Merton's Sociology of Science: The First and the Last Sociology of Science?

KARIN KNORR CETINA University of Bielefeld Merton the founder of the dance of programs of instruction and centers sociology of science of research in social studies of science and technology can be found in the United States Even his enemies admit that Merton is the and Europe, and the status of sociology of founder of the sociology of science. When he science as an academic subdiscipline is published his classic Science, Technology, beyond question. To be sure, there were other and Society in Seventeenth-Centiiry England books produced on science, technology, and in 1938. the sociology of science was not a society at the time of Merton's publication, recognized field. Fifty years later, an abun- most notably Bemal's famous The Social SYMPOSIUM 523 Function of Science (1939). Yet none of the failed, it has not failed in recommending and works examining the social aspects of science initiating professional sociological research. had the range of professional interests, the But has it failed? Many of my colleagues depth of knowledge, and, later, the strategic today would say yes. There exists today a position in sociology to help a whole subfield "new sociology of science," also known as off the ground. Moreover, Merton's achieve- the "sociology of scientific practice" or the ment in this respect was not just an "sociology of scientific knowledge," which institutional achievement. The many pro- has become a central part of the larger field of grams in the area that we have today came science, technology, and society.2 Fater, and most were only indirectly helped by This new brand of social studies of science Merton. Rather, in finding and motivating has created its research agenda in opposition students, in producing over time a whole to the Mertonian program. The following series of seminal papers on social aspects of concerns itself with the criticism the Merton- science, and in building his "middle-range" ian approach has attracted in relation to this theories in sociology in general, Merton new development. Stripped to its essentials, created a framework of concepts and tools for this criticism can be divided into two the sociology of science. Most importantly, categories: first, it consists of an attack on the he proposed a program for research: to trace "normative" and "functionalist" orientation the way the institutional environment of of Merton's sociology of science; second, it science, including its norms and cultural questions any research agenda that saves the values, impinges on science—not on the effort of examining in detail the substance of nature of science or the substance of its science and of scientific work. theories but on its progress and development. Merton's students fleshed out this program by emphasizing, in addition, the institutional The critique of Merton structure within science—for example, its social structure (e.g., Cole and Cole 1973; x Interestingly enough, Merton's original work Zuckerman and Merton 1971). on Puritanism and the rise of modern science This research program set the new field has not attracted the attention it deserves among apart from the conception of science studies sociologists. Sociologists more readily latched as a pastime for natural scientists-turned- on to his later essays, particularly his work on commentators of their field (a conception still the "ethos" of science (e.g., Stehr 1978, Col- dominant in some countries). Merton is lins 1982). Merton's first fully fledged discus- sometimes criticized for not producing_ a sion of this ethos is a paper from 1942 in which systematic theory of society or a system of he described "four sets of institutional impera- sociology, and for instead using his extraordi- tives": universalism, communism, disinterest- nary talents to focus theoretical propositions edness, and organized skepticism. These are on empirical research (see Bierstedt 1981). the "guiding principles" of scientific work, the Yet in his stubborn insistence that theory must "canons" expressed through demands made have utility for research and must adapt its upon scientists: scientific findings must be pub- range and conceptions to this role, Merton lished (the norm of communism), knowledge was ahead of his time rather than behind claims must be subjected to impersonal criteria among American sociologists. Certainly, in of evaluation (universalism), personal interests sociology of science his research orientation must be excluded from proper scientific proce- has set a trend that continues today within and dures (disinterestedness), and criticism is per- without the Mertonian program; and in mitted and encouraged (organized skepticism). sociology in general, grand, unifying systems The critics argued that these norms are neither of thought are now treated with widespread stable properties nor exclusive sanctionable ide- suspicion. If the Mertonian program has als of scientific activities. Where the norms are endorsed, "counternorms" also appear which to some degree cancel the original imperative.

It is only fair to say that Merton's students (those associated with Merton) did not "just" extend his 2 For an overview over this program, see Knorr Cetina program. See. for example, the most recent book, by and Mulkay (1983) and Zuckerman (1988). For a review Stephen Cole (1991). from the Mertonian perspective see Gieryn (1982). 524 SYMPOSIUM Consequently, both norms and counternorms science. He essentially took science to be may be perceived as part of a larger (and chang- identical with its public face, as the embodi- ing) rhetoric of science whose relationship to ment of objective knowledge. Yet an ade- scientific practice remains an open question. quate analysis, so Hall argued, would demand But the criticism runs deeper: it is directed better care in establishing the institutional against any approach that treats norms, or val- reality of science (and of course of Puritan- ues, as primary explanatory principles of social ism). If this care was taken, other features of behavior. The whole movement of sociological science would emerge (such as mathematiza- theory, after Parsons, is a move against such tion and mechanization) whose congeniality assumptions. Within the sociology of science, with Puritanism would have to be proven by the goal of '" explaining" scientific behavior it- Merton. self became a point of contention. Where the The details of this debate are of no concern goal was maintained, the normative model was to us here. What is significant is the extent to replaced by the interest, conflict, and interac- which the problems historians had with Mer- tion models of scientific conduct. ton's approach and the problems on account of In addition to the objections against any which the new social studies of science moved "normative" theory, the critique of function- away from Mertonianism are identical. The point alisms spilled over into debates about "Mer- is that social influences upon science, and in- tonianism" in science studies, although it was deed the social makeup of science, cannot be directed more against Parsons than against adequately understood if the "'cognitive1' be- Merton. More interesting perhaps, and more liefs, the methodical procedures, the ontologi- specific to science studies, was the second cal assumptions, and more generally the tech- major objection against the Mertonian sociol- nical structure of this institution are not known, ogy of science, an objection directed against and not addressed in the analysis. Merton's def- the original research program. Since virtually inition of science remained an outsider's defi- the same objection has been raised indepen- nition. Since then, the sociology of science has dently by historians of science against the emulated the history and philosophy of science "Merton thesis." let me look at the latter by becoming a field that includes the substance first. The ''Merlon thesis1' is the upshot of his of science. It no longer shuns the responsibility 1938 volume. In essence it says that Puritan- of considering the technical content of scien- ism in seventeenth-century England promoted tific work. In fact, it often considers it in as a favorable attitude toward science in virtue much detail as do the scientists themselves. The of the '"inner-worldly" activism which it result is that the sociology of science has turned favored as a means to the Puritan's goal of into a sociology of scientific knowledge. It has achieving a state of grace. In modern science, become internalist as well as externalist^ con- inner-worldly activity translates into empiri- cerned with the content within as well as the cism and rationalism—the presumed worldly context of scientific work. To be sure. Mer- means for revealing God's works. The ton's thesis was also a thesis within the sociol- ensuing debates concerned the question of ogy of knowledge. In this respect, as in others, whether the Puritan or Catholic context Merton anticipated the development of the field. provided the social reinforcement that helped Yet he did not consider enough the need for a seventeenth-century science off the ground. sociology of scientific knowledge to develop Predictably, they also concerned the question not from external influences (such as Puritan- of whether religion, commerce, or industry ism) upon science, but from a definition of the should be taken as the dominant sustaining phenomenal structures and the technical activ- factor in regard to science (Heilbron, FE, p. ities of its objects. 11). Yet the deeper issue, from the point of view of recent sociology of science, is a methodological one. Could a thesis such as The alternative definition of social the Puritanism-science thesis even be ad- studies of science dressed without adequate analysis of the nature of the new science? From this The Mertonian conception of sociology is a perspective, predominantly put forward by pure, coherent, but exclusionary conception. It Hall (1963; see Rattansi. CMM. pp. 351-79). is based on the deployment of important socio- Merton was cavalier about characterizing logical concepts (social structure, function. SYMPOSIUM 525 norm, value, social actor, social role, anomie, sociology of science as it once existed and its and the like) as defined by the classic studies of current developments. But the point I want to the field. These concepts are tools for classify- draw attention to is the weakening of social ing social relations and mechanisms of integra- analysis that follows from the discussion of tion or disintegration. They go hand in hand reflexivity. Traditional, Mertonian sociology with a set of predominantly "quantitative" meth- applied the belief in the edge of objectivity of ods that suitably support these concepts. Yet in science to itself. It remained secure enough in choosing this paradigm, sociology had pro- its knowledge of the positivist foundation of posed a division of labor with other disciplines— science to carry the Mertonian research for example, with history, linguistics, ethnog- program through until today. The new- raphy, or philosophy. The cognitive content, sociology of scientific knowledge, on the discourse, cosmology, and ontology of modern other hand—since it cannot shirk the duty of institutions were left to these fields. Stimulated confronting reflexivity—more easily lends by Kuhn, the new studies of knowledge pro- itself to discussions that lead away from, or posed a more inclusionary definition. They re- continually redefine, a coherent research jected the special epistemic status of science agenda. If the turn away from the Mertonian and came to believe that cognition, discourse, program has contributed to opening up the cosmologies, and ontologies are also socially definition of science and nature for sociology, constituted. The inclusionary definition mirrors reflexivity has contributed to opening up the developments in sociology in general, where definition of sociology itself. such subfields as ethnomethodology, discourse Of course, in a sense this definition has been analysis, and micromethods, formerly left to at issue ever since sociology moved into sci- historians and anthropologists, have taken hold. ence. Unlike the history of science, which used Yet within social studies of science, the move to be an intellectual history when it was inter- toward an internalist sociology of scientific nalist, the sociology of science has not become knowledge raised further issues, which domi- "cognitive" or "intellectual" through this move. nate the discussion in the field today. These are But neither has it remained the strictly social the issues of reflexivity and of the redefinition relational, strictly social institutional sociology of sociology itself. that it had been in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s. First reflexivity. The conception developed Merton's definition of sociology, too, was an by new studies of knowledge sees scientific outsider's definition, a definition applied to but (and technological) reality and "facts" first not learned from a deeper understanding of the and foremost as the outcome of a process of working of science. Complex systems that are construction. "Truth" is seen as a conse- organized around large bodies of esoteric knowl- quence rather than a cause of this process. edge which they construe using their own in- But if natural scientists' results are not ternal mechanisms have their own ways of en- unproblematic representations of natural real- acting society. They enact society (and other ity, what about social scientists' representa- matters) within the technical body of their work, tions? It is easy to see that the constructionist not just within their organizational structures, thesis applies equally to the '"findings"' of financial departments, or other more obviously sociologists of science themselves. This "social" components. They may, for example, awareness has led to a self-reflexive discus- achieve social goals through their own '"tech- sion of the '"methodological horror'" of nical" means, or use social means to further reflexivity (e.g., Woolgar 1988), and to its scientific goals. Such systems include a whole further exploration through the study of the new level of reality, a whole new category of methods through which social scientists learn resources and mechanisms (the category of the about science (e.g., Mulkay et al. 1983). To a "technical" or ''scientific"), which they can certain degree, the exploration of reflexivity bring to bear on or intertwine with more tradi- has promoted a problem shift in science tional social categories and resources. They may studies: it has mingled the original problems incorporate new definitions of the social, and on the research agenda of the field (e.g., the revise distinctions that sociologists derive from problem of understanding the practice of other, less textured environments. In other natural science) with methodological and words, they construct a cultural order of their epistemological questions, and has thereby own that is embedded within the technicalities contributed to a further alienation between of their work. 526 SYMPOSIUM One consequence of learning from complex, Other Literature Cited knowledge-based institutions how they recreate Bemal, J. D. 1939. The Social Function of Science. New- the social is that sociologists have to begin to York: Macmillan. rebuild their conceptual framework for analyz- Bierstedt, Robert. 1981. American Sociological Theory: ing science. For one thing, the distinction be- A Critical History. New York: Academic Press. Cole, Stephen. 1991. The Sociology of Science. Cam- tween the social and the natural order, between bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. social and natural forces, between the inten- Cole, Jonathan R. and Stephen Cole. 1973. Social tional human actors sociology assumes and in- Stratification and Science. Chicago: University of tentionless nonhuman "things" has itself been Chicago Press. Collins, H. M. 1982. "Knowledge, Norms and Rules in called into question (e.g.., Latour 1991). For the Sociology of Science." Social Studies of Science another, comparisons between different sci- 12:299-309^ ences suggest that there exists a variety of "so- Gieryn, Thomas 1982. "Relativist/Constructivist Pro- ciologies" embodied in the cultural orders of grammes in the Sociology of Science: Redundance and these sciences, and that abstract metaconcepts, Retreat." Social Studies of Science 12:279-97. or alternations between frameworks, will be Hall, A. Rupert. 1963. "Merton Revisited, or Science 3 and Society in the Seventeenth Century." History of needed to deal with this situation. At this point Science 2:1-16. the redefinition of sociological resources in re- Knorr Cetina, Karin and Michael Mulkay, eds. 1983. lation to the sciences is in full course. It seems Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of likely, however, that students of science in this Science. London: Sage. Knorr Cetina, Karin D. 1991. Epistemic Cultures area will not revert to Merton's program. With (forthcoming). regard to some questions, his institutional, pure, Latour, Bruno. 1991. 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"Why an Analysis of Scientific Discourse is Needed." that have been foundational for sociology—as Pp. 171-203 in Science Observed: Perspectives on the it blurred the distinction between cognitive and Social Study of Science, edited by Karin Knorr Cetina social analysis by finding society within the and Michael Mulkay. London: Sage. technical part of science. If this happens, Mer- Stehr, Nico. 1978. "The Ethos of Science Revisited." ton's program will nonetheless have been the Pp. 172-96 in The Sociology of Science: Problems, Approaches and Research, edited by J. Gaston. San irst_true professional sociology of science. But Francisco: Jossey-Bass. perhaps it will also remain the last true sbcioF" -Woolgar, Steve, &A..-132&. ^Knowledge and^ Reflexivity: ogy of science. New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge. LonHbn: Sage. Zuckerman, Harriet. 1988. "The Sociology of Science." Pp. 511-74 in Handbook of Sociology, edited by Neil J. Smelser. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 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