Simmering Strife: Mt. Paektu and Sino-Korean Relations

Home , Asadal, Chinese nobility, Choson Sinbo, Heaven Lake, Hongik Ingan, Jiandao

THESIS

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Katy Straily, B.A.

Graduate Program in East Asian Studies

The Ohio State University

2018

Thesis Committee:

Pil Ho Kim, Adviser

Mitchell Lerner

Deborah Solomon

Katy Straily

2018

Abstract

This research seeks to examine the creation of modern North and South Korean national identity and show the potentially explosive ramifications that this could have on Sino-Korean relations in a reunification era. Historical memory describes the way through which groups of people deliberately construct their history. These narratives are often harnessed by governments in pursuit of their political goals. Paektu Mountain, called Changbaishan by the Chinese, is a 9,000 feet volcano that straddles the border of North Korea and China. This mountain is the source of

Korean foundation myth, as it is said to be where Korea’s founder, Tan’gun, was born over 3,000 years ago. In modern history, Mt. Paektu and the myth that surrounds it has become a symbol of both North and South Korean nationalism. This begs the question: how can a national symbol have the power to affect foreign relations on the Korean peninsula? Mt. Paektu thus offers us a critical window into understanding Korean nationalism and anticipating the subsequent problems of reunification and national identity.

Dedication

Dedicated to Taehyun, Dante, and Petra

Vita

2010……………………………………………………………….. Jerome High School

2013…………..……………………………….. B.A History, The Ohio State University

Fields of Study

Major Field: East Asian Studies

iii Table of Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………….i Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………………ii Vita……………………………………………………………………………………………….iii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………….V Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter 1. The Importance of Mt. Paektu to North and South Korea…………………………….6 Chapter 2. History of Border Territorial Agreements …………………………………………...22 Chapter 3. The Northeast Project and Changbaishan …………………………………………...35 Chapter 4. Future Outlook on Border Negotiations……………………………………………...44 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….53 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..57

iv List of Figures

Figure 1. Image of Mt. Paektu on Sino-Korean border…………………………………………...2

Figure 2. A North Korean postage stamp of the paining “Snowstorm in Mt. Paekdu”…………18

Figure 3. Image of Kando territory ……………………………………………………………...28

Figure 4. Image of women’s short track team holding up signs written with “Mt. Paektu is our territory!”………………………………………………………………………………………...47

“I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”

-Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism

Introduction

Historical memory describes the way through which groups of people deliberately construct their history. These memories or narratives are often harnessed by the state and propagated throughout the masses in pursuit of its political goals. Paektu Mountain, called

Changbaishan by the Chinese, is a 9,000 feet volcano that straddles the border of North Korea and China (See Figure 1). This mountain is where Korean foundation myth claims that its founder, Tan’gun, was born over 3,000 years ago. In modern history, Mt. Paektu became the epicenter of North Korean ideology with the Kim leaders’ “Paektu bloodline” emphasized to highlight legitimacy of the regime.1 It also holds symbolic significance to many South Koreans as the ancestral home of the Korean people and has even spawned several religious followings.

Changbaishan is the focal point of a series of policies aimed at assimilating the region into the

People’s Republic of China. Mt. Paektu and the myth that surrounds it has become a symbol of

1 There are two writing systems commonly used for the romanization of the Korean writing system: McCune-Reischauer and Revised Romanization. My writing adapts to the standards set forth by McCune- Reischauer.

both the North and South Korean nation. This begs the question: how can a national symbol/image have the power to affect foreign relations on the Korean peninsula?

Figure 1: Image of Mt. Paektu on Sino-Korean border2

2 Digital image. South China Morning Post. Accessed March 23, 2018. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1584579/uncovering-secrets-mount-paektu-china-north-korea- border

My research will trace through the history of territorial agreements surrounding Mt.

Paektu and delve into contemporary territorial contentions through the lens of Korean national identity in order to illustrate the contentious nature of this topic and show the impetus for a conflict. Through this case study on Mt. Paektu, this research seeks to examine the creation of modern Korean national identity (North and South) and show how their ancient historical memories may have potentially serious ramifications on Sino-Korean relations in a reunification era.

Identity is an essential component of international relations. Alexander Wendt explains that it is “a key link in the mutual constitution of agent and structure . . . [that] lead actors to see situations as calling for taking certain actions and thus for defining interests in certain ways.”3

The collective identity of a state is largely drawn from elements of its culture and its history, providing a bridge between the past, present, and future. This collective identity allows individuals within a state to identify themselves with a greater being, the nation, that transcends time. This feeling of a larger existence allows the individual to find meaning and dedicate oneself to the needs of the collective. Accompanying the collective identity is the multitude of memories that the group carries with it. Eric Langenbacher explains that “the salience of any value or memory can be assessed by the degree of diffusion and internalization among both the more general elite and the masses.”4 Some memories in particular, resonate deeply with both the elite and the masses which instills a deep well of public sentiment, quietly persisting in the background, or capable of begetting latent conflict when sufficiently provoked. The memory’s

3 Wendt, Alexander. ‘‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State,’’ American Political Science Review 88:2 (1994). 384. 4 Warburg, Bettina. “Germany's National Identity, Collective Memory, and Role Abroad“. Langenbacher, Eric and Shain, Yossi. Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010). 54.

critical association with the deeply instilled collective identity is what allows it to generate such powerful emotions and actions within the realm of international relations.

The importance of memory in international relations is undeniable. Langenbacher elaborates on the two ways through which memory plays a role:

Memory clearly matters for international affairs in both a diffuse sense—in terms of the

identities and values that the makers of foreign policy bring with them; and in terms of

the specific demands, valued or preferred policies, and historical analogies used in

making a particular decision.5

For this research, the way that both North and South Korea views the Korean nation, a collective ethnic identity that in many ways transcends political divisions, is the key identity and associated values that may shape the prerogatives of a reunified state. The ways that both states have chosen to construct memories surrounding Mt. Paektu through the frame of both foundation myth and the ethnic nation have instilled deeply held values that are attached to the geographic region. Mt.

Paektu thus offers us a critical window into understanding modern Korean nationalism and anticipating the subsequent problems of reunification and national identity.

As my research seeks to clarify the Korean views on territorial claims to Mt. Paektu, I heavily utilized the existing literature written by Korean academics on the region. Limited by knowledge of Chinese, I compared these researchers’ interpretations of the texts on historical border negotiations (Andre Schmid, Jong-Seok Lee, Seonmin Kim). Through intensive study of

Korean academic research on Chinese policy surrounding the region, I was able to distill the

5 Ibid. 38-39.

different ways through which Korean academia views Mt. Paektu and explore the nature of the dispute.

In order to accurately depict the way that both North and South Koreans view themselves, it is essential to explore not only how the government represents the Korean nation, but how Korean citizens represent their own interests. Accordingly, my research has analyzed both government and public-initiated actions.

Due to the restrictive nature of the North Korean regime, exploring public opinion or public-initiated actions was unfeasible, but I explored the North Korean perspective on Mt.

Paektu through government propaganda and various official statements from the Korea Central

News Agency. The North Korean political ideology and ethnic nationalism is so deeply inculcated into the public that some measure of internalization can be assumed.

For the South Korean perspective, I utilized a multitude of primary sources including official government and congressional statements as well as news articles which highlight public opinion on the issues and detail the various controversies that have arisen surrounding them. The various news agencies that I searched through included SBS News, Tongil News, Yonhap News,

Chosun Ilbo, Korea Times, BBC, and the Donga Ilbo.

Chapter 1: The Importance of Mt. Paektu to North and South Korea

Tan’gun Foundation Myth

Interpretation of the Tan’gun foundation myth has widely varied throughout Korean history, from being relegated to an inconsequential corner to being proudly hoisted as the progenitor of the Korean nation. The earliest known writing on Tan’gun is in Memorabilia of the

Three Kingdoms (Samgungnyusa), written nearly 3,000 years after his purported birth. The book was compiled by a Buddhist monk, Iryŏn in 1281. The book details how a god named Hwan’in

(lord of heaven) allowed his son, Hwan’ung, to descend from heaven. Hwan’ung gathered 3,000 followers and came to earth at Mt. Tae’baek (an old name for Mt. Paektu), where he established and ruled over Sinsi, a sacred city. One day, a bear and a tiger approached Hwan’ung and entreated him to transform them into humans. He sent them to a cave where he instructed them to remain for one hundred days while eating nothing but garlic and mugwort. The tiger eventually gave up and left the cave. However, the bear patiently remained in the cave and was rewarded for her discipline when she was transformed into a beautiful young woman and given the name of Ungnyŏ. She ultimately wed Hwan’ung when he transformed into a human, and gave birth to a son, Tan’gun, in 2333 BC. Tan’gun then descended down the slopes of the mountain and went on to establish the first Korean kingdom, which is now known as Kojosŏn. Tan’gun ruled for

1,500 years upon which he abdicated the throne and departed for the mountains of Asadal and became a mountain god (sansin).

In the centuries following the publishing of Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms,

Tan’gun foundation myth did not hold the significance to Koreans that it does today. Mt. Paektu held significance to Koreans, but this was largely due to a strong faith in principles of geomancy,

the belief that divination can come from geographic features. Mt. Paektu’s towering peaks were viewed as auspicious features to many Koreans. However, as officials increasingly criticized geomantic practices, Mt. Paektu’s popularity fell into decline in the late Chosŏn dynasty and increasingly disappeared from Korean education.6

While Tan’gun was not a significant figure, Koreans instead elevated Kija to the status as the historical leader of the Korean state. His life detailed in History of the Three Kingdoms

(Samguk Sagi) which was published in 1145, Kija was believed to have inherited the throne from

Tan’gun after he traveled from China with his followers after the rise of the Zhou dynasty, who he no longer wished to serve. He was credited with bringing Chinese civilization and stability to

Korea.

The Making of Minjok

In the late nineteenth century, Korea faced the increasing incursion of Japan. The final nail in the coffin was the Ŭlsa Treaty of 1905, which made Korea an official protectorate of

Japan. As the unwanted imposition of Japanese control pervaded the Korean peninsula, Koreans began to rethink their national identity and history. Andre Schmid details how Korean writers and academics had a sense that they were complicit in Japanese colonization, as their dialogue and calls for reform were then utilized by Japan to justify seizing control in the region.7 For example, the Korean push for civilization and enlightenment (munmyŏng kaehwa) resulted in intense criticism of the nobility (yangban). Scholars argued that the yangban symbolized how inefficient and corrupt Korean society had become, showing the need for reform. Criticism of the

6 Schmid, Andre. Korea Between Empires 1895-1919. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 221. 7 Schmid. Korea Between Empires. 122.

yangban was a part of a larger push by Korean scholars to uproot Chinese traditions from Korean society following the end of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). One newspaper argued that in China “idleness had become a custom.”8 Such customs must be expunged from Korean society in order to root out corruption. Japan utilized this same criticism of the yangban to argue that Korea was essentially rotting from corruption at the core and thus unable to successfully reform without the “guidance” of Japanese authorities. When the sting of Japanese annexation and colonization began to sink in, Korean writers made an effort to distinguish their voice from

Japan, so they began to espouse an ethnically based view of the Korean state.

Sin Ch'aeho (1880-1936) was an eminent Korean nationalist scholar who played a key role in forming this new field of ethnic nationalism. He created a blood-based historiography where Koreans would be a distinctive ethnic group, the minjok. Sin argued that the Korean nation was the same thing as a family. Just as Korean clans would maintain records of their family tree (chokpo), the Korean nation could be traced from their sole progenitor, Tan’gun.

Despite the fact that he lacked the historical evidence to corroborate his claims, Sin traced through Tan’gun’s family tree in his work, A New Reading of History (1908). He posited that the minjok had always been present in Korea. He argued that in fact, Korea would not exist without the minjok, stating, “if one dismisses the minjok, there is no history.”9

This ethnically-based Korean historiography fueled the rise in popularity of Tan’gun. In contrast to Kija, who was Chinese nobility, Tan’gun was a pure-blooded Korean figure and his rise in popularity was part of the fringe history field’s efforts to reshape his image from being the founder of the first Korean state to the progenitor of the Korean nation. Various attempts were

8 N.A. Hwangsong Sinmun, May 13, 1899. Cited by Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 58. 9 Sin, Ch’aeho. A New Reading of History (Toksa Sillon) in The Complete Works of Sin Chaeho (Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho chaonjip). Cited in Schmid. Korea Between Empires. 182.

made to build Tan’gun’s presence in the public consciousness. An official calendar (tan’ki) was created which based time off of the reported birth of Tan’gun. The tan’ki was officially used and even placed at the top of all major newspapers.10 Adoption of the tan’ki was the fourth law passed by the Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman) administration in the newly formed Republic of

Korea in 1948. South Korea continued to use this calendar until it was abolished in 1961. In addition, official celebrations of Tan’gun’s birthday were launched by the state. These celebrations were eventually formalized into a national holiday in 1909, known as National

Foundation Day (Kaech'ǒnjǒl). Today, National Foundation Day is still observed as a public holiday in South Korea. While it is not a public holiday in North Korea, National Foundation

Day is usually marked by a ceremony held at the Tan’gun mausoleum outside of Pyongyang.11

Evidence of the shift in how Koreans began to view Tan’gun can be found in various history textbooks. History textbooks from 1895 treated Tan’gun as a god who had descended from heaven, a mythical figure. However, beginning in 1906, Tan’gun began to appear in history textbooks as a human who had actually lived.12 Tan’gun very visibly shifted from a god to a man in the Korean public psyche.

The rise of Mt. Paektu ran parallel to the ascent of Tan’gun in the Korean public conscious. Given the belief in Mt. Paektu as Tan’gun’s birthplace, it intuitively became an important symbol of Korean statehood the more the Korean public placed significance on

Tan’gun as the progenitor of the Korean nation. The relationship between Tan’gun and Mt.

Paektu would expand in very different ways throughout the nation-building process in both

10 Schmid. Korea Between Empires. 181. 11 N.A. “North Korea, How it Celebrates National Foundation Day” (북한 개천절 어떻게 지내다 ), Tongil News, October 2, 2001. http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=11825 12 Em, Henry. The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). 79-80.

South and North Korea after the division of Korea in 1945 and the founding of the two states in

1948.

The Rise of Tan’gun in South Korea

The relative growth in a nationalistic frame of historical study and the elevation of the figure of Tan’gun began to take root in Korean society at varying degrees. In South Korea religious groups have formed around the worship of Tan’gun as the father of the Korean nation, reinforcing a homogeneous Korean ethnic identity. However, the majority of South Koreans believe that Tan’gun is a myth, symbolic of the Korean nation. Despite this, Mt. Paektu remains a powerful image for South Koreans, symbolic of the Korean nation. It also holds strong significance to them as a symbol of the ultimate goal of Korean reunification.

For centuries, Tan’gun had played a role in the rituals of shamanistic cults who worshipped mountain gods, but Tan’gun-centric religions took on a different context in the early twentieth century. In response to Japanese annexation of Korea, Korean intellectuals chose to create a “national soul” (kukhon) and a “nation spirit” (kuksu) to argue that despite the fact that the Japanese had plundered the Korean body, the national soul would be able to transcend such a tragedy.13 Tan’gun became the embodiment of the national soul, contributing to his growing significance to the Korean populace. Taejonggyo, the first religious group that worshipped

Tan’gun, was established in 1909 by Na Ch’ŏl. They believed that a religion based on the

Korean progenitor would bind the country together based on a shared history and spirit, creating resistance against Japanese imperialism. Taejonggyo’s strong association with the independence

13 Schmid. Korea Between Empires 141.

movement and fervent evangelism contributed to its rise in popularity.14 Membership may have reached up to 400,000 followers around 1920.15 The rise of Tan’gun through the cropping up of religious groups became intertwined with minjok-based history, cementing the role of Tan’gun and Mt. Paektu in Korean thought.

Taejonggyo membership drastically declined following the defeat of Japan in World War

II and its subsequent withdrawal from the Korean peninsula, as its lost its powerful association with the independence movement and Koreans turned their focus to building the newly established Republic of Korea. However, its followers would go on to exert a significant amount of influence over South Korean society. Under the Syngman Rhee administration, a devout taejonggyonite, An Hosang, was given the position as the first minister of education. He took protest with teaching Korean students that Tan’gun was a mythological figure, arguing that he should rather be taught as a real historical figure who was the progenitor of the Korean nation.

This claim among several others became a part of the fringe history (chaeya sahak) movement, who Ki Kyoung-Ryang describes as “distinguished by the irrational obsession with national power and territory.”16 An Hosang and other fringe historians formed several organizations, such as the Society for Ancient Korean History (han’guk kodaesa hakhoe), who mounted decades of petitions and litigation against the South Korean government over official historiography.

The National Assembly held public hearings on issues of historiography throughout many different administrations, at times siding with the views of the fringe historians. South

Korean leaders too, espoused minjok-centered slogans that encouraged the preeminence of

14 Kim, Soo-Ja. “The Modern Korean Nation, Tan’gun, and Historical Memory in Late Nineteenth to Early Twentieth Century Korea”. International Journal of Korean History 19:2 (2014). 213-240. 15 Lee, Gyungwon. An Introduction to New Korean Religions. (Seoul: Moonsachul Publishing, 2016). 54. 16 Ki, Kyoung-Ryang. “Pseudo-history and Historical Fascism”. The Journal of Northeast Asian History 14:2 (2017). 189-214.

Tan’gun in society. Syngman Rhee touted a “one people” ideology (ilmin chuŭi) which emphasized that North and South Koreans are one nation of people despite their separation. Kim

Taejung, South Korea’s president from 1998-2003 and known for his peace and reconciliation efforts with North Korea, spoke during the World Cup in 2002, saying that it was “Korea’s happiest day since Tan’gun, the god-king who, according to legend, founded the Korean nation.”17 In times of both struggle and success, South Korean leaders, even coming from completely opposite political ideologies, all touted the idea of one Korean nation.

The theory that Korea is a cradle of human civilization has also occasionally been put forth in South Korea. Famed South Korean Tan’gun scholar, Ch’oe Namsŏn, developed the

“Pulham theory of culture” which argued that Tan’gun was actually the source of all East Asian culture.18 While such a theory is not so aggressively propagated, as in North Korea, echoes of the argument are reverberated in the South and are sometimes embraces by a small portion of South

Koreans.

Decades of debate between fringe historians and academia have resulted in a convoluted interpretation of Korean history, with some aspects of fringe history accepted by the general

Korean public. Ki Kyoung-Ryang states that “’progressives’ embracing pseudo-history, including the likes of teachers, labor activists, literary figures, politicians, and scholars, exist across diverse professional fields too numerous to list. The character of pseudo-history in Korea is such that it transcends the political spectrum, embraced by left and right as well as conservative and progressive alike.”19 One of the lingering pseudo-historical beliefs in South

Korea is that Tan’gun was an actual historical figure. However, many also believe that Tan’gun

17 N.A. Asia Times Online, June 25, 2002. Cited in Shin, Gi-Wook. Ethnic nationalism in Korea: genealogy, politics, and legacy. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 2. 18 Pai, Hyung Il. Constructing Korean Origins. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 66. 19 Ki. “Pseudo-history and Historical Fascism”, Footnote 26.

is merely a myth. Despite whether South Koreans believe Tan’gun is a real historical figure, decades of education colored by ethnic nationalism have led to a strong belief in Mt. Paektu as the birthplace of Tan’gun, the ultimate symbol of the Korean nation.

Mt. Paektu as South Korea’s Sacred Mountain

Over time, South Korean reverence for Mt. Paektu increased. References to Mt. Paektu as

“the national sacred mountain” (uri minjogŭi yŏngsan) began to crop up in newspapers beginning in the 1980s.20 This belief, compounded with the fact that access to Mt. Paektu in the

1980s was not possible for Koreans, contributed to an increased longing for the spiritual home of the Korean people. The growth of Mt. Paektu’s image as a symbol of Korean reunification contributed to its popularity among South Koreans. The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992 provided the opportunity for South Koreans to travel to Mt. Paektu, which had previously been impossible. In 2011, it was reported that 1.4 million tourists traveled to Mt. Paektu.21 Since then, the numbers have only increased. Nearly

80% of foreign tourists to Mt. Paektu on the Chinese border are Korean.22

Mt. Paektu also began to appear frequently across South Korean television broadcasts.

For example, in 2008, the cast of the reality-variety show, Two Days and One Night (Ilbak Iil),

20 Ten, Victoria. “Mt. Paektu and Sŏndo (仙道 the way of immortality) in Contemporary South Korea: The Case of GiCheon (氣天)”. Situations 10:2 (2017). 38. 21 N.A. “Number of Tourists to Mt. Baekdu Passes 1 Million”, The Chosun Ilbo, February 13, 2012. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/02/13/2012021301057.html 22 Park, Hee Chun. “Baekdusan Korean Tourists Rapidly Dropping Out of Fear of North Korean Terror Attack” (백두산 한국인 관광객 급감...北 테러 우려 때문), YTN News, Aug 21, 2016. http://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0104_201608212202183316

traveled to the Chinese side of Mt. Paektu. Upon arriving at Heaven Lake at the peak, a cast member stated, “Mt. Paektu is the spiritual essence of the Korean people.”23 As a panorama of

Heaven Lake was filmed, the words “Tokto is Korean territory and Mt. Paektu” were plastered over the scene. The cast members brought with them bottles of water collected from regions across South Korea which were then individually poured into Heaven Lake, illustrating the hope that all the waters of Korea will one day be reunified. A small segment explained that the national waters needed to be disguised in regular bottles, as Chinese officials forbid Korean nationalistic activities such as singing the national anthem or waving the Korean flag within the vicinity of Heaven Lake and Mt. Paektu. This was clearly a point of frustration. Television broadcasts such as this trip represent the emotional attachment that many South Koreans feel to

Mt. Paektu and Heaven Lake at its peak, as well as their anguish at the thought that it is no longer their territory.

The majority of South Korean martial art, taekwondo, follows the guidelines established by the World Taekwondo, an organization which the South Korean government created with 208 national member associations. Within this organization, in order to obtain a black belt, students must learn various forms (p'umsae), one of which is called “T’aebaek.” World Taekwondo teaches that T’aebaek is the "name of a mountain with the meaning of ‘bright mountain’, where

Tan’gun, the founder of the nation of Korean people, reigned the country, and the bright mountain symbolizes sacredness of soul and Tan’gun 's thought of ‘hongik ingan’ [humanitarian ideal]. There are numerous sites known as T’aebaek, but Mt. Paektu, which has been typically known as the cradle of Korean people, is the background naming the Taebaek poomsae

23 KBS World TV. “2 Days and 1 Night Season 1 To Mt. Baekdu! Part 3”. Aired (July 2008). Youtube Video, 52:59. Posted (February 2014). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twCuS9G4vII

[T’aebaek p’umsae]."24 Many South Korean children attend taekwondo classes. By 2018,

8,788,284 South Koreans had earned their black belts and there were 9,699 official World

Taekwondo studios running within South Korea.25 A significant number of South Koreans are therefore exposed to this sort of training which reinforces the strong link between Tan’gun and

Mt. Paektu.

The South Korean national anthem, entitled “Patriotic Song,” (aegukka) was adopted in

1948. The lyrics were originally sung by the Korean Provisional government during Japanese colonization and merely continued by the South Korean government. They thus reflect the

Korean government’s growing awareness of the northern Korean territorial limits as well as the increasing symbolic significance of Mt. Paektu:

“until that day when Mt. Baekdu [Paektu] is worn away and the East Sea’s waters run dry, May God preserve our country, our long-living homeland!”

The South Korean adoption of these lyrics into the national anthem enshrined Mt. Paektu in the mind of the public, raised listening to a national anthem which portrays the mountain as the upper reaches of Korean territory.

South Korean culture, politics, and society are steeped in references to both Tan’gun and

Mt. Paektu which has contributed to the belief that the mountain is the sacred home of the

24 N.A. “Poomsae Taebaek”, Premier Taekwondo Manitoba, Accessed March 16, 2018. http://www.premiertaekwondo.ca/poomsae-taebaek-.html 25 N.A. “Statistics and Policy Materials” (통계 및 정책자료), World Taekwondo Headquarters, Accessed March 17, 2018. http://www.kukkiwon.or.kr/front/kor/information/report.action?cmd=View&seq=173&pageNum=1&sear chKey=1&searchVal=

Korean nation. This has led to its association with Korean reunification, creating a strong reverence for the natural site.

North Korea’s “Sacred Mountain of Revolution”

North Korea enfolded the myth of Tan’gun and Mt. Paektu imagery into the propaganda that was used to bolster the legitimacy of the Kim ruling family. The breed of ethnic nationalism developed in North Korea complemented the belief that Tan’gun was the progenitor of the

Korean nation and it paints the Korean nation as a distinct ethnic group that is far superior to others. Unlike their South Korean counterpart, North Koreans are taught that Tan’gun existed as a real historical figure, and he takes on a larger than life role in the lurid Kim family saga.

The peaks of Mt. Paektu are splashed across North Korean propaganda, from news reports to paintings of the leaders. The Kim family deliberately fashioned tales that would anchor themselves to Mt. Paektu in order to strengthen their legitimacy. The rugged slopes of the mountain are depicted as the place where Kim Il Sung’s band of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters fought valiantly against the Japanese imperialists. Kim Jong Un is referred to as the “Prince of

Paektu” and on several occasions state news reports praised Kim Jong Un’s reported hike up Mt.

Paektu in order to view Heaven Lake.

North Korean propaganda strives to materialize the Kim family’s connection to the mountain, using the term “Paektu bloodline (hyŏlt’ong)” to describe members of the ruling family and highlight the family’ strong ties to both the geographic location and to the figure of

Tan’gun himself (See Figure 2). According to official North Korean propaganda, Kim Jong Il was born in a small cabin on Mt. Paektu in the midst of a snowstorm, his birth marked by auspicious occurrences such as the appearance of a double rainbow. The area is now a key site

for North Koreans along state-sponsored pilgrimages to Mt. Paektu, which is referred to as “the sacred mountain of revolution.” Upon the death of Kim Jong Il in 2011, the Korea Central News

Agency released a statement that described a series of supernatural occurrences at Mt. Paektu.

On the morning of Dec. 17 layers of ice were broken on Lake Chon [Heaven Lake] on

Mt. Paektu, shaking the lake with big noise… Kim Jong Il's autographic writings "Mt.

Paektu, holy mountain of revolution. Kim Jong Il." carved on the mountain, in particular,

were bright with glow… A Manchurian crane was seen flying round the statue three

times before alighting on a tree. The crane stayed there for quite a long while with its

head drooped and flew in the direction of Pyongyang at around 22:00.26

In the eyes of North Koreans, the Kim family’s close association with Mt. Paektu and their god- like qualities portrayed them as the direct descendants of Tan’gun himself, imbued with a mystical quality as the leaders of the Korean nation. In the words of North Korean defector,

Sungju Lee, “in my imagination, Kim Il-sung was a descendant of Tan’gun. He was part god, too.”27

On October 16, 1993, North Korea announced the discovery of Tan’gun’ tomb and skeletal remains within. Out of an initiative to undo the disgraceful attempts of the Japanese to wipe out Korean history, Kim Il Sung instructed North Korean researchers to find the tomb.

Under Kim Il Sung’ guidance, they miraculously discovered the tomb in Kangdong County,

Pyongyang. Despite the fact that the tomb was severely damaged, a state blamed on the colonial

26 N.A. “Natural Wonders Observed”, Korean Central News Agency, December 19, 2011. http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2011/12/18/kim-jong-il-is-dead/ 27 Lee, Sungju, and McClelland, Susan. Every Falling Star: The True Story of How I Survived and Escaped North Korea. (New York: Amulet Books, 2016). 7.

reign of the Japanese, eighty-six bone pieces were found. These were claimed to constitute the remains of Tan’gun and his wife. Using the electron spin resonance dating method, North

Korean researchers determined that the bones dated back to over 5,000 years ago, a claim that was never independently verified.28 The discovery that North Korean scientists generated served as proof of the state’s argument that Tan’gun was not merely a mythological figure, but a genuine historical figure. This not only supported the widely-held belief in a Korean nation created by Tan’gun, but it also provided legitimacy to the ruling family by strengthening their mystical connection to Mt. Paektu.

Figure 2: A North Korean postage stamp of the paining “Snowstorm in Mt. Paekdu.”

28 DPRK Academy of Social Sciences. Information on the Disinterment of the Tomb of Dangun. (Foreign Pyongyang: Languages Publishing House, 1994). 4.

To ensure the continued significance of Mt. Paektu in the North Korean psyche, propaganda continuously plastered images of the peaks of Mt. Paektu across art and constantly referenced to it in official texts. Events are held regularly that are meant to strengthen the link between the ruling party in Pyongyang and Mt. Paektu. For example, a relay race between Mt.

Paektu and Pyongyang was arranged beginning in 2012.29 Such an event allows the North

Korean public to physically envision the link between Mt. Paektu and the nation’s capital.

Like South Korea, North Korea also practices taekwondo, however it officially follows the practices created by the International Taekwondo Federation. Students of this camp of taekwondo are also required to learn patterns (hyŏng) as well as explain their meaning in order to advance their level and obtain new belts. The first pattern that students learn is called

“Ch'ŏnji,”30 which is described to students as the beginning of the world. The second form that is taught is called “Tan’gun,” who students need to know as the legendary founder of the Korean nation in 2,333 BC. As practitioners of taekwondo, North Koreans are taught the sacred importance of both Tan’gun and Heaven Lake at the peak of Mt. Paektu both to Korean people and to the meditational development of taekwondo. Learning such concepts as a part of one’s daily practice constantly reinforces the mental image of both Tan’gun as the founder of Korea and the image of Mt. Paektu as the site of his descent to earth.

The transformation of Mt. Paektu into a hallowed site in North Korea served not only to prop up the ruling family, but also to reinforce the belief in a pure, Korean “race.” B.R. Myers, a strong proponent of the theory that North Korea maintains a “xenophobic nationalism,” states

29 N.A.“Youth Carry a Torch Through a Cross-Country Relay” (〈청년절〉홰불을 들고 전국계주한 청년들), The Choson Sinbo Online, August 30, 2012. http://chosonsinbo.com/2012/08/pyongyang_120830-4/ 30 天地 literally translates to “heaven and earth.” This is also a homonym of Heaven Lake (天池).

that Mt. Paektu has become “a national landmark and geographical symbol of racial purity.”31

The need to maintain a pure Korean “race” was not first propagated in North Korea, however. A news article in 1908 set “the country’s most urgent task” as “the preservation of Tangun’s bloodline.”32 North Korean propagandists drew a significant amount of material from the dialogue that cropped up surrounding the formation of a minjok-based historiography in the late

Chosŏn Dynasty. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, North Korea increasingly sought to expel foreign influences from the country. They actively encouraged Soviets to leave the country as soon as possible. In fact, a North Korean party cadre stated in a speech that mixed marriage was “a crime against the Korean race.”33 Over time, North Korea propaganda served to rigidify the belief that Koreans were the pure descendants of the legendary progenitor of the Korean race,

Tan’gun. This strengthened a homogenous identity that not only encouraged devotion to the ruling family, but also fit into the larger belief that all Koreans would ultimately be reunited again.

North Koreans believe that the fracturing of the Korean peninsula was created by meddling foreign powers, but in the end the communal spirit of the Korean people will overcome these political boundaries. The harnessing of such powerful legends, such as Tan’gun, is a useful tool in bringing together the Korean people. As stated by the DPRK Academy of Social

Sciences, “all the Koreans in the north, the south, and overseas…put an end to the tragic division… transcending their differences… and attaching primary importance to the homogeneity of the nation, with Tan’gun as their ancestor.”34

31 Myers, B. R. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters. (N.Y: Melville House, 2010). eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) Ch. 2 Paragraph 11. 32 Schmid. Korea Between Empires. 181. 33 Szalontai, Balázs. Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964. (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005). 201. 34 DPRK Academy of Social Sciences. Information on the Disinterment of the Tomb of Tangun. 11.

Tan’gun has continued to maintain a prominent position in the national psyche as the founder of the 5,000 years old nation of the Korean people. While a minjok-centered history has been used to support very different political regimes in North and South Korea, it has also been used to encourage the belief in both North and South Korea that the Korean peninsula will one day be reunified. The governments of both North Korea and South Korea have continuously espoused the belief that the Korean people are of one blood, meant to be reunited again. For both of them, Mt. Paektu has transcended the politics of this world. It has become the spiritual home of the Korean people and the ultimate symbol of reunification. Interpretation of Tan’gun and how that reflects on Mt. Paektu as a symbol of the Korean nation is remarkably similar across both countries and it continues to elicit powerful emotions from both North and South Koreans.

Chapter 2: History of Border Territorial Agreements

Overlapping Spheres of Chosŏn and Qing

Through the reverence for Mt. Paektu that has grown throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, many Koreans have come to believe that Mt. Paektu is their land. This however, has historically not always been the case. The Sino-Korean border along the Mt.

Paektu region has a long history of overlapping territorial policies and trade, several rounds of border negotiations, foreign incursion, and the division of the peninsula. All of this has generated conflicting views on who truly holds the right to control the region.

North Korea and China share a border that extends 1,334 km continentally. Upon looking at a map of northeast China, it appears that the border between the two countries is clearly delineated along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. However, the ostensibly distinct aquatic border belies an ambiguously defined borderland that fell subject to continuous investigation and renegotiation between Chinese and Korean authorities from the eighteenth century well into the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the very core of Sino-Korean border negotiations was the issue of Mt. Paektu, referred to as Changbaishan in China. Mt. Paektu served to complicate border delineation as both parties struggled to establish where on the mountain lay the source of the Tumen River. Despite efforts on Korean leadership’s part to quell any tension over border arrangements, the Korean people themselves have raised issue with

Sino-Korean border demarcations for centuries. These have served to create a large wellspring for potential territorial dispute with China.

Beginning in 1459, the Chosŏn royal court banned settlements in the regions south of the

Yalu River in response to poor agricultural development opportunities in the area and out of an

effort to prevent interaction and conflict with the Jurchen population across the Yalu River. This isolated zone surrounding the river was composed of four counties: Yŏyŏn, Chasŏng, Much’ang, and Uye and was referred to as the “four closed counties” (p’yesagun).35 However, shifting Sino-

Korean relations ultimately tested the stability of this borderland as human migration and trade patterns would call it into question. The dawn of the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty pulled the

Manchu birthplace, the Changbaishan region, into prominence. The significance of this geographic shift cannot be understated. Previous dynasties had emphasized the Yellow River regions as China proper. The Qing Dynasty’s perspective shifted the Chinese territorial gaze to the Northeast region, directly bringing the Korean border and accordingly, Sino-Korean relations, into focus.

The Changbaishan region was a site of rich natural resources which became a pillar of both Korean and Chinese trade. Such resources included sable, pearls, leather, and most important, ginseng. Ginseng was a highly profitable commodity and the desire to collect and sell it ultimately propelled Korean and Chinese traders to traverse the region, testing the existing borderland structure. Activity in the forested and riverside regions brought Chinese and Koreans into greater contact, and increasingly, conflict. The value of the ginseng trade demanded a resolution to the increasing tension in the region, so in 1712, Chinese officials were sent into

Chosŏn territory where the two sides jointly investigated the situation in order to designate a clear border. Korean officials were concerned that China might suggest a border along the

Korean inhabited regions which due to the existing policy of restricting residency, would place the Korean border south of the Yalu River and Mt. Paektu, resulting in a huge loss of land for the

35 Kim, Seonmin. Ginseng and Borderland: Terrritorial Boundaries and Political Relations between Qing China and Choson Korea. (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017). 29.

Koreans. Due to this fear, the Korean diplomatic representative (chŏppansa), Pak Kwŏn, insisted that the border be set at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The Chinese officials agreed to this offer and thus the 1712 investigation was seemingly concluded with ease.

Rivers at first appeared to be a simple border delineation but identifying the source of these rivers proved to be a complicated task that would mangle border negotiations over the Mt.

Paektu region for centuries. As part of the 1712 negotiations, Pak Kwŏn opted not to accompany the Chinese representative, Mukedeng, to Mt. Paektu to identify the water source.36 Objecting to the physical duress of a Mt. Paektu ascension, he instead sent a Korean translator in his place to accompany the Chinese representative. Mukedeng easily identified the watershed of the Yalu

River, but found it more difficult to accurately identify the source of the Tumen River. He eventually settled on a location and erected a stele in its place. At the time, the exact geographical position of the Tumen River watershed was unclear. Pak Kwŏn’s Northern

Expedition Diary (pukchŏngilgi) indicates that he believed that Mukedeng had mistakenly located the watershed at Taehongdansu, a tributary of the Tumen River.37 He argued that this was because rather than beginning at the mainstream of the Tumen River and following it upstream, Mukedeng mistakenly believed that every stream flowing east from Mt. Paektu would lead into the Tumen River. Regardless, Mukedeng’s stele erection on Mt. Paektu was abided by and he recommended that the Koreans build a fence along the line of this stele in order to clearly demarcate a border. He then sent the map of Mt. Paektu that he had drawn up to the Chosŏn royal courts. King Sukchong warmly received this map, thanking Mukedeng for his efforts to clear up the matter of a Sino-Korean border.38

36 Schmid. Korea Between Empires. 206; Kim. Ginseng and Borderland. 66. 37 Lee, Jong-Seok. DPRK-China Border: Its History and Scenes. (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 2017). 31. Lee’s notes reference to Pak Kwŏn’s Northern Expedition Diary (북정일기). 38 Kim. Ginseng and Borderland. 66.

Despite the fact that the Chosŏn royal court and political elite accepted the border set by

Mukedeng, many Korean scholars, who were out of power, protested the arrangement. They pointed to the Chosŏn officials’ failure to ascend Mt. Paektu with the Qing representative, allowing him to solely select the location of the Tumen watershed, a decision which Korean officials appeared to have passively accepted.39 This generated a significant discussion among the Korean neo-Confucian literati on Korean territory and whether or not this sovereignty had been violated by a faulty agreement made by irresponsible Korean elites. In fact, two Korean officials were ultimately relieved of their duties because they did not accompany Mukedeng up the mountain, failing to carry out the King’s mission to protect Korean territory.40 The contentions of scholars outside of the elite Chosŏn political circles reflects a trend throughout the history of Paektu territoriality. It is a trend where the people, rather than the Korean government, raised contentions against foreign territorial claims to what they perceived as rightful Korean territory. The voice of the Korean people would grow over time, mounting pressure on the issue of Mt. Paektu when nationalist dialogue entered the scene.

Nineteenth Century Negotiations

With the generally clear establishment of the border through the Yalu and Tumen Rivers,

Koreans and Chinese came to interact more as commerce expanded and the number of residents grew throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Encroaching foreign populations caused the Qing Dynasty to rethink their policy which banned Chinese migration to Manchuria, an area they considered sacred. In order to counteract the growing population of Koreans and the influence of neighboring Russia, Han Chinese were encouraged to migrate to the Yalu area.

39 Schmid. Korea Between Empires. 207. 40 Ibid. 323, note 28.

Despite these measures undertaken by the Qing Empire, Koreans became the predominant population on both banks of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Koreans not only populated the Korean side of the Yalu River, but many also crossed the river to reside in Chinese territory to flee both land shortages in the Northern Chosŏn regions and the 1869 famine that resulted from the disastrous Chosŏn grain exchange loan policies (hwan’gok). The Qing Dynasty attempted to manage this influx of Koreans, not by expatriating them back to Korea, but through a unilateral policy in 1882 that required all Korean residents to become Chinese subjects through registering their families with the local government offices as well as paying taxes to the Qing authorities, and abiding by Qing clothing and cultural customs.41 This policy would precipitate another round of joint border investigations as it prompted local action.

The Chinese unilateral policy of 1882 angered many of the Korean residents who, feeling threatened by the Qing administration, decided to take matters into their own hands. They ascended Mt. Paektu in search of the stele that had been erected in 1712 in order to ascertain the true border. At this point, two different spellings of the Tumen River were identified and utilized by the local Korean residents as an argument that there were actually two different rivers.

“Their argument skillfully played off the ambiguity surrounding the character engraved

in Mukedeng’s stele to represent the first syllable in the name of the Tumen River. They

maintained that the Qing officials had failed to distinguish between the two rivers, both

called Tumen but written with two different characters for the first syllable – the first, the

character carved into Mukedeng’s stele, indicating “earth,” and the second, a character

not on the stele and signifying what today is considered the “tu” for Tumen River,

meaning “diagram.”42

41 Ibid. 208; Lee. DPRK-China Border. 34. 42 Schmid. Korea Between Empires. 208-209.

If this was the case, then the contested land fell in between the two rivers, making it Chosŏn territory, thus making Qing claims to the land unfounded. They then petitioned the Chosŏn Royal

Court, entreating them to challenge Qing administrative authority in the northern vicinity of the

Tumen River using the evidence that they had provided. In response, Chosŏn authorities took up the argument presented to them by the Korean people. King Kojong designated Ŏ Yunjung as an official investigator (kyŏngnyŏksa) in 1883, who was tasked with governing the border region. Ŏ investigated the petitions and concurred with the case presented by the local Korean residents.

He conveyed this judgement to the Chosŏn Royal Court who then adopted this official stance.43

The Chosŏn Court did have previous knowledge of the different spellings and were aware that they were still the same river, not two separate ones. Despite this, they ignored previous evidence and sided with the local Korean residents, who sought to prove that the contested region was indeed, Chosŏn territory.44 This sudden keenness to carve out Korean territory sharply contrasts with the Chosŏn response to negotiations in 1712, where they quiescently followed Qing demarcations. The Sino-Korean border had grown in significance to Korea, transforming from a frontier land buffered by zones of isolation, to a crucial region that required a clear-cut boundary line.

The Chosŏn maintained this official position throughout new rounds of border negotiations that began in April of 1887. Disagreement arose between Chinese and Korean authorities on where exactly to place the new border marker, if indeed there were two separate rivers. The Chinese were hesitant to place much emphasis on the 1712 negotiations as all existing documentation was either lost or had rotted away. The Chinese proposed that the marker be placed at a Tumen River watershed within already existing Chosŏn territory, an offer which

43 Ibid. 209. 44 Kim. Ginseng and Borderland. 144.

the Korean officials refused. In the midst of all the debate and confusion, an official agreement was never meted out and negotiations ended without a settlement, never to be recommenced.

Figure 3: Image of Kando territory.45

The Kando Convention

Sino-Korean border negotiations were transformed by massive political shifts in the early twentieth century. Following the signing of the Ŭlsa Treaty of 1905, Korea was declared a protectorate of Imperial Japan. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea, making it an official colony. From

45 Digital image. Korea Times. Assessed March 19, 2018. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/09/117_51482.html

this point onward, Japan would take the lead in Korean affairs and thus negotiating Sino-Korean borders. This period of Japanese colonialism and the border decisions that were made at the time would have severe ramifications on the Sino-Korean border and how it is interpreted in contemporary times.

During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Qing and Chosŏn authorities attempted to rehash the border negotiations that fell apart in the late nineteenth century, but Japan, who had already stationed troops in Korea following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), demanded that they table discussions until Japan was able to achieve victory over the Russians. They argued that the issue would be better handled through Japanese arbitration at a later time. After

Japan defeated Russia and forced Korea into its sphere of influence, it began to consider Korea’s territorial disputes. Japan’s imperial gaze traveled north towards Manchuria and accordingly, the

Tumen River and its northern environs (K: Kando C: Jiandao) (See Figure 3), became of critical importance to Japan as it realized that valuable concessions could be gained from China if they came down on their side in the Sino-Korean border dispute. If it brokered an agreement with

China, Japan could gain favorable terms of agreement that would be useful in later advances into

Manchuria. After deliberating on the issue, Japan stepped away from its original stance that supported the Korean view, when cabinet members argued that the Korean claims to the territory were weak, instead choosing to side with the Chinese claims.

Japan and China convened in September of 1909 to sign the Kando Convention. The treaty laid out the Northeast border as the Tumen River and also settled the dispute over where to demarcate the border along Mt. Paektu. The border that was agreed upon closely followed the

Chinese proposal from the 1880s that Korea had rejected. As a result, Heaven Lake, along with sixteen peaks on Mt. Paektu all were subsumed into Chinese territory, a great loss for Korea. In

exchange for conceding such a large swathe of territory to China, Japan received rail construction rights throughout the region which ultimately paved the way for its invasion of

Manchuria in 1931. In this way, Japan usurped Korean autonomy in the colonial era and sold its territory to another foreign power to aid in its pursuit of expanding the Japanese Empire. In doing so, Japan waded deep into a centuries-old border conflict between China and Korea, laying the foundation for modern contentions over Mt. Paektu territoriality.

The legality of the Kando Convention has been called into question in contemporary

South Korea as modern politics cause these old debates to resurface. In the climate of China’s

Northeast Project, which was launched in 2002 and published "Northeast Borderland Research," the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade declared in a statement by then Foreign

Minister, Ban Ki-Moon, that the Kando Convention was null and void as, like the Ŭlsa Treaty, it had been made by suppressing the sovereignty of the Korean people.46 However, on the day that such statements and evidence were to be presented to the National Assembly, they were suddenly recalled and the Kando portion was expunged from the documents.47 This decision was due to South Korea’s reluctance to spark a diplomatic row with China over its sensitivity to the

Kando problem. Clearly, the South Korean government questions the legitimacy of the border agreements surrounding Kando, but thus far has taken great strides to prevent these concerns from inhibiting peaceful Sino-Korean relations.

Despite the South Korean government’s reticence to create any cause for dispute with the

Chinese government over territorial issues, Korean citizens have at times, taken this issue into

46 N.A. “Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon: “Kando Convention is Legally Void” (반기문 장관 "간도협약 법리적 무효), SBS News, October 22, 2004. http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=115&oid=055&aid=0000030907 47 Lee, Ha-Won. “Govt. Considers Gando Convention Null and Void: Foreign Ministry Materials”, The Chosun Ilbo, October 13, 2004. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2004/10/13/2004101361017.html?related_all

their own hands. In 2009, ten Korean NGOs petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to seek recognition of the Kando region as Korean territory.48 This was done despite the fact that the ICJ clearly states that “the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with applications from individuals, non-governmental organizations, corporations or any other private entity. It cannot provide them with legal counselling or help them in their dealings with the authorities of any

State whatever.”49 However, this filing does represent the continuous efforts of Korean civilians to take issue with the Chinese border despite the government’s inaction. The persistence of civilian-initiated action despite the muted statements of the South Korean government on the sensitive issue of Mt. Paektu demonstrates the potential that public discontent over this territorial status quos can latently impact Sino-Korean relations over territoriality in a reunification era.

Eric Langenbacher coined the term ‘memory regime,’ stating that

“sometimes…collective wounds… have been muted over years but can quickly reopen or explode to dominate public consciousness at home and abroad, given the intimate relationship between domestic and international political arenas.”50 Time and again, Korean memory of the cruelties of the Japanese colonial regime has exploded onto the scene, evoking raw anger at the pain that the Korean nation has inherited. Stemming from the Japanese colonial era, the Kando

Convention holds the potential to trigger similar emotions among the Korean public in a reunification situation when the border may once again be called into question.

In 1907, following the rise of contentions over the Kando region, Mt. Paektu became the focal point of Korean territory. Negotiations carried out before this were based on the desire to

48 Do, Je-hae. “NGOs Go to International Court to Reclaim Gando”, Korea Times, Sep 08, 2009. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/09/117_51482.html 49 “Frequently Asked Questions”, International Court of Justice. Accessed 23 March, 2018. http://www.icj-cij.org/en/frequently-asked-questions 50 Langenbacher, Eric. “Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations”. Power and the Past. 13.

simply agree on a line that would denote the division between China and Korea. The entrance of

Mt. Paektu into the discussion ushered in dialogue on the cultural significance of the region to the Korean nation, elevating concern over who held territorial jurisdiction over the area. In essence, ethnic nationalism utterly transformed the issue of Mt. Paektu as it was elevated to the symbol of the Korean nation, assigning some sense of urgency to its sovereignty.

Sino-DPRK Border Negotiations

The Sino-Korean border again fell under negotiation following Japan’s defeat in World

War II and withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the newly established Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and China compared historical sources in an effort to establish a clear boundary line. However, it became clear that there were large discrepancies between each party’s accounts.51 The complexity of the border issue surrounding Mt. Paektu tied up negotiations as both sides scrapped over where the true source of the Tumen River lay. The DPRK adamantly asserted that the Kando Convention was an unjust and legally unfounded Japanese usurpation of Korean sovereignty and thus demanded that this agreement be scrapped in negotiations with the PRC. After several rounds of high-level talks, the

Sino-DPRK border treaty was concluded on October 12, 1962, whose details on Mt. Paektu and the Yalu/Tumen Rivers were closed to the public. Due to the complex nature of the disagreement over the boundary line, the two parties agreed to split Mt. Paektu along Heaven Lake, with a little over half of its waters going to the DPRK.52 This means that China ceded nearly 1,200 km of territory from the Kando convention back to North Korea. Furthermore, China took a conciliatory stance to border negotiations. For example, China renamed the border city of

51 Lee. DPRK-China Border. 52. 52 Ibid. 54.

Andong to Dandong in January of 1965. Chinese feudal kingdoms had chosen the name

“Andong (安東)” because it meant “stabilizing the barbarians of the east,” which referred to the

Koreans. This changing of the name to “Dandong (丹東)” was a reflection of China’s attempts to stage the border talks against a backdrop of equality and friendship.53 From a North Korean perspective, it came out of these negotiations victorious. The DPRK was in a disadvantageous position as the smaller, weaker state and with a large amount of territory that had been lost to the

Japanese brokered Kando Convention. Despite all of this, it was able to obtain significant territorial concessions from the PRC.

The reason for the peaceful resolution of the Sino-DPRK border as well as China’s large concessions to the DPRK may lie in what Fravel coined as “diversionary peace.”54 His theory states that contrary to popular belief, domestic strife within a state may encourage it to take a cooperative stance. By cooperating with foreign powers, international relations will become more stable which in turn would create domestic stability. DPRK-China border negotiations took place in the 1960s, a time following the Great Leap Forward, when China was concerned with maintaining political stability. This fear of domestic instability may have been a factor that motivated China to conclude a border agreement with the DPRK peacefully, resulting in the large territorial concessions.

Geopolitical calculations also played a heavy hand in Sino-DPRK border negotiations.

Discussions between the PRC and the DPRK took place deep in the midst of the Sino-Soviet split. Kim Il Sung masterfully played North Korea between these two large powers, shifting alliances in order to maximize profit that could be sowed from both of its powerful allies. By

53 Ibid. 90-91. 54 Fravel, Taylor M. “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes”. International Security 30:2 (2005). 46-83.

seeming to align itself closely with China against the USSR, China was more likely to generously grant land to the DPRK in any sort of border settlement.55 China, anxious to ally itself with neighboring states against the USSR, was more willing to cooperate with the DPRK in exchange for their close relationship.

South Korean official response to the Sino-DPRK border agreement was minimal due to the closed nature of the agreement that was brokered. However, on September 16, 1983, fifty- five National Assemblymen signed and submitted a resolution that the entirety of Paektu’s

Heaven Lake is Korean territory. They added that the fact that the Sino-DPRK agreement was made without South Korea’s input instilled elements for a potential future conflict over this border arrangement.56 This interpretation may become more relevant and develop into a serious issue in a reunification era, should a South Korean-led government raise questions surrounding the Sino-DPRK border agreement.

55 Lee. DPRK-China Border. 55. 56 N.A. “Territoriality Resolution Submitted: Paektu’s Heaven Lake is our Territory” (領有權決議案제출 "白頭山天池는 우리땅), Donga Ilbo News, September 17, 1983.

Chapter 3: The Northeast Project and Changbaishan

The Northeast Project

China launched the “Northeast Asian History Project” in 2002 with the declared goal of using academic research to restore historical accuracy and consequently contribute to regional stability in northeast China. The scope of this project covered twenty-seven research projects including the border with Russia, territory that fell under jurisdiction of the Kando Convention, and the modern Sino-Korean border. By far, the research surrounding the Sino-Korean border and has given rise to a cacophony of discordant voices between China and Korea. Some specific time periods and geographic regions that became serious points of contention were the regions of

Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, and the history of Koguryŏ and Parhae.

The official launch of China’ Northeast Project was in response to various actions mounted by Koreans in the preceding years. An example of this surrounds Koguryŏ history.

Koguryŏ was an ancient Korean kingdom believed to have ruled from 37 BC to 668 AD whose borders extended far into modern day China. As a result, their tombs and relics stretch across the contemporary borders of China and North Korea. In 2001, North Korea filed an application to

UNESCO for recognition of Koguryŏ tombs. China quickly followed suit and filed to UNESCO in 2003 to ensure that Koguryŏ tombs were recognized as a world heritage site in both North

Korea and China, an ultimately successful effort. Although this stand-off over historical ownership was originally between North Korea and China, South Korea quickly joined in by coordinating several joint Koguryŏ historical study projects with North Korea and officially supporting the North Korean application to UNESCO. In following years, cooperation between the two Koreas over consolidating Koguryŏ history only expanded. For example, postage stamps

emblazoned with images of murals from Koguryŏ tombs were dispersed in both North and South

Korea.57

While the DPRK has not publicly commented on the existing border situation, its territorial aspirations for the Mt. Paektu region can be gleaned from various actions that it undertook. For example, it felt compelled to cooperate with South Korea on border research questions when China was perceived to be impinging on Korean history through the Northeast

Project. The tensions generated by the claims from China’s Northeast Project even spurred inter-

Korean cooperation to solve historical questions that have come under dispute, including Mt.

Paektu. In 2005, the Koguryŏ Research Foundation led a team of North and South Korean scholars to Mt. Paektu where they carried out an investigation over where the “true” border marker lay.58 Foundation president, Kim Chŏngbae, stated that the original 1712 border marker had been found near a parking lot which contradicts current Chinese research claims that ancient maps prove the original border was delineated at a point four kilometers southeast of Heaven

Lake. This would mean that the 1712 agreement established that the “T’omun River” inscribed on the marker is actually a tributary of the Songari River rather than the Tumen River itself.

North Korea was able to negotiate large territorial gains from China despite its disadvantageous position as a small, relatively weak state in comparison to its powerful neighbor. Seemingly anxious not to rock the boat and risk losing this advantageous agreement, the DPRK has remained silent on the border arrangement outside of the joint Korean research projects.

The spike in tensions surrounding the Northeast Project and UNESCO applications are due largely to both parties’ desire to claim ownership of this ancient history. Staking claims to

57 Ahn, Yonson. “The Contested Heritage of Koguryo/Gaogouli and China-Korea Conflict”. The Asia Pacific Journal 6:1 (2008). https://apjjf.org/-Yonson-Ahn/2631/article.html 58 N.A. “Pan-Korean Team Finds Site of Border Monument”, The Chosun Ilbo, August 3, 2005. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2005/08/03/2005080361030.html?related_all

historical groups has important ramifications for both national identity as well as potential territorial claims in a period of Korean reunification.

Chinese Influence on Changbaishan

A series of Chinese government papers compiled by the national and local Jilin governments revealed Chinese lamentation that there was such a weak association with Mt.

Paektu in the border regions.59 As a result, China began to assert that Paektu has been Chinese territory since the ancient past due to the fact that it was the home of the Sushen (肃慎) tribe, the ancient ethnic group that populated northeast China and became the ancestors of the Manchus who ruled over China during the Qing Dynasty.

The creation myth of the Qing imperial house was recorded as an official history during the rule of the Qing Dynasty which allowed its perpetuation through later texts and history books. According to the myth, three heavenly maidens, Enggulen, Jenggulen, and Fekulen, were all bathing in a lake on the Long White Mountain (present day Changbaishan). A mystical bird flew overhead and dropped a red berry on Fekulen, who then ate it. After this, she gave birth to a boy, Bukuri Yongson, who went on to rule over the region and became the progenitor of the

Qing royal family. Under his rule, the state came to be known as “Manchu,” the name that is now used to describe an ethnic minority in China who are believed to be the descendants of these early peoples.60

59 Yoon, Hwytak. "The Strategy of Baekdu Mountain in China". Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong 48, (2015). 207. 60 Huang, Pei. “New Light on the Origins of the Manchus”. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 50:1 (1990). 244.

The belief that Changbaishan is the spiritual home of the Manchus was aggressively encouraged by Chinese authorities and incorporated into what is called, “Changbaishan culture theory.” This theory centers around Changbaishan as a key cultural asset of Chinese culture and history. As a result, an increased emphasis was placed on the sinification of the mountain.

Changbaishan has been accorded many titles befitting its status including its designation as requiring the highest level of environmental preservation in the country, a UN biosphere nature reserve, a top tourist destination, and Heaven Lake at its peak has been rated as the fifth most beautiful lake in China.61 In just the first six months of 2016, 468,000 tourists traveled to

Changbaishan.62 The effort put forth by China to change the narrative on Changbaishan, shaping it into a valuable Chinese asset has been met with success domestically. This gradual change was closely observed by Koreans who felt increasingly threatened.

Korean Perspectives on Northeast Project

Korean perspectives on China’s Northeast Project and its related projects are split into opposing perspectives. One group argues that China’s actions are offensive and the other believes that they are defensive. However, both groups generally view these actions through the lens of Korean reunification scenarios when the various swathes of territory in border regions may be called in to question.

China’s considerable investment in efforts to subsume the history of the ancient kingdoms of Kojosŏn, Koguryŏ, and Parhae appears to be a defensive recoil due to its perception

61 Ibid. 199. 62 Robertson, Mark. “Chinese tourist trying to avoid the crowds? Try Mount Paektu”, NK News.org, July 20, 2017. https://www.nknews.org/2017/07/chinese-tourist-trying-to-avoid-the-crowds-try-mount- paektu/.

of the rising forces of nationalism and irredentist claims in South Korea. This perspective is supported by a group of scholars including Kim Hui-kyo, Sun Jinji, and Ahn Yonson. China appears to be highly concerned with growing research and emphasis on ancient Korean history.

This shifting spotlight to ancient historical issues has given rise to claims in South Korea that land situated across contemporary borders should be rightfully returned to Koreans. Such rhetoric and at times, actions taken by Koreans to propagate this viewpoint have increased

Chinese anxiety over potential territorial disputes in a reunification era. For example, in 2001, a

Korean nationalist civil group sought to regain Manchurian land based on the belief that in the past, it was traditionally Korean territory.63

As a result of increasing territorial claims, Chinese authorities have become highly sensitive about the Yanbian Autonomous Province, where 30% of the population is composed of ethnic Koreans. In an attempt to prevent these citizens from forming attachments to Korean national identity and associating Chinese territory with the spiritual home of the Korean people,

Chinese authorities have endeavored to instill a distinctly Chinese perspective of the region. In order to do so, it began the “Revitalizing Northeast China” project (zhenxing dongbei), which sought to revive the regional economy as well as to reinforce Chinese identity in the region.64 In order to do that more Han Chinese were encouraged to migrate to the region and a three-pronged strategy was employed. Beginning in August of 2002, the “three perspectives” (sanguan) policy aimed to teach ethnic Koreans that “ethnic Korean history is that of a minority group in China

63 Lee, Hee-Ok. “China's Northeast Project and South Korean-Chinese Relations”. Korea Journal 45:2 (2005). 250. 64 Ibid. 248.

(lishiguan), that ethnic Koreans live surrounded by various nations (minzuguan), and that the ethnic Korean homeland is China (zuguoguan).”65

The “three perspectives” policy was comprehensively carried out in the Yanbian

Autonomous Province. The name Mt. Paektu is never used; the mountain is only referred to as

Changbaishan. As an extension of that, any signs or advertisements which had “Paektu” incorporated into their name were refused registration and already existing contracts were abruptly cancelled.66 Changbaishan was attached to all local school names and intensive curriculum taught that Changbaishan is the sacred home of the Manchus, rather than Koreans.67

The Korean naming for geographical features was swiftly wiped out, erased from all maps of the region. For example, a monument was erected in Yanbian that was inscribed with “Saisŏm.”

This is a prohibited term in China, so as a result, this marker was quickly torn down by Chinese authorities. Song Kiho explains why such a term came to be prohibited.

The most likely of many theories on the origin of this name is that it originally designated

an island in the Tumen River, thus ‘In-between Island,’ which was the first land

reclaimed by Korean farmers, then became used for the general area north of this river. In

Yanbian, ‘saisŏm,’ the native Korean equivalent of ‘Kando’ and meaning “in-between-

island,” is still used to designate the overall region.68

65 Ibid. 249. 66 Yoon. "The Strategy of Baekdu Mountain in China". 209. 67 Ibid. 209. Referenced in footnote 19: 長白山文化傳播中心, 「長白山敎育系統各學校更換新校名」 68 Song, Kiho. The Clash of Histories in East Asia. (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2010). 98.

The sensitive nature with which China treats the issue of the national identity of Korean ethnic minorities can be seen through its precluding of the opportunity to hold dual

Chinese/Korean citizenship. This may also have played a role in China’s decision to bar a

Korean consulate from being set up in Jilin.69 Careful to identify ethnic Koreans as Chinese citizens, Chinese authorities have deliberately closed all avenues through which these ethnic minorities may identify with the Korean nation.

The Chinese launching of the Northeast Project and following measures taken to expunge

Korean influence from China’s northeast territory can be seen as a defensive measure taken in response to perceived threats to Chinese territoriality, such as the North Korean application to

UNESCO for recognition of Koguryŏ tombs, an action which preceded the Northeast Project.

Another camp of nationalist Korean scholars views the surge in Chinese historical claims as an offensive, rather than a defensive measure. They view contemporary Chinese historiography on the region as a twisted distortion of true history. These scholars view Chinese claims as baseless theories that are only carried out by propaganda to further nationalist goals.

The fear is that China is using its historical arguments to stake out preemptive claims to territory that will be wielded in the case of Korean reunification.70 Korean nationalist concerns with

Chinese northeast historiography were amplified when tensions erupted between the two states at events following the Northeast Project. China’s use of international platforms to stage cultural events and circulate Chinese terminology for the region rose concerns that China was planning to

69 Cha, Victor D. “Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security,” Survival 41:1 (1999). 92. 70 Yoon. "The Strategy of Baekdu Mountain in China".

steal geographic regions, such as Mt. Paektu, right out from under their feet. Such public debates have been amplified in the public realm as Korean citizens have taken up similar anxieties, eventually developing into serious controversies that mar Sino-Korean relations.

Conducting research on the history, territorial jurisdiction, and cultures native to northeast China is not a new phenomenon; it has been ongoing since the 1980s. The scope and quantity of such research however, vastly increased upon the launch of China’s Northeast Project in 2002. Prior to this, gauging the Chinese stance on border issues was a difficult task. The sudden change in Chinese positioning over the issue is likely a result of its growing concern that

Korean reunification is a potential scenario and that in such an event, growing Korean nationalism will contribute to demands for Chinese territory along the border regions.71 Yoon

Hwytak discovered documents released by the Jilin local government in 2007 that speculated on potential actions that the Koreas may take on Mt. Paektu.72 Clearly, Chinese authorities looked on Mt. Paektu territoriality in the future with increasing anxiety. Along with this, Korean tourism to Mt. Paektu had steadily increased since the establishment of diplomatic relations between

South Korea and the Republic of China in 1992, resulting in a growing Korean nationalistic pride in the region.

In an effort to deter territorial contentions in the future, China launched the Northeast

Project and invested considerable effort into changing the way that Chinese, particularly ethnic

Koreans, as well as the international community thinks about the region. This culminated in the

2007 Asian Winter Games where China prominently displayed the mountain as the backdrop of their hosting. The success that has been met domestically by Chinese efforts to claim

71 This action came at a time when Sino-Korean relations were relatively good. Trade between the two countries boomed and China was deeply involved in summits held between North and South Korea. 72 Yoon. "The Strategy of Baekdu Mountain in China". 207.

Changbaishan has been met with increasing resistance from Koreans. The continuous bubbling up of tensions over ownership of the mountain indicates that the issue has yet to come to a head, something which may emerge on a much larger scale in a reunification era.

Chapter 4: Future Outlook on Border Negotiations

President Trump invoked the ire of the Korean public in April of 2017 when he made the following statement in an interview. “He (President Xi) then went into the history of China and

Korea. Not North Korea, Korea. And you know, you’re talking about thousands of years . . . and many wars. And Korea actually used to be a part of China.”73 This erroneous statement incited rage in South Korea where the public largely interpreted this as a Chinese attempt to undermine

Korean sovereignty and rewrite history from a Sino-centric perspective. The Korean public took the Chinese government’s obstinate silence in the face of Trump’s remarks as proof that Xi

Jinping indeed stated the claim, a resurfacing of the opinions espoused by China’s Northeast

History Project. Commentators were quick to note that these assertions were conveniently made as the North Korean situation took an urgent turn, creating the possibility of a sudden reunification in the future, a situation in which China may have territorial ambitions. This belief was further expounded upon when one news source claimed, “Korea will have to fight with

China over the history problem as they had to when Japan asserted that Tokto Island was its land.”74 The parallels drawn between the two controversies could not be clearer. Korea feels seriously threatened by Chinese claims staked to their history.

In 2006, China filed to claim Changbaishan as a UNESCO Natural World Heritage and it also made the decision to expel all foreign hotel investors from the region. Additionally, in

73 Lee, Michelle and Ye, Hee. “Trump’s claim that Korea ‘actually used to be a part of China’”, The Washington Post, April 19, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2017/04/19/trumps- claim-that- korea- actually-used- to-be- a-part- of-china/?utm_term=.3d64992cac51 74 Choi, Young-Yun. “Korea a Part of China?...The Northeast Project Controversy Revived” (한국은 중국의 일부?…‘동북공정’ 재연되나), KBS News, April 21, 2017. http://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=3468227&ref=A

September 2012, the cash-strapped North Korean government turned over development rights of their portion of Mt. Paektu (25%) to China. From this point on, North Korean territory was enfolded into the developing Chinese tourism industry.75 This whipped up tensions surrounding the region. South Koreans felt threatened by China’s increasing presence on the mountain and spreading authority over the region, something which seemed to closely align with the widespread fears over Chinese goals of the Northeast Project.

In the years since China’s launch of the Northeast Project, moments of tension have cropped up over jurisdiction and territoriality of Mt. Paektu. One of the first rifts occurred during the events surrounding the 2007 Asian Winter Games which were hosted in Changchun, China, the capital of Jilin province. South Korean media derided Chinese activity in the Paektu

Mountain region and began reporting on what was dubbed as the “Mt. Paektu Project,” highlighting the various techniques through which China was attempting to stake ownership of the mountain and its environs. China handed out booklets advertising Changbaishan, the naming being a source of contention on the Korean side. In addition, Changbaishan took a central role with the Winter Games opening ceremony; the torch lighting ceremony was held at

Changbaishan overlooking Heaven Lake. Such a visual display seemed geared towards establishing Chinese claims to the land. They also proposed to host the 2018 Winter Olympics in the Mt. Paektu region. Shi Guoxiang, the head of the Changbaishan Development Committee, made a statement that portrayed Changbaishan as the Alps of China.76 Attention was also drawn

75 Yoon. "The Strategy of Baekdu Mountain in China". 200. 76 Park, Sang-Hu. “China and the Paektu Project” (중국, '백두산 공정'), MBC News, September 7, 2006. http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=115&oid=214&aid=0000016860

to the multitude of construction projects that China initiated on Changbaishan in order to develop tourism on the Chinese side of the mountain.

Finally, when the Korean women’s short track team won the silver medal, they mounted the podium at the award ceremony and lifted up signs on which were written “Mt, Paektu is our territory!”77 (See Figure 4) China’s response was swift, arguing that such an action was political, a violation of the rules of the Asian Winter Games. The Korean government too, quickly downplayed the incident as an action taken up by the individual players and not representative of the government’s stance. This incident highlighted the emotion that the Korean public itself has invested in Mt. Paektu. Despite government attempts to quell any sort of action that would contend China’s partial ownership of the territory, Korean citizens felt compelled to protest on the issue, setting off a large public debate on the currently existing agreement over Mt. Paektu territoriality.

77 Chang Chun. “Mt. Baekdu is our Territory” (백두산은 우리 땅), Yonhap News, February 1, 2007. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/sports/sports_general/187854.html

Figure 4: Korean women’s short track team holding up signs with “Mt. Paektu is our territory!”78

Tensions over Mt. Paektu again boiled over in 2014 over a celebrity advertisement controversy. Famed actors, Kim Soo-Hyun and Jun Ji-Hyun, signed an endorsement deal for a

Chinese bottled water company, Hengda Bingquan, that sourced its water from the Paektu region. The South Korean public was enraged at the prospect of Korean celebrities endorsing bottled water that was sold using the Chinese name for Paektu, Changbaishan, sold to the profit of a Chinese company. This was tantamount to a star of the “Korean wave” (hallyu), essentially a representative of Korean culture, endorsing Chinese claims to what is viewed as Korean territory. In the case of Kim Soo-Hyun, he actually held several positions as a celebrity cultural ambassador of Korea, including the Promotional Ambassador for Korean Tourism. In addition,

78 Chang Chun. Web image. Yonhap News. Accessed March 27, 2018. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/sports/sports_general/187854.html

with a large Chinese fan base, his endorsement of the product was taken as a betrayal of Korea.

Despite calls to cancel the endorsement contracts, both celebrities decided to follow through with the advertisement campaign, generating significant public ire. This controversy too, was ultimately fomented and carried out by the Korean public, another indicator of how deeply the conviction in Mt. Paektu territorial rights has become embedded into the fabric of Korean society.

Prospects for Reunification

How the border issue is treated in a reunification era hinges on whether or not the reunified Korean government accepts the validity of the 1962 Sino-DPRK agreement and the

1964 protocol that was established. However, the details of this agreement were not made publicly available and the agreement was not even registered with the UN, complicating the issue of what exactly the reunified Korean government would be accepting as the status quo. The acceptance of this agreement would presumably allow the new Korean state to take control of contemporary North Korean territory, including 55% of Heaven Lake at the peak of Mt. Paektu.

Lee Hyun-Jo argues that this situation would conform to the protocol established by the 1978

Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties.79 Article 11 states that “A succession of States does not as such affect: (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary.”80

79 Lee, Hyun-Jo. “A Study on the National Border Treaty Regime between North Korea and China in International Law”. The Korean Journal of International Law 52:3 (2007). 198. 80 United Nations, “Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties”. Treaty Series, Vol. 1946. 7.

Agreeing to honor the 1962 Sino-DPRK agreement would be the most likely scenario to prevent the emergence of border conflict between China and the new unified Korean state. This would be the most stable option and likely course for a unified Korea to pursue.

Although not a border dispute, further complicating the issue of jurisdiction over Mt.

Paektu is the North Korean sale in September 2012 of development rights for their portion of Mt.

Paektu (approximately ¼) to China.81 As a result, China began to incorporate North Korean land into their developing tourism industry. Through these actions, China was able to reinforce its influence over the entirety of Mt. Paektu. In a reunification scenario, securing territory will be one of the first issues and questions of how far Korean and Chinese jurisdiction stretch into Mt.

Paektu will be a sensitive topic. Such complexities over what portion of Mt. Paektu will fall under Korean and Chinese development can easily ignite the passions of the public and escalate tensions.

Public sentiment would be a key factor affecting the unified Korean government’s decision to accept the 1962 Sino-DPRK agreement. If the Korean public is unwilling to accept such an agreement, public malcontent may burgeon into very vocal objections, such as the controversy surrounding the 2007 Asian Winter Games, but larger in scale and magnitude. These tensions may further escalate into escalated history wars, such as what occurred surrounding the

Northeast Project. Historically, the Korean public has not always supported the government’s actions surrounding the Mt. Paektu border demarcation and various actions which they have undertaken to express this have increased Sino-Korean tensions. For example, the 2009 petition of the ICJ by Korean NGOs or the actions of nationalist civil groups to gain additional territory.

81 Yoon. "The Strategy of Baekdu Mountain in China". 200.

If the public vocalizes their disagreement with an inheritance of the 1962 Sino-DPRK border agreement, the issue may develop into an acrimonious dispute between China and Korea, threatening healthy diplomatic relations as the Tokto Island dispute does with Japanese-Korean relations. If the issue becomes contentious enough, Koreans may begin to vote in revisionist politicians who could take action on their behalf. For example, when in 1983, fifty-five National

Assemblymen signed and submitted a resolution that the entirety of Paektu’s Heaven Lake is

Korean territory. A Korean reunification scenario may experience similar tensions despite government action to pursue the most stable territorial agreement. In this way, collective identity in Korea may seriously impede Sino-Korean relations if the public comes to feel that their history and culture is under attack.

A different scenario that would trigger serious conflict between Korea and China would be if the unified Korean state rejects the validity of the 1962 Sino-DPRK agreement. Lee Hyun-

Jo posits that in this scenario, the Korean government would most likely argue that the 1909

Kando Convention is also invalid and instead propose a border demarcation that closely reflects the 1712 border marker.82 The 1712 border marker argument is fraught with complicated implications and it may result in an overall loss of Mt. Paektu territory, rather than any gains.

Additionally, all documents from the 1712 negotiations have been lost to time. Should a unified

Korean state choose to use the 1712 border marker argument as the grounds to renegotiate the border, there would be very little international legal basis to support this. China will likely argue that the 1962 agreement is a fair border demarcation and refuse to change the existing agreement that was set with the DPRK and the Korean government would have little international legal

82 Lee. “A Study on the National Border Treaty Regime between North Korea and China in International Law”. 197.

recourse. Given the lack of a foundation for Korea to challenge the 1962 Sino-DPRK treaty, it seems highly unlikely that they would choose to pursue this option.

China would certainly not be willing to renegotiate any of its Mt. Paektu territory with a reunified Korean state. This is evident from decades of policy aimed at both thoroughly assimilating ethnic Koreans into the Chinese population as well as discouraging any association of the region with Korean foundation myth or even the Korean name of Mt. Paektu. China would likely view any cession of territory as a window of opportunity for a greedy Korean state to pursue even more territorial gain. China would also be concerned that Korean territorial gains on

Mt. Paektu would solidify Korean national ethnic identity, potentially encouraging Chinese ethnic Koreans to identify with the unified Korean state, thereby weakening Chinese hold over its northeast territory. Additionally, North Korea was only able to broker such an advantageous territorial demarcation with China in 1962 due to the unique political pressures that the PRC faced at the time. Since then, China has developed into a regional and global powerhouse that will not be favorable to making territorial concessions to its Korean neighbor. In 2018, speaking in a tense climate surrounding Taiwan, Xi Jinping stated that it would be “absolutely impossible to separate any inch of our great country's territory from China."83 A Korean challenge to territorial boundaries in a reunification era would not be accepted by the Chinese government and would touch off serious conflict.

Korean reunification would raise a tremendous amount of complex problems to solve both domestically and internationally. As the division along the DMZ dissipates, securing the territory and border of the new Korean state will be one of the first priorities. The Sino-Korean

83 McDonell, Stephen. “Xi Jinping warns any attempt to split China is 'doomed to fail'”, BBC News, March 20, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43466685

border will thus come to the fore and require a clear agreement. The most stable option would be for Korea to accept the conditions of the 1962 Sino-DPRK agreement, as there is little legal basis for a re-negotiation of the border. However, the question remains as to whether national sentiment will accept such a territorial succession and what they would do in response to it. The historical persistence of public discontent with Sino-Korean border negotiations fused with a powerful collective identity indicates that serious tensions will arise. Depending on how Korea approaches this demarcation and what historical argument it uses to support its claims, there exists a potential for conflict between the two states over such a highly sensitive issue.

Conclusion

Following the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, both North and South Korea departed on different paths through which they would form entirely separate political ideologies.

Despite this, Korean ethnic identity, which had taken root prior to separation, continued to diffuse into both North and South Korean societies. For North and South Korea, Tan’gun, the progenitor of the Korean race, ascended to legendary heights in the Korean psyche. As Tan’gun and subsequently, Mt. Paektu, developed into potent symbols of the nation, Koreans increasingly called into question the existing border arrangement between North Korea and China.

Responding to these concerns, China launched projects such as the Northeast Project and instituted policies aimed at thoroughly assimilating ethnic Koreans into China. The possibility that someday, the existing border may fall under renegotiation in a reunification era has fueled many of the efforts undertaken by China and the controversies raised by the Koreas over Mt.

Paektu and the region’s history. Thus, it is essential to consider how potential border disputes may play out in the event of Korean reunification.

In an effort to extirpate the roots of Japanese colonialism, both North and South Korea dug deep into ancient history to show that the Korean people have a long, powerful past. The early twentieth century ushered in a new wave of nationalist historians, such as Shin Chae-Ho, who would shape modern Korean ethnic nationalism. The nationalist historiography formed by these historians focused on ancient Korean history in order to emphasize Korea’s long, unique history and was heavily utilized by the state. Ethnic nationalism encouraged the belief that all

Koreans are descended from their legendary progenitor, Tan’gun. Emboldened by the ethnic nation that was coalescing, some fringe Korean historians made calls for the obtainment of

Chinese territory, by arguing that the land was originally ruled by ancient Korean kingdoms.

The Koreas were not alone with delving into their history. China gave its own interpretation on ancient history with the Northeast Project. Launched by the Chinese Academy of Social Science and ran from 2002-2007, its controversial claims on the history of Northeast

China and accordingly, Korea, set off a cacophony of Korean protest to its version of events.

Although the project has now officially closed, reverberations continue to jolt Sino-Korean relations. The Northeast History Project is particularly interesting as North Korea and South

Korea, who are traditionally pitted as rivals, have found considerable common ground over interpretation of ancient Korean history and collaborated in an effort to counter China's perceived infringement on Korean history. This point is significant to this research as it illustrates how the two groups of people can coordinate action when they find a compelling common cause. In a reunification scenario, it then becomes a possibility that Korean reunification may trigger public outcry about China's perceived illegitimate acquisition of a national treasure, Mt. Paektu.

The Sino-Korean border historically was clearly demarcated along the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Mt. Paektu, however, lies on a confluence of the two rivers, so border negotiations suffered from serious ambiguity. As a result, several attempts were made over the years to renegotiate this border. The border was first clearly established through the Kando Convention between China and Japan (1909), and further settled in a deal made between China and North

Korea in 1962. However, South Korea occasionally contests the legality of previous border agreements. Understanding how Korea views these various territorial agreements is important to assessing why they would feel motivated to challenge the status quo in the future. Particularly in a period of reunification, borders may be called into question and various portions of society may feel that a renegotiation is necessary.

Korean foundation myth has played a powerful role in ethnic nationalism throughout

Korean history. North and South Korea shaped their beliefs on Korean foundation in very different ways, but still based off of the belief that Koreans are descended from one bloodline.

Paektu was splashed across North Korean propaganda and used to complement the legitimacy of the ruling family. As a result, the ruling family and Mt. Paektu became inseparable in North

Korean ideology. In South Korea, Tan’gun has taken on more of a symbolic significance, leading to the formation of Mt. Baekdu as a symbol of the Korean nation as well as the ultimate goal of

Korean reunification. The paramount status of Mt. Paektu to Koreans raises the possibility of contentions over a border agreement that splits Heaven Lake at its peak. However, an in-depth analysis of previous border arrangements proves that a reunified Korean government would have scant international legal basis for challenging the currently existing border situation. Despite the fact that the government may choose to pursue the most stable route and accept the terms of the

1962 Sino-DPRK agreement, public sentiment may generate serious anger and result in the elevation of fringe politicians and historians, as occurred under the Syngman Rhee regime, which may lead to a re-ignition of Sino-Korean history wars.

Collective identity and memory play a critical role in international relations. Korean ethnic identity and how that has shaped the way that it views both its past and the other powers that have interacted with it may be a strong determinant of Sino-Korean relations. Collective memory of Japanese colonization affects how Koreans perceive the Kando Convention while ethnic nationalism has created great pride in the ancient Korean Kingdoms and affected their views on Mt. Paektu and its environs. Just as collective identity has caused tensions to bubble up over Mt. Paektu in the past few decades, it can be expected to trigger similar issues into the

future, especially in the case of reunification. Mt. Paektu thus provides a compelling study on the effects of collective identity in international relations.

Korean reunification would bring about the fusing of two states that have existed with entirely opposed political entities for decades. The common thread that is held between the two, is the strong belief that Koreans are one ethnic nation with a shared blood, culture, and history.

With Mt. Paektu as the symbol of the Korean nation, its significance to Koreans highlights the importance of modern Korean nationalism and how the North Korean and South Korean threads may one day intertwine, resulting in tense Sino-Korean relations.

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United Nations, “Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties”. Treaty Series, Vol. 1946.

Wendt, Alexander. ‘‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’’. American Political Science Review 88:2 (1994).

Korean Language Sources

Chang Chun. “Mt. Baekdu is our Territory” (백두산은 우리 땅), Yonhap News, February 1, 2007.

Choi, Young-Yun. “Korea a Part of China?...The Northeast Project Controversy Revived” (한국은 중국의 일부?…‘동북공정’ 재연되나), KBS News, April 21, 2017.

“Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon: “Kando Convention is Legally Void” (반기문 장관 "간도협약 법리적 무효), SBS News, October 22, 2004.

KBS World TV. “2 Days and 1 Night Season 1 To Mt. Baekdu! Part 3”. Aired (July 2008). Youtube Video, 52:59. Posted (February 2014).

Lee, Hyun-Jo. “A Study on the National Border Treaty Regime between North Korea and China in International Law” (조중국경조약체제에 관한 국제법적 고찰). The Korean Journal of International Law 52:3 (2007).

Lee, Jong-Seok. DPRK-China Border: Its History and Scenes (북한 -중국 국경 역사와 현장). Seoul: Sejong Institute, 2017.

“North Korea, How it Celebrates National Foundation Day” (북한 개천절 어떻게 지내다 ). Tongil News, October 2, 2001.

Park, Hee Chun. “Baekdusan Korean Tourists Rapidly Dropping Out of Fear of North Korean Terror Attack” (백두산 한국인 관광객 급감...北 테러 우려 때문). YTN News, Aug 21, 2016.

Park, Sang-Hu. “China and the Paektu Project” (중국, '백두산 공정'), MBC News, September 7, 2006.

“Statistics and Policy Materials” (통계 및 정책자료). World Taekwondo Headquarters, Accessed March 17, 2018.

“Territoriality Resolution Submitted: Paektu’s Heaven Lake is our Territory” (領有權決議案제출 "白頭山天池는 우리땅), Donga Ilbo News, September 17, 1983.

Yoon, Hwytak. "The Strategy of Baekdu Mountain in China". Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong 48 (2015).

“Youth Carry a Torch Through a Cross-Country Relay” (청년절 홰불을 들고 전국계주한 청년들), The Choson Sinbo Online, August 30, 2012.