Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Greitens, Sheena E. 2013. Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11125991 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Authoritarianism A dissertation presented by Sheena Elise Greitens to the Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts April 2013 © 2013 – Sheena Elise Greitens All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Professor Elizabeth J. Perry Sheena Elise Greitens Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Authoritarianism Abstract Why do we observe such widely differing patterns of repression and state violence under authoritarian rule? Despite a wave of recent interest in authoritarian politics, the origins, design and behavior of the coercive institutions that embody the state’s monopoly on violence remain relatively unexamined. This project draws on new statistical and geographic data, elite interviews, and archival evidence from the U.S. and Asia to chronicle the origins and operation of the internal security apparatus in three Cold War anti-communist authoritarian regimes – Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea – and compares them to similar processes in Communist authoritarian regimes in North Korea and China. Its findings challenge dominant narratives about contentious politics and state-society conflict in Asia; offer an unprecedented view inside ‘secret police’ use of surveillance, coercion, and violence; and provide a new understanding of the institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power. I argue that autocrats face a fundamental tradeoff between designing their internal security apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against elite rivals. Coup-proofing requires an internally fragmented security force drawn from narrow segments of society; managing popular unrest requires a unitary apparatus with broadly embedded, socially inclusive intelligence networks. Autocrats construct coercive institutions based on the dominant perceived threat when they come to power, but these organizational tradeoffs, exacerbated by institutional stickiness, blunt their ability to adapt as new threats arise. Organizational characteristics thus give rise to predictable patterns of state violence. A more fragmented, exclusive security apparatus – associated with a high initial threat from fellow elites – is likely to be more violent, both because it has stronger incentives to engage in violence and because it lacks the intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive repression. In contrast to existing threat-based explanations of repression, I demonstrate that autocrats who are deeply concerned about popular threats use less violence rather than more, and do so because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose. In iii Dissertation Advisor: Professor Elizabeth J. Perry Sheena Elise Greitens these organizations, intelligence becomes a substitute for violence, and citizens relinquish their privacy, but less often their lives. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract iii Table of Contents v Acknowledgments vi Front Matter xiii 1 Introduction & Theory 1 2 Taiwan 64 3 The Philippines 135 4 South Korea 214 5 North Korea and China 294 6 Conclusion 362 Bibliography 372 Appendices 419 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Writing a dissertation is a humbling process. While that has been clear from day one, typing these acknowledgments brings home how much I have benefitted from the guidance and support of numerous individuals, without whose influence I would not have embarked upon this project, let alone completed it. It has been an honor to work with and learn from each of them, and it is a pleasure to express my gratitude for the role they have played. The project is better for their involvement, and responsibility for any remaining errors is mine alone. Despite the length of these acknowledgments, I cannot help but worry that I have forgotten to note someone deserving of my thanks; I apologize in advance for any omissions. I arrived at Stanford two weeks after September 11th, 2001, intending to study English and biology in preparation for medical school. At the end of my first year, out of curiosity about current events, I enrolled in Laura Donohue’s course “Security, Civil Liberties, and Terrorism.” The course examined how security threats, particularly terrorism, changed the structure and behavior of democracies, both internally and externally. Eleven years later, preparing for my dissertation defense, I realized I had come full circle, asking how threats work through autocratic governments to affect the lives of citizens. I thank Professor Donohue for kindling my interest in these questions and first pushing me to think critically about the answers. In all likelihood, I would not have embarked on a PhD without the example and encouragement of a phenomenal group of undergraduate advisors, who encouraged me to pursue my interests wholeheartedly and with hard work. Shin Gi-Wook’s overseas seminar in Seoul in fall 2002 took me to Asia for the very first time, and transformed Korea from a personal and family interest to an intellectual one. For three years my undergraduate advisor, Chip Blacker, was a source of wise words and guidance about my studies on campus and my interests in policy work and public service. A term abroad at Oxford brought me into contact with Vipin Narang, then my tutor for a course in security studies and vi later my colleague in the Government Department. Though our friendship unquestionably reflects the fact that we began by arguing every week in Holywell Manor, he has been a source of trusted advice ever since, and a close friend. In my final year at Stanford, the Center for International Security and Cooperation took me on as an honors thesis advisee, and taught me how exciting and relevant research in security studies could be. For their support and guidance throughout that process, I thank Tino Cuellar, Lynn Eden, Keith Hansen, and Tonya Putnam. I also owe a profound debt to Scott Sagan and Bill Perry, who agreed to advise a fairly unconventional investigation into North Korean involvement in illicit criminal networks, and whose support made the project better than I could possibly have imagined. I admire, and strive to emulate, their commitments to scholarship and public service. To this date, I think of CISAC as a model for combining rigor and relevance, and remain deeply appreciative of their example and support. I am also grateful to my advisors at Stanford for encouraging me to apply for post-graduate fellowships to study in the United Kingdom. At Oxford, my supervisor, Patricia Owens, forced me to wrestle with hard questions about power and the social dimensions of security studies. Yuen Foong Khong became a source of guidance and encouragement as well, on both my coursework and my eventual decision to pursue a PhD at Harvard. My thanks to both of them. My research interests were also shaped by a number of outstanding mentors outside academia, including Richard Bush and Kevin Scott at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and Randy Schriver at Project 2049. I am grateful to Christopher Langton at the International Institute for Strategic Studies for reminding me that my first drafts use far too many adverbs, and to Steve Krasner, who recruited me to work for a summer on North Korea at the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, and under whose tutelage I learned how to write a policy memo. At Harvard, I must thank first and foremost my dissertation committee: Elizabeth Perry, Iain Johnston, Steve Levitsky, and Steve Rosen. As my advisor from the moment I arrived at Harvard, and the chair of my dissertation committee, Elizabeth Perry supported me at every point as I sought to bring vii my skills up to the level necessary to do the project justice. She counseled me early on to make my dissertation not only an interesting idea, but an exercise in excellent craftsmanship. My work has become immensely better for her patient encouragement and insistence on high standards, and I hope that it reflects the degree to which I’ve taken her advice to heart. As a mentor and role model from my first semester, Iain Johnston gave me my first opportunity to teach, gave me a true intellectual apprenticeship by involving me in a project on China’s rise, and taught me an enormous amount about thinking like a social scientist. Steve Rosen generously agreed to oversee my general exam in security studies while otherwise on leave, offered an unparalleled reservoir of comments and readings from which to draw new and creative ideas, and provided a formative example of razor-sharp, humble dedication to intellectual inquiry and to teaching. Steve Levitsky generously took the time to teach and advise me in several courses during my third year while I retrained as a comparativist in order to embark on this project. I am grateful for his patience and counsel, and remain in awe of the encyclopedic knowledge, energy, and enthusiasm with which he approaches both teaching and research. I could not have imagined when I began this doctoral program how challenged I would be by it, or how much I would grow as a result of this work. I cannot imagine four better scholars, or four finer people, to work with and learn from for the past six years. Their encouragement, support, and adherence to the highest intellectual standards has been both intimidating and motivating, and this manuscript would not have been possible without their training, their advice, and their example (and sometimes their humor).