DOCSLIB.ORG

[REVISED] Privacy Fundamentalism: an Essay on Social Responsibility Alistair S. Duff Introduction Privacy Faces an Existential T

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
[REVISED] Privacy Fundamentalism: an Essay on Social Responsibility Alistair S. Duff Introduction Privacy Faces an Existential T 25/02/2019 Privacy Fundamentalism - Google Docs [REVISED] Privacy Fundamentalism: An Essay on Social Responsibility Alistair S. Duff Introduction Privacy faces an existential threat. Such assertions are of course unoriginal, not even controversial. State spying on entire citizenries, local council snooping, omnipresent cameras, targeted advertisements, employee monitoring, facial recognition, heat sensors, implanted devices, drones, smart uniforms, the internet of things, genetic profiling, neuro-imaging, artificial intelligence, and so on and so forth: there are so many actual or potential privacy harms that trying to list them is a fool’s errand. Moreover, surveillance is now operating not only at the familiar level of sight, sound, and other observable senses; the “primary qualities” of space and time have also been compromised. The linear time and separate spaces which anchored privacy in the industrial era, have given way in the post-industrial age to a space-time continuum where privacy has lost all boundaries and all permanence. There remain, in Christena Nippert-Eng’s vivid language, precious few “islands” of privacy (Nippert-Eng 2010). It was all prophesied. Jeremy Bentham, a thinker “more important for the understanding of our society than Kant and Hegel” (Michel Foucault quoted in Vysniauskas 2018), foresaw the “inspection principle” governing not just prisons, but also mental asylums, schools, hospitals, factories, and welfare agencies (Bentham 1995 [1787]). Today each and every one of these social institutions has been allowed to fall under more or less complete electronic surveillance. It is not without significance that Bentham’s original sketch for his “Panopticon penitentiary” has scrawled next to it a quotation from Psalm 139: “Thou are about my path, and about my bed: and spiest out all my ways...” (Bentham n.d.). Two hundred years later Theodore Roszak would denounce the quasi-religious “cult of information,” a mindless worship of information technology and concomitant neglect of “the true art of thinking” (Roszak 1994). Now in the twenty-first century the situation is chronic. Personal privacy in the information society is profoundly “against the flow,” at odds with the epoch’s totems of transparency and connectivity. Of course, there are occasional interventions, “data protection” initiatives such as the recent European Data Protection Regulation, but with every step forward, it is not long before we find ourselves two steps back. No one can seriously doubt that, as a basic fact, privacy is in crisis. It will be argued in this article that the only effective antidote to privacy’s predicament is “privacy fundamentalism.” This admittedly striking term has a documented history in privacy research. Introduced by the law professor and pioneering privacy researcher, Alan Westin, “privacy fundamentalists” are defined as persons “generally distrustful of organizations that ask for their personal information, worried about the accuracy of computerized information and additional uses made of it”, and “in favor of new laws and regulatory actions to spell out privacy rights and provide enforceable remedies.” They are different from “privacy pragmatists,” who always “weigh the benefits to them of various consumer opportunities and services, protections of public safety or enforcement of personal morality against the degree of intrusiveness of personal information sought and the increase in government power involved.” Privacy fundamentalists differ even more from a third category of “privacy unconcerned,” individuals who are “generally trustful of organizations collecting their personal information” and “ready to forego privacy claims to secure consumer-service 1 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Or0JiZhj0SmzhJmbl4BG-u-eeeJ0J66FYYrUsjsPK2I/edit 1/14 25/02/2019 Privacy Fundamentalism - Google Docs benefits or public-order values” (Louis Harris Associates & Westin 1990; see also Kumaraguru & Cranor 2005). Westin’s surveys throughout the 1990s showed that approximately 25% of the United States public were privacy fundamentalists, compared with 55% pragmatists and 20% unconcerned. However, he detected a diminishing of the ranks of privacy fundamentalism after 9/11, in favour of pragmatism (Westin 2003). Westin’s magnum opus, Privacy and Freedom (Westin 1967), while it inspired privacy advocacy around the world, was shot through with pragmatism. For example, after expounding numerous ethical shortcomings of “polygraphs,” i.e. lie detectors, Westin ended by sanctioning their use, subject to certain conditions (Westin 1967, 263-267). A privacy fundamentalist would of course condemn these abominable and useless devices outright, as had Pope Pius XII (Westin 1967, 263). Not long before he died, Westin would defend even that egregious American privacy-eater, the Patriot Act (Fox 2013). Today, in the face of all the new and impending threats, it is surely a philosophy of privacy fundamentalism, not pragmatism, that is needed. Pragmatism has been the de facto regnant philosophy for many decades, and it has signally failed to stem the tide of surveillance. A more robust position is needed, one that can fortify the dwindling band of citizens still prepared to make a principled stand for privacy. Little privacy loses the final argument with the big battalions of money and power: that is the underlying script that must be rewritten. Now some people might fully agree that privacy fundamentalism in Westin’s sense is required, but think that it should go by another, less off-putting, name. It is likely, indeed, that Westin’s use of it was all along an attempt to discredit the position it represents. However, the very shock-value of “fundamentalism” is at least helpful in calling attention to the extremely high stakes at issue. If the battle for privacy is to have any chance of being won, a dramatic vocabulary may prove to be an indispensable part of its arsenal. Anyway, labels aside, the rudiments of the content of a theory of privacy fundamentalism are ventured below. Elements of Privacy Fundamentalism The place to commence a defence of privacy is of course at the very beginning. It is obvious that privacy has been at a disadvantage literally from “day one.” The Book of Genesis teaches that humanity’s original, Edenic state was one in which privacy was totally absent. According to that super-seminal text, it was only after the “fall” that Adam and Eve tried to hide their “private parts.” At the other end of the eschatological scale, the Book of Revelation draws a picture of a future heaven of choirs and communion; indeed, the very idea of desiring privacy seems antithetical to a perfected state, religiously understood. It is hardly surprising then that the word “private” occurs only once in the whole of John Milton’s multivolume epic Paradise Lost , according to John Hollander (Hollander 2001, 22). The connotation of weakness, negativity, clings to privacy from start to finish. That much is evident in the cultural gene-pool of Christendom. Secular history, too, has always made privacy subordinate to the public, the political. In evolutionary rationales, survival meant that the group had to take precedence over the individual. As civilization came on stream, Aristotle would define “man” as a political animal. It was in the polis, the public arena of democratic deliberation and decision-making, that a man was in his element, was free; the domestic sphere, the “oikos,” was a subsidiary, necessitous, invisible realm, a back zone into which Aristotle notoriously consigned women, children, and slaves ( Aristotle 1941 [c. 330 BC]) . Privacy was indeed the realm of the “oik”, the idiot. This negative valuation carried over into the Roman world. The very word “privacy” shares the same Latin root as terms like “privation” and “deprivation.” It is no accident then that in Britain, its ruling class raised on Greek and Latin literature, elite schools are still called “public schools,” or conversely that the lowest rank in the British army is that of “private.” And this also perhaps explains why most of the outstanding contemporary privacy theorists are female, as will be seen. 2 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Or0JiZhj0SmzhJmbl4BG-u-eeeJ0J66FYYrUsjsPK2I/edit 2/14 25/02/2019 Privacy Fundamentalism - Google Docs The deep-seated anti-privacy prejudice was never properly addressed in western thought. “What is surprising,” writes Lucas Introna, “is that privacy did not get explicit attention from any of the great liberals. Locke, Rousseau, van Humboldt, and J. S. Mill did not spend as much as a page on the subject” (Introna 1997, 261) ; nor, it might be added, is the idea of privacy salient in the writings of John Rawls, the twentieth-century philosopher who arguably completes the liberal canon. To be sure, private property is a major theme of all of these eminent thinkers, but privacy rights have no necessary connection with any form of ownership. Neither does privacy get a mention in the United States Constitution, although it was subsequently supposedly spotted in the “penumbra” of that great constitution. It would seem then that most commentators are agreed that, under liberalism, privacy should “wear the character of exceptions” (Bentham quoted in Hixson 1987, 102). However, whatever might have been appropriate or tolerable yesterday, in the information society we inhabit now privacy needs to come out of the shadows. Privacy cannot—in an age where information, including personal information, is flowing in all directions in ever-greater
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Library Philosophy and Practice (e-journal) Libraries at University of Nebraska-Lincoln July 2005 Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information Ken R. Herold Hamilton College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac Part of the Library and Information Science Commons Herold, Ken R., "Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information" (2005). Library Philosophy and Practice (e-journal). 27. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libphilprac/27 Library Philosophy and Practice Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 2001) (www.uidaho.edu/~mbolin/lppv3n2.htm) ISSN 1522-0222 Librarianship and the Philosophy of Information Ken R. Herold Systems Manager Burke Library Hamilton College Clinton, NY 13323 “My purpose is to tell of bodies which have been transformed into shapes of a different kind.” Ovid, Metamorphoses Part I. Library Philosophy Provocation Information seems to be ubiquitous, diaphanous, a-categorical, discrete, a- dimensional, and knowing. · Ubiquitous. Information is ever-present and pervasive in our technology and beyond in our thinking about the world, appearing to be a generic ‘thing’ arising from all of our contacts with each other and our environment, whether thought of in terms of communication or cognition. For librarians information is a universal concept, at its greatest extent total in content and comprehensive in scope, even though we may not agree that all information is library information. · Diaphanous. Due to its virtuality, the manner in which information has the capacity to make an effect, information is freedom. In many aspects it exhibits a transparent quality, a window-like clarity as between source and patron in an ideal interface or a perfect exchange without bias.
    [Show full text]
  • Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim‐
    JOURNAL for the SCIENTIFIC STUDY of RELIGION Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim-Majority Countries: Reconceptualization and Assessment MANSOOR MOADDEL STUART A. KARABENICK Department of Sociology Combined Program in Education and Psychology University of Maryland University of Michigan To capture the common features of diverse fundamentalist movements, overcome etymological variability, and assess predictors, religious fundamentalism is conceptualized as a set of beliefs about and attitudes toward religion, expressed in a disciplinarian deity, literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance. Evidence from representative samples of over 23,000 adults in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey supports the conclusion that fundamentalism is stronger in countries where religious liberty is lower, religion less fractionalized, state structure less fragmented, regulation of religion greater, and the national context less globalized. Among individuals within countries, fundamentalism is linked to religiosity, confidence in religious institutions, belief in religious modernity, belief in conspiracies, xenophobia, fatalism, weaker liberal values, trust in family and friends, reliance on less diverse information sources, lower socioeconomic status, and membership in an ethnic majority or dominant religion/sect. We discuss implications of these findings for understanding fundamentalism and the need for further research. Keywords: fundamentalism, Islam, Christianity, Sunni, Shia, Muslim-majority countries. INTRODUCTION
    [Show full text]
  • Peirce, Pragmatism, and the Right Way of Thinking
    SANDIA REPORT SAND2011-5583 Unlimited Release Printed August 2011 Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking Philip L. Campbell Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550 Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited. Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily con- stitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy.
    [Show full text]
  • Citizen Science: Framing the Public, Information Exchange, and Communication in Crowdsourced Science
    University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 8-2014 Citizen Science: Framing the Public, Information Exchange, and Communication in Crowdsourced Science Todd Ernest Suomela University of Tennessee - Knoxville, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Communication Commons, and the Library and Information Science Commons Recommended Citation Suomela, Todd Ernest, "Citizen Science: Framing the Public, Information Exchange, and Communication in Crowdsourced Science. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2014. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2864 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Todd Ernest Suomela entitled "Citizen Science: Framing the Public, Information Exchange, and Communication in Crowdsourced Science." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Communication and Information. Suzie Allard, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Carol Tenopir, Mark Littmann, Harry Dahms Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) Citizen Science: Framing the Public, Information Exchange, and Communication in Crowdsourced Science ADissertationPresentedforthe Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Todd Ernest Suomela August 2014 c by Todd Ernest Suomela, 2014 All Rights Reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • The Theory of Everything
    The Theory of Everything R. B. Laughlin* and David Pines†‡§ *Department of Physics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; †Institute for Complex Adaptive Matter, University of California Office of the President, Oakland, CA 94607; ‡Science and Technology Center for Superconductivity, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801; and §Los Alamos Neutron Science Center Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 Contributed by David Pines, November 18, 1999 We discuss recent developments in our understanding of matter, we have learned why atoms have the size they do, why chemical broadly construed, and their implications for contemporary re- bonds have the length and strength they do, why solid matter has search in fundamental physics. the elastic properties it does, why some things are transparent while others reflect or absorb light (6). With a little more he Theory of Everything is a term for the ultimate theory of experimental input for guidance it is even possible to predict Tthe universe—a set of equations capable of describing all atomic conformations of small molecules, simple chemical re- phenomena that have been observed, or that will ever be action rates, structural phase transitions, ferromagnetism, and observed (1). It is the modern incarnation of the reductionist sometimes even superconducting transition temperatures (7). ideal of the ancient Greeks, an approach to the natural world that But the schemes for approximating are not first-principles has been fabulously successful in bettering the lot of mankind deductions but are rather art keyed to experiment, and thus tend and continues in many people’s minds to be the central paradigm to be the least reliable precisely when reliability is most needed, of physics.
    [Show full text]
  • THINKING with MENTAL MODELS 63 and Implementation
    Thinking with CHAPTER 3 mental models When we think, we generally use concepts that we it would be impossible for people to make most deci- have not invented ourselves but that reflect the shared sions in daily life. And without shared mental models, understandings of our community. We tend not to it would be impossible in many cases for people to question views when they reflect an outlook on the develop institutions, solve collective action problems, world that is shared by everyone around us. An impor- feel a sense of belonging and solidarity, or even under- tant example for development pertains to how people stand one another. Although mental models are often view the need to provide cognitive stimulation to shared and arise, in part, from human sociality (chapter children. In many societies, parents take for granted 2), they differ from social norms, which were discussed that their role is to love their children and keep them in the preceding chapter. Mental models, which need safe and healthy, but they do not view young children not be enforced by direct social pressure, often capture as needing extensive cognitive and linguistic stimu- broad ideas about how the world works and one’s place lation. This view is an example of a “mental model.”1 in it. In contrast, social norms tend to focus on particu- In some societies, there are even norms against verbal lar behaviors and to be socially enforced. There is immense variation in mental models across societies, including different perceptions of Mental models help people make sense of the way the world “works.” Individuals can adapt their mental models, updating them when they learn that the world—to interpret their environment outcomes are inconsistent with expectations.
    [Show full text]
  • A Theory of Pragmatic Information and Its Application to the Quasi-Species Model of Biological Evolution
    A Theory of Pragmatic Information and Its Application to the Quasi-species Model of Biological Evolution Edward D Weinberger Max Planck Institute for Biophysical Chemistry, Am Fassberg, D-3400, Göttingen, Federal Republic of Germany Present address: Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 370 Central Park West, Suite 110, New York, NY, USA, 10025; Email: [email protected]. Abstract "Standard" information theory says nothing about the semantic content of information. Nevertheless, applications such as evolutionary theory demand consideration of precisely this aspect of information, a need that has motivated a largely unsuccessful search for a suitable measure of an "amount of meaning". This paper represents an attempt to move beyond this impasse, based on the observation that the meaning of a message can only be understood relative to its receiver. Positing that the semantic value of information is its usefulness in making an informed decision, we define pragmatic information as the information gain in the probability distributions of the receiver's actions, both before and after receipt of a message in some pre-defined ensemble. We then prove rigorously that our definition is the only one that satisfies obvious desiderata, such as the additivity of information from logically independent messages. This definition, when applied to the information "learned" by the time evolution of a process, defies the intuitions of the few previous researchers thinking along these lines by being monotonic in the uncertainty that remains after receipt of the message, but non-monotonic in the Shannon entropy of the input ensemble. It follows that the pragmatic information of the genetic "messages" in an evolving population is a global Lyapunov function for Eigen's quasi-species model of biological evolution.
    [Show full text]
  • Mental Models Concepts for System Dynamics Research
    Report No. 6 January 7, 1998 Mental Models Concepts for System Dynamics Research James K. Doyle1 David N. Ford 2 System Dynamics Review, in press. 1 Department of Social Science and Policy Studies, 100 Institute Rd., Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 01609. Email: [email protected]. 2 Department of Information Science, University of Bergen, N-5020 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT Although "mental models" are of central importance to system dynamics research and practice, the field has yet to develop an unambiguous and agreed upon definition of them. To begin to address this problem, existing definitions and descriptions of mental models in system dynamics and several literatures related to cognitive science were reviewed and compared. Available definitions were found to be overly brief, general, and vague, and different authors were found to markedly disagree on the basic characteristics of mental models. Based on this review, we concluded that in order to reduce the amount of confusion in the literature, the mental models concept should be "unbundled" and the term "mental models" should be used more narrowly. To initiate a dialogue through which the system dynamics community might achieve a shared understanding of mental models, we proposed a new definition of "mental models of dynamic systems" accompanied by an extended annotation that explains the definitional choices made and suggests terms for other cognitive structures left undefined by narrowing the mental model concept. Suggestions for future research that could improve the field's ability to further define mental models are discussed. 2 A difficulty for those who want to understand or to appraise mental models is that their proponents seem to have somewhat different views.
    [Show full text]
  • INFORMATION– CONSCIOUSNESS– REALITY How a New Understanding of the Universe Can Help Answer Age-Old Questions of Existence the FRONTIERS COLLECTION
    THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION James B. Glattfelder INFORMATION– CONSCIOUSNESS– REALITY How a New Understanding of the Universe Can Help Answer Age-Old Questions of Existence THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION Series editors Avshalom C. Elitzur, Iyar, Israel Institute of Advanced Research, Rehovot, Israel Zeeya Merali, Foundational Questions Institute, Decatur, GA, USA Thanu Padmanabhan, Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics (IUCAA), Pune, India Maximilian Schlosshauer, Department of Physics, University of Portland, Portland, OR, USA Mark P. Silverman, Department of Physics, Trinity College, Hartford, CT, USA Jack A. Tuszynski, Department of Physics, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Rüdiger Vaas, Redaktion Astronomie, Physik, bild der wissenschaft, Leinfelden-Echterdingen, Germany THE FRONTIERS COLLECTION The books in this collection are devoted to challenging and open problems at the forefront of modern science and scholarship, including related philosophical debates. In contrast to typical research monographs, however, they strive to present their topics in a manner accessible also to scientifically literate non-specialists wishing to gain insight into the deeper implications and fascinating questions involved. Taken as a whole, the series reflects the need for a fundamental and interdisciplinary approach to modern science and research. Furthermore, it is intended to encourage active academics in all fields to ponder over important and perhaps controversial issues beyond their own speciality. Extending from quantum physics and relativity to entropy, conscious- ness, language and complex systems—the Frontiers Collection will inspire readers to push back the frontiers of their own knowledge. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5342 For a full list of published titles, please see back of book or springer.com/series/5342 James B.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 HIGHLIGHTS of PRESCRIBING INFORMATION These Highlights Do
    HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION TREMFYA® (guselkumab) These highlights do not include all the information needed to use TREMFYA safely and effectively. See full prescribing information for TREMFYA. ----------------------------DOSAGE FORMS AND STRENGTHS--------------------------- TREMFYA® (guselkumab) injection, for subcutaneous use Injection: 100 mg/mL in a single-dose prefilled syringe or single-dose One-Press patient-controlled injector. (3) Initial U.S. Approval: 2017 -----------------------------------CONTRAINDICATIONS----------------------------------- ---------------------------------RECENT MAJOR CHANGES-------------------------------- Serious hypersensitivity reactions to guselkumab or to any of the excipients. (4) Indications and Usage (1.2) 07/2020 Dosage and Administration (2.2) 07/2020 -------------------------------WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS--------------------------- Warnings and Precautions, Hypersensitivity (5.1) 06/2020 • Hypersensitivity Reactions: Serious hypersensitivity reactions, including Warnings and Precautions, Infections (5.2) 07/2020 anaphylaxis, may occur. (5.1) Warnings and Precautions, Pre-treatment Evaluation for TB (5.3) 07/2020 • Infections: TREMFYA may increase the risk of infection. Instruct patients to seek medical advice if signs or symptoms of clinically important chronic or acute ----------------------------------INDICATIONS AND USAGE------------------------------- infection occur. If a serious infection develops, discontinue TREMFYA until the TREMFYA is an interleukin-23 blocker indicated for
    [Show full text]
  • Designing Information Systems: a Pragmatic Account
    Designing Information Systems Jonas Sjöström Designing Information Systems A Pragmatic Account Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Auditorium Minus, Gustavianum, Uppsala, Monday, October 25, 2010 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Phi- losophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Abstract Sjöström, J. 2010. Designing Information Systems. A pragmatic account. 268 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-506-2149-5. Information technology (IT) plays an increasingly important role for individuals, organiza- tions, markets, and society as a whole. IT systems are artefacts (human made objects) de- signed for various purposes. Given the multiple-purpose characteristics of computers, such artefacts may, for example, support workflows, perform advanced calculations, support hu- man communication and socialization, enable delivery of services and digital products, facili- tate learning, or simply entertain. The diverging application areas for IT present a challenge to designers who, as a consequence, have to address increasingly divergent design situations. There have been numerous arguments suggesting that the IT artefact has been 'taken for granted', and needs to be understood and conceptualized better within information systems (IS) research. This thesis is based on the pragmatist notion that one important value of IT resides in its potential to support human collaboration. Such a belief has implications for the development of (1) knowledge aimed for action, change and improvement; (2) knowledge about actions, activities and practices; and (3) knowledge through action, experimentation and exploration. A view of the IT artefact is outlined, showing it as part of a social and techno- logical context. IT artefact design is explained in relation to the induction of social change.
    [Show full text]
  • GILENYA®  Cardiac Arrhythmias Requiring Anti-Arrhythmic Treatment with Class Ia Or Safely and Effectively
    HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION Baseline QTc interval ≥ 500 msec. (4) These highlights do not include all the information needed to use GILENYA® Cardiac arrhythmias requiring anti-arrhythmic treatment with Class Ia or safely and effectively. See full prescribing information for GILENYA. Class III anti-arrhythmic drugs. (4) GILENYA (fingolimod) capsules, for oral use Hypersensitivity to fingolimod or its excipients. (4) Initial U.S. Approval: 2010 ------------------------WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS-------------------- ----------------------------RECENT MAJOR CHANGES--------------------------------- Infections: GILENYA may increase the risk. Obtain a complete blood Indications and Usage (1) 8/2019 count (CBC) before initiating treatment. Monitor for infection during Dosage and Administration (2.1) 8/2019 treatment and for 2 months after discontinuation. Do not start in patients Contraindications (4) 1/2019 with active infections. (5.2) Warnings and Precautions (5.5) 8/2019 Progressive Multifocal Leukoencephalopathy (PML): Withhold Warnings and Precautions (5.2, 5.8, 5.10, 5.12) 12/2019 GILENYA at the first sign or symptom suggestive of PML. (5.3) ----------------------------INDICATIONS AND USAGE---------------------------------- Macular Edema: Examine the fundus before and 3-4 months after GILENYA is a sphingosine 1-phosphate receptor modulator indicated for the treatment start. Diabetes mellitus and uveitis increase the risk. (5.4) treatment of relapsing forms of multiple sclerosis (MS), to include clinically Liver Injury: Obtain
    [Show full text]