RAPPAPORT POLICY BRIEFS Institute for Greater Kennedy School of Government,

December 2007

Boston Bound: A Comparison of Boston’s Legal Powers with Those of Six Other Major American By Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron,

Boston is an urban success story. It cities — , , , Rappaport Institute Policy Briefs are short has emerged from the fi nancial crises New York , , and overviews of new and notable scholarly research on important issues facing the of the 1950s and 1960s to become — enjoy to shape its own region. The Institute also distributes a diverse, vital, and economically future. It is hard to understand why Rappaport Institute Policy Notes, a periodic summary of new policy-related powerful city. Anchored by an the Commonwealth should want its scholarly research about . outstanding array of colleges and major city—the economic driver This policy brief is based on “Boston universities, world-class health of its most populous metropolitan Bound: A Comparison of Boston’s Legal Powers with Those of Six Other care providers, leading fi nancial area—to be constrained in a way Major American Cities,” a report by Frug and Barron published by The Boston institutions, and numerous other that comparable cities in other states Foundation. The report is available assets, today’s Boston drives the are not. Like Boston, the six cities online at http://www.tbf.org/tbfgen1. asp?id=3448. metropolitan economy and is one of are large, economically infl uential the most exciting and dynamic cities actors within their states and regions, Gerald E. Frug in the world. have ethnically and racially diverse Gerald E. Frug is the Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School populations, and are doing fairly well and is a member of the Rappaport Boston is also a city at a crossroads, Institute’s Advisory Board. His research facing new challenges bred by its own when compared with other American interests include the legal problems of local governments and legal theory. success, by changes in the national cities. And, like Boston, they all and local economy, and by increased face substantial related challenges David J. Barron competition from cities across the occasioned by increasing suburban David E. Barron is a Professor of Law at growth, signifi cant immigration, the Harvard Law School whose research country and around the world. Unlike interests include administrative law, persistence of concentrated poverty, constitutional law, local government law, many of its competitors, Boston is and property issues. not gaining population. The high and an increasingly competitive global environment. But there is no doubt Rappaport Institute for cost of housing, both within the city Greater Boston that Boston, at present, is a city bound. and in the metropolitan area, poses The Rappaport Institute for Greater a major threat to Boston’s ability to The constraining legal structure that Boston aims to improve the region’s governance by fostering better continue to attract and retain workers now governs Boston forces the city to connections between scholars, policy- makers, and civic leaders. The Rappaport whose innovation fuels the economy. rely on a narrow revenue base, limits Institute was founded and funded by There also remain serious inequities the city’s ability to control its own the Jerome Lyle Rappaport Charitable Foundation, which promotes emerging along racial and class lines and the expenditures, and distorts the city’s leaders in Greater Boston. More information continuing task of improving the city’s efforts to plan. It also places the city about the Institute is available at www.ksg.harvard.edu/rappaport. public schools in order to prepare the at a competitive disadvantage at a © 2007 by the President and Fellows of city’s young people to participate in time when all major cities are looking Harvard College. The contents refl ect the and contribute to the city’s future. to deploy as many tools as possible views of the authors (who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the research in order to secure their economic herein) and do not represent the offi cial Yet the City of Boston lacks the views or policies of the Rappaport power that six other major American future. It has long been recognized that Institute . Boston Bound RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

Boston has limited legal authority. In fact, city for additional access to funds or relief from offi cials have long complained about the city’s burdensome costs. It should be noted, however, lack of power, especially its restricted ability that the city elected to do so as a last resort to raise revenue. But the city’s complaints after failing to gain back new powers from have largely been to no avail, in part because the state that had been signifi cantly curtailed the issue has so often been framed in terms of in the fi rst wave. Whether the bargains made the city’s need to avert fi scal crises. As long during this time were wise ones is open to as requests for greater home rule are made debate. Boston became a national leader in redevelopment during these years, and it was The constraining legal aided in that effort by state measures that gave structure that now governs Boston additional powers in return for giving Boston forces the city to rely on up some old ones. But in important respects, Boston emerged from the era of a narrow revenue base, limits with less legal control over key parts of its city the city’s ability to control its (with some exceptions) than it had decades own expenditures, and distorts before. State-created public authorities—and the city’s eff orts to plan. sometimes the state itself—took over important city assets. in terms of Boston’s immediate fi nancial The other noteworthy event was an amendment circumstances, its complaints are likely to of the state constitution in the 1960s that gave reinforce the popular view that city offi cials are home rule to all cities and towns in the state, simply trying to avoid hard budgetary choices. including Boston. Even though the Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution Background on Home Rule appears to grant broad powers to all localities The state-imposed limits on Boston’s powers in the state, it explicitly exempts taxing, have come in two major waves. The fi rst wave borrowing, the regulation of private and civil spanned the early to mid twentieth century. affairs, and municipal elections from its scope. During this period, the state twice revised Moreover, under the Home Rule Amendment, the city’s charter and greatly restricted the Boston can bring order on its own to the current powers of the city to raise revenues, borrow, jumble of statutes that constitute its charter and spend. These efforts were the byproduct only by placing the whole of its governmental of the region’s unique political history and structure in the hands of a separately elected culture, marked both by an exceptionally charter commission. Such a process gives city activist state legislature and sharp ethnically- offi cials little incentive to push for charter motivated political rivalries between the reform. Additionally, the decisions of the Yankee-dominated legislature (and business Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refl ect community) and the Irish-controlled city. a judicial inclination to treat the grant of home The second wave took place in the 1950s rule power narrowly rather than as a broad and 1960s when the city elected to transfer affi rmation of local self-governance. key parts of its infrastructure to the state to There is, of course, more to a city’s legal power address the severe fi scal crises of that time. than the protections contained in state grants Repeatedly during this period, the city ceded of home rule. Other aspects of state law can important authority to the state in return expand or contract city powers in ways that 2 Boston Bound RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

the terms of a home rule amendment might Boston Has Limited Home Rule Power conceal. Still, state home rule provisions are Home Rule Amendment: Because the important in and of themselves. The legal Home Rule Amendment to the Massachusetts defi nitions set forth in provisions such as the Constitution exempts taxing, borrowing, the Home Rule Amendment of the Massachusetts regulation of private and civil affairs, and Constitution play an important role in creating municipal elections from its scope, Boston an ethos of home rule that either presumes city has less authority than the six other major power or city powerlessness. U.S. cities we examined. For example, the Key Findings State law places important Boston’s ability to shape its own future is legal restrictions on innovative limited in three important ways. The fi rst is land use planning tools and that Boston has a much more limited grant of fragments Boston’s control home rule power than other major competitor over much of its infrastructure cities. As a result, Boston’s ability to pursue and territory. No other city in bold initiatives on its own authority is severely our study operates within a restricted. legal structure that has this The second problem is that the current legal combination of restraints. structure is unusually constraining when it comes to local fi scal discretion. State law makes Boston exceptionally dependent on Illinois Constitution grants municipalities home a limited number of revenue sources, most rule powers that pertain to local matters and conspicuously the property tax. As a result, then expressly defi nes them in an expansive Boston’s efforts to plan for its future are fashion.1 As a result, Chicago has the power artifi cially constrained by a need to ensure to tax, the power to borrow, and the power to that its development maximizes a single, “regulate for the protection of the public health, state-selected revenue source. This restriction safety, morals, and welfare . ...”2 Moreover, distorts the kind of open and innovative the Illinois Constitution provides—as the planning process that the state should be Massachusetts Constitution does not—that the encouraging Boston to pursue. “[p]owers and functions of home rule units 3 The third problem is that the current legal shall be construed liberally.” Consistent with structure places limitations on the city’s power that instruction, the Illinois Supreme Court has to be creative in its approach to economic construed the grant of home rule to include development. This is due to the fact that the power to regulate municipal elections, state law places important legal restrictions including the authority to require them to be 4 on innovative land use planning tools and nonpartisan. Similarly, none of the other cities fragments the city’s control over much of its we studied operates under a grant of home rule infrastructure and territory. No other city in our that exempts taxing, borrowing, the regulation study operates within a legal structure that has of private or civil affairs, and the regulation of this combination of restraints. As a result, no municipal elections from its coverage. other city seems as bound in facing its future as Preemption: The state’s power to preempt Boston does. local lawmaking is also more extensive in Massachusetts than elsewhere. The 3 Boston Bound RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment permits and, then, to submit its proposal for an up-or- state statutes to preempt local laws even in the down vote by city residents. The city itself has absence of a clear confl ict as long as the state is no role in the process. In limited instances, thought to have decided the appropriate policy two-thirds of the city council can propose a on the issue covered by the local law. Since change that voters can approve by referendum, the areas in which the state has legislated are but this too is unwieldy and restrictive. Other state constitutional home rule provisions are not None of the other cities operates nearly so rigid. permits Denver’s city under a grant of home rule that council to initiate substantial charter reform exempts taxing, borrowing, efforts without establishing an independent the regulation of private or charter commission, and also permits its cities to propose charters without resorting civil aff airs, and the regulation to a commission. Under Washington’s state of municipal elections from its constitution, cities like Seattle may present coverage. voters with an alternative to the elected charter commission’s proposal. In Denver and San diverse and comprehensive, this means that Francisco, the charter revision process has been virtually any local regulation can be understood a focal point of civic debate and discussion to trench on some state policy. Other cities about the city’s organization and future. enjoy substantially more protection from state The Impact on Civic Engagement: Because laws. The Colorado Constitution specifi cally Boston operates under one of the nation’s more identifi es Denver as a home rule city and restrictive home rule amendments, it is less able invests it with powers, including borrowing than other cities to develop the kind of popular powers, that the state courts have held are participation and energy necessary to promote 5 beyond state control. As a result, Denver has active civic engagement in local government. successfully challenged directly confl icting The absence of this kind of civic involvement is state statutes that attempted to regulate more troubling than simply its diminishing the 6 municipal employment practices and to limit possibility of making a particular governmental the city’s ability to impose sales taxes for local reform. Given the fast pace of economic and 7 purposes. demographic change and the competition The City Charter: Boston’s city charter is among cities nationally and worldwide, a patchwork of special laws enacted by the efforts to promote any possible future for the state legislature. Although the Home Rule city are likely to depend on an engaged civic Amendment gives the city the power to enact sentiment. No doubt, there is room now for a “home rule charter,” it has chosen not do signifi cant innovation within the city’s current so and for good reason. The reason is that, legal structure. And it is equally clear that city under state law, the city can bring order on offi cials have been quite creative in making the its own to the current jumble of statutes that most of the authority that they currently have. constitute its charter only by placing the whole Nevertheless, the limited nature of the legal of its governmental structure in the hands of a structure exerts a drag on local action that is separately elected charter commission. State both problematic and unusual. law enables the charter commission to pursue an unlimited reform agenda once established

4 Boston Bound RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

Percent of Total Revenues Percent of Non-School Budget Covered by Own- Derived from the Property Tax in 2003 Source, Non-Property Tax Revenue in 2004

Boston’s Constrained Fiscal Structure combination of other local taxes than they get Distorts the Planning Process from the property tax. Like Boston, Chicago has limits on the amount of property taxes Revenue Restraints: From taxing to it can raise. But Chicago’s limits are self- borrowing to imposing fees, Massachusetts imposed, not imposed by the state. Chicago’s state law gives Boston comparatively little ability to exercise this kind of self-restraint is authority to raise local revenue. As a result, important in itself, in that it signals to everyone Boston is exceptionally dependent on a limited that the city has the ability to handle its own number of revenue sources, most notably the fi nances. property tax, which provides more than half the city’s total revenue and about three-quarters of State Aid: In addition to its dependence on its own source revenue, signifi cantly more than property taxes, Boston is unusually reliant on any other city in our study. Every other city in state aid. For the past decade, state aid has been our study receives a portion of its revenue from the city’s second largest source of revenue, sales taxes. And every city, other than Boston providing about 20 to 30 percent of the city’s and Atlanta, receives a portion of its revenue funding. Boston is by no means unique in terms from an income or an occupation tax. Because of its reliance on state aid. of these differences, the property tax in Seattle receives about 30 percent of its revenue in the accounts for only about a quarter of the city’s form of state grants. Other cities, however, are general fund revenues, while the retail sales far less dependent, particularly on state aid that tax, business and occupation taxes, and utility is not earmarked for education. The structure taxes each provide between 15 and 20 percent of state aid also differs in signifi cant ways. of the city’s general fund revenues. Similarly, Boston receives non-education state aid from San Francisco raises more revenue from a programs that can be—and have been—altered combination of other local taxes than from by the legislature and the Governor. In recent the property tax, while Atlanta and Chicago years, for example, the legislature capped the both receive, in total, twice the revenue from a 5 Boston Bound RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

amount of aid cities and towns could get from Number of Taxes the state lottery, even though it was established That Contribute to Municipal Revenues to give localities an additional source of funds. Chicago, by contrast, receives much of its state money as of right, not as a consequence of the state legislature’s annual judgment about what the city “needs” and what the legislature can afford to transfer to it. Under a strict formula established by state law, Chicago (along with other Illinois municipalities) receives ten percent of the income taxes collected by the state on a per capita basis. If a sale occurs in Chicago, the city also receives one percent of the state sales tax, in addition to the revenue from its own sales tax. Targeted Taxes: While the state has authorized Boston to impose excise taxes on motor Fees: Although the Home Rule Amendment vehicles, hotels and motels, and jet fuel, the denies Boston the power to levy taxes without city’s efforts to obtain legislative authorization state authorization, the city can assess and for other targeted taxes have been unsuccessful. collect fees on its own authority. But the Other cities can impose these kinds of taxes defi nition of a fee is unusually constrained themselves because they have home rule in Massachusetts, thereby leaving Boston authority to tax. Denver has a lodging tax, with less power than would otherwise appear. a telecommunications tax, a franchise tax, a For example, the Supreme Judicial Court car rental tax, a food and beverage and liquor construed a state-authorized additional charge stores tax, a facilities development admissions for fi re services to high-rise buildings as a tax, and an aviation fuel tax, among others. tax rather than a fee. California courts have San Francisco levies a business license tax, a taken the opposite stance, broadly construing real property transfer tax, a utility users tax, cities’ ability to impose fees. San Francisco’s a parking tax, and a transient occupancy tax. transit fee, imposed on new downtown Chicago has more than a dozen taxes. Even developments, was upheld as a fee, not a tax. Atlanta, which lacks home rule taxing power, In Massachusetts, the opposite result would imposes a hotel/motel tax, an alcohol tax, a be likely. Like San Francisco, Denver and public utility tax, a car tax, and an insurance Chicago have substantially relied on fees as premium tax, and has the statutory authority a source of income, enabled in part by these to impose a host of additional taxes—not just cities’ ownership of assets, such as airports, that an income tax and an occupation tax—that it Boston no longer controls. has not exercised. Boston thus has four types Expenditure Control: The revenue constraints of taxes (including the property tax) while Boston faces are particularly signifi cant because other cities have from three to seven times that Boston lacks control over its expenditures as number. Like the sales and income taxes, these well. Eighty percent of the city’s expenditures targeted taxes present another way that cities are devoted to schools, police, fi re, debt service, diversify their source of revenue.

6 Boston Bound RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

state assessments, retirement expenses, and because the city recently received the power health insurance. Many of these are mandated to impose a hotel tax. On the other hand, as a by the state, and others cannot be signifi cantly Boston Foundation report has noted, Boston reduced without making Boston less attractive has no dedicated tax for culture and the arts, to residents, businesses, and visitors. As a even though arts funding can be an important result, Boston has very little discretionary means of enhancing tourism as well as have income and thus can do little to target its benefi cial impact on the urban experience expenditures to pursue any of its possible for residents.8 Cities that do have a dedicated futures. Other cities also are constrained in funding mechanism for culture and the arts rely their ability to control their expenditures. on either a sales tax or a hotel tax. The fact that But they are less restricted than Boston. For the hotel tax is one of the few non-property tax example, Boston has little ability to negotiate revenue sources that Boston can tap for this with municipal employees about changes in purpose makes it less likely that the city will benefi ts while Denver has signifi cant ability be willing to do so rather than use it to support to do so. Boston is also more subject than the general budget. San Francisco uses part of other cities to state decisions reversing local its hotel tax to fund the arts, but it also has a spending allocations. The Supreme Judicial wide variety of other non-property tax levies Court determined that Boston’s decision to on which it can rely. extend group health insurance to domestic Revenue and Policy: There is no mechanical partners was preempted by state law, while link between revenue source and policy every other state court decided the same issue outcomes. But revenue structures generate the opposite way. It is ironic that Boston is the incentives, whether or not the decisions a city only city without the power to spend city funds makes in response to these incentives turn to provide health insurance benefi ts to domestic out to be mistaken. Boston’s current fi scal partners of city workers. After all, it is also the structure is problematic because it makes the The revenue constraints Boston city unduly focused on a single tax in thinking faces are particularly signifi cant about how to plan for its future. The city thus lacks the proper incentives to undertake because Boston lacks control a range of actions that would promote over its expenditures as well. useful development. For example, many people contend that the future of the city’s economic health depends on the willingness of only city that must confer marriage licenses as universities and hospitals to maintain a strong a matter of state constitutional law to same-sex presence in Boston. But without the power to couples. tap revenue streams other than the property Impact on Planning: Boston’s fi scal structure tax, it is harder for Boston than it is for cities distorts local planning not only by restricting like Chicago to see beyond the loss of property the absolute amount of money the city can tax revenue generated by these tax-exempt raise but also by limiting the kinds of revenue institutions and focus instead on the value they that the city can generate. It’s no coincidence provide the city. Yet Boston is powerless to that Boston is in the midst of a hotel boom. alter its current incentives, because they have Attracting hotel guests is more in the city’s been imposed by the state. We suspect that direct fi nancial interest than it previously was the state had no intention of using its fi scal

7 RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

oversight as a covert means of shaping local of BIDs to improve many commercial areas, planning decisions. Still, decisions about the particularly in Manhattan, and virtually every city’s future should be made on the merits of other city in our study has experimented with the alternatives, not because of state-created BIDs as well. Massachusetts’ law in effect revenue rules. This kind of distortion would permits a district to be formed only with the be reduced if Boston, like other cities, had a unanimous approval of affected properties diverse array of income sources on which to because it permits each property holder to opt rely and more fl exibility as to the expenditures out of the fee requirement if they wish. This it must make. That would be true even if the state expanded Boston’s discretion without In addition to the problems increasing the overall amount of revenue the engendered by Boston’s city can raise. unbalanced reliance on property Limited Tools to Spur Development and tax, the city lacks tools it can Build Aff ordable Housing use to promote economic Tax Increment Financing: In addition to the development. problems engendered by Boston’s unbalanced reliance on the property tax, the city lacks tools it can use to promote economic development. requirement, which is not contained in the Until 2003, state law did not allow Boston enabling legislation that applies to other cities, (or other Massachusetts communities) to has proven to a serious obstacle to efforts to use Tax Increment Financing to help fund create a BID in Boston’s . redevelopment efforts. Even the current Inclusionary Zoning and Impact Fees: law only allows this fi nancing tool under Boston’s efforts to fund affordable housing comparatively constricted circumstances. programs by imposing impact fees on new Chicago used Tax Increment Financing commercial development and establishing throughout the 1980s and 1990s to develop an inclusionary zoning program for new more than 1.5 million square feet of industrial residential projects have been limited by the space. And San Francisco made extensive use state courts’ concern that these programs were of Tax Increment Financing as part of its efforts illegal taxes or were otherwise not allowed by to redevelop the China Basin area as a major state law. San Francisco has had more leeway new locus for biomedical research. to shape (and reshape) its impact-fee program, Business Improvement Districts: State and Denver’s inclusionary zoning program law has also made it diffi cult for Boston to has not even been challenged in court because establish Business Improvement Districts Colorado’s home rule provisions give its cities (BIDs). BIDs allow an entity created by much more discretionary power than Boston. the city and run by local business owners State Authorities: State authorities have to collect additional taxes from commercial considerable power in Boston. Massport owns establishments and use the additional money an unusually large amount of land in the city, for improvements that will make the area including Logan Airport. Thus, unlike Chicago, more attractive to shoppers and commercial Atlanta, Denver, and San Francisco, a state tenants. New York City has made extensive use authority, not the city, owns and operates its airport.9 Yet control of the airport can be 8 Boston Bound RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

critical because airports have positive effects state mandate, and state funding has fallen short on the local economy and negative impacts on of the needed expenditures. State mandates nearby neighborhoods. The state could give also require English-language immersion for Boston a much greater say in airport policy the education of students with limited English than it has now even if Massport continued profi ciency. to own it. Massport is but one of many state authorities that make policy for parts of the Conclusion city. The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority Boston might overcome the legal obstacles has a major impact on the city’s development, surveyed in this report, just as it has reversed above all through its control of the Big Dig. its declining fortunes over the last three Providing Affordable Housing: Boston is decades. But it should not be forced to do engaged in a number of efforts to maintain so. If, in the future, Boston is less able than and increase its supply of affordable housing. other comparable American cities to respond But state limitations on housing policy and to the economic and demographic shifts revenue constraints limit what it can do. These that are affecting major urban areas, it will constraints are more severe than those in operate at a disadvantage in an increasingly other cities. San Francisco, like Boston, has competitive atmosphere. Boston should be as an affordability problem. But San Francisco free as other major cities in the country are has tools to respond to this problem that to develop its own plans for the future. The Boston lacks. Unlike Boston, the city strictly current legal structure provides Boston with controls condominium conversions. Chicago more disincentives than incentives for doing so. too is an expensive city, but it uses tax To enable Boston to profi t from its advantages increment fi nancing funds to help subsidize and address its problems, the state should help affordable housing construction. And Cook Boston take control of its future. County, of which Chicago is a part, decreases Boston has less power than New York, Chicago, property taxes when multifamily buildings Atlanta, Denver, Seattle, or San Francisco to are rehabilitated and at least 35 percent of the control its own destiny. Not every one of these apartments are leased to low- and moderate- other cities has each of the following powers income households. Other innovative – but one or more does. The important point is strategies, such as the promotion of limited that Boston has none of them. equity ownership, are not within Boston’s ■ The power to amend its city charter power to implement. without following a detailed state-imposed Education: Development is not simply a process matter of land use policy. The future of Boston ■ The power to enact “private laws” without depends as well on the quality of the city’s explicit state authorization schools. Unlike other matters, the now has an unusual amount of ■ The power to pass a local law (for control over the city’s public schools. But example, one that offers domestic there remain signifi cant limits to that control. partnership benefi ts or that sets municipal Class size in Boston’s schools is affected by employee benefi ts) that the state has no the substantial number of classes devoted to power to overrule special education—signifi cantly more than in ■ The power to levy new kinds of taxes other cities. Provision of special education is a without state permission 9 RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

■ The power to have a fi xed share of a state- that bode well for future gains in performance. wide income or sales tax or to levy such a Its pilot school program is an important tax on its own example. Signifi cantly, the state has not simply ■ The power to receive a dependable share withdrawn from the education fi eld; it remains of state aid without an annual legislative an important actor when it comes to educational authorization policy in Boston. But it has usefully permitted Boston to assume a leading role. ■ The power to borrow money in excess of 5 percent of the valuation of the city’s As the education structure illustrates, the point property tax base of legal reform is not simply to transfer power from the state to the City of Boston. The state ■ The power to exercise substantial control has a creative role to play. But Boston should over health and pension costs for city not be subject forever to a legal structure employees designed in another era for another kind of ■ The power to design its own governmental city. Without a legal structure that fosters civic structure for zoning and redevelopment confi dence, that decouples the general endeavor without new state legislation of planning from local dependence on a narrow ■ The power to own its own airport revenue base, and that provides the city the full range of economic development tools that ■ The power to engage in Tax Increment cutting edge planning requires, Boston will face Financing without signifi cant state the 21st century at a disadvantage. restrictions To spur the kind of rethinking needed to make ■ The power to create Business the current structure of local government law Improvement Districts without giving appropriate for Boston in the 21st Century, landowners the ability to opt out of new initiatives are needed. These initiatives assessments should focus not just on substantive issues of ■ The power to establish linkage and land use, education, and city fi nance but on inclusionary zoning policy without state the legal structure that now defi nes the power legislative authorization of the City of Boston. The changes made in ■ The power to control the number of local government law are likely to be most charter schools in the city’s school system successful— and most politically powerful—if they are formulated in a democratically ■ The power to regulate municipal elections responsible manner. One essential point should ■ The power to control city transportation underlie these future undertakings. Boston is systems and infrastructure changing, as everyone who lives or works or ■ The power to ensure that the state can visits here can readily see. Its legal structure override a city ordinance only by making needs to keep up with these changes. its intention to do so clear As noted above, the state seems to have recognized the virtue of enhancing local control over one key area of city policy: education. Boston is now using its unusually high degree of control over its schools in ways

10 RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

Endnotes 1 ILL. CONST. art. VII. 2 Id. § 6(a). 3 Id. § 6(m). 4 See Boytor v. City of Aurora, 410 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Ill. 1980). 5 See id. § 1; Berman v. City of Denver, 400 P.2d 434, 439 (Colo. 1965). 6 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 592 (Colo. 1996) (invalidating state statue that imposed training and certifi cation requirements on Denver police offi cers). 7 Winslow Const. Co. v. City of Denver, 960 P.2d 685, 695 (Colo. 1998). 8 The Boston Foundation, “Funding for Cultural Organizations in Boston and Nine Other Metropolitan Areas,” 47-53 (2003). 9 Seattle’s airport is owned and operated by the Port of Seattle, which is governed by an fi ve-member commission elected by the voters of King County, a 2,340 square mile entity that includes the city of Seattle. Kennedy and LaGuardia airports, which are located in New York City, are owned by the city but leased to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a bi-state agency that is governed by a board comprised of six members appointed by the governor of New York and six by the governor of New Jersey.

11 RAPPAPORT INTITUTE POLICY BRIEFS

PREVIOUS RAPPAPORT INSTITUTE “Betting the Future: The Economic Impact POLICY BRIEFS of Legalized Gambling,” by Phineas Baxandall (Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston) and Bruce Sacerdote (Dartmouth College) January 2005. “Hard Choices for the Next Governor” September 2006. “Can Social Capital Last: Lessons from Boston’s Villa Victoria Housing Complex,” by Mario Luis “The Impacts of Commuter Rail in Greater Small (Princeton University) October 2004. Boston” by Eric Beaton (MUP, 06, Graduate School of Design, Harvard University) September 2006. RECENT RAPPAPORT INSTITUTE “The Economic Impact of Restricting Housing WORKING PAPERS Supply” by Edward L. Glaeser (Harvard University) May 2006. “Land Use Planning in the Doldrums: Growth Management in Massachusetts’ I-495 Region” “Why Are Smart Places Getting Smarter?” by Christina Rosan and Lawrence Susskind by Edward L. Glaeser (Harvard University) and (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) September Christopher Berry (University of Chicago) March 2007. 2006. “The Massachusetts Community Preservation “Regulation and the Rise of Housing Prices in Act: Who Benefi ts, Who Pays?” by Robin Greater Boston” by Edward L. Glaeser, Jenny Sherman (MPA ‘07, Kennedy School of Schuetz and Bryce Ward (Harvard University) Government) and David Luberoff (Rappaport January 2006. Institute for Greater Boston, Harvard University) July 2007. “Local Services, Local Aid and Common Challenges” by Phineas Baxandall (Rappaport “Power and Interest Groups in City Politics” Institute for Greater Boston) November 2005. by Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney, Robin Liss, Jessica Simoncelli, and Lisa Berger (Tufts “Crowd Control That Can Kill: Can American University) December 2006. Police Get a Grip on Their New, ‘Less Lethal’ Weapons Before They Kill Again?” “Massachusetts’ Hancock Case and the by Christopher Stone (Kennedy School of Adequacy Doctrine” Conference Paper for Government), Brian Buchner and Scott Dash “Adequacy Lawsuits: Their Growing Impact (Police Assessment Resource Center) October 2005. on American Education, by Robert M. Costrell (Commonwealth of Massachusetts) March 2006. “Creating an Effective Foundation to Prevent Youth Violence: Lessons Learned from Boston in “Guarding the Town Walls: Mechanisms and the 1990s,” by Anthony A. Braga (Kennedy School Motives for Restricting Multi-family Housing of Government) and Christopher Winship (Faculty in Massachusetts,” by Jenny Schuetz (Kennedy of Arts and Sciences and Kennedy School of School of Government) March 2006. Government, Harvard University) September 2005. “Creating an Anti-Growth Regulatory Regime: “Smart Growth: Education, Skilled Workers, A Case from Greater Boston,” by Alexander von and the Future of Cold-Weather Cities,” by Hoffman (Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard Edward L. Glaeser (Harvard University) April 2005. University) February 2006.

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“Needed Corrections: Promising Strategies for Improving Massachusetts’ Prisons and Jails,” by Anne Morrison Piehl (Kennedy School of Government) February 2005. 12