Appendix A: International Standards There are few international standards for redistricting. A usable source, however, is the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (Code of Good Practice) adopted in 2002 by the European Commission for Democracy through Law, or Venice Com- mission. This Commission was created in 1990 as an advisory body of the Council of Europe. It was created after the fall of the Berlin Wall to advise on constitutional matters and to assist in the development of democratic systems and institutions in the recently independent nations of Eastern Europe. Section 2.2, Equal Voting Power, of this Code is reproduced below along with the Organization for Security and Coop- eration in Europe (OSCE) policy statement on equal voting power and the United Nation’s guidance on redistricting and reallocation of seats. In this book, I have contrasted this view of “good practice” with international realities. The European Commission for Democracy through Law, or Venice Commission, in 2002, adopted a Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters. Section 2.2 reads as follows: A.1 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters A.1.1 Equal Voting Power Seats must be evenly distributed between constituencies. This must at least apply to elections to lower houses of parliament and regional and local elections; It entails a clear and balanced distribution of seats among constituencies on the basis of one of the following allocation criteria: population, number of resident nationals (including minors), number of registered voters, and the number of people actually voting. An appropriate combination of these criteria may be envisaged; © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 183 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7 184 Appendix A: International Standards The geographical criterion and administrative, or even historical, boundaries may be taken into consideration; The permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and certainly should not exceed 15% except in special circumstances (protection of a concentrated minority, sparsely populated administrative entity); In order to guarantee equal voting power, the distribution of seats must be reviewed at least every 10 years, preferably outside election periods; With multi-member constituencies, seats should be redistributed preferably with- out redefining constituency boundaries, which should, where possible, coincide with administrative boundaries; When constituency boundaries are redefined—which must be in a single-member system—it must be done: Impartially; Without detriment to national minorities; Taking account of the opinion of a committee, a majority of whose members are independent; this committee should preferably include a geographer, a sociolo- gist, a balanced representation of the parties and, if necessary, representatives of national minorities. A.2 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Guidelines According to OSCE commitments, all votes should carry the same weight to ensure equal representation. This means that each elected representative should represent a similar number of registered electors. For example, in a majority voting system, the size of the electorate should not vary by more than approximately 10% from constituency to constituency. Under the proportional representation system, the size of the electorate may vary, but the number of representatives for each district should be proportional to the size of the electorate. The election law should provide detailed and uniform criteria for the drawing of electoral-district boundaries, spec- ifying considerations such as the number of voting population per district and geographic, administrative, and historical continuity of boundaries. The boundaries should be drawn in a transparent manner, under the principle of political neutrality, ideally by a non-partisan commission of experts. A domestic observer group should assess whether election districts have been drawn in a transparent manner to ensure as far as possible that all votes carry the same weight or whether they have been drawn in “a selective, discriminatory, and biased manner.” Appendix A: International Standards 185 A.3 UN (Center for Human Rights): Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, Annex II Para. V.b When voting is conducted on the basis of electoral districts, the said districts shall be established on an equitable basis such as would make the result most accurately and completely reflect the will of all the voters. Appendix B: International Election Systems The following lists are compiled largely from the Comparative list of the ACE, the Electoral Knowledge Network (2012) at http://aceproject.org; International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) at http://www.idea.int/resources/ databases; Lisa Handley, “Appendix C: Criteria Considered in the Delimitation Process,” Delimitation Equity Project: Resource Guide, IFES Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance and USAID, 2006, Chap. 2; and my own research. The organizations’ work is invaluable, but it is incomplete and sometimes inconsis- tent or outdated. I have verified most of the information and expanded the lists to include some countries not in the original lists or deleted some, but I have not independently verified the accuracy of every part of every list.1 1Please note this appendix uses the following abbreviations: PR—proportional representation, voting with each party entitled to representation according to its share of the vote; FPTP—first- past-the-post, plurality voting with a single winner; TRS—two round system, usually majority voting with a single winner; MMP—mixed member proportional, with a mix of FPTP and PR elections; P—parallel system (also called Mixed Member Majoritarian [MMM]), with a mix of FPTP and PR elections; STV—single transferable vote, with ranked or preferential voting in a MMD designed to achieve proportional representation; SNTV—single non-transferable vote, designed to produce plurality winners in multi-member districts; AV—alternative vote (also called instant run-off voting) with ranked or preferential voting among multiple candidate designed to achieve one winner with a majority; Blk—block voting (also called multiple non-transferable vote), designed for electing several representatives from the same party in a multimember electoral district; SMD—single-member district; MMD—Multi-member district. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 187 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7 188 Appendix B: International Election Systems B.1 Bicameral or Unicameral National Legislature B.1.1 Bicameral Legislatures with Upper House Not Directly Elected (Usually Selected by States or Provinces [Indirectly Elected] or Appointed by Head of State or Monarch) Afghanistan, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bermuda, Bhutan (Mon- arch appoints 11 members), Bosnia & Herzegovina, Botswana, Cambodia, Camer- oon, Canada, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)(appointment by monarch), Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany, Gre- nada, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Myan- mar, Morocco (appointed by Monarch), Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Rwanda, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland (appointed by Monarch), Thailand (appointed ½ by lower chamber and ½ by government), Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Lucia, Uzbekistan, United Kingdom (appointed by Monarch and hereditary), and Yemen. B.1.2 Bicameral Legislatures with Some Members of Upper House Directly Elected Australia (STV), Belgium (PR), Bolivia (PR), Brazil (3 elected by majority for each of 26 states and Federal District), Chile (PR), Colombia (PR), Czech Republic (TRS), Dominican Republic (FPTP), Haiti (3 elected by majority [TRS] in each of 10 administrative département), India (STV), Indonesia (SNTV), Italy (P), Japan (P), Jordan (SMD), Kazakhstan (FPTP, with 9 appointed), Liberia [2 elected in FPTP from each of 15 counties for 9 year terms], Mexico (P), Nigeria (FPTP), Palau (In MMDs; there are no political Parties), Paraguay (PR), Philippines (nationwide through majority at-large voting), Poland (FPTP), Romania (PR), Spain (FPTP), Switzerland (FPTP), United States (FPTP), Uruguay (PR nationwide), and Zimba- bwe (PR, with addition of eighteen tribal chiefs and two disabled persons). B.1.3 Unicameral Legislatures Andorra, Anguilla, Albania, Algeria, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus (North), Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Estonia, Egypt, Eritrea, Equa- torial Guinea, Falkland Islands (Maldives), Finland, Fiji, Georgia, Guernsey, Ghana, Greenland, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Appendix B: International Election Systems 189 Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jersey, Kenya, Kosovo, Republic of Korea, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Libya, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Macau, Mali, Malta, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Monserrat, Micronesia, Republic of Moldova, Mozambique, Nauru, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Niue, Norway,