanders, 58. 56

Moses ten miracles just in case three was insufficient? Apparently, God knew that three miracles would be enough. 4:30-31 simply states, "Aaron spoke all the words that the

LORD had spoken to Moses and did the signs in the sight of the people." There is no

indication that Moses stopped short of using all three miracles. A more coherent reading would acknowledge that God both anticipates and accommodates Moses' fears

and seeks both to challenge and to assure him. Interpreted in this light, the 'ifs' of the passage serve to further reassure Moses that God would help him win the confidence of the elders.

A third scripture commonly cited by open theists is 1 Samuel 15:11, 35 in which

God is said to 'repent', or 'regret' that he made Saul king. Between the two

'repentance' verses is the affirmation that God "will not lie or have regret, for he is not a

man, that he should have regret" (v. 29). According to Sanders, "This chapter says both

that God changes his mind and that God will not change his mind. In its context the

teaching is clear: God reserves the right to alter his plans in response to human

initiative, and it is also the divine right not to alter an alteration."124

How shall we understand these three declarations? We begin by noting that the

relevant term, niham, may be interpreted as 'to repent' or 'to grieve', as discussed

earlier in the treatment of Genesis 6:6. We may also note that verses 11 and 35 refer to

God's action of making Saul king, while verse 29 contains a general statement about

God, that unlike a man, he does not niham. Given the context, it seems almost certain

that the term should be read differently in verse 29 than in the other two verses.

Contrary to Sanders' interpretation, verse 29 does not say that God has the right not to

124 Sanders, 70. 57 niham, but that he, unlike man, does not do so. To say that God does not repent in a passage bracketed by two statements that he does repent is a clear contradiction.

Likewise, if each of the three occurrences is translated as 'grieve', a contradiction results.

Given the contrast in verse 29 between God and man, we must affirm that man either grieves or repents in a sense in which God does not. Suppose we say that man

'grieves', but God does not (v. 29). God 'repents' (vv. 11, 35), but does not 'grieve'.

Open theists would certainly have a problem in affirming divine impassibility in order to argue that God repents.126 Furthermore, this yields the awkward statement that God, unlike man, "does not lie or grieve." This is awkward first because there does not seem to be any connection between 'lying' and 'grieving', and second because the idea of

'grieving' does not seem to fit the context at all. The other alternative is to affirm that man 'repents' in a sense in which God does not (v. 29). But God does at times 'grieve'

(vv. 11, 35). In light of the Hebrew affinity for synonymous parallelism, it seems best to translate niham in verse 29 as 'repent'. It is an affirmation that God's expressed

intention is not a lie and will certainly come to pass. Accordingly, the translation of

niham in verses 11 and 35 as 'grieve' results in statements that God is grieved by the

consequences of his making Saul king. As previously noted in the discussion of Genesis

6, to grieve does not necessarily mean that one has made a regrettable mistake. Neither

does it mean that God was previously unaware of the outcome. One can certainly grieve

over the predictable negative fallout of a wise or necessary action, as in the

125 See Ware, 88.

126 The denial of divine impassibility is a key component of open theism. 58 crucifixion.127 In this case, 1 Samuel 9:16 reveals the purpose for which God had made

Saul king, to deliver his people from the Philistines. The subsequent narrative tells us that Saul had achieved some degree of success (1 Sam 13-14). His appointment as king served a divine purpose, though it also brought some grief.

Sanders may object that God has in fact changed his mind, since he had

"originally planned to establish Saul's household as a perpetual kingship in Israel (1

Sam 13:13-14)."128 But the passage in question suggests that this was a conditional

intention: ".. .the LORD would have established..." It does not indicate a change of

mind or lack of foreknowledge on God's part. God had previously expressed his

intention to establish a permanent kingdom through the line of Judah, not Benjamin

(Gen 49:10). Not only is Saul from the wrong tribe, but the only indication that his

could be a permanent kingdom occurs in the context of his rejection.

We have outlined some clear biblical reasons why God not only has infallible

foreknowledge, but that such foreknowledge sets him apart from false gods.

Foreknowledge appears to be an essential attribute of God. In examining four of the

most prominent passages that appear to deny foreknowledge, we have found the

openness interpretations to be untenable. It is impossible to deny divine foreknowledge

on the basis of these passages without also denying God's omniscience, wisdom, and

providential competence. The openness attempt to walk the line between classical

theism and process theism ultimately fails, having no biblical ground to stand on.

127 See Ware, 91: "Just because God knows in advance that some event will occur, this does not preclude God from experiencing appropriate emotions and expressing appropriate reactions when it actually happens."

Sanders, 70. 59

How Does God Know the Future?

Having set forth some arguments for divine foreknowledge, we may also ask how it is that God knows the future. One solution would be to derive foreknowledge

1 9Q from divine timelessness, following Boethius and Aquinas. Since God stands outside of time, he is able to access past, present, and future with equal ease. Technically, this is not/ordcnowledge since a timeless God does not have a future. Rather, God possesses

omnitemporal knowledge from his timeless perspective. Another solution, following

Calvin, conceives foreknowledge as a function of theological determinism. God knows

the future because he knows what he will bring to pass.131 William Lane Craig proposes

a third alternative for explaining how God knows the future. He rejects the first two

solutions because he holds that God is temporal in relation to the universe and that he 1 T9

created humans with libertarian free will. According to Craig, God is able to know

future contingents because as an omniscient being, he necessarily knows all true

propositions innately. God's knowledge of the future is 'conceptual' rather than

'perceptual'.134

Since I hold that God is temporal in his relationship to creation, I would reject

the solution offered by Boethius and Aquinas. Space does not allow for a discussion of

129 Tiessen, Providence, 191.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid., 233; cf. Calvin, Institutes, III.23.6. 132 William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2001), 87, 97.

133 William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987), 123.

134 Ibid., 120-3. 60

God's relationship to time. Another reason for rejecting atemporality as an explanation for 'foreknowledge' is that the sequence involved in creating, knowing, and providentially responding to that knowledge seems incompatible with timelessness.

Craig's Molinist proposal will be treated below. As a compatibilist, I would naturally prefer the Calvinist view. God knows the future exhaustively because he has decreed all that will happen. This includes actions that God intends to perform in the future as well

as the actions of created agents. Given compatibilist freedom, humans will respond predictably in any given set of circumstances. Because God knows each person

exhaustively, he knows how they will act in every specific circumstance that confronts

them.

This is the basis for God's counterfactual knowledge, as demonstrated in 1

Samuel 23:7-13 and Matthew 11:20-24. In the first passage, David is hiding in Keilah

from Saul. He asks the Lord whether Saul will come to Keilah and whether the citizens

of Keilah will hand him over to Saul. The answer to both is affirmative. Neither of

these things actually happens. But they were statements about what would have

happened given other circumstances. Likewise, in the Matthew passage, Jesus says that

if he had performed the miracles in Tyre, Sidon and Sodom, they would have repented.

Granted, these passages do not provide an undeniable biblical basis for affirming divine

counterfactual knowledge. Jesus' statements in Matthew 11 could be dismissed as

For a discussion of God's relationship to time, see Paul Helm et al., God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001). Of the three views of divine temporality, I find Alan Padgett's proposal most attractive, though I am currently uncommitted.

136 For this reason, an atemporalist model also requires God to have hypothetical knowledge. Atemporalism alone offers no providential advantage. 61 rhetorical. The case of David at Keilah seems more promising, since God, who

cannot lie, gives a categorical answer, "They will."138 Since God is giving guidance in a

real situation, it seems his counterfactual statement must be true.

Many theologians and philosophers of religion are agreed that simple

foreknowledge, which denies God's knowledge of hypotheticals, would be futile in

helping God to govern the world. Simple foreknowledge allows God to know all

events in the actual future, including his own actions. But without hypothetical

knowledge, he is unable to adjust his actions in response to his knowledge of the future.

Any deviation from the actions he 'foreknows' would change the content of his

foreknowledge, which formed the basis for his adjustments in the first place, resulting in

an absurdity. With simple foreknowledge, God would know the future, but still be

committed to acting as though he did not.140 Simple foreknowledge would offer a

temporal God no providential advantage.

Hypothetical knowledge affords God with crucial advantages that enable him to

exercise providential control over the world. Since God possesses hypothetical

knowledge, he is never surprised by human conduct. His intimate knowledge of each

individual, combined with his comprehensive knowledge of all circumstances, allow

Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 64.

138 Contrary to Kenny's assessment (ibid.).

139 E.g. Craig in Gregory A. Boyd et al„ Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 135-6; Boyd, Satan, 89-90; Ware, 37, 41; William Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 197, cited in Helm, The Providence of God, 236n. 2.

Boyd, Satan, 89. 62 him to unfailingly predict all human actions. In this manner, he can know the future

definitely and exhaustively.

Counterfactual knowledge also allows him to determine free human choices as

needed to accomplish his purposes. By arranging the relevant circumstantial variables,

he can ensure that humans will act in the way he has determined while preserving their

freedom. Thus he is able to bring to pass all that he has decreed. Yet because humans

act freely according to their character and desires, they are genuinely self-determined,

free and responsible for their actions.

This account of God's foreknowledge is consistent with such scriptures as Isaiah

46:10 and 48:3 in which his foreknowledge is closely tied to his sovereignty.141 He

knows the future because he ordains it. This is also evident in the manner in which

some prophecies are fulfilled (e.g. Matt 1:22-23). Thus God's foreknowledge is the

knowledge of what he has decreed. It is a function of his specific sovereignty.

Libertarianism and Divine Temporal Foreknowledge

In light of the preceding, one may question how a libertarian view of human

freedom can be compatible with either divine temporal foreknowledge or with middle

knowledge. Craig offers a credible and sophisticated explanation. He begins by arguing

that future tense statements can be true and must be either true or false. The statement

"It will rain tomorrow" (asserted on April 12) is just as true as the statement "It did rain

yesterday" (asserted on April 14) if it obtains that it rains on April 13.142

In order for this future-tense statement to be true, all that is required is that when the moment described arrives, the present-tense version of the statement will be true.. .A

141 Also see Isa 14:24-27; 55:1 l;Ps 33:11.

142 Craig, The Only Wise God, 58. 63

future-tense statement is true if matters turn out as the statement predicts, and false if matters fail to turn out as the statement predicts—this is all that the notion of truth as correspondence requires.

Next, Craig argues that God's knowledge is 'conceptual' rather than

'perceptual'. Since God is "an infinite disembodied Mind," sense perception does not apply to him.144 Rather, "God innately knows only and all true statements. Since true future tense statements are included among them, he foreknows the future.. .God has the essential property of knowing only and all true statements. That is part of what it means to be God, to be omniscient."145

Craig's proposal is forceful. But I believe it contains weaknesses that can be exploited. We begin by noting three components of Craig's system. First, he holds to a dynamic or A-theory of time, according to which the future is objectively non­ existent.146 Second, he consents to the correspondence theory of truth. Third, he holds to libertarianism, according to which humans, under normal circumstances, possess the power of contrary choice. In the following, I seek to demonstrate that these three positions present systematic problems that Craig has yet to resolve.

Any real state of affairs is determined by one or more factors. Such factors can include antecedent circumstances, physical processes, divine decree, or free choices of

143 Ibid., 57-58.

144 Ibid., 120-1.

145 Ibid., 121-3.

146 Craig, Time and Eternity, 251. According to this theory, time has a 'front edge' and its 'passage' is an objective reality. There is a 'now' in an objective sense that time has progressed to this particular point. Thus the present is real in a sense that the past and future are not. Alternatively, the static or B-theory conceives of time as a continuum through which we 'travel'. The 'now' is simply a point on the continuum relative to our experience. Ideas such as 'past', 'present', and 'future' are merely relative descriptions from a particular perspective within the continuum. For more detailed discussions of time, see Helm et al., God and Time and Craig, Time and Eternity. 64

created agents, whether their freedom is libertarian or compatibilistic. In the present

discussion, the relevant factors are divine and human choices. Consider the future tense

statement "Joe will mow the lawn on April 13," made on April 12. When April 13

arrives and Joe mows the lawn, the statement is true by virtue of correspondence to the

event. Craig would argue that the statement is true for all time and therefore true on

April 12. But given his premise of libertarian freedom, the determinant for the state of

affairs, that Joe mows the lawn on April 13, is Joe's libertarianly free choice, which he

does not make until April 13. Until the time arrives and Joe makes his choice, that

choice remains undetermined. As a result, the state of affairs remains undetermined.

Alternatively, one could say that the future state of affairs is determined by divine

decree or compatibilistic freedom. But neither option is available to Craig.147

Craig, along with J. P. Moreland, defines the correspondence theory as such that

"truth obtains when a truth-bearer stands in an appropriate correspondence relation to a

truth-maker."148 Moreland and Craig hold that propositions are truth-bearers and states

of affairs are truth-makers.1 Future tense statements can be grounded in two ways.

Their first strategy is to remove the future tense by translating the statement into a

tenseless form. Consider the future-tense statement, "The U.S. president in 2070 will be

147 Perhaps Craig could argue for divine decree as a determinant, based on middle knowledge. But this negates Craig's thesis that divine foreknowledge can be independent of divine determination. Also, middle knowledge seems incompatible with libertarian freedom, as I shall demonstrate in the next section.

148 Moreland and Craig, 135.

149 Ibid., 136. 65 a woman." This statement is true if the corresponding state of affairs "the U.S. president's being a woman in 2070" tenselessly obtains.

Note that in the above quote from The Only Wise God, Craig removes the

futurity of statements by restating them in the present tense. In the present case, he does

so by restating them in a tenseless form. In both cases, he attempts to circumvent the

problem of futurity by altering the temporal perspective. In the first case, he speaks of

the future as if it were present. In the second case, he speaks of the future as if it were

part of a static continuum. The "state of affairs" to which Craig refers contains a future

time reference. To speak tenselessly of a temporally indexed future state of affairs is to

evade the distinction between past and future states of affairs. It implies that the future

is in some sense just as accessible as the past. While this is perfectly compatible with a

static theory of time, it seems inconsistent with his adherence to the dynamic theory.

Given dynamic time, future states of affairs do not possess the same status of reality as

present states of affairs. The future is not 'ahead of us', waiting for us to arrive. It is

objectively undeveloped and non-existent. As a result, the proposition is lacking a truth-

maker, not being grounded in any determining factor. If time is a dynamic reality, no

future state of affairs can be said to "tenselessly obtain."

Moreland and Craig's other strategy for grounding a future tense statement is to

ascribe to the statement "the property of obtaining in the future, specifically, in 2007.

The fact that the state of affairs 'the U.S. president's being a woman' currently has this future tense property is what grounds the truth of [the statement]."151 As with his first

150 Ibid., 138.

151 Moreland and Craig, 138; italics mine. 66 strategy, this one fallaciously transports an undetermined element of the future into the present, implicitly granting it the status of a determined reality. "The U.S. president's being a woman" is essentially a potential state of affairs, but not an actual state of affairs.152 The idea that a potential state of affairs can have "obtaining in the future" as an intrinsic property is doubtful. Because "obtaining in the future" contains a reference to a future event, namely, that of obtaining, it remains contingent on undetermined factors that lie in the future. It only becomes an actual state of affairs if and when the future referent arrives and the potential state of affairs obtains.

If the preceding arguments hold, it follows that future-tense statements in Craig's

system cannot possess truth value. He is left with no basis for affirming the

compatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom.

John Martin Fischer presents a positive argument against the compatibility of

divine foreknowledge with the notion that humans possess the power of contrary choice.

He begins with the idea of the fixity of the past. "I have suggested that we can construe

this idea as requiring that any scenario which is a possible future for an agent.. .be an

extension of the actual past." He also makes a distinction between "soft" facts and

"hard" facts. Soft facts are temporally relational and "entails that a certain kind of fact

152 Some would consider potential states of affairs to be propositions, as distinct from facts (Robert Audi, gen. ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, second edition [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 876).

153 Cf. Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1991), 97. Morris expresses similar doubt regarding the possibility of truths about future libertarianly free acts. His reasoning is essentially the same as Fischer's, which I describe in the following. Although we take different approaches in our arguments, we arrive at essentially the same point of conflict between the undetermined status of the future and the fixity of prior divine knowledge.

154 John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, Vol. 14 of the Aristotelian Society Series (Maiden: Blackwell, 1994), 111. Also see his discussion of Newcomb's Problem on pp. 98-110. 67

obtains in the future."155 Although William of Ockham did not use the language of

softness and hardness, he made the same essential distinction. The position Fischer

labels as "Ockhamist" infers from the "entailment criterion" that soft facts are not

'fixed' by virtue of being in the past. This position also includes in this class God's beliefs about the future. Thus, God's beliefs in the past about future states of affairs do

not affect our freedom to do otherwise, since they, unlike hard facts, are not fixed by

virtue of being in the past.156 In other words, present human choices determine the

relevant soft facts in the past. If S chooses to do Xat t2, God would have known at tl

that S will do Xat t2. If S freely chooses not to do XaX t2, God would have known at tl

that S will not do Xat t2. Although Fischer cites Plantinga as a proponent of

Ockhamism, this in essence is also the position of Craig.

Against Ockhamism, Fischer argues that God's beliefs about the future contain hard properties and are properly classified as "hard-type soft facts" about the past.

"Suppose now that H [human being] merely believes at tl that S will do Xat t2.. .one

and the same state of IT s mind at tl would count as believing that S will do Xat t2, no matter what S (or anyone else) does at t2."l5% Since belief is a mental state, it exhibits "a

certain sort of resilience to the future."159 Since God's beliefs can be similarly

construed as a mental state, they also exhibit the same sort of resilience to the future.

155 Ibid., 112.

156 Ibid.

157 Stated in Craig's terms, if S chooses to do Xat t2, it would have been true at tl (or any other time) that S chooses to do X at t2 and God would have known this truth at tl.

158 Ibid., 119.

Ibid. Fischer makes a distinction between hard-core soft facts and hard-type soft facts. But that distinction is not important in the present context. 68

When God believes at tl that S will do X at t2, His mind is in a certain state at tl. Further, my contention is that being in this state would still count as believing that S will do X at t2, even if S were to refrain from doing X at t2. Believing a proposition just is not counterfactually dependent on the future: it is not the case that one and the same state of mind would count as one belief given one future, and another belief (or no belief at all) given another future.160

Because God's prior beliefs have hard properties, and because God is essentially omniscient, "an agent's doing otherwise would require some hard (temporally nonrelational) feature of the past to be other than it actually was... [Consequently,] an agent's doing otherwise cannot be an extension of the actual past."161

Thomas V. Morris concurs regarding the implausibility of the Ockhamist solution.

If the Ockhamist insists that I can now act in such a way as to change, or otherwise determine what God's beliefs in the remote past already were concerning what I shall do, then he swims upstream against some pretty strong intuitions most people have about the impossibility of changing or affecting the past in any substantive way whatsoever.162

Ockhamism ultimately fails because it requires that future libertarianly free choices bear consequences regarding the content of God's knowledge in the past, assuming that his foreknowledge is infallible. The power of contrary choice entails either a power to falsify divine foreknowledge or a denial of the fixity of the past, neither of which are attractive solutions for the majority of Arminians and Molinists.

160 Ibid., 119-120.

161 Ibid., 130.

162 Morris, 95. 69

Libertarianism and Middle Knowledge

If divine temporal foreknowledge in a libertarian system is difficult to explain,

middle knowledge is even more dubious. Craig defines middle knowledge as

follows:

God knows what every possible creature would do (not just could do) in any possible set of circumstances. For example, he knows whether Peter, if he were placed in certain circumstances, would deny Christ three times.. .Peter is entirely free, and under the same circumstances he could choose to act in another way. But God knows which way Peter would freely choose.. .For if it is true that Peter would sin if placed in certain circumstances, it follows that even though a world with identical circumstances in which Peter does not sin is possible, nevertheless it is not within God's power to create that world.164

In response to Craig, one may ask whether, given libertarian freedom, there are

counterfactuals. Consider his statement, "If I were rich, I would buy a Mercedes."

Given libertarian freedom, it is possible that Craig would choose otherwise. What is it

that makes the statement true? Applying the "disquotation principle," Craig affirms that

what makes the statement true "is the fact that if I were rich, I would buy a

Mercedes."165 Craig stops there, offering no explanation of how the disquoted version

could be a 'fact' without being a factual. For a compatibilist, the solution would be

quite simple. The statement is true because Craig wants a Mercedes and given his

character, he would buy one if he were rich. But for the libertarian, the event in

question is determined by a hypothetical free choice on Craig's part. Instead of a future

Tiessen argues that "By definition of the terms it is impossible to know what a person would decide to do in a given situation if the person's decision is conceived to be indeterministically free" (Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation in Christ and World Religions [Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004], 317).

164 Craig, Only Wise God, 130. Unfortunately, Craig uses a factual to illustrate his point rather than a counterfactual.

Craig, in Boyd et al., Divine Foreknowledge, 142; emphasis mine. 70 contingent, we are now confronted with a hypothetical contingent. Unlike the future contingent, the veracity of this statement cannot be established by a static or B-theory of time, nor can it be established by the arrival of the event in question. The veracity of the statement hangs on an undetermined determinant that will never be determined, since the free exercise of Craig's will never occurs. Craig's proposal fails because it uses a definition of 'would' that only a factual can resolve. It is also problematic because he apparently denies the causal relationship between a proposition and its truth-maker without offering an alternative way of construing the relationship.166 Even his previous explanation of foreknowledge seems to assume such a relationship.

If the preceding critique holds, then no libertarian system can produce a set of

'feasible worlds' that lies between the possible worlds and the actual world,167 and middle knowledge becomes impossible. It seems counterfactuals can only be true if some form of determinism is true, in which case the 'would' of the counterfactual becomes a function of the agent's character in a particular set of circumstances.

One last observation that can be made of Molinist middle knowledge is that it reads very much like a compatibilist account, except that it denies compatibilism. It is motivated by the biblically correct view that God exercises a great deal of providential control in the world, aided by a comprehensive knowledge of hypotheticals about the future to which he is free to respond. However, the attempt to reconcile such knowledge with libertarian freedom ultimately fails.

Ibid., 141.

Ibid., 123. This is a reference to Molina's original proposal of divine 'middle knowledge'. 71

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented a case for divine specific sovereignty supported by human compatibilist freedom, divine exhaustive foreknowledge and middle knowledge. An attempt was made to consider the relevant biblical, theological, and philosophical arguments. It has been found that the general sovereignty models not only lack scriptural support, but they also leave doubts about whether God, so portrayed, can truly be the sovereign, wise, and trustworthy God depicted in the Bible. It stands to reason that only a God who is specifically sovereign can inspire the kind of confident hope to which Scripture calls us. Likewise, not only is there explicit biblical support for compatibilism and contrasting silence about libertarianism, there are reasons to believe that the former is philosophically more coherent. Furthermore, libertarian freedom creates severe difficulties for divine foreknowledge and providence in general.

Although the positions adopted make the task of providing a theological account of evil more difficult than the general sovereignty models, they seem to be demanded by the relevant considerations. Since this project is an attempt to propose a theological explanation of evil rather than a philosophical defence of theism, solutions based on libertarianism, such as the popular 'free will defence', must be rejected as incompatible with my system. CHAPTER 3

THE GOODNESS AND FREEDOM OF GOD

The second and fourth premises of the classic formulation of the logical problem of evil exploit the Christian belief in the goodness of God. Mackie's fourth premise claims that a supremely good God would do his best to eliminate evil.1 In responding to this claim, a key question to be addressed is that of the moral obligations of God. What

obligations are imposed on God by his moral perfections? How do such obligations

relate to the traditional doctrine that God is free? In preparation for articulating a

theological account of evil, this chapter explores the theological concepts of divine

goodness and freedom and the tension between the two.

Theological Distinctions

The goodness of God encompasses a wide range of attributes. For our purposes,

these various attributes may be placed into two broad categories: moral purity and

benevolence. Moral purity refers to God's complete freedom from evil in his character

and actions and includes such attributes as holiness, righteousness, justice, genuineness,

veracity and faithfulness. Benevolence refers to God's bestowal of benefits on his

creatures and includes such attributes as love, grace, mercy and patience.3 Moral purity

emphasizes his perfection of character while benevolence emphasizes his relational

generosity.

1 J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 25-6. See Chapter 1.

2 This follows approximately Stanley Grenz's two-fold classification of the moral attributes as 'holiness' and 'compassion' (Theology for the Community of God [Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994], 121-2).

3 These lists of attributes are adapted from Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, second edition (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 310-23.

72 73

However, there is a significant amount of overlap between the two categories.

For example, faithfulness properly belongs in both of these categories, and divine acts of covenant faithfulness are often referred to as 'righteous' acts. Such passages emphasize the benefits of belonging to the faithful and righteous God who keeps his promises. His faithfulness to himself gives assurance that he will be faithful to his covenant partners (2

Tim 2:13; cf. Gen 22:16-18). We may observe that morality in Scripture is primarily relational. God reveals his moral perfection by keeping his covenants. For this reason we cannot draw a hard line of separation between God's purity and his benevolence.

However, the distinction is helpful in clarifying the doctrine of goodness in the present context.

Scriptural Affirmations of God's Goodness

Goodness as Moral Purity

Throughout Scripture, God's moral purity is affirmed as part of his essential

character and as expressed in his righteous dealings with his creatures. Many passages

speak of God's holiness. The seraphim declare God's holiness in Isaiah's vision as well

as in John's: "Holy, holy, holy is the LORD of hosts..." (Isa 6:3); "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God Almighty..." (Rev 4:8). Throughout Isaiah's prophecies God is called

"the Holy One of Israel" (Isa 1:4; 5:19; 10:20; 12:6; 17:7). In Exodus 15:11 and 1

Samuel 2:2 the LORD is said to be unique in his holiness. In Leviticus 19:2 (cf. 1 Pet

1:16), 11:44-45, 20:7, 26, and 21:8, God himself is said to be holy.4 The attribute of holiness refers to God's metaphysical transcendence as well as his moral perfection.

4 For more examples see 1 Sam 6:20; Pss 22:3; 71:22; 78:41; 89:18; 99:3,5, 9; Hos 11:9; Rev 15:4. 74

The righteousness of God is also a prominent theme in Scripture, referring to the moral perfection that characterizes all his actions, particularly his treatment of his creatures. Deuteronomy 32:4 declares "The Rock, his work is perfect, for all his ways

are justice. A God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and upright is he" (cf. Ps

92:15). Psalm 145:17 says that "The LORD is righteous in all his ways and kind in all his works." Several times in Scripture God is said to be righteous in his judgments (Pss

9:8; 50:4-6; 51:4; 96:10,13; 98:9; Rom 2:5; 2 Tim 4:8). His law is declared to be

righteous (Deut4:8; Pss 19:7-9; 119:138, 142; Isa 42:21). In 1 Samuel 12:6-11, Samuel

testifies to "the righteous deeds of the LORD" in saving the people of Israel.

Mark 10:17-18 (par. Luke 18:18-19) records Jesus' statement, "...'Why do you

call me good? No one is good except God alone.'" The absolute goodness of God

stands in contrast to the universal sinfulness of humanity (Rom 3:23).

Goodness as Benevolence

Most of the Old Testament references to God's 'goodness' carry the meaning of

benevolence. God is consistently portrayed as one who acts to benefit others. The

goodness of God is a source of confidence for his people and the appropriate response is

thanksgiving and trust. The exhortation, "Oh give thanks to the LORD, for he is good;

for his steadfast love endures forever!" is repeated many times (1 Chr 16:34; cf. 2 Chr

5:13; 7:3; Ezra 3:11; Ps 106:1; 107:1; 118:1, 29; 136:1-26; Jer 33:11). Many of the

Psalms speak of the goodness of God in the context of praise:

Good and upright is the LORD; therefore he instructs sinners in the way. (25:8)

Oh, taste and see that the LORD is good! Blessed is the man who takes refuge in him! (34:8)

5 For more examples see 2 Chr 12:6; Neh 9:8; Ps 72:1-3; 98:2-3; Isa 45:8; 51:5; Rev 15:4. 75

For the LORD God is a sun and shield; the LORD bestows favor and honor. No good thing does he withhold from those who walk uprightly. (84:11)

For you, O Lord, are good and forgiving, abounding in steadfast love to all who call upon you. (86:5)

For the LORD is good; his steadfast love endures forever, and his faithfulness to all generations. (100:5)

You are good and do good; teach me your statutes. (119:68)

Praise the LORD, for the LORD is good; sing to his name, for it is pleasant! (135:3)

Among the ruins of fallen Jerusalem, Jeremiah proclaims: "The LORD is good to those who wait for him, to the soul who seeks him" (Lam 3:25). In the midst of a

solemn warning of judgment, Nahum declares: "The LORD is good, a stronghold in the

day of trouble; he knows those who take refuge in him" (Nah 1:7). These statements of

God's goodness emphasize his faithful benevolence to his people and urge them to

"forget not all his benefits" (Ps 103:2). Frame observes that "In such contexts, goodness

is a covenantal category. God's goodness means that he gives blessings in accordance

with his covenant promises."6 However, this does not mean that his benevolence is

always conditional. God graciously blesses his people before there is any inclination to

obey. His blessings begin "before the foundation of the world" (Eph 1:4) and "while we

were still sinners" (Rom 5:8), and are intended to lead us to repentance (Acts 14:17;

17:26-31; Rom 2:4; 2 Pet 3:9).7

Although it receives far less emphasis, Scripture also teaches that God's

benevolence extends to all people, both good and evil. In Matthew 5:45, Jesus says that

the Father "makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and

6 John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg: P & R, 2002), 410.

7 Ibid., 411. 76 on the unjust." Psalm 145:9 declares, "The LORD is good to all, and his mercy is over all that he has made." Such declarations of universal blessing refer to God's provisions through the natural order.8 While spiritual blessings, particularly salvation, are bestowed on the covenant people by virtue of their union with Christ (Eph 1:3-14), temporal blessings are given to all.9 Yet both kinds of blessings are given on the basis of Christ's redemptive work on the cross.10 Frame notes that the universal blessing in

Psalm 145:9 is set in the context of God's covenantal love (v. 8; cf. Exod 34:6-7).n

Thus even unbelievers who never reach repentance receive benefits in this life as an

overflow of God's gracious provisions in redemption.

Beyond the pages of Scripture there is certainly abundant evidence for the

universal blessings of God. Some may even argue that the wicked often seem to enjoy

more blessings in this life than God's own people (Ps 73:3-5; cf. Luke 16:19-31).12

Both common observation and the disciplines of natural science confirm that the earth

and the surrounding universe are meticulously designed to sustain life. What scientists

refer to as the 'anthropic principle' Scripture attributes to the providential care of a

8 Also see Job 37:12-13; Pss 36:6; 65:9-13; 104:10-28; Isa 42:5.

9 Frame writes, "Therefore, human beings do not all receive the same blessings of God's goodness. Those who are eternally elect receive the fullness of eternal life. Those who are eternally reprobate receive blessings only in this life" (Frame, Doctrine of God, 412). Also see Francis Turretin, Institutes ofElenctic Theology, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison Jr. (Phillipsburg: P & R, 1992), 1:244. Perhaps universal temporal blessings reflect God's commitment to an original creation covenant, which is renewed after the flood.

10 Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation in Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 100.

11 Frame, Doctrine of God, 412.

12 Ibid., 413. 77 benevolent Creator (Ps 36:5-9; 145:15-16; Acts 14:17).13 Although some may despair of specific adverse circumstances, none can deny that the earth affords the human race with immeasurable blessings.

The Freedom of God

Freedom and Sovereignty

We now turn to the question of the nature of God's freedom. What do we mean when we say that God is free? In the previous chapter on providence I cited many

Scriptures that affirmed God's sovereignty. Some aspects of God's freedom are functions of his sovereignty. For instance, the statement that God "does all that he pleases" (Ps 115:3; cf. Ps. 135:6) means that God possesses the power to do what he wants, unlike the idols of the nations.14 It also means that he possesses the rightful authority to do as he pleases and is answerable to no one (Job 9:12; Isa 45:9; Dan 4:35).

As Creator and Sovereign, God has the right to give or to take life (Gen 9:5-6; Deut

32:39; 1 Sam 2:6), to bring benefit or disaster (Job 1:21; 2:10; 1 Sam 2:6-8), since everything belongs to him (Job 41:11; Ps 24:1; Exod 9;29). Romans 9:20-21 asserts

God's unique prerogative to do whatever he wants with his creatures as it suits his purposes: "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, 'Why have you made me like this?' Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honored use and another for dishonorable use?"

See John C. Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God's Interaction with the World (Philadelphia and London: Templeton Foundation Press, 2005), 44-45.

14 Note that these examples also illustrate some of the various senses of 'can' or 'could' besides the contra-causal sense, as discussed in Chapter 2. 78

These scriptures affirm that God is free because he is sovereign. There is nothing outside of himself that possesses either the power or the right to restrain him from his chosen actions or constrain him to perform other actions. He possesses privileges far beyond that of his creatures.

Accordingly, Turretin states that God's sovereignty gives him the right "of determining concerning [his creatures] at pleasure without injustice. Its foundation is double. The first is the excellence of his nature above all creatures.. .The other is the dependence of all creatures upon him, both in being and in operation (Acts 17:24)."16

Ethics and the Goodness of God

In view of God's sovereignty, we must approach the ethical evaluation of his

actions with caution and humility. Scripture is clear that God alone is the judge of all humankind (Ps 94:2; Heb 12:23). It would be foolishly presumptuous to stand in judgment of God's actions (Job 9:15, 19). Yet the problem of evil raises this very issue

about the morality of God's conduct. In our attempt to understand God's goodness, we

must consider the grounds of morality and how ethical judgments may be applied to

divine acts.

Regarding ethics in general, I hold to theistic essentialism. As finite creatures

with limited knowledge and wisdom, humans are neither qualified nor privileged to

decide for themselves what is right and wrong. We are under God's authority and rely

on his self-revelation in Scripture for our ethical decisions (2 Tim 3:15-17; Deut 29:29).

"The whole duty of man" is to "Fear God and keep his commandments" (Eccl 12:13).

15 Frame, Doctrine of God, 233.

16 Turretin, 1:251. 79

As the sovereign Creator, Redeemer and Judge, God has the unqualified right to command our obedience (Gen 1-2; Exod 20:2-17; Eccl 12:13-14). However, God's commands are not arbitrary. Rather, they are grounded in the nature of God. Absolute moral standards exist because God is a self-existent morally perfect being. Because his character is morally perfect, all of his commands necessarily reflect his perfection (Pss

19:7-9; 119:137, 138,142,144,151, etc.; Jas 1:25).17

The Euthyphro Problem

In grounding ethics in the character of God, we are presented with a problem. If we say that God is the standard for goodness, and also that God is good, the two claims produce a circularity. They can be reduced to an uninteresting statement that God is like

God. Alternatively, one may suggest that there is an abstract standard of goodness to

which God conforms, thus justifying our statement that God is good. But in that case, we are still faced with the problem of how that abstract standard can be grounded.

Consider any abstract standard, such as "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," or "Moral Tightness is whatever course of action would result in the

maximum amount of benefit to the maximum number of people." Such standards stated

apart from some authority or criteria would still be subject to the charge of being

arbitrary. Yet if we affirm a standard because it conforms to the command of Jesus, the

utilitarian ethic, cultural consensus, or some process of rational argument, one can still

question why such criteria are employed. William Alston argues that "Whether we are

17 See David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw, Readings in Christian Ethics, Volume 1: Theory and Method (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994), 21; Millard J. Erickson, God the Father Almighty: A Contemporary Exploration of the Divine Attributes (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 245; John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil, revised and expanded edition (Wheaton: Cross way, 2004), 165; Frame, Doctrine of God, 407. Turretin makes a distinction between God's moral law, which is grounded in his holy nature, and his ceremonial law, which is regulated only by his will (Turretin, 1:233). Our concern here is only with the moral law. 80

Platonist or particularist, there will be some stopping place in the search for an explanation." Our ultimate standard will either be a general principle or an individual paradigm. There does not seem to be any reason why "the invocation of God as the

supreme standard" would be "more arbitrary than the invocation of a supreme general principle."

Frame also notes that circularity always occurs when we are dealing with an

ultimate standard. However, the circularity involved in making God the ultimate

standard of goodness is a broad circularity loaded with content:

The biblical writers never say that God is good because he says he is good, and that he says he is good because he is good. That would be narrow circularity. Rather, they describe and praise God's mighty acts of deliverance, his kindness in providence, and his grace in salvation. These are big, bold, obvious evidences of goodness.19

Thus, in answer to the question, "What is goodness?" we can say more than

simply that it is God. We can say that it includes such qualities as truth-telling, promise-

keeping, and the giving of undeserved kindness and unselfish concern for others. These

answers are not merely abstract principles, but descriptions of God's character as

revealed in his Word and his acts. Divine commands are truly self-expressions of God

William P. Alston, "What Euthyphro Should Have Said," in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 2002), 293. Alston also observes that "we come to recognise and appreciate good-making properties more often through acquaintance with specially striking exemplifications than through being explicitly instructed in general principles" (ibid., 294).

19 Frame, Doctrine of God, 408-9.

See Alston, 291-2. 81 rather than expressions of his knowledge of external standards. Goodness is ultimately a person, rather than a principle.

One may object that it still seems arbitrary to make one person the supreme

standard of morality for all others. I would argue that it is not arbitrary when we consider that God is uniquely eternal, self-existent, and perfect. No abstract principle of

morality exists prior to him nor, as I propose, apart from him. Since every other moral

agent is created by him, it stands to reason that they should be obligated to conform to

him.

Others may object that this account is equivalent to the ethic of 'might makes

right.' If our creator and supreme ruler had been a cruel and oppressive despot, he could

command cruelty as a 'good' moral standard. I agree that such would indeed be a most

unhappy and hopeless world. But we need not fear, since God has revealed himself as a

God of love, mercy and truth. He has so revealed himself not only in Scripture and

creation, but also in the human conscience, so that his moral standards, though

uncomfortably convicting at times, resonate with our hearts as being true and desirable.

The very reason we abhor the scenario in which cruelty is commended as 'goodness' is

that God has placed his righteous standards in our conscience, standards by which we

evaluate such scenarios. Granted, the conscience of a fallen race is an imperfect test

for true moral standards. But I would argue that it is at least sufficiently intact that when

sinners witness God's judgments, no one will question the justice of his verdicts (cf.

21 This is analogous to the assertions that God is love (1 John 4:8) and that Jesus is the truth (John 14:6).

22 For this reason, some have argued that the problem of evil in fact counts as evidence for the existence of a good God. 82

Rev 16:5-7; 19:1-2). Regarding the objection itself, we may also note that "might makes right" is an abstract standard and wholly incompatible with my position that God is the ultimate standard of goodness.

Is God Able to Sin?

Another question regarding the goodness and freedom of God is whether he is

able to sin. Theologians have traditionally claimed that God is necessarily good and

therefore cannot do evil. This is closely related to the doctrine of immutability held by

Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas. Augustine held that God is unable to sin, and yet is

free.23 Anselm wrote:

Or else to be capable of these things is not power, but impotence. For, he who is capable of these things is capable of what is not for his good, and of what he ought not to do; and the more capable of them he is, the more power have adversity and perversity against him; and the less has he himself against these.24

Anselm's argument appears to be an appeal to the fact that sinful behaviour is

self-destructive and enslaving. Against Anselm, Stephen Davis argues that while evil

can enslave human beings, there is no reason to think that it can enslave an omnipotent

being.25 Davis' objection seems valid. However, Anselm's argument can be easily

salvaged if we substitute the corrupting or destructive effect of sin for its enslaving

power. In this case, corruptibility is construed as a weakness or vulnerability. To be

"Certainly, God Himself cannot sin; but are we therefore to deny that God has free will?" (Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], bk. 22, chap. 30, 1180.)

24 St. Anselm, Proslogion, chap. 7, in Saint Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. S. N. Deane, with an introduction by Charles Hartshorne, 2nd ed. (La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1962), 12.

25 Stephen T. Davis, Logic and the Nature of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 87. Davis' other objection, that Anselm's argument can also apply to the doing of good acts, fails because goodness, unlike evil, is a part of God's essential nature. God's good acts are simply instances of self-expression, and imply no limit to his freedom, given our compatibilist position. 83 capable of sinning implies that a morally perfect being can become distorted and morally damaged. It then follows that a being "than which none greater can be thought" should be unchangeably perfect, incorruptible, and therefore unable to sin.

Following the general consensus of traditional theology, I hold that God is morally immutable.27 According to James 1:13, "God cannot be tempted with evil."

Erickson reasons that "If God cannot even be tempted, then he most surely cannot possibly sin."28 Hebrews 6:18 states that "it is impossible for God to lie." 2 Timothy

2:13 assures us that God will remain faithful since "he cannot deny himself." These

Scriptures unambiguously teach that there is a sense in which God cannot violate his own moral nature. His being is perfect and immutable, and his actions are infallibly consistent with his character. I have argued in the previous chapter that there is a necessary link between character and action. The reason unglorified humans are morally inconsistent in their actions is because they have imperfect character. But God, being perfect in character, is necessarily perfect in his actions. Turretin has rightly remarked that "God cannot do that which he cannot will."29 I would add that God cannot will that which he cannot desire. And it is impossible for evil desires to arise within an infinitely wise and self-existent morally perfect being.

Although I do not subscribe wholly to perfect being theology as a method, I do agree with this conclusion.

27 Although God is also immutable in other senses, I will restrict the present discussion to the moral sense.

28 Erickson, God the Father Almighty, 239.

29 Turretin, 1:249.

30 This brings up questions about the fall of humanity and of angels, which will be addressed in Chapter 5. The argument that God cannot sin because he cannot err in reason was propounded by Thomas Aquinas (Summa contra Gentiles 1.95.3, cited in Erickson, God the Father Almighty, 240). 84

While there is a sense in which God cannot sin, there is also a sense in which he can. We have noted in the previous discussion of human freedom that there are various senses of the word 'can'. God is able to sin in the sense of possessing the power to perform actions that would constitute 'sin'. For instance, he possesses the power to speak a lie, since it does not require any powers distinct from those required in speaking the truth. However, there is also a sense in which God cannot lie, since such an act would contradict his moral nature. As the ultimate standard of moral goodness, God is perfectly and immutably himself. It is impossible for him to act contrary to his goodness or to desire to do so, since that would entail his becoming other than himself.

This concurs with Turretin's distinctions between three different senses of

'impossible' and'possible': supernatural, natural, and moral. The supernaturally

impossible refer to logically contradictory tasks such as the making of a "sensitive [i.e.

sentient] stone." Such acts as the creation of the world or virgin conception are naturally impossible, but supernaturally possible. "The morally impossible is what

cannot be done according to the laws of holiness.. .God can indeed do the naturally

impossible, but not what is said to be such either morally or supernaturally."32

However, this does not imply any lack of freedom on God's part. In Chapter 2,1 argued

that freedom consists in being able to do what one desires, without external restraint.

Since God necessarily desires to abstain from sin, his abstaining is always free.33

31 Turretin, 1:245.

32 Ibid., 1:245-6.

33 This is not to say that all of God's choices are determined by his nature, a proposition I deny in the following section. My point here is simply that while God cannot do evil, he is still free at least in the compatibilist sense, though his freedom may transcend that of humans. 85

Ethics and the Obligations of God

God is Obligated Not to Violate His Own Moral Character

Given the assumptions that God is the ground of morality and that it is impossible for God to sin, it seems superfluous to discuss the moral obligations of God.

The language of obligation falsely implies an external standard to which God must conform. It also falsely implies that there is some tendency for God to violate that standard.34 But in light of the problem of evil, which charges theism with inconsistency, our present task is to consider how various kinds of hypothetical divine behaviour may be considered consistent or inconsistent with the doctrine of God's goodness.

Speaking somewhat anthropomorphically, I would affirm that God is 'obligated' to act consistently with his own moral character. If it were possible, it would be

immoral for God to lie, break a promise, or condemn the innocent. This does not mean that God cannot withhold truth from his creatures. It is certainly his prerogative to reveal only the truths he chooses to reveal. Regarding promise-keeping, Erickson has rightly stated that "While God is bound to keep his promises, he was not initially under

any compulsion to make those promises."35 Likewise, God's obligation to execute justice does not prevent him from providing substitutionary atonement through the

voluntary self-sacrifice of Christ. In order to render my theological system inconsistent,

one would have to demonstrate that God has personally performed an act that contradicts his moral nature.

William Alston has argued that concepts like 'obligation' and 'ought' do not properly apply to God (Alston, "What Euthyphro Should Have Said"). But the question is irrelevant to our present discussion.

Erickson, Christian Theology, 303-4. 86

What about the claim that a perfectly good God must always prevent or eliminate evil to the best of his ability? It seems rather simplistic to think that a perfectly good being must immediately and indiscriminately eliminate every occurrence or potential occurrence of evil. A chess player who immediately takes any opponent's piece within reach is sure to get himself into trouble. We can expect a morally perfect

and supremely wise God to hate all evil and to prevent or eliminate evil as wisely as

possible. If God permits evil at all, he must have some justifiable reason for doing so.

This issue will receive fuller treatment in Chapter 5.

God is Not Obligated to Grant the Benefits of His Grace

While God may not perform morally evil acts, he is free to grant or not to grant

the benefits of his grace to his creatures. The very definitions of 'grace' and 'mercy'

imply that these are freely bestowed gifts, apart from obligation, to undeserving

recipients. According to Deuteronomy 7:7-8, God's choice of Israel as his covenant

people was not because of their numbers or because of any merit, but simply because of

his love and his promise to their fathers, a promise he freely and graciously made.

Likewise, his decision not to elect the other nations did not constitute any injustice on

his part. One may argue that God's faithfulness does indeed 'compel' or 'obligate' him

to love his people. But the covenant itself was based on grace alone and nothing apart

from God's sovereign choice determined his decision. According to Turretin,

Mercy indeed is perfectly free, able to exert or not exert itself without injury to anyone because it consists in a merely gratuitous act which it is not bound to exercise towards anyone. For whether he had pitied us or not, he would have done injury to no one because he owed this to no one.37

36 I.e., in the 'contra-causal' sense.

37 Turretin, 1:240. 87

This is confirmed in Romans 9:18: "So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills" (cf. Exod 3:19). God's acts of benevolence are absolutely free. He is under no initial obligation to grant either temporal benefits or

spiritual blessings to anyone. He has the prerogative to grant saving grace to whom he chooses and to withhold it from the non-elect. If he had chosen to condemn everyone, that would still be just. It is absurd to think that a sinner can claim the right to be

forgiven.39

Yet we must keep in mind that God is gracious and merciful. He has freely

chosen to provide salvation for a world of sinners who deserve only death and

condemnation. He graciously sanctifies his people and grants them the privilege of

participating in his redemptive activities in the world. Furthermore, he has lavished his

temporal blessings on the righteous and the wicked alike.40

God is Committed to His Own Glory

Scripture reveals that God is supremely committed to bringing glory to himself.

Colossians 1:16 states that "all things were created through him [Christ] and for him."

The whole human race, and particularly his covenant people, was created for his glory

(Ps 86:9; Isa 43:7). His acts of redemption are "for [his] name's sake" (Isa 48:11; Ezek

M See Turretin, 1:244, 251-2; Frame, Doctrine of God, 411.

39 My brief comments here are an affirmation of God's freedom in exercising benevolence. For a treatment of the problem of evil, see Chapter 5.

40 Regarding the condemnation of the non-elect to hell, Frame suggests the following: 1) the condemnation of the wicked is an act of benevolence to the other people; 2) he is as good to them as possible, given their hatred of him and the demands of his justice; 3) God may possibly exercise his benevolence by mitigating punishments in hell; and 4) in their punishment, the lost is given the privilege of displaying his justice and his victory (Frame, Doctrine of God, 413). Also see Feinberg, "Hell and the Problem of Evil," in The Many Faces of Evil, 395-444. 88

20:9; Ps 79:9) and the election of his saints for "the praise of his glory" (Eph 1:5-6, 12-

14; Rom 9:21-24). Even those to whom God did not extend his saving grace are means by which God reveals his power (Rom 9:17, 22). The Gospel of John repeatedly mentions this theme: the Father glorifies the Son (John 8:50, 54; 13:32; 17:1, 5); the

Son glorifies the Father (John 7:18; 13:31; 14:13; 17:4); the Spirit glorifies the Son

(John 16:14); the Father glorifies himself (John 12:28); believers glorify Christ (John

17:10). Christ's disciples are called to glorify God by doing good deeds (Matt 5:16), bearing fruit (John 15:8), and in everything they do (1 Cor 10:31). Glory rightfully belongs to God alone and he will not share it with any other (1 Chr 16:28-29; Isa 42:8).

Erickson asserts that God's glory is the highest value and the motivating factor in all that God has done.41

Some may object that God's commitment to his own glory seems to contradict his command that we be unselfish (Phil 2:3-4; John 13:14; Mark 10:42-45; John 15:13).

But such objections fail to take into account the unique status of God as the self-existent

Creator for whom all things were created. God is not our equal, but is objectively the ultimate value in the universe. The first commandment, "You shall have no other gods before me," is not an arbitrary stipulation, but a necessary moral law grounded in metaphysical reality. To allow anything or anyone else to take priority over God would be morally wrong. Erickson aptly states,

For us to put any finite object, whether ourselves or some other human, ahead of God would be wrong, for it would be a denial of the very structure of reality.. .Similarly, if God were to make some created object the ultimate value, over even himself, that would be wrong. Not merely selfish concern for himself, but

Erickson, Christian Theology, 379. 89

concern for the preservation of 'the nature of things' requires that he seeks his own glory.42

Divine Freedom and Determinism

At this point, it may be helpful to relate the present discussion to that of the previous chapter. How should we understand God's freedom in light of the compatibilist/libertarian debate? I have proposed that God's moral character does impose boundaries on his will, so that it is impossible that God would choose to do evil.

We should note that God's moral restraint is internal to himself rather than external, and poses no problem for asserting that God is free in at least the compatibilist sense. But given this internal impossibility, we may not say that God has unqualified libertarian freedom. In fact, I have argued in the previous chapter that the notion of performing

acts against one's motives and desires seems detrimental to the concept of free will.44 I have also proposed that God possesses the power of contrary choice with respect to his

gracious acts of benevolence, since he owes nothing to his creatures. He is neither

'obligated' nor 'determined'45 to be as benevolent as he can be. We may add that his

decision to create was similarly free.46 He could have chosen not to create anything at

all. Or he could have created an alternative world that reflects his goodness in ways

quite different from the present world. But he could not have created evil creatures,

42 Erickson, God the Father Almighty, 246; cf. Turretin, 1:219: "God wills himself necessarily.. .(as) the ultimate end and the highest good which he cannot but will and love.. .for he cannot nill his own glory or deny himself."

43 Frame, Doctrine of God, 233; cf. Erickson: "God's decisions and actions are not determined by consideration of any factors outside himself (Erickson, Christian Theology, 304).

44 Cf. Frame, Doctrine of God, 233.

45 Obviously, I use this word in the philosophical sense. His benevolent acts are determined neither by his nature nor by external causes.

46 Frame, Doctrine of God, 232. 90 since that would be inconsistent with his moral essence. In short, I affirm that God's acts are morally bounded but not morally determined. They are necessarily consistent with but not determined by his nature.47

It is evident that the nature of God's will does not neatly fit into the human categories we have outlined in the previous chapter. But this should not surprise us, since God is a wholly different kind of being than humans. We are exploring the transcendent mysteries of God's nature which he has not exhaustively revealed to us.

We can certainly affirm that God is supremely wise. But there is no reason to think that his supreme wisdom would narrow his choices to a single possibility in any

'circumstance'. Given the initial 'circumstance' of being without any created thing, his supreme wisdom could conceivably have been expressed in creating a different world, or in choosing not to create at all. In fact, it seems that the category of 'circumstance' can hardly apply to an eternally self-existent being. Likewise, the complexities of

God's 'desires' and his 'good pleasure' are mysteries. Augustine's questions about why

God chose to create when he did are beyond the reach of human reason.49

Broadly speaking, I would suggest that there are at least two ways in which

God's freedom transcends ours. The first relates to the various meanings of the terms

'can' and 'could' as noted in the previous chapter. Besides the contra-causal sense,

47 Cf. Erickson: "Not only do God's decisions not stem from any sort of external determination, they are not a matter of internal compulsion either. That is to say, although God's decisions and actions are quite consistent with his nature, they are not constrained by his nature" (Erickson, Christian Theology, 378). Although Erickson expresses a very similar idea, his words 'compulsion' and 'constrained' are too strong for my purposes here. Also see Turretin, 1:252-3 regarding natural and free right.

48 Also see Erickson's comment quoted in note 43 of this chapter.

49 For this reason, Augustine held that God is absolutely timeless. But we need not follow his conclusions. There may have been dynamics or 'events' within the Trinity about which we know absolutely nothing. Or there may have been other kinds of 'reasons' altogether. 91 these words can also refer to the possession of powers and opportunities. It stands to reason that God by virtue of his omnipotence and sovereignty would possess a corresponding freedom far beyond that of his creatures.

The second relates to the various degrees of self-determinism, which is more properly the issue in question. I argued in Chapter 2 that both 'theological determinism' and 'self-determinism' are true of humans and that they are mutually compatible. I also

argued that human choices, or self-determinations, are predictable responses to circumstances determined by the individual's character. I would propose that God's freedom of self-determination is distinct from that of humans for three reasons. First, as

the supreme infinite being, God is without a superior who determines his actions.

Second, because God is completely free from the force of circumstance, his actions are

free in a significant sense that ours are not. Third, because his essence is

incomprehensibly greater and richer than ours, his self-determination is correspondingly

broader and freer.50

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the various aspects of God's goodness

particularly as it relates to his freedom. Although we may not properly speak of moral

obligations being imposed on God, I have used such language to define the boundaries

of theological and ethical consistency as applied to God's actions. I have concluded that

while God always acts consistently with his moral nature, he is never obligated to

perform benevolent acts for the sake of his creatures. Rather, his highest commitment is

to glorify himself. Yet there is abundant evidence that God does graciously lavish his

blessings on all his creatures. I have also concluded that the freedom God possesses

50 See Appendix 2: Aseity, Ontology, and Freedom. 92 certainly transcends the compatibilist freedom I described in the previous chapter. Yet it

is not without the necessary boundaries consistent with his unchanging moral nature.

With these definitions in place regarding God's goodness and his freedom, as

well as the account of providence presented in the previous chapter, we are now ready to

proceed to the specific issue of moral evil. Admittedly, some issues raised in this

chapter concerning the goodness and freedom of God have not been adequately treated.

But they properly belong to the task of Chapter 5, which specifically addresses the

problem of evil within the theological framework I have outlined thus far. CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF SOME MAJOR APPROACHES

The purpose of this chapter is to survey and analyse some of the major

approaches to the problem of moral evil in preparation for constructing my own proposal. I assess their validity within their own theological systems as well as the

usefulness of various elements for my construction. No attempt will be made to provide

a comprehensive survey of all existing approaches or to give full expositions of those it

addresses.

Best Possible World Theodicy - G. W. Leibniz

Leibniz believed that God must always act according to what is rationally

determined to be the greatest good.1 Since God is supremely wise and supremely good,

the world he has created must be the best possible world and the evil that exists must be

a logically necessary part of this world.2 A commonly misunderstood fact is that by

"best possible world," Leibniz did not mean that the world in its present state is best, but

•a

that the world, infinitely extended into the future, is the best possible world.

According to Leibniz, humans were created as finite beings, whose finitude

made mutation and sin possible. He held that all logical possibilities, including the

specific natures of all possible creatures, are contained in "the Region of the Eternal

1 Gottfried W. Leibniz, "The Freedom of Man in the Origin of Evil," Theodicy, abridged and edited by Diogenes Allen, trans. E. M. Huggard (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pt. 1, sect. 8; also pt. 3, sect. 319.

2 Ibid., pt. 2, sect. 226. Also see pt. 1, sect. 25.

3 Ibid., pt. 2, sect. 228. John M. Frame's comments in The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg: P & R, 2002), 171 implies this misunderstanding.

93 94

Verities" independent of God's will.4 Everything that God creates, he selects from the given possibilities. Leibniz held that "there is an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence." Because of this limitation, creatures can deceive themselves and commit errors. Thus, evil is ultimately caused by

finitude.6

Besides finitude, Leibniz also invoked the abuse of free will as a secondary

explanation of moral evil:

Lying or wickedness springs from the Devil's own nature.. .from his will, because it was written in the book of the eternal verities, which contains the things possible before any decree of God, that this creature would freely turn toward evil if it were created. It is the same with Eve and Adam; they sinned freely, albeit the Devil tempted them.7

Leibniz held that there are an infinite number of logically possible worlds which

were coeternal with God, each of which is "the whole succession and the whole

agglomeration of all existent things." Because of the interconnectedness of objects and

events within each possible world, not all conceivable combinations are possible.

Instead of choosing specific elements in isolation from others, God must actualize a

whole possible world. For this reason, there will necessarily be parts of the whole that

seem undesirable, though they contribute to the goodness of the total plan. "We know,

4 Ibid., pt. 1, sect. 20.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. Also see pt. 3, sect. 288: "The original imperfection of creatures, which is already present in the eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause [of evil]."

7 Ibid., pt. 3, sect. 275. The notion of eternal verities bears some initial resemblance to the content of Molina's middle knowledge, or what others have called counterfactual or hypothetical knowledge. However, he does not make the Molinist distinction between possible and middle knowledge.

8Ibid.,pt. l,sect. 8.

9 Ibid., pt. 1, sect. 9. 95 moreover, that often an evil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without that evil."10 Leibniz also argues that the presence of evil helps us to better perceive and appreciate the good: "Do men relish health enough, or thank God enough for it, without having ever been sick? And is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good more discernible, that is to say, greater?"11

In creating the world, God first surveyed these possible worlds, then chose and

actualized the best of them. His purpose in creating the world was "to manifest and

communicate his perfections in the way that was most efficacious, and most worthy of his greatness, his wisdom, and his goodness." God could not have refrained from

creating, nor could he have created a different world, since either alternative would have

resulted in an inferior state of affairs, and would not have displayed his perfections

adequately.14

Leibniz also made a distinction between God's 'antecedent' will, by which he

desires only the good features of the world, and his 'consequent' will, by which he wills

and actualizes the best combination of compossible features, including the necessary

evils. God is committed to creating the maximum amount of good with the minimum

compossible amount of evil. Even though God does not will evil directly or

Ibid., pt. 1, sect. 10. This part of Leibniz's argument utilizes a form of the greater good defence. Also see Pt. 2, sect. 216.

11 Ibid., pt. l,sect. 12.

12 Ibid., pt. 2, sect. 225.

13 Ibid., pt. 1, sect. 78. His point in this passage was that this purpose is compatible with his concern for the welfare of his creatures.

14 John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil, revised and expanded edition (Wheaton: Crossway, 2004), 56, 58. 96

'antecedently,' he does so indirectly or 'consequently' by willing the best possible world, which necessarily includes evil.

Finally, I have already observed that love of virtue and hatred of vice, which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence and to prevent the existence of vice, are only antecedent acts of will, such as is the will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save them from misery. These acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of all the antecedent will of God taken together, whose result forms the consequent will, or the decree to create the best. Through this decree it is that love for virtue and for the happiness of rational creatures, which is undefined in itself and goes as far as is possible, receives some slight limitations, on account of the heed that must be paid to good in general. Thus one must understand that God loves virtue supremely and hates vice supremely, and that nevertheless some vice is to be permitted.15

Evaluation of Leibniz's Best Possible World Theodicy

Leibniz's theodicy offers many contributions that are compatible with my

theology. The idea that humans are finite and therefore mutable is a necessary, though

not sufficient, explanation of sin for any system that takes seriously the biblical idea of

the fall.16 It also seems true that some evils are necessary to some goods, though I

would question whether all the facts and components of the world are as

comprehensively interrelated as Leibniz proposes. I agree with Leibniz that God's

motive in creating the world is to "display his perfections."

Leibniz's distinction between God's antecedent will and his consequent will is

similar to the Reformed distinction between preceptive and decretive will. The crucial

difference is that for Leibniz, the consequent will is based on a rationally determined

Leibniz, pt. 2, sect. 222. Also see pt. 2, sect. 209.

Feinberg, Many Faces, 168.

See Chapter 5 for discussions on divine motive as well as the fall. 97 best possible world, while the Reformed perspective holds that God's decrees were freely chosen.

Frame suggests that if we extend the concept of 'world' beyond the past and the present state of creation into the future consummation, this may be the best possible world.18 That this world with its entire course of history, including God's redemptive

work, is the best possible world is quite feasible. If we could see all that God has done with the world from the perspective of eternity, perhaps we would be amazed at the

wisdom of his work and confess that it could not possibly have been better. However,

this is only a possibility, not a necessity. Feinberg states plainly that "there is no best

possible world."19 I doubt that such a judgment is epistemologically within our grasp.

However, I would suggest that perhaps this world, omni-temporally considered, may be

one of the best possible worlds. This would affirm God's power of contrary choice as

well as the perfect wisdom of all his works.20

Frame argues that a perfect world does not logically require the existence of

evil.21 While I would agree, this seems to miss the point. Leibniz does not claim that

this world is perfect in the sense of being flawless. Rather, he suggests that the present

world could be better than one that is flawless and consequently lacking certain

accompanying goods. Frame also objects that the original creation as described in

Scripture lacked perfection in many ways. While Adam was created good, he was also

18 John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Phillipsburg: P & R, 1994), 159.

19 Feinberg, Many Faces, 68.

20 See Appendix 3: Must God Create the Best Possible World? for further discussion of this issue.

21 Frame, Apologetics, 158. 98

"alone," which was not good (Gen 2:18). Also, Satan was "most likely created good,

99 but was from the beginning capable of rebellion against God." It is certainly true that humans and angels as originally created were finite and fallible. But I would argue that the original creation, which certainly included Eve, was perfect in the sense of being flawless and complete as well as being perfectly suited to God's good purposes (Gen

1:27, 31; 2:1-3).

As for the question of whether the original creation was the best possible

world,23 it is conceivable that finitude and fallibility are a necessary part of any creation,

and that it is only through some subsequent process that creatures can be made

infallible. This is to conjecture that it may have been impossible to create at the

beginning the world as it will be in the final state.24 If this is the case, one could say that

the pre-fall state may have been the best among the original states of all possible worlds,

though not yet the best possible state of affairs. This can be likened to a 'best possible 9^

sapling', which, though extremely good, does not yet bear mature fruit.

Leibniz's doctrine of 'eternal verities' from which he derives the certainty of

freely chosen moral evils resembles a compatibilist account of hypotheticals. However,

his doctrine of verities seems to place unnecessary restrictions on the kind of things God

can create. There does not seem to be any reason why God could not have created a

Here, Frame is speaking of the best possible world in the temporally restricted sense, without consideration of subsequent states of the world.

24 Although I suggest this possibility, I am not committed to it. My point is simply that this is not logically impossible.

25 Although this suggestion is somewhat reminiscent of the Irenaean two-stage creation thesis, it should be noted that even Augustine affirmed that the final state will be better than the original. 99 being very similar to the devil, but who would not do evil. Likewise, one may argue that God could have created beings very similar to Adam and Eve who would not succumb to temptation. It seems that in order to argue that this is the best possible world, Leibniz has somewhat arbitrarily narrowed the limits of what is possible by positing a region of eternal verities which is beyond God's control. In Leibniz's theodicy, the verities serve the strategic function of restricting God's control over evil,

corresponding to libertarian free will in a synergistic system. But unlike proponents of

the latter system, Leibniz does not offer a sufficient justification for these verities. He

simply asserts, somewhat conveniently, that they are logically necessary.

Another objection is that if, as Leibniz proposes, the evil acts of the devil and the

fall of Adam and Eve are logical necessities, fatalism ensues. This is clearly

incompatible with his invocation of free will in explaining these events. That these

creatures are fated, by logical necessity, to freely choose to do evil seems an irresolvable

paradox.27

Although I have charged Leibniz with inconsistency, we should note that his

theodicy does not rest on the notion of free will; the functional element of his theodicy is

the logical interconnectedness of all things in the world. While I reject his metaphysical

system as implausible, I grant that his solution to the problem of evil is technically

Leibniz, "Preliminary Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason," sect. 2, in Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, trans. E. M. Huggard, ed. with an introduction by Austin Farrer (Project Gutenberg, 2005), http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/17147 (accessed May 12, 2006).

27 Granted, the philosophical discussions on the nature of freedom were far less developed in Leibniz's time than today. The apparent contradiction could be attributed to imprecise terminology. Perhaps Leibniz was a compatibilist. 100 successful. More importantly, it yields a number of valuable insights that can be incorporated into my proposal.

Free Will Defence - St. Augustine, Alvin Plantinga

Augustine, who is generally acknowledged as the originator of the free will defence, began by affirming the supreme value of the will, which is necessary for moral good, but also entails the possibility of evil. God's intention in granting free will is that humans would "live rightly and honourably and to reach the highest wisdom."28 It is

free will that makes human actions morally significant, whether righteous or sinful, and

90

to be justly rewarded or punished. Although free will makes sin possible, God is justified in granting it because free will is necessary for humans to act rightly. Note

however, that Augustine did not mean to ascribe to free will only instrumental value.

He wrote, "An errant horse is better than a stone that cannot err because it has neither

motion nor feeling of its own. So a creature which sins by its own free will is more •a i

excellent than one which cannot sin because it has no free will." Evidently, Augustine

held moral agency to be intrinsically valuable, regardless of whether it is used to do

good or evil.

Alvin Plantinga builds on Augustine's basic argument with a philosophically

sophisticated defence, of which the following is an overview. By utilizing a libertarian

Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 1, chap. 12, 25, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans. By John H. S. Burleigh, The Library of Christian Classics: Ichthus Edition (Philadephia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 127.

29 Ibid., bk. 2, chap. 1,3.

31 Ibid., bk. 3, chap. 5, 15. 101 view of freedom32 and presupposing the truth of counterfactuals,33 Plantinga argues that it is possible that every person suffers from 'transworld depravity'. By this he means that it is possible that in every possible world, each person would freely perform at least one morally wrong action. Consequently, it is possible that even an omnipotent God is unable to create a world in which there is moral good, but not moral evil.34

Evaluation of the Free Will Defence

Given the presupposition of libertarian freedom, the free will defence is successful. It seems true that if human free will is of sufficient intrinsic value, and if it is beyond God's ability to prevent free acts of moral evil, God would not be culpable for such evil. Within its premises, this defence provides a coherent explanation for the presence of moral evil in our world for which God is not responsible.

However, Matthew 10:29-31 poses a considerable problem for proponents of this defence who subscribe to biblical infallibility. As Jesus warns his disciples of the persecution they will experience, he assures them that these moral evils can only come upon them by the Father's specific permission. This passage seems to be irreconcilable to the free will defence.

Furthermore, as I have argued in Chapter 2, the idea that libertarian freedom is the only form of freedom, or the only valuable form of freedom, is highly unlikely. If it is possible for God to have significant free will, and yet be free from the risk of sin, it seems possible for him to grant his creatures free will while keeping them from sinning.

32 Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 29.

33 Ibid., 41-43.

34 Ibid., 47-48,53. 102

If one argues that any freedom worth having also entails the significant possibility of sinning, it becomes difficult to give a coherent account of God's free will, as well as the nature of human free will in the final state. If it is admitted that compatibilist freedom is possible, as in the final state, proponents of the free will defence would then have to explain why God did not create humans with compatibilist free will in the first place.

Even if it is assumed that libertarian freedom is the only legitimate form of free will, one may still question whether, given the consequent evils, free will is of sufficient value to justify God's decision to grant it. In light of the excessive amounts of evil and the kinds of horrendous evils that exist,35 critics of the defence may question God's wisdom in creating free creatures. Atheists and Christians alike may be left asking, "Is free will really worth it?" Those who believe that both libertarian and compatibilist free will are logically possible certainly have reason to answer in the negative. This objection may be partially alleviated by Augustine's argument that free will is also necessary for the moral good that exists. But for the many consequentialists who believe that the moral evil in the world far outweighs the moral good, this solution lacks plausibility.

Marilyn Adams lists the following examples: "the rape of a woman and axing off of her arms, psychophysical torture whose ultimate goal is the disintegration of personality.. .cannibalizing one's own offspring...child pornography, parental incest, slow death by starvation, participation in the Nazi death camps..." (Marilyn McCord Adams, "Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God," in Philosophy of Religion: the Big Questions, ed. Eleonore Stump and Michael J. Murray [Oxford: Blackwell, 1999], 251).

36 In considering the choice between being a robot and being libertarianly free, Feinberg grants that the latter is superior, though it is unclear whether he is referring to the combination of free will with evil or simply free will. He goes on to make a comparison "between incompatibilism and evil on the one hand, and compatibilistic freedom and no evil, on the other," in which case he thinks the latter is preferable (Feinberg, Many Faces, 121). This appears to be an erroneous comparison since incompatibilists by definition reject the possibility of compatibilist freedom. I assume that he is referring to indeterministic or libertarian freedom. He had previously noted that there are individuals of both determinist and indeterminist persuasions who think that both views are logically possible (ibid., 91). In this case, he is quite right and the free will defence should be rejected on this ground. 103

The idea of free will contributes a useful idea. Even in a compatibilist system free will37 is necessary for moral agency and responsibility. It is by virtue of free will, whether compatibilist or libertarian, that human agency is distinct from divine agency.

This refutes the caricature of theological monergists as positing divine omni-causality,

according to which God would be the author of evil. However, free will is insufficient

as an explanation for evil. As a compatibilist, I hold that free will and moral capacity do not necessarily entail the risk of moral evil as an indeterminate possibility; it merely

provides the formal possibility. That is, moral agents possess the capacity to sin; but because theirs is a compatibilistic freedom, they can also be properly prevented from

sinning.

Open Theist Defences

Sanders: "Logic-of-Love" Defence

Open theist defences are essentially variations on the free will defence that

further limit divine providential control by denying that God has exhaustive knowledge

of the future. In building his openness theology of providence, Sanders follows Peter

van Inwagen in stressing the value of a "genuinely reciprocal relationship of love"

between God and his creatures.38 He writes,

God desired to create beings capable of entering into genuine give-and-take relationships of love with him and with one another.. .Love is vulnerable and does not force itself on the beloved. In creating such conditions God takes the implausible yet possible risk that his creatures may reject him.

37 I.e., a will that is free in the sense of being voluntary and not coerced.

John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 258. Sanders' "logic-of-love" defence is essentially a restatement of Peter van Inwagen's theodicy, according to which God's overriding purpose of a freely chosen love relationship requires that he takes the risk of granting libertarian freedom to his creatures. See Peter van Inwagen, "Magnitude, Duration, Distribution of Evil," in Stump and Murray, eds., 196-7.

Ibid., 257-8. 104

It is for the purpose of facilitating this love relationship that God took the risk of granting people libertarian freedom. Such freedom made moral evil possible, but not

inevitable. By setting van Inwagen's theodicy within his own openness account of

providence, Sanders heightens the element of divine risk in creation. Since God does

not have foreknowledge, he did not know at the time of creation that his creatures would

sin. Therefore he is not culpable.40

Sanders also follows van Inwagen's suggestion that God must refrain from

habitually intervening to prevent moral evil and its painful effects because that would

make God a deceiver and ours a world of illusion. The experience of suffering causes

us to become dissatisfied with our state of separation from him and to desire his

redemption.41

Boyd: Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy

Gregory Boyd provides a detailed treatment of the problem of evil based on the

premises of open theism. Using the scriptural motif of divine warfare, he explains evil

in terms of a cosmic struggle between God and the forces of evil, namely Satan and his

fallen angels.42 On the one hand, these forces are no match for God. He has defeated

them in the past, and will defeat them again in the future. In fact, "it was the Lord who

assigns these rebel waters a 'boundary that they may not pass' (Ps 104:9, cf. Job 38:6-

40 Ibid., 259.

41 Ibid., 258. We should note that van Inwagen used this argument to address one of the sub- problems of natural evil, not moral evil (van Inwagen, in Stump and Murray, eds., 207-8).

Gregory A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 30, 35. 105

11; Prov 8:27-29)."43 On the other hand, these are formidable enemies against whom

God has to fight to defend his sovereignty.44

All evil is ultimately to be explained by the free will of moral agents, whether

human or angelic. Angelic agency accounts for any evil that cannot be attributed to

humans, such as natural evil.45 The existence of evil is evidence that "God's good will is

not being uniformly carried out in history" and that "he does not control everything."46

Like Sanders, Boyd explains that God took the risk of creating such free agents because

only libertarianly free beings can possess the capacity to love.

Evaluation of Open Theist Defences

The strength of these openness proposals is that they provide the free will

defence with two plausible justifications for God's decision to give humans free will.

The first of these is the value of freely chosen love. While many would question the

value of libertarian free will, the value of freely responsive love is biblically and

theologically more tenable. This argument previously proposed by van Inwagen was

appropriately adapted by Sanders and further incorporated into a complete openness

theodicy by Boyd.48

A further justification for human freedom given by open theism is that God did

not know the evils that would result. In creating free moral agents with a capacity for

43 Ibid., 30-31.

44 Ibid., 30,34-35.

45 Ibid., 24, 39.

46 Ibid., 48, 30.

47 Ibid., 23,55-7. 48 Although Augustine did not speak of freely chosen love, this is easily inferred from his argument that free will is necessary for acting rightly, since loving God is the supremely 'right' act. 106 love, God took the risk that his creatures would commit evil. The strength of this position is that since it was quite plausible that his creatures would choose to love, and since God ultimately did not know how they would respond, he was justified in taking the risk of creating them.

As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, simple foreknowledge seems inconsistent, or at least inexplicable, given the libertarian view of human free will and a temporal view of

God. More significantly, I have argued that middle knowledge, without which foreknowledge is providentially unprofitable, is clearly inconsistent with libertarianism regardless of one's position on divine temporality. In this respect, open theism appears to be more philosophically consistent than the traditional synergism represented by van

Inwagen and Plantinga. However, the problems abound when we carefully consider the theological implications of openness exegesis. Openness readings of key texts logically result in conceiving of God as lacking not only in foreknowledge, but also in

omniscience, wisdom, and providential competence.49

I would grant that Boyd's theodicy is plausible given his synergistic premises.

His consideration of Satan and fallen angels is useful in explaining natural evil, and to

some extent, moral evil committed by humans. However, his exact position on divine

sovereignty is unclear, if not contradictory. He follows the biblical affirmation of God's

supremacy over his enemies, stating that they are "no match for Yahweh."50 Yet he

explains specific occurrences of evil as events that were against God's will and beyond

See my critique of open theism in Chapter 2.

Boyd, 31, 32. 107

God's control.51 If these foes are no match for God, why is God losing so many battles?

And if God draws "boundaries that they may not pass," Boyd has yet to explain why the boundaries are not tighter.

Rather than stressing the warfare aspect, the Old Testament stresses God's

absolute sovereignty and victory over these mythical creatures (e.g. Ps 74:13-14; Isa

27: l).52 They are not portrayed as posing any threat or limitation to God's providential

control. While God's people are powerless against these foes, God retains full control

over them. The Psalms in particular contain a high concentration of prayers for God to

arise and take action (e.g. Pss 3:7; 7:6; 9:19; 10:12; 59:4b-5; 74:22). If God was already

doing all he can to combat evil, such prayers would be superfluous. They only make

sense within a worldview of absolute divine sovereignty, in which the writer is puzzled

about why God delays in taking action.

Soul-Making Theodicy - John Hick

As suggested by the title, John Hick's theodicy attributes the presence of evil to

God's purpose of building souls. It presupposes a libertarian account of human freedom

and a consequentialist account of ethics. He rejects the Augustinian idea of a fall from

a perfect original state and opts instead for an Irenaean account of a two-stage creation

process to which he weds the paradigm of evolutionary development. In order to create

perfect finite human beings in a freely chosen relationship with their Maker, God had to

begin by creating spiritually immature creatures in a religiously ambiguous world in

51 Ibid., 30,48.

52 Note that Isaiah 27:1 speaks in terms of punishment rather than warfare.

53 By "consequentialist account of ethics," I mean that Hick morally justifies God's actions by virtue of the good consequences that come out of the presence of evil in the world. This follows Feinberg's classification (See Feinberg, Many Faces, 65). 108 which God's presence is not overwhelmingly evident.54 Also, given the value of virtues

developed by "right decisions in situations of challenge and temptation," humans also

had to be created morally immature and placed in an ethically challenging environment

in which they can develop moral virtues through their own free choices. "Thus that

one is morally imperfect (i.e., that there is moral evil), and that the world is a

challenging and even dangerous environment (i.e., that there is natural evil), are

necessary aspects of the present stage of the process through which God is gradually

creating perfected finite persons."56

Hick also holds that God's project of soul-building will ultimately succeed and

every human being will be saved. "If the justification of evil within the creative process

lies in the limitless and eternal good of the end state to which it leads, then the

completeness of the justification must depend upon the completeness, or universality, of

the salvation achieved. Only if it includes the entire human race can it justify the sins

and sufferings of the entire human race throughout all history."57

Evaluation of Hick's Soul-Building Theodicy

One critique that has been brought against the soul-building theodicy is that

apparently suffering does not always build souls. In fact, horrendous forms of suffering,

such as the holocaust, seem to destroy the souls of both perpetrators and victims more

John Hick, "Soul-Making Theodicy," in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson et. al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 285. Hick refers to this principle as 'epistemic distance'.

55 Ibid., 286.

56 Ibid., 290.

Ibid., 294. 109 than they build them.58 Another is that even if evil or the resultant suffering sometimes builds souls, it is not a necessary condition for soul-building.

I have many problems with Hick's set of presuppositions: his consequentialist ethic, his libertarianism, his proposal that epistemic distance is necessary for preserving

creaturely freedom, his denial of the fall and corresponding evolutionary assumptions,

and his universalism.60 However, he provides two concepts that can be adapted with

some modification into my theological system. First, his idea of epistemic distance is

suggestive of the biblical theme of faith. There is intrinsic value in the human exercise

of faith in the absence of compelling evidence for God or in the face of evidence against

God's existence and loving providential care (John 20:29; Heb 11). Second, while I

reject Hick's evolutionary presuppositions, there is scriptural support for the idea that

the final state of humans will be superior to the initial pre-fall state (e.g. 1 Cor 15:42-

49). The fall was a genuine tragedy. But it is plausible that the value of glorified

humans, which presupposes the fall, overbalances the evil that resulted from the fall. In

rejecting his consequentialist ethic, I deny that the good achieved in the final state justifies the presence of evil in the world. However, the value of the final state is

certainly important to Christian theology.

John K. Roth, "A Theodicy of Protest," in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 3; Frederick Sontag, "A Divine Response: 'Now Hear This,'" in Encountering Evil, 209.

59 This objection is raised by G. Stanley Kane and affirmed by Feinberg {Many Faces, 149, 154).

60 Feinberg points out that Hick's universalism is inconsistent with his libertarian account of freedom, but affirms that Hick's theodicy can be successful without universalism (ibid., 152). 110

Greater Good Defence - Keith Yandell

In his version of the greater good defence, Keith Yandell challenges the premise that "it is always good to prevent evil," a premise entailed in the logical problem of evil.

He proposes the possibility that "the prevention of [a particular evil] E will also prevent some good G which is of equal [or greater] value to [than] the nonexistence of E and for which E is a logically necessary condition." It is also possible that "the prevention of E will entail the existence of E' which is as evil as E.. .[or] a greater evil than E and for which the nonexistence of E is a logically sufficient condition."61 He argues that the permission of the existence of an evil is morally justifiable if it is necessary to bring about an equal good or prevent an equal evil. Also, the permission of the evil is morally obligatory if it is necessary to bring about a greater good or prevent a greater evil.

Yandell also makes the distinction between first- and second-order goods and evils. For example, second-order goods such as courage seem to require the presence of first-order evils such as pain and fear. Yandell suggests that the growth to moral maturity of free moral agents qualifies as a criterion for second-order 'good'.63 Thus, the evil that God allows to occur to each moral agent must be logically necessary to providing that agent with maximal opportunity for moral maturity.64

61 Keith E. Yandell, Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 47.

Keith E, Yandell, "The Greater Good Defense," Sophia 13 (October 1974): 5-6; quoted in Feinberg, Many Faces, 136-7. Yandell defines free moral agency in the libertarian sense.

64 Ibid. Note that in Yandell's version, the greater good is justified "where the evils occurring to each agent are so arranged as to provide him maximal opportunity for moral maturity," though it may also further the growth of another (ibid.). In some versions of the greater good defence, the evil is justified by benefits to others without necessarily benefiting the sufferer. For example, one person's suffering can cultivate compassion in another. Such solutions are more objectionable than Yandell's. Ill

Evaluation of Yandell's Greater Good Defence

Feinberg lists several objections to Yandell's version of the greater good

defence: 1) he cites Stanley Kane's objection that second-order goods such as courage

and fortitudinous pain-bearing are not sufficiently valuable to justify first-order evils

such as fear, pain, suffering, or disease; 2) it unnecessarily incorporates Hick's soul-

building theodicy; 3) it unnecessarily incorporates the free will defence, which utilizes a

non-consequentialist account of ethics and is therefore incompatible with Yandell's

consequentialism. In addition to these particular problems with Yandell's proposal,

Feinberg also rejects the greater good defence as a whole because its consequentialist

premises are incompatible with his own non-consequentialist view of ethics. In spite of

these problems, Feinberg affirms that the basic defence is successful in solving its

logical problem of moral evil.65

I would agree that Kane's objection has some merit. From a human perspective,

many horrendous evils would seem unjustifiable, regardless of the possible second-order

goods they may produce. However, it is difficult for us to properly assess the nature and

value of the goods produced. More will be said about this in my own proposal.

Feinberg's other two objections also seem valid. However, the objection that Yandell

incorporates the soul-building theodicy is specific to Yandell's version of the defence.

A greater good defence that suggests other types of good consequences would evade this

objection.66 I would also argue that, aside from Yandell's case, an eclectic approach

Ibid., 139-41.

As noted by Feinberg (Many Faces, 140). 112 incorporating elements from various theodicies can be a viable option, as long as those elements are compatible with one's own theological system.

Greater Glory Defence - Jonathan Edwards

Jonathan Edwards presented a greater glory defence that has been followed to

fa various degrees by many Calvinists. Unlike Yandell's emphasis on moral maturity, Edwards identified the greatest good as the manifestation of the glory of God.

It is a proper and excellent thing for infinite glory to shine forth; and for the same reason, it is proper that the shining forth of God's glory should be complete; that is, that all parts of his glory should shine forth.. .Thus it is necessary, that God's awful majesty, his authority and dreadful greatness, justice, and holiness, should be manifested. But this could not be, unless sin and punishment had been decreed.. .If it were not right that God should decree and permit and punish sin, there could be no manifestation of God's holiness in hatred of sin, or in showing any preference, in his providence, of godliness before it. There would be no manifestation of God's grace or true goodness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no misery to be saved from.. .And as it is necessary that there should be evil, because the display of the glory of God could not but be imperfect and incomplete without it, so evil is necessary, in order to [sic] the highest happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that communication of God, for which he made the world; because the creature's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, and sense of his love.

Edwards applied his characteristic determinism even to divine actions. God

necessarily does what is "fittest," "best" and "most wise."69 In the present passage, this

means that God necessarily chose to permit evil in order to display the full spectrum of

his glory, which includes his just punishment of sin as well as his salvation.70

E.g. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 1:435; Frame, Apologetics, 185; Jay Adams, The Grand Demonstration: A Biblical Study of the So-Called Problem of Evil (Santa Barbara: EastGate, 1991), 27-30.

68 Jonathan Edwards, Remarks on Important Theological Controversies, chap. 3, sect. 10, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, (Christian Classics Ethereal Library), 2:1290, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/works2.html (accessed July 17, 2006).

69 Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, vol. 1, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller, gen. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 377, 380.

70 Also see Edwards, Dissertation on the End for Which God Created the World, chap. 1, sects. 1-4, in Works, 1:685-705, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/worksl.html (accessed July 17, 2006). 113

We may also observe that Edwards used a consequentialist ethic in justifying the

71 divine act of permitting evil. Sin is an evil, yet the futurition of sin, or that sin should be future, is not an evil thing. Evil is an evil thing, and yet it may be a good thing that evil should be in the world. There is certainly a difference between the thing itself existing, and its being an evil thing that ever it came into existence. As for instance, it might be an evil thing to crucify Christ, but yet it was a good thing that the crucifying of Christ came to pass. As men's act, it was evil, but as God ordered it, it was good. Who will deny but that it may be so, that evil's coming to pass may be an occasion of greater good than it is an evil, and so of there being more good in the whole, than if that evil had not come to pass? And if so, then it is a good thing that that evil comes to pass.72

Evaluation of Edwards' Greater Glory Defence

In keeping with my deontological commitment, I reject Edwards' use of consequentialist ethics. I also reject his thesis that God's acts are determined by the greatest consequential good. God is free in his actions not only in the sense of acting voluntarily (i.e. compatibilist freedom), but also in the sense that he possesses the power

of contrary choice, though not including the ability to sin.

Edwards overstated his case when he claimed that "there would be no

manifestation of God's grace or true goodness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no

misery to be saved from." Certainly God's goodness can be manifested in other ways,

such as his initial provisions in the garden (Gen 2). Likewise, God's justice and holiness can be manifested in other ways besides hatred and punishment of sin. His

abstinence from evil and delight in moral purity is also a manifestation of his holiness.

71 Although Edwards would probably not subscribe to a consequentialist ethic as a guide for human moral behaviour, he uses this method in morally evaluating God's behaviour. While some would allow this discrepancy based on God's unique status, I would argue that one's account of ethics should be consistently applied to the task of morally justifying God, as in the case of Feinberg (see below).

72 Edwards, Remarks, chap. 3, sect. 17, in Works, 2:1293.

See my statements in Chapter 3. 114

He can deal justly with good creatures by blessing them with good things. While God freely chose to manifest his glory through sin and redemption, he was free to choose otherwise.

Edwards' affirmation that God necessarily manifests himself in these ways led to a misguided charge by James Beilby that Edwards' position undermines the doctrine of divine aseity.74 Beilby addresses Edwards' statement that "it is the necessary

consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation

and effulgence of it."75 He argues that if God must demonstrate his glory, and if his

glory cannot be fully demonstrated without creation, there is a sense in which God is

"psychologically dependent" on creation.

Contrary to Beilby's inference, Edwards' point was that while God is

independently and infinitely happy, he also takes delight in communicating himself to

77 the creature, and consequently, he necessarily self-communicates. We could infer a

7fi

teleological necessity, that because God necessarily does what is wisest and best, he

adds to his delight by sharing. But we need not infer & psychological necessity, since

God was not in any sense unhappy or psychologically lacking apart from self-

James Beilby, "Divine Aseity, Divine Freedom: A Conceptual Problem for Edwardsian- Calvinism," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 47, no. 4 (2004): 647-58.

75 Edwards, Dissertation, chap. 1, sect. 4,1:698.

76 Beilby, 649,654.

77 Edwards, Dissertation, chap. 1, sect. 4,1:697. That there is no contradiction here is evident when we consider the mathematical metaphor that infinity plus x equals infinity. Just because God is able to add x does not mean that the first 'infinity' was less than infinite.

Cf. Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 377, 380. 115 manifestation. Edwards' position is problematic not because it contradicts divine aseity,

70 but because it contradicts divine freedom.

I also object to Edwards' affirmation that the full display of God's glory, and hence evil, is necessary to achieve the maximum happiness of creatures. Those punished in hell are certainly not happier than they could have been without sin.

Likewise, many Christians would be happier if their unsaved loved ones were saved. It is certainly a good thing for God to justly punish the wicked. But to make this an end to happiness seems inappropriately anthropocentric. This line of thinking led Edwards close to denying the tragedy of sin and suffering. "There is no such thing truly as any pain, or grief, or trouble in God." "Sin is an evil, yet the futurition of sin, or that sin

should be future, is not an evil thing. Evil is an evil thing, and yet it may be a good thing that evil should be evil in the world."

Although I disagree with some of Edwards' particular statements, his basic

defence is compatible with my theology. I agree that God is committed to displaying his

glory and that such commitment is consistent with his concern for the welfare of his

creatures. Evil certainly offers an opportunity for the particular display of his justice

and mercy through redemption and punishment, though this does not entail any

necessity.

79 I.e., in the traditional Reformed sense of divine freedom to contrary choice. My suggestion in Appendix 2 that divine aseity is one of the foundations for divine freedom is not compromised by my present analysis. While Edwards and I draw different inferences from divine aseity, we can both consistently affirm the doctrine. I infer from aseity that God possesses a freedom that transcends human compatibilistic freedom, an inference that leads me to reject Edwards' teleological necessity. Because Edwards does not draw the same inference regarding divine freedom, he is able to hold to teleological necessity.

80 Edwards, Remarks, chap. 3, sect. 14, 2:1291.

Ibid., chap. 3, sect. 17, 2:1293. 116

Integrity of Humans Defence - John Feinberg

John Feinberg proposes a defence based on a compatibilist account of free will

and non-consequentialist ethics. It is built on the intrinsic value of human beings as God has created them, as well as the adverse consequences that would result from possible

actions God could take to eradicate or prevent evil. God intended to create humans as

metaphysically and morally finite and possessing a rational capacity, emotions,

compatibilistically free will, desires, intentions, and capacity for bodily movement.82

He also created our world to run according to its particular set of natural laws. Given

such intentions, "God cannot eradicate moral evil without contradicting his intentions in

producing that being."84

In explaining how sin arises, Feinberg cites James 1:13-15 and argues that

or

"morally evil actions ultimately stem from human desires." Humans have certain

basic desires or needs which are not intrinsically evil. However, there are means of

satisfying those desires which are morally evil and can be a source of temptation.

Such temptations can arise from circumstances of everyday life, whether or not God was

involved in bringing about those circumstances.87

Feinberg, Many Faces, 167-8.

Ibid., 168.

Ibid., 169.

Ibid.

Ibid., 170, which see for a helpful account of the process.

Ibid., 171; idem, No One Like Him (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001), 655. 117

Feinberg contends that the kinds of interventions required to eradicate moral evil from our world would produce greater evil than already exists in the world. To explain why God cannot bring a compatibilisitically free person to freely choose a good action, he writes:

To convince one person to do right would probably require rearrangements in other people's lives, changes that would require that they do things they don't want to do. If God wants those other people to do what he wants unconstrainedly, he may need to rearrange even other people's lives.. .To leave everyone's freedom intact may be a lot more difficult than we suppose. It is more likely that the free will of many will be abridged as a result of God's attempts to convince certain people to do good.89

Feinberg's point is not that God is unable to prevent any of the specific evils we do. He implicitly grants that specific evils are preventable at the cost of considerable disturbances to the established order of the world. His point seems to be that God is unable to remove all evils from the world without disturbances of unacceptable

90 proportions.

In another work, Feinberg gives an account of how God can ordain and bring about specific events by arranging circumstances so that people will choose according to his intentions: Of course, bringing about circumstances to move us (but not constrain us) to act will undoubtedly involve actions of other people, and God will have to arrange things so as to move them to do things and be places that will coincide with the details of our life. Being omniscient and able to see a whole interconnected world at once, God can do such things. In some cases, it may mean that one agent or another does act under constraint (and hence, unfreely) in order for him or her to do something involved in getting someone else to act freely. But compatibilists never claim that every act ever done is free in their sense.91

Feinberg, Many Faces, 172-9.

89 Ibid., 173. This problem is further complicated by our sin nature (ibid.).

90 This is implied in his references to removal of "all evil" (e.g. Feinberg, Many Faces, 172-3, 431).

91 Feinberg, No One Like Him, 653. 118

This quote is part of Feinberg's explanation of morally neutral actions.

However, he acknowledges God's ability to arrange circumstances in order to determine all actions, whether they are morally neutral, good, or evil, though only as a remote cause in the occasions of sin.92 In the case of morally good actions, he provides grace for us to perform those actions, as well as to help us avoid sin.

Evaluation of Feinberg's Defence

Given the limitations of Feinberg's compatibilism and non-consequentialist

ethic, he has proposed an admirably innovative defence. His argument for the intrinsic

value of humans as God intended to create them is an important contribution, though

many will question its sufficiency. As in the case of the free will defence, critics will

ask, "Is this particular design of humans worth it?" Just as compatibilistic freedom with

no evil is a superior alternative to libertarian freedom with evil, one could argue that

many of die endless variations of superhumans who would not perpetrate evil may be

superior to humans as God created them.

Feinberg's account of the dynamics of temptation, and particularly his use of the

concept of 'desires', is a helpful analysis from a compatibilist perspective. His appeal to

the natural laws necessary for a stable environment is also helpful.

An unfortunate flaw in Feinberg's defence is that it deals only with the post-fall

state. It does not adequately demonstrate that God was unable to properly prevent

compatibilistically free humans in the original state from falling into sin. Nor does it

suggest any reasons why God would permit the fall if it was the case that he was able to

92 Ibid., 655-6.

93 Ibid., 654,655. 119 prevent it. While divine intervention to eradicate existing evil would cause severe disturbances, it is not clear that interventions to prevent the fall would do the same.94

Note also that Feinberg's strict application of non-consequentialism has led him to use a priority-oriented strategy,95 which is difficult to reconcile with his specific sovereignty account of providence.96 Feinberg's defence essentially states that God committed himself to achieving and preserving a prior good (G), though it entails the possibility of unpreventable evil consequences (E). Note that if E is a specific evil, and

God is unable to properly prevent it given his prior commitment to G, it would seem that he is not specifically sovereign.97 This in itself is not a problem for Feinberg, as he seems to hold that specific evils are preventable, though at the cost of significant rearrangements in the lives of many people.

There seems to be significant tension between his account of evil and his account of specific sovereignty. In the former, he makes much of the interventions required to

QQ prevent an evil action, while in the latter, he downplays the level of interventions required. Perhaps human depravity accounts for the disparity. Yet Feinberg also grants

Feinberg applies his account of temptation to the initial sin, but stills fails to address this critical question of why God did not or could not prevent the fall.

95 See my analysis in the next section.

96 While I also hold to a non-consequentialist ethic, I differ with Feinberg in the way this position should be applied to the problem of evil. See the following section.

97 Some clarification is needed regarding this assessment. Although such evils are not properly preventable, neither are they logically necessary. They are simply the contingently possible consequences of God's prior commitment to granting and preserving human agency. Although a particular human, H, commits an evil E, which God cannot properly prevent, there are possible worlds in which H would compatibilistically choose not to commit E. That is, compatibilistically determined choices (as in Feinberg's system) are not to be equated with logical necessity (as in Leibniz). See Feinberg, Many Faces, 181.

Note that he does so in the process of making the point that God is unable to properly prevent all moral evil. 120

that God can provide grace to help individuals avoid sin as he chooses." Consider also

that Feinberg, as a moderate Calvinist, believes that God is able to grant such grace that

is efficacious in bringing a sinner to repentance and faith. Is it not conceivable that God

could likewise provide grace for an individual to avoid a particular evil action without

causing any more disturbance than that required to bring about a morally neutral action?

If we may legitimately question Feinberg's assessment of the level of disturbance

required to prevent an evil action, it calls into question his account of why God is unable

to properly eradicate all moral evil. Note that this does not invalidate Feinberg's

proposal. But I question the wisdom of combining a priority-oriented approach to the

problem of evil with a specific sovereignty account of providence.

A more substantial problem for Feinberg is that he fails to explain why God

permits the specific occurrences of evil in our world, particularly those of the greatest

intensity. If E is possible, but properly preventable, then E becomes gratuitous and G is

insufficient as an explanation. While Feinberg's defence successfully demonstrates that

God cannot properly eradicate all evil from the world without compromising his good

design for humans, it fails to address the problem of specific evils. The logical problem

of evil may be restated as follows: "If God is all powerful (and specifically sovereign)

and perfectly good, why do these particular evils occur?" His defence seems especially

vulnerable to the forms of the problem that build on gratuitous and horrendous evils.

In light of Feinberg's assertion that God need not create the best possible world, but simply a good world, these problems do not fatally compromise his defence. He has

Feinberg, No One Like Him, 655.

See my analysis in the next section. 121 demonstrated some plausible reasons for believing the present world to be a good one.

However, he has not offered plausible reasons for the origin of evil in the world, nor has he offered a systematically consistent explanation of specific evils.

This analysis of Feinberg's proposal yields an important insight for monergists.

In his estimation, a non-consequentialist ethic requires an approach that invokes a prior

commitment on God's part that limits his intervention in specific occurrences of evil. I have argued that if there is some sense in which God cannot properly prevent a specific

occurrence of evil, it follows that in that same sense, God is not specifically sovereign.

Any system that posits specific sovereignty must also posit specific permission of evil.

And specific permission seems to demand some element of future-oriented purpose in

God's permitting evil.101 Unless one denies either the reality or the significance of evil,

a specific sovereignty account of providence must incorporate some form of purpose-

oriented explanation for evil.

General Analysis: Sovereignty and Theodicy

Among the theological systems that retain the traditional doctrines of

omnipotence and goodness, theodicies can be classified as either priority-oriented or

purpose-oriented. A priority-oriented strategy argues that God creates an antecedent

good (G) from which evil (E) arises, where the latter is a possible but not necessary

consequence of the former. God does not eliminate E because of his prior commitment

101 One could argue that God chose to permit certain evils simply as an exercise of his divine prerogative, or for reasons beyond our ken. While this is logically defensible, it alone would leave most people unsatisfied. This is perhaps the reason why Frame has included some consequentialist explanations for the problem of hell (Frame, Doctrine of God, 413). In addressing the problem of hell, Feinberg avoids relying on consequentialist considerations. However, he does conjecture in passing, "It isn't unlikely that at least some have decided to turn to God as a result of knowing that hell is the ultimate punishment for those who finally reject him" (Feinberg, Many Faces, 432). Perhaps the main difference between the two problems is that God's justice demands punishment of sin, but nothing in his nature demands the permission of evil. 122 to G. A purpose-oriented strategy argues that God allows evil (E) in order to achieve a subsequent good (G). We may also refer to this as a 'goal-oriented' or 'subsequence- oriented' strategy. Both strategies argue that God judges G to be of sufficient value to

v T? 102 permit E.

This classification is somewhat analogous to Feinberg's contrast between

'consequentialist' and 'non-consequentialist' systems. The departure is necessary because Feinberg's classification implicitly confuses ethics with motivation. I hold that not all of God's actions are morally determined (i.e. moral necessities). While his moral

nature sets boundaries on the kinds of actions he would perform, he is free to choose

between various options within those boundaries. It follows that God may have reasons

for freely choosing to permit evil that are distinct from his justification for doing so.103

For some approaches (e.g. Yandell), the distinction between motive and justification appears to be inconsequential. Plantinga's free will defence has achieved

widely acknowledged success because its stated purpose is to address only the problem

of logical consistency, of which moral justification is a key component.104 Although

opponents can complain that he fails to address the question of divine motive, he has

relieved himself from that burden.105 In the case of Feinberg's proposal, however, the

102 In the case of openness theodicies, this is not a prior evaluation on God's part, as he did not know the kinds of evil that would result from his creation. However, these theodicies still use free will as a prior divine commitment, for which the lack of divine exhaustive foreknowledge is a supplement.

103 Feinberg's classification is appropriate for the stated purpose of his defence, which is to demonstrate logical consistency without speculating about God's reasons for permitting evil. But it is inadequate for my purposes here.

104 For Plantinga's distinction between theodicy and defence, see Plantinga, 28. In defences that appeal to limits of providential control (i.e. free will, openness, process), this move is logically tied to the moral justification of God. That is, God is not morally culpable for failing to eliminate evil that he cannot properly eliminate.

Also see Plantinga, 10-11. 123 failure to make this distinction has led him to use a strategy that is incompatible with his system.

I would argue that while synergists may utilize either strategy, monergists may not use the priority-oriented approach. In a priority-oriented strategy, God's commitment to G entails the risk of E. In order for the theodicy to succeed, some element must be in place that makes it impossible or at least inappropriate for God to prevent the subsequent evils that occur. This is clearly inconsistent with a specific

sovereignty, or no-risk model of providence.

A monergist who uses a priority-oriented strategy may argue that even though

God's intentions make it generally inappropriate for him to intervene to prevent evil, he

could still do so in special cases when he judges it wise. But many synergists also grant

that God is able to override human freedom if his purposes demand it.106 Such a

position is still synergistic because some of God's goals, particularly the successful

prevention of specific moral evils, are dependent on human cooperation. In the case of

Feinberg's defence, the dynamics of human cooperation has changed. But what has not

changed is the limitation of divine providential control by a human variable. God's

i rv-i

sovereignty has been compromised by his prior commitments.

We should also note the basic message inherent in each of these strategies. The

priority-oriented strategy argues that since God is unable to properly prevent evil, he is

not responsible for the evil in our world. Alternatively stated, since God is committed to

106 Feinberg et al., Predestination & Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 13.

Given Feinberg's compatibilism, this dependence on human cooperation does not mean that the success of his specific goals is indeterminate. But the distinction does not help Feinberg's case, since an assured failure is no better than a possible failure. The end result is that God does not get his way. 124 certain valuable priority, he is justified in actualizing a state of affairs from which evil arose. It is primarily, though not exclusively, a past-oriented explanation. The purpose- oriented strategy argues that even though there is evil in the world, we can trust that God

is doing a good work through these evils. One day, we will see and understand the wisdom of his ways. One day, we will enjoy the fruits of the divine project and judge them worthy of the preceding evils endured. It is primarily a future-oriented explanation. In keeping with my monergistic position, I will adopt a primarily purpose- oriented strategy in constructing my proposal. CHAPTER 5

TOWARD A MONERGISTIC ACCOUNT OF EVIL

A successful response to the problem of evil should accomplish two tasks. First,

it should offer plausible reasons God may have had in creating a world that currently contains evil.1 Second, it should demonstrate that God is not culpable in doing so. The first task is an affirmation of God's wisdom. The second is an affirmation of his

goodness. These two tasks must be accomplished within the framework of a particular

theological system or, more specifically, a doctrine of providence. Given the

monergistic framework I have outlined in Chapter 2,1 hold that God could have

prevented any or all of the evils that occur in the world. Accordingly, my proposal

seeks to address the following questions: 1) what possible reasons could have motivated

God to permit evil to exist in the world? And 2) how is his willing permission of evil

morally justified?

Strictly speaking, only the second question is relevant to the issue of logical

consistency. Given that this thesis is theological in nature rather than philosophical, my

aim is to address both questions. A systematic theology that constructs a logically

consistent proposal without attempting to relate it to the God we confess and worship2

seems misguided. A theological approach requires us to examine the revelation

available to us in an attempt to discern the reality of God and his world.3 This is not to

' Or, to the extent that the explanations are unsatisfactory, it should explain why knowledge of those reasons should be inaccessible to us.

2 Consider the designation used by Francis Schaeffer: "the God who is there" (Francis A. Schaeffer, The God Who Is There: Speaking Historic Christianity into the Twentieth Century [Chicago: InterVarsity Press, 1968]).

3 In this sense, theology is ultimately a metaphysical, rather than analytic, endeavor.

125 126 say that we can know fully or certainly about divine motives in creation and providence.

The revelation God has chosen to give us in its general and specific forms is sufficient for his purposes. But it is certainly not comprehensive. Furthermore, human capacities for reason, observation, and interpretation are not only finite by design, but also fallen.

While we have some access to reality, it is a finite access (1 Cor 13:12). For this reason, any attempt to propose a theology of evil, or any theology for that matter, requires that we humbly embrace some degree of mystery.4 Nevertheless, Scripture and reason does offer us some clues to alleviate the theological tension.

By separating the problem of motive from the problem of justification, I am proposing that God is motivated by his wisdom and justified in his goodness.5 God is providentially working to achieve certain purposes and goals in the world, some of which require the presence of evil. But those goals do not justify his actions. Rather, he is justified because all of his acts are perfectly consistent with his moral character.6 I

4 I am not suggesting that there is little we can know. I am simply denying that we can know reality comprehensively and with absolute certainty. Neither am I appealing to 'mystery' as a solution for all theological problems. Biblical and logical consistency is still important here. See Plantinga: "Perhaps God has a good reason [for permitting evil], but that reason is too complicated for us to understand. Or perhaps He has not revealed it for some other reason. The fact that the theist doesn't know why God permits evil is, perhaps, an interesting fact about the theist, but by itself it shows little or nothing relevant to the rationality of belief in God" (Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977], 10).

5 This distinction is not a denial of the traditional doctrine of God's simplicity. All of his actions are both good and wise. But this distinction is useful for the sake of analytical clarity. Paul Helm has made a similar distinction between motive and justification (Paul Helm, The Providence of God, Contours of Christian Theology [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994], 203, 213). However, he goes on to include soul-building as part of his proposal for moral justification (i.e. non- punitive evil) on the basis that the evil suffered can be construed as chastisement towards character development (ibid., 208). This move makes him susceptible to the accusation of minimizing the reprehensibility of evil.

6 This addresses the hesitation John Frame expressed regarding the greater-good defence: "Although the greater-good defense is basically sound...it is hard to imagine how God's good purpose justifies the evil in the world" (John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God [Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 2002], 173). 127 will use the non-consequentialist ethic71 defined in Chapter 3 in addressing the problem of justification. Given my monergistic assumptions, I will use a purpose-oriented approach in addressing the problem of motive.

The Question of Divine Purpose

In addressing the question of why a specifically sovereign God permits moral

evil, I begin by proposing that the evil that occurs in our world must be a necessary condition for achieving or preserving some greater good. This is not to say that the

greater good is a result or consequence of the evil. Any good that presupposes the

existence of evil is a direct result of God's redemptive action. Evil makes no causal

contribution to the subsequent good. Rather, the presence of evil provides the occasion

for actualizing the greater purposes of God.

Although Augustine is known for his free will defence, he was also confident

that God would not allow any evil unless he is able to bring forth good out of evil.

Edwards makes explicit use of the greater good defence in his explanation of evil:

There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe, there is no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in

7 As I noted in Chapter 4, my application of these ethical categories to various theodicies and defences follows Feinberg (John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil, revised and expanded edition [Wheaton: Crossway, 2004], 65).

8 This is a slight but necessary adjustment of Yandell's proposal in light of my monergism.

9 While some proponents of the greater good defence may construe evil as a means of (or instrument for) bringing about good, I prefer to avoid this language. While a scalpel or a surgeon's skill may be a means of bringing about a successful by-pass surgery, we can hardly say the same of the heart attack. It seems more appropriate to speak of 'occasion' rather than 'instrument' or 'means'.

1 Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 11, trans. J. F. Shaw, in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post- Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 111:240; also see Augustine, The City of God, bk. 11, chap. 17-18, trans. Marcus Dods, in Nicene and Post- Nicene Fathers, 11:214-5. 128

the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world.. .God don't [sic] will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil; though it be his pleasure so to order things, that he permitting, sin will come to pass; for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence.11

Because I hold to a non-consequentialist ethic, I reject the greater good defence as a method for justifying divine permission of evil.12 Nevertheless, the basic idea is useful in addressing the question of motivation. I agree with Edwards' assertion that

God can hate moral evil in itself, but permit it in order to achieve some good purpose.

As John Frame has pointed out, "of all the classical defenses [sic], [the greater good defence] is the only one with scriptural support."14

There are some inherent dangers in using the greater good approach against which caution should be exercised. First, we must resist any inclination to minimize evil or turn it into a relative good.15 Evil is not made any less abhorrent, nor in any way morally justified, by God's intention to bring good out of it.16 Perpetrators of moral evil that God uses for good, such as Pharaoh or Judas, are fully culpable for their actions.

And humans who observe such evils are morally obligated to combat evil when possible

11 Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, vol. 1, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller, general editor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 407-9. We may make two brief observations of Edwards' proposal at this point. First, he uses an explicitly consequentialist strategy. Second, his evaluation of the good consequences of evil extend limitlessly into the future.

12 As I noted in Chapter 4, it is likely that Edwards held to a non-consequentialist ethic as a guide for human moral behaviour, but used a consequentialist ethic for the present purpose of justifying divine behaviour. I have chosen to apply my non-consequentialist ethic to the present task because I consider this to be systematically more consistent.

13 Note also the resemblance to Leibniz.

14 John M. Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 1994), 184. For scriptural basis of the greater good defence, see the following sections.

15 Cf. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 1:432-3.

Cf. Feinberg, Many Faces, 187. 129

(e.g. Ps 101:5, 7-8; Prov 24:11-12; Rev 2:2). Second, we must be careful not to think of the greater good in terms of some human pleasure or happiness that results. Although human happiness is of value, Scripture never makes it the ultimate concern. If it were

so, then surely the specifically sovereign God who unconditionally elects sinners to

salvation would have chosen to save everyone. Scripture presents us with a

theocentric worldview in which humans were made for the glory and pleasure of God

who is the greatest good (e.g. Ps 24:1; 1 Cor 10:31; Eph 1:6,12, 14; Col 1:16).18 As I

submitted in Chapter 3, God is the ultimate value in die universe and is rightfully

committed to his own glory. It would be morally wrong for him to place human

pleasure above this priority. Accordingly, John Frame has wisely defined 'greater good'

as that which is "more conducive to the glory of God."19

One may object that this explanation of evil denies the intrinsic value of humans

and ascribes to them only instrumental value. But as Feinberg has contended, it is

wholly reasonable to hold that God created humans as intrinsically valuable as well as

instrumentally valuable in bringing glory to God. Nor does the commitment to greater

John Frame writes, "The greater good should be seen, first of all, not as greater pleasure or comfort for us, but as greater glory for God. Certainly there are events that are hard to justify as benefits to the people involved, the chief one being eternal punishment" {Doctrine of God, 171).

18 Ibid. Also see Charles Hodge: "That the glory of God is the end to which the promotion of holiness, and the production of happiness, and all other ends are subordinate" (Hodge, 1:435).

19 Frame, Apologetics, 185. This reflects the well-known statement from the Westminster Catechism that "Man's chief and highest end is to glorify God, and fully to enjoy him forever."

Feinberg, Many Faces, 186. 130

91 glory mean that God is unconcerned about human welfare. That God's purpose of self-glorification also benefits humans will become evident as this chapter progresses.

In affirming that God is committed to his own glory, I do not mean that all of his actions are necessarily determined by the overriding goal of his 'greatest glory'. God is free to glorify himself in any way he chooses (Rom 9:20-23). His work of redemption is not only "to the praise of the glory of his grace" (Eph 1:6) but also "according to the 99

good pleasure of his will" (v. 5).

The Meaning of 'Glory'

My proposal is that God permits evil in order to glorify himself. The idea of

'glory' requires some explanation. The Hebrew term for glory, kabod, generally refers

to a "visible manifestation of God," or a disclosure of his reality, his splendour, and his

character.23 The corresponding Greek term, doxa, has a wider usage in the New

Testament. It is closely linked with the Old Testament concept of kabod and used to

denote the manifest glory of God "in the operation of God's power and salvation in

'salvation history'." Due to Greek influence, it also carries the meaning of fame and

honour. "We can, however, always hear the overtone of glory when honour is given to

God.. .for it must include the recognition of God's glory."24 From these brief word 21 Frame, Apologetics, 186; Gottfried W. Leibniz, 'The Freedom of Man in the Origin of Evil," Theodicy, abridged and edited by Diogenes Allen, trans. E. M. Huggard (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pt. l,sect. 78, 60.

22 Regarding Ephesians 1:5, Harold Hoehner writes, "In the NT when EUSOKI'CX is used of God it speaks of God's sovereignty. In the context of Eph 1:5 and 9, God's good pleasure is expressed freely from his own will, which is not influenced by any other person or thing." (Harold W. Hoehner, Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002], 199).

23 John N. Oswalt, "133," in Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason Archer, Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 1:943.

24 Sverre Aalen, "5o£cc," in The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed. Colin Brown (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986), 11:46-7. 131 studies, we can see that the glory of God is closely connected with his self-revelation.

As a working definition, we may think of God's glory as the greatness and magnificence of God's being, as revealed and recognized, including his power, wisdom, and moral perfection.25 The glory of God refers primarily to his self-manifestation and secondarily to his creatures' response of recognition and honour. It is to this end that God is supremely, and rightly committed.

Defined in this way, it becomes evident that God's commitment to his own glory does not disregard the welfare of human beings. It is a supreme privilege for God's creatures to witness the glory of their Creator. Hodge writes: "The knowledge of God is eternal life. It is for creatures the highest good. And the promotion of that knowledge, the manifestation of the manifold perfections of the infinite God, is the highest end of all his works."27 This accords with the high priestly prayer of Jesus:

Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son that the Son may glorify you.. .And this is eternal life, that they know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.. .1 glorified you on earth.. .1 have manifested your name to the people whom you gave me out of the world... (John 17:1-6)

Moreover, God's acts of self-glorification also result in other benefits for his creatures. According to Frame, "God's greater glory does bring with it a 'greater good' for creation in general, and for those who love God (Rom. 8:28), but not for every

See Frame, Doctrine of God, 592; Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, second edition (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 78; Hodge, 1:435.

26 Erickson, 379; Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, trans. E. M. Huggard, ed. with an introduction by Austin Farrer (Project Gutenberg, 2005), pt. 2, sect. 229, http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/17147 (accessed May 12, 2006).

Hodge, 1:435. 132 individual person or thing in the universe." The event of the Exodus was a means of self-glorification as well as salvation for the covenant people (Exod 14:4; cf. Ps 136).

Fall, Redemption and Glory

Many readers will agree that evil is not to be justified as a means to the glory of

God. We rightly gravitate toward scriptures such as Matthew 5:16, 1 Corinthians 6:19-

20, and 1 Peter 2:12, which exhort us to glorify God through righteous acts. Yet it is hard to deny that Scripture gives at least equal emphasis to God's own works in redemption as the means of his glory (e.g. Exod 14:4,17,18; Pss 79:9; 85:9; Isa 49:3, 6;

Eph 1:6,12,14; Rom 9:22-23). More specifically, Paul stated that God's "eternal

purpose" in redemption was to reveal God's wisdom (Eph 3:9-11),29 grace (Eph 2:7),

righteousness (Rom 3:21, 25-26)31, and love (Rom 5:8).

As redemption presupposes the fall, it is at least possible that God permitted

the fall in order to display his glory through the work of redemption. Although

Scripture does not clearly present this as God's actual motive, we can at least affirm that

the entrance of evil into creation has provided the occasion for this greater good. That

sin resulted in the expression of God's grace is clear in Paul's statement, "where sin

Frame, Apologetics, 186.

29 [Paul was given grace to preach the gospel] "so that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places."

30 "[God...made us alive...] so that in the coming ages he might show the immeasurable riches of his grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus."

31 'Righteousness' is translated from dikaiosyne, while 'just' (v 26b) is translated from dikaios, representing the nominal and adjectival forms of the same word. Here, his righteousness refers to his covenant faithfulness, by which he has provided an effective solution for sin (James D. G. Dunn, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 38A: Romans 1 -8 [Dallas: Word Books, 1988], 175).

Helm, 96, 214. 133 increased, grace abounded all the more" (Rom 5:20).33 Paul Helm offers a plausible line of reasoning to the same point:

As it is impossible for a person to be forgiven who has not committed a fault, so it is impossible for God to forgive, to show mercy, in a universe in which there is no fault. If one supposes that it is a good thing for God to display his mercy and grace, and that both the universe and its creator benefit if God manifests his forgiveness and grace, then this also provides a reason for permitting evil.. .In the permission of moral evil lies the prospect of God's own character being revealed in ways which, but for the evil, it could not be.34

Hodge is more forthright in postulating that the benefits of redemption were in fact the reason God permitted the fall:

There could be no manifestation of his mercy without misery, or of his grace and justice, if there were no sin. As the heavens declare the glory of God, so He has devised the plan of redemption, "To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God."(Ephiii.l0.r

I propose that God's purpose in permitting the fall was to display his glory through the drama of redemption, which is established in Christ's work of atonement and culminates in the salvation and future glorification of his people.36 Although he glorifies himself in other ways, the presence of sin is a necessary condition for displaying his glory in this particular way.

33 In Romans 6:1-2 Paul cautions his readers against using this as a license for sin. However, this is not a denial that sin has borne good consequences. It simply affirms the absolute evilness of sin and the culpability of sinners. That Paul considered it necessary to issue this warning confirms my point. Also see Romans 3:5.

34 Helm, 215. Also see Hodge, 1:435.

35 Hodge, 1:435.

36 While redemption includes all of creation, the redemption of humans is central in Scripture (Romans 8:19-21). 134

God's Glory in Judgment

Not only is the glory of God revealed in redemption, but his glory is also revealed in his acts of judgment. The punishment of sin, whether in its historical or eschatological forms, reveals the perfect justice of God. Throughout the Old Testament, the deliverance of God's people is closely associated with divine judgment upon their

enemies.

The defining act of salvation in the Old Testament is the Exodus, which entails

not only God's faithful deliverance of his covenant people, but also his righteous judgment upon the oppressive Egyptians, who were perpetrators of evil and enemies of

God. The 'Song of Moses' in Exodus 15 describes the conflict in terms of a battle in

which God triumphs over his enemies. As I argued earlier against Boyd's warfare

theodicy, the Bible portrays the enemies of God not as comparable rivals, but as finite

creatures easily subdued by the omnipotent God (e.g. Ps 37:20; 66:3; 89:10). Because

they are evil creatures in rebellion against their righteous Creator, the divine victory is

also literally portrayed as an act of just punishment. The stated purpose of his judgment

on the Egyptians is to "get glory" over them so that they "shall know that I am the

LORD" (Exod 14:4, cf. vv. 17-18).38

The eschatological form of this pattern is seen primarily in prophecies regarding

"the day of the LORD" (e.g. Isa 34:8; 35:2, 4; 66:1-24; Joel 2:30-3:8; Amos 5:17-24).

In the New Testament, references to the 'day' (or 'hour') of judgment abound (e.g. John

37 See especially verses 3 and 7, 'The LORD is a man of war.. .you overthrow your adversaries."

38 According to John Durham, the clause "I will get glory" means that God will win glory, honour, and reputation for himself (John I. Durham, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume.3: Exodus [Waco: Word Books, 1987], 192). 135

5:25-29; Rom 2:5-11,16; Rev 6:16-17, cf. v 10; 16:3-7; Matt 16:27; Jas 4:12; 5:9). The

'day of the Lord' and the closely related expression, the 'kingdom of God'(e.g. Rev

12:10),39 point to the eschatological manifestation of God's righteousness and justice, as well as his sovereign rule over all creation:

"The kingdom of the world has become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever.".. ."We give thanks to you, Lord God Almighty, who is and who was, for you have taken your great power and begun to reign. The nations raged, but your wrath came, and the time for the dead to be judged, and for rewarding your servants, the prophets and saints, and those who fear your name, both small and great, and for destroying the destroyers of the earth." (Rev 11:15-18)

Then I heard a loud voice from the temple telling the seven angels, "Go and pour out on the earth the seven bowls of the wrath of God.".. ."Just are you, O Holy One, who is and who was, for you brought these judgments.. .It is what they deserve!" And I heard the altar saying, "Yes, Lord God the Almighty, true and just are your judgments!" (Rev 16:1, 5-7)

As with historical acts of divine judgment, eschatological judgment will result in the punishment of the wicked and the reward of the faithful, both of which are manifestations of the sovereignty and justice of God. Hodge wrote that the promotion of the knowledge of God "is the highest end of all his works.. .both in the punishment of sinners and in the salvation of believers."40 That the book of Revelation sets this eschatological hope in the context of historical persecution is significant. The themes of persecution, sovereignty and justice approximate the basic elements of the logical problem of evil: evil, power and goodness. Eschatologically, the solution is the

The New Testament motif of the kingdom of God, perhaps more than its Old Testament counterpart, emphasizes its manifestations in the present age in anticipation of eschatological coming of the kingdom. In this case, deliverance is for the needy and judgment is for Satan and the demonic realm (Matt 12:26-29).

Hodge, 1:435. 136 judgment and salvation that comes with the consummation of the kingdom and the extermination of evil.41

Redemptive Permission of Evil

I have acknowledged that Scripture does not explicitly state that God's purpose in permitting evil in general was to glorify himself.4 But we can at least assert that evil has presented the occasion for his self-glorification via the plan of redemption. There are also biblical passages that link specific occurrences of evil with his redemptive purposes (e.g. Rom 5:3-5; 8:18, 28-30; 2 Cor 4:16-17; 2 Tim 2:10-12).43 While these passages speak of 'suffering' as opposed to sin, they are set in the context of persecution, which is clearly a moral evil. In these contexts, 'glory' usually refers to the final state of humans, but certainly not in radical distinction from God's glory. More

accurately, 'glory' in these passages refers to the manifestation of the true nature of redeemed humans (Rom 8:19). Glorified humanity is in turn a fruit of God's redemptive work, and as such, is reflective of his divine character. In this sense, evil

can be seen as a necessary condition for at least some aspects of the divine work of

perfecting humans (Rom 8:28-30), resulting in a manifestation of his glory in them.

Helm argues that in these cases, the suffering is logically necessary for the glory that

George Eldon Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 64, 69; cf. Henri Blocher, Evil and the Cross, trans. David G. Preston (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2003), 105.

42 The lack of an explicit statement is of itself no reason to doubt my proposal. The same could be said of any of the other proposed solutions to the problem of evil, as well as many of the commonly held doctrines of our faith. As I have already stated, the Bible is adequate for God's purposes, but it was never intended to satisfy all of our intellectual curiosities.

43 The Old Testament also supports the idea that suffering leads to sanctification (e.g. Ps 119:71, 67,75). 137 results.44 But affirming that suffering is necessary for glory is not quite the same as

affirming that this is the divinely intended purpose of suffering. We shall have to look

elsewhere for a clear statement of purpose.

Redemptive Suffering of Christ

Perhaps the most obvious place to look for a biblical statement of divine purpose

in permitting evil is the redemptive suffering of Christ. That the suffering of Christ at

the hands of sinners was divinely planned can hardly be doubted. The 'servant song' of

Isaiah 52:13-53:12 is well acknowledged in the New Testament and throughout church

history as Messianic (e.g. Matt 8:17; 12:17-21; John 12:38; note especially 1 Pet 2:22-

25). Isaiah clearly specifies that the servant would suffer moral evil (53:3, 7-8) and that

it was according to divine purpose (vv. 4-6,10, 11). One can hardly expect to find a

more explicit statement of purpose than verse 10:

Yet it was the will of the LORD to crush him; he has put him to grief; when his soul makes an offering for sin, he shall see his offspring; he shall prolong his days;

the will of the LORD shall prosper in his hand. (Isa 53:10)

It would be difficult to read this verse as referring to an occurrence of evil that God was

unable to prevent but creatively used for good. The servant's suffering was "the will of

the LORD" by which God would redeem his people from their sin (vv. 5-6, 8, 10-12).

In a previous servant song, Isaiah also states that God's purpose is to glorify himself

(49:3). The theme of divine glory is prominent throughout the book of Isaiah.

The New Testament confirms that the atoning work of Christ involved the

morally evil acts of "the Jews" (John 5:18; 18:12), particularly the chief priests and the

Pharisees (John 11:57; 18:3; 19:6), as well as the soldiers (John 18:12; 19:2-3, 23),

44 Helm, 203. 138

Pilate (John 19:1,16), and not least, Judas Iscariot (John 18:2-3). Acts 2:23 contains a clear statement of divine purpose in the betrayal and crucifixion of Jesus: "this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men."45 According to Acts 3:18, God not only foretold the sufferings of Christ but also fulfilled the prophecy. In Luke 22:22, Jesus states that his betrayal was divinely determined while also affirming the responsibility of the betrayer. These scriptures leave no doubt that the morally evil acts leading up to the

death of Christ were planned by God in order to redeem his creation from the bonds of

sin.

Other Statements of Purpose

There are other biblical examples in which God permits moral evil for

redemptive purposes. One such example is Joseph's suffering at the hands of his

brothers. That the brothers' actions were morally evil is undisputed. In Genesis 50:20

Joseph explicitly states that God's intention was to use their evil actions to bring about

good. In Genesis 45:5-8, Joseph reveals that the course of events that brought him to

Egypt was ultimately a purposeful act of God. If the story is read through the

framework of a free will theodicy, one would have to infer that God attempted, but was

unable to prevent the brothers' evil actions. God was able to use the regrettable event to

save many lives. But it was certainly against his will. This reading is difficult to

reconcile with the text. Joseph's three-fold insistence that "God sent me before you"

(45:5, 7, 8) simply does not allow for a synergistic interpretation. He was not

45 Emphasis mine. This reading is confirmed by F. F. Bruce in The Book of Acts, revised edition, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 63-64. Bruce also cites Rom 8:32 and Acts 3:18 for support. We may also note that the crucifixion was also an example of horrendous suffering. 139 abandoned to the evil will of his brothers, but was in the hands of a wise and benevolent

God who was providentially working to benefit humans.

In the divine use of Assyria and Babylon to chastise his covenant people, we also see redemptive permission of evil (Isa 10:5-7; Jer 25:8-14; Hab 1:6-12). The people of

Israel undoubtedly suffered moral evil at the hands of their captors. The writers of the

Old Testament were unanimous in interpreting the exiles as Yahweh's acts of judgment in response to covenant violation. However, his intent was not to completely destroy them, but to chastise them so that they will return to him (Isa 10:24-27; 12:1; 40:l-2).47

In 2 Corinthians 4:10-11 Paul identifies his sufferings with the sufferings of

Christ: "always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our bodies. For we who live are always being given over to death for Jesus' sake, so that the life of Jesus also may be manifested in our mortal flesh."

The persecution Paul endured for the sake of the gospel is indisputably a case of moral evil. He seems to be saying that his suffering serves the purpose of manifesting the "life of Jesus."48

Consider also Philippians 1:19-26:

Also see my treatment of these verses in Chapter 2.

47 The exiles were both redemptive and punitive. See my comments under "Punitive Permission of Evil."

48 One could object that it is possible to interpret the hina ('so that') clauses as 'outcome' rather than 'purpose' (Ralph P. Martin, Word Biblical Commentary Volume 40: 2 Corinthians [Waco: Word Books, 1986], 88; cf. Richard A. Young, Intermediate New Testament Greek: A Linguistic and Exegetical Approach [Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994], 186-7). The grammatical construction certainly allows for both interpretations. But Stauffer and Dunn both interpret the hina clause as teleological (Ethelbert Stauffer, "iva," in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 3, ed. Gerhard Kittel, trans, and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromily [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965], 328-9; J. D. G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit, 327-8, cited in Martin, 88). The preposition 'hupef in 2 Cor 1:6 is likewise ambiguous (Martin, 9-11; cf. Young, 94, 101). However, in his explanation of 1:3-7, Martin plainly states, "There is a divine purpose in human suffering that is borne for the Gospel's sake" (Martin, 11). I would conclude that while there is some exegetical ambiguity here, it is likely that these clauses indicate divine purpose. 140

For I know that through your prayers and the help of the Spirit of Jesus Christ this will turn out for my deliverance.. .For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain.. .1 am hard pressed between the two. My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better. But to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account. Convinced of this, I know that I will remain and continue with you all, for your progress and joy in the faith...

Paul's reasoning in this passage presupposes God's ability to save him from death. He

also assumes that whether God delivers him or permits his martyrdom, he does so

purposefully.49

These specific examples from the biblical narrative provide paradigms for

understanding God's providential work in incidents of moral evil. It is true that God's

providential activity can vary according to the contexts of different periods in history.

But the flow of biblical history is held together by the unchanging character of God who

continually shows himself to be sovereign, wise, and good. Both Frame and Helm have

stated that examining God's acts in the context of biblical history can help make sense

of the present as well as give insight regarding how God may resolve the problem in the

future.50

Hebrews 11 and the Value of Faith

The stories of Hebrews 11 suggest the possibility that perhaps God permits some

evils in order to cultivate or demonstrate the faith of his people. Although faith can be

construed as a product of sanctification (or 'soul-building'), it deserves special treatment

because of its sustained association with the presence of moral evil in this and other

scriptures. While it is possible for faith to exist without evil,51 many outstanding

49 Also see Frame, Apologetics, 186-7.

50 Ibid., 179; Helm, 94.

51 E.g. Abel (Heb 11:4), Enoch (v. 5), and most notably Abraham, in offering up Isaac (v. 17-19). 141 expressions of faith would have been impossible apart from evil, or at least suffering.

Verses 35-38 describe some incidents of horrendous evil in which victims demonstrated such exemplary faith:

Some were tortured, refusing to accept release, so that they might rise again to a better life. Others suffered mocking and flogging, and even chains and imprisonment. They were stoned, they were sawn in two, they were killed with the sword. They went about in skins of sheep and goats, destitute, afflicted, mistreated - of whom the world was not worthy - wandering about in deserts and mountains, and in dens and caves of the earth. (Heb 11:35-38)

The entire history of the church from the New Testament to the present has

witnessed innumerable expressions of outstanding faith occasioned by horrendous forms

of persecution. That these examples have been highlighted as exemplary by Scripture

and the later Christian community testify to the immense value of persevering faith in

the face of evil (cf. v. 6). It is certainly possible that God has permitted these incidents

of evil in order to produce and exhibit this particular kind of faith.

The stories of Hebrews 11 are followed by both exhortation and theological

interpretation (11:39-12:17). In Chapter 12 the author interestingly identifies the

suffering of moral evil as part of the divinely appointed process of sanctification.

Consider him who endured from sinners such hostility.. .In your struggle against sin you have not yet resisted to the point of shedding your blood.. .It is for discipline that you have to endure. God is treating you as sons.. .but he disciplines us for our good, that we may share his holiness. For the moment all discipline seems painful rather than pleasant, but later it yields the peaceful fruit of righteousness to those who have been trained by it. (Heb 12:3-11)

Sarah's barrenness was certainly a source of suffering for Abraham and Sarah, though not necessarily a case of evil. Although many would refer to this as 'natural evil', I would suggest 'natural suffering' as a broader and more appropriate term and reserve 'evil' as a morally significant designation. Some would justifiably ascribe such 'natural sufferings' to Satan and the demonic realm (Job 1 and 2), in which case, they would be properly classified as moral evil, and only apparently natural (also see Paul's thorn in the flesh in 2 Cor 12:7-10). Moses' case seemed to involve moral evil (vv. 24-26).

53 See John Foxe, Foxes Book of Martyrs; Thieleman J. van Braght, Martyrs' Mirror, DC Talk and The Voice of the Martyrs, Jesus Freaks, as well as other publications from The Voice of the Martyrs. 142

That the author uses the language of discipline and divine agency indicates that

God is both sovereign and intentional in his use of evil. But this does not mean that God

is the author of evil. The author follows the general Old Testament language that

attributes all circumstances to God (e.g. Job 1:21; 2:10; Ruth 1:13, 20-21). In each case, this attribution is not a hostile accusation against God, but a trusting acknowledgement

of his sovereignty. The present context suggests that the recipients of Hebrews were

afflicted by human agents (Heb 10:32-12:3-4). I would conclude that by permitting

these human acts of evil, God is sovereignly and lovingly training his children in

holiness and righteousness. Ultimately, the development of faith is to be credited to

Jesus, "the founder and perfecter of our faith" (Heb 12:2). It is his suffering on the cross

that laid the foundation for our redemption.

Like the book of Hebrews, the story of Job also affirms the inherent value of

faithful suffering (also see 1 Pet 2:19-21; 3:14, 17; 4:12-14; 5:9-10). The privileged

perspective of the reader reveals that God may have an interest in demonstrating Job's

uncompromising faithfulness (Job 1:8; 2:3).55 From these scriptures we can deduce the

general principle that God providentially permits evil as an occasion for achieving both

divine glory and human benefit.

Punitive Permission of Evil

It is entirely possible that every specific occurrence of evil is divinely permitted

for a redemptive purpose. However, I am not prepared to rest my case on this alone.

Helm has suggested that evil can also be justly permitted as punishment for previous

54 Also see F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews, revised edition, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 334-6.

55 Cf. Frame, Apologetics, 174. 143 evils. This serves the purpose of revealing God's justice by upholding the moral order of the universe.56 Ultimately, punitive permission of sin, like redemptive permission, is for the glory of God (e.g. Rev 19:1-3).

Punitive Permission: Perpetrators

Punitive permission of evil has two aspects. The first relates to the perpetrators

of evil. It is possible that God sometimes permits sinners to commit evil acts as a form

of punishment for previous sin. Augustine wrote, "Vice in the soul arises from its own

doing; and the moral difficulty that ensues from vice is the penalty which it suffers."

The idea of moral corruption as punishment is supported in Romans 1:18-32, in which

Paul states three times that "God gave them up" to their degrading passions and

"debased mind" (vv. 24, 26, 28; cf. Acts 7:42). The language here does not imply that

God is actively driving sinners into further corruption. Rather, he abandons them to the

progressively deepening moral corruption already resident in their hearts.

Providentially, this means God has specifically chosen to withdraw his restraining grace,

allowing them to act out their evil inclinations.59 This abandonment is an expression of

God's wrath against sin (v. 18). The implication is that moral evil is destructive to its

perpetrator.

30 Helm, 209, 212.

57 Augustine, Of True Religion, trans. J. H. S. Burleigh (Chicago: Regnery, 1959), S. 39, quoted in Helm, 209.

See J. Christiaan Beker, Suffering & Hope: The Biblical Vision and the Human Predicament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 80.

59 According to Dunn, Paul would have seen this 'handing over' as primarily punitive, but also "at least potentially redemptive" (Dunn, WBC, Vol. 38A, 62-63). 144

Another example of punitive permission can be found in the hardening of

Pharaoh's heart (e.g. Exod 4:21; 7:3,13; 8:15; 10:1). That the text alternately attributes the hardening to both God and Pharaoh suggests that this is a case of concurrence.60 W.

L. Walker interprets divine hardening as a punishment for previous sin:

The hardening of people's hearts by God is a way of punishment, but it is always a consequence of their own self-hardening.. .[Pharaoh] became more confirmed in his obstinacy, till he brought the final doom upon himself: sin is made to become its own punishment.61

The hardening of Pharaoh's heart intensifies the drama and the final victory of

God, resulting in a greater demonstration of God's sovereignty and power as well as a

greater degree of judgment upon Pharaoh (cf. 7:5).

In Romans 9, Paul uses Pharaoh's story as a paradigm to illustrate God's

absolute sovereignty in election. Although it is set in a story of redemption, God's

hardening and subsequent affliction of Pharaoh is entirely punitive, in order to reveal his

wrath and his power (Rom 9:17-18, 22-23). Verse 17 is especially telling: "For this

purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you, and that my name

might be proclaimed in all the earth."

James Dunn, commenting on Romans 9:18, gives a superficially opposing view:

Paul for his part clearly has in view the divine initiative.. .So to look for reasons for God's hardening in Pharaoh's 'evil disposition' or previous self-hardening...is a rationalizing expediency.. .Such a thought clearly has no place in Paul's exposition and in fact contradicts what Paul has been so careful to stress in vv 11 and 16.63

See my comments in Chapter 2.

61 W. L. Walker, "Harden; Hardened," in The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, fully revised, gen. ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979-1988), 2:615.

62 Durham, 56.

Dunn, WBC, Vol. 38B, 554-5. 145

Though exegetically significant, the discrepancy is inconsequential to the present theological point. Even if Paul's argument in Romans does not depict the hardening as punitive, it is implied in the Exodus narrative. Pharaoh was guilty of cruelly oppressing the Israelites and murdering their male children (Exod 1; cf. 3:7-9, 19). His stubborn character was established before any mention of 'hardening' (3:19). Granted, God's expressed intention from the beginning was to harden Pharaoh's heart, resulting ultimately in the death of Pharaoh's firstborn son (Exod 4:21-23). However, God was afflicting an agent of evil, not an innocent victim. I would propose that God's ultimate purpose in the hardening was self-glorification. But in the process, he justly punishes

Pharaoh.64

Punitive Permission: Victims

The second aspect of punitive permission of evil applies to the victims. It is

possible that God allows some individuals to suffer the consequences of morally evil

acts as an expression of divine retributive judgment. This idea is also found in

Augustine:

But if you know or believe that God is good (and it is not right to believe otherwise), God does not do evil. Also, if we admit that God is just (and it is sacrilege to deny this), He assigns rewards to the righteous and punishments to the wicked - punishments that are indeed evil for those who suffer them. Therefore, if no one suffer punishment unjustly (this too we must believe since we believe that the

Although I would affirm, with Dunn, that God took initiative in decreeing that Pharaoh should be hardened, this does not contradict my proposal mat the hardening was punitive. While divine hardening is always punitive, the divine decree to harden or to show mercy may well be unconditional. That is, given the sinfulness of humankind, God could, in his justice, punitively harden everyone. But in his sovereignty, he chooses to (punitively) harden some but show mercy to others. This is analogous to his unconditional election of some to salvation and his pretention (i.e. passing over) of others. (In fact, Pharaoh's hardening was the analogy Paul used to illustrate the doctrine of election!) In choosing not to grant efficacious saving grace, God acts sovereignly apart from any human initiative. However, God's ultimate punishment of the individual is still a punishment for sin. The distinction is between the act of divine punishment, which by definition is a response to sin, and the unconditional divine decree regarding whether such punishment should be executed or mercifully averted by atonement and conversion. 146

universe is governed by divine Providence), God is the cause of the second kind of evil, but not of the first.65

God's vengeance on Assyria and the other nations is certainly punitive (Isa

10:12,16-19; Jer 46-51). Yet it is also clear that he used the morally evil acts of

Babylon to punish Assyria, Persia to punish Babylon, etc. There is also a punitive element in the Assyrian and Babylonian exiles. Although these events are ultimately redemptive for the nation, they are certainly punitive for many individuals (e.g. Jer

22:18-30; Jer 15:1-10).

The fact that sinful agents continue to live together in the universe naturally results in occurrences of moral evil. God did not have to use specific intervention to motivate these nations to attack their victims. To achieve his punitive purposes, he simply permits them to act according to their characteristic tendencies. It is very likely that many potential incidences of evil have been prevented by God's common grace.

But it is also possible that some of the evils that occur have been specifically permitted by God for this purpose. Jesus' comments in Luke 13:1-5 suggest a possible divine use of both moral and 'natural' evil as means of punishment.

Punitive permission of evil can also be seen as part of God's judgment on humanity in general. The expulsion from the garden was a just punishment for the initial rebellion (Gen 3:22-24). He allows us to live with the consequences of sin by leaving us in this sinful world. This is not to say that these specific evils are unpreventable. Rather, God specifically permits some evils as just punishment for the sinful race. It is only by his grace that he prevents other potential evils or limits the

65 Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will, trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 1.1.1, quoted in Helm, 209. While Augustine uses the term'evil' interchangeably with 'suffering', I would make a distinction. See my comment in note 51. 147 evils that do occur. While the notion of unequal punishment offends the modern

Western culture that values equal treatment for all, it is certainly not inconsistent with

classic Reformed doctrine.66 Luke 13:1-5 also suggests that God may punish sinners

unequally in this life.67 It is critically important to remember that retribution will not be

completed until the final judgment.

One could object that many victims of moral evil are innocent. It seems unjust

that God would specifically permit some occurrences of evil as 'punishment' for

innocent children. Helm appeals to the principle of "human solidarity in the first act of

moral evil."69 Since all humanity participated in Adam's sin, the entire race is subject to just punishment (Rom 5:12-19). Although this solution is highly offensive to the

modern individualistic mindset, it is wholly consistent with the corporate mentality of

the biblical worldview as well as the classic doctrine of original sin. In the conquest of

Canaan, the inhabitants were completely destroyed (Josh 6:21; 11:14). This presumably

includes children.70 When Achan was punished for his sin, his sons and daughters were

also put to death (Josh 7:24). I am not suggesting that innocent children ought to be

afflicted with evil, or that such evils are in any way excusable.71 Punitive acts are

exclusively the prerogative of God. My point is that, with the exception of Christ

66 Cf. the unequal reward of the workers in Matthew 20:1-16 as well as Frame's comments in Apologetics, 174-5.

67 Ibid., 186.

68 Helm, 210. See my previous discussion on the Day of the Lord and the Kingdom of God.

69 Helm, 211. Again, he quotes Augustine.

70 Note "young and old" in Joshua 6:21.

71 Note that the cleansing of Canaan was sanctioned by divine command and the punishment of Achan was a direct act of God. Neither of these were actually cases of moral evil. But this is inconsequential to my point that even children could be justly punished. 148 himself, no human being is fully exempt from just punishment by God. Emotional objections regarding innocent children are technically no more valid than arguing that while God should send the likes of Adolf Hitler and Charles Manson to hell, surely "Joe

11 and Mary next door" deserve to enter heaven.

Used in isolation, the notion of punitive permission of evil is logically impossible, since punishment presupposes a prior act of evil.73 But when put in conjunction with redemptive permission and set in the overarching context of the divine commitment to his own glory, punitive permission completes the picture as a revelation

of God's retributive justice.74 It also leaves open the possibility that not all moral evils

(perpetrated and suffered) are necessarily redemptive. God may allow some people to

sin as well as to be victimized, and not ultimately redeem such occurrences of evil. His

doing so is an expression of his wrath against sinful humanity. However, I would

suggest that perhaps the vast majority of evil occurrences are ultimately redemptive. I

would also caution that the possibility of divine punitive use of evil does not in any way justify or minimize the evils committed.

72 My comments here are in regards to the suffering of temporal evils, not eternal suffering in hell, which is a separate problem.

73 Helm, 211.

74 Cf. ibid., 213.

75 Note that divine punitive permission of evil applies to the unredeemed, not to the elect. Although we continue to suffer the accompanying evils of living in the fallen world, we have good reason to trust that all the evils God allows us to suffer are redemptive in nature, not punitive (Rom 8:28-29). 149

Temporary Permission of Evil

The Transient Nature of Evil

Although God permits evil for various purposes, it is important to note that evil is never left unchecked. There is a discernible pattern in the Old Testament in which

God permits evil for a time, but prevents it from going beyond a certain limit. God ultimately judges them and demonstrates his perfect justice in putting an end to the evil, punishing the wicked, and vindicating the righteous.

Genesis 15:16 contains an interesting remark from the mouth of Yahweh, "for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet complete." The immediate context is the promise of the land to Abraham and the prediction of the period of slavery in Egypt, the Exodus, and the conquest of Canaan. The implication is that God is intentionally permitting the sin of the Amorites to continue until they are "ripe for judgment," at which time he will use his people to put it to an end. Paul's statement that God "endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction" (Rom 9:22) also suggests a temporary permission of evil.

In the present age, it is evident that Satan rages (1 Pet 5:8). But his works of evil are limited and controlled, and will come to an end. Peter's assurance in 1 Peter 5:9-10 implies that the suffering of his readers is permitted for a limited time, and will come to an end. Revelation 6:9-11 indicates that God permits some of his saints to be martyred, and refrains from punishing these evils until all have been martyred according to his plan.

76 N. T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2006), 32. 150

Then they were each given a white robe and told to rest a little longer, until the number of their fellow servants and their brothers should be complete, who were to be killed as they themselves had been. (Rev 6:11)

Revelation 13:5-8 tells us that the beast "was allowed to exercise authority for forty-two months.. .Also it was allowed to make war on the saints and to conquer them..." Boyd is correct is affirming that we are involved in a war against Satan.

However, this war is not one in which God's powerful archrival prevents his will from being done. Rather, it is a war between Satan and God's people that God has

specifically permitted for a time. God is a referee, drawing boundaries and limits, not a participant struggling to keep his enemy at bay. Consider also Revelation 20:2-3, 7-10.

Satan was released to deceive the nations and to make war for a time, not in spite of

God's attempts to restrain him, but because God released him to do so. The major

theme in Revelation is the eschatological end of evil. Evil, no matter how

overwhelmingly intense and pervasive, is transient and subject to divine providential

control.

The story of Job falls within the same parameters. As we read the story, it is

clear that Job's sufferings are ultimately instigated by Satan (Job 1:12; 2:6-7). It is also

clear from these passages that Satan is able to afflict Job only by God's specific

permission. Although Job's sufferings are intense and presumably prolonged, the end of

the book reveals that Job's suffering is limited and God ultimately restores him (Job

42:10-17). He was more blessed after his trials than before (Job 42:12). But more

importantly, God is vindicated, not by answering Job's objections, but by silencing them

(Job 40:7-8; 42:2-6). 151

In the larger context of human history, the horrendous evils of the Nazi holocaust were likewise transient. There is no denying the reprehensibility of the evils perpetrated. There is no denying that evil was intense and powerful. But the holocaust

is over. The evils committed, however horrendous, were finite. God has brought them

to an end.

The Eschaton and the Wisdom of God

The transient nature of evil in Scripture points to the hope of future vindication.

If God has put a just end to evil in the past, we can trust that he will do so in the future.

Had I been living in the Old Testament period, I would have had very little idea (despite the hints of the coming Messiah) of how God would resolve the problem. Were I of a skeptical bent, I might even have been tempted to say that God could not possibly solve the problem.. .If God could vindicate his justice and mercy in a situation where such vindication seemed impossible, if he could vindicate them in a way that went far beyond our expectations and understanding, can we not trust him to vindicate himself again?78

Psalm 73 is a reflection on the problem of evil that finds its ultimate solution in

the future vindication of God. The prosperity of the wicked (vv. 3,12) and the

sufferings of the righteous (vv. 13-14) presented a seemingly insurmountable problem

for the psalmist (v. 16). The dissonance is relieved only by looking to the future, in

which God justly punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous (vv. 17-20, 24, 27).

Likewise, the rest of Scripture testifies to a future reckoning, when God will completely

and finally vindicate himself and deliver us from evil.79

As he wrote the book of Revelation, the apostle John was well aware of the

moral evil present in his world. The apocalyptic drama of intense warfare and ultimate

78 Frame, Apologetics, 183, 184.

79 Ibid., 188. Frame also offers the following Scriptures: Isa. 40:lff; Matt. 25; Luke 1:51; Hab. 2:2-3; 3:16-17; Rev. 15:3-4, etc. 152 victory is set in the context of severe persecution (e.g. Rev 2:9-10,13; 6:9-11; 7:14).

Yet he wrote of the declarations that God's ways are just and wise (Rev 5:12; 7:12;

15:3; 16:5, 7).80

Although I deny that God is obligated to create the best possible world and that the success of my theodicy requires me to demonstrate that he has done so, I would suggest that the final state of the redeemed could well be a 'best possible world'.

Augustine certainly meant to communicate this when he wrote, "How great shall be that felicity, which shall be tainted with no evil, which shall lack no good." The description of the new heaven and new earth in Revelation 20-21 approximates the same using biblical metaphors. I would follow Edwards and Frame in suggesting that, taking into account all future states of affairs, this is the best possible world.82 Quite plausibly,

God's acts in creation, providence, and redemption on the whole were the best and wisest possible. Not only will we live in the best possible world, but we will look back in time and acknowledge that God has brought this about in the wisest possible way.83

Although Rev 5:12 and 7:12 do not specifically state 'wisdom' as an attribute of God, that seems to be the only sensible way of reading these passages. It would hardly make sense to say that God is worthy to receive wisdom from his creatures. See Robert H. Mounce, The Book of Revelation, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 149-50.

81 Augustine, The City of God, bk.22, chap. 30, 509.

82 Frame, Apologetics, 159. Edwards, 407. Although often misunderstood, this is what Leibniz originally meant by "best possible world" (Leibniz, pt. 2, sect. 228).

83 Jonathan Edwards held that God necessarily does what is most wise (Edwards, 380). Although I reject this as a necessity, I tend to think that, when all is revealed, his acts will prove to be the wisest possible. I differ from Edwards in denying that all of God's actions are determined by what is maximally wise. Rather, there could be more than one wisest possible course of action. We can affirm that all of God's ways are maximally wise, though there are other equally wise options available to him. See Appendix 3: Must God Create the Best Possible World? 153

Evil and the Moral Justification of God

As I have stated in Chapter 3, the notion of morally evaluating God's actions is anthropomorphic. It would be presumptuous for creatures to stand in judgment of God, who is the ultimate standard of goodness. There is no indication in the book of Job that

Job's sufferings were either redemptive or punitive. The most noted biblical book on the topic of suffering answers the problem with an intellectually unsatisfying, but religiously unassailable response: God permits evil for his own mysterious reasons, and is not answerable to anyone. The overarching theme is the sovereignty and glory of

God. Although Job complains bitterly and even accuses God of injustice (Job 9:22-24;

19:6-7),85 all of his complaints are silenced as he is given a glimpse of the greatness and majesty of God (Job 38-42; note especially 42:5-6). Nevertheless, it is the task of theology to pursue a greater understanding of God's nature and his ways within the epistemological boundaries he has assigned to us. The question of moral justification is properly an exploration of the justice of God in the context of the problem of evil.

The present question is premised on the idea that the actions of a moral agent reflect the moral character of that agent. If God is perfectly good, we can expect all of his actions to reflect his goodness (Psalm 119:68). In regard to the problem of evil, I propose that God is morally justified if three conditions obtain:

1. That God does not perpetrate evil, or efficiently cause another agent to perpetrate

evil.

Frame, Apologetics, 172-3.

85 John E. Hartley, The Book of Job, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 177,284. 154

2. That all of God's actions are good; or more specifically, that God's action in

actualizing this world is good.

87 3. That God responds to evil justly.

The first condition addresses the charge that God causes all things and is therefore the author of evil. The second addresses the charge that a perfectly good God cannot possibly have actualized the present world, which evidently contains evil, and that if he did, he would be morally culpable. The third addresses the charge that God is morally obligated to eliminate evil, but has not done so.

Condition 1: Non-Perpetration of Evil

The first condition is essentially a denial that God is the author of evil. Scripture is clear that God does only good and not evil (Deut 32:4; Job 34:10; Ps 145:17). But atheists and synergists alike may charge monergists with making God the author of evil.

They reason that if God is specifically sovereign, if the morally evil acts of his creatures are within his control, it follows that God is morally responsible for those acts.

This objection comes from a misunderstanding of compatibilism. As I argued in

Chapter 2, compatibilist freedom entails self-determination and agent causation.

Because human and angelic agents possess genuine moral agency, they are responsible for their own evil actions. Even if a particular evil action is determined by the combination of the circumstances and the character of the human agent, it is still a

86 Many philosophers and theologians would state this condition as follows: that the world God has actualized is good. We may also observe at this point that Condition 2 is a corollary of Condition 1. I have separated them for ease of analysis.

87 Although I have followed Helm (Helm, 203) in separating justification from reason, I have rejected his consequentialist method of justification, which I consider to be significant, but inadequate (ibid., 208). 155 genuinely human action and cannot be attributed to God. God is the Creator of all beings. But because he has created agents who are distinct from himself, he is not the

cause of all events. The agent that sins is fully responsible and justly punishable (Ezek

18:4; Rom 9:19-24).

Edwards makes a distinction between God's permission of sins and his production of sins "by a positive agency." Scripture affirms that God does sometimes

permit sin, with the result that the sin in question will infallibly come to pass. But this is

not the same as his "producing it and exerting the act of sin." Edwards offers the

following illustration:

As there is a vast difference between the sun's being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but it is not the proper cause, efficient or producer of them; though they are necessarily consequent on that motion, under such circumstances: no more is any action of the divine Being the cause of the evil of men's wills.. .It would be strange arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves 'em [sic] to themselves, and necessarily sin, when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God; and so, that God SO

must be a sinful being.

For Edwards, responsibility for sin resides in the active agent. Sinners who sin

are culpable, regardless of any absence of restraining factors. Also, he makes a useful

distinction between consequence and causation. While God's non-intervention may

result in a creature committing evil, it is not the cause. The cause of the evil resides

solely in the creaturely agent. Because God's withholding intervention is not the

Edwards, 403.

Ibid., 404. 156 efficient cause, he is not the author of sin. While God ordains all things, he does not cause all things.90

Edwards' argument is a commentary on the divine punitive abandonment of

sinners in Romans l.91 By withdrawing his intervention, he abandons sinners to their

depravity. James Dunn writes, '"God handed them over'; the word denotes a measured

and deliberate act, but also the resigning of direct control over what is thus passed on."9

Thus, the evil acts described are an indirect result of God's sovereign and deliberate

permission. But precisely because God has withdrawn his intervention, they are

exclusively the actions of human agents.

To say that God specifically permits a set of circumstances in which a creature

deterministically sins is not the same as saying that God tempts that creature to sin. I

would agree with both Feinberg and Frame that God is never the cause of temptation

(Jas 1:13). While he is providentially capable of inciting someone to sin, he would

never do so actively.94 Temptations often arise as a result of prior sinful acts of agents,

In a similar tone, Henri Blocher states: "It is, to be sure, sovereign, but it is also a permissive will that is being referred to. Divine causality with respect to good is efficient (i.e. God acts efficaciously... Jas 1:17). With respect to evil, it is deficient (i.e. God is content not to act, as if he failed to assist; he did not bring forth the will to do good, nor the deed). Whereas God himself works good by making it work, evil is always the deed of one or of several created beings, exclusively" (Blocher, Evil, 99).

91 Also see my comment under "Punitive Permission."

92 Dunn, WBC, Vol. 38A, 73.

93 Frame, Apologetics, 166; Feinberg, Many Faces, 171.

Although 2 Samuel 24:1 states this, 1 Chronicles 21:1 attributes the event to Satan. I would suggest that in his anger against Israel, God punitively permitted Satan to tempt David. 157 whether demonic or human. They can also arise through the natural course of events

i • 95

and circumstances.

While the argument for creaturely agency is similar to the free will defence, it is

to be distinguished from the latter because it assumes specific sovereignty and a

compatibilist account of free will. Evil is not beyond the control of God. He has

specifically chosen to permit the evil acts that occur in our world. My position is also to

be distinguished from hard determinism in that I affirm creaturely freedom and the

accompanying moral responsibility.

Condition 2: The Goodness of God's Creative Acts

Proponents of the problem of evil argue that God's act of creating a world that

contains evil is inconsistent with his goodness. If God is perfectly good, that goodness

should be reflected in a perfectly good world.96

In assessing the goodness of the world, we must remember that we are assessing

its value, not its moral nature. Strictly speaking, moral evaluation can properly apply

only to moral agents and their actions and motives.97 Therefore, we must direct our

moral assessment toward God's act of creating this world. For our purposes, I would

propose that a creative act is morally good if its products are intrinsically valuable, its

John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God, Foundations of Evangelical Theology (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001), 654.

96 Consider William Rowe's argument that since this world apparently is not the best possible world, the God who created it must not be the best possible God (William Rowe, "Evil and God's Freedom in Creation," American Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 2 [1999]: 101-113. For a discussion of this article, see Appendix 3: Must God Create the Best Possible World?

97 It makes no sense to say that an ant or a bicycle is evil. Certainly an ant can be a pest and a bicycle can be defective. But they do not merit the designation 'morally evil'. 158 moral creatures are not created with a bent towards evil, and the motives behind the creative act is good.

Regarding moral creatures, Christian doctrine has traditionally affirmed that both humans and angels were created good. They have been subsequently corrupted by a fall. But in their original states, they were good moral creatures whose goodness reflected God's own goodness. Elect angels have been confirmed in their goodness, and one day, redeemed humans will likewise be perfected. Both the original creation and the subsequent redemption are results of God's good works. The problem of the fall will be addressed later. For now, it is sufficient to affirm that the fall was caused by creaturely agency, not divine agency.

The biblical narrative affirms that the original creation is valuable. After each creative act, God evaluated his creation and called it 'beautiful' (Gen 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21,

QQ

25, 31). We should not take the negative evaluation in Genesis 2:18 to be a denial of the goodness of creation." That man's aloneness is "not good" simply means that creation is incomplete and that this state of affairs is inappropriate. It is only with the creation of Eve that the first creation was completed. God considered the completed world to be 'very good' (Gen 1:31). It is very good because it reflects the beauty of its

Creator and is pleasing to him.

Although most translations render tob as 'good', Victor Hamilton translates it as 'beautiful' (Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis Chapters 1-17, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990], 120). Obviously,'good'as a designation of inanimate creations such as light cannot be a moral evaluation. In this context, tob seems to mean beautiful, pleasing, desirable, or suitable (William L. Holladay, ed. A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971], 122).

Contra Frame, Apologetics, 158-9. 159

Given the beauty and life present in our world, it should be self-evident that the world is of intrinsic value. Most proponents of the problem of evil would agree that it would be evil to destroy the world or the human race. Most would agree that life is worth living and that this world is a valuable place in which to live.100 These common intuitions affirm that in spite of the evil in the present world, it is still intrinsically valuable. If the fallen world is valuable, surely the value of the original creation can be affirmed with greater confidence.

Most proponents of the problem care little about the original state of creation.

They object to the idea that an all-powerful and perfectly good God would actualize a world that contains evil. Although much emphasis is placed on the present state of affairs, what is meant is that if such a God exists, evil should not exist in our world at all, throughout the entire course of its existence. Although the special concern with present evils is existentially significant, it is logically inconsequential. From an omni- temporal perspective, there is no reason why the present state of affairs is any more or less significant than the original or final states.

When we consider the problem of how God can be justified for actualizing a world that, omni-temporally considered, contains evil, we are no longer evaluating

God's creative acts exclusively, but also his providential acts. God created a good world; then he permitted evil to arise. But as I argued in the previous section, God has created moral agents who are responsible for their actions. The evil contained in this

100 Cf. William Hasker, "On Regretting the Evils of This World," Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981):425-37; reprinted in The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, ed. Michael L. Peterson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 153-67; and Peter Kreeft, Making Sense out of Suffering (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Books, 1986), 87; both cited in John G. Stackhouse, Jr., Can God Be Trusted? Faith and the Challenge of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 79. 160 world is not caused by God's creative act, but by the acts of morally responsible agents.

Certainly God has created conditions in which evil is possible, but he does not cause them to occur.

Although I reject consequentialist accounts of ethics, it is worth noting that many proponents of the problem of evil at least implicitly hold to a consequentialist ethic.

They consider God culpable for the evil consequences of his creative acts. If the

Christian God is to be evaluated on the basis of a consequentialist ethic, we must

evaluate all consequences as a whole, including the greater good that has resulted and

will result from the occurrence of evil, and particularly the final state, which may well

be the best of all possible consequences.

When we consider that God's ultimate purpose in creation is to manifest his

glory, and that he also purposes to bring about many other good consequences,

including the optimal final state of the redeemed, it is evident that his motives are

perfectly good. Not only are his actions in creation morally good, but his intentions in

creation are correspondingly good.

In short, God is responsible for his many good acts in creation, providence, and

redemption, but not for the evil acts of other moral agents. All of his actions and

creations reflect his goodness, beauty, and wisdom.

Condition 3: A Just Response to Evil

Another objection raised by proponents of the problem of evil is that although

God, being omnipotent, could have eradicated evil, he has chosen not to do so. It would

appear that God is not doing all he can to eliminate evil. The objection could be stated

as a question of whether God's response to evil is morally justified. Interestingly, N. T. 161

Wright has proposed that Old Testament theodicy is primarily about "what God can do, is doing, and will do about [evil]."101 The biblical data regarding divine response to evil includes both judgment and redemption, in their historical and eschatological expressions.102 Judgment is an expression of divine justice and a means of eradicating evil from the world. Redemption is an expression of divine mercy and a means of eradicating evil from God's people. These two themes jointly constitute the appropriate response of a good God to the problem of evil. It is in the cross of Christ that they ultimately converge.103 The event of the unjust crucifixion of the Son of God is at once the ultimate expression of evil and the ultimate expression of God's justice and

104 mercy.

Judgment

Biblical accounts of divine judgment against evil are numerous. The initial sin was met with curses upon the serpent and the ground as well as expulsion of humans from the garden (Gen 3). Cain was sentenced to futility and banishment for the murder of Abel (Gen 4:11-12). The wicked generation of Noah's time was destroyed by the flood (Gen 7). Architects of the Tower of Babel were scattered (Gen 11). Sodom and

Gomorrah were destroyed by fire and sulphur (Gen 19). The evil peoples of Canaan were purged at the time of the conquest (Joshua). The evil deeds of God's own

101 Wright, 23. 102 Note the correspondence to redemptive and punitive permission of evil. In both his permission of evil and his active response to evil, God is concerned with punishment and redemption, justice and mercy. 103 Helm, 213-4. The dual themes of judgment and redemption are intertwined throughout the biblical narrative (e.g. Gen 3:21-24; 4:14-15; 6:1-9:17; 11:1-12:3; cf. 2 Cor 2:15-16). But the cross is the decisive fulfillment and the eschaton is the final consummation. Also see my previous discussion on the "day of the Lord" and the "kingdom of God."

104 Wright, 50,55-6. 162 covenant people were judged severely both before (Numbers) and after the conquest, ultimately resulting in the exile (Judges, Kings). Consider also the acts of judgment

against Koran and his followers (Num 16:24-35), Achan (Josh 7:24-26), Jezebel (2 Kgs

9:30-37), Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5), and Herod (Acts 12:21-23).

The cross of Christ was God's judgment against the sins of his people. "Jesus

was taking upon himself the direct result of the ways in which God's people had failed

in their vocation."105 The frequently quoted passage in Isaiah 53:5-6 explicitly states

this:

But he was wounded for our transgressions; he was crushed for our iniquities; upon him was the chastisement that brought us peace, and with his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the LORD has laid on him the iniquity of us all.

Although it does not exhaust the meaning of the cross, the penal-substitution theory of

atonement yields the important insight that the cross was a divine act of judgment on sin

that justifies his forgiveness of sins (Rom 8:3).

The Book of Revelation warns of the terrible punishments that will be inflicted

on evildoers in the future (Rev 9, 16), leading eventually to their final judgment and

everlasting torment in hell (Rev 14:11; cf. 19:1-3, 20; 20:10). The final judgment is not

only a final destruction of evil, but also a final vindication of the justice of God, as all

creation will see and declare that his ways are righteous and just (Rev 15:3-4; 16:5-7;

19:2). 163

Redemption

The cross represents God's merciful response to the problem of evil. He not only eradicates evil by destroying evildoers, he also eradicates evil within evildoers in order to redeem them.107 The processes of justification, sanctification, and glorification are a means of purging humankind of evil. Wright points out that the various theories of atonement are ultimately about what God decided to do about evil. It was at the cross that the full expression of evil and hatred against God and his creation was fully absorbed and ultimately defeated.

The biblical metanarrative of creation, fall, and redemption can be construed in terms of initial blessing, the loss of blessing, and the restoration of blessing.

Theocentrically, we can understand the progression as: 1) divine rule of creation, 2) creaturely rebellion against the divine rule, and 3) the restoration of creation to the divine rule, where the divine rule entails blessing and rebellion results in a curse (cf.

Deut 28). God begins the drama of redemption by calling Abraham, with the express purpose of restoring blessing to all the nations of the earth (Gen 12:l-3).110 The divine purpose is accomplished in the work of Christ (Eph 1:3-14; Rom 1:16-17; 8:2-4) and will be fully manifest in the eschaton (Rev 21-22). The cross is the means of defeating evil and bringing about the 'greater good' God has intended, which will one day be revealed for all to see.

107 Wright relates a keen insight from Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn that the dividing line between good and evil is not between 'us' and 'them,' but runs through each of us (ibid., 19).

108 Ibid., 45.

109 Ibid., 55.

ll0Ibid.,25. 164

The cross also answers the objection that God's permission of evil was selfish.

How can God permit the horrendous sufferings experienced by so many people for the

purpose of glorifying himself? The answer is that the crucified Christ was the greatest

victim of evil, the perfectly innocent victim who voluntarily suffered the most

horrendous moral evil in order to demonstrate the love of God by eradicating evil and

restoring blessing to his people. Henri Blocher writes:

God battles with evil, and will conquer it. Or rather, God has battled with it and he has conquered it.. .The unadulterated goodness of God is demonstrated there. At the cross, who would dare entertain the blasphemy of imagining that God would, even to the slightest degree, comply with evil? It brought him death, in the person of his Son. Holiness stands revealed. Love stands revealed, a pure love; there is no love greater. Because of the cross we shall praise his goodness, the goodness of his justice, the goodness of his grace, through all eternity. At the cross, God turned evil against evil and brought about the practical solution to the problem. He has made atonement for sins, he has conquered death, he has triumphed over the devil. He has laid the foundation for hope. What further demonstration do we need?111

Temporary Permission of Evil Morally Justified

A common assumption made by those who object to the divine permission of

evil is that a supremely good God must immediately react against evil either by

preventing a potential occurrence of evil or by destroying all present evils. Three

further theological considerations will help to dispel this assumption. First, every sin

committed is ultimately against God. It is primarily a violation of the divine right, and

only secondarily a violation of creaturely rights if at all. Consequently, God is uniquely

privileged to temporarily permit sin in order to achieve his purposes. Second, every sin

is ultimately accounted for, whether by direct punishment of the sinner in the final judgment, or by the substitutionary atonement of Christ. Moral evil is never unjustly

111 Blocher, Evil,l03-4. 165 excused or overlooked. Rather, every evil act will be brought to justice. Third, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, God's reaction against evil, whether actual or potential, is not

an unthinking automatic reaction. He is capable of strategic planning in order to achieve

a greater good. His temporary permission of evil may be likened to a chess player who

sometimes refrains from capturing an opponent piece because he takes future moves into

consideration. To this effect Turretin writes:

But this does not hold good of the moral necessity because the exercise of this attribute depends on the most wise will of God (which in the infliction of punishment can, according to moderation [epieikeian], use various modifications without detriment). This is true of justice which indeed necessarily demands that every sin should be punished, but not that every sinner should be punished immediately.11

We may also note that monergists and synergists both hold that God could, and

one day will, eliminate all evil, but has justifiably chosen to wait. The question of

why he delays is a question about his wisdom, not his goodness.

The Origin of Moral Evil

In the preceding sections of this chapter I have proposed possible reasons God

may have had in permitting moral evil as well as moral justification for his acts in

creation, providence, redemption, and judgment. A further question to be addressed is

that of how it is possible for evil to originate in creatures that were created to be

compatibilistically free and morally good. Given my proposal that God purposefully

Francis Turretin, Institutes ofElenctic Theology, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. (Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 1992), 1:240.

113 Some may argue that for the unsaved, evil has not been eliminated. It is true that for such individuals who have freely chosen to embrace evil by rejecting God's provision of redemption in Christ, evil is not eliminated. But from the perspective of the whole of creation, evil is effectively eliminated by the elimination of unredeemed moral agents. The problem of hell is a separate problem beyond the scope of this thesis. I would refer readers to relevant works by other authors, such as Feinberg, "Hell and the Problem of Evil," in Many Faces, 395-444. 166 permitted the fall, the present task is not to demonstrate why God was unable to prevent the fall, but simply that the idea of a fall is consistent with my account of compatibilistic freedom.

The Fall of Humankind

The Fall and Creaturely Goodness

A common but misguided assumption is that if a creature is capable of

subsequently sinning, sin must be inherent in the creature.114 If the sinful nature had been prior to the fall, God could be blamed for creating an evil being. But Scripture

clearly teaches that the fall both precedes and causes original sin (Gen 3-11; Rom 5:12-

7:25; cf. Ps 51:7).115 Evil originated not in the nature of the creature, but in an act of the

creature. Adam and Eve became sinners by sinning. That they were created good need

not preclude the fall if we remember that as creatures, theirs was a contingent goodness.

Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 2, the actions of compatibilistically free

agents are determined by external as well as internal factors. It would be an error to

narrow the determinants to one factor, such as moral character. It is certainly possible

for evil to arise from some external source of temptation, some appeal to an aspect of

human nature that is intrinsically valuable and potentially exploitable, but not inherently

evil. I propose that the fall becomes possible if three conditions obtain: creaturely

fallibility, divine permission, and a source of temptation. To use a physical metaphor,

this amounts to a downward pull of gravity combined with the lack of an opposite

sustaining force.

114Erickson,453.

115 Also see Marguerite Shuster, The Fall and Sin: What We Have Become as Sinners (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 60. 167

Creaturely Fallibility

God alone is by nature immutably and necessarily good. Humans were created flawless but fallible. That humans are mutable is proven by the fact of the fall.116

Although John Calvin affirmed the goodness of the original state of humans, he also described it as "weak, frail, and liable to fall."117 Francis Turretin likewise described the first man as "one who was created indeed just and holy, but mutably. Thus, he could indeed stand if he wished, but could also if he wished become evil." That God created humans to be mutable makes the fall possible, though this alone is clearly insufficient to cause the fall.

Leibniz considered human fallibility to be a logically necessary consequence of metaphysical finitude.119 Against Leibniz, I would suggest that God could conceivably have created finite but infallible beings. One could even conjecture that if Adam and

Eve had chosen to eat from the Tree of Life instead of the other, they, like the unfallen angels, would have been confirmed in their moral goodness.120 But God in his sovereignty chose to create both humans and angels to be fallible and subsequently to permit their fall into sin in order to fulfill his purpose of demonstrating his grace through redemption.

"" Turretin, 1:607.

117 John Calvin, A Defence of the Secret Providence of God, trans. Henry Cole, in Calvin's Calvinism (London: Sovereign Grace Union, 1927), 274, quoted in Helm, 212.

118 Turretin, 1:607.

119 Leibniz, pt. 1, sect. 20,40. Also see my exposition in Chapter 4.

120 For confirmation of righteous angels, see Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, Vol. VI: God Who Stands and Stays, Part Two (Waco: Word Books, 1983), 272. 168

An Evil Act as Cause of Mutation

There is scriptural evidence to suggest that morally significant actions can play a role in shaping the character of their subjects. When Paul wrote that "endurance produces character" (Rom 5:4), he implies that a faithful response to suffering plays a role in developing godly character. In the case of redemptive suffering, he gives the subject grace to endure the suffering with the result that mature character is developed and God is glorified (cf. Jas 1:3-4; 2 Cor 4:17; 12:9-10). In the case of punitive abandonment of sinners, God withdraws his grace and they reap the consequences of their sins, becoming increasingly corrupt (Rom 1:18-32). Paul's comment regarding sowing and reaping makes this clear:

Do not be deceived: God is not mocked, for whatever one sows, that will he also reap. For the one who sows to his own flesh will from the flesh reap corruption, but the one who sows to the Spirit will from the Spirit reap eternal life. (Gal 6:7-8)

Given the principle of sowing and reaping, it is quite conceivable for morally good agents to subsequently become evil by committing evil acts. The question is how the initial act can come about.

Divine Permission

The second condition necessary for the fall is divine permission. As I have argued in the first section of this chapter, God could have prevented the fall, but purposefully and freely chose to permit it. Given the omniscience and omnipresence of

God, it is a curious fact that he is absent from the fall narrative (Gen 3:1-7). God subsequently called Eve to account saying, "What is this you have done?" (Gen 3:13), 169 but did not intervene at the time of the temptation saying, "What is this you are doing?"

Clearly there was some sense in which the original couple was left to themselves.

In his explanation of the fall, Francis Turretin made a distinction between sufficient grace and efficacious grace. The former gave Adam the power to refrain from sinning if he had so chosen. There was nothing lacking in Adam, moral or otherwise, that prevented him from resisting the temptation. There was no inability for which he could have blamed God. But God withheld efficacious grace, by which Adam would have chosen not to sin.

The former was necessary to his ability to persevere, but the latter to his actual perseverance. The former help was never absent from Adam, not even in the very moment in which he sinned; but the latter, God withheld from him freely as he was not bound to give it. Notwithstanding, neither can man be excused (because he sinned voluntarily and was impelled by no force) nor God be accused (because as a most free dispenser of his own goods, he was bound to the bestowal of that grace by no law, as will hereafter be more fully shown).122

Henri Blocher objects that while sufficient grace made it possible for Adam to obey God, that possibility never comes to fruition without efficacious grace. "Pascal, in the Lettres provincials, showed the Jesuits that the chief characteristic of what they called 'sufficient grace' was that it was not sufficient."123 In defence of Turretin,

Tiessen points out that the Jesuits' held a synergist model in which 'sufficient grace' is unlike that of his and Turretin's monergism. In both models, the grace God gives becomes effective only when supplemented by an additional element. In the case of synergism, it is the cooperative work of people (in this case Adam), that would result in

121 Cf. Helm, 212.

122 Turretin, 1:608.

123 Henri Blocher, Original Sin: Illuminating the Riddle, New Studies in Biblical Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 57-8. 170 actual obedience. In the case of monergism, it is efficacious grace that yields the same result.124

Synergists will object that in the monergist model, God has not given Adam all he needed for obedience. But this is a misunderstanding of the model. In both models,

God has provided the ability. What is lacking is human willingness. Ultimately, the difference is that between libertarian and compatibilist models of free will. Synergists hold that because Adam had libertarian freedom, God could not have prevented the fall.

Monergists hold that because Adam had compatibilist freedom, God could have prevented the fall by granting efficacious grace. But he chose to permit the fall and was justified in doing so. Given compatibilism, God knew that Adam would willingly sin if left to himself.125 Because Adam willingly sinned when he had the ability to obey, he was responsible for his actions and justly condemned.

God's withholding efficacious grace from Adam is somewhat analogous to his abandoning sinners to their sins (Rom 1) or 'hardening' Pharaoh's heart, if we remember that the 'hardening' was a passive act of abandonment on God's part. It is also analogous to his withholding efficacious grace from the non-elect, allowing them to continue in their unbelief and ultimately to be punished. The synergist's objection assumes that God is obligated to do all he can to promote the welfare of all of his creatures. But this is clearly not the case when we consider that God often chooses not to heal physical illness, though he obviously possesses the power to do so.126 While

124 Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation in Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004), 241-2.

125 Note that classic Arminians and Molinists would likewise hold that God had prior knowledge of the fall, though how God knows is less than obvious (see Chapter 2).

126 Obviously the free will defence is inadequate in dealing with problems of natural suffering. 171 many who suffer chronic debilitating diseases gain outstanding character as a result of their suffering, others become bitter and cynical. Still others lose heart and abandon their faith as a result of suffering. If God was morally determined to do all he can, only a god who is powerless to heal or lacks foreknowledge could make such blunders.

Classic Arminians and Molinists have no recourse.

The Role of Satan

The Genesis account of the fall names "the serpent" as the source of temptation.

Johannine materials later identify the "ancient serpent" as Satan, "the deceiver of the whole world" (Rev 12:9; cf. 20:2; John 8:44).127 In the fall narrative, the serpent initiates the dialogue with the woman that led to her deception and act of disobedience.

He begins by exaggerating God's prohibition, expressing shock and surprise that God would not allow them to eat from any of the trees (Gen 3:1; cf. 2:16-17).128 This is followed by a direct contradiction of God's warning of death and a misrepresentation of

God's motives (3:4-5; cf. 2:17, 18). The serpent claims to know God's thoughts and motives and suggests that God is withholding a blessing from them. He suggests to the woman that she can exceed God's intentions for her and become like God.129

Ultimately, he slanders God as being unworthy of trust and obedience. The satanic temptation provides some of the 'gravity' by which the fall becomes possible.

Invoking the Genesis 3 account of satanic temptation does not solve the problem of the origin of evil, but only pushes it back one step. The question of Satan's origin

127 Turretin, 1:608; Henry, 244.

128 Hamilton, 186, 188.

129 Ibid., 189-90. 172 leaves us with the task of explaining how good angels can fall into sin. However, the satanic temptation is certainly part of the biblical narrative and therefore plays an important role.

Appeal to Natural Desires

Any process of temptation involves some appeal to desire, whether it is a

positive desire for a perceived good or a desire to avoid something unpleasant or harmful (cf. Jas 1:14-15). Clement of Alexandria linked temptation with a desire for

what is good. He writes, "Hence ideally, man is attracted by choice of what is good;

evil as a privative cannot be directly desired. No one prefers evil as evil. One is enticed

by the pleasure that is in a thing and, imagining that to be good, considers the object

111

desirable." Note that in Clement's account of the temptation, misdirected desire is

implicitly a consequence of misperception: "imagining that to be good."

Humans by design possess desires that are natural and morally blameless. The

creation and fall narratives imply, and common experience confirms, that God created

humans with natural desires for food, companionship, beauty, and wisdom (Genesis 2-

3). That God satisfies desires as an act of blessing also confirms the essential goodness

of such desires (e.g. Pss 37:4; 145:16, 19; Rev 22:17). But the fact that these desires are

present makes humans vulnerable to temptation. Inherent in any desire is the possibility

of fulfilling that desire by an illegitimate means.

Alternatively, we could concede that God has created an evil being or that there is an eternally existent metaphysical dualism, neither of which is compatible with my theological system.

131 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, i.84.4, quoted in W. E. G. Floyd, Clement of Alexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 32. 173

The temptation narrative reveals that natural desires led astray by deception played a key role in the fall. In Genesis 3:4-5, the serpent denies the deterrent of negative consequences and suggests some desirable consequences of eating the fruit:

"You will not surely die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil." That the woman evidently believed the serpent rather than God constitutes unbelief as the first step of her sin.132 In verse 6, the narrator tells us that the temptation appealed to Eve's desire for food, beauty, and wisdom: "So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate." Each of these desires and their objects are inherently good.

The desire for food reflects our physical embodiment and creaturely dependence. The desire for beauty reflects not only our capacity for aesthetic pleasure, but also our spiritual capacity and need to worship. The desire for wisdom reflects our personal agency, which in turn is also a reflection of God himself as well as his intention for us. It was only in the context of the divine prohibition that the eating of the fruit was evil.

In the case of Adam, Scripture states that he was not deceived, without giving an explanation of why he sinned (1 Tim. 2:14). Hamilton notes that in receiving the fruit from the woman, "He neither challenges nor raises questions.. .His is a sin of

132 Turretin, 1:605.

133 The beauty found in creation is a reflection of God the Creator and is intended to point us to him. For this reason, aesthetics is not to be construed as merely aesthetic; art has a spiritual, and therefore ethical dimension (personal conversation with Brian Tysdal, June 1, 2006).

Consider image and dominion in Genesis 1:26. 174 acquiescence."135 While this is a significant observation, it still does not answer the puzzling question, "Why?" The context of the Genesis 3 story suggests that Adam's sin may have been one of misdirected allegiance (Gen. 3:12, 17). That Adam "listened to" his wife (v. 17) does not merely mean that he heard her acoustically, but that he obeyed her instead of God.136 If this is the case, Adam may have been motivated by an immediate desire to please his wife by taking the fruit she offered him. This was a good and natural desire that under the circumstances led to his sin of disobeying God.

In my exposition of compatibilist freedom, I made a distinction between general preferences and immediate desires.137 While Adam and Eve may have a general preference for obeying God, the temptation aroused conflicting immediate desires, which in the absence of restraining grace may conceivably have overtaken the virtuous desires in them. Their sins were the result of compatibilistically free choices to fulfill their immediate desires.

Given the mutability of the creatures, their fall was possible. Given the absence of divine efficacious grace, their fall was inevitable. That their natural desires were misdirected made the fall actual.

The Fall of Satan and His Angels

While the scriptural data regarding the fall of humans is limited, the materials addressing the fall of angels is virtually nonexistent. Any attempt to explain the origin of Satan will be necessarily incomplete and speculative. Therefore, the following is an

135 Hamilton, 191.

136 jQ "j;sten t0 me voice 0f (sama' lsqol) is a Hebrew idiom meaning 'obey', as reflected in Wenham's translation, "Because you have obeyed your wife" (Gordon J. Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 1: Genesis 1-15 [Waco: Word Books, 1987], 82).

137 See Chapter 2; cf. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 136. 175 attempt to explain not how evil actually originated, but simply how it may have been possible.

Although many passages have been interpreted as references to the fall of

•I 1Q

Satan, most fail to stand up to scrutiny. Isaiah 14 and Ezekiel 28 are generally

interpreted by exegetes as referring to human political powers. Luke 10:18 is a reference to Satan's defeat by the coming of the Messiah and the kingdom of God.140

Both Robert Mounce and David Aune interpret the expulsion of Satan from heaven in

Revelation 12:7-9 as an eschatological battle rather than primeval.141 Jude 6 clearly

refers to angels but does not yield any insight relevant to our purposes.142 1 Timothy 3:6

contains a brief allusion to the judgment of the devil, suggesting that Satan's sin was one

of conceit. The term for 'conceit' denotes deluded arrogance.143

138 Although it is common to refer to the pre-fall Satan as 'Lucifer', I have chosen to avoid this designation because of its association with Isaiah 14. I shall retain the term 'Satan' even for the creature's pre-fall state.

139 See John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 1-39, The New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), John D. W. Watts, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 24: Isaiah 1-33 (Waco: Word Books, 1985), Leslie C. Allen, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 29: Ezekiel 20-48 (Waco: Word Books, 1990).

140 Norval Geldenhuys, The Gospel of Luke, The New International Commentary on the New Testament, reprinted (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 302.

141 R. H. Mounce, 240; David E. Aune, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 52B: Revelation 6- 16 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson,1998), 712.

142 According to Richard Bauckham, Jude 6 is a reference to Genesis 6, and follows traditional Jewish interpretation of the latter passage as an account of the sexual immorality of a particular group of angels (i.e. the Watchers). By the mid-second century A.D. in Judaism, and fifth century in Christianity, there was a consensus that the "sons of God" were men (Richard J. Bauckham, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 50: Jude, 2 Peter [Waco: Word Books, 1983], 50-53).

143 William D. Mounce, Word Biblical Commentary, Volume 46: Pastoral Epistles (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2000), 181-2. 176

As I proposed in the previous section, the three conditions required to make the initial fall possible are creaturely fallibility, divine permission, and a source of temptation.

Creaturely Fallibility

The comments I have already made regarding the fallibility of humans can also apply to angels. To our knowledge, there is no reason why angels would be different.

"They could fall because they were created mutable and capable of falling." The fact that Satan and his angels have fallen is evidence that they were created fallible.

Divine Permission

D. A. Carson mentions the election of angels (1 Tim 5:21) as a function of God's

sovereignty.145 Given the monergistic framework I outlined in Chapter 2, the

implication is that God unconditionally elected the righteous angels and sustained them by his efficacious grace. He permitted the fall of Satan and the fallen angels by withholding the same grace, though he could have sustained them if he pleased.146

144 Turretin, 1:603.

145D. A. Carson, "God's Love and God's Sovereignty," Bibliotheca Sacra 156 (July-September 1999): 263. This reading is supported by Gordon Fee, / and 2 Timothy, Titus, New International Biblical Commentary (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1988), 131 but opposed by William Mounce, 316. However, Mounce's argument presupposes an interpretation of 'elect' (eklektos) elsewhere in Scripture as referring to those chosen for special tasks. While God appoints his chosen people to special tasks (i.e. to be his witnesses), the term 'elect' in both testaments (bahar in the OT) usually refers to the entirety of his people, whether Israel or the church. Where it refers to a select group within his chosen people, the purpose of that choice is almost always specified in the immediate context (Ps 78:68; 1 Kgs 8:16; 1 Chr 28:5; 1 Sam 10:24; 2 Sam 7:21). Knight incorporates both meanings into his interpretation (George W. Knight III, The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Greek Text, The New International Greek Testament Commentary [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992], 238). I would argue that 'elect angels' in the present passage can include all unfallen angels for three reasons: 1) the terms 'elect' and 'chosen' are frequently used to designate the entirety of Israel and the church; 2) the two ideas are mutually compatible (i.e. the chosen people/angels of God are appointed to a special task); and 3) the passage does not specify a select group from among unfallen angels.

146 See Augustine, The City of God, bk. 12, chap. 9, 231: "These [fallen] angels, therefore, either received less of the grace of the divine love than those who persevered in the same; or if both were created 177

Much of the same explanation I have provided for divine permission of human evil can be applied to the fall of angels. Certainly the glory of the elect angels reflects God's

own. His final victory over the fallen angels and judgment upon them will likewise

display his power and justice (e.g. Rev 19:1-3). That God sovereignly permitted the fall

is the most indispensable component of any monergistic account of the fall.

The Source of Temptation

The key problem regarding the fall of angels is how Satan the tempter was

initially tempted. There is obviously no recourse to a personal tempter, as in the case of

the fall of humans. The temptation must come from within. In this case, the analogy of

human desires is useful. It is quite likely that, as created agents, angels also have natural

desires. As non-corporeal beings, they would not share the same physical desires as

humans (i.e. food, sex, etc.).148 However, 1 Peter 1:12 suggests that they may have non-

physical desires.

Even in the absence of a tempter, it is possible for desires to be directed and

intensified in a way that leads to sin. James 1:13-15 gives an account of how this can

happen:

Let no one say when he is tempted, "I am being tempted by God," for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one. But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin, and sin when it is fully grown brings forth death.149

equally good, then while the one fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and attained to that pitch of blessedness at which they became certain they should never fall from it."

147 The brevity of the present treatment of divine permission is an effort to avoid redundancy, since a large portion of this chapter is already devoted to the idea of divine permission of evil.

148 Although they appear in human form, it is generally acknowledged that they are non- corporeal. The vivid descriptions of cherubim and seraphim (e.g. Isa 6, Ezek 1, Rev 4) are rich with metaphorical meaning and should not be taken as physical descriptions.

For a helpful discussion of this passage see Feinberg, Many Faces, 170-1. 178

Among the many function of angels, one of the most prominent is that of worship. They are pictured in heaven as praising God and declaring his glory (Isa 6:3;

Rev 4:8). We can infer from this that angels are created with a natural attraction to the beauty and glory of God, an attraction that moves them to worship. Yet the angels themselves also possess some form of 'glory' (Luke 9:2). It is wholly possible that

Satan's pre-fall glory created a natural temptation for others to worship him and even for him to turn his admiration away from God toward himself. Augustine writes,

"Therefore it is not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing."

It is also possible that the pre-fall Satan, like the archangel Michael (Dan 10:13;

12:1; Jude 9; Rev 12:7), was also an archangel possessing some authority over other

angels, and was created with a corresponding inclination to fulfill this function. Perhaps

even the nature of created agents implies a natural desire for some level of independent

function.151 A natural desire for dominion and independence could conceivably be

intensified to become rebellion.

Both the admiration for self and the inclination to rule can contribute to the rise

of conceit or deluded pride, which 1 Timothy 3:6 identifies as the beginning of the

devil's sin.152 Turretin's comment is helpful here:

Still we think that pride so exercised itself here that a thoughtlessness and decreased attention about the contemplation of God must have preceded it. The angel, becoming somewhat remiss in the contemplation of God, began to turn the sharpness

150 Augustine, City of God, bk. 12, chap. 6, 229.

151 See Heb 1:14, which refers to angels as "ministering spirits."

152 Augustine also names pride as the beginning of sin (ibid.). 179

of his intellect from God to himself and to admire himself; to be carried on from the admiration and overweening love of self to pride. This was followed by rebellion. Thus a certain error must necessarily be admitted here - not indeed speculative (as if he was ignorant of what he was bound to know), but practical, through which (blinded by self-love) he preferred the pleasurable good to virtue. Nor should it seem a wonder that into the angelic intellect (which was not pure act and immutable) such thoughtlessness and error (producing rebellion and pride) could creep.

Turretin's comment also introduces the idea that misperception resulting from Satan's creaturely finitude can be a factor. His finite intellect, further hampered by self-love, led to his self-deception and subsequent rebellion.

The Bible is silent regarding the temptation that led to the initial fall of Satan.

The foregoing account is highly speculative. However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, these considerations give us reason to believe that such a fall is possible without implying divine culpability.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a proposed solution for the problem of moral evil that is consistent with a monergistic account of providence and a non-consequentialist account of ethics. This proposal is comprised of three major theses:

1. In spite of the present existence of evil, we have reason to believe that God is purposeful and wise in his governance of the world throughout the course of its history. He has chosen to permit evil for purposes that will one day be universally acknowledged as wise.

2. In spite of the presence of evil in the world, God is morally blameless in all his works. All of his acts in the past, present, and future as well as the occasions in which he chose to refrain from acting, in creation, providence, and redemption, are perfectly justified. He has neither committed an evil act, nor has he failed to perform a moral obligation.

3. It is entirely possible that evil can originate apart from divine causation within a world that in its original created state perfectly reflects God's goodness. The fact that evil came into being need not imply either metaphysical dualism or divine fault.

Turretin, 1:603. 180

Unlike the various standard forms of the greater good defence, this proposal does not minimize evil in any sense. God will ultimately call evildoers to account, as he has in the past. It is God, not evil, that is justified. Furthermore, it avoids resorting to a consequentialist account of ethics, which many find objectionable.

The advantage of this proposal over various forms of the synergistic free will defence is that it provides a basis for present faith and future hope in a God who is sovereign over all things. We are ultimately in the hands of a just and merciful God, not abandoned to the hands of evil creatures (cf. 1 Chr 21:13).154 We can place our confidence in a God who is sovereign over all that happens, knowing that the evils we witness and experience serve his wise purposes. The monergistic approach is ultimately more optimistic.

In light of this monergistic account, issues related to the magnitude of evil can be viewed not as an unsolvable problem for our faith, but as an occasion for reflection on the greater magnitude of God's grace, which is able to produce good even from such evils (Rom 5:20). Viewed through the eyes of faith, these issues point us to a greater vision of the grace, power and wisdom of God, which will one day be revealed to us.

When David sinned by taking a census, he was given the choice among three punishments: famine, pursuit by his enemies, and plague. His reply was, "Let me fall into the hand of the LORD, for his mercy is very great, but do not let me fall into the hand of man." Cf. Edwards, 405. CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have presented a monergistic account of providence and evil with the aim of demonstrating that the theological monergism to which I hold is consistent with the present existence of evil. I began by demonstrating that a theological system that incorporates a specific sovereignty model of providence and a compatibilist account

of human free will is more exegetically sound and logically consistent than major

competing systems. While the open theist model offers a plausible account of evil, it

encounters serious exegetical challenges and results in a view of God as providentially

incompetent. Traditional Arminian models that hold to divine simple foreknowledge

but deny hypothetical (i.e. counterfactual) knowledge are unable to consistently attribute

to God any more providential control than the open theist model. The Molinist model

fails because it affirms the mutually incompatible doctrines of divine hypothetical

knowledge and libertarian freedom.

As a basis for ethical justification, I briefly outlined a non-consequentialist

account of ethics in which the universal laws of morality are grounded in the essence of

God's being, not in an independent set of abstract standards or in the consequences of

one's actions. I also made a distinction between the moral purity and the benevolence of

God. While God's actions are necessarily consistent with his character, his gracious

acts are freely offered without obligation. He is morally bounded, but not morally

determined.

I then proposed that the various approaches to explaining the existence of evil

can be classified as either priority-oriented or purpose-oriented. I argued that while both

181 182 options are available to synergists, a monergistic model of providence cannot consistently incorporate a priority-oriented approach. I further proposed that in order to use a purpose-oriented approach while consistently holding to a non-consequentialist account of ethics, one must make a clear distinction between divine motives in permitting evil and divine moral justification for doing so, and treat these as two separate problems.

In addressing the problem of evil, I proposed that while God could have prevented moral evil, he chose to permit them in order to achieve his wise purposes, most significantly that of glorifying himself through the drama of redemption. His permission of evil is primarily redemptive, though at times it can serve a punitive purpose, as he is uniquely privileged to punish. Yet no act of evil can be morally justified since humans are commanded to combat evil by doing good. God is morally justified because he never perpetrates evil, nor does he efficiently cause another agent to do so. He has created a world rich in value that contains morally good creatures, some of whom subsequently became corrupted apart from divine causation. The fall of moral creatures is possible given creaturely fallibility, divine permission, and a source of temptation. It is possible that some of the intrinsically valuable features of created agents made them vulnerable to temptation and subsequently to fall into sin.

I conclude that in spite of the apparent problems posed by the presence of evil in our world, they constitute no compelling reason for rejecting monergistic theism. It is wholly reasonable to believe in a God who is specifically sovereign, perfectly good, and who has wise and justifiable reasons for permitting the evil in our world. 183

I further conclude that this monergistic account of providence and evil is superior to synergistic accounts for three reasons. First, it is more consistent with an exegetically sensitive reading of the entirety of Scripture. Second, it more effectively upholds traditional and widely held beliefs about God while maintaining internal coherence. Finally, as a purpose-oriented approach, it offers more substantial reason for confidence and hope in a wise and sovereign God as we continue to live out our faith in the face of the evil in our present world. APPENDIX 1

BURNING HOUSE STORY

My compatibilist proposal is that human actions are determined by the combination of circumstance, character, and current internal conditions. Libertarians contend that while such factors affect the probability of an action, a free agent always possesses the power of contrary choice. The following story illustrates my argument that libertarianism ultimately reduces to irrationality rather than freedom.

Suppose that John, being a responsible father, runs into a burning house in search of his infant son because he knows that his son is in the house. His act of running into the burning house is determined by two main factors discernible to us: 1) his character as a responsible father, and 2) the circumstance of his son being in danger of being burned to death inside the house. According to compatibilism, John's act of running into the burning house is determined by the combination of these two factors.1

If he had been cowardly or irresponsible, or if his son had not been in the house, he would have refrained.

Libertarians believe that while circumstances and character affect the probability of a particular action, the exercise of one's will is the final determining factor. Thus, it is quite possible that while John is a responsible and courageous father, and while he knows that his son is in the burning house, there is still a chance that, despite the absence of any opposing determinant, John may choose not to rescue his son. Initially, this does not seem objectionable, until we examine closely the meaning of "the absence of any opposing determinant." Suppose it happens that John refrains and his son is

1 One could argue that a third factor is John's internal state of highly aroused concern. For sake of simplicity, this could be left out, since the current internal state is a combination of character and circumstance.

184 185 burned to death. He is subsequently questioned about why he did not make an attempt to rescue his son. It is accurately determined that John was not deterred by fear. Not

only was he clearly unafraid, but he was in fact an experienced fire fighter accustomed

to making such rescues. Nor was he lacking concern, since he loved his son very much

and wanted to save him. Nor did he judge the rescue to be unattainable, since he saw

that it was quite attainable. God himself searches John's heart and in his omniscience

discerns that there was absolutely no determining factor beyond the sheer exercise of

John's will! It seems quite absurd that given John's courage and expertise as a

firefighter, his love for his son, and the likelihood of his success, he would choose not to

attempt a rescue. A libertarian would say that while the circumstances make it highly

likely that John would attempt to rescue his son, there is always the possibility that he

would choose not to do so.

The story becomes even more absurd if we alter the circumstances. Suppose

John knew that there was no one in the house to rescue, nor was there anything of value

he needed to salvage. Suppose also that he knew the situation to be extremely

dangerous, as the house would collapse at any moment. Suppose also that John was

characteristically a wise and rational man, and retained his wisdom and rationality in

this instance. A compatibilist would say that there is no (i.e. 0%) chance that John

would run into the burning house. A libertarian is committed to saying that given the

lack of incentive it is highly improbable, but not impossible (i.e. > 0% probability), that

he would do so. That is, the libertarian must invariably allow for the possibility that

John would, as an exercise of his will, choose to run into the burning house for 186 absolutely no reason at all. I would argue that ultimately, libertarian freedom, or

'contra-causal' freedom, is a freedom to irrationality.

A libertarian could counter that the initial rebellion of Adam and Eve was irrational. Given their creation by God as morally flawless creatures designed to worship and serve him, God's glorious and beautiful perfections that were obvious to them, and the optimal conditions of the garden, it seems wholly irrational that they should fall into sin. While this is appealing and certainly contains some truth, the temptation story in Genesis 3 reveals that the fall was not wholly irrational. The serpent's appeal and the woman's rationale are otherwise portrayed by the narrator. A stronger case could be made for the irrationality of the angelic fall. But I have argued in

Chapter 5 that even the angelic fall may not be wholly irrational. I conclude that the libertarian position ultimately amounts to indeterminism, and 'contra-causal freedom' is essentially an affirmation not of freedom, but of irrationality. APPENDIX 2

ASEITY, ONTOLOGY, AND FREEDOM

In Chapter 2,1 presented a case for human compatibilist freedom and argued that human libertarian freedom reduces to irrationality. It seems irrational to choose against one's immediately strongest desires without a stronger opposing cause or motive. In

Chapter 3,1 argued that while God's freedom is bounded by his moral perfection, he

possesses the power of contrary choice within those bounds. Synergists may object that

the freedom I have attributed to God could well be attributed to humans. As I pointed

out in Chapter 2, this position would be detrimental to the free will defence. I would

propose two further arguments toward my proposal that divine freedom transcends

human freedom, one from divine aseity and the other from his ontological

transcendence.

First, according to my position, human choices are predictably1 linked to human

desires. But human desires are determined by antecedent conditions, both internal and

external. Because our desires are not the product of our choice, which would result in

an endless circularity of choice and desire, we determinately choose according to our

immediately strongest desire. It follows that we lack the power of contrary choice.

In the case of God's freedom, this clearly does not apply. God, as the uncaused

cause, has no antecedent conditions. His desires are not responses to circumstances, but

arise from within himself. As a function of his aseity, God alone has uncaused desires.

1 That is, predictable in the sense that if one knows all the conditions exhaustively and is capable of assessing such knowledge, one could predict the outcome.

2 This is the basic argument of Edwards (Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, vol. 1, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller, gen. ed. [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957], 172).

187 188

This is admittedly mysterious. But such mystery is unavoidable when we explore the aspects of God's nature that are not revealed in Scripture and beyond human analogy.

One could object that because God is temporal, he is exposed to circumstances, and within those circumstances he has desires. But this is to reverse the order of things.

Prior to the existence of 'circumstances', God possessed exhaustive hypothetical knowledge. His initial decree to actualize this particular world using his hypothetical knowledge is conditioned by nothing outside of himself. His exhaustive hypothetical knowledge is a means of providentially fulfilling his antecedent desires, not a determining cause of them. His subsequent responses to actualized circumstances are likewise a means of fulfilling such uncaused desires. Thus, God's desires and choices are not caused by anything outside of himself.

My second argument is that God's transcendent freedom could be a function of his ontological transcendence. To begin, let us divide various subjects into different ontological levels. For the sake of illustration, let us say that an abacus is level one while a computer is level two. They both exist and may be used for calculations. But the distinction is one between a mechanical device and a complex electronic one. Let us say that humans are ontologically level three. While computers are capable of performing many functions similar to humans, there is clearly a wide ontological gap between the third and the previous two levels such that the previous distinction pales in comparison. This represents a distinction between impersonal objects and personal agents. As we contrast humans with God (i.e. level four), the distinction is between finite creatures and the infinite self-existent. Again, there is some significant sense in

3 One could dispute my assignment of 'levels', but this should not affect my point. 189 which humans are like God. Humans are personal moral agents made in the image of

God. Yet one could arguably say that the ontological gulf between Creator and creature is the widest of all, though I am not prepared to make such a commitment.

The point is that significant functional differences can be based on ontological differences. I would suggest that freedom is part of our functional ontology. Between level three (computers) and level four (humans) is the great divide of personal agency and freedom. It stands to reason that the great divide between created persons and God entails further dimensions of freedom incomprehensible to humans. APPENDIX 3

MUST GOD CREATE THE BEST POSSIBLE WORLD?

Leibniz's thesis that this is the best possible world (BPW) has been widely discussed in relation to the problem of evil. It raises the question of whether God is morally obligated to create the BPW. As I noted in Chapter 4, Leibniz's designation of

BPW did not mean that the world in its present state is best, but that the world, infinitely extended into the future, is the best possible world.1

Edwards echoes this notion in a slightly different way when he affirms that God necessarily does what is wisest.2 Frame seems to accept the omni-temporal version of

BPW as a possibility, though without committing to it.3 Feinberg states that there is no best possible world.4 I would agree with Frame in affirming that the world God has created, omni-temporally considered, could possibly be the BPW. The evils we encounter in the present do not eliminate that logical possibility. However, I would suggest that there may well be more than one BPW, each of which is equally optimal, though differing from one another. Though this is beyond our epistemological grasp, it is logically possible. Note that my proposal is wholly consistent with Feinberg's affirmation that there is no singularly best possible world. In this case, God's choices are not necessarily determined by what is wisest, contrary to Edwards. His power of contrary choice is preserved.

1 Gottfried W. Leibniz, Theodicy, pt. 2, sect. 228.

2 Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, vol. 1, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller, gen. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 380.

3 John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing, 2002), 171.

4 John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil, revised and expanded edition (Wheaton: Crossway, 2004), 68.

190 191

Edward's proposal that God necessarily does what is wisest raises some interesting issues. First, we should reject the idea that any of God's actions are necessary in the logical sense. It also seems obvious that a perfectly wise God would reject possible actions that are unwise. But would he also reject possible actions that are wise, but not maximally wise? To say that God makes a decision that, though wise, is not maximally wise, seems to suggest that while it was wise on the whole, it was also tainted with some degree of folly.5 This seems unworthy of Christian theism.

Edward's statement also raises the question of whether the wisest possible creative act necessarily results in the BPW. While we evaluate moral goodness apart from consequences, it seems reasonable that wisdom should be evaluated based on consequences, though this says nothing about what those consequences ought to be. If this is so, it follows that perhaps the wisest possible God should create the best, or at least one of the best possible worlds. Against atheist critics, we must emphasize that the world God has created is not obviously less than the BPW. We can reasonably expect

God's criteria for what constitutes a BPW to be different from those of humans in general and atheists in particular.

A problem arises when, from this commitment to maximal wisdom, we deduce that God must always choose toward the goal of maximal glory for himself.6 It seems prima facie that God could always bring more glory to himself by one additional act or by creating one additional thing. The potential appears limitless. But the question of

5 This is not a hard deduction, but is my intuition.

6 Jonathan Edwards, Remarks on Important Theological Controversies, chap. 3, sect. 10, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 2 (Christian Classics Ethereal Library), 1290, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/edwards/works2.html (accessed July 17, 2006). 192 whether or not his potential for self-glorification is limitless is beyond our ken, as is the question of whether this world achieves maximal glory. Also, while self-glorification is

God's primary concern, it is not his only concern, as I have argued in Chapter 5.

I would conclude that God is supremely wise and that all of his acts reflect his wisdom. However, this is not to attribute some form of sapiential determinism to God's choices, since there may often be more than one maximally wise possible course of action. God retains the power of contrary choice. God's wisdom is analogous to his goodness in the sense that, while God is bounded from making unwise choices, he has freedom within those bounds of perfect wisdom. I would also conclude that God can be expected to create one of the many BPWs, each of which is equally optimal.

Review of William Rowe's Argument

In his article, "Evil and God's Freedom in Creation,"7 William Rowe uses an interesting argument toward the thesis that a best possible God should be expected to create a BPW. We should note that he is addressing Robert Adams' claim to the contrary. Rowe comes just short of conceding that Adams has successfully demonstrated that God is not morally obligated to create the best world he can. But he argues that even if God is not doing anything morally wrong by creating less than the best world he can, his perfect goodness renders it "necessary that he create the best world he can." He continues,

One being may be better than another even though it is not better by virtue of the performance of some obligation that the other failed to perform. It may be better by virtue of performing some supererogatory act that the other being could have but did not perform. Analogously, a being who creates a better world than another being may be better, even though the being who creates the inferior world does not thereby

7 William Rowe, "Evil and God's Freedom in Creation," American Philosophical Quarterly 36, 2 (April 1999): 101-113. This is not a comprehensive review of his article, which continues on to other issues. The point I address here is the first of his two main points in the article. 193

do anything wrong. Indeed, I'm inclined to think that if an omnipotent being creates some world other than the best world it can create, then it is possible there should exist a being better than it is. For it would be possible for there to be an omnipotent being who creates the best world that the first being could create but did not. I conclude then that if an essentially omnipotent, perfectly good being creates any world at all, it must create the best world it can.

The following observations can be made about Rowe's position: 1) Rowe evaluates the goodness of a conceivable being according to acts performed rather than qualities possessed. 2) Such acts fall into two categories: moral obligation and supererogation. 3) It is not clear whether Rowe is arguing that a) performance of good acts makes a being better; or b) a better being will necessarily perform better acts; the latter is a more likely interpretation. 4) Both Adams and Rowe evaluate possible worlds in terms of the happiness of the creatures that inhabit them.9 Evidently, they subscribe to a utilitarian ethic. 5) Rowe concludes that a perfectly good being who creates a world must necessarily create the best world it can.

I begin by noting that Rowe's argument does not apply to my theological position for two reasons. First, while I question that this is the BPW, I tentatively accept that this could well be one o/the BPWs. In some sense, I agree with his thesis, though I reject both his argument and his atheist conclusion. The other reason his argument does not apply is that he, as Adams, assumes a consequentialist ethic. They both seem to define BPW in terms of the happiness of its creatures.10 However, this discussion is still a concern, since I am not firm in my commitment that this is a BPW.

8 Ibid., 102.

9 Ibid., 101-2.

10 Ibid., 101. 194

Against Rowe's conclusion, I would raise the following objections. 1) In order to use the idea of supererogation as he does, Rowe would have to demonstrate how such acts of supererogation would make one being superior to another. He has not assumed this burden of proof. 2) If observation 3a is correct, Rowe is assuming that a being can become morally better by performing supererogatory acts. This assumes that the being is in the process of evolving by the performance of acts. This would be justified only if

Rowe is critiquing the ever evolving 'God' of process theology, which neither Adams nor I hold. 3) Alternatively, if observation 3b is correct, as I believe it is, Rowe is imposing a necessity on divine actions that begs the question. He assumes that a being of quality x will necessarily create a world of quality x, thereby allowing us to evaluate the quality of that being by observing the world it has created. This is the very thesis he is attempting to prove.

I conclude that theists, such as Feinberg, who reject the Leibnizian BPW thesis while affirming the supreme goodness of God are justified in doing so. Although I have tentatively accepted a variation of the BPW thesis, I also consider Feinberg's position to be a viable option. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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