A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE 1966 UGANDAN CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS ON BUGANDA’S MONARCHY
by
Fred Musisi
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Philosophiae Doctor
in
The Faculty of Arts
at the
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
Promoter: Dr R.O. Herbst (NMMU) Co- Promoter: Professor P. Cunningham (NMMU)
2017
DECLARATION
NAME: Fred Musisi
STUDENT NUMBER: 211062847
QUALIFICATION: Philosophiae Doctor
TITLE OF PROJECT: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE 1966 UGANDAN CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS ON BUGANDA’S MONARCHY
In accordance with Rule G4.6.3, I hereby declare that the above-mentioned thesis is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment to another University or for another qualification.
……………………………………….. SIGNATURE
DATE: 2017
i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The completion of this thesis is owed to the insightful help and direction of various people who provided encouragement and love.
I am greatly indebted to Dr. R. O. Herbst, my Promoter for his professional guidance, motivation and dedication in pursing this study and eventual writing of the thesis.
I would like in a special way thank my Co-Promoter Professor P. Cunningham whose continuous encouragement gave me immeasurable impetus to complete this study.
Without the steadfast support of my Promoters this research would not have materialised. This thesis therefore represents almost as much the culmination of their hard work and energy as well as mine.
I also wish to thank my family: My wife, Allen Musisi and children; Matovu Nathan, Sserugga Elijah and Namatovu Nicole who for the purpose of pursuing the Ph.D. studies to fruition, I denied them sufficient company, love and affection. Their patience and understanding are rare qualities that were undeniably central to my success.
I owe great gratitude to Nsibambi Xavier Francis and Nabbira Jackline for the enormous work they did as my research assistants during the early stages of this study. Words will never be able to express my thanks and appreciation but I hope my actions will also inspire you in the academic world.
My colleagues, staff and Management at Muteesa Royal University (MRU) deserve special thanks for the encouragement and support you gave me. In particular, I would wish to thank colleagues at the Faculty of Education; Namazzi Winfred, Mahajubu Abudul and Kyankuzire Zubedah who often stood in for me while I was away.
Finally, my gratitude extends to my fellow Doctoral students at NMMU for the encouragement, comradeship and with whom we have been pursuing our academic goals, namely; Wasswa Hannington, Kyagulanyi Ronald, Sekiswa Peter, Jagwe Aisha, Ddungu Rachael, Sebuliba Natumbwe and Kiggundu Joseph. You made the journey bearable.
ii To the Family of Professor Vincent Kakembo; the warm hospitality you always gave whenever we came to South Africa was immensely rewarding and unparalled. Our stay at your home reflected a home away from home.
May Almighty abundantly bless you all. `
iii ABSTRACT
1966 was a particularly tumultuous year in the East African country of Uganda. After an era of relative peace and stability, the country was plagued by a range of tragedies that resulted in a constitutional crisis after the 24 May attack on the palace of the King of Buganda. This was the first time in Uganda's short history that the state had deliberately and systematically turned its guns on its own people.
As a point of departure the study advances that existing historical analyses on the crisis lack detail. Consequently, the core of the study was to provide a more focused detailed and multi-faceted historical account of the 1966 crisis on the Buganda’s monarchy. The study yielded insights into the political and socio-economic impacts of the 1966 political turmoil on the people of Buganda.
Using the historical method to inform the research design; the study employed an archival history methodology to examine how both the colonial legacy and the internal dynamics of the Ugandan society combined to lead to a serious and dramatic conflict between the kingdom of Buganda and State of Uganda. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that the political turmoil left an indelible scar on the Kingdom of Buganda.
The study offers clarity on why and how the crisis occurred and contributes a better understanding of the ‘grey area’ of knowledge and insights into what the abolition of the Kingdom meant to the Baganda.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ...... i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... ii
ABSTRACT ...... iv
LIST OF APPENDICES ...... x
LIST OF UGANDAN TERMS ...... xi
ACRONYMS ...... xiii
CHAPTER 1
THE NATURE AND CONDITIONING INFLUENCE OF BRITISH COLONIALISM ON BUGANDA
1.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1
1.2 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA ...... 1
1.3 ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION ...... 2
1.4 EARLY FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN UGANDA...... 2
1.5 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE IN UGANDA ...... 12
1.6 THE IMPACT OF THE NATURE OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE ON BUGANDA ...... 16
1.7 THE EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF INDIRECT RULE ON BUGANDA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER REGIONS ...... 22
1.8 THE PROBLEM OF LOST COUNTIES ...... 25
1.9 SUMMARY ...... 33
CHAPTER TWO
A DECADE TO INDEPENDENCE: AN ERA OF POLITICAL TURMOIL
2.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 34
v 2.2 THE 1953 DEPORTATION OF THE KABAKA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PATH ...... 36
2.3 THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS ALTERNATIVE POWER CENTRES TO THE MENGO ESTABLISHMENT ...... 44
2.4 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF BUGANDA’S REGIONAL NATIONALISM ...... 49
2.5 THE FORMATION OF UGANDA PEOPLES’ CONGRESS/ KABAKA YEKKA ALLIANCE ...... 53
2.6 THE LEGACIES OF THE 1961 AND 1962 LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES ...... 58
2.6.1 The 1959 Wild Committee Report ...... 58
2.6.2 The Munster Commission ...... 60
2.6.3 The Molson Commission ...... 61
2.6.4 The Conference Deliberations ...... 63
2.7 THE 1962 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION: A PRELUDE TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY ...... 70
CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL DISORDER FROM 1962 TO 1966: PRELUDE TO THE ATTACK ON BUGANDA
3.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 77
3.2 THE FORMATION OF THE KABAKA YEKKA-UGANDA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS COALITION GOVERNMENT ...... 77
3.3 KABAKA MUTEESA II BECOMES PRESIDENT OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT ...... 83
3.4 AN INTENSIFICATION OF POLITICAL RIVALRY: THE CONFLICTING ROLES OF PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ...... 87
3.5 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS IN BUGANDA ...... 90
vi 3.6 COLLAPSE OF THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS-KABAKA YEKKA ALLIANCE AND THE EFFECTS THEREOF ON BUGANDA ...... 94
3.7 THE RISE OF THE MILITARY AS A FACTOR IN THE CRISIS ...... 104
3.8 THE 1965 LOST COUNTIES REFERENDUM...... 110
CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNEASY PATH TO OBOTE’S DICTATORSHIP
4.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 118
4.2 IDI AMIN AND THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE GOLD SCANDAL MOTION ON 4 FEBRUARY 1966 ...... 118
4.3 OBOTE’S PATH TO DICTATORSHIP ...... 127
4.3.1 The 22 February 1966 Arrest of Cabinet Ministers ...... 127
4.3.2 The Suspension of the 1962 Independence Constitution ...... 129
4.3.3 Abolition of the Offices of the President and Vice President ...... 132
4.3.4 The Abrogation of 1962 Independence Constitution ...... 136
4.4 KABAKA MUTEESA II’S REACTION ...... 144
4.5 THE BUGANDA LUKIIKO RESOLUTION OF 20 MAY 1966 ...... 149
4.6 THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ...... 154
CHAPTER FIVE
THE BATTLE OF MENGO 24 MAY 1966
5.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 157
5.2 THE PREPARATIONS ...... 157
5.3 THE SKIRMISH ...... 159
5.4 THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH ...... 162
5.5 BUGANDA’S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE FALL OF THE PALACE . 165
5.6 OBOTE TIGHTENS HIS GRIP ON BUGANDA ...... 171
vii 5.7 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE MENGO ATTACK ON BUGANDA ...... 176
5.7.1 The Removal of Muteesa and Buganda’s Federal Powers ...... 176
5.7.2 Loss of Financial Autonomy ...... 179
5.8 THE DECLINE OF BUGANDA’S CIVIL SERVICE DOMINANCE ...... 181
5.9 SUMMARY ...... 183
CHAPTER SIX
THE IMPACT OF OBOTE’S DICTATORSHIP ON THE KINGDOM OF BUGANDA 1966-1971
6.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 185
6.2 THE DISSOLUTION OF KABAKA MUTEESA II’S GOVERNMENT ...... 185
6.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF OBOTE’S ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES ON THE FUNCTIONALITY OF BUGANDA’S CULTURAL STRUCTURES . 191
6.4 AFTERMATH OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE ...... 193
6.5 THE MILITARIZATION OF UGANDAN POLITICS ...... 197
6.6 THE 1967 CONSTITUTION; THE FINAL PHASE OF OBOTE’S DICTATORSHIP ...... 201
6.6.1 The Obliteration of Monarchism ...... 203
6.6.2 The over centralisation of power ...... 205
6.7 THE POST 1966’S OBOTE LAND POLICY TOWARDS BUGANDA ...... 208
6.8 THE IMPACT OF THE ‘MOVE TO THE LEFT’ POLICY ON BUGANDA ..... 211
6.9 CONTRACTION OF BUGANDA’S ECONOMY ...... 219
6.10 BUGANDA DEEP HATRED AND ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION ...... 223
CHAPTER SEVEN
viii CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS
7.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 227
7.2 COLONIAL LEGACY ...... 228
7.3 MISDEEDS OF POLITICIANS ...... 234
7.4 THE BUGANDA FACTOR ...... 237
7.5 CONCLUSION ...... 243
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 244
ix LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix I: A Map of Uganda showing Location of the Kingdom of Buganda alongside other Ethnic Regions ...... 262
Appendix II: Two letters ...... 264
Appendix III: THE UGANDA GAZETTE STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS NO 61 TO 68 OF 1966...... 268
Appendix IV: Letter to Milton Obote by Sir Edward Muteesa (28 February 1966) .. 269
Appendix V: SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HON DR.A.M.OBOTE MP, ON THURSDAY 3rd MARCH 1966...... 270
Appendix VI: THE 18 POINTS GIVEN BY THE UGANDA ARMY UNDER MAJOR GENERAL AMIN JUSTIFICATION FOR TAKING OVER POWER OF GOVERNMENT ON 25TH JUNUARY 1971 ...... 275
Appendix VII: Excerpts of the 1900 Buganda Agreement ...... 278
Appendix VIII: OLENGA’S TELEGRAM’S AND STATEMENT ...... 280
x LIST OF UGANDAN TERMS
Baganda: The largest ethnic community in Uganda, found in the central part of the country
Banfaransa: The Baganda Catholic Christians
Bangerenza: The Baganda Anglican Christians
Bataka: Clan Heads
Buganda: A region in the central part of the country and one of the four kingdoms of Uganda
Butiikiro: The official residence of the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Buganda
Crown Land: The land placed under British colonial control under the terms of the 1900 Buganda agreement signed between the British and the main Baganda chiefs
Ebisakatte: Enclosures found at the chiefs’ homesteads that were used as training grounds for the young
Enganzi: Title given to the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Ankole
Kabaka: One of the titles given to the king of Buganda
Kabakaship: Kingship
Katiikiro: Buganda’s premier
Katukiro: Title given to the Prime Minister of the Chieftainship of Busoga
Kyabazinga Hereditary chief of Busoga
Lost counties: Bunyoro territories ceded to Buganda by the British.
Luganda: The language of the Baganda
Lukiiko: The Legislative Assembly of the Kingdom of Buganda
Mailo Land: The land that was allocated to Leading Baganda chiefs by the British Colonial administrators under the terms of the 1900 Buganda agreement signed between the British and the Baganda chiefs
Matooke: Bananas, the staple food of the Baganda
xi Mengo Establishment: A group of politicians that dominated and influenced political affairs in the Kingdom of Buganda from 1900
Mengo: The seat of the Kingdom of Buganda
Omugabe: Title given to the King of Ankole
Omuhikirwa: Title given to the Prime Ministers of the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Tooro
Omukama: Title given to the kings of Bunyoro and Tooro
Omutaka: Clan Head
Protectorate: Uganda territory that was under British rule.
Rukurato: The local parliament of the Kingdom of Bunyoro
Saza: A county/largest administrative unit in the Kingdom of Buganda. The 1900 Buganda Agreement between Britain and Buganda divided Buganda into 20 counties, and today 18 remain. The other two reverted to the Kingdom of Bunyoro.
Ssabassaja: One of the titles given to the King of Buganda depicting him as the head of all men in his kingdom
Ssabataka: One of the titles given to the King of Buganda in his capacity as the Head of heads of clans
xii ACRONYMS
CMS: Church Missionary Society
DP: Democratic Party
GSU: General Service Unit
IBEAC: Imperial British East African Company
K.A.R: King African Rifles
K.Y: KabakaYekka, loosely translated as ‘king only’. The movement that arose in the early 1960s to participate in the 1962 independence elections with the view to protecting Buganda’s interests
LEGECO: Legislative Council
NRM: National Resistance Movement
PP: Progressive Party
UCP: United Congress Party
UNC: Uganda National Congress
UNM: Uganda National Movement
UPC: The Uganda People’s Congress
UPU: Uganda People’s Union
NP: Nakivubo Pronouncements
xiii CHAPTER 1
THE NATURE AND CONDITIONING INFLUENCE OF BRITISH COLONIALISM ON BUGANDA
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Prior to the establishment of colonial rule in the second half of the nineteenth century, the area which now comprises the country of Uganda; a name derived from the Kingdom of Buganda, was home to many ethnic groups. Their settlement into this area was as a result of different waves of migration that were accomplished around the 15th century.1 Hence thier history predates the creation of the Ugandan state by the British colonial masters. This is a clear indication that these societies existed before Uganda was given definite geographical boundaries and legal existence by the British. However, they were so different in almost all respects, and Lake Kyoga, in central Uganda formed a natural division between two broad ethnic and linguistic groups: the Bantu in the south and the Nilotes in the north, with significant differences in political and social organization.
1.2 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA
The process by which the different communities that make up modern Uganda developed their respective identities and political institutions was a long and gradual one and in each case, owed a lot to environment conditions and a multiplicity of other factors which dictated the political organisation.2 Politically, the Bantu in the south, because of their non-nomadic way of life, developed a highly sophisticated political system welded into centralized states under kingship. For centuries, they had a government system with a parliament, a hierarchy of chiefs, and laws that governed the relationship between the rulers and the ruled.3 The Bantu’s settled way of life stimulated extensive contacts with the outside, unlike the Nilotic who were nomadic. The Bantu’s early contacts with the outside world prior to the arrival of European administrators enabled them to control the region’s political organization for centuries.
1 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Buganda, p.10 2 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Buganda, p.10 3 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence. A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.1
1 Prior to the establishment of colonial rule in 1894, the Bantu groups in the south had transformed themselves into centralized, independent nations under their respective kings. These included the kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro. There were, however, also a number of decentralized groups such as the Bagishu and Basoga in the southern parts of the country. The Nilotic north largely consisted of decentralized groups such as the Acholi and the Langi. Unlike the Bantu of the south, the groups in the north fell largely under the clan authority of elders and chiefs.4
1.3 ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
The pre-colonial economic organisation of these societies further highlighted divisions between the Bantu-south and the Nilotic-north. The Bantu were predominantly crop cultivators while the Nilotes reared livestock. Both were subsistence economies and mostly self-sufficient and as a result there was minimal contact between the north and the south, another reason for their continued division. At the arrival of foreigners in the region which is today known as Uganda, it was by and large an amalgam of independent national groupings.
1.4 EARLY FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN UGANDA
The first foreign influence came from Egypt and the Sudan in the north. However, due to the insecurity caused by slave trade in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, the route was considered unsafe for Arab traders and European explorers, traders and Christian missionaries.5 Consequently, an alternative route from the East African coast through Kenya to the south was sought. This is why European influence was first established in the south of the country in general and in Buganda in particular. The preference for the southern route would have profound effect on the development of the Kingdom of Buganda and its relationship with the rest of what would become the Uganda Protectorate for many years to come.
The first foreigners to arrive in Uganda were the Arab Traders in 1845.6 They were later followed by Asian traders from Indian, Pakistan and Goa while European
4 T.V. Sathyamurthy, Political Development in Uganda 1900-1986, p.43 5 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Uganda, p.56 6 J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda: A modern History, p.23
2 explorers arrived in the second half of the nineteenth century.7 The Arabs, whose main concern was trade, were largely attracted by the numerous trading opportunities the Buganda region offered. Their arrival boosted trade and commerce by introducing new commodities such as glassware, rugs, guns and ammunition. To cement the good working relations with new comers, Muteesa in 1879 exchanged gifts with the Sultan of Zanzibar where the majority of these Arabs originated.8 The Arabs had minimal involvement in the political affairs of Buganda and despite their longer stay in Buganda before the coming of the missionaries; they had not made any special effort to convert the en-mass Baganda to Islam. The keen interest to spread Islam was only adopted later after realising the pace at which Christianity was spreading. However, their arrival in Buganda earlier had contributed to the spread of Islam which became the first foreign religion to be practiced in the Kingdom.
In 1862, John Speke Hannington, became the first European to arrive in the region and the first to find the source of the Nile. He was followed in 1875 by James Grant and Henry Morton Stanley.9 It was a Bugandan tradition that all visitors to the Kingdom had to be first taken to the Kabaka’s court and this was also the case with Stanley who, like Speke, was greatly impressed by Buganda’s political organization and the hospitality of the Baganda and their king. In their writings, Speke and Stanley express appreciation of Buganda’s organization and praise the Baganda’s willingness to ‘modernize’. Their reports markedly influenced two other categories of Europeans who later chose Buganda as their base for expansion, the missionaries and the British colonial administrators.10
However, despite the high level of organisation at the time of his arrival in Buganda, Stanley found Kabaka Muteesa I fearful of external attacks. The Egyptians, under their leader Khedive Ismail, had troops advancing southwards along the Nile Valley in search of commercial empires. Indeed Samuel Baker a Briton with his invading troops working on behalf of Khedive Isamil had reached as far as Bunyoro, a kingdom to the north of Buganda. Although Baker was defeated by the Banyoro and forced to retreat, this event had not been lost on Muteesa. Muteesa I was the thirtieth Kabaka of
7 T. Kabwegere, Politics and State formation, p.23 8 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.9 9 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.8 10 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.8
3 Buganda. He ruled the kingdom from 1856 to 1884, a critical time in which foreign interest in his kingdom was rapidly increasing.11
Due to threats from external forces and as a consequence of Stanley’s visit, Kabaka Muteesa I agreed to Stanley's proposal to allow Christian missionaries into his kingdom. The king wrote to Queen Victoria requesting missionaries to come and teach Christianity and ‘western knowledge’ to his people. It is now generally agreed that, in consenting to invite European Missionaries to his kingdom, Muteesa hoped that, in the event of Egypt entertaining expansionist designs against his kingdom, he could count on the support of the governments of those missionaries or at the very least, on getting access to their firearms.12 His letter to Queen Victoria of England soon bore fruit with European Christian missionaries arriving as the nineteenth century came to a close and before Islam could gain any significant footing. In June 1877, Anglican missionaries led by Shergold Smith and the Reverend C.T. Wilson from the Church Missionary Society (CMS) arrived in Buganda from England.13 Two years later, in 1879, the French Roman Catholics, Father Lourdel and Brother Amans, followed and were later joined by Fathers Barbot, Girault and Livinhac.14
Like their predecessors the Arab traders, European explorers and missionaries found Buganda greatly conducive to their stay. Buganda’s hospitality and political organization assured them of their security and a good work environment. Their arrival and long stay in Buganda in ever-increasing numbers certainly became significant both in the internal dynamics of the Kingdom of Buganda and its relationship with the rest of Uganda.15
From the outset, the Baganda benefitted immensely from the missionary activities in the kingdom. The missionaries promoted a move from a subsistence economy with traditional crops to a cash crop economy with surplus production.
The decision to promote agricultural production in Buganda was aided by the fact that the missionaries focused more on the economic development of the region than
11 A.B.K. Kasozi, The social origins of violence in Uganda, p.67 12 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.9 13 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.8 14 Entebbe National Archives (ENA), A46/7/70, White fathers Missions, the Catholic Missions, p.43 15 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.44; J. J. Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, p.227
4 others, particularly those in the north, giving Buganda a head start. The region was blessed with fertile soil and had a relatively good individual land tenure system known as mailo land ownership. Also Buganda which lies astride the equator has favourable climatic conditions with rainfall characteristically equatorial. Modified by the high altitude and Lake Victoria, her average rainfall is a slightly above 1300 mm with a mean temperature of just above 22 derees celicius. In addition, the seasonal variations of winds, humidity and temperature are also minimal.16 Buganda was also strategically located on the shores of Lake Victoria making it easy to reach the port of Mombasa on the Indian Ocean via Port Kisumu and by rail through Kenya. The railway from Mombasa reached Kisumu on Lake Victoria in 1901.17 Finally, Buganda had a hierarchy of chiefs and a streamlined system of administration under the Kabakaship (Kingship) which, according to the missionaries, aided economic administration.18
Since large-scale European settlement was discouraged at that time by the missionaries and later the colonial administrators, cash crops were mostly produced by the Baganda smallholders and not on plantations owned by Europeans.19 Cotton was the first commercially grown cash crop in Buganda and quickly become the staple cash crop during the colonial period up to the outbreak of World War One in 1914.20 During the 1920s, sugarcane, tobacco, tea and coffee were also very successfully grown, coffee becoming the most important commercial export.21 Agricultural production generated a great deal of wealth to the Baganda cultivators as well as to the protectorate government established in 1894.22 So successful had been the agricultural sector that by the 1915-1916 financial years, the protectorate was able to dispense with imperial grants-in-aid.23 Indeed in the later years the primary concern no longer became the raising of local revenue to meet the running of the protectorate but creating an export oriented economy that would suit the British system of
16 K. Semakula, A History of Buganda, p.25 17 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.46 18 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.21 19 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.7 20 MAK, AR/BUG/23/5, History of the cotton industry, District Annual reports - Buganda, 1958, p.23 21 MAK, BUG/6/9, Uganda Coffee Association, the Bugisu Coffee Industry, Uganda Coffee Association, the Bugisu Coffee Industry; P. Mutibwa, 22 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.7 23 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.28
5 international trade.24 In fact the main function of the protectorate in the wider imperialistic context was to supply the British with cheap raw materials largely cotton and coffee.
Another fundamental contribution of Christian missionaries was the introduction of formal education based on western traditions. Buganda obtained the most benefit again with not only the first schools being established there but also, for a long time, the largest concentration of educational institutions, at the expense of other regions.25
The switch to a cash crop economy created sufficient wealth for the Baganda to invest in the education of their children at the best schools which were, as explained above, in Buganda.26 Such was the rate of development in Buganda that by 1920 the Kingdom had 81% of all the educational institutions in the Protectorate while the northern regions had no schools and those in the rest of Uganda were few and undeveloped. In addition, when Makerere Technical School (later Makerere University) was founded in Kampala in the Buganda region in 1922, all the students were Baganda.27 It was not until a decade after its establishment that non- Baganda students joined Makerere.28
The development of education, like agriculture, became entrenched in the Kingdom and thus another form of the disparity between the south and the rest of the country that had existed since the pre-colonial era continued to the post-colonial period. For example, the proportion of children of school-going age at school in 1910 was 74% in Buganda compared to 20% in the West and the North combined and only 6% in the East.29 Indeed, nowhere else was the disparity in development more evident than in the field of education. Owing to the fact that education was more accessible in the south in general and Buganda in particular, educational attainment now became another divisive tool. What would have appeared a step forward in intergrating the
24 E.A Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa : the Politics of Economic change, p.54 25 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.9 26 T. Kabwegere, State formation in Uganda, p.158 27 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence. A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.9 28 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence. A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.9; MAK, AR/BUG, Records on Buganda Government Ministries, Department of Education Kabaka’s Government, 1964 29 MAK, AR/BUG/1/3, Ministry of Education 1961-1966, Educational institutions in Buganda; T. Kabwegere, State Formation in Uganda, p.157
6 Ugandan society was denied its significance due to the almost none existence of educational infrastructure in other parts of the country. This extremely uneven development would later create intense suspicion of and hostility towards the Baganda. At the time of independence, the southerners, particularly the Baganda, were the most educated, and education had become one of the means by which the Baganda came to dominate the affairs of the country.30 Leaders from the less educationally developed areas of northern Uganda were not likely to be recruited to positions of dominacy in the post-colonial Uganda basing on the norms of merit recruitment. It was this failure of education to be disasociated from the south that explains the continued Baganda dominancy in the early years of post-colonial Uganda.
From the outset, the missionaries fostered rivalry between converts to the Anglican and converts to the Roman Catholic denominations of Christianity. These divisions would ultimately reflect in the internal politics of Buganda as well as in Buganda’s relationship with the rest of the protectorate. The rate of conversion was extremely successful. Each of the mission groups gathered a group of converts around itself, with the Catholics managing to attract more followers. The Catholic Baganda referred to themselves as the Bafaransa (the French) because their teachers originated from France, while the Anglicans were the Bangereza (the English) because the teachers came from Britain.31
Noteworthy among these new converts, were the pages who worked at the King’s palace and the chiefs. In the Bugandan political set up the palace was the training ground for future leaders. The pages working at the Kabaka’s court were therefore at their last stage of training in leadership skills, while the chiefs played a major political role in the governance of the kingdom. The conversion of these two categories of people was very significant for the future political development of Buganda. The new religions had gained an important footing at the core of the structure of the governance of the kingdom. And owing to the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of Bugandan government, their influence among the Baganda was to be great.
30 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence. A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.9 31 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The coming of Europeans, p.13
7 However, due to the fact that Buganda court politics was rife with factionalism, when both the pages and the chiefs adopted Christianity, the rivalry between the two Christian denominations intensified. It was therefore not a surprise that within a space of ten years of the arrival of foreign Christian religion; the factionalism at the court acquired a new overlay of religion. The chiefs, belonging to either of the two, led the political struggle for influence and supremacy in Buganda’s political circles. They fashioned private armies which owed loyalty to them rather than to the King (Kabaka), against whom they were even willing deploy them.32
In the end the rivalry was to prove irreversible as religion was married to politics, resulting in the outbreak of religious conflicts in Buganda during the 1880s and 1890s between the Banfransa and the Bangereza. These conflicts continued for five years without any one religious faction neither establishing control nor being able to defeat the other. This made Christianity in Buganda divisive and contributed greatly to the political weakening of the kingdom. This also came about because the factions who were battling out in Buganda were not fighting for the protection of their faiths but rather for the political control of Buganda.33 At the same time, European interest in Buganda was rapidly increasing and the divisions made it easy for the British to establish their control over the kingdom. By the time the British colonial agents arrived in Buganda, the kingdom had already been divided, principally by the political factions who grouped around the new religious faiths. Indeed it was the ardent support of the Anglican party (Bangereza) for the British colonialists that made the British takeover of Buganda easy.34
The divisive influence of the Christian missionaries thus became integrated in the political life of Buganda to the disadvantage of Bugandan traditions. Both Kabaka Muteesa I and the British manipulated the religious differences to consolidate their own power positions. Muteesa I rotated his support among the Bangereza and the Banfransa creating opportunistic and temporary alliances which further exacerbated religious differences. Whereas Kabaka Muteesa I had been successful in containing the negative influence of western missionary groups in his kingdom, his son Kabaka
32 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.11 33 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.13 34 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.11
8 Mwanga who had succeeded him in 1884 after his death was less successful in his endeavour and Bugandan traditions increasingly fell away.35
Kabaka Mwanga’s reign coincided with a dramatic increase in the number of Bagandan converts to both Christianity and Islam, which increasingly became a threat to his kingdom. The intergrity of Buganda had been compromised by these divisions. Buganda was no longer the vibrant and united kingdom that Muteesa I had inherited some three generations before.36 The introduction of all foreign religions represented a form of cultural imperialism and domination to Kabaka Mwanga. His authority had been undermined as his pages were becoming more disrespectful something that had never happened before in the history of the kingdom. Mwanga perceived the Christians as a particular threat, hence his persecution of them. 37
In 1886 barely two years on the throne, Mwanga killed at Numugongo a number of pages and a few chiefs who refused to renounce the new faith. These (populary referred to as the Uganda Martyrs) were burned to death in an attempt to teach a salutary lesson to all his subjects as well as their Christian teachers as to what was awaiting them. In addition he also decided to round up all the missionaries and and their prominent followers within the kingdom to maroon them in an island in Lake Victoria so to get rid of foreign religions in his kingdom. Unfortunately, to Mwanga, he could have acted too late. He was not successful; his foes were more than adequately prepared and seemed to have taken active measures to defend themselves. Fearing the escalation in the wave of persecution, a combined Christian and Muslim force successfully deposed him in September 1888. He was replaced by his brother Kiweewa (1889) and later another brother Kalema (1889-1890).38 This course of events had a lasting impact as they influenced important traditional practice around succession of kingship in Buganda.
For the first time in the history of the kingdom, a small clique of converts had seized power and installed a king.39 This was also the first time in the history of the kingdom
35 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.28; S.R. Karugire, A Political history of Uganda, p.64 36 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.11 37 ENA, A46/7/70, White fathers Missions, the Catholic Missions, p.41 38 Lubaga Catholic Archives (LCA), A/L/135, Munster’s report of the Uganda Relationships Commission 1961, p.13 39 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.12
9 that a king had been overthrown by his subjects with the help of foreign influences.. The power of the Buganda State passed onto the hands of a revolutionary oligarchy that was led by Apollo Kagwa and Zakariah Kizito thus, reducing the importance of the king (Mwanga). Thus it is not being overstretched to state as Wrigley points out that Christianity had a profound effect in the politics of colonial Buganda.40 Also Christianity was in position to render the King politically irrelevant because it had seriously undermined his customary authority by underming the Bugandan religious beliefs that originally had been part political super structure.41
Kabaka Mwanga was only able to permanently regain his throne in early 1890 at the expense of losing much of his power to the Christian chiefs with whom he had negotiated his return.42 From then on the Mwanga unlike his fore fathers, who had been unquestionably masters of their chiefs, became a client of the Christian chiefs rather their master. This was un-heard of in the history of the kingdom. Mwanga was also not prepared to accept this changed role. On 6 July 1897 he declared war on the British. Unfortunately in this fluid situation that threatened the newly acquired powers by the Christian chiefs, Mwanga did not have the support from his trusted chiefs. The Chiefs betrayed him and instead cooperated with the colonial masters. Apollo Kagwa one of the leading Christian chiefs who was later to become the Katiikiro following the exiling of Mwanga and Zakariah Kizito the County chief of Bulemezi wrote to Mwanga upon his capture in April 1899 informing him of their inability to have helped him fight the British as noted in their letter;
“We your highness the loyal subjects, beg to remind you of what we said to you. We advised you not to fight against Europeans but you did not take it. In reply to this advice you said that if you would be lucky to vanquish them you would kill us. We told you that if you would be defeated you would be sent to prison.
You are therefore not to come back to Buganda. Let them imprison you at Mpwanyi”43
This illustrates how Christian missionary influences in just a decade had been entrenched in the traditional Bugandan political setting. Thus the Baganda leading
40 C.Wrigley, Economic History Review, p.74 41 F.Musisi, Popular Unrest against Colonial Rule: A case study of the 1945 and 1949 Riots in Buganda, p.14 42 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.33 43 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The Reign of Kabaka Mwanga, p.18
10 Christian chiefs played an active role in the establishment of British colonial rule in Buganda. This is not a matter of opinion but a historical fact.
The Baganda spearheaded the spread of Christian evangelization in the rest of the protectorate. This created anti-Bugandan feelings and resentment grew as a result of the perceived close relationship between the Baganda and the Europeans. Thus, wherever the Baganda Christian teachers went, their actions were seen as a ploy to extend their influence and political actions. What aggravated anti-Bugandan sentiment was the fact that wherever the Baganda Christian teachers went they insisted on the use of their language, Luganda. Also, the refusal by the Baganda to translate the Bible into the local languages of the people they were working with only served to intensify the suspicion of intended cultural domination by the Buganda. To the Banyoro for example, the use of Luganda was seen as a way of informing the Banyoro of Buganda’s superiority. Similarly, in Toro, also in the west of the protectorate, the work of Apolo Kivebulaya, a Muganda Anglican priest, was linked to the political influence of Buganda.44 Thus, the Baganda evangelization of the rest of Uganda marked the beginning of anti-Buganda ethnic strife which intensified and became destructive in the era leading to independence.
In summary, the missionary influence on Buganda was double-edged. On the one hand, it positively contributed to the wellbeing of the Baganda, by making them economically successful and putting Buganda on the sound economic footing that put the kingdom at the apex of the economic pyramid in the protectorate. However, the prospects brought by the missionaries also led to British colonialism and the introduction of indirect rule. Similarly, when the Baganda Christian teachers began to spread the gospel to the rest of the protectorate, the indirect effect was the growth of the new anti-British as well as anti-Buganda sentiments. Finally, the missionary activities contributed to the division of the people of Uganda into the educated southerners and the uneducated of the north and the east, another significant factor in the period leading to independence.
44 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.13
11 1.5 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE IN UGANDA
Britain under the liberal administration of Prime Minister Gladstone had been initially reluctant to colonise Uganda apparently because there were no obvious material benefits to be immediately gained by Britain.45 However, owing to the fact that Uganda was the source of River Nile, Britain imperial strategic designs swayed the relutanct public opinion to have Uganda colonised. Prior to taking over Uganda, Britain had occupied Egypt that lagerly depended on the waters of the Nile river. The necessity to control the source of the Nile therefore made it a reality to control Uganda. Moreover, this was the period when other European powers were showing increasing interest in Africa. For instance, in 1889 during the reign of Kabaka Mwanga, Carl Peters, a German trader and outspoken colonialist who had been operating in neighbouring Tanganyika, visited Kabaka Mwanga with whom he signed a treaty of friendship between the Kingdom of Buganda and Germany.46 This greatly alarmed the British as increased German influence threatened their position on the Nile. Thus, in 1890, Great Britain negotiated a treaty with Germany that gave the British rights to what was to become Uganda.47
It was against this background that the first British administration in Uganda was established in 1892 under the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC). The IBEAC, led by William MacKinnon, was a British chartered trading company operating in East Africa. Under the charter, signed with the British Government, the IBEAC was authorized to undertake the duties of general administration, the imposition and collection of taxes and the administration of justice in the areas under its control. These powers were to be exercised within the scope and in accordance with the treaties the company concluded with the traditional rulers in Uganda.48 Consequently in 1890 Captain Fredrick D. Lugard, a well-known architect of colonial rule, acting as an agent of the IBEAC, arrived in Buganda. Like many earlier Europeans before him, Captain Lugard was greatly impressed by what he found in Buganda and is quoted to have stated:
45 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p18 46 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The Reign of Kabaka Mwanga, p.13 47 MAK, AR/BUG/64/4,History of Buganda, p.42 48 G.W. Kanyehiemba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.7
12 So far as we are aware, no purely pagan tribe in Africa shut off from contact with the surrounding people on a high plane of civilization, has ever developed so extraordinary such a political and even legal system as we found at the time of its discovery in Uganda.49
Notably, although on his arrival he had found the Baganda people torn by religious conflicts, he managed to control the situation. These conflicts had ended with the Protestant victory thanks to the support Captain Lugard and his Sudaness troops had rendered to them. In April 1892, he signed a treaty of co-operation with Kabaka Mwanga, thereby establishing company authority in Uganda (although the territory under IBEAC control technically only covered the Kingdom of Buganda.50
IBEAC control, however, did not last long as its involvement in the Bugandan religious conflicts on the side of the Bangereza affected its profitability negatively. For this reason, it soon announced its withdrawal from Uganda to the British government. The impending IBEAC withdrawal led the British Government to appoint in 1892 a one- man Special Commission in the person of Sir Gerald Portal to study the feasibility of British takeover of Uganda.51 At the time of his appointment, Gerald Portal was the Consul General in Zanzibar. His recommendations were that Britain should take over the administration of the entire Uganda. Hence, on 1 April 1893 the British flag replaced company rule.52 Following the signing of the agreement between Sir Gerald Portal and Kabaka Mwanga, Buganda, on 18 June 1894, was officially declared a British Protectorate.53 Thus Buganda became the centre of colonial Government and communications and soon colonial expansion radiated out from it across the rest of the country. This phenomenon marked the beginning of the preferential treatment and the controversies of Buganda’s status in the Protectorate. Moreover there was available evidence that the British initially had no ambition of expanding their sphere of influence beyond Buganda (at this point in time being referred to as Uganda). For instance, on 9 June 1894 the Earl of Kimberly wrote to Arthur Hardinge, Consul General in East Africa pointed out that;
49 W.M.J.W. Roome, Through the Lands of Nyanza, p.17 50 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The reign of Kabaka Mwanga, p.11 51 G.W. Kanyehiemba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.7 52 E. Muteesa, The Desecration of My Kingdom, p.41 53 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The coming of Europeans, p.29; T. Kabwegyere, State Formation in Uganda, p.43
13 “This Protectorate (Uganda) will extend only over the territory which is included in Uganda proper (i.e.Buganda), bounded by Koki, Ankole, Bunyoro and Busoga. He (Col. Colville) should be told that he must understand that he must confine his military operations and occupations of forts in Bunyoro or other places not included in the protectorate to such measures as are indispensable to secure the safety and the defence of Uganda from aggression. He should make every effort with a view to establish friendly relations with Kabalega and to preventing him from entering into an alliance with the adherents of the Madhi.”54
From the above, it’s thus clear that British extension of their influence at a later stage came as either an after thought or as a result of external influences. This would probably, partly explain the apparent neglect of these territories during the colonial period. The obvious question asked here would be that if that Buganda was British’s pre-occupation, why then did Britain extend her influence elsewhere that sometimes by use force. The answer to the above is that Britain’s expansion outside Buganda was accidental rather than design. And as noted by Karugire these accidental happenings had a lot more to do with the security of Buganda rather than the expansion of their territory for its own sake.55 For instance, the British colonizing of Bunyoro a kingdom to the west of Buganda is best explained in elements in Buganda opposed to British rule that found refuge in the kingdom. These poised a security threat to Buganda and consequently in 1893 Bunyoro was invaded and added onto the protectorate.56 Similarly, when the same elements also sought shelter in Ankole another neighboring kingdom to the south west of Buganda, and also when intelligence reports indicated that the rebellious Bunyoro was receiving fire arms through Ankole, the British signed a treaty of protection with the kingdom of Ankole in 1894 and later in 1901 a formal agreement was signed incorporating the kingdom into the protectorate.57 Another clear indication that the incorporating of Ankole into the protectorate had little to do with what Ankole would provide to the protectorate, but everything to do with the containment of security threats to Buganda.
In addition, northern Uganda was brought on board on two related accounts; the Sudanese troop mutiny in eastern Uganda and the fleeing to the north by the rebellious kings Mwanga and Kabalega of Buganda and Bunyoro respectively. In 1897, the
54 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Buganda, p.96 55 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.15 56 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The coming of Europeans, p.8 57 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The coming of Europeans, p.12
14 Sudanese troops who from time to time had been used by the British in enforcing peace in the protectorate rebelled against the poor living conditions.58 The British put down the rebellion but the remnants regrouped around Lake Kyoga that divides the country between the south and the north. The regrouping mutineers, who coincided with the fleeing of the royal fugitives to the north, poised a security threat to British stay in Buganda. In this regard, northern Uganda had to be occupied. In addition, there had been the threat of French advance on the Nile River through northern Uganda.
Therefore, the desire by the British to have a firm control of Buganda by neutralizing any security threats primarily motivated them to extend the original size of the protectorate to include territories in the west, east and northern Uganda. Had it not been the above, possibly the northern societies would have been excluded from the protectorate because as late as 1909 the British officials on spot were convinced that the northern territories should be excluded.59 In all, the centrality of Buganda had played a pivotal role in the expansion of the protectorate and later would play a vital role in the political direction in which the British would govern the protectorate. Moreover, this eminent position of Buganda within the protectorate was strongly emphasized by the British throughout the colonial era a phenomenon that would spark controversies in the post-colonial era.
It is equally important to point out that until late 1897 when Kabaka Mwanga began to oppose the growing power of the colonialists; the British had ruled Uganda through Buganda with the help of their Baganda agents. However, after the British removal of Kabaka Mwanga from the throne and his replacement by his infant son Daudi Chwa, the British began to introduce a much direct form of rule. On the whole British occupation of Uganda had been accomplished by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It is significant that there were hardly anything dramatic in the establishment of British colonial rule in Uganda. It was largely peaceful with only a few cases of resistance.60 Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the British Protectorate of Uganda was characterized by a number of ethnically divergent regions in various stages of development.
58 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.16 59 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.32 60 ENA, A46/350, Sir Apollo Kagwa Records 1831-1969, The coming of Europeans, p.29;
15 1.6 THE IMPACT OF THE NATURE OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE ON BUGANDA
One of common characteristics in the British system of indirect rule was to give preference to established indigenous government structures to administer colonies on Britain’s behalf. In practice this involved giving preference to one ethnic group over another. In the case of the Uganda protectorate, the British throughout the colonial period bestowed this preferential treatment upon the Kingdom of Buganda at the expense of the neighbouring kingdoms and chiefdoms. The British preference for Kingdom of Buganda over other groups is not surprising. In the first place Buganda had existed as an independent kingdom for nearly five hundred years before the arrival of the British. Consequently, with the long British tradition of favouring established monarchies, preference would be given to kingdom states such as Buganda. This together with its size and central location in the protectorate explains why Buganda was favoured.61
In addition, Buganda was the largest kingdom in Uganda, the wealthiest, the most advanced and the most strategically placed of all Ugandan regions in terms of serving colonialist interests.62 Furthermore, it had a standing army and a history of conquest and expansion stretching over three centuries.63 Moreover, at this particular point in time among the Uganda societies only the kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro had been capable of posing a real military threat to the British, hence the latter’s choice of cooperating other than confronting the kingdom. Finally, the Baganda’s earlier warm reception of European foreigners gave them precedence. This left the British with almost no choice but to use the kingdom as the linchpin for their long-term plans. The Kingdom of Buganda in every way met the requirements of the system of indirect rule, which the British wanted in order to cut the costs involved in colonial administration. 64
Thus, having established the geographical limits and firmly established their rule, in administering the Uganda protectorate, the British, especially in the south, largely
61 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and his Times, p.19 62 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.18 63 J. Lonsdale (ed.), Uganda: Recent History in Africa South of the Sahara, p.63; R. C Pratt, Nationalism in Uganda, in Political Studies, 9 (1961), Vol. 9, pp 157-178; K.Semakula.A History of Buganda, p.29 64 B. Berkely, Race, Tribe, and power in the heart of Africa World, in Policy Journal; Vol. 18.No (2001)
16 employed the Bugandan model of administration. This was a highly centralized system of administration where orders came from the top to the lower levels. The model not only impressed them but could also easily serve their interests.65.The British further argued that the Baganda, who lived in the country where they were working, required no supplies and hence were of great use in the occupied areas that required immediate administration.66 It was also suggested that the Baganda were used to a disciplined and centralized system of administration. Therefore, they could be thoroughly relied upon under minimal European supervision.67 And the Baganda who best understood their system were the ones to be employed in areas outside Buganda as chiefs.
Because of this cooperation, unlike in many other parts of the Uganda protectorate, the Kingdom of Buganda was governed by legal agreements with the colonial overlord throughout the colonial era. Notably, within these agreements were treaty rights enshrined that elevated Buganda interests over those of other ethnic groups in the country. The kingdom received special nurturing in the colonial era that was to place the region above the others. A milestone of British colonialism in Buganda was the Protectorate Agreement of 1894 signed between the British and the Kingdom of Buganda. At face value the agreement did not refer specifically to the Kingdom of Buganda or explicitly privilege Buganda but the mere fact that the agreement which established colonial rule in Uganda was signed with Buganda and not any other region marked the cementing of a special relationship between Buganda and the British that lasted 68 years. This relationship was, as will later be established, a precursor to an antagonistic relationship between Buganda and the other ethnic communities in the rest of Uganda.
On 20 December 1899, five years after it became a British Protectorate, Sir Harry Johnston was sent to Uganda and in 1900 signed the Buganda Agreement which had a profound effect on both the governance of the Kingdom of Buganda and its relationship with its neighbours, especially the Kingdom of Bunyoro. The 1900 Agreement was thus the second agreement to be signed between Buganda and the British. Sir Harry Johnson signed on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government and the
65 S.R. Karugire, Roots of instability in Uganda, p.21 66 MAK, AR/BUG/66/2, History of Buganda and the Surrounding African tribes, The Baganda Administrators, p.65 67 ENA, A46/133, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper no 322, Eastern province
17 leading Buganda chiefs, Apollo Kaggwa, Zakaria Kisingiri and Stanslus Mugwanya signed on behalf of the Kabaka Daudi Chwa who was still an infant. This agreement effectively brought Buganda under British colonial control while at the same time it served as the basis for co-operation between Britain and Buganda for half a century. In terms of the same agreement, the British recognized the Kabaka as the native ruler of Buganda.68
Notably, in line with the policy of indirect rule, the 1900 agreement bestowed upon Buganda a special status. The most compelling evidence of this in terms of the basics of indirect rule was that the Kingdom of Buganda retained a degree of autonomy in the running of its affairs. This allowed its kings, together with their chiefs, to govern and at the same time preserve Buganda’s political institutions. This gave Buganda a distinctive and privileged position compared to the other Ugandan kingdoms and tribal areas in both the colonial and the post-colonial era.
The British also signed agreements with the other three kingdoms of Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro while ignoring the territory of Busoga. The treaties included the 1900 Toro Agreement, the 1901 Ankole Agreement and the 1933 Bunyoro Agreement.69 However, these agreements did not give the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro the administrative independence which had been granted to Buganda in the 1900 Buganda Agreement. In brief, the provisions enshrined in these treaties were quite different. They merely provided for the recognition of hereditary rulers as long as they remained loyal to their colonial master. Indeed unlike in Buganda where the king was supreme, in these kingdoms it was the British District commissioners who were recognized as the highest executive authorities. In essence, the other kingdoms were governed more directly as districts, in the same way as the tribal areas.70 This was clearly preferential treatment to Buganda and resulted in envy and animosity from the other territories.
Another significant outcome of the 1900 Agreement was the entrenchment of the power of the leading Anglican conservative chiefs in the running of the kingdom’s
68 LCA , A/L/135, Munster’s report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.14 69 P. Mutibwa , Uganda since Independence. A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.5 70 C. Johannessen, The Restoration of Kingship in Uganda: A comparative study of Buganda and Ankole, p.18
18 affairs. In later years this group was popularly referred to as the Mengo Establishment. This development accounted for the religious discrimination in the kingdom. The key positions in Buganda came to be predominantly occupied by Anglicans and Anglican domination was entrenched in the 1900 Buganda Agreement in terms of the allocation of administrative heads to the twenty counties in the kingdom. Ten were Anglicans; seven counties were headed by Catholics and only three by Muslims.71 In doing so, the 1900 Buganda agreement established religion as a basis of recruitment into the Buganda government. This distribution was not an expression of the numerical strength of the religious followers of these religious groupings but the military and political force of the protestant and their British allies, hence once again another form of discrimination among the Baganda based on religion.
Although Sir Harry Johnson was quick to defend this arrangement by arguing that it would in no way militate against freedom of religion of religious teaching as per his dispatch to London in April 1900 which among others stated that;
“The foregoing arrangement is not in any way binding on the Government. At any time, for good and sufficient reasons, the commissioner may call upon the native government to remove a chief from any particular district and replace him by another chief who may be of different faith. Naturally, however the commissioner would be guided in his choice of chiefs by the prevailing wishes of the majority of inhabitants in each county.”72
The above statement however was contradictory to the agreed positions in the 1900 agreement in regard to the appointment of chiefs according to religion. If recruitment would be based on merit then we wouldn’t have had religious shares in the 1900 agreement. It has been argued that possibly the statement had been made just to be used by the British to strengthen Protestant domination in future. Indeed this was the practice that was followed later as Protestants were given a number of posts beyond what had been agreed upon in the agreement at the expense of Catholics.
It was this clear manifestation of discrimination that prompted seven Catholic chiefs in 1918 led by the Buganda Chief Judge, Stanislas Mugwanya to complain to the
71 MAK, AR/BUG/64/14, The 1900 Buganda Agreement, p.19; J Katoboro, Education for Public Service, p.14 72 ENA Minute 12A dated 18 October 1919 of SMP 5310 by T.S Thomas , the acting Chief Secretary to the provisional commissioner, Buganda containing an excerpt from sir harry Johnson dispatch to the foreign office april 1900
19 governor about the none appointment to position of chiefs in Buganda. They noted that the eight County (Saza) chiefs which were allocated to the Catholic Church were now being filled by the Protestant church. In addition, they also pointed out that the principle of merit recruitment was invoked in appointing posts previously held by catholic chiefs, but when the post was previously held by a Protestant, appointment according to religious shares of the 1900 Buganda agreement was invoked. These grievances were quickly followed by a petition to the Governor by Stanilias Mugwanya in 1919. He raised similar concerns as those raised in 1918. He submitted a list of eight sub counties that had been held by the Catholics but filled by the Protestants when they became vacant.73
Well one would wonder as to why the issue of unfair distribution of chiefs would be cause such attention. In the matter chieftaincies taking away one from one religious grouping to another was always interpreted as belittling the group losing the office to favouring the other gaining it. In addition it was also expected that most people in the area would tend to take on the religion of the chief. The reluctance of the British to justly address the Catholic grievances in this area meant it remained a recurring problem throughout the colonial era and in post-colonial Uganda.
As Christian evangelization spread to the rest of the protectorate, the internal divisions it had brought to Buganda spread to other regions as well. This was so because as Church missions opened in the rest of the protectorate, they introduced the same religious conflicts, tensions and competitions that had been witnessed in Buganda. Adminstrative postitions in these areas also came to be allocated on the basis of religion. In Kigezi, in south western Uganda, for example, the subcounty of Kambuga was the only one reserved for the Moslems as the Christians took over the rest. A similar situation occured in Ankole, one of kingdoms of western Uganda; where the county of Isingiro too was reserved for the Moslems. In 1927 the King of Bunyoro and his premier formally informed the Governor that Bunyoro had resolved to adopt the system of distributing political offices according to religious affliations as done in Buganda.74
7373 ENA Mwganya’s petition Minute 1 of SMP of 5310 74 J Katoboro, Education for Public Service, p.23
20 Finally, the 1900 agreement had implications for the relationship between the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro. In terms of the 1900 Agreement, the boundaries of Buganda were established; the kingdom was to comprise twenty counties including two which formerly were part of the Kingdom of Bunyoro.75 Certainly, the inclusion of the two Bunyoro counties to the Kingdom of Buganda greatly incensed the Banyoro who regarded it as an injustice perpetrated on them by the British and Buganda. Indeed in the later years it would bring about an antagonistic relationship between the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda.
In an effort to make the Uganda Protectorate economically self-sustaining, the British colonial administrators singled out agriculture as the cornerstone of the colonial administration’s economic policy.76 Having been introduced by the missionaries earlier, the commercial agricultural sector was doing relatively well. Thus, to further boost the sector in Buganda, a favourable labour policy was put in place during the colonial era. The policy encouraged labour recruitment into Buganda rather than expanding production to other regions. Consequently, the northern regions, particularly Acholi and Lango, were considered labour reserve areas to provide labour to support the agriculture in the south.77 Because the north had now become a labour reserve, the British made little investment in the region and this elevated Buganda to a more prominent economic position than other regions of the protectorate, thereby creating glaring economic disparity between Buganda and other regions, especially the north. Without the necessary transportation infrastructure, the growing of cash crops in northern Uganda as it had been demonstrated that cotton could grow well; would have been meaningless in economic terms any way, since the cost of getting such crops to Kampala and then to the Indian Ocean port of Mombosa in neighbouring Kenya would have been prohibitive.78
In line with the British colonial policy of divide and rule, and much to the detriment of Buganda at a later stage, the designated labour reserve areas of the north were also used by the British as recruitment grounds for the security forces.79 The creation and
75 W. Kaberuka, The Political Economy of Uganda 1890-1979, p.67 76 MAK, AR/BUG/23/5, History of the Cotton Industry, Cotton production in Uganda, p.24 77 ENA, A46/183, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper no 533, Northern Province 78 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.33 79 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence. A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.6
21 recruitment of the Uganda colonial army also popularly known as the King African Rifles (K.A.R) which became the coercive arm of the colonial administration also reflected the divisive nature of the colonial rule. Indeed some scholars like Karugire assert that nowhere was the divisive nature of British colonial adminstration more pronounced as the recruitment of the Uganda army.80 This led to the establishment of an army completely dominated by recruits from outside the Buganda Kingdom. Although later the British would justify the rational of recruiting heavily from northern Uganda on the grounds that the army needed recruits of a strong physique, stamina, speed of reaction and upright bearing,the actual reason for doing this could be found elsewhere.81 Buganda had gained her position of prominence in the region prior to the British colonisation owing to her military prowess. If this staus quo was to remain then Buganda would remain a constant threat to the British colonial interests. Therefore Buganda’s fighting machinery had to be dismantled and in its place a northern force established. This partly explains the recruitment of northerners to man the army, police and the prison service. Thus the bulk of the protectorate armed services were recruited from northern Uganda particularly from Acholi, Lango and West Nile in that order of numerical strength.82 This would become the trend throughout the colonial period and as will be expounded upon in the following chapters, was later exploited by northern leaders such as Obote to the detriment of Buganda.
1.7 THE EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF INDIRECT RULE ON BUGANDA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER REGIONS
Under the system of indirect rule, the Baganda became the main source of labour for the colonial agents.83 They were utilised as a conduit for the colonial agenda while implementing the system of indirect rule, which was beneficial for both the British colonialists and the Baganda. The British were provided with a firm base for expansion throughout the rest of Uganda and the Baganda were also employed as initial administrators in many parts of the protectorate outside the Kingdom of Buganda.84 This policy elevated the Kingdom of Buganda to prominence, often at the expense of
80 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p. 32 81 I. Grahame, Amin and Uganda, p.15 82 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda p.33 83 D. Welsh, Ethnicity in Sub Saharan Africa, in International Affairs, Vol. 72, No 3(1996): 479 84 J. Lonsdale (ed.), Uganda: Recent History in Africa South of the Sahara, p.863
22 the other regions in the protectorate. For example, in the west, Bugandan subjects were employed in the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Toro and in the territory of Kigezi. Similarly, preference was given to Baganda administrators in the east, in the territories of Teso, Budama, Bukedi, Busoga and Bugishu, and in the north in the territory of Lango.85
As much as the cooperation between the British and the Baganda had brought benefits to Buganda, it is important to note that this association marked the beginning of the anti-Baganda sentiments in many parts of the country outside the Kingdom of Buganda where the Baganda had been employed at the expense of locals. The Baganda, as the preferred administrators of the British, found it difficult to appreciate the decentralized nature of these societies. Therefore, in the process of expanding colonial rule, the Baganda exported and imposed their centuries-old political system and administrative structures in the newly colonized areas. These were the equivalents of British counties, sub-counties, parishes and villages.86 This increased resentment towards domination by Buganda.
Feelings of resentment at Buganda were aggravated when the chiefs appointed to fill the newly introduced Bugandan structures, whether Baganda or locals of the area, were instructed to use the Buganda administrative titles in these recently colonised areas. This became a cause of resentment and the 1903 Badama revolts against British colonial rule in eastern Uganda illustrate the sense of frustration about the Baganda who were seen as the henchmen of the British. The principle cause of Badama discontent was not the British but the perceived misrule of the Baganda. The Badama of eastern Uganda insisted on appointing their own agents and controlling their own affairs without the interference of Kakungulu, a Muganda colonial agent.87 They also requested that the newly appointed agents should no longer be given Buganda administrative titles such as Mukwenda, and Mugema.88 Similar sentiments were expressed in 1905 by the Padhola in the neighbouring district of Bukedi.89
85 ENA, A46/133,Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper No 322, Eastern Province 86 ENA, C2588, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper No 2, The Kakungulu Estate 87 ENA, A46/133, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper No 322, Eastern Province 88 T. Michael (ed.) Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on the Ugandan Asians, p.208.; ENA, C2588, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper no2,the Kakungulu Estate 89 ENA, C2588, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper no2, The Kakungulu Estate
23 The anti-Buganda sentiments in the rest of protectorate were also brought about by what the colonized people outside Buganda Kingdom interpreted as cultural imperialism. In many of these areas, for example, the Baganda colonial agents had insisted on the use of the Luganda language as the official means of communication. To these people the use of Luganda wherever the Baganda went became one of the most painful aspects of the intrusion of Buganda’s rule.90 These sentiments were aggravated when Buganda rule began to affect other local traditions. The Baganda in most cases regarded the Kanzu, the traditional dress of Buganda as proper. The Baganda agents were also accused of appropriating local women. Mika Kisaka, a Muganda colonial agent in Budama in eastern Uganda, for example, was accused of inappropriate sexual activity with the local women. Such behaviour led to deep and widespread resentment which often erupted into violence and the killing of Baganda agents.91
Baganda agents were allegedly also involved in corruption, leading to the individual amassing of wealth in the areas under their jurisdiction. This personal aggrandizement is best illustrated by the Kakungulu estate in Eastern Uganda. The whole of Mbale County covering 80 square kilometres was taken over by Kakungulu and his followers. He took 32 square kilometres of land while the rest went to his followers and their successors.92 Particularly painful for the Bagishu inhabitants of this area was that most of the land taken by Kakungulu and his followers, was useful arable land which was now left idle and inaccessible to the Bagishu. In addition to expropriation of land, Kakangulu and his followers obtained substantial income through the imposition of an annual rent of 11 shillings on those who lived on this land.93 The Bagishu, who constituted the majority in the area, considered it a great injustice to have to pay rent on what they regarded as communal tribal land. The Bagishu were even more incensed at the fact that the taxes paid were not implemented to their benefit.
Furthermore, the Baganda were accused of being arrogant and harsh in their actions as labour agents and tax collectors and overbearing and unsympathetic towards the
90 ENA, A46/16, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper no 898, Buganda 91 ENA, A46/133, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper no 322, Eastern province; ENA, C2587, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper No2 the Kakungulu Estate 92 ENA, A46/133,Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper no 322, Eastern province 93 ENA, C2577,Letter to Hon Chief Secretary from the Provincial Commissioner, Eastern
24 local people among whom they operated. A vivid illustration of this is when Kakungulu embarked on the building of forts in eastern Uganda, using local labour that he treated as slaves.94 The Bagishu alleged that such forced labour characterized Buganda’s rule. As a result the Bagishu often viewed Buganda rule as more harsh and humiliating than that of the British. In fact, wherever the Baganda agents went outside the Kingdom of Buganda, intense feelings of resentment escalated. In Mbale in eastern Uganda for instance, Buganda’s rule was characterized by fierce resistance from the Bagishu and the Badama. The situation in northern Uganda, especially in the Lango region, was similar. Between January 1910 and July 1911 there were 109 conflicts between Baganda agents and local people in eastern and northern Uganda. In these skirmishes five agents and 10 followers were killed, 6 agents and 11 followers wounded, and 170 locals from eastern and northern Uganda were killed or wounded.95
The locals perceived this as Buganda nationalism and imperialism but it must be remembered that, in carrying out their duties as colonial agents, the Baganda were serving colonial interests and not those of Buganda. The political and economic influence they gained was as individuals and not in the first place to the advantage of Buganda as a kingdom. On whole these agents simply embraced the opportunities offered to them in the course of their duty and used them to their own advantage.96 In so doing, the Baganda used the system of indirect rule to their advantage to dominate and exploit others in the Protectorate.
1.8 THE PROBLEM OF LOST COUNTIES
Clearly, and as already described, Uganda like many other African countries, was a creation of the colonial period. Its physical borders were largely determined by administrative convenience and economic considerations or natural boundaries such as mountain ranges and river beds rather than the people. British colonial interests did not in any way correspond with the ethnic patterns of Ugandan people when it came to the demarcation of internal boundaries. As a result, many different ethnic groupings
94 ENA, C2587, Uganda Protectorate ,Secretariat Minute Paper No2 African boundaries Eastern Province 95 ENA, A46/323, Uganda Protectorate, Secretariat Minute Paper No 898, Buganda 96 P. Mutibwa., Uganda since Independence. A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.3
25 were lumped together in territories which did not reflect or have the ability to accommodate ethnic diversity and thus, ethnic tension invariably worsened.
Many territorial disputes occurred as the country moved towards independence and continued for a short period thereafter. In western Uganda, for example, disputes arose between the Bamba and Bakonjo ethnic groups led by their Rwenzururu secessionist movement against the Batoro.97 Similarly, in eastern Uganda there were disputes between the Bagishu and the Sebei, and in the north between the Acholi and the Jonam.98 However, for the purpose of this study, the emphasis is on the conflicts in central Uganda between the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro over the matter of the ‘lost counties’.
The Kingdom of Bunyoro was one of the few that, in the course of colonial expansion, severely resisted any foreign intrusion and the British colonialists had to use military means to subdue them. In December 1893, the British Colonel Colville, with the assistance of Baganda soldiers, led a military campaign against Kabalega, the King of Bunyoro. He was defeated in 1894, and sought refuge in Lango in northern Uganda.99 As a reward for their assistance in the war against Bunyoro, the British ceded the Bunyoro territories (counties) of Buyaga and Bugangaizi covering approximately 6,000 square miles of land to the Kingdom of Buganda.100 These areas in the later years came to be known as the ‘lost counties’. Bunyoro loss of the said territories was officially communicated on the 19 November 1896 by Mr. E.J.L. Berkeley to the Marquis of Salisbury in a dispatch numbered 113 where he stated as follows;
“I proceeded to explain the distribution of these territories between two religious (Buganda) parties as made by Col. Colville, (a British colonial administer) would be maintained, namely, the districts (marked as south Unyoro) bounded to the north by Ngusi river, to the west by the south-east shore of lake Albert, to the south by Muzizi river and to the east by Kitumbwi river, would go to the Catholics and the territory lying to the east thereof, viz bounded to the North by
97 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Uganda, p.176 98 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Uganda, p.176 99 MAK, AR/BUG/64/2, History of Buganda from Kabaka Ssuna to Kabaka Chwa 1935, p.31 100 ENA, REL/8/121 The Lost Counties, the Bunyoro Counties ceded to Buganda
26 the Kafu River to the east by the Nile and to the south by Buganda( as therefore) would go the protestants”.101
According to the kingdom of Bunyoro it was this dispatch that sealed off the freedom of many hundreds of thousands of the Banyoro. And in the 1900 Agreement the British concluded with Buganda inserting the lost counties within Buganda boundary without any special regard to Bunyoro.
This great injustice by the British on the part of the Banyoro attracted sympathy from many circles including Mr. Pulteny, the Bunyoro District commissioner of the time who tendered the following resignation to Mr. Berkeley. Mr Pulteny noted as thus; “If you decide that South Unyoro is to be handed over to the (Baganda) Roman Catholics, particularly under Luwekula. (Luwekula is a title of a county chief of Buwekula one of Buganda counties) I regret to be obliged under these circumstances to request you to accept my entire resignation of all civil administration in Unyoro (Bunyoro) and appoint some officer to relive me of these duties”.102
Some historians have suggested that the matter of the lost counties was blown out of proportion as it was no different to the expansion of pre-colonial Africa states through wars of conquest.103 However, for many, the take-over of Buyaga and Bungaigainzi was a particularly serious injustice towards the weaker Kingdom of Bunyoro.104 J.R.P. Postlethwaite, the District Commissioner of Bunyoro in 1927 and 1928 noted that “the inclusion of this area in the Kingdom of Buganda is considered to be one of the greatest blunders we (British) committed in the past”.105
First and foremost, the Banyoro were aggrieved at the transfer of these territories to Buganda because it meant that most of the burial places of their former kings now lay in the district of Mubende outside the Kingdom of Bunyoro but within the Kingdom of
101 ENA, REL/8/121 The Lost Counties, Memorandum submitted by the Mubende Banyoro Committee to the Commission of Privy Councilors appointed to investigate the issue of Bunyoro’s Lost Counties. 102 ENA, Memorandum submitted by the Mubende Banyoro Committee to the Commission of Privy Councilors appointed to investigate the Issue of Bunyoro’s Lost Counties. 103 C.P. Mayiga, The King on the Throne: The story of the restoration of the kingdom of Buganda, p.142 104 Center for Basic Research (CBR), Pf 320.7 UGA, Report of the Commission of Privy between Buganda and Bunyoro, 1990, p.13 105 S. Lwanga-Lunyiingo, The Struggle for land in Buganda, p.187
27 Buganda. Ten of these tombs had been in the county of Buyaga and three in Bugangaizi.106
Also, the Banyoro perceived the loss of land to Buganda as a penalty inflicted upon Omukama (King) Kabalega and the people of Bunyoro-Kitara for having waged a war against British colonialism.107 What incensed them greatly was that this lost territory was a reward for the collaborating Buganda whom they considered their traditional enemy. Throughout the colonial period it remained important to the Banyoro to regain this territory.
In 1921, the Mubende-Banyoro Committee was founded at Nakaima Hill in the Mubende district by Yowana Nyakatuura, Benwa Rubuto and Zaakaliya Rugangwa.108 The founders of this committee, all of whom came from the county of Buyaga, aimed at putting pressure on the colonial administration to unconditionally return the territories to Bunyoro. Numerous petitions were also made to both the colonial administrators and to the Kingdom of Buganda accusing the Baganda chiefs of being arrogant, high-handed and extortionist.109
The Banyoro were to use any opportunity they got to demand the return of the lost counties. For instance, when Kosia Labwoni a Munyoro opinion leader went to England in connection with the parliamentary joint committee on closer union where the British wanted to bring the three east African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania together, he raised the question of the return of the counties of Buyaga, Bugangaizi and Buwekula to the kingdom of Bunyoro with the British Secretary of State. He alleged the injustice by Baganda chiefs against local Banyoro peasants.110
In the same year, the Banyoro led by Zakalia Lugangwa carried out agitations against the Baganda chiefs in the disputed areas. Zakalia Lugangwa whose headquarters were in the subcounty of Mutuba1 of Buyaga had, had his political stature raised
106 ENA, 1161/II Bunyoro counties ceded to Buganda under Uganda government (lost counties) 107 ENA, REL/s/121, Bunyoro Lost counties, Preliminary correspondence between the Mubende- Banyoro Committee and the Resident, Buganda early in the 1920’s 108 ENA, Bun/11,Speech of the Owekinisa Katikiro of Bunyoro-Kitara at Mengo on the 22nd Aug 1956 at the opening of the negotiations with Buganda Government 109 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Buganda, p.209 110 ENA, C 144 Mubende district unrest in agitations from Bunyoro, Letter to the Chief Secretary Entebbe by Acting provincial commissioner, Buganda, 21 February 1932
28 following his appointment in January 1932 as the Mugema of the king of Bunyoro. Assisted by Tomasi Wamala the C.M.S teacher at Kagadi, Tomasi Mayanja, Balamuzi Mutabazi and Kijolo they carried out an active campaign of disrespecting the Baganda chiefs and obstructing them from collection of poll tax and refusing the Banyoro peasants to pay tax.111
To apprehend the animosity the issue of the lost counties had caused between the people of Buganda and those of Bunyoro, the reception Muteesa received on his tour of Mubende one of the contest territories on 29 October 1948 reveals much. During one assembly with inhabitants of Mubende, Muteesa recognised the uneasiness within the meeting and when he asked, a one Y.B.N Katera, a Munyoro catechist of Nnabukagala sub county, Buwekula County stood up and requested his son to read a letter he had prepared. Despite the objection from his Katikiiro, Muteesa allowed the letter to be read. The letter would further intensify the already bad relations between the Baganda and the Bunyoro. Below are the excerpts of the content of the letter:
“The Baganda who came in the region from 1894 and settled in the region, did distribute among themselves in 1900 all the land without considering the natives (the Banyoro). That it is now a period of 49 years and no any native has been considered for we the people of Mubende were not given land, we are only tenants.
We are subjects of non-natives they (the Baganda) monopolized all our wealth and they do not give us chieftainship. So far as development and welfare is concerned we are people who have been forgotten for example during your visit today you have not been introduced to a prince or princess as a son or daughter/grandson/daughter of the later Kabaka’s, where as in this county (Mubende) is where tombs of the late Kings of Bunyoro (Bakama) can be found. In addition no elders of people who have been introduced to you are a native of this region.
Owing to the above our leaders think that we are not intelligent. I have written this letter asking to regain my country which was cheated.”112
The contents within the letter highlighted how seriously the Banyoro felt by the failure of Buganda administration to appoint the native Banyoro as chiefs within the region,
111 ENA, C 144 Mubende district unrest in agitations from Bunyoro letter to Owesaza Inyasio Lule Kyambalongo by Yozefu Kyasikane Mutuba 1 112 ENA, Report to the Chief Secretary on the incident that took place during the Lukiiko held by His highness the Kabaka at Luwekula’s headquarters Mubendeon 29 Oct 1948, 13 November 1948
29 the total neglect of the Banyoro’s welfare and loss of land to the Baganda. Muteesa was greatly angered by the contents of the letter and left assembly pre maturely. However to the Banyoro Y.B.N. Katera’s letter was reflective of the mood among the Banyoro.
In 1949 33 Banyoro opinion leaders led by Zakaria Lugangwa wrote to the Honourable Provisional Commissioner protesting the loss of the counties. The cited that the said land had belonged to their ancestors ever since the rule of King Chwa II Kabalega. Kabalega had been the fiercest king of Bunyoro who bravely fought the British during the early period of establishing colonial rule between 1894-99. “If we compare the numbers of miles (Mailo) possessed by the Baganda in the 3 counties of Mubende District they are about 1260 yet the natives (the Banyoro) possess 43 miles. We lost the chance of getting the share of Mailo under the 1900 Buganda Agreement.”113 In addition, the Baganda administrators resorted to gradual eviction of a considerable number of Bunyoro princes and princesses from their hereditary estates.
In their protest letter, the Banyoro also cited the unfair political distribution of offices in which all the county chiefs in Mubende District were Baganda. This was alongside 24 of the 26 sub county chiefs.114 Moreover, the Baganda had acquired these posts following the dismissal of the former Banyoro chiefs such as, Bamuloga Mubigwia, Lugwa, Lwana Kabangokalega Bittakwaine, Kabagonza, Kasolo Kawa. Others were Kabijenge Kaija, Kamagadu, Malimba, Kauzo, kanyamugobwa, Mugasa Katabalwa Kabwogi, and BirigendaIgisi. These were also to lose the official land attached to the offices they had occupied. They concluded on this issue by noting as follows “We have no hope of getting chieftainship in our country (Bunyoro kingdom) even at the parish level. This is because when a chief dies his heir gets this appointment and also takes charge of the official estate (mailo). We have no way of getting appointment because we did not get the land (mailo). That is why by 1949 they were only 2 Banyorosub county chiefs and 35 parish chiefs.”115
113 ENA, C 144 Mubende district unrest in agitations from Bunyoro Letter to the Honourable Provincial commissioner Buganda by 33 Banyoro opinion leaders, 25 January 1949 114 ENA, C 144 Mubende district unrest in agitations from Bunyoro Letter to the Honourable Provincial commissioner Buganda by 33 Banyoro opinion leaders 25 January 1949 115 ENA, Ref Appointment of Banyoro as chiefs in the Mubende area, Letter to honourable Chief Secretary Entebbe from the Resident Buganda, 25 January 1949
30 It is also interesting to note that among the Banyoro, the lost counties did not simply represent a loss of territory but also looked at it as financial loss injuring of their prestige. Financially, the Banyoro were incensed by the financial implications attached to the loss of the territory. The petitioners noted that the new Baganda chiefs drew salary of Ugandan shillings 18,600/= and when computed for the period of 35 years they had been administering Bunyoro up to 1949, they had drawn over Uganda shillings 651,000/= taxed from the Banyoro.116 In addition the Baganda chiefs collected revenue in form of land rents from the Mailo popularly known as Busulu. Agricultural produce especially cotton and coffee as well as collection of market dues reduced their profit margins.
The Banyoro opinion leaders also bitterly resented their children being taught in Luganda a local language of the Baganda while at school and not in Lunyoro their native language. This to them represented cultural imperialism of the Baganda.117
In 1958, the Banyoro sought the intervention of the Queen of England through the Privy Council.118 It was the un-relentless pressure exerted by the Banyoro demanding the return of the disputed areas which forced the Baganda to ease the tension by making some concessions with the Banyoro acquiring some limited control in the conquered areas. In 1909, the Buganda government agreed that 13 burial places of the fallen Kings of Bunyoro be fenced and caretakers be appointed by the Omukama of Bunyoro.119 Also six years later, in 1915, the Buganda government agreed to allot 5 acres in each of the 13 places to the Omukama of Bunyoro.120 Additionally, from 1940 the Omukama was also given a mailo estate of 337 acres in Buyaga, one of the two lost counties which acted as the headquarters of his Mugema, the keeper of the royal tombs.121
116 ENA, Ref Appointment of Banyoro as chiefs in the Mubende area, Letter to honourable Chief Secretary Entebbe from the Resident Buganda, 25 January 1949 117 ENA, C 144 Mubende district unrest in agitations from Bunyoro, Letter to the Honourable Provincial commissioner Buganda by 33 Banyoro opinion leaders June 1949 118 ENA, C 144, Mubende district unrest in agitations from Bunyoro, Memorandum to H.M. the Queen dated 26th October 1959 119 ENA, F 001, Lost Counties, Lukiiko Resolutions and administrative nets by the Kabaka’s government 120 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.65; ENA, REL/s/121, Bunyoro Lost Counties, Bunyoro claims to the colonial secretary, 10 January 1961 121 LCA, A/L/135, Munster’s report of the Uganda Relationships Commission 1961, p.33
31 However, the half-hearted attempts to appease the Bunyoro over the lost territory did not go far enough to ease the tension between the two kingdoms. Consequently, the British, prior to their departure in 1962 attempted to find a solution to these territory disputes between the two kingdoms and set up two commissions, the Munster and Molson Commissions, to investigate how best the issue should be handled.122
The Munster Commission, also known as the Uganda Relationship Commission of 1961, on the issue of the lost counties dispute noted that Bunyoro’s claims were essentially a political problem. It therefore, recommended a referendum to be held before the protectorate ended so that any areas in which Bunyoro was successful should be handed over at the end of the protectorate.123 This recommendation was not implemented.
In contrast, the Molson Commission’s report on the lost counties, published at the beginning of May 1962, rejected the idea of a referendum on the grounds that it would almost certainly inflame tribal feelings and instead recommended direct transfer of the disputed counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi to Bunyoro.124 Furthermore, the Molson Commission categorically stated that this transfer of territory from Buganda to Bunyoro should take place before 9 October 1962 while the British Governor was still in office.125 It also called for a generous act of statesmanship on the part of Buganda in accepting its recommendations.126
As clear testimony that the redrawing of boundaries had not only irrevocably altered ethnic realities in Uganda but also strengthened ethnic rivalry, the Kingdom of Buganda predictably rejected both recommendations. On 4 May 1962, the Buganda Lukiiko declared that Buganda would fight to keep its counties and that it was opposed to any move to transfer Buyaga and Bugagaiazzi to Bunyoro.127 Not surprisingly, the British colonial administrators were not keen on enforcing Molson’s recommendations and the stalemate on the matter of the lost counties remained, leaving the Banyoro
122 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence. A story of Unfilled Hopes,p.27;ENA,REL/s/121,Bunyoro Lost Counties, Bunyoro claims to the Relations commission, 15 Jan 1961 123 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and his times, pp.269-270 124 ENA, REF/1,Molson Commission Report, p.31 125 ENA, REF/1, Molson Commission Report, p.33 126 ENA, REL/1,Molson Commission Report, p.31 127 ENA, AR/BUG/13/2, Lost Counties Issues 1961-1964,The Lukiiko Resolution no 5 of 1962
32 feeling that they had been unjustly treated by the British and with their hunger alive into the post-colonial era.
1.9 SUMMARY
In summary, the manner in which British colonial rule was extended from Buganda outwards to the rest of the protectorate and the British administrative policies of indirect rule coupled with the preferential treatment of Buganda, strengthened divisions and sharpened ethnic conflict. It left a residue of distrust between Buganda and the rest of Uganda which strongly impacted on the political environment of post- independence Uganda. Consequently, the issue of Buganda’s relationships with the centre attained national significance in the years immediately before and after independence.
33 CHAPTER TWO
A DECADE TO INDEPENDENCE: AN ERA OF POLITICAL TURMOIL
2.1 INTRODUCTION
With independence imminent in the 1950s, there was growing apprehension among many Ugandans about the power vacuum that was being created by the imminent departure of the British. Consequently, a desire to redefine relationships among Ugandans intensified which led to tremendous political upheavals during the decade prior to independence as several issues came to a climax. The most important was the need for a new constitutional order that would take the different political interests into account and guarantee the survival of the young nation in the future.
Uganda’s journey to independence can be traced to the 1950s. Prior to this period, the growth and development of nationwide nationalism moved at a slow pace as all major state pillars such as the legislature, judiciary and the police were at their infancy. By 1952 the existing British colonial legislative council (Legeco) included only eight African councillors against the majority of European and Asian representatives.128 However, as momentum for independence gathered force in the ten years leading up to independence, the struggle for Uganda’s independence evolved three main characteristics. Firstly, it was characterized by a growing nationalism and desire for independence for the entire Uganda. Secondly, was Buganda’s quest for nationalism through regional independence, and thirdly by anti-Baganda feelings amongst all other ethnic groups in Uganda.
These three aspects of nationalism were not unique to Uganda. Several historians have indicated that African nationalism was quite different from European nationalism.129 What Europeans called collective nationalism in Africa was actually an amalgam of heterogeneous nation-states different from the monolithic European nations. Thus, whereas in Europe for instance, nationalism would revolve around shared identities, the case in Africa in general and Uganda in particular was different. By and large African scholars agree that African states were a colonial creation and in
128 ENA, S077/401, Uganda Protectorate, Proceeding of the Legislative Council 1949-52, p.79 129 K. Semakula. A History of Buganda, p.12
34 the period leading to independence, nationalist feelings were largely driven by the desire to get rid of colonial overlords rather than being based on shared identity.130 These scholars also argue that African nationalism therefore makes possible the existence of regional nationalism which is not necessarily in opposition to broader nationalistic feelings.131
The development of mass nationalism in Uganda faced many obstacles, some of which were brought about by the colonial situation while others originated in traditional structures. At the time the British took political control of Uganda, all major ethnic groups had already developed independent and formidable political states presided over by either kings, in the case of centralised states, or chiefs in decentralised states. With the establishment of British colonial rule, indirect rule made it possible for each region to continue being governed by its own indigenous rulers and remain independent of other regions.132 Hence, throughout the colonial era, most Ugandans continued paying allegiance to their traditional rulers, and to local councils rather than to the central government. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the build-up to independence, Ugandan nationalism was not able to transcend tribal nationalism and these presaged problems in the future.
Also British colonial rule in Uganda had been generally speaking ‘mild’ with no major grievances to unite and bring all Ugandans together across traditional tribal barriers against the British. Whereas this might have been a binding force in a number of African states it was lacking in the Ugandan entity.133 Moreover, the traditionally independent economic subsistence nature of Ugandan communities made for minimal inter-ethnic interaction which also worked against the formation of a common identity. Hence the unity created in the wake of the British departure was not strong enough to bind Ugandans together. Following the departure of the British in 1962, former traditional divisions along tribal lines re-emerged.
130 M. Semakula-Kiwanuka, Nationality and Nationalism in Africa: The Ugandan Case, in The Canadian Journal of African Affairs, Vol.4, No2 (1970):229-247 131 M. Semakula-Kiwanuka, Nationality and Nationalism in Africa: The Ugandan Case, in The Canadian Journal of African Affairs, Vol.4, No2 (1970):229-247 132 J. Kiwanuka, Uganda; The Dilemma of Nationhood, p.253 133 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence, p.29; S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.37
35 As a consequence of the absence of a strong bond as Uganda moved towards independence, different manifestations of regional nationalism swept through the entire country and sentiments around tribal identities intensified. Particular ethnic groups viewed the achievement of independence as a means to safeguard their traditional structures and secure regional interests as opposed to national ones.134 This extreme regionalism was exhibited in the Kingdom of Buganda which during this period over-focused on its regional independence as Buganda’s sense of regional nationalism intensified as had been encouraged by the British in the period leading to independence.
Outspoken sentiments of regional nationalism in Buganda posed a threat to the non- Baganda ethnic groups and led to what became anti-Buganda ‘nationalism’.135 Such divisions undermined the call for national unity in the late 1950s and were a precursor to future political instability.
2.2 THE 1953 DEPORTATION OF THE KABAKA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PATH
In 1952, Uganda received a new British Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, whose administration was significant in the political development of the country.136 Cohen’s governorship witnessed two important issues that had a great bearing on both the road to independence and the kind of constitution Uganda was to have. These were constitutional reforms in the Kingdom of Buganda and the deportation of Kabaka Muteesa II in 1953.
It was under the governorship of Cohen that the constitutional path began to be mapped and his political and constitutional reforms greatly transformed Uganda.137 As soon as Cohen settled in, he immediately made it clear that he wanted to develop Uganda as an African state as opposed to a white-dominated one as had been the case in neighbouring Kenya. To begin with, he changed the colonial structure with the aim of rebalancing the uneven distribution of power between Uganda’s different ethnic
134 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.12 135 Onyago- Odongo, Why Uganda Independent Constitution Failed, p.31 136 G.W. Kanyiehemba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.27 137 R.C. Pratt, Nationalism in Uganda, in Political Studies, Vol.9, p.160; G. Engholm, Political Parties and Uganda’s Independence, in Transition, Vol.3, pp.15-17
36 groups. This he did by subjecting all levels of local administration and the national Legislative Council (Legeco) to function as local government authorities.138 As a consequence, Ugandans under Cohen’s governorship felt freer and began taking a more active interest in the machinery and operation of central government. It was around this time that trade unions and newspapers came into being in Uganda. His arrival also coincided with the emergence of political parties which he encouraged to operate.139 The prospect of having all Ugandans moving towards independence on equal footing looked brighter during the governorship of Cohen.
Another of Cohen’s objectives was to form an independent Uganda that would be a unitary state but intense Buganda regionalism threatened this.140 To achieve the objective of a united Uganda, it was imperative for Cohen to overcome the Kingdom of Buganda’s obstacle of strong regional nationalism and he embarked upon constitutional development and reform in the kingdom aimed at making it part of the entire Uganda as the country moved towards independence. Cohen was quite aware that governance in the kingdom was largely in the hands of the ruling oligarchy at the helm of Buganda’s political hierarchy also known as the Mengo Establishment. On 17 March 1953, the Governor reached an understanding with Kabaka Muteesa II under a memorandum known as Constitutional Development and Reform in Buganda.141
In terms of the memorandum, in order to bring about efficiency in the operations of the kingdom’s affairs and improved service delivery, the king (Kabaka) would increase the number of senior officials in the Buganda government. The composition of Buganda’s legislative assembly also referred to as the greater Lukiiko was to change with the increase in the number of elected members to 60. There would be three representatives from each county (ssaza). One of these three would be a person of either substantial educational standing or prominence in trade and agriculture elected by a full ssaza council. The other two were to be elected at a lower level of the parish (muluka) through an electoral college.142 Regarding financial management there was to be devolution of financial and administrative responsibilities to the twenty ssaza
138 Gingyera-Pinchwa , Apollo Milton and His Times, p.19 139 ENA, GEA/U/02/1953/29, Administrative changes under Governor Cohen,1952- 1956 140 J. Tumusiime, Uganda 30 Years 1962 – 1992, p.23 141 ENA, GEA/U/02/1953/29, Memorandum of Constitutional Development and Reform in Buganda 142 ENA, GEA/U/02/1953/29, Memorandum of Constitutional Development and Reform in Buganda, Composition of the Great Lukiiko
37 councils that comprised the kingdom. In essence, both the Buganda Lukiiko and senior members at Mengo, the seat of the Buganda’s government, were to surrender some of their financial powers and administrative responsibilities to the lower levels of administration.143 These measures were all intended to lure the Baganda to the movement for a united independent Uganda.
The protectorate government furthermore agreed to transfer certain departmental services to Buganda’s control. In the education sector this was the management of primary and junior secondary schools and in the health sector, the management of rural hospitals, the dispensaries and sub-dispensaries, first aid posts and rural health services of Bombo, Mityana and Mubende.144 Similarly the agricultural field services, the improvement of farming methods and soil conservation, animal health and livestock breeding and disease control were all transferred to Buganda’s control as the protectorate government took on a merely supervisory role.145
Two significant issues emerged from these constitutional developments and reforms in the Kingdom of Buganda. Although the transfer of these services to Buganda enhanced its semi-autonomous status within the protectorate, these measures had been designed to appease the Baganda royal conservatives and encourage them to become part of an entire Uganda. As a trade-off, the Kingdom of Buganda committed itself to continue being a province and a component of the protectorate and ultimately the unitary independent state.146 Buganda’s acceptance of their participation in a united Uganda eased the road to independence. Also, through the attempts made to broaden the ordinary Baganda participation in governance through democratic reforms, the powers of the Mengo Establishment that had bled the isolationist agenda had been checked. This appeared to guarantee a smooth transfer to independence.
Unfortunately, no sooner had this understanding been reached than the issue of the East African Federation re-surfaced. For a long time the British had sought to bring the three East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania into a single
143 ENA, GEA/U/02/1953/29, Memorandum of Constitutional Development and Reform in Buganda, Local Government in Buganda; Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.34 144 ‘ Mengo ye’nevunyizibwa ku e’byenjigirizza n’ebwobulaamu’ , Matalisi, 23 March 1953, pp.1-3 145 ‘ Mengo ye’nevunyizibwa ku e’byenjigirizza n’ebwobulaamu’ , Matalisi, 23 March 1953, pp.1-3 146 S.R. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, p.151
38 federation.147 However, from the outset the Kingdom of Buganda had not been interested in proposals for a Federation of East Africa for fear that whites in Kenya would dominate them.148 Kenya, which was to be part of the federation, had been a settlers’ colony with whites dominating both the political and economic life of the Kenyans.
This was the third time that the idea of the formation of the East African Federation had been tabled. It had been first floated in 1910 and then again in the 1920s.149 Whereas Kabaka Muteesa II bitterly opposed the idea, Cohen favoured it and the issue brought the two men to loggerheads and a bitter exchange of correspondence between them ensued.150 Kabaka Muteesa II demanded more solid assurances against the Kingdom of Buganda ever being included in any federation of East Africa. He had also managed in a rare incidence; convinced his other three fellow kings within the protectorate but outside to Buganda to oppose the Federation in unison. Y. Winy IV the King of Bunyoro, E. Muteesa II, the King of Buganda, G.K. Rukidi, the King of Toro, and C, Gasyonga the King of Ankole, on 10 October 1953 wrote to Governor Cohen expressing their stand in regard to the federation question. They also requested him to convey the same message to Her Majesty the Queen of England; a matter as illustrated by the following excerpt;
“We the undersigned, being the rulers of the agreement states in this protectorate bring to your Excellency’s notice the subject, which we feel is imperative and of the virtual far reaching importance to the interests of the communities which we jointly and severally have the honor to represent, namely the federation of the East African Territories: Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda.
Your Excellency, this subject has from time to time come up from high Government levels. The most recent statement being that made by the secretary of state for the colonies on the 30 June 1953 which did not by any means dismiss the project beyond future probability. Our grave concern and objection in this connection cannot be strongly over emphasized.
147 MAK, AR/BUG/4/18, Amadda g’Omutanda, Souvenir booklet, 1961 148 MAK, AR/BUG/4/18, Amadda g’Omutanda, Souvenir booklet, 1961 149 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.38 150 ENA, C515, Muteesa II’s File, Official Correspondences with Governor Cohen 1952-1956
39 In the light forgoing therefore we urged to present to Her majesty’s Government our strong convictions that every avenue should be explored to ease our minds to set at rest the apprehensions which now beset us.”151
Muteesa II’s bringing together of all the kings within the protectorate was no mean achievement on his part. However, this was to bring enmity of Governor Cohen and worsen the working relations between the two.
The Kingdom went further in 1953 to request the British Governor Cohen to transfer Buganda affairs from the colonial office to the foreign office and also demanded a timeframe for Buganda’s separate independence. Kabaka Muteesa II based the request for the transfer of Buganda’s affairs to the foreign office on the strength that according to the 1900 Buganda Agreement and all other agreements prior to it signed between the British and the kingdom, Buganda had been referred to as a protected state. Furthermore, these agreements had been ratified by the foreign office and not the colonial office.152 However, both requests were turned down by the Governor.153
The significant implication of transferring Buganda’s affairs from the colonial office to the foreign office was that the Kingdom of Buganda would henceforth deal directly with the British Colonial Secretary in London, without necessarily going through the Colonial Governor in Kampala. Governor Cohen’s reply indicated that Kabaka Muteesa II’s request had been based on a misunderstanding. He informed him that the foreign office dealt only with independent countries outside the British Commonwealth.154
Further correspondence and meetings between the Governor and Kabaka Muteesa II were fruitless. On 27 November 1953 Cohen wrote to Muteesa II requesting him to make an understanding to the Governor that he will not make any statement opposing the decisions undertaken by the Her Majesty’s government in relation to the protectorate. Also that Muteesa II will not by word or deed encourage other persons to oppose these decisions, and that he will inform publically at the opening of the Buganda Lukiiko’s next sitting that whatever decisions of Her Majesty’s government
151 ENA, C515, Muteesa II’s File, Deposition of His Highness the Kabaka of Buganda 152 S.R. Karugire, A political History of Uganda, p.152 153 P. Mutibwa, The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics, p.19 154 ENA, C515, Muteesa II’s File, Official Correspondences with Governor
40 must be accepted.155 In addition, the Governor further reminded Muteesa II of his obligations which the the two reached upon in March 1953 when the Kabaka promised to positively co-operate in the future progress of Buganda as an integral part of the Uganda protectorate. These conditions put on Muteesa II were rejected. In his reply to the Governor Muteesa II in his letter of 28 November 2015 stated as follows;
“I and my ministers have the honor to refer to our interview with you at Government House Entebbe, yesterday morning when a document marked “SECRET” was presented to us with what was a demand for my signature.
You very kindly agreed to give us some time for due consideration of the document. After such consideration it appears impossible that I can put my signature to any such document with out of all consideration with my Great Lukiko. When I put to my signature to the document in question I should be nullifying my whole position with my people as their kabaka and acting contrary to the democratic principles which are supposed to motivate Her majesty’s Government.
Your Excellency I am sending a telegram to the secretary of state through your Excellency setting out my position, which I please request you forward with all expedition.”156
This led Cohen to warn Kabaka Muteesa II that if he did not agree with the formation of the East African federation he would be dethroned and on 30 November 1953 Cohen lived up his warning when he withdrew his recognition of Kabaka Muteesa II on the grounds that the king had refused to cooperate with the British Government, and deported him to England.157
It is possible that, in exiling the Kabaka, the Colonial Secretary and Governor Cohen had thought that the Baganda would easily replace him as, at the time of his deportation, Kabaka Muteesa II was not been a very popular king in Buganda. Indeed on the 22 December 1953, the Colonial Secretary announced that Kabaka Muteesa II would never be allowed to return to Buganda.158 Unfortunately, what the British administrators had failed to take into account was that in Buganda the kingship is regarded as sacrosanct; the king is the outward and visible sign of the Baganda’s history and sense of nationhood and he has an indefinable though powerful mystique.
155 ENA, C515, Muteesa II’s File, Official Correspondences with Governor 156 ENA, C515, Muteesa II’s File, Official Correspondences with Governor 157 ‘Kabaka alli mubuwanguse e’Bungerenza’, Dobozi lya Buganda, 20 December 1954, p.1 158 ‘Kabaka siwakudda’ Uganda Empya, 3 January 1954, pp.1-2
41 The Baganda attach a great deal of devotion and loyalty both to the kingship (kabakaship) and the person holding the office. Thus, besides making him an instant hero in the eyes of the Baganda, Muteesa II’s forced departure set off a storm of protest and Cohen’s actions were condemned throughout the kingdom of Buganda. The deportation provoked an intense and insular nationalism among the Baganda because by violating the the very foundation of their polity and culture it was deeply insulting to them. Demands for the abolition of the national Legeco, the recognition of Luganda as the second national language besides English and the recognition of the precedence of the Kabaka over everyone in Uganda other than the Governor all intensified.159 Thus, other than solving Buganda’s regionalism, the deportation of the Kabaka made the Baganda more inward-looking thereby making the road to independence as a united country harder.
Also Cohen’s deportation of Kabaka Muteesa II received condemnation countrywide. The Uganda National Congress (UNC), led by I.K. Musaazi, a Muganda, and the only existing political party at the time, strongly opposed the exile of the Kabaka. Later I.K Musaazi, the party president worked hard to bring back Kabaka Muteesa II from exile.160 Ben Kiwanuka, also a Muganda, who later became the leader of the Democratic Party (DP) at its formation celebrations, was among other nationalists who condemned the act of deporting Kabaka Muteesa II. Kiwanuka, although always seen to have been an archenemy of the Mengo Establishment referred to the deportation as a blatant show of British force, arrogance and pride which would never gain any lasting achievement. He stated that what were required were tolerance, mutual understanding and at times tact and patience:
“The people of Britain should clearly understand that we have been wronged and our whole country slighted by the arbitrary removal of our beloved ruler; and unless their leaders change their minds and reinstate Muteesa II on the throne of Buganda, they are helping to darken our future to a degree beyond human imagination”.161
The persistent Buganda resistance and hostility to Cohen’s plans made Buganda ungovernable for two years.162 During this period Cohen changed his position and
159 S.R. Karugire, A political History of Uganda, p.154 160 ENA, REl /2913, Uganda National Congress, political activities 1954-1960 161 Governor Okuwangagussa Kabaka’ Dobozi lya Buganda, 12 January 1954 pp.1-3. 162 J. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda the First 50 Years, p15
42 wanted Kabaka Muteesa II to return. Consequently, protracted exploratory talks presided over by Sir Keith Hancock, the previous governor, were held between the Baganda and the British on the possible return of the Kabaka.
In early 1955, the Buganda Lukiiko also sent a delegation to London for similar talks around the return of Kabaka Muteesa II.163 On 7 October 1955, following a period of two years in exile, Kabaka Muteesa II returned to his kingdom. His return was accompanied by the signing on 18 October of an agreement in which Governor Cohen secured the trade-off of Kabaka Muteesa II’s agreement to not oppose independence for a united country.164
In terms of the constitution-making process that followed, the return of Kabaka Muteesa II was a resounding victory for the Baganda. The 1955 agreement largely freed Buganda from colonial control and further enhanced its special position in the protectorate and complicated the integration of the Kingdom of Buganda into a unified Uganda. The kingdom was left to enjoy a considerable degree of independence which had been initially provided for in the 1900 agreement and had now been further ratified by the 1955 agreement.165 This privileged position greatly strengthened Buganda’s request for a federal status during the later London conferences in 1961. Indeed the agreement acted as basis for future constitutional negotiations between Buganda and the rest of the protectorate.
However, again due to Buganda’s aloofness, the kingdom failed to exploit the opportunity provided by Muteesa II’s deportation and nationwide support for his return to provide national leadership. Kabaka Muteesa II’s deportation had united the nation against the British with many nationalists demanding his unconditional return. Unfortunately, upon his return the leadership at Mengo, instead of portraying it as a national achievement chose to portray it as a purely Buganda’s. They went to an extent of accusing some nationalist leaders of having contributed little to the Kabaka’s
163 AR/BUG/17/2, Buganda, Daily Records of Events, 1953-55 164 ‘Dyabadde sanyu jjelele e’ Entebbe’ Uganda Empya, 19 October 1955, pp.1-3; ‘Omutanda yanyanilizddwa mu sanyu’ , Ebiffa Mu Buganda, 20 October 1955, pp.1-2 ; MAK, AR/BUG/4/18, Amadda g’Omutanda, Souvenir booklet, 1961; S.R. Karugire, A political History of Uganda, p.157 165 ‘ Ebikkulu ebili mu e’Ddanganno lya Namirembe’ Emmambya Essazze, 31 October 1955, pp.1-3; A. Mazrui, Privilege and Protest as Integrative Factors: The Case of Buganda’s Status in Uganda, in Protest and Power in Black Africa, p.1074
43 return.166 Such acts further isolated the Kingdom of Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate at this critical time as the nation moved towards independence.
2.3 THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS ALTERNATIVE POWER CENTRES TO THE MENGO ESTABLISHMENT
With the prospect of gaining independence, a sudden proliferation of new political parties emerged both within and outside the Kingdom of Buganda. The British had anticipated that the process of decolonization would last for thirty years. But, due to popular demand and international pressure, the move towards independence developed momentum to the extent that there was limited time to establish and develop democratic rules and institutions.167 When the demand for African political participation became more pronounced the British realised that their preferred system of indirect rule through the traditional administrative structures could not be integrated with popular participation. As a result they embarked upon administrative and institutional reforms that were to give birth to the political parties.168 This was despite the fact that the British colonial administrators before Governor Cohen had been reluctant to allow political parties, arguing that multiparty politics would breed sectarianism, regionalism and instability.169 Hence the first political parties were only established in the early 1950s. The formation of these parties however, reflected two contradictory yet related factors at play: continued Buganda political dominance in the protectorate and the anti-Buganda feelings of the other ethnic groups.
The first political party to be formed in Uganda was the Uganda National Congress (UNC) established on 2 March 1952 with I.K. Musaazi as its president, A.K. Mayanja as secretary-general and Jolly Kiwanuka as chairman. All three leaders were Baganda. However, it is worth noting that its membership cut across ethnic and religious lines to include prominent men such as Dr B.N. Kunnuka and George Magezi
166 ‘Mengo eloppedde Kabaka abamulyamu Olukkwe’, Ebiffa Mu Buganda, 7 November 1955, p.1; MAK,AR/BUG/4/15, The return of King His Highness Muteesa II, Correspondences 1955-1961 167 C. Johannessen , The Restoration of kingship in Uganda: A comparative study of Buganda and Ankole.p.4 168 T.V sathyamurthy , The Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986, p.297 169 J. Mugaju, Uganda’s Age of Reforms: A Critical Overview , p.15
44 from the west, Yokosafati Engur, Oala, and Otema Allimadi from the north and Charles Onyu from West Nile.170
In 1954, another Buganda-led political party, the Democratic Party (DP) was formed. The Democratic Party had little to distinguish itself from the Uganda National Congress but its formation stemmed from fear of supposed communist elements in the Uganda National Congress and the desire to end domination of the politics of Uganda by Anglicans in general and the Mengo clique in particular.171 Frightened by communist tendencies in the Uganda National Congress, the Catholic Church leaders approached their Anglican counterparts with the proposal to form a united Christian front against the perceived threats that were also a concern for the British agents. The Catholics were incensed at the Anglican (Protestant) rejection of their proposal on the basis that Eridadi Mulira, a trusted Muganda Protestant, had already formed the Progressive Party (PP) to protect Protestant interests against the communist threats. Against this background the Catholic Church leaders encouraged some leading Catholics to form their own party as they could not trust Mulira to take care of their interests.172 Thus the Democratic Party was exclusively Roman Catholic in origin, inspiration and membership, and at first it would appear to be the natural opposition to the existing largely Protestant-dominated parties.173 Its leadership however, was also dominated by Baganda although at the same time it had a nationalist outlook and its membership reflected a number of ethnic groups, mainly from the south.
As stated above, the fundamental difference between the Uganda National Congress and the Democratic Party was that the latter was Catholic-dominated in contrast to the Anglican-dominated Uganda National Congress. The other, smaller parties formed thereafter included the United Congress Party (UCP) formed in July of 1957 by among others Muwazi and Lubogo and the Uganda National Movement (UNM). The leadership and membership of these parties followed a similar trend: they were all led and dominated by the Baganda.174
170 ENA, REL/29A, Political Parties, the Uganda National Congress 171 G. Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation, p.236 172 Onyango-Odongo, A Political History of Uganda, p.26 173 Onyango-Odongo, A Political History of Uganda, p.27 174 ENA, Box no 29, Collections on political parties, formation of pre-Independence parties
45 From the outset the Kingdom of Buganda rejected party politics within the Kingdom. The conservative royal supporters at Mengo feared that the new political leaders would undermine the traditional authority of the Kabaka and the chiefs. They believed that the leaders of these parties would overthrow the 1900 Buganda Agreement signed between the British and the Christian chiefs that had ensured their prestige and honour.175 Hence, from 1956 to 1958 these conservative leaders at Mengo made every effort to stifle the growth of political parties in Buganda as they saw their leaders as enemies of the kingdom. E.M.K. Mulira, the President of the Progressive Party was charged with insulting the Kabaka Muteesa II and was not allowed to attend the Buganda Lukiiko. Matayo Mugwanya, the leader of the Democratic Party, was also removed from his seat in the Lukiiko. Similarly, Jolly Joe Kiwanuka, the Chairman of the Uganda National Congress was arraigned on the trumped-up charge of plotting to kill the Kabaka.176 Attempts were also made to ultimately outlaw political parties in the kingdom with clan leaders’ protesting at the Governor’s meeting of party leaders and issued a statement condemning any Muganda who joined a political party, arguing that political parties were usurping the Lukiiko’s powers as the voice of the Kingdom of Buganda.177
In spite of this opposition, the formation of these political parties demonstrated the pattern of continued Buganda domination as the country was moving towards independence. Also, despite the fact that the Kingdom of Buganda had for long generated resentment throughout Uganda, Buganda’s leadership of the first national political parties was generally accepted, as manifested in the leadership and membership of both the Uganda National Congress and the Democratic Party. However, even with this apparent acceptance of Baganda as leaders of the independence struggle, the leadership at Mengo seemed disinterested and their failure to provide acceptable leadership led to the formation of other national political parties that were anti-Buganda.
175 Ssemwanga Kivumbi, SSekabaka Eyeerabirwa, p.97 176 ENA, REL/29A, Uganda National congress, political intimidation of party leaders, Open later to the great Lukiiko by I K Musazi, 23 January 1959 177 MAK, BUG/6/12, Matters relating to political party activities in Buganda,1955-1960
46 The Uganda People’s Union (UPU) became the first non-Baganda led political party.178 Although in a real sense the Uganda People’s Union could not easily be categorized as a political party as it had no existence at all outside the walls of Parliament, its strength lay in the fact that all its founder members had been respected leaders in their regions.179 The party was composed of members of the Legeco outside the Kingdom of Buganda; these included G. Magezi from the west, W.W. Nadiope from Busoga and C. Obwangor from the Teso.180 Its objective was specifically to fight Buganda’s domination and separatist tendencies. Later another significant anti-Buganda political party, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) was formed in 1960 as a result of a merger of splits from the Uganda National Congress and the Uganda Peoples Union.181 Like the Uganda National Congress and the Democratic Party, the Uganda People’s Congress was nationalist and composed of several tribal groups, although largely from the north and specifically dominated by the Acholi and Langi.182 These ethnic groups felt that they had been marginalized in the colonial era and hence had to struggle for recognition. The Uganda People’s Congress, like the Uganda People’s Union, harboured anti-Bugandan sentiments and its main political platform was thus opposition to the hegemony of the Kingdom of Buganda.
The formation of anti-Buganda parties was significant for two reasons. First, they were a clear testimony that non-Baganda ethnic groups in the protectorate needed both representation and political cooperation against the dominant kingdom of Buganda. They were determined to ensure that Buganda’s privileges would not continue in independent Uganda. Also, the formation of these parties itself was a protest against Buganda’s superiority.183 This attitude of suspicion and hostility of the rest of Uganda towards the Baganda, however, could hardly be relied upon as a sound basis for national unity; indeed it was a prelude to political instability.184
178 ENA, REL/32, The Uganda Peoples Union, Leadership and Organisation structure 179 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.42 180 ENA, REL/32, The Uganda Peoples Union, Leadership and Organisation structure 181 ENA, REL/5/10928 Uganda People’s Congress, the Formation of Uganda People’s Congress; P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.16 182 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.26 183 A. Mazuri, Privilege and Protest as Integrative Factors: The Case of Buganda’s Status in Uganda, in Protest and Power in Black Africa, p.1082 184 G. Glenworth and I. Hancock, Obote and Amin; Change and Continuity in Modern Ugandan Politics, in African Affairs, Vol. 72, pp.237-255
47 Though the pre-independence political parties were intended to be the main vehicles through which independence was to be achieved by uniting all Ugandans against Buganda’s domination of the protectorate; they largely failed in these respects. Uganda’s low levels of urbanisation and industrialisation had weakened formalised and urban-based forms of political organisation such as trade unions and professional associations whose aspirations would cut across local issues. In the end party politics was dominated by local issues, ethnic divisions, and religious differences. As a result progress towards independence was slow. In their internal organization, the parties generally had neither a clear ideology nor strong structures in place. Consequently, party politics of the last ten years to independence was dominated by local issues, ethnic divisions, and religious differences. Moreover the parties’ leadership lacked charisma and in many cases the parties were more concerned with local caucuses rather than a strong national executive who would try to branch out to other districts. Also most of the parties were organized on a part-time basis. The parties therefore became a reflection of the divisions that characterized the nationalist movement in Uganda and also a reflection of strong loyalty to local institutions that now had translated into political behaviour largely based on linguistic, socio-cultural and economic identities and interests.185
The 1953 deportation to England of Kabaka Muteesa II of Buganda by the British Governor, illustrates how parties had become inward-looking. Despite the fact that party politics had been resented by the Mengo Establishment, the Uganda National Congress under the leadership of Musaazi, a muganda, devoted all its energies to having Kabaka Muteesa II reinstated, at the expense of addressing other hard hitting issues that concerned the rest of the protectorate. Also, the Uganda National Congress leaders, because they feared provoking the Baganda who were vociferous in their insistence that no commoner should ever be above the king, never declared their position on who the leaders of post-independent Uganda should be and the type of government Uganda should adopt.186 This had the effect that members of the party who were not Baganda now viewed the Uganda National Congress as being driven by Buganda’s interests.
185 D. Mudoola, Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Uganda, p.25 186 Onyango-Odongo, A Political History of Uganda, p.32
48 Thus, though the lack of focus on national level by political parties can partly be explained by the emphasis of the colonial administration on regionalism, the failure of political parties to bring about integrative politics as the country moved towards independence indicates that national unity was still distant, and this threatened Uganda’s political stability in the post-colonial era.
2.4 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF BUGANDA’S REGIONAL NATIONALISM
The reasons for Buganda’s regional nationalism were varied but its emergence was one manifestation of the long-standing tradition of local nationalism in Uganda that had been encouraged during the colonial era. Its 500 year history as an independent kingdom made possible the semi-autonomous status accorded to it during the colonial era. At the dawn of independence, traditional Buganda institutions were almost all intact and the kingdom saw no reason to identify itself with the rest of Uganda as a unified nation.
The economic and political power at Mengo was concentrated in a few families that created a wealthy and powerful ruling elite popularly known as the Mengo Establishment.187 They were convinced of their superiority and directed the political and economic agenda of Buganda. The degree of autonomy and political dominance they had been accustomed to in the colonial era also contributed to a situation where many ordinary Baganda developed an attitude of complacent arrogance towards the other peoples of Uganda.188 However, the emergence of alternative power centres did mean a shift of power from Mengo, the regional capital of Buganda, to the national level. This greatly alarmed the conservative leaders in the Kingdom represented by the Mengo Establishment.189
Their fears were expressed in Kingdom’s rejection of the national legislative council (Legeco) during its entire life from 1958 to 1961. Governor Cohen, as part of his political reforms designed to create unity as Uganda moved towards independence,
187 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II II II During His Final Exile 1966-1969, p.16 188 T.V. Sathyamurthy, Uganda Politics: Convoluted Movement from Tribe to Nation, in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42 (1972), pp.2122-2128 189 ‘ Abatakka tebakanyizza na Governor’, Matalisi, 12 May 1958, p.1
49 expanded the Legeco to include African representation but the Mengo Establishment flatly refused to send any representatives to the Legeco up to eve of independence.190 In October 1958, the first direct elections of African representatives to the Legeco were held in 10 constituencies of Uganda. These elections, supervised by C.P.S. Allen, registered a turn up of 534,326 out of the registered 626,046.191 As a result of the 1958 elections, the composition of the national legislative council was as follows: the government side had 32 members while the representative side had 30 members that included the five seats for Buganda that remained vacant.192 Thus the British’s desire to have all regions represented in the Legeco suffered a setback as the Kingdom of Buganda stood its ground. The Buganda government and its Lukiiko argued that; firstly there were no provisions in the 1900 agreement for the Kingdom of Buganda to participate in the Legeco elections. Secondly, that the Kabaka, who was the only link between the Buganda Lukiiko and the protectorate government had advised people in Buganda not to register for elections.193
The Kingdom of Buganda remained steadfast in its regionalism. In 1960, the Mengo Establishment announced their intention to boycott the second direct elections to the Legeco scheduled to take place in March 1961 on the eve of independence.194 The kingdom’s announcement that it would boycott the registration of voters which had been scheduled to begin in rural Buganda on 22 August 1960 in preparation for the 1961 elections greatly alarmed the British authorities and the British Secretary of State invited Kabaka Muteesa II and the constitutional committee of the Buganda Lukiiko to London for talks. The Kabaka and his delegation pressed for an immediate undertaking that Uganda should become a federal state or at least that Buganda’s future relationship with the rest of the country should be a federal one. However, nothing came out of the protracted London talks held in early August 1960. Despite the numerous safeguards highlighted by the Secretary of State that already gave Buganda a degree of autonomy in its internal affairs, the Buganda government refused to rescind its decision not to participate in the elections without specific and concrete safeguarding of Buganda’s independence. The Secretary of State felt unable to give
190 ENA, S7740, Buganda and Legislative Council, Buganda’s Participation in Legeco Elections 191 ENA, S7740, Buganda and Legislative Council, Buganda’s Participation in Legeco Elections 192 ENA, S7740, Buganda and Legislative Council, Buganda’s Participation in Legeco Elections 193 ENA, S10116/4, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buganda Secession 194 LCA, A/L/135, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.25
50 the undertaking they asked for in advance of the investigations of the Relationships Commission and he refused to postpone the registration of voters which in fact started on the scheduled date while Kabaka Muteesa II was still in London.195
On 1 January 1961 the Buganda Lukiiko declared the independence of Kingdom of Buganda. This being so near to the forthcoming elections, Kiwanuka, the Democratic Party leader came out to openly to oppose the unilateral declaration of independence.196 He referred to the actions of the Buganda Lukiiko as treason. The British ignored the declaration and as a result it was of no significance. This then forced the Buganda Lukiiko to come up with another statement, on 6 February 1961. In a special meeting they unanimously passed a resolution that barred the Baganda from participating in the forthcoming national legislative council elections.197 This did not stop the British from going ahead to organize the first nation-wide Legislative Council elections in March 1961 but the Baganda heeded the boycott call of the Mengo Establishment as demonstrated by their low participation in the elections: a mere 35,000 out of an estimated total of 1,000,000 potential voters (thus approximately 3.5%) in the kingdom, mainly Catholic supporters of the Democratic Party, registered and voted.198 In contrast, in the rest of the protectorate voter registration had been very successful: of the estimated 1,800,000 who were eligible voters, I, 300,000 registered - about three quarters of the country’s population.199 It is possible that the British expected this turnout in the rest of the protectorate and that this contributed to holding the elections in spite of the Kingdom of Buganda’s boycott.
There were thus two striking features of the 1961 elections that indicated the direction in which post-independence Uganda was heading. First, the high turnout of voters in the rest of the protectorate which meant that the March elections were largely a success, showed how warmly the rest of the protectorate welcomed the independence. Second, however, the low turnout in Buganda was a striking testimony
195 LCA, A/L/135, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.25 196 MAK, AR/BUG/5/8, Elections of the Legislative Council, the Registration of Voters 1961 197 ‘Olukiiko lwawezze abanganda okwetaba mu kulonda’, 198 MAK, AR/BUG/5/8, Elections of the Legislative Council, the Registration of Voters 1961 199 MAK, AR/BUG/5/8, Elections of the Legislative Council, the Registration of Voters 1961, LCA, A/L/135, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.26
51 to the scepticism with which Buganda considered constitutional development and its fear of being dominated by the rest of Uganda.
As a result of the Buganda boycott, the Democratic Party which did take part in the elections won 19 seats in Buganda although they clearly did not represent Buganda’s voice, with some of delegates being elected with as few as 17 votes in constituencies that had well over 100,000 who would have been eligible.200 The Democratic Party was adamant, however, about its victory in Buganda in spite of the low turnout; it argued that even if there had been no interference from the Mengo Establishment, their candidates would still have been returned (albeit with many more votes).201 Nationally, the Democratic Party won 43 seats and the Uganda People’s Congress 37, which meant that the Democratic Party emerged victorious and formed Uganda’s first independent government. The Democratic Party leader, Benedict Kiwanuka, became Minister without Portfolio and Leader of Government Business in the Uganda Legislative Council.202 And on 1 March 1962, Uganda became self-governing with Ben Kiwanuka as first Chief Minister.
Buganda’s aloofness was further exhibited in the kingdom’s refusal to participate in the national celebrations of self-government. For many of the ruling clique at Mengo, the Democratic Party’s participation in the elections was an act of treason: the Democratic Party had exploited the call of the Buganda Lukiiko (of which its leader Kiwanuka was a member) for a boycott in order to win and for this reason the Mengo Establishment did not join the national celebrations of Kiwanuka’s victory, not even the official ceremony held on 1 March 1962 in honour of Kiwanuka that had national attendance. Instead, they arranged an alternative occasion at which Kabaka Muteesa II inaugurated the kingdom’s own High Court, and on the evening when the Uganda government held a celebratory dinner, the Mengo Establishment preferred to hold its own reception.203 On 7 April 1961, the Buganda Lukiiko in its special sitting suspended the members who had defied it and participated in the legislative council elections.
200 MAK, AR/BUG/5/8, Elections of the Legislative Council, the Registration of Voters 1961 201 LCA, A/L/135, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.26 202 LCA, A/L/135, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.26 203 MAK, AR/BUG, Buganda control: General Records, the Official Opening of the Buganda High Court
52 These included B. Kiwanuka, the Democratic Party’s leader and now the Chief Minister and A.K. Mayanja, the Minister of Education.204
It is clear from the above that Buganda’s rejection of participation in the Legeco handicapped the work of the legislature and also held back the political development of the entire protectorate. The Kingdom of Buganda in no way supported a united Uganda; on the contrary its massive boycott of the 1961 elections, which almost 95% of the Baganda heeded, was a clear indication of its political power. Consequently, the British had to find another way to incorporate Buganda into the mainstream of Uganda’s political development and this meant conceding to some of its demands and reaffirming what the rest of the country had long seen as special treatment of Buganda with the result that anti-Buganda feelings grew. Incorporating Buganda at all costs was bound to backfire and continued Buganda’s aloofness and the British concessions to it had dire consequences in the future when Obote would exploit the anti-Buganda feelings.
2.5 THE FORMATION OF UGANDA PEOPLES’ CONGRESS/ KABAKA YEKKA ALLIANCE
The birth of Kabaka Yekka (KY) on 10 June 1961 resulted from the Mengo establishment’s alarm at their diminished power because of the Democratic Party victory.205 The Democratic Party gained prominence when its Leader Ben Kiwanuka became the first Ugandan Chief Minister following its victory in the 1961 general elections to the Legeco which Buganda had largely boycotted.206 Kiwanuka’s surprise victory amidst Buganda’s call for an election boycott awakened the Baganda conservative royalists to the need for a political movement to safeguard Buganda’s interests in a rapidly changing political climate. The Kabaka Yekka launch followed mass demonstrations for several days in Kampala against the Democratic Party leaders. Kabaka Yekka vowed not to recognize a ‘rebel’ government led by a Catholic commoner (Ben Kiwanuka) who had set himself above the Kabaka.207 The movement acquired mass support from all levels in Baganda and quickly spread throughout
204 J. Kiwanuka, Uganda, The Dilemma of Nationhood, p.266 205 ENA, C 10316, The 1961 Legeco Elections, Kabaka Yekka Election and Intimidations 206 ‘Obubaka bwa Ben okuwangula bunkya jja’ Munno, 12 May 1961, p.1 207 ‘Aba Yekka baganyi omukoppi okukulembela’ Emmambya Essazze, 12 June 1961, p.1; T.V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986, p.396
53 Buganda to the extent that by the end of 1961 it had become a rallying point for all opposition against the Democratic Party in Buganda.208 At a press conference held on 9 November 1961 in the Katwe suburb of Kampala, Masembe Kabali, one of the leaders of Kabaka Yekka stated; “that although the aim of the Kabaka Yekka was to unite all the people, all those who did not resign their membership of the Democratic Party would not be admitted to the movement.”209
Unfortunately for the Baganda conservative royalists, Kabaka Yekka was Buganda’s party and because of anti-Buganda feeling, not supported in other regions of Uganda. It was when the Mengo establishment realised this, that in October 1961, as final constitutional talks were being held in London that an alliance between the Uganda People’s Congress and Kabaka Yekka came into existence. Prior to this, an alliance had never been considered because these parties had divergent views and political goals on almost every conceivable subject in addition to their different ethnic bases.210 The Uganda People’s Congress had been formed with one of its aims being to counter Buganda’s nationalism. Indeed it had even acted as a vehicle to rally opposition to Buganda’s hegemony before independence.211 On the other hand, Kabaka Yekka had been formed largely to protect Buganda’s privileged status in Uganda.212 The Uganda People’s Congress–Kabaka Yekka alliance, therefore, was a compromise aimed at neutralizing the Democratic Party’s popularity outside Buganda and maintaining Mengo’s dominance in Uganda’s political structures.213
The interplay of a number of issues had compelled the two parties to come together: in the first instance, the ascendancy to the political limelight of Ben Kiwanuka, a Catholic and leader of the Democratic Party. His victory in the 1961 elections had sent shock waves both through the departing Anglican British officialdom and the Protestant Mengo Establishment which ruled Buganda. For them the prospect of a Catholic becoming the first head of government of an independent Uganda meant that
208 I.R Hancock, Patriotism and Neo-Traditionalism in Buganda: The Kabaka Yekka (The King Alone) Movement 1961-62, in The Journal of African History, Vol. 11 No3 pp.419-434 209 ENA, PP/3/67, Kabaka Yekka File, The Formation of Kabaka Yekka Movement 210 H. Dinwiddy, The Search for Unity in Uganda: Early Days to 1966, in Africa Affairs, Vol.80, No 321, pp.501-511 211 ‘Dr. Obote on Uganda People’s Congress Support’, Uganda Argus, October 3 1966, p.5 212 ENA, PP/3/67, Kabaka Yekka File, The Formation of Kabaka Yekka Movement; G.W. Kanyeheimba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.66 213 J. Tumusiime, Uganda 30 Years 1962 – 1992, p.29
54 political forces had to be redirected to favour Protestants.214 It was against this background that the British authorities encouraged the reconciliation of Kabaka Muteesa II and Milton Obote, both of whom were Anglicans, with a view to defeating the Catholic Ben Kiwanuka. The intense hatred of the Catholics by the Mengo Establishment thus led them into an alliance with the Anglican-led Uganda People’s Congress. Grace Ibingira a distant relative of the King (Omugabe) of Ankole, one of the four kingdoms in Uganda, a Uganda People’s Congress member and a friend to Kabaka Muteesa II, together with Balaki Kirya another Uganda People’s Member from eastern Uganda were charged with the task of bringing together Obote and Muteesa II.215
Kiwanuka’s arrogance also worked against the Democratic Party. His disregard of the Mengo Establishment in his participation in the Buganda-boycotted 1961 elections and his visit to the sensitive Mubende district in the west of the country which contained the two disputed (between the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda) counties of Buyaga and Bugaangaizi incensed the Baganda. It was against this background that the Mengo Establishment was determined to get rid of both of Kiwanuka and the Democratic Party which he had led to power.
The Buganda Lukiiko was fearful of Kiwanuka’s emergence as the leader of a political party and now as the first Chief Minister. It was now time to oust Democratic Party but the newly formed Kabaka Yekka had no organizational structure or official policy.216 It was an amorphous collection of personal factions united only by their non-Catholic affiliations. Its only strength stemmed from the overwhelming love of the Kabaka of the Baganda but this alone was not enough to oust the Democratic Party from power, thus the need for an alliance with another willing partner. Obote, the Uganda People’s Congress leader wanted to unseat Ben Kiwanuka, so the Uganda People’s Congress and Kabaka Yekka united.
It was Obote’s realization that the Baganda of the 1960s never looked anywhere except to the Kabaka as a symbol of their tribe and unity that led him to accept that he had to align with Kabaka Yekka. Also, the Baganda looked towards Mengo, the seat
214 Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Constitution Failed, p.38 215 J. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda the First 50 Years, p.23 216 T.V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986, p.422
55 of the Kabaka’s government, rather than to Kampala, the seat of the national government. Therefore, Obote would have to bring the Baganda to the rest of Uganda and he sought to negotiate with the Kingdom of Buganda.217 The Uganda People’s Congress/Kabaka Yekka alliance greatly undermined the political stability of post- colonial Uganda. Both party had no any illusions about the permanence of the alliance as Obote and Muteesa II had different agendas.218 The Uganda People’s Congress’s sole aim was to use the alliance to get to power by depriving the Democratic Party of support in Buganda while Mengo Establishment’s aim was to use the alliance to retain the status and privileges they had enjoyed during the colonial rule.219 Obote, the Uganda People’s Congress leader, regarded the alliance as a temporary measure; this is why he appeared to accept the demands of the Mengo Establishment and to incorporate them into the constitution, especially the issue of indirect elections to the National Assembly that had been vehemently opposed by Kiwanuka of the Democratic Party.
Obote and Muteesa II reconciled superficially but they continued to harbour ill feelings against each other. Nothing best illustrates Obote’s attitude towards the alliance as a statement he made immediately after Kabaka Yekka joining the Uganda People’s Congress.
“Kabaka Muteesa II of Buganda and his blundering advisers have surrendered to us today, bringing with them the mass of misguided Baganda. These are now committed to vindicate every one of our political actions in order to uphold their false honour and prestige among their ignorant supporters. This has immensely lessened our problems and brought our final victory over the forces of backwardness within sight. When time becomes propitious, the moribund Kabakaship will be gallantly liquidated and the opposition Democratic Party will be muzzled and made defunct. Thereafter, the socialist programme will be boldly introduced and systematically implemented without any fear or impediment from any quarter”.220
217 ENA, REL/31, Uganda People’s Congress National Headquarters, Records on the UGANDA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS/KY Alliance 218 LCA, A/L/237, Church and State, Political Leadership and Political Maturity , a Pastoral Letter to Uganda’s Political Leaders by Most Rev Arch-Bishop Joseph Kiwanuka, October 1961 219 J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda; A Modern History, p.67; G. Glenworth and I. Hancock Obote and Amin: Continuity and Change in Modern Uganda Politics, in African Affairs Vol.72, No 288, pp.237-255 220 ENA, AAL/con/G.7 /f 13, Leader of Opposition; a Letter Written by Milton Obote to Moscow, Acknowledging Receipt of Funds Sent to Uganda People’s Congress through Cairo, October 1961
56 On the other hand, Muteesa II, in one of his remarks relating to how the alliance was formed, stated that;
“Not long after the election (1961), two mutual friends, Abu Mayanja and Daudi Ocheng brought Obote to Bamunanika (Palace) as someone I should meet. He was very friendly, almost obsequious. We talked and for a few weeks he sent me letters ... an alliance between Buganda and UPC was suggested, with innumerable promises of respect for our position after independence. He would step down and I should choose who ever I wished to be prime minister. Though I did not particularly like him for he is not a particularly likeable man, I agreed to the alliance without misgivings. He understood our fear for the position of Buganda; we shared his hope for a united, prosperous and free Uganda. Kintu (the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Buganda) was alone in opposing this new friendship. Obote had one time said that he meant to crush the Baganda, and Kintu would not forgive or trust him. We waved it aside as an impetuous remark made to please crowds. Now we thought he had reformed, and was the obvious and best ally against Kiwanuka and the hated Democratic Party.” 221
In light of the above, the alliance has been regarded in some circles as the most dishonest political venture that Ugandan politicians have ever undertaken.222 Even within the Uganda People’s Congress, the democratically minded members regarded the alliance as a sell out for the sake of power.223 The Mengo Establishment’s intense hatred of Benedicto Kiwanuka effectively prevented them from seeing Obote’s intention to become a dominant political force and that he was exploiting them. It was only the Katikiro Michael Kintu, who saw clearly that the Uganda People’s Congress/Kabaka Yekka (KY) alliance concealed a social time-bomb. He asserted that, “sooner or later the alliance [will] explode and finish off Buganda kingdom and its glory once and for all.”224 His counsel was never heeded but as soon as the Democratic Party threat was over, cracks began to emerge in the alliance.225 It was clear that the Uganda’s first post-colonial government rested on a fragile coalition in which neither party trusted the other nor expected the coalition to last.
221 MAK, AR/BUG/4/6, Kabaka Yekka, Reports and Proposals for Kabaka Yekka/UPC Alliance 222 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Muteesa II During His Final Exile,1966-1969, p.93 223 ‘Aba Uganda People’s Congress abbamu tebakkanyizza na Obote ku byo Omukaggo’, Uganda Empya, 11 June 1961, p.1; A. Kirunda, Uganda the Crisis of Confidence, p.23 224 ENA, PP/3/67 KabakaYekka file, Katiikiro Kintu’s comments on the KY/UPC alliance 225 Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Constitution Failed, p.39
57 2.6 THE LEGACIES OF THE 1961 AND 1962 LONDON CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES
The two London constitutional conferences held at Lancaster House from 18 September to 9 October 1961 and at Marlborough House from 12 June to 30 June 1962 marked the final stage of the grappling process around the drafting of the independence constitution. The constitutional path which had begun gaining shape during the governorship of Cohen continued to be British-led and the governors who succeeded Cohen further speeded up the process. The major steps after Cohen’s reforms had included the setting up in 1959 of a constitutional committee known as the Wild Committee and later two commissions, the Munster Commission and the Molson Commission.
The findings of the above commissions acted as the basis for the holding of the two London conferences that produced Uganda’s final constitution.
2.6.1 The 1959 Wild Committee Report
Sir Fredrick Crawford the then British Governor of Uganda, on 4 February 1959 appointed a Constitutional Committee on self-government for Uganda.226 The committee was headed by John V. Wild and was a racially inclusive one for the time with three Europeans (J.V. Wild, A.A. Baerlein and K. Ingram), two representatives of the Asian community (H.K. Jaffer and C.K. Patel) and 11 Africans (T.B. Bazarrabusa, C.B. Katiti, Erisa Kironde, B.K. Kirya, G.B.K. Magezi, B.J. Mukasa, W.W.K. Nadiope, A.M. Obote, C.J. Obwangor, G. Oda and Frank K. Kalimuzo, who was the Secretary to the Committee).227 Buganda, in line with its stand on boycotting any constitutional advancement that did not guarantee of its autonomous status, refused to appoint representatives to the committee or give evidence.228
In view of the fact that the country was moving steadily towards independence, the committee’s terms of reference were; first, to consider and recommend to the Governor the form of direct elections on a common roll for representative members of the Legislative Council to be introduced in 1961. Secondly, to recommend the number
226 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.42 227 MAK, AR/BUG/5/3, The Wild Committee Report,1959, p.2; Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Constitution Failed, p.39 228 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.43
58 of representative seats to be filled under the common roll; thirdly, to consider the allocation of representation among the different areas of the Protectorate, and finally, to determine the method of ensuring that there would be adequate representation on the Legislative Council for non-Africans.229
Buganda refused to participate in this process, claiming that it should be treated separately from the rest of the protectorate.230 To this end, the Kabaka in the same year (1959) wrote a letter to the Queen of England renewing the demand for independence for Buganda alone.231 Buganda, in addition to rejecting participation in the Legeco, had now rejected the constitution-making process and wanted to follow its own constitutional path separately from the rest of the protectorate.
On 5 December 1959 the Committee handed its report to the Governor. The Wild Committee report rejected indirect elections to the Legeco as had been advocated by the Kingdom of Buganda. It instead recommended direct elections in all parts of Uganda and that no option of indirect elections should be offered.232 The publication of the wild report firstly, crystallized the conflict between the aims of the political parties and the Buganda government. Whereas on one hand the political parties had demanded the swiftest practicable advance towards self-government for Uganda as one country, on the other Buganda government pressed for a federation with special safeguards for the kingdom’s position. Also its strong recommendation on the nature of elections to be held was definitely rejected by the Kingdom of Buganda and this slowed the pace of political development towards independence. Much as the British would have liked to proceed without the kingdom of Buganda, they were too mindful of Buganda’s large population and strategic importance to just ignore it. Moreover, it had noted within its report that Uganda is an artificial unit containing within its boards a variety of different tribes with different languages and customs.233 Hence, they tried to find a way to bring the kingdom on board.
229 MAK, AR/BUG/5/3, The Wild Committee Report,1959, p. 32; G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.34 230 ENA, S10116/4, Ministry of foreign affairs, Buganda Secession 231 LCA, A/L/135, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.22 232 MAK, AR/BUG/5/3, The Wild Committee Report,1959, p.14; G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.34 233 ENA, REL/1, The 1959 Wild Report, p.34
59 2.6.2 The Munster Commission
The 1961 Constitutional Conference in London, which preceded the 1962 Independence Constitution, was premised on the framework provided by the Munster Commission’s Report. The Earl of Munster had, earlier in 1960, been appointed chairman of a committee entrusted to make recommendations about the form of government most suitable for Uganda.234 In relation to the Kingdom of Buganda, it ruled out secession but recommended that Buganda’s relationship to the rest of the protectorate be a federal one and that three other kingdoms and the territory of Busoga should have a semi-federal status. This was a contradiction of its recommendation of a single democratic state with a strong central government: the proposed federal status of Buganda would make it a state within a state.
Whereas the Commission also recommended direct elections to the Buganda Lukiiko, it accepted the idea of indirect elections of Buganda’s representatives to the National Assembly by the Buganda Lukiiko.235 In addition, the Committee recommended that Buganda should be given a guarantee that the Ugandan laws affecting the kingship (kabakaship) and Buganda should be of no effect unless agreed to by the Kabaka and the Lukiiko.236 With such guarantees, it became evident that Buganda in the post- colonial era would receive even more preferential treatment than in the colonial era.
With regard to boundary disputes and specifically the matter of the lost counties, the Commission noted that the majority of the people in these territories were Banyoro. For instance, out of the total population 22,000 inhabitants in Bugangaizi, 16,600 were Banyoro constituting 75%. The Baganda were 4,200 which was 19%, and the rest of other nationalities were 1,200 or 5.5%. While Buyaga the other disputed territory out of the total population of 41,300, the Banyoro made up 33,000 which was a percentage population of slightly over 79%. The Baganda were 2,300 translating into 5.5% and the rest of the nationalities making up 6,000 an equivalent of 14%.237 The Commission also considered the Kingdom of Bunyoro’s claim to be a political one. It therefore recommended a referendum in the two territories before the protectorate came to an
234 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.34 235 ENA, REL/1, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, pp.45-47 236 ENA, REL/1, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.165 237 ENA, File 001 Lost counties, Population figures, March 1961
60 end.238 By suggesting a referendum on the matter of the lost counties, Lord Munster had simply postponed a problem that his commission should have solved.
2.6.3 The Molson Commission
The Molson Commission was a follow-up to the findings of the Munster Commission. It had three members: Lord Molson as chair, assisted by Lord Listowel and Lord Ward of Witley, appointed on 20 December 1960. It commenced its work in January 1961 when the commissioners visited Uganda.239 The Commission’s main aim was to inquire into and report on the long-standing boundary dispute between the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro.
This territorial dispute and in particular the issue of the ‘lost counties’ had continued to be a major problem. So tense was the issue that in one of many the Banyoro to British clearly outlined what the agggrived Banyoro wanted; “We would wish to make it clear that we are not requesting the king (Kabaka) of Buganda to appoint Banyoro chiefs and judges, to administer the lost counties nor do we ask the commission (Lord Molson) to recommend measures of redress, we only want to return us to mother country Bunyoro, to our rightful ruler the king (Omukama) of Bunyoro.”240 As the country moved towards independence, it had now become more alarming due to the fact that the kingdom of Buganda which so vehemently opposed to any surrender of any of her territory to the kingdom of Bunyoro had now become a partner with the Uganda Peoples’ congress and was destinated to be part of Uganda’s first post- colonial government. As a result, this was derailing progress to an accepted new constitutional order.
The Lord Molson committee report was published at the beginning of May 1962. The Commission identified six contested counties namely Bugangaizi, Buyaga, Buwekula, Bugerere, Buruli, and Bulemezi. It however recommended that only Buyaga and Bugangaizi out of the six counties be returned to the Kingdom of Bunyoro and that the other four should remain part of the kingdom of Buganda. The Commission also
238 ENA, REL/1, The Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, pp.89-91 239 S.R. Karugire, A political History of Uganda, p.175 240 ENA, REL/8/121 The Lost Counties, Memorandum submitted by the Mubende Banyoro Committee to the Commission of Privy Councillors appointed to investigate the issue of Bunyoro’s Lost Counties.
61 recommended that Mubende Town, another contested area, be put under the administration of the Central Government.241
In addition, the Molson Commission rejected the idea of the referendum over the counties of Bugangaizi and Buyaga as had been proposed by the earlier Munster Commission. They argued that it would be impossible to bind the Ugandan Government to settling the problem of the ‘lost counties’ after the British had left. According to Lord Molson, “It was quite beyond reason to expect a young Uganda Government to handle a problem of this kind which was, in any case, sixty years ago the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, and about which nothing has been done ever since”.242 The commissioners were thus anxious to have the issue settled before the date of independence.
The recommendations of the Molson Commission were accepted by the British government without any reservations. Likewise, the King (Omukama) of Bunyoro, though disappointed at not all six of the counties being returned, accepted Lord Molson’s recommendations.243 At this point it seemed as though one of the major obstacles to a smooth constitutional path had been settled but the Kingdom of Buganda, the other party in the dispute, rejected Lord Molson’s recommendations outright. On 4 May 1962 the Buganda Lukiiko declared that Buganda would fight to keep its counties and opposed any move to transfer Buyaga and Bugangaizzi to the Kingdom of Bunyoro. In addition Mr Mpanga, the legal advisor to Buganda’s government in press conference of 18 May 1962 expressed the kingdom of Buganda’s rejection of any talks on the issue of the lost counties. He stated that; “negotiations on the transfer of territory are a closed door. What was done 70 years ago cannot be undone”.244
Furthermore the Buganda government made its objections known to the British Colonial Secretary in the following telegram:
“The Lukiiko is indignant and profoundly disturbed by the fact that privy councillors have recommended transfer of Buganda territory to Bunyoro
241 MAK, AR/BUG/6/10, Molson’s Committee Report, p.24 242 MAK, AR/BUG/6/10, Molson’s Committee Report, Buganda’s Position, p.16 243 ENA, 001, Lost Counties, Letter to the Governor by the Katikiro of Bunyoro Kingdom Mr. Z.H. Kwebiha, 13 April 1962 244 MAK, AR/BUG/6/10, Molson’s Committee Report, Buganda’s Position, p.16
62 although this did not come within their terms of reference and despite their findings of fact that allegations of discrimination contained in Omukama’s petition and grievance referred to in the Munster’s report were unfounded. Lukiiko was further astonished to hear of prime minister’s secret letter to commissioners going back on express terms of reference which had been agreed between her majesty’s government and Kabaka. Lukiiko condemned these un-agreed dealings and resolves to reaffirming earlier resolutions that in no circumstances will Buganda agree to transfer of her territory and Kabaka’s subjects to Bunyoro. Lukiiko invites her majesty’s government to give fullest backing to this rejection in as much as to accept commissioner recommendations would constitute worst of injustice to Buganda and breach of faith thereby precipitating the very situation we seek to avoid.”245
This was followed by Kabaka Muteesa II’s letter to the Colonial Secretary in London also expressing strong objection to the transfer of Buganda’s territory to the Kingdom of Bunyoro. This was in reference to the recommended transfer of the lost counties. Kabaka Muteesa II urged that the Molson Report had not captured what he had agreed with the Colonial Secretary in October 1960.246 Buganda’s rejection of Lord Molson’s recommendations meant the issue of territorial disputes between Buganda and Bunyoro was un-settled at the time of the 1961 London conference.
2.6.4 The Conference Deliberations
The Constitutional Conference marked the last stage of Uganda’s move to independence. The delegates covered a wide spectrum from both Britain and Uganda. The first conference in April 1961 had 55 delegates, 22 advisers and a secretariat of eight officials. The Kingdom of Buganda alone had six delegates and six advisers and the Uganda government seven delegates and two advisers.247 The second Constitutional Conference of June 1962 was attended in all by 49 delegates, 28 advisers and a team of six members of the Secretariat.248
Among the British dignitaries that attended the conference were the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Ian Macleod MP; the Minister of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Perth; and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Hugh Fraser MP. They were accompanied by the official British government delegates headed by Sir Hilton Poynton. Others were F.D. Webber, W.B.L. Monson, and Sir John Martin,
245 MAK, AR/BUG/6/10, Molson’s Committee Report, Buganda’s Position, p.16 246 MAK, AR/BUG/6/10, Molson’s Committee Report, Buganda’s Position, p.16 247 J.Kiwanuka, Uganda, The Dilemma of Nationhood, p.276 248 J. Kiwanuka, Uganda, The Dilemma of Nationhood, p.294
63 and. Messrs J.M. Kisch, A.R. Rushford, M.G. Smith and M.G. de Winton who served as advisers to the delegates.249
From the Uganda Protectorate, the delegates to the Lancaster Conference were selected from different parts of the country and represented different stakeholders. The delegation from the Uganda government was headed by Sir Frederick Crawford, the Governor while the 11 member delegation from the Kingdom of Buganda was led by the Katikiiro M. Kintu.250 The rest of the Protectorate was divided into 13 District Councils and each Council was represented by one delegate and one adviser. The only two existing Urban Authorities, Kampala and Jinja, were represented by Mr C. Lewis and Mr K. Evans; Mr. G.F. Brooks served as their adviser.251 The two formidable political parties at that time the Uganda People’s Congress and the Democratic Party sent delegations too. The Democratic Party’s twelve man delegation was headed by R.A. Mbonye Byombi, MP for Bufumbira County.252 The Uganda People’s Congress was represented by eleven delegates headed by A.M. Obote, MP for Lango who was also the leader of the opposition.253
The main aim of these two constitutional conferences was to come up with a new constitutional order which would be acceptable to all Ugandans. However, the two irreconcilable issues remained: the future relationship of Buganda with the rest of the protectorate and the dispute between the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro about the ‘lost counties’.254
The relationship of Buganda with other parts of the country was a key issue and had evolved from a number of factors as described above. The first was that throughout the colonial era the dominant role played by Buganda had been felt in every region and there was a feeling in the Protectorate that this domination should not be left to
249 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, Her Majesty’s Government Representatives to the Conference 250 ENA, C1016 8/1, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, District Council Representatives 251 ENA C 1016 8/1, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, District Council Representatives 252 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, Political Parties’ Representatives to the Conference 253 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, Political Parties’ Representatives to the Conference 254 J. Kiwanuka, Uganda, The Dilemma of Nationhood, p. 265
64 continue in the post-colonial era. Secondly, by the time of the constitutional conferences the kingdom of Buganda had achieved, courtesy of the 1955 Namirembe Agreement, an autonomous regional status.255 This was a source of envy to the rest of the Protectorate. Buganda’s delegation insisted that the Colonial Secretary gives them assurance that Buganda’s autonomy would not be endangered when the Britain transferred power to an independent central government.
At the London conferences the matter of the lost counties emerged as one of the most contentious and the resolution was not satisfactory. The lost counties, which had been a problem since 1897, suddenly returned to ‘cause trouble’.256 The delegates from both the kingdoms Bunyoro and Buganda, which contested the areas, had declared that they would not accept the Independence Constitution if the lost counties were to be ruled by the other of the two kingdoms.
To support their entrenched position, the Banyoro highlighted that unlike the Baganda who because of the bursaries and scholarships extended to them by Buganda’s government to receive higher education, the Banyoro had been in the last fifty years neglected. The few Banyoro that ever got such scholarships had been those that had renounced their ethnic loyality. The Banyoro had also been irked by the fact that their children continued being taught in a foreign language (Luganda) in the very first years of their education. 257 To the Banyoro this had been viewed as suppression of their mother tongue. Moreover, their local language had been banned by the Baganda sub colonial administrators in Courts, offices and churches. They were also grieved that forty seven Banyoro chiefs had been replaced by chiefs brought over from Buganda. Therefore, the Kingdom of Bunyoro wanted the lost counties reinstated and insisted that the issue be resolved before independence while the Kingdom of Buganda wanted the counties to remain part of Buganda and regarded the issue as non-negotiable. The high emotions on both sides over this issue nearly led to the collapse of the conference.258
255 ENA, C1067/2, The Namirembe Agreement 1955, p.3 256 E. Mutesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.23 257 ENA, Memorandum submitted by the Mubende Banyoro Committee to the Commission of Privy Councilors Appointed To Investigate The Issue Of Bunyoro’s Lost Counties. 258 ENA, File 001 Lost Counties, Administration of the Lost Counties, Debates and Resolutions at the London Constitutional Conference; ‘Boundaries cannot be altered by Rukarato’ Uganda Argus, 18 October 1961, p.1
65 Lord Molson had called for the solving of the issue of the lost counties before independence.259 The Conference, however, ignored this recommendation and instead opted to postpone its resolution for two years after independence, recommending that it then be subjected to a referendum, a suggestion that had been ejected by the Molson Committee. Although this problem had been created by the British at the early stages of their rule in Uganda, they adroitly avoided making a decision about it. Thus, the failure of the Constitutional Conference to solve the issue of the lost counties before the country attained independence became a contributor to its future political instability.
The other contentious issue that threatened to derail the conference was the call for fresh elections before independence because of the boycott by Buganda of the 1961 election. The legitimacy of a Democratic Party government leading the country to independence on the basis of a minority vote was questioned. In the 1961 polls, the Uganda People’s Congress polled a total of 488,334 votes against the Democratic Party’s 407,416 in the popular vote but the Democratic Party was victorious because it had won 20 of the 21 seats in Buganda on the basis of participation by fewer than 4% of eligible voters.260 Despite strong opposition from the Democratic Party, consensus was eventually achieved and all delegates were in agreement about a fresh election. The contention now turned, however, to when to hold the elections. The Democratic Party proposed after independence, but the Uganda People’s Congress and Buganda pressed for elections before independence and it was agreed that they would be held in April 1962.
The decision to hold fresh elections was significant in this period of Uganda’s political development. The Uganda People’s Congress and Kabaka Yekka, who had now become allies, were given the opportunity to reverse the Democratic Party victory which they bitterly detested and the prospect of new elections before attainment of independence solidified the relationship between the Uganda People’s Congress and the Kabaka Yekka and led to the formation of a coalition government of the two at
259 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, the Lost Counties 260 K. Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography, pp.68-69
66 independence. This coalition between two partners with divergent political views on almost everything was to prove disastrous for the post-colonial era.
The Conference came to another resolution: the form the elections would take in Buganda. The Wild Committee had recommended direct elections throughout the Protectorate yet Buganda insisted on having indirect elections through its Lukiiko. On this issue, the Kingdom was given the opportunity to determine the form elections would take in its area of jurisdiction. This was against bitter opposition from Kiwanuka, the Democratic Party leader and Uganda’s Chief Minister who vehemently argued:
“In the past blood has been shed for the principle of one man one vote. In Uganda that principle has been implemented. Now it is proposed to disenfranchise the people of Buganda … there is no legal or moral obligation on the Secretary of State to support this proposal, which is in direct conflict with the principle of democracy. The chairman has spoken of compromise but I would like to ask: on what do we compromise now? Speaking on behalf of the progressive elements in Buganda, I say it would be a great disappointment if anything less than full democratic elections were agreed to. Speaking for the elected government of Uganda, I must say that I and my party would not, and no African nationalist could, support the present proposals.”261
Despite Kiwanuka’s opposition, Obote, the leader of opposition, as expected, given the deal he had made with Kabaka Yekka, defended the proposal of indirect elections for Buganda. In his reply to Kiwanuka’s remarks, he stated,
“I think the proposals were formulated in light of the prevailing situation in Buganda. It was vital that the ‘people of Buganda’ should recognise the central government. In my view it was better that this be achieved through indirect elections than that the existing situation be allowed to continue”.262
The controversy of indirect elections in Buganda divided the delegates with Kiwanuka apparently having the upper hand. He had succeeded in winning over many delegates including those from the other three Kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Tooro. Against the background of the likely victory of Kiwanuka over the issue of indirect elections in Buganda, the British leaders of Church of England intervened by appealing to the religious emotions of the delegates to dissuade them from supporting the Catholic
261 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, the conduct of Elections 262 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, the conduct of Elections
67 Kiwanuka.263 Lord Fisher of Lambeth, though not a delegate to the Conference, also wrote to Kiwanuka opposing the stand he had taken.
“The proper rights of the kingdoms especially Buganda owing to its size and importance must be recognised; and so far as the internal affairs of the Baganda are concerned, they must have their wishes respected provided that they do not interfere unjustifiably with a federal government of Uganda. I profoundly believe that the matter before us is not merely a political matter, though it is one; it is fundamentally a religious problem and a Christian problem Mixture of common sense and Charity”264
On Saturday, 30 September 1961, the Colonial Secretary formally concluded the debate on the mode of elections Buganda would have when he informed the plenary session of the conference of his agreement with Buganda. The Colonial Secreatary was emphatic in his message that he was to implement what has been agreed upon with Buganda in relation to elections. According to the agreed terms Buganda would register on the national roll which would be used for the direct elections of the Lukiiko. The new Lukiiko would then decide how Buganda should be represented in the National Assembly, for which general elections would be held soon after the protectorate achieved self-government. Thus the Colonial Secretary had decided against Ben Kiwanuka, Uganda’s Chief Minister and his DP government in favour of Buganda. Kiwanuka was furious and was quick to respond in which he stated that;
“It would be a grave mistake to include these proposals in the constitution in the face of wide-spread disagreement. If however Her Majesty’s government proposed to incorporate the proposals in an Order – in-Council without reference to what was said in the Conference, then there seems to be little purpose in going on with the conference”265
The above decision of the Colonial Secretary prompted the DP delegation, led by its leader Ben Kiwanuka to temporarily to walk out of the conference session of 2 October 1961.This issue symbolised what had come to characterise the London conference - delegates being preoccupied with what rewards they would get at the expense of their opponents in an independent Uganda
263 Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Independence Constitution Failed, p.8 264 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, Letter to Ben Kiwanuka by Lord Fisher, 2 October 1961 265Records of the 11th Meeting of the Uganda Constitutional Conference held in London,1961,p6
68 Thus, as part of the conference deliberations and in an attempt to solve the issue of relationship between the kingdom of Buganda and the other regions, a new agreement was reached upon between Buganda and the British. This was the 1961 Buganda Agreement also referred to as the Buganda Constitution. It was published on 23 October 1961, as part of the new Ugandan 1962 constitution that was being formulated as a basis for governance in independent Uganda. On 25 October 1961 the agreement was presented to the Buganda Lukiiko for discussion. Almost everyone who debated on the agreement was in approval of its adaptation. Its main provision was Buganda’s federal relationship with the rest of the country, particularly the division of powers between Buganda and the central government.266 E.M. Kalule the speaker to the Buganda Lukiiko was full praise of what had been achieved and in his statement he declared that: “those who thought the kingdom of Buganda would fall in to the hands of another power when the British left Uganda were wrong. It is us who will run the central government by joining it.”267 Sempa another outspoken royal conservative erroneously informed the Buganda Lukiiko that after Uganda attaining independence Buganda’s relationship with the rest of Uganda would be explained to the members of the United Nations who would arbitrate between the kingdom of Buganda and the central government in cases of disputes. Apparently, Sempa seemed unaware that after Uganda would have achieved independence and henceforth Buganda’s own affairs would be considered ‘an internal matter’ of Uganda in which the United Nations could not properly interfere.
Among those who were upbeat about what Buganda had achieved at the conference was Muteesa who on his return from the conference had this to say to the Baganda;
“The talks were successfully for us. With Obote’s support we obtained a great deal of what we wanted and look forward to receive the rest later. We are to have our own High Court and Bodyguard. The lukiiko will decide whether to hold direct elections for the legeco, which is to be called the National Assembly or whether to nominate members; Benedicto Kiwanuka was disturbed by this. Though we had started by asking for an army we were contented with the police. We returned with high hopes....all we have to do now is to win the election, tie up a few loose ends and Independence would finally be won on a satisfactory basis...” 268
266 ENA, C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Schedule 1 267 ‘Spikka w’olukiiko attangaziza ebili mu Ndaganno Empya’ Matalisi, 28 October 1961, pp1-3 268E Mutesa Desecration of my Kingdom Constable& Co ltd London 1967pp161-162
69 However, such was the euphoria that surrounded the Buganda’s constitution and with the assurances given, it appeared that everyone was satisfied hence its adaptation by the Buganda Lukiiko on 26 October 1961 with a unanimous vote of 77 for and none against. There were only two abstentions. On 31 October 1961 the new agreement was signed, amid great rejoicings by the Governor of Uganda, Sir Frederick Crawford, and Edward Muteesa II the Kabaka of Buganda.269
The Conference agreed to let Buganda determine the nature of the elections in the Kingdom and as expected, it opted for indirect elections. With this concession, the Conference had given the neo-traditionalists in Mengo the opportunity to continue dominating affairs in Buganda through the Buganda block vote of 24 electoral constituencies in the national assembly. This was a setback since the interests of the Mengo leaders were not those of a united Uganda or even those of the average Muganda. The Conference did, however, succeed in making Buganda part of a united Uganda and also came up with an acceptable Constitution.
2.7 THE 1962 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION: A PRELUDE TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY
The 1962 Constitution was the culmination of a long and treacherous constitutional path. It was a negotiated document that aimed at forging a unified Ugandan state and was intended to deal with the political problems that existed and intensified in the decade to independence. These included Buganda’s secession plans, its acceptance of being an integral part of united Uganda, Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress which in the past had taken an anti-Buganda stance being brought to the point of aligning with Kabaka Yekka, and the British desire not to leave power in the hands a Catholic Ben Kiwanuka.270 All of this meant, however, that the country now possessed a compromised and weak constitution that could not effectively guarantee the political stability of the new nation.
Under the main provisions of the 1962 Independence Constitution, Uganda was divided into five federal states corresponding to the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole,
269 ‘Buganda enfunye constitution empya’, Omukulembeze, 2 November 1961, p.1 270 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.25
70 Bunyoro, and Toro, the territory of Busoga, and ten districts.271 Each of these federal states would have its own ruler, executive council of ministers and legislature. The ten districts that became a federal state were Acholi, Lango, West Nile, Madhi and Karamoja in the north of the country, Bugishu, Bukedi, Sebei and Teso in the East, and Kigezi in the West.
As stated above, a tedious process had resulted in a constitution with numerous shortcomings that contributed to the political problems of post-colonial Uganda. In the first instance, the 1962 Constitution failed to curb Buganda’s dominance: under Article 74 (1) and (2), Buganda’s federal powers and responsibilities were enormous.272 They were further described in detail in schedule 7 of Constitution. Part I of this schedule for instance, gave to Buganda exclusive powers to make laws over the following ten matters.
The Kabakaship
1. The powers, obligations and duties of the Kabaka 2. The status of the Kabaka’s ministers and their powers obligations and duties as such (other than those conferred by the law enacted by parliament) 3. The public service of Buganda. 4. Matters incidental to the Lukiiko and other authorities established by the Constitution of Buganda (schedule) 5. Such taxation and matters relating thereto as may be agreed between the Kabaka’s government and the government of Uganda. 6. The public debt of Buganda 7. Buganda political holidays and festivals. 8. Traditional and customary matters specified relating to Buganda. 9. Such other matters, (not being matters specified in part ii of this schedule as the national assembly may be designated as matters that are of primary domestic concern to Buganda.273
271 ENA C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Article 2; T.V Sathyamurthy, Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986, p. 416 272 ENA, C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Schedule 7, pp.10-13 273 Sechudule 1 to the 1962 Independence Constitution
71 Article 74 (3) provided that national assembly and the Buganda Lukiiko both had the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Kingdom of Buganda with respect to matters other than matters specified in schedule 7.274 However the powers of the national assembly were limited, to the effect that if the national assembly legislated on certain matters within schedule I (this schedule largely dealt with issues concerning the kingdom of Buganda) which was considered to be of special significance to Buganda’s interests then the legislation could not be enforced without the consent of the Buganda Liukiiko.275 Thus, by depriving the national assembly on encroaching upon the reserved and residual powers of the kingdom of Buganda, the 1962 constitution had made the central power weak and ineffective. This was a recipe for disaster.
In addition, though the constitution aimed at creating a united Uganda, customary law was excluded from the legislative powers of the national assembly. Issues of land ownership, education and administrative personnel were all left in the hands of regional assemblies such as the Buganda Lukiiko.276 This would leave the central government almost helpless in areas where it would have needed improvement and modernisation in an effort to bring about the spirit of nationhood. In other words, whereas the central government was mandated to effectively plan for the nation, the tools for planning were beyond its reach.
To further strengthen its federal autonomy, the 1962 Constitution in schedule 1 granted Buganda its own police, its own legislature, and its own judiciary, which had the same status as other institutions in the rest of Uganda.277 The appointment of senior members of the Kabaka’s Police Force was made on the king’s recommendations from the Buganda public service commission.
In order to enable it to implement its federal autonomy effectively, in the financial arrangements the Kingdom of Buganda was further granted independent and important sources of revenue. These included financial sources of revenue from
274 ENA, C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Schedule 1, p12; ENA, C10628/5, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, Financial Relations and Fiscal Commission; Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.83 275 G.W.Kanyiehamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda,p.85 276 Schedule I to the 1962 Independence constitution 277 ENA, C10628/7, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1962, Police Functions
72 graduated tax and entertainment tax. Buganda was also entitled to receive 50% of the annual statutory contribution from general revenue and 50% of assigned revenue from the Kingdom of Buganda. This was raised from the sale of petrol and diesel.278 In other words, in its devolution of power, the 1962 Constitution left the Kingdom of Buganda as a strong unit within Uganda with almost as the same status as it had in the colonial era.
The federal aspects of the Constitution protected certain pockets of power within the polity making them beyond the reach of the central government. For instance, there was great rigidity around amending the Constitution in any way that affected Buganda’s entrenched federal stipulations. Any change in matters such as territorial boundaries, protection of fundamental rights, the police, the interpretation of the Constitution and such others as were enumerated in Article 5 (3) 5 (4) and 5 (5) required a rigorous procedure.279 Such changes had to be backed by at least two- thirds of all members of National Assembly and also two-thirds of all the members of the Buganda Lukiiko.280 In this regard it has been argued that, by attempting to appease the separatist tendencies of the different kingdoms, particularly those of Buganda, the Constitution became a parcel of contradictions.281 It placed regional interests above national interests thereby emphasising division rather than unity.
Also, the 1962 Constitution did not clarify the matter of unitary versus federal entities. In the first place, it created a hybrid form of governance which was both federal and unitary.282 Although allowing for elements of each form seems fair, the ambiguity and attendant problems were too great a cost. The combined federal and unitary system meant that there were two categories of membership in the National Assembly: those from the Kingdom of Buganda, who were indirectly elected by its Lukiiko, and the rest of the members, elected directly by the people in their electoral areas. This meant
278 ENA, C10628/5, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1961, Financial Relations and Fiscal Commission; MAK, AR/BUG/1/8, Ministry of Finance Kabaka’s Government, Revenue Sharing; Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.83 279 ENA, C10628/3, Report of the Constitutional Conference London, 1962 , Structure & Relationships Between Central Government and the Kingdoms 280 ENA, C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Schedule 1 p32; ENA, CT(1962)55, Cabinet Memoir, Interim Report of the Commission Matters Affecting Fiscal Relationship with his Highness the Kabaka’s Government 281 H Dinwiddy, The Search for Unity in Uganda: Early Days to 1966, in African Affairs Vol.80, pp.501-518. 282 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.81
73 that the Baganda members were delegates of their Lukiiko, which would control them rather than them being representatives of the Buganda electorate, while the National Assembly was that of a unitary state. The members of the National Assembly from the Kingdom of Buganda, acting as a block vote controlled by the Mengo Establishment, often created strain for Uganda’s Prime Minister which led to him bribing them to cross over to the Uganda People’s Congress.
The functioning of the National Assembly was thus handicapped by the federal powers of Buganda as enshrined in the Constitution. About this hybrid, Kanyeihamba rightly observes that Article 73 was a potential flashpoint between the central government and the federal states, including Buganda.283 Article 73 left the Lukiiko with the supreme authority to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of Buganda.
The National Assembly also had no authority to legislate on the offices of the Kabaka of Buganda and his powers, obligations and duties. It could not determine public holidays or festivals of the federal states including Buganda. By placing regional interests above national ones and exalting regional leaders at the expense of national ones, the Independence Constitution emphasized division rather than unity and the system was bound to fail. No government, however able, could have directed the development of the country without encroaching upon the reserved and residual powers of the component states.284 State authority had been undermined through the creation of other centres of power. It was these seeds of contradiction sown in the Constitution that made the crisis of later years inevitable.
The 1962 Independence Constitution has also been criticised with regard to power distribution between both regions and offices. All the kingdom territories had wanted full federal status as granted to the Kingdom of Buganda but the Kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and the territory of Busoga were only granted semi-federal status. The Constitution provided for federal states, but only Buganda had a full federal status with more powers, rights and privileges such as a police force and a High Court.285 The other Kingdom territories lacked the independent status accorded to Buganda. They
283 G.W. Kanyeheimba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.12 284 G.W. Kanyeheimba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.12 285 ENA, C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Schedule 1, p.27
74 were given only a very short list of executive powers with all residual powers being given to the central government implying that their federalism was largely a myth under Article 75 (2).286 The rest of the country was made up of the ten districts of Acholi, Bugishu, Bukedi, Karamajong, Kigezi, Madi, Sebei, Teso, West Nile and the territory of Mbale and as per article 88 (1) they were to be governed by the centre in a unitary fashion.287 Again, by failing to redistribute power successfully among the smaller ethnic groups of Uganda, the 1962 Constitution contributed to the political problems of the young nation.
The Independence Constitution endorsed the historical disparity of treatment of Buganda and other parts of Uganda, a fact that made other areas of Uganda resent Buganda.288 Hence, the anti-Buganda sentiments of the colonial period were now extended into the post-colonial period. These were exploited by opportunist leaders to bring about the turmoil of 1966.
With regard to power distribution among offices, there was the question of who would take precedence at state functions: the Kabaka of Buganda or the Prime Minister, the executive head of government? The Kabaka of Buganda is referred to as the Ssabassaja, which literally means the head of all men and women or ‘supreme man of the land’ and thus, following Buganda’s tradition, he takes precedence over anyone in his kingdom. Most state functions would take place in the Kingdom of Buganda as Kampala, the capital city, was located in the kingdom.
In addition, Obote the Prime Minister could be said to be in the shadow of the country’s four kings, particularly the Kabaka of Buganda.289 The Kabaka’s influence under the 1962 Independence Constitution in politically crucial matters such as appointments to offices of the state, in decision-making in Buganda government, and in the general political climate in Uganda had been enhanced. In Buganda, governance was done in the name of the Kabaka who appointed his subordinates down to the lowest level of administration. As a result, his impact was so strong that it extended beyond his kingdom. The Kabaka appointed members to special responsibilities and removed
286 ENA, C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Schedule 1, P.19 287 ENA, C10736/ DGc 230 III, Independence Constitution, Schedule 1, P.23 288 A.R. Nsimbambi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, pp.32-34 289 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.119
75 them at will and appointments to the central government offices were at his complete discretion. This would clearly make Obote; the executive Prime Minister’s position an uncomfortable one.
In summary, at the start of independence, Uganda witnessed a period of tension and pressure as a result of the enormous loopholes in the 1962 Constitution. However, it can also be argued that the weaknesses of the Constitution were exaggerated by unprincipled politicians in order to reverse the balance of powers and foster turmoil in the country.
76 CHAPTER THREE
POLITICAL DISORDER FROM 1962 TO 1966: PRELUDE TO THE ATTACK ON BUGANDA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Uganda’s independence had a precarious beginning. However, at the dawn of independence Uganda appeared to have been on a sound footing unlike a number of other African countries that attained independence through armed conflicts. Uganda attained hers through peaceful means. As a result, the country had a sound socio- economic structure. The Agricultural sector was fairly prosperous and her education system was the best comparable to the other two member states of East Africa and had produced a considerably large number of educated Ugandans. All the above signalled a successful independence.
However, although that had been the case and despite the preparations that had been made by the departing British for Ugandans to embark on a successful independent unitary state, the political machinations around who would lead the first independent government compromised it. Several factions motivated by political ambitions soon began to struggle to change the constitutional order.
3.2 THE FORMATION OF THE KABAKA YEKKA-UGANDA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS COALITION GOVERNMENT
The 1962 elections for the first independent government were held in two rounds: the first in March in Buganda and the second in April for the rest of the country. In preparation for these elections, Buganda had by 23 December 1961 registered 747,656 voters. To this total, 35,996 eligible voters were added from the electoral register of those who had registered in 1960 in preparation for 1961 April elections that most Baganda had boycotted, heeding the call of the Mengo Establishment. The overall total of eligible voters in Buganda therefore rose to 783,652.
In Buganda, Kabaka Yekka (KY), in coalition with the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), had an overwhelming win in March; largely because it had an unfair advantage there over the even more organized Democratic Party. Kabaka Yekka, which was a
77 predominantly an Anglican party, was able to exploit the religious prejudices of the Mengo Establishment which opposed the predominantly Catholic Democratic Party and distributed resources unfairly and to the disadvantage of the DP in the kingdom. Ever since the signing of the 1900 Buganda Agreement, in terms of which political positions in Buganda were allocated according to religious affiliation, the Catholic and Muslim communities had been marginalised in the kingdom, and 60 years later, the dominance of the Protestant oligarchy remained unchanged.
By the late 1950s, Catholics had become the majority in Buganda and the most united and educated religious group in the kingdom yet they continued to be marginalised.290 The Mengo Establishment largely Anglican based refused to accept the changed social situation in Buganda. The Mengo Establishment had been largely created by the 1900 Buganda Agreement when it rewarded them economic power through the land donations. i.e. About a thousand chiefs chosen by no one other than the colonialists took share in the new ethos of becoming land owners.291 This created a landed class of Baganda that had hitherto been unknown in the history of the kingdom. Land in the kingdom had now become a private property of a few individuals. Moreover these had not necessarily been the most prominent in Buganda but simply because they happened to have been on the right side during the religious struggles of the last decade of the 1880s. Later their postion would be reineforced and sustained by its political domination as both the ministers and the saaza chiefs were also full members of the Lukiiko with rights to vote and approval bills. The Lukiiko would not approve any legislation that undermined their enshrined position since they controlled it. As Kasozi points out, any individual who threatened their preveliges was hounded since the Lukiiko had political and judicial powers. The Chief Justice, for example, was a cabinet minister and also a voting member of the Lukiiko.292 They were also responsible for appointing the lower subcounty and parish chiefs. In adition, their officies had no term limits nor were subjected to elections. As a result, they ruled like small kings in their areas of jurisdication.
290 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile, The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During his Final Exile 1966-1969, p.25 291 F.Musisi, Popular unrest against colonial rule; A case tudy of the 1945-1949 riots in Buganda, p.6 292 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile, The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During his Final Exile 1966-1969, p.18
78 Discrimination against Catholics took various forms but centred on them being denied political office in the Kabaka’s Government. For example, of the 20 counties in Buganda, ten were predominantly Anglican, seven Catholic and three Muslim and of the three Ministers of the Kingdom, two were Anglican and one a Catholic.293 Also of the eighty nine Lukiiko Members, fifty five percent were Anglican, the catholics who had a majority population in the kingdom did constitute thirty five per cent in the lukiiko. The Muslims made a mere six per cent.294
Also political manoeuvring by the Mengo Establishment stopped Matayo Mugwanya, a Catholic from becoming the Katikiro of Buganda.295 He and two Anglican candidates, Paulo Kavuma and Michael Kintu expressed interest in standing but the Mengo Establishment, predicting an overwhelming victory for Mugwanya, asked Kavuma to stand down, allowing Kintu to win by a majority of three of the total 86 votes cast by the members of the Lukiiko.296 Not satisfied with stopping him from becoming Katikiro, the Mengo Establishment further did not allow Mugwanya to take his seat in the Lukiiko even though he had been duly elected as a people’s representative.297
The defeat of Mugwanya led to bitterness and intensified religious identity amongst the Catholics of Buganda. Ben Kiwanuka, the leader of the Democratic Party, blamed the opportunistic and power thirsty politicians at Mengo for playing a dangerous game of dividing the people and using the name of the Kabaka to perpetuate religious conflict.298 The leaders at Mengo effectively contributed to the religious division in Buganda that weakened the internal cohesion of the kingdom. Also, they alienated the Baganda Catholics; forcing them to join in large numbers rival political organizations such as the Democratic Party. Similarly, the Mengo Establishment’s dislike of Catholics drove their Kabaka Yekka into what would be a disastrous alliance with another largely Protestant political organization, the Uganda People’s Congress. The Mengo Establishment declared that voting for the Democratic Party in Buganda was an act of disloyalty to the king. Throughout the kingdom, anyone found supporting the
293 MAK,AR/BUG/1/1, Katikiro’s Ministry, The set-up Kabaka’s Government, 1956-1966 294 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile, The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During his Final Exile 1966-1969, p.18 295 Gingyera-Pinchwa , Apollo Milton and His Times, p.25 296 Gingyera-Pinchwa , Apollo Milton and His Times, p.25 297 MAK,AR/BUG/1/1 Katikiro’s Ministry, Membership to the Lukiiko,1956-1966 298 ‘Ben attabukidde Mengo ku byo okusosola’, Munno, 23 April 1962, p.1
79 Democratic Party was often confronted with the following question “What kind of Muganda are you to allow Benedicto Kiwanuka [the leader of the Democratic Party] or any other person to ‘sit over’ the ‘Lion’, His Highness, the Kabaka of Buganda as the Democratic Party is proposing.”299 Such propaganda had a considerable impact and meant that the DP would have little success in Buganda.
The actions of the Mengo Establishment attracted the concern of Catholic leaders in the country who called for sanity to prevail. In a pastoral letter of 1961 under the theme ‘the Church and the State’, the Archbishop of Lubaga, head of the Catholic Church in Uganda, was critical of both the activities of Kabaka Yekka and the active involvement of the Kabaka in politics and warned that the throne was digging its own grave.300 The letter was read in all the Catholic churches in the country. Kabaka Muteesa II was furious at the contents of and ordered for the arrest of the Archbishop who had fortunately left the country by this time and Monsignor Joseph Sebayigga, whom the police found at Lubaga Cathedral, was arrested instead. The gap between the Catholics of Buganda and the Mengo Establishment widened, although Monsignor Sebayigga was later released and reconciliation talks held between the Buganda Government and the Catholic Church, the damage had been done.
Thus at independence, the Democratic Party and its Catholic backers were still bitter about their unjustified defeat at the polls in the 1962 pre-independence elections that determined the first leadership of an independent Uganda.301 By going up against the Catholics and Muslims in Buganda, Mengo alienated itself from a large section of the Baganda and created the resentment that would be used against them by their political opponents.
In addition to the exploitation of religious favouritism, Kabaka Yekka’s victory in March 1962 was a result of its access to vast financial resources and ability to trade on the Baganda’s emotional loyalty to the Kabaka.302 Kabaka Yekka also used the kingdom’s
299 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, 1961 Elections and Intimidations
300 LCA, A/C/237, Church and State, Political Leadership and Political Maturity, a Pastoral Letter to Uganda’s Political Leaders by Most Rev Arch-Bishop Joseph Kiwanuka, October 1961 301 LCA, A/C/237, Church and State, Political Leadership and Political Maturity, a Pastoral Letter to Uganda’s Political Leaders by Most Rev Arch-Bishop Joseph Kiwanuka, October 1961; A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problems of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During His Final Exile,1966-1969, p.44 302J. Tumusiime, Uganda 30 Years of Independence, p.30
80 government structures to intimidate its opponents. The chiefs at different levels, who were supposed to be civil servants, were used not only to campaign for Kabaka Yekka but also to intimidate voters.303 In Gomba County for example, Kamya, the Kintunzi304 openly condemned Democratic Party supporters. He said that all those who had registered and taken part in the boycotted April 1961 elections would be prosecuted by the Buganda police and sentenced to death by the High Court.305 In the preparations for the March 1962 elections in Buganda, Kamya also warned that anyone in the county who voted for the Democratic Party would be hanged.306
Similar forms of political intimidation against Democratic Party supporters occurred in the neighbouring Butambala County, many led by Kyazze, the muluka chief. In a Kabaka Yekka public meeting held on 19 January 1962 in Bulo constituency, Bumali Lugobe Magatto a candidate of Kabaka Yekka, together with Kyazze read out the names of the 34 Democratic Party voters who had registered and taken part in the boycotted 1961 elections. Elsewhere in the county, Kyazze went further to threaten Democratic Party supporters with death and also mobilised locals to kill Democratic Party supporters on 1 March 1962, the proposed date for the national Legeco elections.307
It was alleged that in Kyadondo County, Kabaka Yekka supporters raped women who supported the Democratic Party or were married to men who did. In a letter to the Governor, Mary Nkata wrote, “I wonder whether you are aware of the sad news of women being raped by the Kabaka Yekka supporters because their husbands are Democratic Party supporters”.308 In other parts of Buganda war drums were sounded as campaigns gained momentum. The chiefs mobilized the locals and called upon them to arm themselves with spears, knives and clubs and stones and attack Democratic Party candidates.309 Despite bitter protests by the DP leaders at the arbitrary arrest of their supporters in the villages, nothing was done. It was against this
303 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, 1961 Elections and Intimidations 304 A title given to the Saza Chief of Gomba 305 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, Letter to the Officer in Charge Mpigi Police Station by Sabastain B. Kibuuka, 30 November 1961 306 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, 1961 Elections and Intimidations 307 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, Letter to the Inspector General of Police by Sabastian B. Kibuuka, 23rd February 1962 308 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, Letter to the Governor by C. Mary Nkata, 13 March 1962 309 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, 1961 Elections and Intimidations
81 background that even Ben Kiwanuka, the DP President who was also Uganda’s Chief Minister with the Protectorate’s forces at his command, could not effectively intervene.
It was also in this intimidating atmosphere that the March 1962 Buganda Lukiiko elections were held. As was expected, the DP performed poorly with most of its top leadership, including Ben Kiwanuka, unable to secure seats in the Lukiiko. Ben, the party president was one of the victims.310 In the end Kabaka Yekka won 63 of 66 seats with the three secured by the DP all from Mubende, another area contested by the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro. The DP’s defeat in Buganda made who would win the national elections a foregone conclusion. Under the terms of the 1962 Independence Constitution, the Buganda Lukiiko had the mandate to appoint the 21 members of parliament who represented Buganda in the National Assembly.311 It now became obvious that the 21 member Buganda block vote would ally with Uganda People’s Congress, following the pre-independence arrangements between the two parties.
Following the March elections in Buganda, elections in the rest of the country were held seven weeks later on 25 April 1962. In this nationwide poll except for Buganda, elections took place in 59 constituencies with about one million people as registered voters. The Uganda People’s Congress won 34 seats and Democratic Party won 24.312 The Uganda People’s Congress-Kabaka Yekka alliance thus had 55 seats in the National Assembly (UPC 34 and KY 21). To this were added nine specially elected members who brought the final figure to 64.313 This was 40 more seats than the 24 that the Democratic Party had won countrywide. Thus, as a consequence of the pre- independence negotiations between the different political groupings, on 9 October 1962, Apollo Milton Obote, at the age of 36, became Uganda’s first prime minister under a coalition government between the Uganda People’s Congress and Kabaka Yekka.314
310 ‘Lwaki Ben yaggwa’ Omukulembeze, 27 March 1966, p.1 311 MAK, AR/BUG/4/1, Kabaka Yekka file, General Records 1944/65 312 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.68; E. Kabaka Muteesa II II, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.141 313 ENA, DG.C.26, Collections of the Office of the President, Formation of Government 1962 April 314 MAK, AR/BUG/4/6, Kabaka Yekka, Reports and Proposals for Kabaka Yekka/Uganda Peoples’ Congress Alliance, 1963; J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, p.227; G. Glenworth and I. Hancock, Obote and Amin: Continuity and Change in Modern Uganda Politics, pp.237-255
82 Thus, almost 100 years since the first British explorers, Speke and Grant had arrived, Uganda gained independence as a single united nation from Britain.315 On 10 October 1962, the first Session of the first National Assembly, which replaced the Legeco was held.316 These two events marked the end of 68 years of British colonial rule.
Many saw the victory of the Anglicans at the expense of the Catholic majority as an injustice resulting from pre-independence political machinations. This alienation of Catholics in the governance of the country became one the major sources of grievance in the post-colonial era and would threaten Uganda’s political stability. Also, the fact that government was now in the hands of a coalition between two parties with fundamentally different aspirations put Uganda at a shaky and false start.
3.3 KABAKA MUTEESA II BECOMES PRESIDENT OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT
For the purpose of continuity as the country attained independence, the temporary office of Governor General was created and filled by the outgoing British Governor, Sir Walter Coutts. The office was to last only a year and thereafter be replaced with one of the traditional rulers from the kingdoms as a Head of State, elected by parliament for a term of five years.317
However, in 1963 as the first independence anniversary approached the question of who would replace the Governor General nearly tore Uganda apart.318 The prospect of electing a head of state from the variety of traditional rulers such as kings and hereditary chiefs generated much resentment in the ten districts of Uganda that was not kingdoms.319 The 1962 Independence Constitution had divided Uganda’s governance structure into two categories: the kingdoms and the Chieftaincy of Busoga had federal status and were led by their traditional rulers, but the rest of the country was divided into ten constitutional districts under a unitary system of government. Under the terms of the 1962 Constitution therefore, these districts could not provide a
315 Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Constitution Failed, p.56; E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.144; J. Lonsdale, Uganda: Recent History: in Africa South of the Sahara, p.863 316 National Assembly Archives (NAA), Parliamentary Hansard, Official Report 1st Session 1962- 63, Vol. 11, p.231 317 E. Kabaka Muteesa II II, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.150 318 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.75; S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.50 319 J. Bossa, Reflections on the 1966 Political Crisis, p. 21
83 candidate for presidency. Therefore, the creation of the office of the President to replace the British Governor General now became a source of tension between the kingdoms and the ten constitutional districts. Whereas the four kingdoms warmly welcomed it, all ten constitutional districts of Uganda were opposed to the idea.
To appease the ensuing tension, the National Assembly passed the Constitutional Heads (elections) Act No. 66 of 1963 which empowered all districts in Uganda to elect constitutional heads.320 The elected constitutional heads would then have an equal chance under the Constitution of being selected for presidency as they would now enjoy the same status as kings. Elections were held for such constitutional heads in the ten districts with the following results: Yekosefati Engur as paramount chief of Lango, Phillip Angoga with the title of Laloyo in Acholi District, Mungoma as Omukhuuka of Bugishu District, Wasukulu as Isenkulu of Bukedi, John Bikangaga as Rutakirwa of Kigezi, and Chemonges as Kingoo of the Sebei District.321
With the election of constitutional heads, the conflict between the constitutional districts and kingdoms was solved. However, the conflict was now about who would be the candidate. Badru Kankungulu, an Uncle of Muteesa II, recounts how he, together with Sir George Rukidi, the King of Tooro, and Sir Charles Gashonga, the king of Ankole, met Muteesa II at his place at Mengo and suggested, unsuccessfully, that he step down as a candidate for the presidency but to no avail.
“We met in the Lubiri [palace at Mengo] as planned fortunately, Muteesa was present. The Omukama [king] of Toro casually hinted to Muteesa on what he heard, that, you are being proposed as the first president of Uganda. Don’t you think this will put you in an awkward position and is likely to jeopardize not only your position but ours as well? I would strongly feel we consolidate our kingdoms and leave the Bakopi with their politics in the central government. The Omugabe [King] of Ankole supported the Omukama [King] and so did I. Muteesa refused to disclose his mind, but the three of us realized that he was definitely eager to become President.”322
320 NAA, Parliamentary Hansard, Official Debates, 1st Session 1962-63, Vol. 17, p.165; ‘Etteka eddigujulwawo abufuzzi a’benonno lileteddwa’ Taifa Empya,12 June 1963, p.1; ‘Buli Kitundu kya Uganda kinnaletta avuganya ku bukulembezze bwe ggwanga’ Sekanyolya, 22 July 1963, p.1; S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.49 321 ‘Babano Abakulembeze abanavuganya ne Kabaka’ Ssekanyolya, 26 August 1963, pp.1-2; A.R. Nsibambi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, p.33 322 A.B.K Kasozi, The Life of Prince Badru Kakunkugulu Wasajja, p.147
84 Having failed to persuade Muteesa II to not offer him as a candidate, the three kings of Bunyoro, Tooro and Ankole and the hereditary rule of Busoga later met at Mbarara in western Uganda and selected a candidate for the office of the president. Their candidate was not Muteesa II but William Nadiope, the Kyabazinga of Busoga.323 Thus, as a result of both Muteesa II and Nadiope showing interest in becoming head of state, serious misunderstandings then developed between the Kingdom of Buganda and the Chieftainship of Busoga. In each of these regions the election of their traditional ruler to the office of the Head of State was seen as inevitable.324 Neither was willing to countenance the selection of anyone except their own ruler.325 To this regard, the Busoga district passed a resolution that their traditional ruler, Kyabazinga should be made president.326 Not to be outdone, the Buganda Lukiiko, passed a similar resolution to the effect that the Kabaka of Buganda should be elected president or Buganda would not cooperate with the central government, a significant threat, given that the seat of central government was in Buganda,.327
The conflict over the choice of candidate extended to the coalition government and nearly tore apart the Uganda Peoples’ Congress/Kabaka Yekka alliance. Due to the unrivalled superior position Buganda had enjoyed in the colonial period that had long generated resentment throughout the protectorate, the majority of the rank and file of the UPC were against the election of Kabaka Muteesa II. They also preferred William Nadiope, the Kyabazinga of Busoga and the UPC vice-president.328 Obote, as party president, seemed to be aware of this. He acknowledged that a substantial number of UPC members and supporters had not favoured its alliance to Kabaka Yekka which to him indicated the degree to which the rest of the country opposed the special position of the Kingdom of Buganda.329
323 ENA, DG.C.26, Collections of the office of the President, Myths and Realities, Letter to ‘London Friend’ by Milton Obote, 16 November 1968 324 ‘Abaganda baganye Omukopi oku’bakulembela’ Omukulembeze, 20 June 1963, pp.1-3; G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p. 75; S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.49 325 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.49 326 ‘Busoga yeremwe, bagala Kyabazinga yabafuga’, Omukulembeze, 26 June 1963, pp.1-2 327 ‘Ababaka batabuse ku ekifo kyo bwa pulezident’ Munno, 27 June 1963 pp.1-2 328 ‘Obote- Master of Political Skill’, Drum, May 1965, p.23 329 ENA, DG.C.26, Collections of the office of the President, Myths and Realities, Letter to ‘London Friend’ by Milton Obote, 16 November 1968
85 Obote faced a dilemma: Kabaka Muteesa II had contributed greatly to the UPC’s coming to power in its alliance with the 21 Kabaka Yekka members of the National Assembly and still had the command of the block vote of the 21 Kabaka Yekka members.330 Obote had to find a way of returning the favour Kabaka Yekka had done him in making him premier. Also, by virtue of the prior arrangement reached between the Uganda Peoples’ Congress’s Grace Ibingira and B. K. Kirya on the one hand and Kabaka Yekka’s Dr. Lumu and Amos Sempa on the other during the formation of the UPC-KY alliance, Obote had to side with Kabaka Muteesa II.331 However, the contribution of Nadiope, the Kyabazinga of Busoga and Uganda Peoples’ Congress vice-president, who had made the Busoga region in eastern Uganda a UPC stronghold, was equally important.332
This was the situation when Obote, on 3 October 1963 prevailed upon his fellow Uganda People’s Congress colleagues in the National Assembly to have Kabaka Muteesa II elected as President. This was what Kabaka Muteesa II expected him to do:
“…there was little choice either for Obote or me. He was not in position to snub the Baganda, who would have been enraged if any other ruler were chosen, as the new President would have precedence over the Kabaka even in Buganda. Similarly, it was difficult for me to refuse.”333
As a compromise, the first amendment to the 1962 Independence Constitution that created the post of Vice-President was made on the curious grounds that the duties of the President, which were ceremonial, would be too heavy for one man: Nadiope, the Kyabazinga of the Busoga Chiefdom became the Vice-President. Thus the alliance appeared to have survived the first serious political hurdle. However, not everybody was convinced of the reasons given for the creation of the post of the Vice-President. Latim, the leader of the opposition stated in the National Assembly,
“…the Government had found it necessary to propose the post of the vice president for this reason that the Prime Minister has already committed himself
330 ‘Olukiiko lwe’lunavunanyizibwa ku babaka ba Buganda mu assembly’,Taifa Empya, 12 March 1961, p.1 331 ‘Kabaka ye Plezidenti’, Sekanyola, 7 October 1963, pp.1-3;J. Tumusiime, Uganda 30 Years 1962- 1992, p.32 332 ‘Aba Uganda Peoples’ Congress bawangunde mu Busoga’, Emmabya Esazze, 24 April 1961, pp.1-3 333 E. Kabaka Muteesa II, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.150
86 to offer the post of the president to one particular individual and then came another individual who wanted to take the post of the president and that therefore, there developed a tug of war between the two persons … the two persons concerned here are His Highness the Kabaka of Buganda and the Isebantu, the Kyabazinga of Busoga.”334
The election of Kabaka Muteesa II as first President of Uganda was a significant achievement for Buganda and for the Baganda; it was a landmark in the history of their kingdom which deserved recognition for the contribution it had made in the creation and development of Uganda.335 However, the reality was that the election of Kabaka Muteesa II as president had not been a smooth one and it revealed the underlying political issues that were to have a heavy bearing on Uganda. From the very beginning, the Northerners were unhappy about the Kabaka’s position as the Head of State which signified the continued dominance of Buganda in the post-colonial era.336 The assumption that Kabaka Muteesa II, a Muganda could not act in the national interest showed the effects of Buganda’s separatist tendencies in the 1950s and its hegemony in the colonial days that had angered many.337 This history now had implications for national politics. Also the fact that the majority of the Uganda People’s Congress members were opposed to Kabaka Muteesa II, the symbolic head of Kabaka Yekka, becoming the head of state was ironic as he was a partner in the ruling coalition government that they were part of. This shows again the shaky grounds on which the coalition government of the UPC and KY had been built and the danger for Uganda’s political stability.
3.4 AN INTENSIFICATION OF POLITICAL RIVALRY: THE CONFLICTING ROLES OF PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
The election of Kabaka Muteesa II as President of Uganda did not bring him and Obote closer. Misunderstandings developed about each other’s roles and conduct as Head of State and executive Prime Minister. Muteesa’s position as President was largely a ceremonial one but his dual roles as the Kabaka, expecting loyalty from his Baganda
334 NAA, parliamentary hansard,pp100-101 335 ‘Essanyu lyabuutikidde Buganda nga Ssabasajja alondedwa’, Omukulembezi,4 October 1963, p.1; A.R. Nsibambi, National Integration in Uganda-1962-2013, p.32 336 ‘Not Buganda again’, New Day, 19 June 1963, p.2; P. Mutibwa, The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics, p.66 337 ‘Aba Uganda Peoples’ Congress batunulidde Kabaka Yekkaabazinga’, Ssekanyolya, 22 July 1966, p.1
87 subjects, and the President of Uganda brought complications.338 The Kabaka was a man used to making personal decisions in matters of state and would find it hard to abide by any limitations. However, as President he was constitutionally required to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Milton Obote. Thus, whereas on the one hand the 1962 constitutional provisions had given him as President minimum powers, on the other, as the Kabaka of Buganda, he could act as he wished with the advice of the Lukiiko. This split role was clearly a problematic one.
Meanwhile, Obote, from the non-kingdom north, with his republican bias was determined as Prime Minister and the executive head of government to have a strong central authority. 339 As executive Prime Minister he inherited a country of mixed fortunes.340 Though he had inherited power from the colonial governor, he had not inherited the authority that had gone with that power.341 He presided over a nation divided between the kingdom states and the non-kingdom states and the existence of kingdoms whose kings commanded loyalty in an independent Uganda who denied Obote his authority as Prime Minister.
What made his predicament worse was that Obote governed a state with a constitution which, for all practical purposes, provided for the existence of the Kingdom of Buganda as a state and the kingdoms of Bunyoro, Tooro and Ankole as mini-states within the nation-state of Uganda.342 Thus, from the outset, Obote was faced with the problem of exercising authority over Kabaka Muteesa II whose powers were clearly defined by agreements worked out with the colonial government and now part of the 1962 Independence Constitution. Moreover, at this point the Kingdom of Buganda under Kabaka Muteesa II had become a microcosm of the central government rather than its local outpost.343 For Obote, this contradicted his long term plan of both becoming Uganda’s absolute ruler and building a strong central government at the expense of entrenched local interests, especially those of the kingdom areas. He now bitterly opposed the federal aspects of the 1962 Constitution which had invested powers in the Kabaka as head of the Bugandan government. The federal nature of the Buganda
338 J. Mittelman, Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From Obote to Amin, p.89 339 S.R. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, p.189 340 G. Wavamunno, Kabaka Muteesa II ne Uganda, p.26 341 S.R. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, p.173 342 S.R. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, p.189 343 T.V. Sathyamurthy, Political Development in Uganda:1900-1986, p.470
88 Kingdom made Obote’s position an insecure one and the existing relationship between the President and the Prime Minister did not encourage cooperation.344
Kabaka Muteesa II gives an example of the ambiguous positions the two men found themselves in with regard to the question of who took precedence, Kabaka Muteesa II as the Head of State or Obote as the executive Prime Minister.
“I paid a visit to the Omukama (the King) of Bunyoro on his birthday, wearing my Major-General’s full dress uniform as Commander- in-Chief of the Uganda Army. It turned out that he had asked me in my capacity as the Kabaka, and as Obote was also there, difficulties about procedure arose. He took precedence on arrival: I on departure. This was early as the situation was delicate.”345
This became a worrying feature of the first independence government and the uncertainty about the relationship between the two offices undermined the cohesion of the UPC/KY coalition. There were often public disputes over whose portrait should be displayed in public places. Two different political posters were also used. One was in Uganda People’s Congress party colours with a huge portrait of Obote in the centre and a small one of the Kabaka in the corner. The other was in Kabaka Yekka party colours with Kabaka Muteesa II in the middle and a small Obote on the side.346 It was clear that the achievement of independence had different meanings for different people and this had bearing on their political behaviour in the independent Uganda.
The unprecedented popularity of Kabaka Muteesa II as the king in the Buganda region; where the capital city was located, also compounded the situation. Given that most of the state occasions took place here, Kabaka Muteesa II’s presence loomed large, thereby seriously undermining the authority of Obote as Prime Minister. Kabaka Muteesa II commanded natural respect and obedience from his subjects. However, Obote, from the north which was a non-kingdom area outside Buganda, did not command the respect in the kingdom areas, especially Buganda that was his due as Prime Minister.347 The Kabaka Yekka leaders always insisted that the Prime Minister
344 T.V. Sathyamurthy, Political Development in Uganda:1900-1986, p.536 345 E. Kabaka Muteesa II Desecration of My Kingdom, p.159 346 ‘Ebiffananyi bya Kabaka n’Obote byabatabudde’, Sekanyolya, 12 October 1962, p.1; J. Tumusiime, Uganda 30 Years of Independence, p.29; 347 S.R. Karugire, A political History of Uganda, p.189
89 be subordinate to the Kabaka and other hereditary rulers in Uganda.348 The following illustrates the position of Kabaka Yekka followers:
“The seat of the Uganda prime minister will be in Buganda, and the national assembly of Uganda will also be in Buganda, in Kampala. We, Kabaka Yekka, cannot hesitate to state that if Uganda is ever to be a prosperous and peaceful country, the Prime Minister must always be subordinate to the Kabaka and other hereditary rulers”349
This issue of precedence was not a trivial one. It indicated how Uganda was still a fractured nation during these early years of independence and tainted the good will between Obote and Muteesa that was necessary to steer a young nation to political stability. Muteesa recalls that from 1964; he and the Prime Minister met less and less often and that communication between the two was mainly by letter.350 Indeed, Obote’s actions against Buganda seem to stem from the struggle for power that developed between him and Muteesa. This power struggle would eventually lead to the constitutional crisis in 1966.
3.5 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS IN BUGANDA
The political stability of Uganda to a great measure depended on a strong united leadership of the Uganda People’s Congress as a ruling party. Unfortunately this was not the case. The UPC was born of a loose coalition of divergent ethnic groups that largely came together to change their marginalized status and end Buganda’s domination.351 As a result, its leadership was factionalized. Each faction leader represented a local constituency which was usually ethnically distinct from the others. Obote’s power base, for example, lay among the Langi in the north of the country, George Magezi’s came from the Bunyoro in the western region and John Babiha’s from Tooro in the mid-west. W.W. Rwetsiba’s support base was in the Ankole region in south-western Uganda and William Nadiope’s was from Busoga in the eastern
348 ‘Kabaka yafuga-Kabaka Yekka’, Ssekanyolya, 27 September 1962, p.1; D.A. Low, The Mind of Buganda, pp.214-215; 349 D.A. Low, The Mind of the Buganda, pp.161-162 350 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.155 351 S.K. Bantubalamu, Ssekabaka Eyeerabirwa, p.218
90 region. Felix Onama was from the west Nile region and Cuthbert Obwangamoi was from the far eastern region of Uganda.352
Each of these regional leaders was a leader in his own right and none needed the support of the party or its President to be elected in their districts. It was these groups, with John Kakonge; the UPC secretary general, who were engaged in a struggle for the control of the party. This control was crucial because whoever controlled it would ultimately control the country. Obote’s position as the UPC leader had become tenuous and there was no doubt that he faced a formidable challenge to maintain leadership of the party. As party president he had no particular advantage. His appointment as president had largely been a matter of chance; it was not on account of his longer experience in politics, or proven qualities of statesmanship or any particular charisma. Strictly speaking he was a leader among equals.353 For his own political survival, he had to forestall any opposition within the party. As secretary general of the UPC and the most popular leader in the party, John Kakonge posed a major threat to Obote and became his first target.
Kakonge’s popularity among the party youth, who portrayed him as a better leader than Obote and referred to him as the UPC’s leader in waiting, instilled a great fear in Obote which soon developed into a deep-seated hatred of the UPC’s second in command. As a result, Obote prevented Kakonge from becoming a member of the pre-independence Uganda parliament elected in April 1962 to guide and take the country into actual political independence in October 1962.354 To ensure that Kakonge was not elected, Obote persuaded him to make way in his safe electoral constituency of Lugazi to Leonard Kalule Setaala, on the firm promise that he would be given one of the specially elected seats in the Parliament.355 Obote did not honour this promise and contemptuously excluded Kakonge’s name from the list of ten names of specially nominated members to the National Assembly.356 Thus the Secretary General of the party was left out of the National Assembly and was not a cabinet minister.
352 G. Engholm, Political Parties and Uganda’s independence, in Transition, No3 1962, p.17; S.R. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, p.190 353 A.R. Nsibambi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, p.39; S.R. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, p.190; S.R. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, p.190 354 Onyango- Odongo, Why Uganda Independence Constitution Failed, p.13 355 Onyango- Odongo, Why Uganda Independence Constitution Failed, p.48 356 ‘Elinnya lya Kakonge teddilekko kulukkalala’, Taifa Empya, 1 May 1962, p.1
91 Despite his being excluded from both parliament and cabinet, Kakonge’s support did not wane. By the time of the UPC’s annual conference in Gulu in 1964, three major divisions within the party were glaringly visible. There was the right or conservative wing led by Grace Ibingira which was also thought to be pro-capitalist. The second group, led by Obote was referred to as the centre and considered to be the moderate of the three. Finally, there was the third group which was the largest and also deemed to be pro-Marxist headed by John Kakonge. 357
At the Gulu conference, Milton Obote used unscrupulous methods that involved the illegal amendment of the UPC constitution to get rid of Kakonge, the secretary general and leader of the party’s left wing.358 He inflated the number of delegates from the Busoga region of eastern Uganda by lowering its party branches from the level of sub- county to that of parish.359 The intention was to ensure that Kakonge supporters from Bunyoro in western Uganda were outvoted, thereby tilting the balance of power in Obote’s favour. As a result of these changes, the number of Busoga delegates to the conference rose from 114 to 684. This inflated the conference with 570 ‘illegal delegates’, just for the sake of fighting Kakonge.360 In addition, on the day of the election of the secretary-general of the Uganda Peoples’ Congress, the majority of Kakonge supporters were locked out. Kakonge was narrowly defeated by Grace Ibingira, a cabinet minister and the leader of another right wing in the party.361 Furthermore, Kakonge’s leftist young and influential supporters such as Kirunda Kivejinja, Bidandi Ssali, Charles Onyuta, Wadada Musani, Chango Macho, Raiti Omongin, Lomity Obbo, Livingstone Ojepa, Natilo Masaba and Wadada Nabudere were expelled from the party.362 The militant Uganda People’s Congress Youth League, from which Kakonge drew support, was also accused of having diverted from party principles and disbanded. Obote stated, “I have sown seeds, political seeds, some fell on bad rock like Kirunda Kivejinja, Kintu Musoke and Bidandi Ssali”.363
357 ‘Towards a United Uganda’, Drum, May 1965, p.12 358 ‘Konstitution yaUganda Peoples’ Congress enkyusiddwa’, Taifa Empya, 10 August 1964, pp.1-2 359 A. Kirunda, Uganda the Crisis of Confidence, p.44 360 A. Kirunda, Uganda the Crisis of Confidence, p.44-45 361 ‘Aba Kakonge babagalidde ebweru’, Sekanyolya, 10 August 1964 362 ‘Aba Kakonge bagobedwa muUganda Peoples’ Congress’, Ssekanyolya, 12 November 1964, p.1; A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problems of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During His Final Exile,1966-1969, p.46 363 J. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda the First 50 Years, p.70
92 The manner in which Obote decided to deal with the crisis in the UPC showed how he was likely to deal with opposition in the future. At the Gulu conference he violated the party constitution with ease. The increase in the number of Busoga delegates had been in violation of the party constitution which could only be amended by the delegates.364 Obote’s apparent success in dealing with Kakonge, set the pattern for events that were to follow. Two years later, he was to use the same tactic while dealing with Buganda when he unilaterally violated, suspended and abrogated the 1962 Independence Constitution.
Obote had hoped that the removal of Kakonge would secure him a safe stay at the helm of the UPC but in the aftermath of the Gulu conference its power struggle took another twist. The defeat of the Kakonge faction brought to prominence the North and South regional and linguistic divides in the party. Obote led the northern republican group while Grace Ibingira led the southern monarchist Bantu group. Major realignment of political forces began to take shape along ethnic divides. Whereas the leaders from the north wanted more radical social policies intended to uplift their disadvantaged regions, the Bantu from the south adopted a more conservative stance.365 Furthermore, the Bantu group accused Obote of contradicting his own policy of stimulating national unity by showing bias towards the ethnic groups of northern Uganda. As a result of the widening ethnic divide in the party, from mid-1965 a number of Bantu Ministers and leading Baganda personalities began plotting to oust Obote in order to reverse the perceived domination of the cabinet by Northerners.366
By 1965 ethnic division had polarized the party as scheming became the main mechanism through which national affairs were conducted.367 The struggle for the control of the UPC had now reached a crisis level. The rivalry between Obote and Ibingira for the leadership of the party and, by extension, the leadership of Uganda continued unabated. Its outcome would determine who would control the political development of the young nation. Obote now faced two major threats to his hold on power as the country’s prime minister: the infighting in the UPC and the threat from
364 A. Kirunda, Uganda the Crisis of Confidence, p.42 365 K. Nelson, The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics With a Case Study of Uganda,p.142 366 K. Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography, p.108 367 A. Kirunda, Uganda the Crisis of Confidence, p.55
93 Buganda which had remained steadfast in opposing his rule. Obote was aware that he needed to be a step ahead of his political opponents if he was to survive as both the leader of UPC and the Prime Minister. He dealt violently with his opponents and his actions rather than containing the situation simply escalated it to a crisis level which, coupled with other issues, culminated in a crisis in May 1965.
3.6 COLLAPSE OF THE UGANDA PEOPLE’S CONGRESS-KABAKA YEKKA ALLIANCE AND THE EFFECTS THEREOF ON BUGANDA
On 24 August 1964, Prime Minister Obote announced the termination of the 27 month old Uganda People’s Congress-Kabaka Yekka alliance which had largely made his becoming Prime Minister in 1962 possible.368 The announcement followed his 2 August 1964 address to UPC delegates in Kampala in which he called for the disbandment of Kabaka Yekka whose task, he stated, had been completed.369 In essence the announcement of end of the alliance was just a formality because cracks had already begun to emerge in the coalition government by 1963.
Various reasons can be advanced for the failure of the coalition to operate smoothly in its mere two years of existence. According to Kabaka Muteesa II, the quarrel between the Uganda People’s Congress and Kabaka Yekka started a few months after independence, when the UPC fielded candidates for by-elections in Buganda.370 Under the terms of the alliance, Buganda was preserved for Kabaka Yekka. The UPC also established party offices in the Kingdom of Buganda in contravention of the agreement that had led to the formation of the alliance in 1961.371 According to this understanding, the Kingdom of Buganda would be the preserve of Kabaka Yekka and the UPC would operate in the regions outside of it. However, Bidandi Ssali, a UPC official who also happened to be a Muganda, went ahead and in 1963 launched the
368 ENA, Box no 8/15, Collections of the Office of the President, Speeches by Milton Obote, the 24 August 1964 address toUganda Peoples’ Congress Delegates; ‘Obote ebyo Omukaggo abijjewo’ , Taifa Empya, 31 August 1964, p.1 369 ENA, 21153, Broadcast by Prime Minister, The 2 August 1964 Speech to Uganda Peoples’ Congress delegates 370 E. Muteesa , Desecration of My Kingdom, p.148 371 MAK AR/BUG/4/3,Minutes of KabakaYekka and Uganda Peoples’ Congress 1963, pp.13-16; J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda: A Modern History, p.219; ‘New Law May RestrictKabaka Yekka Movements’,Uganda Argus, 10 January 1966, p.3; ‘Eteeka Ly`okuweraKabaka Yekka Terikyazze mu Assembly’, Ssekanyolya, 17 January 1966, p.1; ‘Olwa KabakaYekka Poliisi Yalwekisemu’, Munno, 15 January 1966, p.2
94 party’s first branches in Buganda under Paul Muwanga and Godfrey Binaisa.372 The Buganda government officials alleged that Obote was personally behind the decision to start some of the branches. The UPC leaders in Buganda argued that the Baganda were not the ‘property’ of any individual who could barter with them and that they should not be left behind but should be allowed to participate actively in national politics.373 However, by going against an accord that the UPC would not start branches in the Kingdom, these leaders contributed to the strained relationship between Kabaka Yekka and the Uganda Peoples’ Congress and between Kabaka Muteesa II and Obote.
According to Obote, the opening of Uganda Peoples’ Congress branches in the Kingdom of Buganda in 1964 was a landmark for the party because, even though the party was in alliance with Kabaka Yekka, it was able to move on with its programs in defiance of the Mengo Establishment. This is a further indication of how Obote’s increased confidence in his ability to end the Kingdom’s position of prominence. He later wrote that,
“It is characteristic of the Uganda Peoples’ Congress to make every endeavor to work for the interests of Uganda as a whole, and that the alliance with Kabaka Yekka then did not in the opinion of the party amount to a character which debarred the Uganda Peoples’ Congress from operating in Buganda. The party has never wanted any part of its policy to be determined by another body outside itself and the attempt by the Kabaka Yekka and the Kabaka’s government to oppose Uganda Peoples’ Congress operations in Buganda Region after independence were rejected on the ground that the party could not allow any outside body to determine where the party should operate or should not do so.”374
These actions of the UPC were to annoy many people in Buganda both the ordinary Baganda and those in the Bugandan government. As a result Mr. Bassude the acting Katikiiro of Buganda released a press statement asserting as follows;
“When the UPC / KY Alliance was founded, we all rejoiced because we hoped that in the Alliance was Uganda’s peaceful and true unity. As a result of the recent events, the Baganda have been made aware that in effecting the Alliance UPC was not in earnest. That is why the Attorney General of Uganda, Mr.
372 J. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda the First 50 Years,p.23 373 ‘Uganda Peoples’ Congress mu Buganda’, SSsekanyolya,18 April 1963 374 ENA, DG.C.26, Collections of the office of the President, Myths and Realities, Letter to ‘London Friend’ by Milton Obote, 16 November 1968
95 Godfrey Binaisa said the other day that UPC does not need KY and that his party will not ‘’kneel’’ before KY as UPC has enough support throughout Buganda. The same person made a public utterance that it was an indication of political stupidity for any person to belong to KY.
In those circumstances it would not be proper to continue with a one-sided Alliance as UPC neither needs KY nor values the arrangement. The Baganda are not willing to force another party to stay in Alliance. Therefore, the kabaka’s government is going to summon the Lukiiko presently who will decide whether it is necessary to maintain the Alliance any longer. On the other hand we cannot but be grateful to Mr, Binaisa for having opened our eyes in his public utterances so far, we now know that UPC does not need K.Y and that that political party does not value the Alliance which the Baganda have been regarding as sacrosanct.’’375
Although the UPC was quick to distance the party from the allegations made by Basudde, the remarks were generally reflective of the thinking of the ordinary people in Buganda. Many in Buganda from then looked forward to end the KY alliance with the UPC.
With all the efforts to curtail Buganda’s domineering influence at play many ordinary Baganda supporters of the Kabaka Yekka became desperate. The next elections were far in the future and it was also unlikely that Obote would call for national elections when the scheduled date arrived unless he was sure he could win. He had failed to hold sixteen by-elections because he was unsure of the outcome and sixteen vacancies in the National Assembly remained unfilled.376
The failure of the Mengo Establishment to establish a functioning democracy also strained the relationship between them and Obote. Even after accepting its part in a united Uganda, Mengo was not ready to give up its centuries-old system of administration for the sake of having a uniform system of governance with the rest of Uganda.377 Indeed, since time immemorial, the peaceful integration of Buganda in Uganda and Obote’s failure in the post-colonial Uganda to peacefully accommodate Buganda, to a great extent had been casued by the resistance of the Mengo Establishement foregoing the privileges accorded to them by the 1900 Buganda agreement. This partly explains why most political conflicts within the newly
375 ENA, 5/10928, Uganda Peoples’ Congress, 6 February 1963 376 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.155 377 ‘Mengo ekalambidde ku byo kwefugga’ Omukulembeze, 15 April 1961, p.1
96 independent Uganda rotated around the issue; the desire to change or to maintain these priveleges.The Baganda leaders were caught between being subjects of the Kabaka and participating in national politics, two demanding and conflicting roles. They became preoccupied with preserving the Buganda sub-state to the detriment of the general interests of Buganda and the entire Uganda.378 At times their demands went to the extreme of secessionism, turning the Kingdom of Buganda against the rest of the country. It was this same group that, as the country moved towards independence, had requested safeguards for their Kabaka given the fact that although the institution of kingship had been enshrined in the 1962 Constitution, the position and role of kingship in independent Uganda had not been clearly defined; leaving the kings in an insecure position.379
The Mengo Establishment’s reluctance to establish a functioning democracy in the Kingdom was a manifestation of their poor leadership whose outcome was the intensification of the political rivalry between Muteesa and Obote over their conflicting roles. Mugabe, Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango all, in their descriptions of the development of political democracy in post-colonial Uganda, relate the clashes and conflicts between the monarchists and the state around the Mengo’s Establishment’s hostility towards democracy.380 Despite the creation of an apparently democratic 1961 Constitution that was wholly incorporated in the 1962 Independence Constitution, Buganda in the early 1960s was still in transition from a feudal and autocratic society to a modern democratic one.381
For example, Article 20 (b) schedule 1 of the 1962 Independence Constitution of Uganda dealing with the membership of the Buganda Lukiiko included the county (Ssaza) chiefs. On the contrary, Article 41 (1) bestowed to the same Ssaza chiefs the duties of a civil servant making them the administrative heads of the counties.382 Whereas, there were good reasons in the past for the Ssaza chiefs to be members of the Lukiiko, with the changed political landscape their continued presence in the
378 A.B.K Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During his Final Exile 1966-1969, p.113 379 ‘Who is to Blame for the 1966 Crisis’, Monitor, 20 August 2012, p.4 380 ‘Adimola Stood out’, Sunday Vision, 19 August 2012, p.3; J.B. Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango, No Party Democracy,p.113 381 ENA, Box no 014, Collections of President’s Office, the Buganda Constitution 382 ENA, Box no 89/ 909,Collections of President’s Office, Agreed Recommendation of Buganda Constitution Committee
97 Lukiiko was now an impediment to the progress of Buganda. As long as these chiefs remained members while many of the elected members owed their election to the support of these chiefs, no worthwhile political reform could be passed by the Lukiiko.383 The consequence of the failure to reform the Lukiiko was that the cardinal democratic principle of a clear separation of the legislature and the executive was lacking in Buganda’s government. This meant that there was little authority and control over Ssaza chiefs as civil servants. This not only affected the efficiency of local government and the modernization of its institutions but continued to hinder a smooth working relationship between Buganda and the central government. The result was an antagonistic relationship between Muteesa in his capacity as President and Obote the Prime Minister. These protracted wrangles between the central government and Buganda just added to the already existing bad relations. The political irritant continued to exacerbate the relations between the two governments, contributing to the explosive atmosphere.
Thus, much as it can be argued that the actions of Milton Obote towards the Kingdom of Buganda were the unfolding of a preconceived plot to weaken the Kingdom, it is also true that the Mengo establishment, a collection of conservative county chiefs, heads of clans and neo-traditionalist politicians, was partly responsible for the political turmoil that befell the country in 1966. Its failure to acknowledge the rapidly changing political environment meant that it worked against modern political principles which led to national politicians detesting the ruling clique in the Kingdom of Buganda. It was unfortunate that at this critical time, Mengo failed to provide national leadership and instead concentrated on entrenching Buganda’s regional interests. The enemies of the Kingdom of Buganda then seized this opportunity to further unite the other political forces against Mengo.
Another issue that affected the smooth operation of the coalition and contributed to its collapse was the internal weaknesses of the coalition partners. From its formation the Uganda People’s Congress had never been a grassroots party but one formed by non- Bagandan members of the national Legeco who were mostly interested in
383 MAK,AR/BUG/1/5/5, Report of the Buganda Economic Planning Commission, 1964-1970, p.56
98 strengthening their political opportunities and ending Buganda’s domination.384 Moreover, the Uganda Peoples’ Congress was not run as a democratic institution and since 1963 the party members had not met because Obote was not confident that they would continue to support him.385 Most party decisions were thus made unilaterally by Obote. In addition, there were many rank and file members of the party, especially from the north, who had never believed in the alliance.386 Party unity had been also undermined by factions within the party.387
Kabaka Yekka was equally fractured. On one hand were the ‘progressives’ who favoured unity with the UPC and Buganda taking an active part in national politics and on the other were the ‘separatists’ who still wanted to Buganda go its own way.388 The opposing views and the lack of internal cohesion within the coalition partners were responsible for the increased strains and stresses within the coalition government.
In order to get rid of Kabaka Yekka and hence minimise the Buganda threat, Obote had to get control of the National Assembly. By offering patronage and promising rewards, he encouraged members of the Democratic Party (DP) opposition in the National Assembly and of Kabaka Yekka to defect to the ruling UPC.389 Moreover Obote was a beneficiary of the internal power struggle within the DP which he exploited to have some of the DP members of parliament change sides within parliament. This had been a struggle between Kiwanuka the DP president and Basil Bataringaya the Secretary General of the DP and its leader in parliament. Kiwanuka being a leader of a political party had not joined the national assembly. The Lukiiko, a body that elected Buganda’s representatives to the national assembly could nominate party leader given the fact that parties were detested by the Mengo establishment. This is how he came to miss out. This impacted negatively on the cohesion of the party as now two power centers existed, one in parliament and the other outside parliament. Moreover Bataringaya had attributed DP’s dismal performance in Buganda on Kiwanuka’s
384 ENA, Box no9/23 Collections of the Office of the President,Uganda Peoples’ Congress National Headquarters 385 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.155 386 ENA, REL/32, Political Parties, The Kabaka Yekka Records 387 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problems of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During His Final Exile,1966-1969, p.46 388 ENA, REL/32, Political Parties, The Uganda People’s Congress Records 389 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.51
99 uncompromising attitude towards Mengo to which he had attributed to the latter’s arrogance.390
Basil Bataringaya led six other Democratic Party members who included James Ochola, Vincent Rwamwaro and Stanslaus Okurut to cross over to the UPC.391 Bataringaya was later appointed Minister of Internal Affairs. William Kalema, who led a group that crossed over from Kabaka Yekka, was appointed Minister of Finance.392 From the Kingdom of Bunyoro several Democratic Party MPs also agreed to join the UPC after Obote undertook to carry out a referendum to restore the lost counties to Bunyoro. In all, a total of 14 members of parliament ‘crossed the floor’ to join the Uganda People’s Congress.393 Although on one hand Obote was quick to argue that opposition against the government was a typical capitalist practice that should not be allowed in Africa. On the other about the ‘crossing of the floor’ by Kabaka Yekka members Muteesa writes,
“Members of Kabaka Yekka in the National Assembly were crossing in dribs and drabs to the Uganda Peoples’ Congress … lured by the chance of office … and not least by Obote’s personal power of persuasion. Some thought they were strengthening the moderate wing, which would soon tame or, if necessary dispense with Obote. Others who should have known better were convinced that an opposition was un-African, a luxury we could ill afford, and so on, and that there is something modern and efficient about a one-party state”.394
Whatever these opposition members’ motives in joining the Uganda Peoples’ Congress, Obote had succeeded in gaining an artificial majority in the house and he now had the confidence to terminate the alliance. In the words of Muteesa, “UPC [now] held a handsome majority over both parties [Democratic Party and Kabaka Yekka]. Obote no longer had need of us. Indeed, he was now powerful enough to destroy us as the main obstacle between himself and complete power.”395 Of course, the UPC majority in the National Assembly did not reflect the real strength of the party on ground. In the 1962 election, the UPC had received slightly over 500,000 votes
390 J. Tumusiime,Independent Uganda the First 50 Years, p. 15 391 ‘Bataringaya ye’ yakulimbedde abaDemocratic Party abasazze e’ddiro’, Sekanyolya, 4 January 1965, p.1; J. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda the First 50 Years, p.15 392 ‘Ababaka abasala e’ddilo balidde obwami’ Ssekanyolya, 20 April 1966, p.1; NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 3rd Session, 1966, Vol. 67, p.225 393 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 1st Session, 1964, Vol. 58, p.213 394 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.176 395 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.176
100 against the over 600,000 of Kabaka Yekka and the just more than 500,000 of the Democratic Party.396 It was absurd therefore that a party which had polled less than a third of the total votes in the nationwide elections now had the majority of seats in parliament. This therefore would also be a source of future political conflict.
Obote’s leadership thus involved open bribery of members of the National Assembly, offers of patronage and future rewards in the UPC.397 The members of the ruling party became ‘yes men’ merely rubber stamping any legislation brought to them by Obote.398 With the supremacy of the UPC in the National Assembly, Obote was able to pass whatever resolutions he desired, irrespective of the wishes of Kabaka Yekka, his former partner in the coalition government. The justification for the banning of the Kabaka Yekka was given by the Justice Minister, Cuthbert. J. Obwangor, who stated that it had been necessary to limit the operations of Kabaka Yekka because its activities had wreaked havoc in the central region where cows were savagely decimated, crops burnt or slashed in gardens and human life destroyed.399 Incidentally these acts of illegal intimidation had taken place when relations between the UPC and Kabaka Yekka were still good, in the run-up to the 1962 elections that had brought their coalition to power.400
The termination of the UPC-KY alliance worsened the political situation in the country and had a negative impact on its political stability. Relations between the two parties were naturally strained and Buganda’s opposition to Obote’s rule intensified. The Buganda Lukiiko took over the vacuum left in the weakened National Assembly and became the strongest opposing force to Obote’s leadership. Also the conservative royalists in Buganda, who had originally warned against the coalition in 1961, once again gained momentum and now steered Buganda further away from integrative national politics.
The renewed opposition of Buganda to his rule angered Obote and made it his direct political target. As soon as he had terminated the alliance, he rekindled the issue of
396 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.154 397 Onyango –Odongo, Why the Uganda Constitution Failed, p.9 398 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.52 399 ‘ Lwakki e’Kolangana wakkati waUganda Peoples’ Congress neKabaka Yekka yayimilizzidwa’, Taifa Empya, 31 August 1964, pp.1-2 400 ENA, C 10316, Kabaka Yekka file, 1961 Elections and Intimidations
101 the lost counties and all the animosity around it by introducing a referendum bill aimed at removing territory from Buganda.401 Furthermore, the National Assembly passed a law making it an offence for anyone to use a symbol connected with the name of a ruler or constitutional head in order to incite disaffection against another ruler or constitutional head.402 Of all the political parties, it had been only Kabaka Yekka that had insignia associated with kingship and it was thus clearly the object of the law.
The banning of the political activities of Kabaka Yekka was extended to the rest of Uganda with the movement by law not being allowed to establish party branches outside Buganda.403 This meant that it remained a tribal organisation and did not have the political ability to form a faction. These limitations on Kabaka Yekka did not however benefit Obote as many of its former supporters joined the UPC to fight Obote from within. This intensified the power struggle within the party and amplified the political tension in the country.
The termination of the alliance thus led to a sharp divide of the UPC between the republicans and the monarchists. Ibingira, a distant relative of the royal family in the Ankole kingdom in south-western Uganda led the monarchists, who sympathized with the Kingdom of Buganda, significantly strengthened by the remaining Kabaka Yekka members of the National Assembly who joined with the aim of fighting Obote from within.404 An open leadership challenge to Obote by Ibingira, who sought to replace him as leader of the UPC emerged.405 According to Ibingira, when Obote dissolved the alliance and began to plot the political death of the kingdom of Buganda “we chose, rather than betray our allies and friends, to stand by them in what eventually became a very costly undertaking for us.”406
Ibingira enlisted the help of Muteesa who became one of his strongest backers in trying to remove Obote from power. Muteesa advised Kabaka Yekka members to infiltrate the UPC and vote for pro-Ibingira candidates as a way of changing its
401 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 1stSession 1964, Vol. 58, p.256 402 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 2nd Session 1966, Vol. 64, p.187;‘New Law May Restrict Kabaka Yekka Movements’, Uganda Argus, 10 January 1966, p.3 403 ‘New Law May Restrict Kabaka Yekka Movements’, Uganda Argus, 10 January 1966, p.3 404 ‘AbaKabaka Yekka bagasse ku Ibingira’ Emambya Essazze, 8 February 1965, p.1 405 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.34 406 G. Ibingira, The Forging of African Nation, p.204
102 leadership.407 Throughout 1965 there was massive UPC recruitment of former KY supporters in Buganda. The stage was being set for the removal of Obote from the leadership of the UPCs, as Ibingira’s group which had been joined all the former Kabaka Yekka members, easily won in Buganda in the July 1965 local elections.408 It became clear that come the next national party elections, Ibingira’s faction would win. This was clear to all the protagonists in the struggle: Obote, Ibingira and Muteesa. The Ibingira-led group also won in the west and the east of the country while the Obote- faction, as expected, won only in northern Uganda.409 Thus, in the tension that followed the termination of the alliance, there was substantial evidence that control of the UPC was shifting away from Obote who now faced formidable opponents from Buganda and from within his own party. President Muteesa and Ibingira sought to exploit this as a constitutional way to remove Obote from power and possibly make Ibingira, Prime Minister.410 What Ibingira and Muteesa misjudged was Obote’s support in the security forces, which he would use to his advantage against his opponents.
Obote, realizing that he could not politically defeat these combined forces but not willing to lose his grip on power, became more aggressive. In 1965, he established a spy service under the innocuous name of the General Service Department and headed by his first cousin Adoko Nekyon.411 The Department infiltrated all spheres of government and spied on many members of the National Assembly. The Criminal Investigation Department of the Uganda Police Force also became a political tool, working more and more on political cases and using torture to extract confessions or fabricated statements. People would be detained as result of secret reports made to the Department regardless of the accuracy of such reports.412 Though he claimed this was part of creating a national identity in a newly independent Uganda, Obote reduced his opponents to mere spectators and then later arrested them. Ben Kiwanuka, the Democratic Party leader and first Chief Minister of Uganda was detained, as was
407 A.B. K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Kabaka Muteesa II During His Final Exile, 1966-1969, p.45 408 ENA, REL/32, The Political Parties, Kabaka Yekka Records; P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.35 409 ENA, REL/32, The Political Parties,Uganda Peoples’ Congress By-Elections 410 J. Bossa, Reflections on the 1966 Political Crisis, p.35 411 ENA, CAB/ME/MoS/4/65, Cabinet Memoranda, The Establishment of the General Service Department 412 Onyango –Odongo, Why the Uganda Constitution Failed, p.16
103 Brigadier Shaban Opolot, the first Ugandan commander of the Uganda Armed Forces. These actions of course contributed to the rising political tension of the mid-1960s.
In relation to Buganda’s sustained opposition to his rule, Obote also attempted unsuccessfully to destroy Buganda’s position of advantage in the country. Between 1964 and 1966, he adopted an aggressive stance towards the Kingdom and made concerted efforts to reduce its political power. However, his efforts to bring about Buganda’s demise only served to increase the tension between the Buganda and the central government and turned the Kingdom into the most vocal opposition to his regime.413 This then left him with no alternative but, with the aid of the northern- dominated Uganda army, to attack the Kingdom of Buganda in 1966. This suggests that he either did not know how to otherwise deal with the dissent or that he realised that the democratic path could not guarantee him his personal ambitions.
3.7 THE RISE OF THE MILITARY AS A FACTOR IN THE CRISIS
For the sake of his political survival, Obote had to rely on the army as his own party had by 1965; became far too divided and heterogeneous.414 For Obote, the army was the only organization with the immediate power to impose an integrated political order and he used it to deliver a decisive blow to his opponents in the UPC and in Buganda.
In his reliance to the military, Obote was blessed by the history of the colonial era in which the British recruitment policy had been such that the army was largely filled by persons from the north, Obote’s birthplace and political stronghold.415 With independence, Obote as head of government had seen no need to change the recruitment policy or the composition of the army. In contrast, he reinforced it in his appointments with the Minister of Defence, Felix Onama, and the Permanent Secretary, Lutara; all from the north.416 When complaints were made about the ethnic imbalance in the army, Felix Onama responded thus: “thousands of Northerners (notably Acholi and Langi) died in the two world wars to defend Uganda against Nazis
413 H.B. Hansen, Ethnicity and Military Rule in Uganda, p.468 414 T.V Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986, p.12 415 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.6 416 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Mutesa II During His Final Exile, 1966-1969, p.50; T.V. Sathymurthy, The Political Development of Uganda, 1900-1986, p.212
104 and Fascism and if the young generation or their children would like to follow their fathers, nobody is going to stop me from recruiting them in the army.”417
In I964 there were mutinies in the armies of the three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The mutiny in Uganda on 23 January 1964 was by about 350 soldiers stationed at army headquarters in Jinja, a town in Eastern Uganda, 80 kilometres east of the Capital, Kampala.418 They had two main complaints. The first was the lack of promotions to high-ranking positions; the army command was still in the hands of the British officers and at the time of the mutiny, out of the 113 senior officers in the Uganda army, 95 were British and only 18 were Ugandans.419 Secondly, they wanted improvement in the soldiers’ welfare especially in terms of pay. Obote responded immediately by sending his cabinet minister Felix Onama to Jinja but the minister was detained by the rioting soldiers and only released after government had agreed to address their demands.420 The rebellion was put down within a few days with the help of British troops that had been flown in from neighbouring Kenya at the request of Obote.421
The mutiny had several implications. Obote learnt a political lesson about the importance of the military in the governance of Uganda and made steps to bring the army under his control long before his political opponents within the UPC and in Buganda attempted to do so. His approach was to appease the mutineers: unlike in Kenya and Tanzania where some mutineers were tried and jailed and others dismissed, in Uganda Obote publically dismissed but privately retained them. 422
Furthermore, immediately after the mutiny, to gain closer control of the army, Obote shifted the Uganda Army headquarters from Jinja to Mbuya, a suburb 5 km east of the capital of Kampala.423 Also, he quickly addressed the issue of promotions in the Uganda armed forces. For instance, by March 1964, just a month after the outbreak of the mutiny, the number of senior army officers in the Uganda army had grown from 18 to 55 and by 1 June 1964 Ugandans had taken over the direct command of the
417 Odoi-Tanga , Politics Ethnicity and Conflict in Uganda1962-1986, p.140 418 ‘British Troops fly in. Move Follows Incident at Jinja’, Uganda Argus, 24 Jan 1966, p.1 419 C.J.P. Scott, Re-examining Uganda’s 1966 Crisis, p.35 420 ‘Prime Minister on Jinja un-rests’, Uganda Argus, 27 January 1964, p.1 421 ‘Calm Returns Uganda’, Uganda Argus, 25 January 1964, p.1 422 S.R. Karugire, The Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.67 423 ‘Amagye gaze Kampala’,Omukulembeze,28 March 1966, p.1
105 army.424 Promotions were accelerated and the welfare of the soldiers improved.. All this happened within a year of the outbreak of the mutiny.
President Muteesa however, had misgivings in the way in which Obote handled the mutiny and believed that he had motives for exaggerating the situation. He claims that Obote deliberately delayed his reception of communication about the mutiny as the Commander-in-Chief of the army. He recounts that “normally Obote would send messages of importance by radio but on this occasion he sent a courier which of course wasted a lot of time.”425 The call the President eventually received was from a junior minister. Muteesa also says that Obote censored the press and radio in reporting about the mutiny and for several days did not admit that he had invited the English soldiers to Uganda to help in putting it down.426 Muteesa insists that the disturbance was not a rebellion or threatening as the mutineers were calmed down within twenty four hours without firing a shot. Against this background, Muteesa suggests that the real significance of the mutiny lies in Obote’s reaction which was out of proportion: “He either thought that really the incident was so threatening or he wished to create an atmosphere of crisis.”427 Obote certainly turned the situation to his advantage in the reorganisation he embarked on, placing men loyal to him in direct command of the army.
Obote demonstrated his control of the army, without informing Muteesa, his titular political superior and a coalition partner in government, by reorganizing the army and rapidly expanding it following a similar pattern of an ethnically northern based army used by the departed colonial masters. The army expanded rapidly, almost exclusively with officers and men from northern Uganda.428 Major Augustine Karugaba, who was the first Ugandan to graduate from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, had been highly recommended by the outgoing British army officers as the most suitable candidate to become the first indigenous army commander but he was sidelined by Obote. He
424 C.J.P. Scott, Re-examining Uganda’s 1966 Crisis, p.36 425 E.Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.156 426 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.156 427 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.156 428 Omara-Otunu, Politics and Military, pp.66-67
106 originated from western Uganda and was a Catholic and Obote did not trust him.429 Ibingira comments in elation to the Karugaba Saga;
“During the governor-general’s garden party on 12 October 1962, as I accompanied Obote through the state guests he pointed out Karugaba to me at a distance and inquired whether I knew him. I replied that I did not. He then confided that the senior British officers were recommending him to command the army and to retire Opolot and Amin, who had reached the highest ranks they could reasonably attain. Obote then told me Karugaba was a Roman Catholic and as such could not be trusted and he would not accept him to head the army.”430
Obote cynically transferred Karugaba from active military service to the office of the Prime Minister without any specific official assignment as he could promote an inferior officer to command the army while Karugaba was still in active military service. Shaban Opolot was named Commander of the Ugandan Armed Forces with Lieutenant Colonel Idi Amin; Commander of signals at the army headquarters, as his deputy.431
Alongside the regular army, was Obote’s paramilitary force, the General Service Unit (GSU) under the command of Obote’s cousin, Odoko Nekyon. The General Service Unit was trained by the Israel secret service, the MOSSAD as a specialized unit in counter-insurgency.432 This was perhaps in anticipation of the role the military would play in future.
Also another significant factor that contributed to the rise of the military and later dominant role it played both in the 1966 and the post 1966 crisis era was the effects of Uganda’s active participation in the Congo rebellion of 1964-1965. The Congo conflict was apolitical rebellion led by Tsombe against Lumumba’s Government. The fighting that ensued took place near the north western Ugandan boarder. The Uganda army participated in the conflict largely on two grounds. First, to give assistance to the Congolese government and secondly defending the integrity of the Ugandan boarder in case the conflict spilled over into the country. As a result of Uganda’s participation in the conflict, the army witnessed its enlargement in the size including the recall to
429 Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Independence Constitution Failed, p.58 430 G. Ibingira, African Upheavals Since Independence , p.92 431 C.J.P. Scott, Re-examining Uganda’s 1966 Crisis, p.36 432 Omara-Otunu, Politics and Military, p.65
107 the force of ex-service men.433 In addition, the army purchased better and more sophisticated weapons. In the conflict, the Uganda army succeded against the white mercenaries Tshombe had recruited. This tremendously improved its confidence, boosted its morale and improved its image among both government and the nationals. Karugire asserts that to Obote the Congo episode made him realize that the army had now proved its indispensability to the nation.
In October 1964, a tragic and avoidable incident occurred on Entebbe road. 14 students from St Mary’s College, a Roman Catholic school for boys in Kisubi 12 kilometres along the Kampala-Entebbe road were killed by the army. An army detachment deliberately pushed an empty truck into a crowded bus carrying Baganda school children from a soccer match, killing fourteen persons.434 Without remorse the army justified the actions on grounds that the school boys were believed to be heading towards State House, Entebbe to take part in an allegede Baganda plot to assasinate Obote. Although the death of students saddened the Baganda, no punitive measures were taken against those concerned. Buganda now almost became synonymous with social chaos and political disorder. In succession, each other event appeared to further erode the peace the Baganda had enjoyed.
The events of 10 November 1964 at Nakulabye, a suburb of Kampala, show how the police force had also been gradually moulded into a factionalised apparatus used by political leaders to settle political conflicts.435 On that day, a contingent of the Uganda special forces- a fearsome para- military section of the Uganda Police invaded the suburb and police killed six and wounded many other mostly Baganda civilians. Most of these people killed and injured had been hounded out of their houses, and as expected most of them were Baganda.436 Government leaders had misinterpreted a domestic quarrel as an uprising of the Baganda against the government and dispatched the security forces.437 A crowd had gathered to witness a scuffle between a husband and wife. As the police arrived, without bothering to investigate simply fired
433 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.2 434 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origin of Violence in Uganda, p.76 435 A.B.K Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence, pp.77-78 436 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.2 437 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.83; S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.2
108 on the people, others broke down doors and forcibly entered people’s houses deliberately shooting at the victims.438
The debates about the incident aired in the National Assembly and the press; point to political involvement. On 6 November 1964, four days before the tragedy Prime Minister Obote had given a very stern warning to what he termed lawless elements in Buganda. In his statement to parliament, Obote stated that; “I have therefore, today, issued very firm instructions to the Army Commander and the Inspector General of Police, to use such powers as they have to protect the lives and properties of the public.”439 According to Latim, a Democratic Party member of the National Assembly, a highly placed security officer informed him that the police sent to Nakulabye had been authorized to use violence against civilians by orders emanating from the highest levels of government.440 Eyewitnesses were reported to have heard security forces shout to the crowd. “You Baganda are boastful. You Baganda have troubled us.”441 The people arrested at Nakulabye that day were not charged and were released the following day, suggesting that they had indeed been innocent onlookers and not protesters as the government had thought.
No punitive measures were taken against the police for their murder and misuse of power and the government did not apologise for the death of innocent people. Ezama, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, who commanded the operation was merely transferred to Mbale in eastern Uganda amidst press and parliamentary protests.442 Despite the government’s denial of involvement in the brutality, the people were not satisfied and many believed the government to have had a hand in the Nakulabye incident.443 And from that date as Karugire notes Ugandan uniformed forces learnt the lesson that they could literally get away with murder, and anything else besides, and the lesson is one they did not forget. From that date to the attack of the Palace in 1966 the Baganda never knew what real peace was.
438 G. Ibingira, African Upheavals Since Independence , p.58 439 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 3rd Session 1965, Vol. 67 440 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates,3rd Session 1965, Vol. 67 441 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates,3rd Session 1965, Vol. 67 442 ‘Abantu Batiddwa e’Nakulabye’, Omukulembeze,13 November 1964, p.1 443 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.79
109 Also in 1965, Muteesa requested a military brass band to play at his birthday celebrations and Obote turned down the request even though Muteesa, as President of Uganda was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.444 These incidents belatedly awakened Obote’s opponents to an appreciation of the role of the military and Ibingira’s sympathisers carefully began to also select and recruit among the armed forces and also imported arms and ammunitions without the knowledge of the Government.445 It is likely that the recruitment of ‘loyalists’ in the army and the importation of arms and ammunition by the Ibingira group were aimed at the maintenance of law and order by soldiers loyal to the anti-Obote group once they obtained power, although this did not happen.
The manipulation of the army along ethnic lines by recruiting heavily among Northerners and rapidly promoting officers from the region enabled Obote to create a reliable constituency based on ethnicity. He consolidated his position in government and the Uganda People’s Congress and the northern-dominated army became a basis of his political support. Under those circumstances, he confronted the Kingdom of Buganda in general and President Muteesa in particular - who was the obstacle to his long-term ambition of subjugating the Kingdom of Buganda and becoming the absolute ruler of Uganda. Indeed it was the military factor that eventually saved him from losing his office as Prime Minister. With the army on his side, Obote was able to disregard the delicate and complicated democratic system under the alliance and the institutional authority of the kings and in particular Kabaka Muteesa II that had been put in place with independence. Instead, he adopted an autocratic style of leadership and treated those people who had opposed his climb to power with contempt and with complete disregard for human rights and the rule of law.446
3.8 THE 1965 LOST COUNTIES REFERENDUM
At the London constitutional conference in 1961 that preceded the granting of Uganda’s independence in 1962, it was agreed that the question of the lost counties of Bunyoro Kingdom (Buyaga and Bugangaizi) would be resolved after independence
444 P. Muitbwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.31 445 G.W Kanyeihamba , Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, pp.72-73 446 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.37
110 by the people of the two counties through a referendum.447 This shelving of the problem would, the delegates thought, allow tempers in the kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro to cool off. Also, crucially, the British colonial administrators had been reluctant to annoy their ally, the Kingdom of Buganda if the decision went against them.448
The imminence of this referendum unleashed between the Kingdom of Buganda on one side and the Kingdom of Bunyoro and Milton Obote on the other, one of the most fervent political struggles Uganda has known.449 On 4 January 1963 Bunyoro Premier (Omuhikirwa) wrote to Obote reminding him of his responsibility of the need to change the local administration in the two disputed counties. According to the provision 2 of the Order in Council, the administration of both counties was put in the hands of the central government during the transitional period before the holding of the referendum. In addition, section 26(3) of the same Order in Council Obote as Prime Minister was to appoint a Secretary responsible for the administration of the two counties, however, by this time he had not done so.450 The reasons behind the worries of the Banyoro barely a year into independence was not farfetched. This was coming against the background that the British government failed to implement a just and final solution. This was quite contrary to the findings of the two eminent commissions headed by Lord Munster and Lord Molson respectively; who fully investigated the whole problem on the spot. These worries were now compounded by the feeling among the Bunyoro that owing to the fact that Buganda had immensely contributed to Obote becoming Uganda’s Prime Minister, there was a likelihood of Obote siding with Buganda against Bunyoro.
In the same breadth, the Kingdom of Buganda did everything it could to retain control over these two territories; and in the same year, it embarked upon bold campaigns to settle Baganda families of ex-servicemen in the two counties on a vast scale.451 The
447 ENA, C10168/4, Report of the 1961 Constitutional Conference London, The Lost Counties; J. Tumusiime, Uganda 30 Years 1962-1992, p.33 448 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.46; P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.55 449 I. Kenneth, Obote: A Political Biography, p.14 450 ENA, C10482 the lost counties volume iii letter by the Katiikiro of Bunyoro to Prime Minister, 4tJanuary 1963 451 ‘Bakawonawo bafunye e’ttaka e’ Ndaiga’, Ssekanyolya, 23November 1963, pp.1-2; J. Tumusiime, Uganda 30 Years 1962-1992, p.33
111 aim of this was to upset the population imbalance before the referendum in 1964 and thus ensure that Buganda did not lose control over these two ‘lost counties’.
The most controversial settlement scheme was that of the 8,000 Baganda ex- servicemen at Ndaiga on the shores of Lake Albert in Buyaga County, one of the two lost counties, to which Kabaka Muteesa II accorded legitimacy through his personal involvement. He writes, “It is true that I was not deeply involved in politics (1963-1964). I had put a lot of effort and time as well as money into the Ndaiga Scheme.”452 Muteesa allocated money, well in excess of 30, 000 British pounds to facilitate the resettlement. 453 He also temporarily moved to and resided at Ndaiga. “I was determined to retain the land that had been part of my Kingdom as long as anyone could remember.”454 Muteesa’a actions in the lost counties, however, would serve to escalate the tension between the Baganda he led and the Banyoro; the indigenous inhabitants of the area. For instance, in June 1964 Muteesa burned down a Banyoro village in the area. Muteesa would later justify his actions on the ground that a scheduled anti Baganda meeting had been planed to be held in that village. This was quickly followed by an incident in which it was alleged that Muteesa killed seven Banyoro at Buyaga market near Ndaiga. This had followed an incident where a Munyoro tried to poision him455
In 1964, Milton Obote as Prime Minister of Uganda became actively involved in the controversy of the lost counties.456 This had been so because they were a general feeling among many other Ugandans that the injury to Bunyoro should be addressed. However, when Obote joined in, it raised tension between the Kingdom of Buganda and the central government to crisis levels. In the face of fierce opposition from Buganda, Obote, a day after the termination of the UPC-KY alliance, went ahead and introduced a bill for a referendum to be held on the question of the ‘lost counties’ of Bunyoro.457 Although, this was in line with the requirement of holding the referendum within a period of two years after independence in the agreement at the 1961 London conference, Obote’s timing at this particular junction had much to do with his desire to
452 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom , p.155 453 MAK, AR/BUG/6/7, Lost counties, The Ndaiga Scheme1963-66; MAK, AR/BUG/67/1, History of Buganda and Surrounding Tribes, pp. 898-1890 454 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.147 455 J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda: A modern History, p.221 456 ENA, Box no 8/15, Collections of the Office of the President, Speeches by Milton Obote 457 ENA, S10482, Lost Counties, The Referendum in Buyaga and Bugangaizi
112 further weaken Bugandan opposition. His introduction of a referendum bill in the National Assembly on the 25 August 1964 was a step in this direction.458
Despite the spirited efforts put up by Buganda Kingdom in resettling as many Baganda ex-servicemen as possible in the region, the Referendum Bill provided voting eligibility only to those who had been registered voters in the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi during the 1962 elections. This is what Parliament passed into law as it called for the referendum over the lost counties, effectively excluding the Baganda who had settled in the area under the Ndaiga scheme. This ensured that the people of the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi would vote in favour of their counties being taken back to Bunyoro.
Obote’s actions in the period up to the referendum also fuelled tension in an already bad situation. Notably, whereas it was clear to him that the ex-servicemen whom the Kingdom of Buganda had mobilized and settled in large numbers would not be able to take part in the referendum vote, he simply kept quiet about the matter and this encouraged false hope among the Baganda. For some scholar’s, this is indicative of Obote’s dishonesty and treachery toward his colleagues.459 Also, Obote directed his Cabinet Ministers never to discuss anything concerning the lost counties.460 He had secretly assured Kabaka Muteesa II that he would ensure that the lost counties would remain part of Buganda.461 However, he also told the Omukama of Bunyoro that they would be returned to his kingdom.
By making false promises to the Kingdom of Buganda, he further distanced himself from the Baganda whose government had initially supported the referendum but now rescinded its consent and went to the high court challenging the central government over the validity of the referendum. The plaintiffs in the case were Kabaka Muteesa II’s government and Yowana Kabuye (47) who had settled in Kabaka Yekka Kanema village in Musale sub-county in Buyaga in 1963.462 The Buganda government lost the case but, in a special Lukiiko meeting called by the speaker Sheikh Ali Kulumba, it
458 ENA, S10482, Lost Counties, The Referendum in Buyaga and Bugangaizi 459 G. Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation, p.272 460 ENA, CAB/Memo/1/64, Cabinet Memoranda, The administration of the Lost Counties 461 G. Ibingira, The Forging of an African Nation, p.272 462 ‘Mengo egenze mu Kkoti’, Omukulembeze, 24 October 1964, p.1; J.R. Tumusiime, Uganda, the First 50 years, pp.38-39
113 resolved to appeal to the Privy Council, which also upheld the court’s ruling.463 The ruling, which automatically disenfranchised the Baganda ex-servicemen, had the effect of Buganda continuing to be uncooperative on the issue. Against this background, President Muteesa (also the Kabaka of Buganda) declined to assent to the referendum Act. By law and under the terms of 1962 Independence Constitution, in the event of the President’s failure to assent to a bill, the Prime Minister would do so, which of course Obote did and the referendum was held on 4 November 1965. The results released on 6 November 1965 showed that the inhabitants of the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi had overwhelmingly voted to return to the Kingdom of Bunyoro464. At the end of voting in Bugangaizi, 2,253 were in favour of remaining part of Buganda while 3,275 wanted to revert to the Kingdom of Bunyoro. Another 62 wanted to form a new district. In Buyaga 1,289 wanted to stay in Buganda, while 8,327 wanted to return to the Kingdom of Bunyoro and 50 were for a new district.465 On 1 January 1966 the transfer of these two counties from the Kingdom of Buganda to the Kingdom of Bunyoro was legally affected.466 As a result of this transfer Buganda’s 20 counties had now been reduced to 18, thereby creating intense animosity between Buganda and Bunyoro.
The immediate response when the results of the referendum were announced was that the Baganda rioted. There was an outbreak of unrest in Kampala as angry Baganda roamed Kampala looking for Banyoro. They also flocked to Mengo, the seat of the Kingdom of Buganda. The ordinary Baganda held Buganda government responsible for the disaster. Police cars were stoned and the ministers of the Kingdom of Buganda were not spared and seriously manhandled.467 The Katikiro, Micheal Kintu was attacked and only saved by the 14 central government police officers who were in charge of protecting Bulange House, the seat of the Mengo government.468 Baganda emotions about the lost counties had not softened since the 1962 London
463 ‘Mengo Omusango gwa gyemezze, ejjulidde’ Omukulembeze, p.1 464 Kiwanuka-Semakula, The Diplomacy of the Lost counties of Bunyoro, in Mawazo, Vol. 4 No 26,(1974), pp.111-141 465 ‘Abanyoro amasazza bagedezza’ Munno 3 November 1965, P.1; J.R. Tumusiime, Uganda, the First 50 years, pp.38-39; ‘Banyoro Votes to reclaim counties’, Uganda Argus, p.1 466 ENA, REL/8/121, Bunyoro Lost Counties, The transfer of local Administration of Buyaga and Bugangizi 467 ‘Obusambattuko mu Kibuga, Katikiiro police ye yamukumwe’, Munno, 3 November 1965, p.1 468 ‘Police etaasizza Katiikiro e’ Mengo’, OOmukulembeze , 8 November 1966, p.1
114 Conference. Land was an emotional subject and the loss of territory to the Kingdom of Bunyoro was interpreted as a lowering of Baganda’s prestige.
The unrests in Kampala were eventually quelled by central government troops which erected road blocks and guarded all key government institutions and installations such as the Uganda Broadcasting Station, the Parliamentary buildings, the Post Office, and electrical installations, all which were possible targets.469 On 8 November 1965, two days after the announcement of the results, Micheal Kintu resigned as Katikiro of the Kingdom of Buganda and was replaced by the young Mayanja Nkangi.470
The referendum was also a turning point in the relations between Obote and Kabaka Muteesa II (and by implication, the Buganda Kingdom). The 1965 referendum destroyed anything left in the personal relationship between the President/Kabaka Muteesa II and Prime Minister Obote. Whereas Obote had won much support in the Kingdom of Bunyoro, in Buganda he became the object of deep hatred where the referendum was considered to be act of treason on the part of Obote who at that time was still a partner in the coalition government between the Uganda Peoples’ Congress and Kabaka Yekka.
Obote’s insistence on holding of the referendum had not been on the account of his desire to follow the constitutional path but rather to bring harm to the Kingdom of Buganda. In his letter to a ‘London friend’, he wrote that,
“The ‘Lost counties’ was a serious political issue both before Independence and after, up to the middle of 1964. The Uganda Peoples’ Congress took a decision to implement the constitutional provision, which required the holding of a referendum. Although speeches in the Buganda Lukiiko included statements to the effect that the issue of the ‘Lost Counties’ could only be resolved through bloodshed, the issue of the ‘Lost Counties’ was settled constitutionally, that must certainly be another landmark in the changing Uganda, and it is a landmark that indicates quite clearly that although it was possible to seek the co-operation of the kingdom of Buganda (Mengo) it was not essential to comply with their wishes. What they considered fundamental to them (Mengo Establishment) but not to Uganda, the UPC on national grounds rejected the same. Those who dealt with myth when discussing the affairs of Uganda and
469 P. Mutibwa, The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics, p.40 470 ‘Referendum rocks Buganda’, Drum, November 1966, p.41
115 represented that unless Mengo agreed to this or the other that the Government of Uganda was impotent have always missed this vital point.”471
Despite the fact the country was in great need of political stability, the deep hatred between Obote and Muteesa did not augur well. From then on, there was deep mutual suspicion and actual animosity between the two although the destiny of the country relied upon them. The animosity of the kingdom of Buganda towards Obote escalated. Many ordinary Baganda were depressed and apprehensive. Kabaka Muteesa II increasingly came under the influence of his conservative chiefs such as Amos Sempa, James Lutaya, Antonio Tamale, Nyanja of Buddu, Sebanakita of Kyaggwe, and Kaggwa who urged him to adopt a militant stance against Obote.472 As President of Uganda, Muteesa refused to open the parliamentary session of December 1965 to confirm the referendum results. He also refused to sign the Act which had altered the boundaries of both the kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro.473 The Act only helped to accentuate the brewing suspicion and animosity between Muteesa and Obote and pushed the two further apart.
In regard to the holding of the referendum Muteesa II states that,
“Far from uniting the country, Obote had decisively split it, and I can only say here, as so often, that he must have known what he was doing; the results of his actions cannot have come as a surprise. In this case he purposefully antagonised the ablest and richest unit in his country, presumably already planning to destroy them as he had destroyed the party [Kabaka Yekka] that represented them. His method of building a united nation has been to destroy those that do not agree with him.”474
The referendum thus was a catalyst of the political turmoil that befell the country four years into independence. The enmity created between the Kingdom of Buganda and Obote drew the Kabaka and his Mengo Establishment to Obote’s opponents in the Uganda People’s Congress. This was a potential threat to Obote and the only way he could ensure his political survival was to dismantle the Kingdom of Buganda.
471 ENA, DG.C.26, Collections of the office of the President, Myths and Realities, Letter to ‘London Friend’ by Milton Obote, 16 November 1968 472 Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Independence Constitution Failed, p.14 473 ‘Towards a united Uganda’ Drum January 1964, p.35 474 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.157
116
117 CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNEASY PATH TO OBOTE’S DICTATORSHIP
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the early morning of 24 May 1966, troops of the central government led by the Army Commander Major General Idi Amin attacked the Lubiri (palace) at Mengo, the official residence of the King of Buganda. This attack came to be known as the Battle at Mengo. In the previous chapter, general political conditions from 1962 to 1966 leading to the attack on the palace were set. From early 1966 events began to accelerate alarmingly after Parliament passed the ‘gold scandal’ motion. The significant events that followed, changing the existing constitutional order; were the arrest of Cabinet Ministers, the suspension and abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and the abolition of the offices of President and Vice President. This chapter offers an analysis of these developments which preceded the attack on the palace, symbolic of Obote’s assault on Buganda.
4.2 IDI AMIN AND THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE GOLD SCANDAL MOTION ON 4 FEBRUARY 1966
In February 1966, while Obote and nine of his cabinet ministers were on a tour of northern Uganda, Daudi Ocheng, the secretary general and leader of Kabaka Yekka in the National Assembly introduced a motion in Parliament, calling for the suspension and investigation of Colonel Idi Amin Dada, the Deputy Army Commander.475 Although rumours of involvement in the Congo gold scandal by Amin, Obote and another two ministers had already surfaced the previous year, no investigations had been instituted. The Uganda Peoples’ Congress parliamentary group had on 31 January 1965 rejected the allegations outright and as a result it was not debated in Parliament. However, the matter now resurfaced in February 1966 and the motion was passed.
It was alleged that between 5 February and 2 March 1965 Amin had received about 45,000 United States Dollars for smuggled gold and ivory obtained from Congolese
475 ‘The Centre Cannot Hold’, Drum, February 1966, pp.53-56; ‘Parliament Accepts Ochieng Motion Seeking Amin Probe’, Uganda Argus, 5 February 1966, p.1
118 rebels under the command of Colonel Olenga.476 Ochieng produced a photocopy of Amin’s bank account which showed huge deposits while Amin had no known private means of income. The transactions indicated deposits of United States dollars of $1,500 on 5 February 1965; $9,000 on 15 February; $3,000 on 17 February; $28,250 on 26 February and $3,250 on 2 March1965.477
Introducing his motion, Ochieng also cast aspersions on the credibility of Milton Obote, the Prime Minister, Felix Onama (the Minister of Defence), and Adoko Nekyon (the Minister of Planning and Community Development). When speaking on the motion, Ochieng alleged that the Uganda soldiers patrolling the Congo border in West Nile were lawless and that Amin in his several visits to West Nile (from where he originated) had been seen bringing heavily guarded parcels to his home in Entebbe.478 According to Ochieng, these large sums of money were Amin’s share of the proceeds from the sale of gold, coffee and elephant tusks that had been looted from Congo during the military skirmishes between the Uganda Army and the Congolese troops on the Uganda-Congo border, particularly, in the West Nile region. He also claimed that Obote and the two Ministers had also improperly shared large amounts of money from the same ivory and gold from Congolese rebels.479 Ochieng further alleged that Amin was providing facilities to communist-inspired underground activists and dissidents who were training in the forests of Mount Elgon in the Mbale District in Eastern Uganda, planning a coup to overthrow the Uganda Constitution.480
The motion had overwhelming support from the house and was passed by almost all Members of Parliament, save John Kakonge, the ex-Secretary General of the Uganda Peoples’ Congress.481 Kirya a cabinet minister of mineral and water resources while contributing to the debate noted the following;
“... I wish to pay a warm tribute to the Mover of the Motion, not because Daudi Ocheing is my friend, but because Daudi Ochieng spoke the whole truth. The House will remember that when we’re debating this motion sometime (in 1965), we were told in camera that this matter was in the process of being investigated.
476 ‘The Kabaka Crisis -A Nation in Turmoil’, Drum, May 1966, pp.54-55; ‘Parliament Accepts Ocheing Motion seeking Amin Probe’, Uganda Argus, 5 February 1966, p.5 477 B. Kaija Uganda; Building OF A Nation’, pp18-19 478 ‘Parliament Accepts Ocheing Motion Seeking Amin Probe’, Uganda Argus, 5 February 1966, p.5 479 ‘Parliament Accepts Ocheing Motion Seeking Amin Probe’, Uganda Argus, 5 February 1966, p.5 480 ‘Parliament Accepts Ocheing Motion Seeking Amin Probe’, Uganda Argus, 5 February 1966, p.5 481 NAA, Parliamentary Hansard, Official Debates, 1st Session 1966, Vol. 63, p. 278
119 Now any sensible person would think twice whether the investigation takes twelve months to get the final results. We cannot tell the country that there were any laws missing that would enable the authorities to do this.”482
Kirya’s support of Ochieng’s motion would have been seen as a surprise to many owing to the fact that during this time he was the acting Prime Minister when Obote was touring northern Uganda. However, it was clear right away that Ochieng’s motion never targeted the central government. It was aimed solely and directly against Obote and the perpetrators of the alleged crimes that led to the gold scandal and illegal payments namely; Idi Amin, Obote and Felix Onama. 483 For this reason many in cabinet never felt obliged to support their prime minister for the crimes he allegedly carried out as an individual.
The motion was passed on 4 February 1966 and read as follows,
“This House do urge Government to suspend from duty Colonel Idi Amin of the Ugandan Army, forthwith, pending the conclusions of police investigations into the allegations regarding his bank account, which result should then be passed to the appropriate authority whose final decision on the matter shall be made public.”484
The mere fact that a vote against the Prime minister’s conduct was debated and passed by parliament without effort whether being accused in his capacity as an individual, was a clear manifestation that intrigues within both the party and the government had reached its highest levels. This led an observer to comment; “The cabinet was in the hands of Ibingira, ready for him to use as he saw fit. The legal head of government (Obote) was reduced to a retracted housemaster whose house had been commandeered by the inmates leaving him with nothing but a small corner to sit in silently.”485
Parliament also resolved that a commission be appointed to study the charges against both Obote and Amin. At a press conference on 11 February 1966, Daudi Ocheng stated, “The reason that I have done this is because I have checked and cross- checked my information and have been convinced that the sons of Uganda who were
482 NAA, Parliamentary Hansard, Official Debates, 1st Session 1966, Vol. 61 p.1381 483 P. Mutibwa,The Buganda Factor in Uganda politics, p.97 484 NAA, Parliamentary Hansard, Official Debates, 1st Session 1966, Vol. 63, p.234 485 A.M.Kirunda-Kivejinja, The Crisi of Confindence, p.90
120 killed in the Congo were killed not in defence of our territorial integrity, but because certain individuals had personal interests in the conflict that was going on between the Congolese people themselves.’’486
Obote had left on 1 February, three days before the motion was debated in Parliament, on a tour of northern Uganda that was to last 12 days.487 There was a great deal of speculation about this and many suggested that he was keeping open an escape route to neighbouring Congo open. President Muteesa was outspoken about this, saying that there was no urgent reason for Obote to go to the north and said that Obote either thought the questions in Parliament were not worth answering or he was trying to evade the proceeds by “fleeing” to his political base.488 However, a more probable reason is that Obote, increasingly besieged within the party, was anxious to forestall any opposition as he realised that his position as head of the UPC had become tenuous. He might therefore have deemed it necessary to garner support from his political base in northern Uganda, as he knew he would face a formidable challenge from internal opposition in his party at the next Party Delegates’ Conference which was to be held before 1967.489
What made things worse for Obote was that the circumstantial evidence around the gold scandal made it easy for the motion movers to convince others about the authenticity of their claims. Amin’s reaction to the accusations made against him also made things worse. Instead of letting the investigations proceed, Amin rang up Alexander Latim, the leader of Democratic Party and threatened to kill him and Daudi Ochieng, the leader of Kabaka Yekka, who had moved the motion that implicated him in the scandal.490 Although he later apologised, in the minds of the general public, Amin’s reactions meant that he and Obote were probably guilty. Moreover, General Nicholas Olenga, the leader of the Congolese rebels implicated in the scandal and a key witness who had come to Kampala to testify, was attacked at his home and disappeared.491 When Ochieng died shortly thereafter under unexplained
486 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.98 487 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My kingdom, p.162 488 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My kingdom, p.162 489 Onyango- Odongo, Why Uganda Constitution Failed, p.13 490 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.161 491 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.168
121 circumstances, his family attributed his death to poisoning.492 He had been imprisoned in Lira Prison in northern Uganda, allegedly because of his accusations against Obote and Amin. The shocking death of Ochieng contributed further to the rising suspicion and tension of the time.
Furthermore, Obote at one time had appeared to defend Amin when he suggested that Amin’s bank statement had not been misdirected, as alleged by Ochieng, but that it was Muteesa’s operatives who had obtained a copy of the bank ledger. Obote also said that the transactions reflected in Amin’s account had to do with goods purchased in Uganda from Mrs Lumumba, a Congolese national.493 His insinuation was that this was all simply a plot to overthrow him. Obote’s reluctance to discuss the issue increased the suspicions of ordinary Ugandans, particularly the Baganda who had never wholeheartedly supported KY’s alliance with the UPC. Muteesa stated that Obote had outrightly refused to divulge any details about the gold scandal.
“I received a mysterious telegram from General Olenga (a Congelese rebel leader) in Khartoum asking about the money frozen on behalf of the Congolese nationalists. I could make nothing of it, but when I passed it on to the prime minister, he said he knew what it was about, but it was not authentic and of no importance”.494
More pressure was put on Obote when Ben Kiwanuka, the president of the Democratic Party, asked for the temporary resignation of the Prime Minister so that full inquiries could be made into the Congo gold allegations in an atmosphere of freedom.495 Kiwanuka also questioned the delayed implementation of the parliamentary resolution to appoint a commission of inquiry. He was in full support of the appointment of a commission as the only way in which the country’s name could be cleared since the whole world had been told about the gold allegations. He also insisted that in order for the commission to appear impartial its membership should include representatives of all three political parties, the Democratic Party, the Uganda Peoples’ Congress and Kabaka Yekka.496
492 ‘Daudi Ocheng Yafudde’, Munno, 2 June 1966, p.1; ‘Daudi Ochieng’, Acholi Times, 9 December, 2013, p.1 493 “Plan was to arrest me. Says President”, Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, pp1-3 494 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.159 495 “DP Chief on Amin Motion”, Uganda Argus ,7 February, 1966, p.1 496 “DP Chief on Amin Motion”, Uganda Argus, 7 February, 1966, p.1
122 With tension rising after the parliamentary motion and with the suspicion that Obote was part of the gold scandal, political turmoil escalated. On 13 February nine days after the accusation Obote in a desparete position held a press conference at Entebbe in which he would deny all the charges. In his statement, Obote stated that: “I have received no money, gold, coffee or elephant tusks or any gainful commodity out of the troubles last year along the Congo boarder. I have led the government with clean hands and a clean heart. This is a frame –up to blacken my name and present me as the dirtiest man in Africa.” 497 Two days later, on 15 February 1966, Obote called for a special cabinet meeting in a desperate attempt to persuade his ministers to change their stand on the motion but Cabinet refused to rescind the decision to establish a commission of inquiry into the scandal. With internal pressure rising, Prime Minister Obote issued a statement on 16 February 1966 denying the allegations. 498
Eventually however, on 28 February 1966, Obote went ahead and announced the composition of the judicial commission of inquiry in accordance with the Commission of Inquiry Ordinance.499 The commission was chaired by Sir Clement de Lestang of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, assisted by Justice E. Milter, a judge in the High Court of Kenya and Justice Augustine Saidi of the High Court of Tanzania. Obote further assured the nation of the independence of the Commission. In his address to the nation, he stated that,
“On the subject of the judicial commission of inquiry, we have already made it public that we do not intend to interfere with the courts of the commission. Every person who has any evidence to give to the commission is free to do so and will not be obstructed in any way.”500
The Commission began its hearings in early March 1966. Its appointment was a political victory for Obote’s opponents. Its composition was not questioned, with Muteesa stating that it was an ‘unimpeachably honest commission.’501
497 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister, Press releases 498 ENA, CAB/ ME/MoS/4/64, Cabinet File, The Judicial Commission of Inquiry 499 ‘Inquiry Commission named’, Uganda Argus, 28 February 1966, p.1; A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problems of Sir Edward Muteesa II During His Final Exile,1966-1969, p.47 500 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister,3 March 1966 Speech; 501 E. Muteesa , Desecration of My kingdom, p.169
123 The significance of the 4 February motion is mainly not the truth or not of what was alleged, but rather the motives of those who sponsored it, the series of manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres it sparked off, and the fact that findings were never made public during the time of Obote’s presidency. Moreover, the support of a commission of inquiry by almost the entire government, including Obote’s own party, implied serious concerns about Obote’s integrity and signified that the power struggle in parliament as well as in the ruling party was serious. Although in-fighting in the UPC had been evident since the Gulu conference of 1964, it had now intensified dramatically, splitting the party along the ethnic divide between the north under Obote and the south under Grace Ibingira. The Ibingira group had all along wanted to remove Obote from the party and government leadership. The current turmoil afforded them the second opportunity; they had first planned to do so in 1965 at the Annual Delegates’ Conference in Mbarara but Obote, aware of the threat from within his own party, had postponed it indefinitely, denying the Ibingira group the opportunity to unseat him.502 It is probable that Obote’s opponents decided to use the gold scandal to achieve what they had not been able to in 1965. The motion that would culminate in the overthrow of Obote was clearly planned: Daudi Ochieng, a northerner like Obote, introduced the motion, thereby avoiding making it look like an attack from Buganda. He also belonged to Kabaka Yekka and not the Uganda Peoples’ Congress, which helped portraying this as national issue and not something that resulted from UPC infighting.
The allegations were undoubtedly part of a campaign to embarrass the Government in general and Obote in particular; the intention was to influence public opinion against Obote in order to create optimum conditions for his removal. But the accusations against Amin and Obote and his ministers were grave ones and the character and integrity of the Prime Minister and two of his cabinet colleagues were clearly in question.503 By supporting the motion, Cabinet had endorsed the investigation around the allegations of corruption. Moreover, constitutionally, the passing of the 4 February gold scandal motion in reality meant a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister which gave Muteesa as President the right to remove Obote from office. It
502 ‘Obote Ayongezzayo O’ Lukiiko lwa Uganda Peoples’ Congress Ssekanyolya,13 June 1965, p.2; P. Mutibwa, The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics, p.92 503 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Mutesa II During His Final Exile, 1966-1969,p.48
124 was not that simple however, as Muteesa was not sure whether the majority in the army would support him. His uncertainty about the loyalty of the military made him hesitant to take further steps but the battle lines between him and Obote had clearly been drawn.
There were particular motives in targeting Amin together with Obote. The anti-Obote group in Government, led by Grace Ibingira, had identified Amin as a major obstacle to removing Obote from power. Amin had a close association with Obote which caused unease in Commander Brigadier Opolot who was an anti-Obote sympathiser but feared retribution if he took steps against Amin. The anti-Obote group now wanted Amin arrested and on 9 February 1966 Cabinet passed a resolution, sponsored by Brigadier Opolot, that this occur.504 The decision in itself was not constitutionally binding but its importance lay in what was implied. By passing a resolution to arrest Amin, Cabinet gave Opolot the space to get rid of his rival and take full charge of the army. This would have eased the removal of Obote thereby enabling Ibingira’s group to take power.
But of course Obote did not execute the 9 February Cabinet order to arrest Amin, as his removal would have left the control of the army under Brigadier Opolot’s leadership. Relations between him and Opolot had deteriorated when the Opolot married a distant relative of the Buganda royal family.505 Instead of arresting Amin, Obote worked fast to consolidate his position by arresting his opponents in government.
Immediately after the 4 February motion, a great deal of activity in the military was witnessed, with troop movements and counter-movements. It was claimed that, with the knowledge of Brigadier Opolot, the Army Commander and President Muteesa, but unknown to Prime Minister Obote and the Minister of Defence, troops were moved from Jinja and other places to Kampala.506 Many political observers believed that the troop movement was intended to remove soldiers loyal to Obote from the city and bring
504 ‘Amin wakwatibwa- Kabinetti’ Ssekanyolya, 12 February 1966, 505 Onyango- Odongo, Why Uganda Constitution Failed, p.14 506 ‘Plan was to arrest me, says President’, Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, p.1; A.B. Kasozi. The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Mutesa II During His Final Exile, 1966- 1969, p.31
125 those who supported the opposition to it.507 This was around the same time that Brigadier Opolot was sent to northern Uganda to bring back Obote who was in West Nile where he had gone during his tour of the north. According to the Obote sympathisers it was Amin, the deputy army commander who, by stationing his loyal units at Entebbe International Airport where Obote disembarked, who saved him.508 It was Amin’s quick actions that made Opolot and his colleagues abandon the plan to arrest Obote.
Refuting Obote’s version of unauthorised troop movements and a plan to arrest him, Muteesa instead states that Brigadier Opolot was sent to northern Uganda on the instructions of Cabinet to inform the Prime Minister about the unauthorised troop movements that had come to their and the President’s attention in his absence.509 Muteesa adds that,
“the whole of Kampala was expectant, and it was in a tense atmosphere that I heard of troops being moved –some into Kampala, some out. Precisely what was going on I still do not know for certain. Neither the Brigadier (Opolot) nor I had authorised the troop movements, My guess now is that the men most loyal to Obote were replacing the less devoted in Kampala, so that he might be in control…At that time I was still less certain. Obote did not return (from his northern Ugandan tour). In my capacity as President, I talked to the Chief Justice and with Brigadier (Opolot the army commander) about the growing danger of the situation. I suggested the army commander seeks advice from Cabinet and informs the Prime Minister…When he [Brigadier Opolot] arrived to deliver the message, the contents of which he did not know, Obote’s party was bathing and several ran naked into the woods thinking they were being arrested. Indeed, Obote has since accused me of sending them to arrest him. But he has not said in that case what went wrong. If the Brigadier had wanted Obote, he had got him. In fact he was a professional soldier carrying out his instructions”510
Regardless of who was telling the truth, Obote had interpreted the troop movements as an attempt to remove him from office should the 4 February parliamentary motion not succeed in doing so.511 Against this background, rather than wait for the situation to get out of control, Obote decided to react first. He stopped the troop movements, alleging that they were intended to assist in a coup against him planned for 22
507 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.89 508 ‘The president`s status was to be divide government’, Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, p.1 509 J.Bbosa, Reflections on the 1966 Political Crisis, p36 510 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My kingdom p.186 511 ‘Plan Was to Arrest Me, Says President’, Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, p.1
126 February 1966. He also arrested those he believed to be behind the 4 February motion.
4.3 OBOTE’S PATH TO DICTATORSHIP
The political turmoil created by the gold scandal brought the country to breaking point. The nation was tense with expectation as everyone waited anxiously for the next move and, more importantly, who would make the move. Many had believed that the passing of the February resolution would be sufficient for the Prime Minister to re- sign.512 Others contemplated Obote’s flight from the country and yet others went as far as calling for the government to be handed over to the military.513 Prime Minister Obote was very fearful and referred to events surrounding the motion as an attempt at a ‘palace coup’ to remove him from power by a group in the Uganda Peoples’ Congress.514 . Fearing this, he began the steps to establish his dictatorship.
4.3.1 The 22 February 1966 Arrest of Cabinet Ministers
Questioning the motives of senior government figures within his Uganda Peoples’ Congress led most notably by Grace Ibingira, the Secretary General, in raising the Congo gold allegations and passing the motion of censure in parliament during his absence, Obote turned to unconstitutional methods to cling to power. Feeling besieged and with his power threatened, he sprang into action even before the gold allegations could be investigated by the Commission. His focus was on devising alternative ways to deal with intensified opposition from the rebel group in the Uganda Peoples’ Congress. On his orders, on 22 February 1966, a dozen policemen burst into the cabinet room and arrested five cabinet ministers who had taken an active part in the debate on and passing of the Congo gold scandal parliamentary motion. This arrest occurred during the special cabinet meeting called to discuss the terms of reference of the judicial commission.515 It is alleged that the decision to arrest the ministers was reached upon during a top secret meeting held on 16 February 1966.This was
512 ‘Obukenke mu Gavumenti’, Ssekanyolya, 18 February 1966, p.1 513 ‘Obukenke mu Gavumenti’, Ssekanyolya, 18 February 1966, p.1 514 ‘Premier Suspends Constitution-Attempt to Overthrow Government’, Uganda Argus, 25 February 1966, p.1; ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister, 12 February 1966 Speech 515 ‘Baminista batanno bakwatidwa’, Omukulembeze, 24 February 1966, p.1; A.R. Nsibmbi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, p.43
127 between Obote, Oryema the Defence Minister, Wilson Lutara the permanent secretary for the Defence Ministry, Olwoch the permanent secretary for the Ministry of home affairs and Akena Adoko the head of the General Service Unit. Those arrested were Grace Ibingira, the UPC Secretary-General and the Minister of State, the Minister of Health Emmanuel Lumu, the Minister of Housing and Labour George Magezi, Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives Mathias Ngobi, and Balaki Kirya, Minister of Mineral and Water Resources.516 They would later be detained in Karamoja in the north Eastern part of Uganda. The move to arrest the ministers astonished many but was indicative of how deeply Obote had been fearful of his colleagues in cabinet. All were prominent members of the Uganda Peoples’ Congress and had called for the establishment of a judicial commission of inquiry into the corruption scandal. These would later be dismissed from the cabinet. Besides being improperly arrested with one other being beaten as he tried to resist, Obote legally had no powers to dismiss them. This was a function of President Muteesa II as per the 1962 independence constitution.517
Regarding the timing of the arrest, Obote alleged that at about 10 o`clock on 21 February he received information that on the night of 22 February an attempt would be made to remove the government by force.518 All five of the arrested ministers were from the south of the country, including one from Buganda. Although Obote promised that the matter would be handled within the provisions of the law and that the ministers would be given every opportunity to defend themselves in court- this did not happen.519 They remained in custody throughout the rest of Obote’s regime which ended in 1971. The arrest was another indication of the ethnic divide that had become entrenched in Ugandan politics.
To counteract any opposition to the arrest of the ministers, Obote, on the same day and in contravention of the 1962 Independence Constitution, also announced his takeover of the powers of government:
516 ‘The Situation is under Control, 5 Former Ministers Detained’, Uganda Argus, 23 February 1966, p.1; A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.82 517 1962 Constitution, Schedule 1 518 “The plan was to arrest me”, Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, pp.1-3 519 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister,3 March 1966 Speech;
128 “In the interest of national stability and public security and tranquillity, I have today the twenty second day of February, 1966 taken over all powers of government of Uganda. I shall hence forth be advised by a council whose members I shall name later. I have taken this course of action independently because of my understanding of the wishes of the people of this country for peace order and prosperity.”520
With the arrest of Ibingira, the UPC Secretary-General, all political powers of the party became invested in Obote; he had effectively silenced the opposition from the right wing of the party and was now in firm control. However, it also set the stage for further political struggle and fierce confrontation for the control of government. With Buganda opposition to his actions ever increasing, Obote now concentrated his efforts in getting rid of his other formidable opponents: President Muteesa and his followers in the Kingdom of Buganda.
4.3.2 The Suspension of the 1962 Independence Constitution
To curtail the effectiveness of Buganda’s opposition to his regime, on 24 February 1966 Obote illegally suspended the 1962 Independence Constitution that had given Buganda a privileged status in the country.521 This came two days after the earlier arrest of the five cabinet ministers. In a statement released to the nation, Obote made the following announcement,
“The Constitution shall be suspended temporarily with effect from seven o'clock tonight. In order, however, to provide for effective administration for the smooth running of the Government machine and also for the promotion of unity the following subjects contained in the Constitution shall be preserved. The courts, judges and magistrates, the civil service; the army, police and prisons service; the rulers of Federal states and constitutional heads of districts; the districts administrations and urban authorities, the schedules to the National Assembly.”522
The declaration to suspend the constitution was also signed by a total of 13 Ministers amongst who were G.L. Binaisa, the Attorney General, J.S Luyimbazi Zaake, W.W. Kalema, L. Lubowa and L. Kalule Settala, A.A. Ojera, C.J.
520 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister; ‘The Situation is under Control’, Uganda Argus, 23 February 1966, p.3 521 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister 522 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister; Gingyera- Pinchwa , Apollo Milton and His Times, Apollo and His Times, p.91
129 Obwangor, J.M. Lwamafa, S.N. Odaka, B.K. Bataringaya, F.K. Onama, A.A. Nekyon and J.K. Babiiha.
The exceptions listed in the quotation above were made to curtail opposition to the steps Obote had taken.523 Furthermore, Obote stated that in order to provide for effective administration and for the smooth running of the government machine and also for the promotion of unity, further consultations would be made. He stated,
“I intend to carry out the widest consultations and I ask fellow citizens to believe me when I say that the suspension of the constitution was to enable us to arrest a dangerous situation which had developed and to ensure our dignity as a people and the dignity of our independent status.” 524
In justifying his actions, Obote blamed President Muteesa II and the Mengo Establishment: “The crucial point in the present situation is that my colleagues and I resolved not to allow the powers of the state to pass into the hands of an individual supported by a few individuals and for him and his supporters to exercise those powers for their individual personal glory.” In addition, he pointed out that parliamentary privilege had been turned into an instrument for character-assassination and promotion of the power and prestige of Muteesa II.525 He stated that there could be no doubt now that for much of 1965 and up to the present, parliament has been used to promote the interests of a few individuals rather than the interests of the country as whole. “It was because of this that I told the nation on the 9th of October last year (1965) that it will not be the aim of the government to allow the interests of any owekitibwa (a title given to Buganda’s kingdom officials) to outweigh those of the common man.”526
Positioning himself as the champion of the common man and in a further step to alienate the Mengo Establishment, Obote created the impression that present crisis, necessitating the suspension of the 1962 Independence Constitution was a struggle between the interests of the common man and those in highly placed
523 Gingyera-Pinchwa , Apollo Milton and His Times, pp.90-91 524 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister,3 March 1966 Speech; ‘Obote Speaks to the Nation’, Uganda Argus, 4 March 1966, p.1 525 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister 526 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister
130 positions of influence. This referred to Muteesa II and the Mengo establishment, whom he had accused of hiding the truth and being the real source of trouble by misleading the country about the reasons behind actions taken by the government. “The wild cries of freedom sound indeed very hollow when one realizes that certain individuals make that cry not because they want to serve the general public but because they want the general public to serve them.”527
Obote blamed the 1962 Constitution: firstly, he claimed, it favoured the already privileged, and secondly, that the President who at the same was the Kabaka of Buganda, continuously abused his privilege.
Obote also highlighted a number incidents which according to him proved that Muteesa had acted unconstitutionally, arguing that there was no need to preserve a constitution that had been repeatedly violated by the head of state. He cited various examples where the president had violated or abdicated his constitutional duties such as his refusal to sign both the ‘lost countries’ referendum act to legalise the holding of a referendum on the matter as well as the Act of Parliament that altered the boundaries between the Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda after a majority had voted that the two lost counties should revert to Bunyoro.528 Obote indicated that not a finger had been raised in protest by members of parliament or anybody else when President Muteesa II had abdicated from his constitutional duties by refusing to sign the act after the inhabitants of the lost counties of Bunyoro had overwhelmingly demonstrated their wish to be part of the Kingdom of Bunyoro and not Buganda.529
In addition, Obote added, “it will be remembered that the President refused to open the parliament session which began in December 1965 because as one Bugandan Member of Parliament informed me that; the President had refused to open parliament because he disliked certain measures which were due to be passed by parliament.”530
527 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister3 March 1966 Speech 528 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister3 March 1966 Speech; Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.91 529 ‘Obote Speaks to the Nation’, Uganda Argus, 4 March 1966, p.1 530 ‘Obote Speaks to the Nation’, Uganda Argus, 4 March 1966, p.1
131 Obote also questioned the motive of Muteesa in summoning the Acting Chief Justice, the Army Commander and the Attorney General in his absence. He pointed out there was not a single line in the 1962 Independence Constitution that provided for their summoning. Therefore, according to Obote, it was clear that Muteesa wanted to divide the Cabinet and remove him from government.531 According to Obote these were but a few examples, and they showed quite clearly that the constitution had been interpreted by various individuals to suit their needs.532 It would be very difficult, he urged, to continue operating under a constitution not respected by the head of state.
It was clear, however, that Obote’s actions were directed against his political detractors and at consolidating his position. Four days after the suspension of the Constitution on 26 February 1966, Obote promoted his fellow northerner, Colonel Idi Amin, the subject of the 4 February 1966 parliamentary motion, to the command of the Ugandan Army. Amin, who had been very instrumental in ensuring that Obote remain in control, replaced an easterner, Brigadier Shaban Opolot.533 Obote then ‘promoted’ Opolot to the ceremonial post of “Chief of Defence Staff” effectively removing him from direct control of the army.534 Major S. Kakuhikire, a southerner and a relative of Ibingira was demoted by transfer to the third battalion, while Major Senkeeto, an associate of Muteesa II, was accused of ‘stealing’ weapons from the army and sidelined. Oyite Ojok, another northerner was promoted to the post of Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master General. With all this in place, Obote moved on to directly confront Muteesa II.
4.3.3 Abolition of the Offices of the President and Vice President
Despite his consolidation of his power through the arrest of the ministers and the suspension of the 1962 Constitution, Obote was still insecure. His victory was incomplete until he succeeded in eliminating Ibingira’s powerful friends outside the Uganda Peoples’ Congress. Among these was Muteesa, the Kabaka of Buganda and
531 “Plan was to arrest me, says President” Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, pp.1-3 532 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister 533 “Ekiteseso Ekigoba Dr.Obote mu Buganda” Munno,21 May 1966,p1 534 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.56
132 President of the country, who at that time was Obote’s most powerful political opponent.535
To counteract the very real threat of Muteesa, Obote, in a special declaration on 2 March 1966, officially merged the constitutional offices of the President and Vice President and annulled the powers of these offices, which were now vested in his office of Prime Minister, which was clearly the aim of the restructuring. In the address he made, Obote announced that,
“We have passed through very anxious moments since early last month. The issues at stake are a challenge to the hopes and aspirations of the masses as opposed to the privileged few. The steps that government has taken in respect of the President and Vice President have not been motivated by hatred or anything of that kind. The removal of powers from the President and Vice President was forced upon us as a result of activities of certain individuals which were dangerous to security, peace and government.” 536
On 2 March 1966 Obote had the State House at Entebbe, which was the official residence of the President, sealed. He also withdrew all the soldiers and workers that served President Muteesa there and cut off power and water supply.537 Muteesa, who at the time was residing at the Makindye State Lodge, expressed his disappointment and condemnation of Obote’s actions, but he was powerless to do anything about it.
Obote’s abolition of the offices of President and Vice President served two purposes: it consolidated his position in government and subdued Muteesa, his remaining opponent. In effect both Muteesa and Nadiope had been sacked from government.
As further justification, Obote used the incident of Muteesa contacting of the British High Commissioner for military assistance, to demonstrate how dangerous his activities were. He stated that during his (Obote’s) tour of the northern region in early February 1966,
“The President contacted some ambassadors accredited to this country and made firm requests for military assistance. Nobody can, with any stretch of the imagination, make us believe that this was a constitutional act, and that the
535 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.82 536 ENA, 21153, Broadcast by Prime Minister,3 March 1966 Speech 537 ‘Ebya Kabaka E’byasigala e Ntebe Byamuddidde’, Munno, 23 May 1966, p.1; P. Mutibwa, The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics, p.95
133 President was acting within the provision of the constitution when he summoned accredited ambassadors without notifying the foreign office or any other minister, or I.”538
Later Muteesa would admit contemplating the move of inviting foreign troops but denied that this was for the purpose of invading the country. This is how he narrates his version of the story;
“During the meeting I had with the army commander and the Chief Justice, in my capacity as Head of State, I sounded out the British Commissioner and some African ambassadors as to whether it would be possible to fly troops, if the situation got out of hand. I did not invite a foreign force to invade Uganda. I had in mind something similar to the successful intervention by the British which Obote had authorised two years before (this was in 1964 during the army mutiny).”539
Like in many instances that would follow later, Obote had blown the issue of Muteesa II’s invitation of soldiers out of context. In the first instance, the British had turned down the request. Secondly, this would not be the first time that foreign troops were being invited in the country to create political stability as already mentioned. It was Obote who in 1964 during the army mutiny ‘fired the first privy shot’ in this struggle when he requested the help of British troops without informing Muteesa II, the Head of state.
Accordingly amplifying the situation out of proportion for his own benefit, Obote noted that,
“If no drastic measures had been taken to stem what appeared to be a tide rising against the existence of Uganda as an independent sovereign nation, the country would have been plunged into very grave dangers of finding itself invaded by foreign troops for the sake of satisfying the selfish motives of a few individuals.”540
Naturally the failure by the President to inform the Prime Minister would be constitutional bleach but it did not call for the abolition of the offices of the President and Vice President. Moreover, Obote as the executive head of government with all state organs at his disposal, it is unlikely that in abolishing the offices of the president
538 ENA, 21153, Broadcast by Prime Minister,3 March 1966 Speech 539 ‘Mengo Eby’amagye Abyegaanye’, Munno, 11 May 1966, p.1; E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.164 540 ENA, 21153, Broadcast by Prime Minister3 March 1966 Speech; NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 1st session 1966, Vol. 59, p.243
134 and the vice president that he acted hastily to ‘save the bad situation from getting worse’ as he claimed. Obote just blew the situation out of proportion to achieve his long held desire of being at helm of Uganda’s political power. Obote’s claim of ‘late discovery’ that the President was plotting with some ministers to overthrow the constitution and legally elected government by unconstitutional measures as a reason for the removal of the office of the presidency casts doubt. On the contrary, the chronology of events from the early February 1966 that included the arrest of Ministers, the suspension of the constitution and the abolition of the offices of the President and the Vice president are but indicative of Obote’s use of the crisis as an excuse to systematically abolish other centres of power. Moreover, still unsatisfied with the steps he had taken so far, Obote would go ahead to constitutionally strengthen his powers. Muteesa II reaffirms Obote’s intention in the following statement;
“On 2 March I was accused on television and radio of asking ambassadors to give me troops to invade Uganda. Also I was accused of not carrying out my duties as President because I constitutionally had refused to sign two acts concerning the lost counties. Finally, I had not opened the last parliament. This was perfectly true, though I did not see it as so terrible a crime. The Vice – President had performed that function, again in perfect accordance with the constitution. This, I suppose, was to try to bring up the old disputes in order to alienate sympathy from me.”541
Obote was however, to send a mixed signal as to where the nation was headed to. Whereas on one hand created an impression that whatever he was doing was to be short-lived, on the other he signalled that more autocratic measures would come. In his address to the nation on 3 March 1966, Obote stated that;
“My colleagues and I believe most firmly that we must do everything make the present situation a temporary one. I shall therefore be engaged throughout next week in holding discussions with a view to preparing the road for a return to normal and greater stability. I must however make it absolutely clear that government will not hesitate to take such further measures as it may think appropriate if the situation warrants in the interests of peace, security, law and good government”.542
541 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom , P.167 542 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Broadcasts by Prime Minister
135 Indeed on same day of 3 March 1966 the Inspector General of Police issued an order that banned the holding of public rallies in the Kingdom of Buganda ostensibly to prevent instability in the region.543
4.3.4 The Abrogation of 1962 Independence Constitution
As further manifestation of his emerging dictatorship, Obote, on 15 April 1966 abrogated the 1962 Constitution he had suspended ‘temporarily’ on 24 February. In an extraordinary meeting of the National Assembly, Parliament turned into a constituent assembly to pass the 1966 Interim Constitution without a debate.544 Obote literally forced members to pass and adopt a new Constitution which they had not seen or debated upon but which they were told they would find copies of in their pigeon holes.545 Thus this became known as the ‘Pigeon Hole Constitution’. Obote informed the house as follows:
“Mr Speaker Sir, I beg to move … as from this moment, the constitution we had from 9 October 1962, on this fifteenth of April Nineteen hundred sixty-six, we sitting as citizens of Uganda who at one time were elected to represent the electorate in the national assembly… now here assembled in the name of all the people of Uganda do resolve, and it is hereby resolved to abrogate the 1962 Uganda Constitution. Now a new Constitution is laid down before us here. Let it be adopted now; It is hereby adopted on this fifteenth April day Nineteen sixty- six AD. This is now the provisional Uganda Constitution till another enactment. Go down to your pigeon holes you will find your own copies of the new constitution whose content I now disclose.”546
This statement clearly left no room for consultation, debate or dissent. The members of the National Assembly were further intimidated when, as Obote delivered his speech, they learnt that the parliamentary buildings were surrounded by several truckloads of soldiers and four military helicopters hovering above the building.547 The
543 “DP Chief Wants Rally Ban lifted”, Uganda Argus, 1 September 1966, p.1 544.‘Konstitution Empya Dr.Obote Kati ye President’, Omukulembeze, 16 April1966, p.1 545 ‘Konstitution Empya Dr. Obote Kati ye President’, Omukulembeze, 16 April 1966, p.1; A.B.K Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Mutesa II During His Final Exile, 1966-1969, p.52; G. Ibingira , African Upheavals Since Independence, p.45; K. Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography, p.110 546 The Report of The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations Report, October 1994, p.513 547 ‘Parliament Meets under the New Constitution’, Uganda Argus, 17 May 1966 p.1; ‘Parliamenti Etuula Leero’, Munno ,16 May 1966, p.1; A.R. Nsimbabi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, p.45
136 1966 Interim Constitution made Obote the executive President and decreed that Uganda was one united country.548
The manner in which the new constitution came into effect was not only illegal but also a manifestation of the autocratic style of leadership which Obote had adopted since February 1966. The 1962 Constitution was rigid with regard to amendments: they had to be supported by 62 members, or two thirds of the National Assembly, as well as two thirds of all the kingdom and district councils throughout Uganda. This also applied to amendments pertaining to crucial matters affecting the entrenched federal stipulations of the Kingdom of Buganda as well as matters relating to protection of fundamental rights and the interpretation of the Constitution. The requirements had not been adhered to.
The new 1966 Pigeon Constitution was approved by only 55 votes out of the 92 members of parliament who were eligible to vote; 33 were either absent or did not vote.549 Four members, E.M.K. Mulira, Francis Sembeguya, S.K. Masembe and A.J.R. Kangahho, who. belonged to the now defunct Kabaka Yekka, voted against.550 On the same day, 15 April 1966, Obote was sworn-in as executive President of Uganda and the first parliamentary sitting under the new Constitution was held on 16 May 1966.551
The 1966 ‘Pigeon Hole Constitution’ went a long way in enabling Obote to achieve total control of political power in Uganda. With an interim constitution in place, obote began to rule Uganda alone supported by his cousin, Akena Adoko the head of the General Service Unit.552 According to Article 40 of the new Constitution, the office of the executive president was now strengthened as long as the president enjoyed the confidence of the national assembly.553 In addition, according to Article 39(I), Obote became the head of state and Commander-in-chief of the Uganda armed forces. Article 35(1 and 2) made him the repository of the executive authority of
548 ‘The Kabaka Crisis – A Nation in Turmoil’, Drum, May 1966, pp.55-56; ‘Konstitution Empya Dr.Obote Kati ye President’, Omukulembeze, 16 April1966, p.1 549 ‘ENAaluwaYaSsabasajja gye Yasindika’,Munno,12 May 1966, p.1 550 ‘Parliament Meets under the New Constitution’, Uganda Argus 17 May 1966, p.1; A.B.K. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.84 551 ‘Parliament meets under the New Constitution’, Uganda Argus 17 May 1966 p.1 552 Onyango-Odongo, Why Uganda Independence Constitution Failed, p. 94 553 Ginyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.99
137 Uganda. As chairman of the cabinet of ministers in terms of Article 44(2J), Obote also became the head of government and was responsible for diverse important appointments in the country.554 He could also unilaterally legislate in circumstances which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action while, under Article 38(1), he could promulgate such ordinances as the circumstances’ appeared to him required. In the execution of his functions the President was to act in accordance with the advice of cabinet, or of a minister acting under the general authority of the cabinet, except when the national assembly was sitting. 555 This was in sharp contrast to the powers Muteesa had held as ceremonial head of state/president. In the 1962 Independence Constitution, the office of the president was largely ceremonial and cut off from the control of the government. It was the prime minister who had the duty to keep the president informed on state matters from time to time.556 The 1966 Constitution now strengthened the presidency which Obote had taken over.
Obote had now taken two major steps to weaken Muteesa as well as the Kingdom of Buganda: the suspension and abrogation of the 1962 Independence Constitution and the abolition of the office of the president. However, he was still mindful that to consolidate his emerging dictatorial powers further steps needed to be adopted. In early April 1966, he sponsored a conference of the Prime Ministers of various Kingdoms and the Secretary Generals of Ugandan Districts, excluding the Kingdom of Buganda. 557 The conference took place in Kabale in south- western Uganda. It is suggested that Obote’s intention in sponsoring the conference had been to achieve a unified stand from the rest of the country against Buganda’s domineering influence and also to legitimise the steps he had taken, particularly the suspension of the 1962 Independence Constitution and the dismissal of Muteesa from government. The conference was fairly well responded to and was attended by:
T. Katuramu, the Katiikiro (Prime Minister) of the Kingdom of Bunyoro J. Kahigiriza, the Engazi (Prime Minster) of the Kingdom of Ankole
554 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.59; A.R. Nsimbmbi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, p.46; G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p117Ginyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.99 555 Ginyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times,p.99 556 ENA,CG.L.O.29, The 1962 Independence Constitution 557 ‘Katiikiro did not attend the KigeziConference’, UgandaArgus, 14April 1966, p.2
138 Mukombe-Mpambara, Secretary-General of Kigezi District Okello Olong, Secretary-General of Lango District B.K. Wegulo, Secretary-General of Bukedi District W. Wepukulu, Secretary-General of Bugishu District J.E. Eloku, Secretary-General of Teso District E.W. Kamwaka, District Commissioner of Kigezi558
To the delight of Obote, the participants congratulated him warmly on having abrogated the 1962 Constitution and on his appointment as the first executive President of Uganda in terms of the 1966 Interim Constitution and pledged their overwhelming support.559 The Uganda Argus described the participants as joyful that Obote was returning the country to normality, as he had promised in his communiqué of 22 February 1966 when he suspended the 1962 Constitution.560 That subduing the Kingdom of Buganda was accepted as part of that normality indicates how successful Obote had been in isolating the kingdom in the run up to his final assault.
The conference was an indication of Obotes’s success; virtually the entire country seemed to have succumbed to his point of view. There was little indication that the rest of the country was unduly disturbed by the events in the Kingdom of Buganda.561 In fact, many other Ugandans believed that in attacking Buganda, Obote had set right a historic wrong.562 He received congratulatory messages from different parts of the country including, surprisingly, from the three other kingdoms which one might have expected to have defended one of their own.
The Kingdom of Bunyoro, Buganda’s archrival, seemed to be most pleased about the events of 1966 that brought about the demolition of Buganda’s special status. Sir Tito Owinyi, the Omukama (King) of Bunyoro, immediately after the annulment of the 1962 Independence Constitution, sent a congratulatory message to Obote upon his success in ushering in the new constitution. He said that the 1966 Constitution was intended to
558 ‘KonstitutionEmpyaDr.Obote ye President’,Omukulembeze, 16 April 1966, p.1 559 ‘Katiikiro did not attend the KigeziConference’, UgandaArgus, 14 April 1966, p.2 560 ‘Katiikiro did not attend the KigeziConference’, UgandaArgus, 14April 1966, p.2 561 K. Ingham, Obote: A political Biography, p.111; D. Mudoola, Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Uganda, p.95 562 ‘Good wishes from far and near’ Uganda Argus, 19 April 1966, p1
139 unite Uganda.563 His message was shortly followed by that of T. Katuramu, his Prime Minister who stated that in the annulment and replacement of the Constitution, only a little wrong had been done.564 He went to great lengths to explain the reasons behind the congratulatory message of the Bunyoro Rukurato (the local parliament, the equivalent of the Buganda Lukiiko) to Obote. He declared that the majority of the people of the Kingdom of Bunyoro supported Obote’s move because none of the sections of the 1962 Independence Constitution that had been suspended affected the common people whose lives continued as they had before. He also argued that if Obote had followed the correct political channels, the situation would have escalated and spiralled out of control, and because this had not happened, there was now no cause for alarm.565 In addition Katuramu stated, if foreign troops had entered Uganda at Muteesa’s invitation, the people of Bunyoro would have been their first victims.566 A reduced Kingdom of Buganda would be less troublesome for Uganda he said and he went on to request that the central government also remove the four counties of Buwekula, Buluri, Bugerere and Bulemezi from the Kingdom of Buganda.567
The competitive frenzy of congratulation showed how successfully Obote had turned the nation against Buganda. The congratulatory message from the Kingdom of Bunyoro was followed by many more: from western Uganda came a message from the Omuhikirwa (Prime Minister) of the Kingdom of Toro, Samson Rusoke, congratulating him upon his election as executive president of Uganda.568 From the Kingdom of Ankole, Enganzi (Prime Minister), E.R. Muntuyera sent a message on behalf of the Omugabe (King’s) government and the people of Ankole that the 1966 Constitution was an advancement towards the achieving the true needs of Uganda.569 From south-western Uganda, John Bikangaga, the constitutional head of the District of Kigezi also congratulated Obote.570 Similar messages were received from the
563 ‘Good wishes from far and near’. Uganda Argus, 19 April 1966, p.1 564 ‘OboteYeerazengaMugezi’,Omukulembeze, 7 April 1966, p.1 565 OboteYeerazengaMugezi’,Omukulembeze, 7 April 1966, p.1 566 ‘Bunyoro’s views on Dr.Obote’ actions’, Uganda Argus, 18 April 1966, p.2 567 ‘NowBunyoro plea for more counties’, Uganda Argus, 22 July 1966, p.1; ‘AbanyoroBabagudde ate basabaAmasazaAmalala Ana’, Munno, 10 June 1966, p.1 568 ‘Good wishes from far and near’, Uganda Argus, 19 April 1966, p.1 569 ‘President gets messages of congratulations from Ankole’,Uganda Argus , 18 July 1966, p.3 570 ‘Konstitution Empya Dr. Obote ye President’, Omukulembeze, 18 April 1966, p.1
140 eastern part of the country, from the regions of Mbale, Busoga and Bukedi. The Mayor of Mbale town in eastern Uganda, Titi Mudanye’s message read;
“Congratulations from elder men, councillors, staff, people of Mbale Municipal Council and myself for being sworn in as an executive President of Uganda and for producing a constitution aimed at uniting Uganda.”571
The Kyabazinga (hereditary chief) of Busoga Sir Wilberforce Nadiope congratulated Obote on becoming the first executive President of Uganda. The Kyabazinga’s message was accompanied by that of Mwangu, his Katukiro (Prime Minister) which read as follows;
“You’re Excellence; please accept our sincere congratulations and best wishes from the Kyabazinga, government and people of Busoga on your appointment as the President of Uganda. May God bless Uganda.”572
From the northern and north-eastern Uganda congratulatory messages came from the Secretary Generals of Acholi, Lango and Karamoja Districts. A letter to Obote from A.K. Akera the Acholi Secretary-General stated as follows;
“We are fully behind you and your government in this action taken by you in the interest of peace and orderly government of Uganda. You have saved the country from riots, civil wars, corruption and political insecurity. I therefore, urge all peace loving, law abiding Ugandans to rally behind the Acholi people in supporting the Prime Minister”.573
The Karamoja District Council unanimously resolved to thank the Prime Minister Dr.574 Milton Obote for “his bravery and joins hand with him in assuming all the powers of government and suspending the 1962 independence constitution in order to deal with any eventualities that might arise.”575
All the messages congratulated Obote and seemed to support the unconstitutional moves he had made to the detriment of the Kingdom of Buganda. To the Baganda, this indifference to their plight by the other regions and especially the other kingdoms was a great disappointment. An atmosphere of mistrust and hostility resulted, which
571 ‘Good wishes from far and near’, Uganda Argus, 19 April 1966, p.1 572 ‘Good wishes from far and near’, Uganda Argus, 19 April 1966, p.1 573 ‘Dr. Obote’s Action supported’, Uganda Argus , 10 March 1966, p.2 574 This was an honorary Doctorate 575 ‘Karamoja thanks Obote’, Uganda Argus, 19 April 1966, p.2
141 enabled the conservative Mengo Establishment to gather more support for Buganda’s national-regionalism and further encourage enmity between Obote and the people of Buganda. The indifference of other regions to the defeat of the once powerful Buganda would become ironic when Obote’s autocratic rule impacted on them 16 months later with the introduction of the 1967 Republican Constitution which abolished monarchism, as will be described in the next chapters.
The support from the rest of the country for Obote’s steps to bring the Kingdom of Buganda under control energised him for his final assault on the Kingdom. Anticipating opposition from Buganda, Obote remained steadfast, emphasising that Government would be firm in implementing the provisions of the new constitution.576
Predictably, Obote’s actions were opposed by both the opposition Democratic Party and the Kingdom of Buganda. Kiwanuka the Democratic Party president wrote to Obote in which he vehemently criticised and rejected the new constitution. He informed the President that he preferred death to being ruled unconstitutionally.577 His remarks were later to be followed by DP’s rejection of the new constitution and instead outlined the constitutional path the country should follow if a new constitution was to be introduced. The party executives called for general elections followed by a constitutional conference, arguing that this was the only way to achieve a constitution that would truly enjoy the blessing and support of the entire country. 578 Alex. A. Latim, the party secretary general, and Paul Semogerere, the publicity secretary respectively in their statement they issued further noted that;
“The current political situation resulting from the abrogation of the constitution and its replacement by a new one on April 15 creates a dangerous precedent hence the Democratic Party executive cannot support the new constitution later rejoice over its introduction. The Democratic party will not regard it until such a time when Ugandans will voluntarily and democratically and without fear or intimidation what so ever agree to it or make such changes in it as they choose”.579
In addition, the DP pointed out a number of constitutional flaws that now existed in government because of the new constitution. First, the parliament as now
576 ‘Fair Deal for Buganda’, Uganda Argus,19 April 1966, p.1 577 ‘The Kabaka Crisis-A Nation in Turmoil’, Drum, August 1966, p.55 578 ‘DP rejects new constitution, calls for General Elections’. Uganda Argus, 5 May 1966, p.5 579 ‘DP rejects new constitution, calls for General Elections’. Uganda Argus, 5 May 1966, p.5
142 constituted with the 21 indirectly elected members from the Kingdom of Buganda, contravened the new constitution which stipulated that all members must be directly elected by voters. Also, although the current parliament would expire on 25 April 1967, the new constitution stated under section 73, subsections 3 and 5 that it would expire in the next five years.580 Despite their objections, however, the DP members of parliament took the oath to the new constitution.
The Kingdom of Buganda rejected the Pigeon Hole Constitution. The Kabaka and entire institution of kingship was still a major rallying point for the Baganda and for a commoner like Obote to dismantle it; the Baganda self-esteem was hurt. However, they also became determined not to remain aloof in Obote’s violation of the 1962 Independence Constitution and the steady entrenchment of his autocratic rule upon Uganda. The Buganda Lukiiko, in its special meeting on 16 April 1966, passed a resolution rejecting the new Constitution, stating in clear terms that the Baganda would only recognise the Constitution of 1962 as the basis for Uganda’s unity and stability.581 The Buganda Cabinet was in agreement with the Lukiiko resolution. Sempa, a Minister in Buganda’s government issued a statement claiming that the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution was aimed at abolishing Kingship in Buganda and other parts of Uganda. He stated that “Buganda is built on Kingship and without Kingship there is no Buganda, hence we had to support the Buganda Lukiiko.”582 Also the other six remaining members of the now defunct Kabaka Yekka namely Mrs F Lubega (representing the constituency of North West Singo), B. Lukyamuzi (Masaka North), Y.K. Musiywa (Mengo Central), A.K. Sempa (Sezibwa West), P.N. Serumaga (Masaka South West) and H. Visram Kiboga refused to take oath of loyalty to the new Constitution arguing that it was illegal.583 They would thus lose their seats in the National Assembly.
580 ‘DP rejects new constitution, calls for General Elections’. Uganda Argus, 5 May 1966, p.5 581 ENA, C392/2, Buganda File, Buganda Lukiiko Resolution of no 5 of 1958; ‘Buganda Lukiiko Statement on the Constitution’, Uganda Argus, 20 April 1966, p.3;. ‘OBuganda Lukiiko Luganye Constitution Empya’, Omukulembeze, 19 April 1966, p.1 582 ‘Parliament Sat Yesterday for the First Time under the New Constitution’, Uganda Argus, 17 May1966, p.3 583 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 1stSession 1966, Vol. 59, p.132; ENA CT(1966) Cabinet Memoir 32 ‘Parliament Sat Yesterday for the First Time under the New Constitution’, Uganda Argus, 17 May 1966, p.1
143 Accordingly, Obote sarcastically urged that the new Constitution was a fair deal to Buganda because it only had three provisions that related to Buganda for only which he could be criticized on the ground that these provisions came rather late. As a further step to isolate the Mengo Establishment from the ordinary Baganda, Obote argued that the new Constitution only altered three provisions: the surrendering of land and land profits by the Chiefs and Ministers; that a political party winning the election in Buganda and hence having the majority seats in the Buganda Lukiiko must be the one to form the government, and that the leader of that party would be the Katikiro irrespective of his religion; and that no person applying for a job in the Kingdom of Buganda’s public service should be requested, as in the past, to pay anything to those who are in authority.584
The adoption of a new constitution through the manipulation of the National Assembly greatly infuriated the Baganda and deepened the conflict between Obote and Buganda. Obote clearly did not have the power to alter the 1962 Independence Constitution. Although, he appeared to have followed a constitutional path in terminating the influence and power of the Kingdom of Buganda, the 1966 Pigeon Constitution lacked political legitimacy, not only among the Baganda, but also among a large section of other Ugandans. Also, the ‘spirit’ in which the 1966 constitution was presented, as noted by Mutibwa, was one of anger and individualism, as opposed to the spirit of compromise, tolerance and pluralism infused in the 1962 Constitution.585 The Kingdom of Buganda strongly objected to Obote’s constitutional changes and their challenge to Obote would influence the course of events thereafter.
4.4 KABAKA MUTEESA II’S REACTION
In the events leading to the Battle of Mengo, there were two major steps undertaken by Obote that directly affected the fortunes of Kabaka Muteesa II: the suspension and abrogation of the Independence Constitution and the abolition of the office of the President. The former ended the privileged and federal position of his Kingdom of Buganda and the second meant that he had been dismissed from government. This
584 ‘Fair Deal for Buganda’, Uganda Argus, 19 April 1966, p.1; ENA, 20.2, Buganda File, Commentary on the Constitution of Uganda; MAK, AR/BUG/4/15, The Buganda Lukiiko Activities,1955 585 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.58
144 brought Muteesa and Obote into direct confrontation, endangering the stability of the country.
Muteesa was infuriated at Obote’s single-handed unconstitutional actions since February 1966 when he took over the powers of government. Therefore for his survival as president of Uganda and most importantly as the Kabaka of Buganda, Muteesa took an active part in opposing the emerging dictatorship of Obote. This was the only one way he would salvage both his presidency and the Kingship. Unfortunately, although bitterly opposed to the actions of Obote, to his disadvantage, Muteesa II’s presidency had been largely ceremonial which greatly limited his areas of manoeuvre. Thus Kabaka Muteesa II’s reaction apparently seemed to be lukewarm. His protest was largely through cautions, petitions and helping in building of the anti Obote coalitions.
Muteesa did not recognise Obote’s changes and as a form of protest, he wrote several open letters to Obote warning him about the anxiety he had caused by arresting the five ministers and the suspending the Constitution. “As president, I sent three letters protesting against him (Obote). The third concerned my being locked out of State House, the official residence of the President…I published copies of my letters in the press, and they were well received, as no one had known where I stood.”586
In one of such open letters written to Obote, Kabaka Muteesa II cautioned him against his dangerous endeavours of introducing a totalitarian regime in complete violation of the Constitution of Uganda.587 Muteesa reminded Obote that “the existing tensions in the country today demand that we do our uttermost to reduce them instead of adding to them in any manner.”588 Muteesa made it known to Obote that he could not be a party to the illegal usurpation of his office of President, election to which, in terms of the Constitution, was by parliament and by nobody else: “I should be failing in duty if I left you in the slightest doubt that the people of this country would ever accept these,
586 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.168 587 ENA, File no C9, Buganda Affairs, The events which leads to Bulange attacks; ‘ENAalwa ya Kabaka eri Obote’, Omukulembeze, 4 March 1966, p.1 588 MAK, AR/BUG/2/5 ,The Kabaka Yekka Records 1964-66, Kabaka’s Correspondences to Prime Minister,1966
145 your own un-constitutional measures. Your intentions are now clear; they are not motivated by the sense of service to one’s country.”589
Muteesa looked outside of Uganda for assistance. Acting in what he still considered to be his capacity as the President of Uganda and citing the provisions of Article 34 of the United Nations Charter, he appealed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, to intervene in the Ugandan situation. His petition raised a number of points. It outlined the way in which Muteesa and George William Nadiope had been elected President and Vice-President respectively. It pointed out that the 1962 Constitution was the supreme law of the land and that there were no provisions empowering Parliament or anybody else to suspend it or any part of it. It described the course of events in Uganda from February to April 1966 in which the Independence Constitution was abrogated and the unconventional way in which an interim one had been introduced and adopted.590 With regard to the Interim Constitution, the petition stated that some of its provisions gave the president supreme arbitrary powers: “These powers plunge us back into the colonial era where the Governor could govern by decrees.”591 The 1966 Interim Constitution had also eliminated Buganda’s federal powers and replaced them with a unitary form of government. Muteesa through the petition requested the return to the 1962 constitution.592 However, as in his earlier attempt to gain foreign troop assistance against Obote, he was unsuccessful. Obote referred to Muteesa’s petition to the United Nations Secretary-General as act of rebellion. In the statement he released he had this to say:
“I don`t mind him writing or sending cables to the secretary general of the United Nations. The thing is that signing that letter as it was worded was a declaration of rebellion that in itself, in my opinion, was an act of rebellion and he becomes a party of that rebellion. The president said Sir Edward had bad advisers and was being misled on the political front, and probably agreed to do what he did because of his own personal ambitions, and being under false assurance that the army was on his side.”593
589 ENA, File no C9, Buganda Affairs, The events which leads to Bulange attacks; ‘Ebbalwa ya Kabaka eri Obote’, Omukulembeze, 4 March 1966, p.1 590 ‘Kabaka signed appeal to UN’, Uganda Argus, 27 May 1966, p.1 591 ‘EbbaluwaYa Ssabasajja gyeYasindika’, Munno, 12 May 1966, p.1; MAK, AR/BUG/2/5, The KabakaYekka Records 1964-66, Kabaka’s Correspondences to Prime Minister,1966 592 ‘Kabaka signed appeal to UN’, Uganda Argus, 27 May 1966, p.1 593 “ The Plan was to arrest Me”, Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, pp.1-3
146 Muteesa continued trying to build and strengthen the anti-Obote coalitions with the hope of having him removed from power. Muteesa is quoted to have sated; Now that I was no longer part of government, I felt free to appear as a rallying point for the opposition to this dictator. There could be no question of his allowing us to escape. Hope was small; we started an act of testing the legality of his acts.594 In Buganda, Muteesa’s efforts had some limited success as the Uganda Peoples’ Congress elections held in the region of Buganda were largely won by the Ibingira faction, a group that he allied with. However, since Obote did allow the democratic path to determine the course of events, Muteesa’s attempts to unite with Ibingira to remove Obote from office came to nullity.
In addition Muteesa also looked at the judiciary for help. Mr Abu Mayanja, a member of the National Assembly representing the Kabaka Yekka who at the same time had been instrumental in 1961 in bringing about the cooperation between UPC and KY filled a plaint in the high court on behalf of Muteesa.595 The suit was against Mr. Godfrey Binaisa, the Attorney General who was to represent the government of Uganda. The plaintiff stated that is and has been since October 9 1963 the President of Uganda having been duly elected according to the constitution of Uganda for five years from that date hence the claim of the takeover of powers by the Prime Minister (Obote) on 22 February 1966 is null and void. In the case Mayanja cited four statements and declarations made by the Prime Minister on 22, 25 February and 3 and 10 March 1966.596
According to the plaint, the first statement purported to take over all the powers of government. The second was a declaration purporting to suspend the constitution of Uganda, the third, to appropriate to the Prime Minister all the powers, duties and functions vested in the President and the fourth, issued by the Prime Minister’s office stated that the plaintiff had ceased to be President of Uganda with effect from 24 February 1966.597 Also stated in the plaint was that on the 25 February 1966 the officers of the defendant sealed off the State House, the official residence of the
594 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom , p.168 595 “Plaint filed on Behalf of Sir Edward Muteesa” Uganda Argus, 15 March 1966,p.1 596 “Plaint filed on Behalf of Sir Edward Muteesa” Uganda Argus, 15 March 1966,p.1 597 “Plaint filed on Behalf of Sir Edward Muteesa” Uganda Argus, 15 March 1966,p.1
147 plaintiff at Entebbe, dismissed all his household staff and prevented him occupying the State House.
Furthermore, it alleged that the Prime Minister (Obote) had not kept the plaintiff informed on all matters affecting the government “as he is required to do by section 60 of the Constitution of Uganda. Acting in accordance with government declarations reffered to previously, the Prime Minister had “actually purpoted to usurp the powers and functions “which under the Constitution is vested in the President said the plaint. The plaintiff states on the plaint that for these reasons he has been “unlawfully deprived of his constitutional rights, official duties, privileges, statue, dignity and calling as president of Uganda, and has suffered injury to his reputation and damage”.
The plaintiff sought Judgment for and against the defendant for a declaration that Sir Edward Muteesa is and has always been since October 9th 1963 the President of Uganda, and that a declaration that the taking over of all powers by the Prime Minister is contrary to the Constitution and therefore null and void. Mayanja also sought for judgment that the 1962 independence Constitution is still in force and that its suspension is null and void, that the declaration abolishing the office of President is null and void; that the government of Uganda has no power to do any of the things complained of; that all acts done by the government since 22 February 1966 are ultral vires the constitution and therefore null and void, and the declaration that messers Ibingira, Kiraya, Magezi, Ngobi and Lumu are still ministers of Uganda.
However, like many his other attempts Muteesa made to salvage his presidency even this one too came to a nullity.
Attempts had also been made to rejuvenate the activities of the defunct Kabaka Yekka by giving it a new name as a way of circumventing Obote’s law that had banned the party activities. The central executive argued that the new name would enable them to operate and open branches inside and outside Buganda.598 This was never implemented. There was a genuine fear that changing the name of the party from Kabaka Yekka would lose them supporters in the Kingdom of Buganda. Also the rate
598 “Kabaka Yekka Meets at Mengo”, Uganda Argus, 7 February, 1966, p.1
148 at which events were happening, Muteesa and his supporters were not able to implement this idea.
4.5 THE BUGANDA LUKIIKO RESOLUTION OF 20 MAY 1966
With the arrest of Cabinet Ministers, the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and the abolition of the presidency, Obote had succeeded in eliminating most of his political enemies and was in a much stronger position than he had been four years before. The only formidable opposition that had remained to speak out against Obote’s undemocratic approach and the turn of events that was being witnessed in the country in 1966 was the Kingdom of Buganda.599
The Buganda Lukiiko was outraged by Obote’s abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and spearheaded opposition to him. The abrogated constitution was the basis of the Kingdom of Buganda’s relationship with the rest of the country and the Lukiiko felt it could no longer tolerate the arrogance of Obote and his government.600 It argued that, according to the provisions of the 1962 Constitution, constitutional disputes could only be settled in courts of law, which had not been the case here. Yet, in the new Constitution of 1966 no such provision of settling constitutional disputes in courts of law had been made.601 Moreover, to effect amendments, the 1962 Constitution had required the support of 62 Members of Parliament and two-thirds of all Kingdoms and districts councils throughout the country. Again, this had not been the case. On this basis, the Lukiiko resolved not to obey the Obote government, while some of its members thought that secession was the only answer. 602
In all, the period leading to attack of the palace, the Lukiiko was the lone consistent voice in opposing Obote. It believed that there was no need to continue giving respect to a government that was un–constitutional. It had made its opposition to the Interim Constitution clear on 16 April, the day after its promulgation when rejecting it and stating that as far as Buganda was concerned, the 1966 Interim Constitution did not
599 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, p.38 600 ‘Okuggya Obwesige mu Dr. Obote Kwalemaganye’, Munno, 11 May 1966, p.1 601 ENA, C 10736 D.Gc 230 III, Independence Constitution , p.112 602 ‘Lukkiko Statement on the Constitution’, Uganda Argus, 20 April 1966, p.1; ‘O Lukiiko Luganye Constitution Empya’, Omukulembeze, 19 April 1966, p.1; I.R. Hancock, Patriotism and Neo- Traditionalism in Buganda: The ‘KabakaYekka’ (The King Alone) Movement 1961-62, in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.40 (2002), pp.419-434
149 affect it and its acceptance by the National Assembly was a shameful action that had spoiled its dignity and the good name of Uganda.603
The sentiments expressed by the Lukiiko reflected those of a large section of the Baganda and were widely supported in the kingdom. This was illustrated by the hundreds of Baganda who gathered at the Bulange Building, the seat of the Buganda government in Mengo, on the day of deliberation of the Interim Constitution and the release of the statement rejecting it. People gathered in the early morning of Saturday 16 April 1966 and remained there; through the entire deliberations without eating or drinking until evening.604 For the ordinary Baganda, the dismissal of Muteesa from the presidency and the nullification of the Independence Constitution had severed the link between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. A social contract had been broken and the Baganda did not feel bound by the terms of the Pigeon Constitution which disregarded the terms under which the Kingdom of Buganda had agreed to be part of a united Uganda.
On 19 April 1966, during a special session, the Lukiiko issued another statement explaining their opposition to the new constitution and affirming their earlier decision that Buganda would only recognise the 1962 Constitution.605 In addition, they called for a trade boycott and rebellion against the central government if the 1962 Constitution was not restored. However, this call was rejected by Buganda’s cabinet on 26 April 1966.606 The situation in Buganda in the months of April and May was generally tense. Despite the Buganda cabinet’s objection to the Lukiiko’s call for a trade boycott, leaflets appealing to the Baganda to stay at home were issued in Kampala in early May 1966.
Following the promulgation of the 1966 pigeon constitution, the situation in the kingdom of Buganda in the months of April and May was generally tense. The kingdom was in a quandary with its leadership divided as to what direction they should take. The majority of ministers in the Bugandan government had realized that a head-on collision with the central government’s forces was not in the interests of the kingdom
603 ‘Constitution Rejected by Buganda Buganda Lukiiko’, Uganda Argus, 18 April 1966, p.1 604 ‘Constitution Rejected by Buganda Buganda Lukiiko’, Uganda Argus, 18 April 1966, p.1 605 ‘Lukiiko Statement on the Constitution’, Uganda Argus, 20 April 1966, p.1 606 ‘Nkanji OLukiiko Lwamuyuuzizza’, Munno, April 27 1966, p.1
150 and would be disastrous. The Buganda cabinet ministers thus followed a cautious approach with hope that sanity would prevail and lead some dialogue between the Bugandan government and the central government, with a view to settling the conflict. Unfortunately, their cautious approach would have negative repercussions as the control of the situation and leadership now shifted to the chiefs and the feudalist elements within the Buganda Lukiiko. These called for stronger measures against the central government. It was against this background, that the new Bugandan leadership without consulting the Buganda’s ministers summoned a meeting of the Buganda Lukiiko and first thing the meeting did was to pass a resolution congratulating the six Kabaka Yekka members who refused to swear allegiance to the pigeon constitution and also re-affirmed their decision of non recognition of Obote’s regime.607
In further defiance of Obote’s machinations, the Lukiiko, on 10 May 1966, passed a motion supporting Muteesa’s appeal to the United Nations Secretary General calling for UN intervention in the political affairs of Uganda before they came out of control. 608 It is reported that the Lukiiko noted that;
“Dr. Obote had created a constitutional dispute which might result in chaos and worldwide instability. Since according to the new constitution the courts could not settle constitutional disputes, Sir Edward (Muteesa II) could not wait till the situation got out of hand. Hence his appeal to the Secretary General U Thant” 609
The Lukiiko sitting of 10 May 1966, also declared 16 May 1966 a day for moaning throughout the kingdom of Obote’s suspension and abrogation of the 1962 Independence Constitution.610 Leaflets were then circulated in various parts of the kingdom that called upon the Baganda to stay home on that particular day.611
Indeed, the loss of control predicated by the Lukiiko would take place 14 days later on 24 May 1966 when the army attacked the palace. The attack was Obote’s response to another Lukiiko resolution on 20 May when it declared all of his actions null and void
607 MAK, AR/BUG/2/8 , Records of the 1966 proceedings of the Buganda Lukiiko 608 ‘OLukiiko Lwanyjuliddwa ENAlaluwa ya Ssabasajja Gye Yasindika Mu UNO’, Munno, 11 May 1966, pp.1-3 609 “Lukiiko supports appeal” Uganda Argus, 11 May 1966, p1. 610 ‘Stay home leaflets ignored’, Uganda Argus, 17 May 1966, p.3.; ‘Police Erabudde ku bya Pamphlet’ Omukulembeze, 13 May 1966, p.1; ‘Anawagira Boycott Kanamujutuka’, Omukulembeze, 23 May 1966, p.1 611 ‘ Stay at home leaflets ignored’ Uganda Argus, 17 May 1966, p.3
151 and demanding withdrawal of the central government from Buganda’s soil within ten days.612 Kampala, the capital city and the seat of the central government, was of course, in Buganda. They thus expected Obote to relocate his government by 30 May 1966.613
As with earlier events in 1966, the Lukiiko resolution of 20 May set off a chain of reactions, culminating into the physical confrontation between Buganda and the central government four days later. To Milton Obote, the resolution to remove the seat of the central government from Buganda represented an excellent opportunity to get rid of both Kabaka Muteesa and the Kingdom of Buganda, both of which had continued to oppose his emerging authoritarian tendencies. In an attempt to possibly justify the actions that he would soon take against the kingdom of Buganda, Obote stated that Muteesa II was allegedly behind the passing of the resolution as he had been determined to do everything possible to frustrate the provisions of the new 1966 pigeon constitution.614 Determined to potray the kingdom as having rebelled against the central government, Obote stated that this particular resolution had been presented to the Buganda Lukiiko twice; in late April where it was debated and rejected by the Buganda Lukiiko and on 20 May when it was passed. He argues however, that that it’s being passed on the second presentation was not that the members of the Buganda Lukiiko believed in it, but because of the large number of paid hooligans who had taken up positions in the gallery and various parts of the Lukiiko chambers. These according to Obote shouted down Buganda government ministers and the members of the Lukiko who had been against the resolution, but it was passed because Muteesa II was very much involved in it.
Actually what had happened on that day, Semakula a member of the Buganda Lukiiko from the county of Kooki moved the motion to that effect that the Obote government should remove its seat from Buganda. The level of emotions was very high on both sides for and against the motion. One of speeches made on that day illustrates;
“Gentlemen the time has come to carry our plans… the essence of this motion, may be analogically explained in terms of ants and Red ants which live in their
612 ‘The Centre Cannot Hold’, Drum, February 1966, pp.53-56; ‘Ekiteeso Ekigoba Dr.Obote mu Buganda’, Munno, 21 May 1966, p.1 613 ‘Ekiteseso Ekigoba Dr.Obote mu Buganda’, Munno, 21 May 1966, p.1 614 Memoirs of Mayanja Nakani, ex-Katiikiro
152 anthill and are divided into two: the Queen who is only one, and many soldiers whose main task is to see that no one touches the Queen at all. Should any try to do so, the alarm is raised, war begins and soldiers fight to death before the Queen can be harmed. Thus Obote’s constitution is a move to harm the Queen (Kabaka Muteesa II). We have now raised an alarm by calling this Lukiiko. Let the fight begin at once; let all die to save the Queen.”615
One County (Saza) Chief who tabled a counter motion urging peaceful talks with Obote was shouted down by men in the public galley.616 Such had been the atmosphere in the house. Those debating in favour of Semakaula’s motion were cheered and those against were often shouted down. It had been this commotion in the public galley that the motion was never voted upon.617 During this particular Lukiiko meeting Katikiiro Mayanja Nkanji to whom now everybody looked to for guidance was caught between the two sides- the radical group that wanted to move on with the motion and the moderate one that preferred adopting a cautious approach. He would avoid direct acceptance or rejection but apparently he was more inclined to the moderate group and it seems Obote was aware of this, but this would not be in his interest hence he had to go ahead with his plans against Buganda.618
It is also alleged that supporters of the motion had been aware that the Kingdom of Buganda had no means to enforce its resolution but had hoped that the issue would ended up in the courts of law. This was partly the reason why a period ten days in which the central government would respond was given. “We gave as a date 30 May. We did not for a moment expect them (central government) to leave. The purpose was to bring a case against them for remaining (in Buganda), for we felt that if we could get the matter into court we were certain to win our case”619 Unfortunately, to the Buganda leadership, Obote did not pursue their anticipated path. Instead in his response to the alleged 20 May Buganda Lukiiko resolution Obote claimed that the ultimatum by the Buganda Lukiiko meant the de facto secession of the Kingdom of Buganda from the rest of Uganda and that this was an act of rebellion.620
615 MAK, AR/BUG/5/12, Proceedings of the Buganda Lukiiko (1966) 616 ‘The Kabaka Crisis- A Nation in Turmoil’, Drum, 8August 1966, p.54 617 Memoirs of Mayanja Nkanji, ex-katikiro 618 Nkanji OLukiiko Lwamuyuuzizza’, Munno, April 27 1966, p.1 619 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.169 620 ‘Uprising Planned Last Month’, Uganda Argus, 26 May 1966, p.1
153 In the statement he issued, Obote stated that;
“Time has now come when we must think very seriously as to how we are going to move ahead, and let me now say this to the country. It is simply not possible to do what Buganda Lukiiko wants. It is simply not possible to do what Sir Edward wants; it is simply not possible for us to go back and restore the constitution and restore to the position of Presidency someone who, in ordinary language actually committed treason against Uganda”.621
Obote’s statement was received with defiance in Buganda and from then events moved rapidly towards a military confrontation.
4.6 THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
The political tension between Buganda and Obote since the 20th May was very high and there were signs that an attack on the kingdom was imminent. On the 23rd of May 1966, school children attending school within the palace at Mengo were assembled and told to go back home. They would not come back until they were told to do so. On the same day, the central government arrested the three militant Buganda Sazza chiefs who had apparently influenced the passing of the 20th May Buganda Lukiiko resolution. These were Michael Matovu of Buddu, James Lutaaya of Singo and Lameka Sebanakitta of Kyaggwe. They were detained at Kampala Central Police Station, alongside Amos Sempa the leader of the defunct Kabaka Yekka.622 Commenting on the events of the arrests of 23 May 1966 Obote states that; “the day had been a bad one. We had ordered for the arrest of three Saza Chiefs and three other persons. The idea was to prosecute them not because of what was said in the Buganda Lukiiko, ordering the Government of Uganda to remove itself from the soil of Buganda by 30th May 1966, but because of outward activities undertaken by them before the debate on the motion in the Lukiiko. Immediately they were arrested nearly every part of Buganda region was in a state of disturbance”.623 As news of their arrest spread, disturbances within the Kingdom of Buganda erupted as angry Baganda rose up in un-coordinated resistance against Obote. Roads were blocked; bridges destroyed; police station chiefs and mobs took possession of police firearms.624
621 ‘Uprising Planned Last Month’, Uganda Argus, 26 May 1966, pp.1-3 622 ‘Sempa Detained’, Uganda Argus, 24 May 1966, p.1 623 ‘Uprising Planned Last Month’, Uganda Argus, 26 May 1966, pp.1-3 624 ‘Uprising Planned Last Month’, Uganda Argus, 26 May 1966, pp.1-3
154 At Makindye a suburb west of Kampala, at the former Kabaka Muteesa II’s Lodge, Baganda ex-servicemen and angry Baganda crowds fought against government troops.625 It is alleged that these troops on army trucks had been sent near the Kabaka Muteesa II’s lodge as a way of inciting the Baganda.626 However, Obote was to give his own version. In his statement to the nation he stated that; outside the palace at Mengo a number of roads leading to it had been heaped with heaps of sand perhaps to forestall troop movements. These events, though uncoordinated, raised tension that threatened the stability of government.
“On the same day, 23rd May, a number of world war II Baganda ex-service- men who were roaming around Kampala since February 1966, shot at an Army lorry, which was taking supplies to the presidential Lodge at Makindye near Kampala. Makindye is where Sir. Edward Muteesa II was staying as from October 1965 to the middle of March1966. He had requested for a platoon of the Army to be at Makindye, and the platoon was being supplied regularly with essentials. The Army lorry, which was taking to the platoon essential supplies on 23rd may, was attacked by ex-servicemen using modern weapons. It was in these circumstances that a special meeting of the Cabinet was called to consider the situation, which was developing.”627
Thus according to Obote as a result of the above events and in an effort to assert the authority of the central government over the kingdom of Buganda, he on the 23 May 1966 convened an emergency Cabinet meeting. The decision to declare a state of emergency in the Kingdom of Buganda was not taken until a report was received at about 8:30 p.m. To that effect, some of the ex-servicemen who had attacked the Army lorry had been arrested by the police and had in their possession modern weapons which they alleged were distributed to them by officials at the Lubiri (Kabaka’s palace), Mengo. There was also information at about 9:00 p.m. also to the effect that a number of police stations had been over-run by mobs led by chiefs, and that some of them had been burnt out. These were some of the considerations that led to the declaration of the state of Emergency in Buganda Region.628
With the curtailed Baganda movement, the situation calmed especially in and around Kampala. This gave Obote an upper hand, and with help of the military, he took
625 ‘The Kabaka Crisis – A Nation in Turmoil’, Drum, May 1966, pp. 55- 56 626 Memoirs of Mayanja Nakani, ex-Katiikiro 627 ‘Uprising Planned Last Month’, Uganda Argus, 26 May 1966, pp.1-3 628 ‘Uprising Planned Last Month’, Uganda Argus, 26 May 1966, pp.1-3
155 decisive measures against the Kingdom of Buganda which apparently had remained the sole opposition to his rise to the position of an absolute ruler.
156 CHAPTER FIVE
THE BATTLE OF MENGO 24 MAY 1966
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The 1966 political turmoil which culminated in the Battle of Mengo was pivotal in the history of the Kingdom of Buganda. The era immediately before the attack on the palace marked the zenith of the Kingdom. Thereafter, it became a shell of its former glory. To many Baganda, the capture of the palace (Lubiri), which for them symbolized the ultimate attack on Buganda’s civilization and hegemony, made 1966 and the period thereafter the darkest in the history of their kingdom. This chapter gives an account of the events of 24 May 1966 and analyses the immediate political impact of the Battle of Mengo on both Buganda as a region and the Baganda as an ethnic group in Uganda.
5.2 THE PREPARATIONS
Since the beginning of 1966 the political struggle for the control of the country had greatly intensified. First, as described in earlier chapters, there had been a struggle within the Uganda Peoples’ Congress, the ruling party, and also between Obote and the leadership of Buganda. Obote had emerged victorious from the struggles within the UPC and now he turned his attention to the Kingdom of Buganda which had remained the major obstacle to his firm control over Uganda. As manoeuvres and counter manoeuvres between Obote and Muteesa II intensified, Obote’s strategy was to portray Buganda as a kingdom that threatened the unity, peace and stability of the nation. In his campaign of propaganda, he hinted, on a number of occasions, that both Muteesa and the Buganda Lukiiko had been involved in unconstitutional and treasonable activities. Later he also claimed that intelligence showed that Muteesa had amassed arms in preparation for a rebellion.629
These statements coming from the executive head of government could not be taken lightly; there were indications that Obote was only awaiting an opportunity to attack the Kingdom. Having laid the groundwork, he preceded to plan the attack on the
629 EBB, Box no 8/15, Miscellaneous Assorted papers only, Speeches by Milton Obote
157 Palace at the Mengo, the official residence of Kabaka Muteesa II. At a cabinet meeting he chaired, it was decided that a single army company would be deployed during the attack.630 This had been a tactical move by Obote because using more than one company in military manoeuvre constitutionally required the executive to receive parliamentary approval. However, Obote at this particular time was not sure he would get that support. 631
In the meantime, many people from Kampala and the surrounding villages, in anticipation of an attack, came to Mengo Palace to protect their King.632 This raised tension even more and a company from Jinja, a town 50 miles east of Kampala, commanded by Captain Hussien Marijan, was sent to Kampala to contain the situation that appeared to be getting out of hand.633 During this period Muteesa also stated that low-flying Tiger jets passed all over the palace presumambly taking photographs on which the Army could base their tactical decisions.634
It was the Marijan Company that drew up a plan to enter and cordon off the Lubiri with the help of the Uganda Army field engineers. They planned to enter the Lubiri by demolishing the part of the palace wall facing Katwe, a suburb of Kampala neighbouring the palace in the south. This was done by the head of the army’s demolition unit, Lieutenant Suleiman, who was based in Jinja.
In further preparation for the attack the next day, on the afternoon of 23 May soldiers from the B Company from Moroto barracks in north-eastern Uganda were hurriedly flown to Kampala to maintain order.635 They were brought in without dry rations and resorted to eating at Nateete a suburb west of Kampala largely occupied by Baganda. They were poisoned and about 45 of them died.636
630 G. Ibinigira, The Forging of an African Nation, p.287 631 E. Muteesa, The Desecration of My Kingdom, p.169 632 ‘Abantu bayiwa ku Lubiri e Mengo’ Ssekanyolya, 23 May 1966, p.1; P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence, p.39 633 ‘Obote ayiyye amagye mu Kampala’ Omukulembeze, 22 May 1966, p.1; J.R. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda, the First 50 Years p.45 634 E. Muteesa, The Desecration of My kingdom, p.1 635 ‘Amagye okuva e’Moroto gayiridwa mu Kampala’ Ssekanyolya , 24 May 1966, P.1; J.R. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda, the First 50 Years, p.45 636 ‘Abasilikale bafudde obutwa’, Omukulembeze, 26 May 1966, p.2; J.R. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda, the First 50 Years, p.45
158 Inspector Ezama who had led this Special Force unit was sent to reinforce the Moroto troops. The unit was so brutal that even before the battle of Mengo it had been involved in the shooting of 80 people at Nankulabye and Natete suburbs.637 Though Ezama was arrested and taken before the High Court, he was later acquitted by the Chief Justice.
5.3 THE SKIRMISH
“At about 5.30 in the morning when I was awakened suddenly by the sound of gunfire I hurried into a shirt, some trousers and a pullover and sat on my bed to pull on some suede boots. I dashed into the cool, dark garden to look for the commander of the Bodyguards. Troops from the Uganda army were attacking my palace”.638
This is from Kabaka Muteesa II’s decription of what happened at his palace on Tuesday 24 May 1966 as the government soldiers stormed the Mengo Palace.639 It was the soldiers who had attacked the palace through the Sabagabo gate on the southern side of the palace that had awakened Muteesa. The Sabagabo gate was one of the four entrances to the palace, the others being the main Nalongo gate on the west and the Kaalaala gate on the east side. This marked the beginning of the Battle of Mengo. The attack was commanded by the Army Commander, Major General Idi Amin. The force that attacked the Lubiri was 1,000 strong, made up of 700 army soldiers from two infantry companies from each of the Uganda Army’s four battalions and an advance team of 300 special force troops.640
The Kabaka was defended by a probable maximum of 120 bodyguards.641 According to the 1962 Constitution the Kabaka’s bodyguard was his official security. The Constitution provided for as many as 300 in the guard but it reality its number was never more than 120 and on this day many were absent.642 In addition to the advantage in number of the invading troops, the palace was never designed as a
637 ‘Abantu batiddwa e’Nakulabye’ Ssekanyolya, 24 May 1966, p.2; J.R. Tumusiime, Independent Uganda, the First 50 Years, p.45 638 E. Muteesa , Desecration of My Kingdom, p.1 639 ‘Police Capture Palace Several Killed’, Uganda Argus, 25 May 1966, p.1; ‘The Centre Cannot Hold’, Drum, February 1966, pp.53-56 640 ‘Amin yekulembede abalumbwe o’Lubiri’, Omukulembeze, 26 May 1966, pp.1-3; E. Muteesa , Desecration of My Kingdom, p.3 641 A.B.K Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Mutesa II During His Final Exile: 1966-1969, p.53 642 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.2
159 fortress: its main gate was indefensible as were the two buildings closest to it. The Kabaka’s bodyguard also had inferior weapons compared to those of the government troops, each of whom had a Lee-Enfield rifle, and there were half a dozen Sterling sub-machine guns and six automatic rifles.643
The attack at the palace began at the Kaalaala gate by the Special Forces unit, which made a tactical error by setting fire to thatched huts there. The light from the fire exposed the invading troops as they ran across an open sports ground, attempting to join the rest of their colleagues who had entered by the main gate. This helped the Kabaka’s body guards to inflict heavy causalities on the invaders and hold their ground for some time.644
Also, it is alleged that to the advantage of the Kabaka’s bodyguards, the invading government troops lost valuable time as the initial attackers focussed on the destruction of buildings, particularly the official residence of the Kabaka. Commenting on this destructive nature of the invading troops, Kabaka Muteesa II had this to say in his memoir: “I think they believed their own stories about hidden supplies of arms, and even indulged in fanciful ideas that a king must have hoards of treasure buried beneath his palace.”645 It was to the advantage of the Kabaka’s bodyguards however, as they were able to organise a formidable defence of their king. Muteesa wrote in his memoir that, although he had anticipated an attack on the palace, he had not expected to witness the random and pointless violence of the invading soldiers.646
Eventually, the government troops were able to take command of three entrances; the Main gate, the Kaalaala gate and the Sabagabo gate. It was only the western gate, known as Nalongo that remained contested with Kabaka Muteesa II’s bodyguards defending it until their eventual defeat later in the day.
As the fighting progressed, the main concentration of the Kabaka’s bodyguards under his command was at the western gate, also known as Nalongo. This particular gate was strategically well placed for the poorly equipped bodyguards. They had a limited
643 ‘Kabaka Yannyonnyodde nga Bweyadduka mu Lubiri’, Munno, 25 June 1966, p.1; E. Muteesa II, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.2 644 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.3 645 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.4 646 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.4
160 supply of ammunition, but the eucalyptus trees, buildings and cattle kraal at the gate helped them to defend their position.647
Muteesa initially thought that the attack on his palace was a simple skirmish that would only last a short while but fighting continued to midday with the sounds of small guns and mortars that had started at dawn continuing. There was an apparently endless supply of enemy soldiers but a dwindling supply of ammunition for the Kabaka’s bodyguards.648 Muteesa and his bodyguards at first hoped that, in the face of such a prolonged and successful resistance, the central government troops might call off the attack but this did not happen.
It was in these circumstances that Muteesa, in desperation, decided to abandon the trees at the Nalongo gate and provide for his defence in the cattle kraal. At about noon there was a heavy downpour which reduced visibility to a minimum and fighting died down considerably for over an hour.649 Muteesa writes that; “Many thought I had escaped during the rain but we hoped to resist until evening and escape in the dark.”650 Thus, with the rain subsiding, Muteesa’s fighting group decided to move north, away from the kraal which they now thought they would not be able to defend with their depleted ammunition.
Although Muteesa had planned to fight until day break, as the day progressed, he realised that he needed to think seriously about escaping from the palace: “Our own ammunition was low and there was no indication of the troops pulling out. All the entrances to the palace had been surrounded by the invading troops. It was then decided that we attack some army trucks on the road with a hope of creating a gap for the escape.”651 The target was mainly around the western gate (Nalango) where the Kabaka’s bodyguard had also maintained a strong foothold. When the bodyguards attacked the three central moving army trucks in a convoy on the road across from the palace, a gap was created which gave Muteesa the opportunity to escape. He climbed
647 ‘KabakaYannyonnyodde nga Bwe yadduka mu Lubiri’, Munno, 25 June 1966, p.1 648 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.5 649 ‘Police Capture Palace’, Uganda Argus, 25 May 1966, pp.1-2 650 E. Muteesa, Desecration of My Kingdom, p.5 651 ‘Kabaka Yannyonnyodde nga Bweyadduka mu Lubiri, Munno, 25 June 1966, p.1
161 over the brick wall assisted by a few of his bodyguards.652 With his escape, and after twelve hours of fierce fighting, the Uganda Army overcame the Kabaka’s bodyguards and the palace was captured. The attackers set the palace ablaze destroying many centuries-old cultural treasures.
The Battle of Mengo marked the climax of the period of political and constitutional questions and crises that arose as soon as Uganda attained independence. This battle was mostly precipitated by the manoeuvres and counter manoeuvres emanating from the February 1966 Motion which provided Obote with several opportunities to effect a coup against his political opponents within and outside his party, eventually leading him to create and occupy the topmost position of power in the country — the executive presidency. Buganda became the biggest victim of the crisis. It must be emphasized, however, that the crisis never began as a conflict between Obote and Buganda; it was Buganda’s refusal to accept Obote’s illegal actions that led Buganda taking the centre stage in the conflict that was to culminate in the violent confrontation between the central government and the leadership of Buganda. Buganda had contributed to the politically uncomfortable environment in which Obote was functioning and this left him with no alternative but to use unconstitutional methods to get rid of it.
5.4 THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
With the escape of the Kabaka from the palace, the Battle of Mengo came to an end. Muteesa’s first stop, ironically, was the headquarters at Lubaga of the Roman Catholic Church, which had been so discriminated against by his government. Later, he was taken to the home of Semyoni and Eva Nsibambi where he was prayed for and given lunch.653 After surrendering his firearm on the night of 24 May 1966, he was taken to Canon Kigozi’s home across the road after a visit from people suspicious of goings- on at the Nsibambi home. The next day he was driven by Kamanyi Dan Junior to a remote area of the kingdom and he later he found his way to exile in England via the central African country of Burundi aboard a United Nations cargo plane after spending
652 ‘EBB, Box 81/5, Newspaper clipping, Kabaka in Exile, Kabaka Tells of Dash to Freedom after Escape from Palace, The Guardian, 24 June 1966. King Freddie in Escape Drama, Daily Sketch , 24 June 1966 653 A.R. Nsimbabi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, p.75
162 four weeks in hiding.654 Before leaving the country Muteesa lamented the suffering and hardships the attack brought about. In his statement he stated;
“It was on May 24. Within 12 hours my life suddenly changed. Instead of being a king and ex-president of Uganda I was a hunted man in my own kingdom, hiding in the bush where I had once hunted big game with my friends… for food we took berries and anything we could find; sometimes we had to take food and sometimes friendly villagers would give us things like sweet potatoes. But I did not want to create trouble for friendly Baganda by staying in their villages.”655
The battle, which Kabaka Muteesa II described as an amazingly inexpert attack on his palace, had marked the first major blood bath in independent Uganda.656 It was also for the first time in the country’s short history, that the state had deliberately and systematically turned its guns on its own people. The events that occurred on that day had far-reaching consequences and left a scar on the history of the Kingdom of Buganda and the state of Uganda. Though the king had escaped from the palace, hundreds of defenceless innocent people had lost their lives in Buganda.657
In the immediate aftermath of the battle, government issued a statement in which it gave its explanation for the attack. The explanation was that they had gone to the palace to investigate reports that arms were being issued there and it was then that they were fired at.658 Though no weapons were actually discovered in the palace, the central government maintained its version that indeed arms had been found. It stated that the arms which had been captured at Mengo had been illegally obtained without the knowledge of the central government and that they could only have been brought into the country by illegal means and also for the express purpose of overthrowing the Uganda government by force of arms.659
654 EBB, Box 81/5, Newspaper clipping-Kabaka in Exile, Grateful Kabaka in England, Daily Telegraph, 24 June 1966. King Freddie Flies in, Daily Mail 24 June 1966 655 EBB, Box 81/5, Newspaper clipping-Kabaka in Exile, King Freddie Flies in, Daily Mail 24 June 1966 656 E. Muteesa , Desecration of My Kingdom, p.192; P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.39 657 ‘The Kabaka’s Flight into Exile’, Drum, August 1966, p.57; MAK, AR/BUG/2/7, The Buganda Records 1965-66, The Attack of the Lubiri; P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.39; ‘Police Capture Palace. Several Killed’, Uganda Argus, 25 May 1966, p.1 658 ‘Plan was to arrest me, says President, Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, p.1 659 ‘Why force was used’, Uganda Argus 28 May 1966, p.1; ‘Dr.Obote yatangazizza Ebissibizuliddwa muttaka’, Omukulembeze, 28 May 1966, p.1 ‘Plan was to arrest me, says President’, Uganda Argus 13 July 1966, p.1
163 This Buganda version of the events of 24 May 1966 and its aftermath is best summarised by the following two excerpts from letters to a friend in London by an eyewitness and participant, one of the Kabaka’s bodyguards. In the first letter, dated 14 June 1966, the bodyguard describes the bloodshed during and after the attack:
“I escaped from the war when Uganda army men attacked all Buganda and shoot large number of people, which I think the number over two thousand dead. I am still alive, but condition is very bad for me. Buganda now is no longer a freedom land as it was before, but it’s a land for blood day and night. The situation is still very hard because Army men still killing people without favour, all power are in their hands. Kabaka’s palace damaged, all houses which were inside all burnt, all motorcars belongs to him were burnt by fire and all properties which were inside the palace all were taken by Army men and now palace become Uganda Army’s Lodge. From 23 May 1966 to 29 May 1966 large numbers of Baganda were killed including those who were living in the palace and even now Uganda army men still killing people in Buganda.”660
The author of the letter also wished to find out whether Muteesa and the Katikiro, Mayaja Nkanji were still alive, as the Baganda were distressed, uncertain of whether or not the soldiers had killed them. He also lamented the restricted freedom of movement in Buganda: “No one can be allowed to pass on the road which is going around the Palace if the army sees any they shoot at once.”661
In his letter, the former bodyguard also gives an overview of the situation after the attack. He points out how Buganda is no longer a kingdom as it had been divided into four districts. About the general way of life of the Baganda he writes,
“All people who were employed by Buganda are jobless, doing nothing all the time poor day and night. The Baganda are facing a very difficult future because now we are slaves, all prisons are full up Baganda people, the nation is no longer freedom land and I don’t know whether God will save us from this hard ruling, if the gods wish to change everything I beg him to break this bitter and horrible ruling of this one man whom you know well.”662
The second letter, dated 28 June 1966 gives some insight into Buganda’s preparation in expectation of the battle as well as the actual battle. The bodyguard writes that an attack had been anticipated at any time, which is why, on 23 May, the day before the battle, about fifty Baganda World War II ex-servicemen had moved to Kibuye outside
660 ENA, C10316 Kabaka Yekka file, General Records 661 ENA, C10316 Kabaka Yekka file, General Records 662 ENA, C10316 Kabaka Yekka file, General Records
164 the palace with the intention of defending their king. He also mentions another large number of ex-service men at the main gate on that day.
The former bodyguard gives an account of the actual fighting and also what happened in Buganda more generally and how the Baganda were affected. He wrote to his friend that,
“some people in the kingdom of Buganda fought with police and they burnt four police stations. They also dug trenches in the roads and cut trees which were put in the roads in order to block the movement of army Lorries. Buganda is not yet recovered back to its normal situation and it will take time as the soldiers have continued to kill people in villages and also steal their properties. Baganda people are facing a very hard life for present and even in the future time we shall be like slaves in Uganda because we have now no jobs and everywhere all people are poor.”663
He concludes his letter by saying that, because of the situation in Uganda, he was about to flee to neighbouring Kenya.
5.5 BUGANDA’S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE FALL OF THE PALACE
There were spontaneous riots in various parts of Buganda. The tradition of the Baganda was to fight and die for their King and there was therefore determined, although uncoordinated, resistance against the army during and after the attack on the palace.664
In Singo County, for instance, riots broke out in and around the towns of Mityana, Kasanda and Busunju. The main Kampala-Mityana road was blocked with cars being overturned, deep trenches dug and logs and trees put across the road by the rioters to hinder the movement of the security forces.665 The Kampala-Kasese railway line that passed through the county was practically destroyed when the rioters removed the rails. The power substations in the area were wrecked and rioters also attacked government security forces. At Busunju, one of the trading centres in the county,
663 ENA, C10316 Kabaka Yekka file, General Records 664 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.39 665 ‘Rough Ride to Mityana’, Uganda Argus, May 25 1966, p.1
165 policemen on patrol were attacked. In Mubende in Buwekula County, an officer of the Uganda Army was ambushed at a road block and beaten, leading to severe injuries.666
Serious disturbances occurred in Kyadondo County, the seat of palace of Mengo as well as in Uganda’s capital city of Kampala. In suburbs of Kampala such as Bwayise, Katwe, Mulago, Ndeeba, Nateete and Makindye, Baganda armed with sticks, knives, hoes and pangas rioted in response to the army’s attack on the palace.667 The riots in Kyadondo were spearheaded by the World War II ex-servicemen.668 A characteristic of the riots in Kyadondo and Singo was the targeting of the road network to demobilise the soldiers. In the west of Kampala, the Kampala-Hoima road was cut off at the Lubigi River, five miles from the city centre, where the bridge was destroyed. The Kampala– Entebbe road was also blocked with deep trenches dug and tree trunks put across the road near Kajjansi, 13 kilometres from Kampala, meaning that access to Entebbe, the only international airport in the country, was blocked.669 Elsewhere, in various suburbs of Kampala, fires were set on various roads leading out of the city and bridges destroyed to halt the movement of government troops in response to their actions on 24 May.670
In Kyaggwe County, east of Kampala serious riots occurred at Mukono, Buikwe and Ngogwe.671 At Mukono, twelve miles, east of Kampala, telephone and telex links between Nairobi in Kenya and Kampala were cut.672 At Buikwe, one of the trading centres in the county, a police station was overrun by the rioting crowd. It was set on fire and two policemen were killed.673 In the neighbouring Bugerere County, also to the east of Kampala, the most affected areas were the towns of Kayunga and Nagalama. The rioters targeted government property. At Kayunga, for example, a police station was also overrun by a large crowd and police property was destroyed.
666 ‘Baali Bakyasenguka’ Munno, 10 June 1966, p.1 667 ‘Baali Bakyasenguka’ Munno, 10 June 1966, p.1 668 ‘Police Capture Palace’, Uganda Argus , 25 May 1966,p.1 669 ‘Abantu Baabadde mu KusengukaKibuga’, Munno, May 26 1966, p.1 670 ‘Several Killed at Lubiri’, Uganda Argus,May 25 1966, p.1 671 ‘Abantu Baabadde mu Kusenguka Kibuga’, Munno, May 26 1966, p.1; “Baali Bakyasenguka” Munno, 10 June 1966, p.1 672 ‘Police Capture Palace’, Uganda Argus , 25 May 1966,p.1 673 ‘Police Capture Palace’, Uganda Argus , 25 May 1966,p.1
166 One policeman was killed and three European surveyors were attacked, two of whom died.674
In Luwero in Bulemezi County, north of Kampala, a police station was attacked and completely burned down. A police man inside the building died. Several other persons who were travelling through Luwero were attacked and there were several cases of lawlessness in the surrounding area.675 There was also extensive damage of property in Masaka in Buddu County, 80 miles south east of Kampala.676 The rioters attacked an army unit and a number of them were killed and injured.677 As was in the other counties, there were also roadblocks in Buddu County, set up by both the rioters and the army, significantly disrupting the movement of goods and services.
The spirited resistance of the Baganda was unsuccessful, however, and contributed to their suffering and the further spread of insecurity.
The Baganda chiefs adopted another form of resistance in being uncooperative in their performance of central government duties. Traditionally in Buganda, chiefs, as the political head of areas under their jurisdiction, also had the duty of supervising economic activities with a view of ensuring the economic welfare of both the individual and the kingdom. In the period immediately after the attack on the palace, however, many chiefs abdicated this role. Also, in a number of instances, the chiefs simply did nothing in as far as their routine duties were concerned. They lacked devotion to their work and were very rarely seen at their duty stations.678 The consequence was breakdown in a number of sectors such as transport, especially in the maintenance of roads. The Bulungibwansi’ a communal service scheme under the supervision of local chiefs ensured that feeder roads were well maintained. However, with the chiefs not performing their supervisory roles, the quality of the roads deteriorated. Many roads,
674 ‘President Urges Katikiro to Come out’, Uganda Argus June 1 1966, p.1 675 ‘Baali Bakyasenguka’ Munno, 10 June 1966 p.1; Rough Ride to Mityana’ Uganda Argus, May 25 1966, p.1 676 ‘Abantu Baabadde Mukusenguka Kibuga’, Munno, May 26 p.1 677 ‘Abantu Baabadde Mukusenguka Kibuga’, Munno, 26 May 1966,p.1 678 EBB NO. C.ADM. 9, Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports, Matters concerning Chiefs, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service, 31 May 1967, p.3
167 both all-weather and seasonal, such as the Kataaba-Kakindu road, became impassable.679
In other instances, chiefs were tardy in collecting revenue, despite the rigorous tax campaigns by central government in counties such as Ssese and Buddu. Many argued that they could not collect revenue for a government they did not support and revenue collection in Buganda was drastically reduced. This led to the failure of a number of counties in Buganda to meet their revenue target and would have serious implications for the general progress of Buganda as the provision of social services was greatly affected. In certain cases where revenue had been collected, the uncooperative chiefs disappeared with the funds.680
Also as a further sign of defiance, many chiefs used their official positions to support and spread the ‘freedom campaign’ that was aimed at restoring their monarch. These campaigns were mainly led by sub-county (Gombolola) and parish (Miluka) chiefs and further fuelled the state of uncertainty in Buganda. The campaigns were more vigorous in southern Buganda, in particular in the county of Buddu where men like K.S.N. Ssebaale the Gombolola chief of Sabaddu Kalisizo, and A. Ntesibe, the parish chief of Kawoko were active.681
One of the major disappointments to the newly appointed district commissioners in Buganda about the chiefs was as noted by the Masaka District Commissioner had been the apathetic attitudes of some of the chiefs and heads of departments. “Despite the constant reminders sent to them they neither gave me any briefs nor sent me somebody to accompany me on the tour”682 Perhaps unknown to the District commissioner this had been a deliberate action by the concerned chiefs. In fact chiefs like Mr Wamala, the sub county chief of Kalungu and Muwonge the parish chief of
679 EBB NO. C.ADM. 9, Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports, Matters concerning Chiefs, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service, 31 May 1967, p.4 680 EBB NO. C.ADM. 9, Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports, Matters concerning Chiefs, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service,31 January 1967,p.7 681 EBB NO. C.ADM. 9, Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports, Matters concerning Chiefs, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service, 31 March 1967, p.14 682 ENA, NO. C.ADM. 9, Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports, Matters concerning Chiefs, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service, 31 March 1967, p.14
168 Kalungu had done very little work in the area and a lot of people complained that he does not cooperate with them, especially in rural development projects and voluntary schemes (Bulungi Bwansi). 683
Beyond acts of defiance, the ordinary Baganda involved in various forms of internal subversive acts. In many parts of Buganda such as Kalagala and Zirobwe in the county of Bulemezi, pamphlets allegedly by the supporters of defunct Kabaka Yekka were circulated calling upon the Baganda to boycott the buying of beers, taking part in the national rotary and stopping them from paying taxes.684 A number of young men were seen growing beards as a sign of mourning for the fleeing of the Kabaka.685
Though banned, the Kabake Yekka supporters in different parts of Buganda remained active. Secret night meetings were conducted from that time up to; as late as 1969. These were active in the in the counties of Bulemezzi, Kyaggwe and Buddu. The main themes of these meetings were planning to overthrow the present government and return Muteesa. It was alleged that some of the Buganda government servants actively took part in these meetings. An appeal fund was also put were money was collected by the so called secret council to facilitate the return of Muteesa.686 In Masaka area it was allegedly stated that Kako the seat of the Bishop for west Buganda was the premise were secret meetings were held.687 In East Mengo District the monthly intelligence report of October 1967 noted as follows; Kabaka Yekka activities took a different form during the past month. They seem somehow to have captured the cooperation of some bodies particularly of the Uganda Muslim community through which meetings continued to be held.688 Religious gathering in Buganda continued to be avenues that were used to cause disaffection to government.689
683 EBB NO. C.ADM. 9, Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports, Matters concerning Chiefs, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service, 17 April 1970, p.2 684 ENA monthly reports 22March 1969 p1 685 ENA Monthly reports march ,7 April 1967 Masaka p.1 686 ENA no s.int,1/A, Buganda Affairs Monthly report from the District Commissioner, East Mengo to Mr. VA Ovonji, Permanent Secreatary, Public Service, for 7 March 1969 687 ENA no s.int,1/A, Buganda Affairs Monthly report from the District Commissioner, East Mengo to Mr. VA Ovonji, Permanent Secreatary, Public Service, for 8 September 1967 688 ENA no s.int,1/A Buganda Affairs Monthly report from the District Commissioner, East Mengo to Mr. VA Ovonji, Permanent Secreatary, Public Service, for November 1967 689 ENA no s.int,1/A, Buganda Affairs, Monthly report from the District Commissioner, East Mengo to Mr. VA Ovonji, Permanent Secreatary, Public Service, for January 1967
169 Rumours were also ripe of the printing of new currency notes made with the portrait of Muteesa printed on them to be the legal Tender notes that would be used in Uganda when Muteesa overthrows the present government and takes over the administration.690
The disbandment of the KY saw the formation and revival of old political organisations for the purpose of offering resistance against the Obote regime. Among the new ones formed was the secret council. Also formed was the Uganda Conservative Party (UCP) while the old revived one was the Bataka Party.691 These made various meetings in attempt to unite the Baganda supporters of DP with those that formerly supported KY in attempt to put up a formidable resistance. In Kampala the home of Abdul Kasobya in Nakulabye a suburb west of Kampala was often used as the meeting ground. Kasobya was later together other eleven members arrested in December 1968.692 P.K Mpungu Masaka chief Magistrate was also deeply involved in the campaign which led to his dentition.693
Rumours throughout Buganda ever since the fleeing of Muteesa into exile were ripe for his return among the ordinary Baganda. Routine collection of funds under ‘Secret Council Appeal Fund’ to facilitate his return as well as helping the surviving members of the royal family that had not been arrested was carried out throughout the region.694 These efforts of course due to the existence of the state of emergency in Buganda did not yield many positive results as the ring leaders were often arrested. Kefa Nsubuga one of the fund raisers was in December 1968 found with collection of Christmas gifts, food and various staff being transported on a lorry to Princess Nalinya Mpologoma, a sister to Muteesa. He was also found with a sum of two hundred shillings. He was arrested by the police.695
690 ENA no s.int,1/A, Buganda Affairs, Monthly report from the District Commissioner, East Mengo to Mr. VA Ovonji, Permanent Secreatary, Public Service, for 8 September 1967 691 ENA Monthly report C/ADM.9/1A, 10 Feb 1969 Kampala to G.R Katongole Secretary for Adminstration 692 ENA Monthly report C/ADM.9/1A, 17 Jan 1969 Kampala to G.R Katongole Secretary for Administration 693 ENA Buganda Affairs, Monthly report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. VA Ovonji, Permanent Secreatary, Public Service , 7 July 1967 694 ENA Monthly report for dec 1968, 13 Jan 1969 Kampala to F.K Kolimuzo Permanent Secretary / Secertary to Cabinet, President’s Office 695 ENA Monthly report C/ADM.9/1A, 17 Jan 1969 Kampala to G.R Katongole Secretary for Administration
170 5.6 OBOTE TIGHTENS HIS GRIP ON BUGANDA
The situation in Buganda following the spread of these uncoordinated riots became threatening to Obote’s hold on power. At this point it looked as if he might be losing control of the political situation in Buganda and he had to react fast to avoid the spontaneous riots becoming a coordinated resistance to his rule.
On the day of the attack, Obote had addressed the National Assembly. He informed the House that the Buganda Lukiiko and by Sir Edward Muteesa, had declared an open rebellion. In his statement, Obote noted that:
“The government is in possession of documentary evidence that Sir Edward Muteesa had already decided by April 12 1966, to mount a full scale rebellion against the authority of the government of Uganda. The method by which this rebellion was to be executed was three-pronged. The important point to note was how the mind of Sir Edward was working in the early part of April, before the house met to debate the Nationalist Constitution on the 15 April. In his view the province of Buganda could secede from Uganda, which, as all members of the House know, forms the integral part of the sovereign state of Uganda. These moves by themselves do constitute an act of rebellion, punishable under the laws passed by this parliament. Government must be based on the will of the people and nationalism and not on the whims of one man who happens to occupy a position because of what position or status his ancestors occupied in society in the past.”696
In addition, in attempt to further justify his attack on the palace and portray Buganda as having taken on a rebellious act, Obote displayed what he alleged had been captured weapons that had been stock piled at Lubiri. He had earlier insisted that the central government intelligence reports had had information of the amassed weapons. Among the displayed had been the rusting Germany Spandau gun that for years had been at the veranda of one of the buildings in the palace and a sword belonging to his brother Prince Henry Kimera. The sword had been given to Kimera by the Royal Air Force while in Britain. However, Obote’s source of the displayed weapons was largely not taken serious by many because it had been common knowledge that there existed no armoury within the palace.
Obote used the military and police to violently suppress the riots in Buganda but his actions exposed the increased suffering and loss of life of the ordinary Baganda. Rape
696 ‘The Centre Cannot Hold’, Drum, August 1966, p.56
171 and sexual violence was increasingly used by Obote troops as a weapon of subduing the Baganda. There were reports of Baganda on the outskirts of Mengo and in the countryside being subjected to and witnessing trauma including massive arrests, killing, sexual harassment including rape, and torture and murder.697
The massive arrests instigated by Obote after the 1966 attack in order to deliberately intimidate the Baganda became institutional violence. Large numbers of people who he suspected to be a threat to his power were arrested. There was unwarranted detention of large numbers of innocent people without trial and for long periods of time, leading to much suffering. On the basis of false allegations in the period immediately after May 1966, Obote arrested and detained over 705 Baganda.698 Many businessmen, lawyers, teachers and doctors and also prominent members of Buganda’s royal family ended up in custody because Obote saw them as political opponents whose actions needed to be controlled.
Among the prominent personalities of the royal family who were detained were Princess Nalinya Mpologoma and Prince David Ssimbwa, sister and brother to Kabaka Muteesa II. Prince Badru Kakungulu, Muteesa’s uncle and a veteran Muslim leader in Buganda was also arrested.699 Also detained were the Nnabagereka, Lady Ddamali Kisosonkole, the Kabaka’s official wife, Sarah Kisosonkole, another wife and the mother of Mutebi who is the 36th and current reigning monarch, and Winifred Keihangwe, a princess from the Kingdom of Ankole and a consort of the Kabaka. Keihangwe was only released shortly before going into labour.700
In addition, a number of county and the sub-county chiefs and prominent members of the Buganda government were also arrested and detained.701 Amongst these were the speaker of the Buganda Lukiiko, Kigozi, the Information Officer, Nathan Matovu and the County chief of Kyadondo, Kaggo Kalule. Nine other men from Kyaggwe County, accused of holding a meeting on 26 May 1966 at Bujuuko in Kyaggwe County,
697 ‘Several Killed at Lubiri’, Uganda Argus,25 May 1966 p.1; ‘Obukambwe obwyolesiddwa e Mengo’, Ebifa Mu Buganda, 13 June 1966, pp.1-3 698 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 1st Session 1966, Vol. 63;‘Abantu 705 be Bakwatibwa mu Busambattuko’,Munno, 2 July 1966 p.1; ‘SpiikaYetutte e poliisi’, Munno, 2 June 1966, p.1 699 ‘Abntu 705 be Bakwatibwa mu Busambattuko’ Munno, 2 July 1966, p.1 700 ‘Abntu 705 be Bakwatibwa mu Busambattuko’ Munno, 2 July 1966, p.1 701 MAK, AR/BUG/2/5,The Kabaka Muteesa Yekka , General Records 1964-1966
172 with the intention of ‘chasing’ Milton Obote away from Buganda were sentenced to one year in prison.702 They were Isreal Magumba, Mawanda Yokaana Ndawula, Kasafu Wandira, Ssabani Nsira, Yoasi Wasswa, Yusufu Kiwesako, Ferdinando Mangoyi and Efraim Waibi.703 By the time Amin took over power in 1971, as many as 1509 political prisoners, mostly from Buganda, had been arrested.704 In fact A.B.Kasozi points out that more than sixty per cent of the political prisioners arrested between 1966 and 1971 were Baganda.705 In this way, the Baganda became the victims of state sanctioned-violence. It was also the first time in Uganda’s history that the country witnessed state reliance on violence and repression, rather than dialogue and rule of law while responding to popular and legitimate demands from citizens.
Obote’s dictatorial actions went beyond the imprisonment of alleged Baganda political opponents to include extreme abuse of human rights. A state of emergency was declared in Buganda with a curfew from 7pm to 6am.706 Although this was later relaxed to 8pm to 5am, the curfew remained in place until Obote’s overthrow by Amin in 1971.707 Under such draconian laws and conditions, there were severe abuses of the civil rights and liberties of the Baganda.
The period from 1966 to 1971 when Buganda was under the state of emergency was the most painful period in the history of the Baganda. It was characterised by gross violation of human rights at the hands of security agents. Obote regarded the Baganda as rebels and those who were suspected of being anti-government were terrorised, tortured and detained by the army and security agents in terms of Section 3, sub- section 2 of the Emergency Regulations.708
The violation of the human rights of the Baganda was mostly executed by the General Service Unit (GSU) and the Military. The General Service Unit was a haven for misfits,
702 ‘OBuganda Lukiiko Lw’okugoba Dr.Obote ku Buganda Lwabasibizza mwaka-mwaka’, Munno,2 July 1966, p.1 703 MAK,AR/BUG/67/1, History of Buganda and surrounding Tribes, 1935, pp.971-1190 704 Uganda Human Rights Commission, (UHRC),Report of The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, 1994, p.373; ‘Amin’s Uganda’ Transition no40, (1971), pp.48-55 705 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origin of Violence in Uganda, p.94 706 EBB Gazette Statutory Instruments No 61 to 68 of 1966. ‘Emergence Powers Approved’ Uganda Argus, May 27 p.1 707 ‘Curfew relaxed’ Uganda Argus, 10 July 1966, p.1 708 J. Mayanja Nkanji, A testimony given during the hearing of Human Rights Violations in Uganda, October 1994
173 failures, petty criminals, prostitutes, drunks and other kinds of opportunists and it became notorious in Buganda for the ruthless operational tactics it employed.709 From 1967 to 1971 it was headed by Obote’s cousin Akena Adoko. The state security agents, acting under the cover of the state of emergency that had been imposed on Buganda, invaded homes and searched and intimidated the occupants. The Baganda were subjected to open harassment and their rights to personal security, privacy and property were violated. Under the state of emergence the security agents were able to kill Baganda and deprive them of the right to freedom of association and movement, the right to practise their culture and the right to participate in government.710 .
Obote also used the military to monopolise political power and suppress the Baganda. The army became deeply involved in the violations of human rights in Buganda from 1966 to 1971.711 Under Amin’s command it turned into an undisciplined and brutal institution at whose hands many Baganda suffered. Amin, acting on Obote’s orders, unleashed a savage and unprecedented slaughter of defenceless inhabitants of the palace and the surrounding areas.712 Scores of Baganda civilians were loaded onto army trucks and disposed of, many of them still live, either thrown down the Murchison Falls on the Nile River or buried in mass graves. Amin was quoted to have said that ten truckloads of bodies were taken from Mengo immediately after the battle.713 The death toll was the highest in any political conflict since Uganda attained independence. Some observers estimated that about 2,000 people were killed at the battle. Most of these deaths were of Baganda civilians, the Kabaka’s servants and ex-servicemen from World War II.714 The foreign press put the estimated death toll at 1500.715
Onama, the Minister of Defence in Obote’s government, however, claimed that only 40 people were killed.716 The Oder Commission, appointed much later in the early 1990s to investigate the matter of human violations in Uganda, though unable to state the exact figure, indicated in its report that the number was much higher than had been
709 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.48 710 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, P.40 711 The Report of The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations report October 1994, p.371 712 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.39 713 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.39 714 ‘Several Killed at Lubiri’, Uganda Argus,25 May 1966 p.1; ‘Kabaka Muteesa II Yannyonnyodde nga Bweyadduka mu Lubiri’,Munno,25 June 1966, p.1 715 ‘The Centre Cannot Hold’,Drum, August 1966, pp.56-58 716 NAA, Parliament Hansards, Official Debates, 2nd Session 1966, Vol. 64
174 reported by the government.717 The exact number of dead, injured and displaced persons from the battle at Mengo and the period thereafter remains unclear with very different numbers published by government, the region of Buganda, and other sources.
Due to the fact the situation in the period immediately after the Battle of Mengo, the Buganda were perceived as enemies to the state, the massacres continued as Obote’s soldiers ruthlessly suppressed whatever resistance to the regime they encountered as they moved through Buganda. Commanding officers lost their command over who became unruly and acted outside the boundaries accepted norms.718 Clashes in the search for the Baganda resistors in various parts of Buganda resulted in them being subjected to extreme human rights abuses. Women and children were often the victims of the wrath of these soldiers and at times women were raped in broad daylight.719 The behavior of soldiers towards civilians and the increased level of political violence however, became a concern of some members of the Obote regime to suggest the need to discipline the army. As a result of these pleas, Amin the commander of the Uganda army was instructed in the aftermath of the 1966 Crisis to create the Military police and enforce discipline within the military.720 Housed in former properties of Buganda government at Makindye, a Kampala suburb in the east of the city, Amin filled the force with people from his ethnic group of West Nile. These included some notorious individual such as Hussein Marella to the extent that though it was intended to discipline soldiers, it extended its activities to civilians as well.721 In the end, the suffering of the Baganda continued.
Obote’s objective was to break the defiant spirit of the Baganda and he was largely successful as they experienced severe psychological stress and in the end became apathetic about politics. Having witnessed the hostilities carried out by the Ugandan army during the attack on the palace at Mengo and the extended period of insecurity that followed the spontaneous riots that occurred in the different parts of the kingdom,
717 Uganda Human Rights Commission, (UHRC), Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, 1994, pp.221-223 718 R. Tanner, Rumour and the Buganda Emergency,1966, in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 16 (1978), pp.329-338 719 J. Mayanja Nkanji, A testimony given during the hearing of Human Rights Violations in Uganda, October 1994 720 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origin of Violence in Uganda, p.87 721 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origin of Violence in Uganda p.87
175 many Baganda were left traumatized. Mamdani has suggested that the Baganda then developed what he calls a “minority psychology”. As a result they still have a low profile in politics and in the governance of the country in post 1966 era.722 Also, the psycho- social effects of the suffering, hardship and extreme violation of human rights experienced by the Baganda, led them to perceive the military as an organisation of torture. Paulo Kavuma, the former Buganda Katiikiro, has been quoted as saying that, “what the Baganda got from independence was to be killed, to be detained and to be tortured.”723 The Baganda largely remained inactive; not wanting to enrol in the security forces even after Obote was removed from power in 1971.724
5.7 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE MENGO ATTACK ON BUGANDA
The cost of the attack on the palace at Mengo is incalculable. Violence spread throughout Buganda and the implementation of the 1966 pigeon constitution added insult to injury. Although the 1966 pigeon constitution which replaced the 1962 independence constitution was to only last for a year, the writing was on the wall for Buganda and this Interim Constitution would have far reaching effects on Buganda’s legacy.
5.7.1 The Removal of Muteesa and Buganda’s Federal Powers
The Pigeon Constitution struck directly at the power of the traditional hierarchy in Buganda by severely curtailing of the king’s power which would be completely removed in 1967 with the enactment of the Republican Constitution. Muteesa had been both the Head of State of Uganda and the monarch of the most powerful and influential kingdom in the country. His privileges, immunities and powers, as President of Uganda, surpassed those of any other person in the land. As the Kabaka of Buganda, his powers in that kingdom were almost absolute and his person inviolable. By way of personal and proprietary interests, the Kabaka lacked nothing.725 His prominent position had remained intact during the era of colonisation and in dependence until the enactment of the pigeon constitution. His was revered by his subjects and Buganda’s social and political structures were kept intact by his
722 Public Lecture, Buganda’s Annual Conference, Held on 15 December 2011,at Kampala 723 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.41 724 Public Lecture, Buganda’s Annual Conference, Held on 15 December 2011,at Kampala 725 G.W. Kanyiehemba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.114
176 presence. Almost all of Buganda’s federal powers had revolved around him. The judiciary had administered justice in his name, while the premier, (the Katiikiro), and his ministers served as the executive arm of the king’s authority in the kingdom.726 Obote’s pigeon constitution stripped Muteesa of these powers and the traditional obligation of appointing the Katiikiro - the second in command in the political hierarchy of the kingdom. The Buganda Lukiiko would nominate three candidates (from inside or outside the Lukiiko) and the Kabaka would appoint one as Katiikiro.727 With the enactment of the new constitution, the political party that won the majority of seats in the Lukiiko would nominate the Katiikiro.728 Thus for the first time, party politics, which for years had been rejected by the Mengo Establishment, had now been introduced in the governance of Buganda.729 The pigeon constitution had thus seriously undermined the traditional authority of the king.
In fact, the 1966 Constitution did away with the monarchy’s role in public affairs in Buganda. It barred civil servants from being members of the Buganda Lukiiko. The twenty Ssaza chiefs, whose sole appointment was the privilege of the Kabaka, were now dismissed from the Lukiiko whose membership would now be elected rather than the King having the privilege to nominate members.730 The King had always overseen the Lukiiko through these nominated representatives who had now been dismissed. In addition, the Buganda government was deprived of the right to appoint civil servants to posts in the central government, again, another sphere of influence of the Kabaka Muteesa. The new Constitution replaced those provisions with instruments for a single unitary government.731
In terms of the 1966 Constitution, Muteesa was no longer President as this office of ceremonial Head of State had been merged with that of the prime minister and all the executive powers transferred to the newly created position of executive president, now occupied by Obote.732 The strengthened presidency and its constitutionally
726 J.J. Jorgensen, Uganda; A modern History, p.230 727 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’ Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3 728 ‘Konstitution Epya Dr.Obotekati ye President’, Omukulembeze, 16 April 1966 pp.1-2 729 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.95 730 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’ Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3 731 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’ Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3 732 ‘Konstitution empya Dr. Obote Kati ye President’, Omukulembeze, 16 April 1966 pp.1-2
177 entrenched powers enabled Obote to effectively deal with opposition to his rule from Muteesa and Buganda.
What was most significant for Buganda was that their king and they themselves had been humiliated. The public humiliation Muteesa II suffered when dismissed from government was a great insult from Obote to their prestige. The attack on the palace and its later occupation by soldiers while its rightful occupants were either in exile or hiding, meant that the Baganda had lost the greatest asset of any community - their pride.
The 1966 Constitution introduced a unitary form of government and abolished federal and semi-federal structures.733 Buganda’s special status in the old order which had also been enshrined in its special federal position in terms of the 1962 Independence Constitution was now removed and under Schedule 6 of the 1966 Constitution, it lost its autonomy.734 Henceforth, Buganda would have the same status as the other kingdoms. In addition, the power of the Buganda Lukiiko was reduced; Schedule 7 of the 1962 Independence Constitution which dealt with legislative issues in the Kingdom of Buganda was scrapped and the Lukiiko could no longer handle any contentious matters over which a contest of power existed between the government of Buganda and the central government.735
The Lukiiko was also deprived of the right to appoint 21 Buganda members to the National Assembly whose Baganda representatives would now be elected directly by the Baganda electorate.736 This was a particular blow to the Mengo Establishment who had always insisted on controlling Buganda’s representatives to the National Assembly through the indirect elections to the Lukkiko.
Obote said that these measures were necessary because the Mengo Establishment’s powers had to be curtailed; it had locked out many ordinary Baganda from participating in the political affairs of their country. Obote stated after the enactment of the 1966 Constitution that, “There was nothing as dangerous or so inhuman as to
733 Premeable to the Interim Constitution of 1966 734 ‘Konstitution Empya Dr.Obote Kati ye President’, Omukulembeze,16 April 1966, p.1; G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.104 735 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’ Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3; ‘Konstitution Empya’, Omukulembeze , April 16 1966, pp.1-3; Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.102 736 ‘OLukiiko lwajiddwa ko Obuyinza: ababbaka bakulondwebwa buli omu’, 20 April 1966, pp.1-2
178 lock up the latent ability of the people and stop them moving forward … but now for the first time a common Muganda was given a chance to elect his own representative.”737 Interestingly, this was in contrast to what he had advocated for at the London Conference in 1962 when he had ardently supported indirect elections in Buganda when Kiwanuka, the Democratic Party leader, opposed the idea. His earlier support of the Buganda delegates probably had to do with needing to align with them in opposition to the Democratic Party rather than supporting the Buganda cause.
5.7.2 Loss of Financial Autonomy
Obote also gradually moved to block the economic aspirations of the Baganda. He took over the control and management of Buganda’s financial resources, saying that this step had been undertaken in order to safeguard against misuse of public funds that would otherwise have been of benefit to the general public. This shift sealed off the financial autonomy previously enjoyed by the Bugandan government. Although the Mengo Establishment believed that the Buganda Lukiko should be the body to determine the amount of money which the central government should give annually to run services in Buganda.738 Obote had the following to say about the absence of firm financial control over Buganda by the central government:
“In this way a handful of individuals can, and have used their power to frustrate progressive policy. In some of the federal states (specifically Buganda) large sums of money have been proved to have been miss-spent and the general public is being prevented from knowing exactly what is taking place. Those who have spent such amounts without authority cannot be taken to court because of their constitution positions. Some federal assemblies have been requested to vote money for development projects, but such monies have found their way into personal overseas banking accounts of certain individuals.”739
The special schedule 9 of the Independence Constitution, which had regulated the financial relationship between Buganda and the central government, had now been scrapped.740 The Buganda government, through its finance minister and the Lukiiko, had been mandated to spend the kingdom’s financial resources without the consent
737 ‘Buganda to be Split into Divisions’, Uganda Argus, 11 June 1966, p.1 738 “ The President’s Status to be used to divide government” Uganda Argus, 13 July 1966, pp.1-3 739 Obote 3 march speech 740 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’, Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3
179 of the central government. This was despite the fact that 40% of the resources were provided by the central government.741 In the changes made, Buganda government lost its financial autonomy. According to Articles 32(4) and 33(2-3) and all of Article 34 of the 1966 Interim Constitution, the financial management powers of the centre were strengthened.742 These articles spelt out clearly the procedures to be followed in financial management in Buganda. The finance minister of the Buganda government had to first present the budget to his counterpart in the central government before sending it to the Buganda Lukiiko for approval.743 The central government now controlled the kingdom of Buganda’s finances and also determined the size of the resource envelope. The financial position of Buganda, the strongest of the federal states, was brought at par with that of the other kingdoms and the district of Busoga. Central government control over funds would prevent the wastage of tax payers’ money. For example, through this kind of control, fruitless and expensive projects such as the Ndaiga scheme where Baganda World War II ex-servicemen were settled in the kingdom of Bunyoro would be unlikely. 744
Revenue-sharing was also now no more. Under the interim Constitution, the Saza (County) Chiefs, lost custody of their official estates, as well as of the rent that accrued from them.745 The rent was now to be handed over to the regional treasury under the control of the central government. This was a departure from what had been enshrined in the 1961 Buganda Constitution which had been wholly implemented in the 1962 Independence Constitution.746 The 1966 Constitution deprived the chiefs of the revenue they needed to manage the Kingdom’s assets. The stripping of the Buganda Government financial autonomy was a deliberate policy and as a result many of these assets became neglected.
741 EBB, 20.2 Buganda, Commentary on the 1962 Independence Constitution of Uganda 742 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.102; NAA, The 1966 Interim Constitution, p.159 743 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times,p.102; NAA, The 1966 Interim Constitution, p.134 744 EBB, S/10482/2, The Lost Counties, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Ndaiga Scheme- Financial Transactions 745 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’ Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3 746 EBB,CG.L.O.29, The 1962 Independence Constitution, Implementation of the 1961 Buganda Agreement
180 5.8 THE DECLINE OF BUGANDA’S CIVIL SERVICE DOMINANCE
Baganda domination of the civil service before the Battle of Mengo was a source of envy for many outside Buganda and now Obote took the opportunity to deliberately design policies of exclusion which curtailed Baganda’s access to civil service. In terms of the 1962 Independence Constitution, Uganda had two separate commissions responsible for recruitment and promotions in the public sector: one was the Uganda Public Service Commission responsible for the employment of Ugandans outside Buganda and the other was the Buganda Public Service Commission responsible for employment made within the Kingdom and also making recommendations to the central government. Buganda was the only region in the country to have its own public service commission and this added to its autonomous powers.
The Buganda Public Service Commission was composed of a chairperson assisted by three vice-chairpersons who were approved by the Buganda Cabinet and confirmed by Kabaka Muteesa II. In its operations, the Commission had been entirely independent of the central government and had hardly any connection to the Uganda Public Service Commission.747 It managed the appointment of various categories of staff, including the permanent secretaries; the county, sub-county and parish chiefs; the men and officers of the Kabaka’s police force and the prisons department; and the judges and judicial officers in the kingdom.748 It would also, as above, recommend Baganda to key positions in the central government. This had ensured easy access of the Baganda to employment opportunities both in the central government and in Buganda. This, coupled with the fact that the Baganda were on average the most educated group in the country, led to their dominance in the public service.749
This changed with the 1966 Constitution. Article 36 that spelt out the functions of the Buganda Public Service Commission saw it merged with those of the Uganda Public Service Commission.750 The independent Buganda Public Service Commission thus ceased to exist and in its place new District Appointment Boards, which were branches of the Uganda Public Service Commission were introduced. Also, as Article 36 of the Interim Constitution stipulated that the appointment of the chairperson of the
747 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.83 748 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.102 749 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfilled Hopes, p.9 750 ‘Abakozzigavumentiewakatiyebalinakoobuyinza’, Omukelembeze, 30 April 1966, pp.1-3
181 Commission was to be done by the President, these changes also meant that Obote now had indirect control over the appointments to the Buganda Government such as those mentioned above.751
The Mengo Establishment had practised nepotism in the awarding of jobs and, if applied objectively, the changes could have benefitted ordinary Baganda. The selection to office had been based largely on nobility and religion as the dominant value of the Mengo Establishment. The District Appointment Boards could have introduced a meritocracy where candidates’ qualifications rather than their family or religion would determine appointments. In practice, however, whereas the Buganda Public Service Commission had been the tool of Mengo, the District Appointment Boards merely became the tools of Obote. For example, Obote used the new order to appoint Abdallah-Anyuru, a fellow Langi, to head the national Public Service Commission. Abdallah-Anyuru had been a Uganda Peoples’ Congress Member of Parliament for Lango West and he was forced to resign his parliamentary seat and take up the new posting.752 Erunayo Oryema, another Langi, was appointed as the Inspector General of Police instead of Timothy Lwanga, a Muganda, or Inyalio, an Iteso, who were most qualified. Sam Ocen, a northerner, was appointed Deputy- Commissioner of Prisons rather than the more qualified Kigonya, also a Muganda.753 Also side-lined was Noah Olwoch, the first Ugandan British-trained civil engineer. He was transferred from the post of Permanent Secretary and Engineer-in-Chief at the Ministry of Works to a purely administrative position at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This was done to create room for Wilson Aguma who was lower in rank but a cousin to Obote and also from Obote’s birth place of Lango, even though there was another better qualified engineer available - Kyobe, also from Buganda.754
This trend was also evident at the lower ranks of the public service. In 1967 Obote wrote the Lango Development Master Plan which stipulated that all key positions in Uganda’s political, commercial, army and industrial life had to be occupied and
751 ‘Abakozzigavumentiewakatiyebalinakoobuyinza’, Omukelembeze, 30 April 1966, pp.1-3 752 S.R. Karugire , Roots of Instability in Uganda, pp.60-61 753 P. Bitariho, A Testimony given during the inquiry into the human rights violations in Uganda: The Republic of Uganda Report of The Commission of Inquiry into violations of Human rights 1994, p.521 754 Onyango Odongo, A Political History of Uganda, p.50
182 controlled by people from Akokoro County, Lango District (Obote’s birthplace) and that Akokoro County should be developed at the expense of other areas of Uganda.755
The appointment of Abdallah-Anyuru placed the day-to-day running of the Civil Service directly in the hands of a pro-Obote politician as Obote’s dictatorship was established. The civil service was abused and appointment and promotion on merit was ignored, mostly because it would largely have favoured the Baganda who at that time were better educated than their countrymen. Instead the civil service was filled with politically unsuccessful Uganda Peoples’ Congress members who had failed to win elections in their constituencies. Obsequious mediocrities filled public office as the only requirements were having a party card and to have proven loyalty to the leaders of the UPC.756 The ‘undesirable civil servants’ especially the Baganda who were considered to be anti-establishment were promptly and frequently transferred to remote stations, often receiving these instructions by telephone.757 As a result some outstanding civil servants joined international and private organisations where job security was assured and others resigned from public service.758
Obote deliberately discriminated against the Baganda. The educated Baganda civil servants who had opted to serve in the central government were deliberately demoted to lower status jobs. Between 1961- 1967 the Baganda share of high level jobs decreased from 46.9% to 36.6%. In addition, Obote did not appoint Baganda to policy- making or Policy implementing positions in key ministries of defence, internal affairscommerce or industry. They were also excluded from important positions in the army police and secrete services.759
5.9 SUMMARY
The northern ethnic group which now came into power had been a disadvantaged minority with a marginal status.760 Now those from other ethnic groups were held back. Obote’s declaration of a new era of politics free from ethnic division was a hypocritical
755 The 18 points given by the Uganda Army under Major General Amin in to justify taking over the powers of government on 25 January 1971, point number 15 756 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, pp.60-61 757 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, pp.60-61 758 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, pp.60-61 759 A.B.K. Kasozi the Social p.74 760 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Muteesa II
183 one. His actions did display commitment to reducing the potency of ethnic affiliation in Uganda but showed the deep hatred he had for the Baganda and an unwillingness to integrate an important and populous region within the national framework. The extent, to which he was eager to isolate the Baganda, after their defeat and the battle of Mengo and the psychological stress they had undergone, further diminished their sense of belonging to the Ugandan nation and contributed to a waning civil society among them.
184 CHAPTER SIX
THE IMPACT OF OBOTE’S DICTATORSHIP ON THE KINGDOM OF BUGANDA 1966-1971
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Nothing raises emotions in Buganda as much as the memories of the 24 May 1966 attack on the palace at Mengo and the political consequences in the kingdom in the wake of the attack. The Battle of Mengo had a multitude of both short and long term significant impacts on the development and well-being of Buganda. The military defeat of Buganda in 1966 directly led to the consolidation of Obote’s dictatorial tendencies which would have a destructive impact on the kingdom of Buganda. It is argued that mayhem of 1966 left an indelible scar on the history of the Kingdom; its full long term political and social-economic impact on the lives of the Baganda as a people and the Kingdom of Buganda as a region, however, cannot be fully understood without a systematic and comprehensive study of Obote’s dictatorship towards Buganda.
This chapter examines the impact Obote’s autocratic policies pursued in the post-1966 crisis in relation to Buganda as well as the impact of the enactment of 1967 republican Constitution on the Kingdom of Buganda. The specific political and social-economic issues highlighted include both the destruction of Buganda’s political and social institutions as well as its social fabric and all its attendant problems, the contraction of Buganda’s economy and the impact of the confiscation and destruction of former kingdom properties. At the end of chapter it is urged that policies and attitudes towards Buganda changed markedly once Obote emerged victorious at the battle of Mengo. As a result, it is further stated that the present distressful socio-economic situation of the Kingdom of Buganda is a result of effects of the 1966 constitutional crisis.
6.2 THE DISSOLUTION OF KABAKA MUTEESA II’S GOVERNMENT
Although the 1966 pigeon Constitution had preserved certain aspects of the institution of kingdom of Buganda as had been guaranteed in the 1962 independence constitution, the kingdom had been greatly weakened. However, its continued existence and influence among the Baganda still made Obote politically uncomfortable. As a result, Obote would take another step and even remove what had
185 remained intact under the pigeon constitution. In his parliamentary address on 10 June 1966 officially announced the total dissolution of Bugandan government.761 Obote was now to argue that there cannot be a Bugandan government when both the King (Kabaka) and the premier (Katikiro) are outside Uganda. Kabaka Muteesa II had fled to exile in England immediately following the attack of his palace while the Katiikiro Mayanja Nkanji after spending some time in hiding in Uganda had also later fled to exile; first, in Kenya and later England.762
Also, the dissolution of the Bugandan government entailed wholesale dismissal of all the chiefs of the kingdom with some of them being arrested. The Kingdom of Buganda had a hierarchy of chiefs in a descending order of seniority and importance. The most important among which were; the 18 county (Ssaza) chiefs; in addition, there were, - 73 sub-county chiefs, over 230 parish chiefs and more than 690 village chiefs.763 In Buganda, it was a tradition to appoint men of outstanding influence and this appointment to chiefly office always followed a carefully programmed course of training. This normally began from the lower chiefs’ courts to the king’s palace. Even the humblest chief, the village chief (Mutongole), was often a local constable. All chiefs were loyal to the king and were men who commanded respect within their various communities, usually on grounds of proven ability and men who possessed some wealth.764 The chiefs had been an important link between the Kabaka and the grassroots of the society; in many cases they knew every one within their locality. In dismissing the Buganda chiefs Obote intended to extend his firm control over Buganda by rooting out any loyalty to the Kabaka Muteesa II that still existed. All but two of the County chiefs and Sub county Chiefs of the former Buganda Government were retired and replaced with new appointments. Thirty three of the Thirty seven new chiefs had from15 to 24 June 1967 assumed their new offices.765
The dismissal of chiefs in 1966 by Obote had been so thorough that by 1967, hardly any of the chiefs serving the Bugandan government in 1965 would be found in office.766
761 ‘Enkuykakyuka Kakuzzi Ku Buganda Ebejjuddwamu Ebitundu Bina’, Munno, June11-12 1966, pp.1-2; ’Buganda to be Split into Divisions’ , UgandaArgus ,11June1966, p.1 762 J.Mayanja Nkani: Memoirs of the 1966 Crisis 763 Ssemwanga Kivumbi, SseKabaka Muteesa II Eyeerabirwa, pp.193-194 764 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p62 765 ENA monthly reports 7 July 1967 Masaka 766 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p62
186 The whole Buganda Administrative system that had been admired by Fredrick Lugard when the British were establishing their colonial in the late 19th century was now totally dismantled. Obote would follow up this with the deployment of his appointees to replace those he had dismissed. What made it worse Buganda was operating a traditionally respected system which was now replaced with Obote’s appointees that had neither cultural nor political ties to the Buganda traditional set up. The newly appointed Buganda Leaders were less educated and less influential in the kingdom of Buganda than their predecessors and as a result commanded no respect in Buganda. A great number of the newly appointed chiefs were drawn from the ranks of hawkers and drivers, the only strata of Buganda society from which the Uganda Peoples’ Congress had managed to recruit a following.767 Many Baganda of good repute had shunned working under Obote’s government. In the end many local Baganda were horrified to see a lorry driver as the county chief of Busiro in the heartland of the old kingdom.768 This to the Baganda served as a humiliation to their once mighty kingdom and a further reminder to them that now they were a conquered a people. Through the retirement, the old chiefs had not surprised many ordinary Baganda; the appointment of new ones did and hence they disapproved of the whole exercise.769
The new chiefs were extremely unpopular in the kingdom of Buganda and in many areas where the DP and KY influence was deep seated the Baganda rejected them. Their working environment became extremely hard to the extent that the central government had to provide them with security. They increasingly administered Buganda with the visible assistance of the army and the special force. In addition, the central government also passed the Penal Code Amendment Bill, 1966 which was a punitive law, to further enhance the authority of its chiefs in Buganda. By this law, section 29 provided for a life sentence for anyone convicted of promoting war on chiefs.770 In addition the chiefs’ traditional titles were abolished.771
767 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p62 768 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p63 769 ENA Buganda Affairs, District Monthly Reports, from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service Permanent Secretary Public Service, July 1967 770 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.63 771 ENA Buganda Affairs Monthly reports of to Permanent Secretary/Secretary to Cabinet, President’s Office, December 1968, 13 jan 1969,
187 Also, the institution of Buganda Lukiiko was abolished as part of the dissolution of the Bugandan government. As the legislative arm of the Bugandan government, it had an oversight duty of supervising the executive arm of the Buganda’s government. Throughout 1960s the Buganda Lukiiko had established itself as the most vibrant political institution that had on various occasions opposed Obote as he veered away from the constitutional path. Though in terms of the 1966 pigeon constitution the powers of the Lukiiko had been greatly reduced, nevertheless its continued existence as another centre of power had remained a stumbling block to Obote’s dictatorial rule. It is the abolition on 10 June 1966 that enabled Obote to consolidate his control over Buganda and enhance his dictatorial powers. He had now succeeded in getting rid of one of his stiffest opposition to his rule. However, on the other he had stifled the political development in Buganda. As an assembly of elected peoples’ representatives since the late 1950s, the Buganda Lukiiko had contributed to emerging democratic tendencies within the kingdom of Buganda. Elections to the Buganda Lukiiko had been by universal suffrage and in this the way, the Lukiiko had succeed in producing vibrant Baganda politicians who had actively participated in national politics. Men like Ben Kiwanuka, who later became the president general of the DP, Ignatius Musaazi, the founder of the UNC, Elidadi Mulira founder of the Progressive Party (PP) and Abu Mayanja who later became a minister in the central government, all had used the Lukiiko as a spring board to join national politics.
Furthermore, fearful of a single united entity of the kingdom of Buganda, Obote took on another phase of further weakening his stiffest potential opposition. This Obote did by fragmenting and dismantling the over five-century old monarchy when he went ahead to politically disintegrate the Kingdom. On the 10 June 1966 Obote announced the division of the Kingdom of Buganda into four administrative divisions namely;- Mpigi, Bombo, Mubende and Masaka.772 The new administrative district of Mubende covered the former counties of Busujju, Buwekula and Singo. The district of Bombo covered the counties of Buvuma, Bugerere, Kyaggwe, Bulemezi and Buluuli. The
772 ‘EnkuykakyukaKakuzzi Ku Buganda Ebejjuddwamuebitundu Binna’, Munno, 11-12June 1966, pp.1-2; ‘Buganda to be Split into Divisions’ UgandaArgus,11 June 1966, p1;S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda,p58
188 district of Mpigi had Kyaddondo, Busiro, Ggomba, Mawokata and Butambala. Finally, the district of Masaka had Buddu, Kokki, Mawogoola and Ssese.773
Obote realised if he was to get rid of the kingdom of Buganda you ought to go beyond the mere removal of Kabaka, you totally had to cancel out anything that united the Baganda hence breakup of the kingdom into smaller administrative units. These changes intended to reduce Buganda into administrative status similar of other districts in Uganda outside the Buganda. The new changes were to be effected through the Local Administration Bill passed by parliament in 1967. This Bill had been introduced in parliament by the Minister of Regional Administrations in the central government.774 The district commissioners of these new administrative units in the kingdom of Buganda were also at the same level as the district commissioners of all the other regions in the country and were answerable to the minster of local government in the central government.775 Markedly, in terms of size and population the newly created administrative units in Buganda were far bigger than the rest of others in the country; clearly showing that Obote’s objectives were to destroy the kingdom of Buganda.
The demarcation of the Kingdom of Buganda into new administrative units had major long term consequences. Firstly, by dividing the Kingdom of Buganda into smaller units, Obote weakened the internal cohesion of the Kingdom.776 During the 1950s, the omnipresence of the Baganda was a key issue, as politicians from outside the kingdom were adamant that the post-colonial state would not be dominated by Buganda. In dismantling Bugandan legacy Obote simply implemented these wishes. Uganda would no longer be dominated by the kingdom of Buganda. Buganda a region that was formerly semi-autonomous and its Kabaka Muteesa II being the head of state was now being administered by four district commissioners, who were answerable to a minister in the central government. To the Baganda this was another great humiliation especially when this went hand in hand with destruction of the monarch and disrespecting of their King.
773 ‘EnkuykakyukaKakuzzi Ku Buganda Ebejjuddwamuebitundu Binna’, Munno, 11-12June1966, pp1- 2; ‘Buganda to be split into Divisions’ Uganda Argus,11 June 1966, p.1 774 A.R. Nsimbmbi, National Integration in Uganda,1962-2013,p.55 775 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.63 776 ‘Seven Years of Freedom’, Drum, October 1969, p.68
189 A further attempt to bring the Baganda into the fold, the above administrative changes affected Buganda financial allocation received from the central government. These in real terms were reduced. The Buganda administrative units despite the fact that they were larger in both size and population, would now be allocated the same financial resources as the smaller administrative units in the rest of the country. This was an indication that Obote intended to deny Buganda adequate services and in doing so; probably, Obote wished to further subdue the kingdom.
Another key observation that came to be associated with the operationalization of the newly created districts in the Kingdom of Buganda was the fulfilling of Obote’s long term desire to effectively remove of Buganda from the political map of Uganda. All Uganda’s political maps after 1966 no longer referred to Buganda as a region but instead the four recently created district administrative units were used. In the period preceding 1966 Buganda’s local administration rotated around the 18 counties as the basic administrative units. In the new era these were also dealt away with and there was no mention of their names. The new administrative units took on names of the former towns. Mpigi District was named after Mpigi town, Masaka after Masaka town similarly where the other two remaining districts.
Two significant issues clearly emanate out from the treatment that Buganda received at the hands of Obote in the post 1966; firstly by consigning the Kingdom of Buganda to a position of virtual irrelevance through disintegrating it politically, Obote had been able to remove the political power away from Buganda and placed it in the hands of politicians from the north of the country. In the words of Ali Mazrui: "In 1966 Buganda was humbled."777 Also this treatment lends little credibility to Obote’s declared intention ‘of reducing the significance of the ethnic factor’. It only revealed what Obote’s real intentions towards Buganda were i.e. to defeat the Baganda, the ethnic group he regarded as an obstacle to his access to power. Though, this he did successfully, it was obviously not the principal solution to Uganda’s political problems to bringing together the different ethnic communities of Uganda. On the other hand it accelerated the ethnic division among the Baganda and communities from northern Uganda.
777 A. Mazuri, Privilege and Protest as Integrative Factors: The Case of Buganda’s Status in Uganda, p.65
190 6.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF OBOTE’S ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES ON THE FUNCTIONALITY OF BUGANDA’S CULTURAL STRUCTURES
In Buganda attachment to culture was being intrinsically valuable. As a result Cultural ties were an important dimension of identity and a form of capital which was harnessed to move people towards development. The King (Kabaka) was the cultural head around whom the culture of the Baganda revolved. It was because of the above that Buganda became the most culturally vibrant, cohesive and progressive society, and possibly the reason why its cultural structures became a target of Obote’s administrative changes after the mayhem in 1966.
Traditionally, Buganda emerged as clan-based state and every person in the kingdom belonged to a particular clan. The Baganda are divided into 52 clans each headed by a clan head (Omutaka and plural Bataka). Under the clan system, there existed a hierarchy of elders up to the smallest unit of an extended family. Clan system was the core of collective identity of the Baganda. The paramount importance of the clans in the whole Buganda political structure was enhanced by the strong position of the King with his role as the Head of Clans (Ssabataka), or the ‘First among equal heads of patrilineages”.778 Assisted by the Clan heads (Bataka) the King was also the chief custodian of the Buganda cultural norms with the responsibility of to protect cultural values, customs and norms of the Baganda. 779 As Head of clan all issues relating to culture in Buganda are a sole responsibility of the king and the clan heads. He was also grand trustee of land in Buganda. Therefore, the clan system had remained the foundation for social organisation of the Bugandan society. In this sense the Baganda were tied to their king as the Ssabatakka both through the social and political organisation.
Moreover each of these clans performed a particular function within the kingdom, the political powers of clan heads was also strengthened. And for this reason, clans in Buganda were also one of the means by which kings secured the loyalty of its subjects by marrying from as many clans of their subjects as possible.780 The fact that in Buganda kings unlike their subjects belonged to the clan of their mothers was
778 S.R.Lunyiigo.The struggle for Land in Buganda 1888-2005,kampala,Wavah Books Ltd,2007 p.1 and S.R. Karugire .A political History of Uganda.Kampala,Fountain Publishers,2010 p.13 779 S.K. Bantubalamu, Ssekabaka Eyeeraburwa, p.28 780 S.R. Karugire, The Political History of Uganda, p.22
191 indicative of the paramount importance of the clan as the basic social and political organization. This phenomenon attempted to serve two purposes; avoiding the emergence of a royal clan if princes had taken on patrilineal succession as the rest of their subjects. Secondly, to enable each clan have a chance of producing a king since every clan was free to offer wives to the reigning king.
When Obote abolished the kingship as an institution, many other cultural structures attached to it such as the clan system were either deliberately destroyed or became non-existent. The institution of the clan heads (‘Bataka’) had an important role of inculcating the Buganda morals and norms among the young and guarding against societal norms. This had ensured a morally upright society. By taking care of the welfare of its clan members in terms of provision of non-formal education, health services and shelter, it also provided a vital support to the wider family and kinship system in Buganda. Many social gatherings in the kingdom including ceremonies related to birth, marriage, sports and death, in most cases rotated around the clan system under the auspices of the clan elders.781
The homesteads of clan elders and chiefs acted as training grounds (Ebisakatte) were life skills were passed onto the young including instilling traditions and cultural values.782All these had ensured a socially coherent society. However, the sequence of events that followed the political turmoil of 1966 would have a negative impact on the functionality of the Buganda’s cultural structures and also on the way of life of the Baganda. In 1966, Kabaka Muteesa II was forced to flee into exile, in 1967 the kingdom was abolished and in 1969 three years after the attack of the palace Muteesa II died.783 There was a disintegration of the cultural structures thereby disrupting the social cohesion that had existed. Also the support provided by the wider family and the kinship system was disrupted. In the long run, the absence of these important cultural structures for twenty-seven years created a new dimension in societal lives where Buganda’s social values were greatly undermined and her social fabric weakened.
781 A. Kagwa, Bassekabakaba Buganda, p.76 782 MAK, AR/BUG/35/3, Empisaza Baganda,1898-1902, pp.35-47 783 A.B.K. Kasozi, The Bitter Bread of Exile: The Financial Problem of Sir Edward Muteesa II During His Final Exile,1966-1969, p.73
192 Children born in Buganda in the post crisis era had little appreciation of the Buganda cultural ways; all they knew was life without a king and any cultural structures to guide them. This resulted in the emergence of a generation that is not well grounded in the Buganda cultural values and customs leading to high levels of moral decadence among the youth in Buganda. Given the absence of cultural structures, it became difficult for the Baganda to live the normal community life of the pre- 1966 crisis. One of the consequences of this development is the increasing number of street children, unemployed youth and homeless people in the major towns in the Buganda sub- region. Thus, the destruction of Buganda’s the social fabric and informal networks of trust would become one of the major lingering effects of the Battle of Mengo. These two occurrences disrupted the old-cultural structures through which the Baganda traditionally organized their economy. Subsequently, economic activities in Buganda slowed down as the chiefs’ inaction affected three aspects of Buganda’s economy revenue collections, road maintenance and agriculture production. It is thus argued that the failure of the Baganda to satisfy their own needs in the period after the crisis was not due to lack of economic resources and means. On the contrary Buganda was still endowed with immense human and material resources. The economic decline therefore is rather explained by the loss of its cultural values that used to be the foundations of the Baganda as a community.
6.4 AFTERMATH OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE
For centuries, the Kingdom of Buganda constituted the apex of the socio-economic organization of Uganda and even with the transition from the colonial to post independent era this seemed to continue. 784 Buganda’s social and political structures had still been kept intact by a Kabaka to whom the Baganda attached strong cultural ties. A glimpse at Buganda’s socio-economic status at the dawn of the crisis demonstrates that the Kingdom of Buganda was arguably one of the most culturally cohesive kingdoms providing leadership in both the social and economic life of Uganda.785 In the education sector, in the mid-1960s, Buganda had the best social infrastructure in the country. More than 80% of the schools in the country that produced
784 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.8 785 P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.8
193 the best students were located in Buganda, and a number of them were being managed by Buganda’s government.786 Many Baganda were able to attend these schools because of the wealth generated from the prosperous agriculture sector.
The Kingdom also owned a number of other educational institutions prior to the mayhem of 1966. At the dawn of the crisis the number of primary schools run and managed by the kingdom, was 155 with an enrolment of 38,068 pupils.787 This was besides the high schools, and the numerous vocational institutes and Teacher Training colleges. Makerere University, the highest institution of learning in East and Central Africa by then, had produced a great number of educated in different professions.788 Furthermore, in order to broaden educational opportunities to academically deserving but financially handicapped children, numerous bursaries were made available throughout the Kingdom by the Bugandan government. In 1966, for example, 47,000 British pounds was spent on this bursary scheme.789 As a consequence of these efforts, at the time of the Battle of Mengo, the Kingdom had an impressive number of educated and prosperous middle-class professionals that dominated most of the key position in government, in the public service and even the private sector than did any other ethnic group.790
The 1966 crisis negatively affected the educational sector both in the short and long term. In the short term, there had been widespread disruption of educational activities throughout the kingdom. The insecurity that immediately followed attack of the palace greatly affected the children`s school attendance from the month of May 1966 to about the end of July 1966.791 As riots spread throughout Buganda, hundreds of school- going children were displaced while others stayed at home for fear of their lives. This included children that had previously attended the schools located within the palace at Mengo where schools had been closed down. There was total destruction of the infrastructure here during the skirmishes at the palace.792 Similarly, some dropped out
786 MAK, AR/1/5/5, Buganda Economic Planning Commission, 1964-1970 787 MAK, AR/BUG/1/3, Ministry of Education 1960-1963, Educational Institutions in Buganda 788 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.9 789 MAK, AR/BUG/1/9, Ministry of Finance Bugandan government1966, Budgeted expenditures for the education sector 790 ENA, Box no 8/15, Miscellaneous Assorted papers only, Government statistical returns 791 EBB, C10.000/37, Buganda Affairs, District Annual Reports, from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service Permanent Secretary Public Service, 12 January 1967, p.73 792 ………………………………………………………………………………………….
194 due to the financial and socio-economic constraints attributed to the crisis. The displacement of people and loss of employment to some had negatively affected their income and no longer afforded to pay fees for their children. On the other hand, the dissolution of the Bugandan government, also negatively affected the beneficiaries of the Kingdom’s scholarships scheme as there was no government to continue with the scheme. Consequently, a number of them also could not complete their formal education.
The Bugandan government also lost ownership and management of up to 180 secondary and primary schools taken over by the central government.793 Various educational institutions that had been initially under the control of Buganda’s government were also made public schools. These included vocational institutes, such as the Masaka Technical Institute, Ssesse Farm Institute, Bukalasa Agricultural College, and Kabasanda Technical Institute.794 Predictably, the educational institutions that had been taken over by the central government in the later years were poorly facilitated and some of these collapsed. These schools lacked adequate number of teachers and scholastic materials were often in inadequate supplies. Also due to the fact that they were also now managed at the centre, these educational institutions often lacked adequate supervision resulting into poor quality education. It is alleged that this might have been a deliberate strategy since it was assumed that almost all the Baganda were anti-government.
Amidist the shrinking political influence, education would have been the best tool to up lift people’s standards of living and keep them at the helm of the socio economic status. Unfortunately one of the greatest effects of the constitutional crisis on the Baganda was the way it disrupted and destroyed children’s education. In the end, the worsening quality in the education sector coupled with the collapse of a number of schools was to negatively affect the livelihood of the Baganda. In the wake of the socio-economic crisis that followed the mayhem of 1966, in the long run these educational institutions that had played a vital role in the past in equipping the Baganda with vital skills that greatly contributed to their livelihood were now either providing poor quality education
793 MAK, AR/BUG/58/4, Records of the Buganda Government Ministries 1894-1967, The Management of Educational institutions in Buganda 794 MAK, AR/BUG/1/3, Ministry of Education 1964-1967, Educational Institutions in Buganda
195 or were in existence. As a result, educational opportunities greatly narrowed and there was a marked decline in the enrolment of children within the region that formerly provided leadership. Obote apparently seemed to be indifferent to this predicament which the Baganda were facing. Perhaps, this is how he had intended to handle the imbalance in education opportunities where the Baganda had been ahead of other ethnic groupings particularly those in the North.
In matters of public health by 1966 the Kingdom of Buganda had the best health infrastructure; accessibility of health services was generally at acceptable levels and above the national average - The national referral hospital at Mulago alongside four major missionary hospitals;Lubaga, Mengo, Nsambya, and Kibuli. Within the Kingdom, there were two other major regional referral hospitals at Masaka and Bombo. They were run by the Bugandan government. Numerous dispensaries were also scattered throughout the kingdom as the Christian missionaries in Buganda had set up a reletaively well developed system of church-run health centres. Others were also managed by the Bugandan government.795 This had resulted into the general standard of living of the people in Buganda between 1962 and 1966 generally higher than that of other regions in the country. In addition, traditional Buganda healthcare was provided in a number of ways such as through traditional birth attendants, healers, herbalist and psychotherapists. These welfare social systems together with institutional frame works that existed were closely related to forms of politcal authority which existed in Buganda that regulated public health.
However, the above status was to drastically change when the management of hospitals such as Masaka and Bombo regional hospitals and a number of health centres in various parts of the kingdom was taken over by the central government.796 There was total mismanagement of these facilities in the years that followed the central government take over. The health institutions received very little material and financial support. In addition, they also lacked essential drugs.797Thus, handicapped by both a
795 MAK,AR/BUG/ 1/6, Ministry of Health and Works, Bugandan government 1965- 66MAK,AR/BUG/6/15, Plans of the 100 bed rural hospitals. 796 A. Sjogren, Between Militarism and Technocratic Governance, p.83 797 A. Sjogren, Between Militarism and Technocratic Governance, p.83
196 lack of funds and a loss of personnel to manage and supervise them, many of these collapsed or operated below capacity.
In context of these disintegrating institutions, the decline in both the health and the education sectors had a profound negative impact on the well-being of the Baganda. Not only did it reduce the quality of their life, but it also limited their capabilities to live the kind of lives they valued and the real choices they were able to make.
6.5 THE MILITARIZATION OF UGANDAN POLITICS
One of the immediate aftermaths of the 1966 crisis as obote embarked on a destructive path was the militarization of Uganda politics. Obote’s continued dominance in the volatile political situation that had been created by the attack on the palace dictated that he continues to ally with the military. Obote’s position as leader of the UPC and state between the years 1966 to 1971 was fragile. This fragile nature of his leadership led him to use violent methods of retaining and consolidating power. By choosing to continue to rely on military for his political struggles against his opponents Obote had turned the army into the main instrument of political control.798 In doing so, Obote began the militarization of Uganda’s political system and since then the army in Uganda has continued to play an active role in governance issues. Under his leadership the army grew enormously to the extent that military bases were almost in every district of Uganda. In Buganda, in particular, where opposition to his rule was strongest, barracks were established in Masaka, Mubende, Kampala (Lubiri) and Nakasongola.
To secure political control of the country, in the aftermath of the crisis Obote re- organized the armed forces ensuring that only loyal officers, who could be trusted, commanded the strategic units and departments. Soldiers whose loyalty to him was doubted were dismissed from the army. Brigadier Opolot the commander of the army, an easterner and a close associate of Muteesa II was detained and dismissed. Also
798 M. Mamdani, The Uganda Asian Expulsion Twenty Years after, in Economic and Political Weekly,28(1993), pp.93-96; G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.127
197 dismissed were twenty five senior Baganda army officers. Similar reorganisation was carried out in the police force and the prisons department.799
To further consolidate his support of military and secure control of the army by his tribemates the Langi and close associates the Acholi, Obote through the recruitment process maintained the ethnic imbalance of the army. Also he ensured that the majority of the recruits were illiterate. To Obote, a literate army was undesirable and an ethnically balanced one much more so, simply because it would not then respond blindly to tribal sentiments and yet these were the basic tenets of Obote’s politics.800 Indeed from 1966 onwards, the ethnic imbalance in recruitment into the army was greatly enhanced. In Mbarara town, south western Uganda for example, a whole Battalion recruited from the ex-servicemen was composed only of Acholi and Langi originating from the north.801 This trend was followed almost elsewhere during recruitment practices leading to public outcry. In parliament one of the members noted as follows;
“When they (recruiting team) go to the north, they spend two or three months recruiting, but when they come to Kampala, they spend here one day and they recruit mainly those whom they have directed to come to Kampala because they failed to recruit them in the north. When they go to Masaka,(in Buganda) they spend half a day to recruit only about three people-two of them probably being those Northern people who are living in Buganda. When they go to Mbarara, (in western Uganda) they spend half a day to recruit only three people. This sort of recruitment must be stopped. They must give us quotas”.802
Obote never addressed the ethnically imbalanced recruitment into the military and by 1969 he had achieved his goal of creating a tribal army dominated by soldiers from northern Uganda, particularly Acholi and Lango, his home area. Accordingly, the Uganda Army Tribal Returns of 30 April 1969 reveals the army’s regional composition was as follows. The Central Region that essentially covered the former area of the kingdom of Buganda had 5%, Eastern Region 22%, Northern region 61% and Western region 12%.This was against the population census figures of 1969 where the Central Region had 22%, Eastern Region 31%, Northern region 19% and Western region
799 G.W. Kanyeihamba,Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p127 800 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.127 801 P. Bitariho , Testimony to the Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violation in Uganda ; Kampala: The Republic of Uganda Report of The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human rights; (1994) p.523 802 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.75
198 27%.803 On one hand Obote’s northern region that had the least population had the largest number of soldiers while on the other hand the central region dominated by the Baganda with the highest population had the least number of soldiers in the Uganda army. By the 1971 military coup when General Amin overthrew Obote, of the 9,000 strong army forces more than a third was Acholi and a considerable number of Langi.804
Thus the continued existence of an ethnically imbalanced and illiterate army in the post crisis era was not as a result of the colonial history but much more fundamentally a result of Obote’s politics. The desire to recruit more Langi and Acholi had not arisen out of Uganda’s need to defend itself against anyone but because a greatly expanded northern dominated army was necessary to control Buganda if need be byforce as the military possessed the means of physical coercion; it became the power base of the Obote regime.805
Obote’s over reliance on an ethnically un-balanced army for power had serious repercussion in as far as the governance of the country in general and Buganda in particular was concerned. The support from military permitted him to do many of the bold things during the post crisis era. He was able to replace the Baganda as the dominant political force in Uganda by placing power in the hands of politicians from northern Uganda who dominated both his government and the army.
Also the Obote regime relied on the army to implement its policies in Buganda and once the armed forces were used to achieve political goals it became impossible to return to a practice of reconciliation politics.806 Throughout his regime, Obote never reconciled with Buganda. Instead he wanted to expand the domain of fear as a strategy of political persuasion. He thus treated the Baganda as a conquered people in a clearly military sense and the governed region by a quasi-military government to remind its people that they had been conquered. Notably, Bulange the former seat of the kingdom of Buganda was sold by the central government to the defence ministry
803 UHRC, The Republic of Uganda Report of The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human rights; Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, 1994, p.377 804 H.B. Hansen,Ethnicity and military rule in Uganda: A study of Ethnicity as a Political Factor in Uganda, p.68 Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.71 805 H.B. Hansen, Ethnicity and military rule in Uganda: A study of ethnicity as a political Factor in Uganda, p.66 806 T.V. Sathyamurthy, the Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986, p.530
199 at British pounds 250,000 and turned into the headquarters of Defence ministry. The King’s palace at Mengo which was stormed in May 1966 was turned into Marine army barracks. The palace at Bamunanika 30 miles north of Kampala where Obote in 1961 had knelt before Kabaka Muteesa II pledging his total support in an independent Uganda was occupied by soldiers. And later Amin turned it into a training ground for the army. The Kingdom Land at Kigo some 30 miles west of Kampala was taken over by the prisons department. To the Ordinary Baganda the military occupation of the properties and more especially the palaces by the military served as the ultimate humiliation of their pride. The palaces symbolised the epitome of Buganda’s civilization, but now were not only being occupied; by not only people not from the Buganda royal family but soldiers that had no respect for Buganda norms and customs. Thus the human impacts the Baganda suffered had not been necessary by– products of the Battle of Mengo but intentional strategies that targeted the Baganda as a way of destroying their once powerful and influential position in Uganda
Obote’s reliance on the military was further supplemented by his dependence on Paramilitary institutions he had created to further enhance his control of both the party and the state. These organisations were extremely loyal to Obote and like the army; the compositions of these institutions were ethnically imbalanced in favour of the north. The first of such institutions was the GSU identified. There was also the Special Force, an elite paramilitary police unit whose headquarters were at Nsambya, a Kampala suburb, approximately four kilometres east of Kampala. This unit had similar combat training like the army. It is alleged that almost seventy five per cent of its members were believed to be Langi, Obote’s ethnic group.807 The Force was mandated to maintain peace and quell down the opposition. It patrolled streets, made its presence in opposition political rallies, and even sports matches at stadiums; in the process striking terror to the Baganda and the potential opponents within the UPC party.
Obote’s preferential treatment of the Special Force, in as far as the matters of security were concerned would later become a threat to Amin the army commander and considered it a rival army. This clearly illustrated with the following statement made by Amin;
807 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.89
200 “The cabinet office, by training large number of people (largely from the Akokoro County in Lango District where Obote and Akena Adoko, the chief General Service Officer come from) in armed warfare has been turned into a second army. Uganda therefore has two armies, one in the Cabinet, the other regular.”808
The third organization was the military police. All these were properly exploited by Obote to further consolidate his grip onto power in regard to the UPC party and state largely through the use of state inspired violence.
The parliamentary government had ceased to operate largely as a result of the failure of the politicians to find lasting solutions to the political problems that they had inherited from the colonial period. By employing military violence to resolve political differences, Obote had turned the army into critical factor in Ugandan political system (to be redefined). Indeed Amin’s comments on the occasion of celebrating the visit of a British Defence college team to Uganda summaries it all. The First Secretary to the British High Commission in Uganda M.C. Qately had wished in his conservation with Amin the army commander on 17 August 1967, to get clarification from Uganda Political leaders as whether it would be in order for the invited army officers to put on Army uniforms or not. In his response Amin stated thus; “They could wear them, I would give an order that they should wear them and no one can argue about it. The President (Obote) knows that he can only rule because of the army so I do what I like.”809
6.6 THE 1967 CONSTITUTION; THE FINAL PHASE OF OBOTE’S DICTATORSHIP
Fifteen months after the introduction of the 1966 Constitution, in June 1967, Obote introduced a new Constitution in parliament through his Attorney General, Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa.810 At the time of the introduction of the 1967 republican Constitution, Obote had felt strong enough to move a step further and consolidate his grip onto power. Having used unconstitutional methods on 24 May 1966 to mollify the Kingdom of Buganda, Obote in the period thereafter manipulated the Constitutional
808 See appendix VI 809 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Letter from the First Secretary British high commission Kampala ,MC Qately to M.Scott 21 August 1967 810 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.59
201 path to consolidate his control over Buganda the region and its people, the Baganda. This he did with enactment of the 1967 republican constitution which completed the process of centralization of power that had begun on 15 April 1966. Unlike the 1966 interim Constitution that was never debated by parliament, the draft version of 1967 republican Constitution was debated at length. It was passed and enacted on 8 September 1967 after three months of debate in parliament.811
However, similar to the 1966 interim Constitution, the enactment, 1967 Constitution too, had major flaws cited; Firstly, no meaningful debates took place within Buganda the country’s most populous and richest region with regard to the new Constitution. The kingdom from 1966 - 1971 was under a state of emergency.812 Thus with the enactment of the 1967 Constitution, the Baganda were offered a Constitution that had virtually been dictated upon them by Obote and the national assembly. Hence, though the Baganda complied with the new Constitution, this did not mean that they had accepted or endorsed it.813
Also, the members of the national assembly who had constituted themselves into a constituent assembly for the purpose of enacting the Constitution had already been manipulated by Obote. Their term of office was supposed to have expired in 1967, but in terms of the Constitution they enacted, their stay in the national assembly was automatically renewed for another five years. In essence, the constitution prolonged that life of the parliament to the 15 April 1971. This meant that Obote’s Government was ensured stay in power for eight and half years instead of five provided for in the both repealed 1962 and 1966 constitutions.
Thus the 1967 republican Constitution was enacted through bribery and threats. This rendered Obote’s Constitutional path as un-credible.814 However, this was not the perception of Obote. In defence of the accusations made against him in regard to the approach used in enacting the republican constitution Obote denied any wrong doing and stated that;
811 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times,, p104.P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.59 812 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.60 813 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.60 814 G. Lule’s Memoirs, The Constitutional Developments in Uganda
202 “When we proposed the new constitution in June 1967 three months passed before the constitutional proposals were adopted and during that period, the proposals were analysed criticized and even condemned and not one person was arrested or detained because of views expressed on the constitutional proposals.
It is true that during the discussion of the constitutional proposals. I had to dismiss one minister. I took this action not because he had criticized the proposals; but because as member of the cabinet, we all spent about nine months in framing the proposals. At every stage the full cabinet without a single dissenting voice agreed to every single proposal. That is why the proposals themselves were published with the title- ‘the Government proposal for a New Constitution.”815
6.6.1 The Obliteration of Monarchism
Under the 1967 Constitution, Obote broadly came out to formally abolish the Kingdom of Buganda alongside other three namely Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro. Article 118(1) the 1967 Constitution stated that;
“The institution of King or Ruler of a Kingdom or Constitutional Head of a District, by whatever name called, existing immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under the law then in force, is hereby abolished.”816
Obote took it further by his attack on the members of the royal families as Article 8 clauses 3 and 4 stated that no citizen was to enjoy any special privilege, status, or title by virtue of his birth, descent, or heredity. Nor were any laws to be made conferring any privilege, status, or title upon any citizen because of his birth, descent, or heredity.817 The Constitution thus ended the era of the kingdoms and of the privileges that used to differentiate them from the rest of the country.
It is urged that Obote had never been comfortable with what he saw as elements of feudal societies. To him, kings were a hindrance to the egalitarian nationalism of his heart, a point he made so often in speeches he made after he had prevailed over Buganda.818 In doing all this, Obote was aware of the royal mystique which surrounded the kings in Uganda. Hence, his ridicule and attack on them during the
815 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, Myths and Realites Obote’s Letter to a London Freiend, 16 November 1968 816 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’ Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3 817 ‘Ebikulu ebbiri mu constitution’ Taifa Empya, 18 April 1966, pp.1-3 818 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.105
203 debate on proposals for the 1967 Constitution. For the purpose of demystifying the Kings who were being referred to as Sir, Obote remarked;
“Mr Speaker, I understand that the British crown gives these Knighthood to commoners and I argue that if anybody said he was a king and took a Knighthood which is for a commoner, he must be a commoner it looks odd to me that the personalities who were known as kings were at the same time Knights of the British Crown”.819
Admittedly, Buganda had given him a headache but it becomes difficult to understand why Obote abolished the rest of other kingdoms in his Constitutional changes if it were not his desire to establish his high handed rule. It could be argued that Obote and his northern dominated government and military, which had come from areas that were not Kingdoms, could not be expected to have much respect or even affection for monarchical institutions. However, in a society as socio-culturally diverse as Uganda and in the spirit under which independence had been achieved, Obote as a national leader should have been expected to exercise tolerance and accommodate different cultures.
Scholars have pointed out that with the abolition of the kingdom; the political power of Kingdom of Buganda was removed. 820 This was a final blow to the Baganda who still had hopes of having their Kabaka Muteesa II return as the 1966 interim Constitution had left the kinship in place. Nothing much has ever devastated the Baganda like the abolition of their 500 year old Kingdom. The king in Buganda is a symbol of totality, and indeed the centre around which the Baganda are organized as a state. Sir Edward Muteesa II, the reigning Kabaka then, was the central symbol of power and legitimacy. The turmoil of 1966 sowed bitterness and divisions between the Baganda and the people from the north that dominated both the Obote government and army. It had not only altered the Buganda traditional political institution but also destroyed it. Thus with the fleeing of the Muteesa to exile and later the abolition of his Kingdom the institutions left behind were not solid enough to prevent the once mighty kingdom from disintegrating. Moreover not satisfied with Muteesa being a ‘thousand’ miles away in England, Obote would still follow him up
819 A.R. Nsibambi, National Integration in Uganda 1962-2013, p.47 820 J. Lonsdale, Uganda: Recent History in Africa South of the Sahara, p.834; C. Johannessen, The Restoration of Kingship in Uganda: A comparative Study of Buganda and Ankole. MA Thesis
204 in exile. Through Akena Adoko the head of the General Service Unit, a spy organisation, Obote would even follow Muteesa to exile. Akena contacted Scot the British commissioner to Uganda to not grant Muteesa any interview on the British Broadcasting services. Akena argued that Muteesa may use such an opportunity to make hostile propaganda against the Uganda government.821 Although the British would turn down such a request, the painting was on the wall. Obote would do anything to ensure that Muteesa is obliterated.
6.6.2 The over centralisation of power
Also the 1967 Constitution totally overhauled the body politic of Uganda by making Uganda a republic.822 The introduction of a republican Constitution finally marked the end of the cherished federal system of government in Buganda. Article (2)1 for the first time broadly referred to Uganda as a republic, to be known as the republic of Uganda consisting of all those areas which were more particularly delineated in schedule 1 to the Constitution. All these territories were now simply referred to as districts. The Constitution thus ended the era of the Kingdoms and of the specialness especially of Buganda that used to separate them from the rest.823 By strongly enhancing the power of the central government, the 1967 Constitution completed the process of centralization of power which was begun by the 1966 Constitution.824 This was at the expense of regional governments especially Buganda which under the 1962 Independence Constitution had a fully-fledged federal system. It also increased control of the central government over Buganda as a region and the Baganda as an ethnic group. To Buganda, her loss of its federal status and consequent abolition of the monarch was a great loss. The monarchy in Buganda was a people’s institution and it had existed largely because the Baganda loved it. Up to the time of its abolition the monarch in Buganda served peoples’ interests and mobilized them for development. In many cases it also acted as a platform for negotiations with the central government.
821 ENA,/ FCO31/179/127A, Communication of Mr. Scot to Foreign and Common Wealth Office 5 December 1967 822 G.W. Kanyeihamba,Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p117; P. Mutibwa, The Buganda Factor in Uganda Politics, p.101 823 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.105 824 G. Lule’s Memoirs: The Constitutional Developments in Uganda; Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, pp.104-105
205 In all, the 1967 Republican Constitution which was a legally binding document negatively impacted on Buganda. By terminating Buganda’s special status at both political and Constitutional levels, the Constitution not only instituted fundamental changes in the political climate of the kingdom but also injured the pride of the Baganda.825
The centralization of power was further manifested in the enhanced executive and legislative powers of the president at the expense of the cabinet, the judiciary and the legislature as pointed out in Article 40[4]). Regional assemblies were abolished among which was the once vocal Buganda Lukiiko.826 Moreover under the 1967 constitution the president could now dismiss the National Assembly and legislate by decrees.827 The President by virtue of his office was a member of the national assembly. This way, he was not only in a position to use his uplifted status, prestige, and power to manipulate parliament to his design, but could also use his power of summoning, proroguing and dissolving parliament or induce parliament to become amenable. Besides being Head of State, and Commander-in Chief of the Armed forces, Obote was also Head of Government.828 This situation put Obote in firm control of over his opponets particularly the Baganda. Thus, the sole beneficiary of the centralization process was the Presidency occupied by Obote, whose power to legislate was now boosted beyond that provided for both in the 1962 and 1966 Constitutions.
Also in the 1967 Constitution the position of the President as the chief executive who was to be elected indirectly by parliament was confirmed.829 The election proposal of the president were so framed that only Obote would have to succeed in serving the complex formalities and procedures provided. In addition to ensure that Muteesa II, the king of Buganda did not stand any chance whatsoever of being elected, Obote inserted a clause that barred rulers of federated states from being presidential candidates as had been the case with the 1962 Independence Constitution. Whereas
825 H.B. Hansen, Ethnicity and military Rule in Uganda: A study of Ethnicity as a Political Factor in Uganda, p.66 826 H.B. Hansen, M. Twaddle, From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitutional making in Uganda, p.41;S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.58 827 G. Lule’s Memoirs: The Constitutional Developments in Uganda. 828 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.117 829 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.58
206 Chapter 36 (1) of the 1962 Independence Constitution had stated that the President and the Vice President were to be elected from among the rulers of the Federal States and the Constitutional Heads of the Districts by the members of the National Assembly for a term of five years.830 In the 1967 Constitution, this was amended to remove rulers of federated states and the Constitutional District Heads. 831 In addidtion the proposals for new electoral laws to cover the elections of members of parliament and the president in July 1970 provided for election of members of one party only the U.P.C., Obote’s party. It also provided that candidates for parliament should stand in four constituencies. The proposals were impractical and unjust and were designed to perpetuate the Obote regime. The cost of campaigning in four constituencies was beyond the reach of many, other than the candidates directly supported by Obote who would have benefited just from standing in four places in Uganda.
Thus, though enacted in the name of all people of Uganda, the 1967 Constitution did little more than consolidate and safeguard Obote’s political position.832
The 1967 Constitution effected two major changes: on one hand it elevated Obote to the position of the undisputed ruler of Uganda and on the other it dismantled and ended Buganda’s special status. Obote’s actions under the guise of the need of unifying the country and fostering synergy, revealed that he had deep-seated hatred for monarchs and, in particular that of Buganda. This was a clear indication that the 1967 Constitution had been introduced in the spirit of hunger and revenge unlike the 1962 independence Constitution that embodied the principles of compromise, tolerance, freedom of choice and conscience.833 The worst victims of the 1967 Constitution were the Baganda who had stood firmly behind the 1962 Independence Constitution. Thus, even after Obote had defeated them at the Battle of Mengo, he continued treating them as an enemy whose legacy should be destroyed. In all, Obote came out of the Constitutional changes victorious against Buganda.
830 EBB, C10736 D.Gc 230 III, The 1962 Independence Constitution 831 EBB, C10736 D.Gc 230 III, The 1962 Independence Constitution 832 G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda, p.118 833 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.61
207 6.7 THE POST 1966’S OBOTE LAND POLICY TOWARDS BUGANDA
Land is very important in Buganda not only because the kingdom of Buganda is a crop-based economy but also because besides being an economic asset, throughout the kingdom’s history it was used both an instrument of political control by the King and cultural tool by the Baganda. The control of this land in the pre-colonial Buganda lay in the hands of the King. However, during the colonial times, Buganda’s economy was developed into one based on the production and export of cash crops. The British found it necessary to take part of Buganda’s land. Thus, under the 1900 Buganda Agreement signed between the British and the Baganda, land in Buganda consisted of two types; crown land and mailo land. The mailo land which was given to chiefs and leading personalities in Buganda, was approximately was 12,800square kilometres. The remaining 14,400 square kilometres was crown land was under the control of the British colonial administrators. This became public land on which the British would carry out their projects.
In March 1962, as the country moved towards independence, the British under the public land ordinances decided to hand over the formerly crown land back to the Bugandan government. 834 The returned crown land was vested in the Buganda Land Board. This was the status quo which Obote sought to alter after his defeat of Mengo in 1966. Obote’s land policy in the post 1966 period directly attacked the ‘heart’ of Kingdom of Buganda. He attempted to dismantle the Buganda land tenure system and also remove the control of land away from Buganda. As a consequence of his policy, the loss of land by Buganda as a region and the Baganda as a people fell in the following categories:
As a result of the transfer of the lost counties of Buyaga and Bugagainzi in 1965 back to the Kingdom of Bunyoro, the kingdom of Buganda lost land. The two counties covered a total of 4.904 square Kilometres of land among which the Baganda had been allocated 4,728 square Kilometres compared to the 112 square kilometres given to the indigenous Banyoro.835 Thus, when the counties reverted to the kingdom of Bunyoro, a substantial area was lost.
834 MAK, AR/BUG/1/1, Katiikiro’s Ministry 1956-1963, The Buganda land Commission 835 S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Struggle for Land in Buganda 1888-2005, p.99
208 The second category was the loss of an estimated 14,400 square kilometres of land the formerly crown land to the central government. Following the enactment of the 1967 constitution, this land was vested in the Uganda Land Commission away from the Buganda Land board and the Bugandan government control.836 The 14,400 square kilometres subsequently became public land most of which was leased to people who were from outside Buganda but close to the Obote regime. These had the political and financial power at a time when the Baganda following their defeat at Mengo and the fleeing to exile by their king were powerless. Moreover, in the terms of the 1900 Buganda agreement, this land had been reserved for the future Buganda generation that had not taken a share in the 12,800 square kilometres (mailo Land) from which only 3700 high profile people in Buganda had benefitted.837 The new land owners, who were largely from outside of Buganda used this opportunity to take over whatever public land they wished to own in Buganda. The removal of the 14,400 square kilometres of land was a great loss to Buganda because this land amounted to more than half of the territorial area that made up the Kingdom of Buganda.
The extent to which this land was grabbed is evidenced by the remarks by Baguma Isoke838 in response to the Baganda’s persistent demand for their confiscated land;
...I have failed to find it (the 9,000 square miles) because the land that is being claimed is occupied by people who have lived on it for a long time. What remains is gazetted land such as wetlands where people are not allowed to settle. Where is the 9000 square miles?839
In addition, land was also removed from the control of Buganda when Government confiscated the official estates of the former kingdom officials. According to the 1967 Constitution all official mailo land was added to the crown land.840 In this category, there were the private estates of the Kabaka totalling to 560 square Kilometres and 333 square kilometres attached to the offices of the Katiikiro, Omuwanika, Omulamuzi,
836 The 1967 Republican Constitution 837 S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Struggle for Land in Buganda1888-2005, p.5 838 Baguma Isoke is the Chairperson of the Uganda Land Commission 839 ‘Mmengo eragge milo akendda Zgyeziri’, Bukedde,30 June 2005, pp.1-2 840 S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Struggle for Land in Buganda1888-2005, p.119
209 the county and sub-county chiefs.841 Each of the county headquarters covered 8 square miles of land.
Finally, although Ugandans from outside the Kingdom of Buganda settled in droves in Buganda from the 1960s, this settlement was intensified after 1966.842 This was largely attributed to the sale of land by the Baganda mailo land owners due to the economic hardship they faced in the post 1966 period. Therefore, as a way of overcoming these hardships, they began selling part of their land. Many non-Baganda bought and secured freehold land titles from the Baganda land owners. The new comers even went as far as creating enclaves of their ethnic groups in Buganda and renaming their acquired land in Buganda after the places where they originated or after their ancestors. For instance, Garuga along the Kampala- Entebbe highway replaced the Buganda name Mbiru.843 Such practices were very humiliating to the Baganda.
In the mind of Baganda, the confiscation of this land was very significant. The Baganda are tied to particular pieces of land, because their staple food, the bananas (Matooke)’is perennial. Therefore, with accessibility to their agricultural land being limited, there was a loss of a resource base that Baganda had. They were deprived of land that they would cultivate, which would nourish their children, and on which they could graze their animals. This negatively affected the household incomes of the Baganda who begun to feel the economic hardships of Obote’s economic policies towards them.
Secondly, the land grabbing represented the real conquest of the Kingdom of Buganda, as the Baganda became tenants on what had formerly been their land and could be evicted at will with no government support. The Obote appointed Chiefs who acted as care takers of the kingdom properties especially at the county and sub county levels. These took this as an opportunity to sell off most of the land without authority.
The loss of land is one of the un-resolved historical grievances that have continued to the present day. In Uganda today, it is only in the Kingdom of Buganda where those
841 EBB,BG 12 iv, The 1900 Buganda Agreement; S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Struggle for Land in Buganda1888-2005, p.119 842 S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Struggle for Land in Buganda1888-2005, p.120 843 S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Struggle for Land in Buganda1888-2005, p.120
210 who own most of the public land belong to ethnic groups other than the indigenous ethnic people of the Baganda.
Also to note, Obote’s actions permanently altered the land ownership patterns in the Kingdom of Buganda, in total disregard of the well-known Buganda customary laws and structures that had been in place. As a result of his new and poorly defined land tenure regime, and a lack of awareness of and adherence to the traditions and customs governing land in Buganda by the new landlords, land conflicts and evictions which had hitherto not existed in Buganda became a common feature. The ‘Busuulu’ and ‘Envujjo’ Law of 1928 which virtually guaranteed the peasants or tenants security of tenure on their bibanja, (plots) thus eliminating land ownership conflicts in the Kingdom had been repealed.844
In summary, although the battle of Mengo lasted only 8hours, its social and economic consequences continued to have a profound impact on the political, social and economic progress of the Kingdom of Buganda for many years long after the battle had ended. The battle not only destroyed the physical, human and social capital of Buganda but also directly diminished available opportunities for the Baganda to progress.
On the other hand, politicians have been accused of protecting economic interests of some individuals in the institution who mismanage Kingdom properties. The concept of wealth has taken centre stage in the institution of kingship. People of all sections are trying to use all means to acquire wealth in form of land, houses etc. Unfortunately, some individuals are trying to grab as much as possible from the institution of kingship as if it is ending tomorrow which is a possibility. The institution of kingship has always been a custodian and a source of peoples’ wealth. This however changed when the Kingdom was overthrown. The Obote government confiscated the Kingdom’s properties such as land, forests.
6.8 THE IMPACT OF THE ‘MOVE TO THE LEFT’ POLICY ON BUGANDA
One of the corner stones of Obote’s economic policies in the post-1966 era were his so-called ‘move to the left’ and the ‘common man’s charter’. In the initial years,
844 S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Struggle for Land in Buganda1888-2005, p.72
211 immediately after 1966, Obote appeared to be consolidating his hold onto power and somehow neglected the economy. However, after a period of three years he felt strong enough to embark upon sweeping changes in the economic field. In 1969 Obote announced that “we will now begin to acquire our true identity.” This statement was quickly followed with the implementation of his socialist policies. This was of course in contradiction of his earlier remarks of 1966when he stated that Uganda was pursuing a “middle of the road strategy”, which was neither “left” nor “right”.
The issuance of the common Man’s Charter in 1969 signified a leftward swing policy towards socialism. The common Man’s Charter documented Obote’s socialist policies, pompously condemning the exploitation of man by man, expounding unity of Uganda in particular and African in general and stating that the political and economic power must be vested in the majority.
The move to the left was passed in June 1968 by the UPC Annual Delegates Conference, and adopted by the same organ on 24 October 1969 in an emergency sitting in Kampala.845 The common Man’s Charter on the other hand was announced on 8th October, 1969, a day before the seventh anniversary of Uganda’s independence and approved by UPC on 19 December 1969.846 This would be later followed by the Nakivubo Pronouncements commonly referred to as NP. Issued 1 May 1970 the NP outlined the increased nationalisation of major industries as part of the commitment to enhancing socialism.
The NP proclaimed that with immediate effect the take over 60% of the major corporations in Uganda. These numbered up to 80 corporations among which were all transport undertakings, banks, insurance companies, plantations, manufacturing and mining industries, and oil companies.847 State corporations, trade unions, municipal councils and cooperative unions had now become the mandated authorities to run the corporations that had been taken over.
Obote’s move to the left was embroiled in vagueness; the common man’s charter condemned capitalism on the one hand while guaranteeing the protection of private
845 G.S. Ibingira, African Upheavals Since Independence, p.35 846 See Appendix V 847 ENA, 21153, Collections of the Office of the President, The Nakivubo Pronouncements
212 property on the other. It also cautiously moved against foreign enterprises and vehemently attacked communism. It was not clear whether the aim of the measures was to take commerce away from foreigners, nationalize it, or give it to Africans. For instance, under Obote’s economic policies, the whites not blacks Africans were allowed to participate in industry, commerce and large scale agriculture. Obote allowed more Asians into the lucrative commodity such as the import and export trade as well as in large scale agriculture than ever before.
In addition, there were more problems at the implementation level as government nationalized more companies than it could manage profitably. As a result, there was a contradiction when previous owners of nationalized companies were asked to manage them on behalf of the government. To the Asians, who like Obote, shared the fear of an emergent Baganda business elite welcomed the idea. Such measures in place, where government was also co-owner, guaranteed the foreign owned companies access to government contracts and protection from workers’ demands as government did not tolerate strikes.
Indeed in reality little preparation seems to have been made in implementing the move to the left. The method for nationalisation was not made clear. For instance, right from the onset it was clear that socialism which was a planned economy model was incompatible with the plans to Africanise Ugandan economy that Obote had professed in his documents. This uncertainty forced Sir Frederick Seebohm, chairman of Barclays Bank, one the Banks found in Uganda that had been affected to make the following remarks which were reflective of the many affected people;
“No one questions the right of governments to nationalise within their territory… But to nationalise by instant decree and without any prior consultations is to say the least, an unfriendly gesture which is not likely to create a feeling of confidence among potential foreign investors.”848
The hurried manner in which Obote wished to carry out his move to the left was a clear indication that possibly what had been intended was to achieve two main goals, winning over support from the civilians and to target and dismantle Buganda’s economic power, his opponents who apparently dominated the economic sector. The
848 ‘Cocerns about Uganda’s move to the left’,Uganda Argus, 27 March 1971,p.1
213 issue was actually never the desire not to follow a socialist line. In the first instance, those preaching socialism were far from being socialists themselves, the ministers, the UPC functionaries and top civil servants in the Obote government were all enjoying a life style that could only be attained through corruption.849 In fact General Amin in 1971 noted that the move to the left led to the creation of wealthy classes of leaders who were always talking of socialism while growing richer yet the common man became poorer.850 Those who were on good terms with Obote were able to get government contracts, jobs and loans. To the Baganda he continued to redistribute national income away from them.
On the question of economically weakening the Baganda, Obote was pragmatic; in the post crisis era he increasingly allied himself to the big capitalists especially the Asians who became the financiers of his government. Obote detested the reliance of the wealthy, hostile Baganda businessmen dominating the economy. Aware that his political victory over the Baganda at the battle of Mengo in May 1966 had not been enough to subdue them, Obote went ahead to make plans to economically weaken the once most commercially powerful ethnic group in Uganda. Thus, instead of having the economy in the hands of indigenous Ugandans, he handed it to Asians whom he considered as being a lesser threat than the Baganda. By doing so, Obote greatly alienated the Ugandan petty bourgeoisie, particularly the Baganda who had dominated the commercial sector from manning the economy. As a consequence, they were steadily removed from the business sector with dire consequences. Many people were left un- employed, insecure and lacking basic needs of life yet facing high levels of taxation.
As another check on Buganda’s economic strength, Obote would put restrictions on the cooperative unions and societies. The prosperous agricultural sector in Buganda had given rise to a strong cooperative movement that dates way back as early as 1913. These had enabled the Baganda process and market their produce. By 1949 there were over one hundred fifty one cooperative societies; over two hundred by
849 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.70 850 The 18 points given by the Uganda Army under Major General Amin to justify taking over powers of government on 25 January 1971, point number 12.
214 independence in 1962.851 Both the members and owners of these cooperative unions acquired economic power from the trade that ensued. This frightened Obote, moreover many of these had been Baganda who were not only in the agricultural sector that was flourishing but also the cooperative movement that was strongest.
By the 1968 Act of parliament restrictions were put on cooperative unions and societies in the supply, the storing the handling, the transportation and processing of both major cash crops such as coffee and cotton and minor crops such as beans, groundnuts and maize. All these were put under government’s monopoly. As a consequence of this act, the cooperative unions that had been alienated were no longer allowed to manage the marketing of crops, deprived of their independence and were subjected to government control. This had been a big blow to the cooperatives that began processing and marketing. This was contrary to what the 1963 Act had legislated. i.e. unions were given complete managerial and financial autonomy.
In 1970 further control was put on the cooperative movement by the Cooperative Societies Act. 852 Government acquired greater power for the guidance, direction and control of the cooperative societies and unions on matters of finance and management of their affairs. Secretary Managers were to be approved by government but in practice they were appointed. As a result of this increased control many Baganda were denied active participation in the economic direction of their country. No wonder Mamdani felt that Obote’s government did not move to the left but simply moved against the right.853 Government control over cooperatives led to some being mismanagement their eventual collapse which had a multiplier effect on the social and economic welfare of both Buganda and the Baganda.
In all, as Kasozi notes, Obote’s economic policies stunted the growth of Buganda’s economy and curtailed the development of a Baganda property-owning class. All these alienated the Baganda to the point where they would always be eager to see him go.854
851 F.Musisi, popular unrest against Colonial rule: A case study of the 1945 and 1949 Riots in Buganda,p.98 852 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.93 853 M. Mamdani, Politics and class formation in Uganda, p.26 854 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p. 94
215 When Obote officially stated that his objective of introducing the ‘common Man’s charter’ in 1969 was to reduce regional imbalances and economic differences on which regional conflicts had thrived, he had made it clear that the Baganda were his target.855 The Charter identified regional imbalance particularly in production (both agricultural and industrial) and education all of which had been dominated by the Baganda.
It is also important to realize that all the chief cash crops of Uganda namely; coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco and cotton were successfully grown in Buganda.856 Buganda, thus, was naturally in the lead. The wealth and prosperity generated from agricultural production was spent on various items that uplifted their standards of living such as the imported goods namely clothing, bicycles, metal roofing and even automobiles. This enabled them to enjoy a relatively high standard of living. Likewise, wealth was also invested in their children’s education. Thus, both in agricultural production as well as in the field of education as noted by the charter, Buganda provided the leadership.
However, it was the solutions prescribed in the charter that were to victimize Buganda. For instance, as a solution to the regional imbalance, Obote in Section 35 of the charter, empowered government to nationalize private enterprises by taking over 60% shares of major corporations in the country.857The shares owned by the Bugandan government in a number of parastatals such as Uganda Electricity Board which generated hydro power in Uganda and Nyanzi Textiles, which was one of the largest textile companies in East Africa were also lost to the central government. Also grabbed was cash from different banks belonging to the Bugandan government.858 This was contradictory to the treatment given to foreign investors. Whereas the later would be compensated up to the period of fifteen years from the post-tax profits made by the nationalised corporations, the Baganda would not be.
In line with this policy, the central government also confiscated a number of properties formerly owned by the Kingdom of Buganda. These included Muteesa II House in London, which used to house Baganda students studying in London or on transit to
855 A. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The making of a Military Ethnocracy. P.91 856MAK,AR/BUG/1/5/4,Minutes of the Buganda Cotton Promotion and Productivity Committee 1965, p.08 857 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.70 858 ‘Charles Peter Mayiga First Year in Office’, Saturday Vision, 6 July 2013, p.1
216 other destinations in Europe and beyond. Muteesa II’s home at Makindye, a suburb of Kampala, was turned into a state lodge. The Makindye Housing estate that used to house civil servants of the Bugandan government was turned into a military police barracks. The Kingdom farm at Kigo, some 30 miles west of Kampala, was taken over by the prisons department.859 Also taken was the official residence (the ‘Butikkiro’) of the Katiikiro of the Kingdom of Buganda at Mengo adjacent to the attacked palace at Mengo. This was in addition to all the 18 county and 73 sub county headquarters that housed both the official administrative offices and the residences of the respective chiefs. Most of these properties, such as Buganda Museum, had moreover been income-generating units of the Buganda government, either by directly generating funds for the treasury or indirectly doing so by employing anumber of the Baganda.860 Thus, although in the institution of kingship in Buganda in the past had been always been a custodian and a source of peoples’ wealth. This had now changed as the Kingdom was abolished and the central government confiscating the Kingdom’s properties the livelihood of the Baganda would be affected negatively.
To the ordinary Baganda, these turns of events injured them greatly and were filled with anger towards Obote. Throughout Buganda atmosphere was of increased enmity of Obote and his UPC. This anger was expressed in various ways such as anonymous pamphlets and letters to Obote and his colleagues in government on the 21 November 1968 circulated countrywide. One of such letters had the following excerpts as reproduced below;
“You robbed with armed forces Gold, Ivory, Coffee etc. from Congo. What an international robber! You robbed our 1962 constitution; you robbed our mandate after the expiry in April 1967 of your five years. Worse still you robbed our liberty of speech by keeping us dumb. You robbed Kabakaship personal properties at Mengo, Bamunanika, Nkoni and Ndaiga (all these were palaces). You robbed and still Baganda many Baganda who are still being arrested…This is free excellent advice; you are digging your own grave for we shall burry you alive. We cannot be led by a small a creature known as chameleon for its constant changing of its colour as you changed your title without being elected by parliament. We all know as well as you do that rightful elected president is
859 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.59;P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.60 860 Gingyera-Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times,p.39
217 Sir Edward Muteesa Kabaka of Buganda who you attempted to murder in May 1966.”861
Also this attitude of opposition to the Obote’s changes with the ordinary Baganda is also illustrated by the numerous intelligence monthly reports by District commissioners from the Buganda sub region. One such report of 24 April 1970 by the Masaka District Commissioner noted that in Kalungu Sub County in Masaka district there existed stiff opposition to government. This was often expressed in the open public meetings referred to as Baraza often organised by government officials to calm down the situation in Buganda in the wake of the 1966 aftermath and explain government policies. “One man had the guts to say that government failed to keep its promise to safeguard the kings and therefore he had no confidence in the government. While a school mistress at Kabungwe School in the same county stated that the National Service was nothing but short of forced labour.”862 On the whole all teachers in this school seemed deadly opposed to the government because oftheir attitude towards government policies especially the common man’s charted and the National Service.
Further confirmation of the severity of the effects of Obote’s economic policy among the Baganda, can be found in the list of 18 points given by Amin to justify Obote’s removal from power. He noted in points 8,9 and 10 that;
“Economic policies have left many people un-employed and even more insecure and lacking in basic needs of life like food, clothing, medicine and shelter. High taxes have left the common man of this country poorer than ever before. Here are some of the taxes which the common man has to bear: development tax, graduated tax, sales tax, social security fund tax. The big men can always escape these taxes or pass them on to common man. The [prices which the common man gets for his crops like cotton and coffee have not gone up and sometimes they have gone down whereas the cost of food, education, etc. have always gone up.”863
The extent to which Obote was targeting the Baganda is clearly illustrated. In the first instance, contrary to his argument that conflicts had risen as a result of regional imbalance, by 1969, no known economic conflicts in Uganda had arisen from ethnic
861 ENA, Box no 8/15, Miscellaneous Assorted papers only, Baganda’s opposition to new changes 862 EBB NO. C.ADM. 9, Buganda Government Affairs: Intelligence Monthly Reports, Matters concerning Chiefs, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service, 24 April 1970, Masaka 863 See Appendix VI The 18 Points given by the Uganda Army
218 economic differences which renders Obote’s argument void. Secondly, the move to the left’s basic stand was anti feudalism which Obote erroneously confused with Kingship in Buganda. Although in 1971 through the Kabale Pronouncement, a year after the Nakivubo Pronouncement, Amin who had now overthrown Obote announced the break away from the move to the left and called for a more liberal economic policy, the damage had been already made.864 The move to the left was no longer a policy of economic guidance. For instance, no efforts were made to reverse the ownership of the properties that had been transferred.
In summary, besides Obote’s strategic move to the left being vague and lacking any political mass base, its implementation produced significant discontent among the Baganda. The transfer of the Buganda institutions to the central government stripped the kingdom of its resource base on which the Baganda depended. Thus as Mazrui observes, in light of the above, it is not far-fetched to state that Obote’s economic policies, especially his ‘move to the left,’ were aimed at preventing the Baganda from emerging as the commercial elite and thus, continuing as a powerful economic force in the Ugandan society.865
6.9 CONTRACTION OF BUGANDA’S ECONOMY
Up to 1966 Buganda had a flourishing economy. She had had the best road system in the country. Most of the major roads originated from or passed through Kampala, Uganda’s capital city which is located in Buganda. The railway line also originated and passed through the Kingdom of Buganda. Buganda, therefore, possessed the best communication network.866 It had been this good transport network and the numerous opportunities provided by the capital city, which in the 1960s helped the kingdom to become the hub of economic activities in Buganda. However, in the years from 1966 onwards when Buganda witnessed pockets of resistance and heightened insecurity and also governed under a state of public emergency by Obote this would change. The outcome of the political insecurity was Buganda witnessing both the loss of investment and infrastructural decay and collapse. The infrastructural breakdown had a direct bearing on the livelihood of the Baganda. This resulted into inadequate
864 ENA, Box no 89/ 909, Collections of President’s Office, Speeches of H.E Idi Amin Dada 865 A. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The making of a Military Ethnocracy, p.91 866 P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes,p.8
219 provision of essential services to the Baganda. It also meant that they were unable to market their produce and this hindered other economic opportunities, as movement and communication from one region to another was greatly hampered. The infrastructural decay, in conjunction with Obote’s policy of economic exclusion, gradually weakened both the social and the economic institutions in Buganda to such an extent that even when Obote was finally removed from power in 1971 and the Kingdom restored in 1993, these institutions were no longer solid enough to allow it regain its former status.
Also since time immemorial agriculture was the main economic activity in the Buganda. The Baganda cultivated both food and cash crops on a large scale. In addition, Buganda’s government greatly supported the sector through the provision of extension workers and buying of farmers produce. It also encouraged farmers into Group Farmer`s Schemes that encompassed numerous farmers’ clubs under the umbrella organization the Young Farmers of Uganda societies which had spread throughout the kingdom. These were 56. In Ssingo County, there existed 22 such societies; Buddu County had 20, Kyaggwe 7, Mawokota 5 and Bulemezzi 2. The two farm institutes at Mukono and Masaka provided technical and external services to the farmers.867 Also the existence of the Buganda National Savings Scheme, a limited entity, owned the by the Bugandan Government had greatly aided the agricultural sector through extension of agricultural loans.868 By 1963 income generated from cotton had reached British pounds 1,545,540. As regards to coffee the revenue was British pounds 9,255,830 which was 97.43% of the coffee production countrywide.869
In addition, the Bugandan government also ran four major ranching schemes with various sub ranches which had ensured not only a steady supply of animal products but also another a steady flow of income to both the kingdom and the individual farmers. The four schemes were; Buruli Ranching Scheme that had 27 sub ranches,
867 AR/BUG/1/5/2, Ministry of Finance Bugandan government1966: Estimates of the Ministry of Natural Resource
868 AR/BUG/1/5/2, Ministry of Finance Bugandan government1966: Estimates of the Ministry of Natural Resource 869 AR/BUG/1/5/2, Ministry of Finance Bugandan government1966: Estimates of the Ministry of Natural Resource
220 Bugerere Ranching Scheme had 20, Singo Ranching scheme had 20 while Kabula Ranching Scheme had 10.
However, in the post 1966 era Buganda too witnessed a dramatic decline in the once prosperous agricultural sector. To appreciate how this occurred, one has to trace back to the period before the Battle of Mengo. In Buganda a chief was not merely a political office holder in the sense of exercising jurisdiction over his chiefdom. For long under his jurisdiction went also with the control of land. The Kingdom of Buganda like many other African social formations had been basically an agrarian society; as a result the political system was fashioned and developed around Agriculture as the mainstay of the kingdom’s economy. Therefore, landholding and usage was intimately linked to the holding of political office. In many cases those who held political office, also supervised the economic activities within their areas; both for the good of the kingdom and for the welfare of his people. In this way economic interest and political authority were harmonized in the social system thereby giving the society political and social cohesion.870
Besides, the prosperity and prestige of a chief depended on the number of peasants he could attract to settle on his land as this would translate into increased agricultural production. Hence the chiefs were viewed as the driving force behind agricultural production especially the cash crop production in Buganda.871 Even when the peasants began to control their produce still the chiefs had continued with their supervisory roles. However, the structural and institutional changes put in place in the post crisis era resulted into the realigning of the production negatively; impacting on the agricultural production in Buganda. The newly appointed political chiefs due their unpopularity abandoned the original role of providing economic guidance that had been performed by the dismissed traditional respected chiefs. Moreover in appointing them it is evident that Obote was preoccupied with the strengthening of his political control other than caring about the welfare of its people.
Firstly the political insecurity that had accompanied the 1966 May disturbances did not permit any major investments to be carried out in the region between the years
870 S.R Karugire. A political History of Uganda,kampala,Fountain Publishing House,2010 p.23 871 A.Mafeje, Kingdoms of the Great Lakes Region: Ethnography of African Social Formations, pp.98- 99
221 1966 to 1971 by both the government agencies and foreign entrepreneurs. Moreover a great number of the Baganda for fear of being arrested by the central government spent most of the time hiding. As a result, the region witnessed tremendous economic decline especially in the agricultural sector.
In addition with the commercialisation of agriculture in Buganda, the successful growing of cash crops such as cotton, tea and sugar cane had largely depended on immigrant labour. This labour was mainly provided by workers from other regions of the country some coming as far as from the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Burundi. However, the political uncertainty that characterized Buganda in that period after turmoil in May considerably led in the drop in the inflow of the number of immigrants in Buganda which had a direct impact on agricultural productivity.872 The existing labour in Buganda was inadequate as many Baganda had this type of work to the less advantage and concentrated on the ‘white collar’ jobs. The decline in agricultural production directly resulted into the decline in industrial production. There was a drop in supply of raw materials for the agro- based industries. This subsequently led to some industries to forcedly lay off their workers bringing about another resultant effect phenomenon of unemployment with all the attendant social and economic consequences.
It is argued that the subsequent economic problems relating to lack of food security, the decay of infrastructure, the collapse of local economic institutions, which affected the Baganda to the extent of making it difficult or even impossible for them to earn a livelihood as being closely linked to the outcome of the political mayhem of 1966. Moreover the continued existence of the state of emergence the possibilities of recovery were distant as any would be investors were frightened away.
Thus, the total economic impact of the turmoil of 1966 on Buganda is literally un- quantified and not easy to quantify. As a result of the waste of human and economic resources, the crisis had lasting consequences that permanently altered Buganda’s economic development. This gives credence to those who argue that the increased
872 EBB, C10.000/37Buganda Government Affairs: District Annual Reports, Agricultural production in Masaka, Report from the District Commissioner, Masaka to Mr. V.A. Ovonji, Permanent Secretary, Public Service,19 December 1966, p.27
222 incidence of poverty among the Baganda in the post 1966 era is directly linked to Obote’s structural adjustments within the Kingdom. This had denied the Baganda the opportunity to progress. Her economy contracted and her socio-economic progress was drastically checked; by 1993 when Kingdom of Buganda was restored, the Baganda were experiencing far higher poverty levels than they had experienced in 1966.
6.10 BUGANDA DEEP HATRED AND ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION
The suffering the Baganda underwent created hatred and hunger welded them together in a lasting enmity against Obote.873 He lost the political good will amongst the Baganda and some plotted for his death. The Buganda anguish at Obote actually made him a political fugitive in Buganda throughout his rule till his overthrow in 1971 and death in 2005. Assassination attempts were also made at his life. On 12 January 1967, assassins had waylaid Obote along the Kampala Luzira Road, where he had gone to attend a function at Luzira prison, 6 miles east of Kampala. The would-be assassins were taking revenge for Obote’s attack on the palace at Mengo in 1966 that had led to the fleeing of Muteesa II to exile in London. The attack of the Lubiri had created mistrust, prejudice and mental anguish, and exacerbated the resentment felt by the Baganda towards Obote hence the attempted assassination. Obote survived by chance, because he had left the ceremony earlier than planned, leaving his Vice President John Babiha, presiding over the gathering. Unknown to the attackers that Obote had left earlier; they targeted the Vice President’s convoy in which, fortunately, Babiha also survived.874
The identified attackers were former members of the Kabaka Yekka and with the exception of one, all were Baganda. They were Abraham Senkoma, a former aide de camp to Kabaka Muteesa II and a captain in the palace guards, Basaiio Lukyamunzi, a former Kabaka Yekka and member of the National Assembly, Daniel Kiwanuka, Kabaka Yekka youth leader, Andrew Kyeyune and John Obo the only non Muganda and a former lieutenant in the Uganda Army.875
873 H.B.Hansen, Ethnicity and military rule in Uganda: A study of Ethnicity as a Political Factor in Uganda, p.67 874 ‘Mystery of the Athi River Murders’,Drum,July,1968,p.64 875 ‘Mysteries of the Athi River Murders’, Drum, July 1968, p.64
223 Also in the same year 1967 some Baganda plotted to over throw Obote’s government and restore Muteesa as President. If captured alive in the planned plot to over throw him, Obote would be put in a cage and place him in a Zoo. To them this was the special punishment to humiliate him.876 A clear illustration of the deep anger the Baganda held against Obote. Fortunately to Obote, this did not happen as the alleged plotters, six men and a woman were arrested and charged for treason and concealment of treason in a court in Kampala.877
On 19 December 1969, Obote again narrowly escaped death by surviving a second assassination attempt. He received minor face wounds. On this particular day, Obote had just closed the Uganda Peoples’ Congress Annual Delegates Conference which had unanimously endorsed the so-called ‘Move to the Left’ that popularly became known as the ‘Common Man’s Charter’. The would-be assassin had managed to evade Obote’s security detail and fired at him. This happened, as he was leaving the Uganda Peoples’ Congress Annual Delegates Conference at Lugogo. At 10.40pm a bullet ripped through his cheeks damaging some of his teeth and part of his tongue.878 Obote survived owing to the fact that the semi- automatic Czech pistol that was used by the would-be assassin jammed after the first shot, and also owing to the fact that the hand grenade that had been thrown at him failed to explode.879 The assassination attempt had been carried out by two Baganda men, Mohamed Sebaduka and Yowana Wamala.880
Unfortunately the chaos that followed the failed assassination attempt, many Baganda suffered, and lost their life. Soldiers were dispatched across Kampala and any moving vechicle was stopped, its occupants pulled out, and if they happened to be Baganda, manhandled.881 It is alleged that many were killed as any car, truck, bus, or motorbike travelling between Kintante Road and Lugogo Bypass near Lugogo stadium was shot at. It was estimated by the mortuary workers of Mulago Hospital that the total number of death resulting from the assassination attempt as one hundred people.882 This is
876 “Plot to cage a President in a Zoo”, Daily Mirrior, 2 August 1968, p.1 877 “Plot to cage a President in a Zoo”, Daily Mirrior, 2 August 1968, p.1 878 ‘Assassination Bid that Failed’ ,Drum, June 1970, p.70; P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes, p.66 879 ‘Assassination Bid that Failed’, Drum, June 1970, p.70 880 ‘Assassination Bid that Failed’, Drum, June, 1970, pp.70-71 881 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p.95 882 A.B. Kasozi, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, p95
224 said to have been on a lower side as the number is belived to have been more putting into consideration the number that was not taken to Mulago.
All in all, the two assassination attempts signified a culmination of the mounting feelings of anger and despondency among the Baganda, many of whom wished Obote dead especially after the death of their former Kabaka Muteesa II exile on 22 November 1969.
Two scenarios best illustrate Buganda’s lasting deep hatred of Obote; his death and the unpopularity of Uganda Peoples’ Congress and the reactions of the Baganda to the radio announcement of 25 January 1971 which informed the country that army had over thrown the Obote government. On that afternoon in the streets of Kampala there were throngs of jubilant crowds dancing, singing, drumming, and moving up and down tree branches. In a rare spectacle, Uganda soldiers were actually seen fraternising with civilians.883 Similar reactions occurred throughout the Buganda region. Songs were made in praise of General Amin who led the coup. Also in 2005 when Obote passed on in South Africa and a great number of the Baganda celebrated upon hearing the news of his death. They also objected to his body traversing through the Buganda region to his home in Northern Uganda for burial. Indeed an alternative route via eastern Uganda had to be found. Also the Uganda Peoples’ Congress the party, which Obote headed, has remained the least supported party in Buganda among the two traditional political parties in Uganda.
Obote’s deep hatred towards the Baganda was also illustrated when he refused to give Muteesa II the exiled Kabaka of Buganda his pension which he had given to the rest of other former traditional rulers.884 Article 118(3) of the 1967 had provided for the payment of a pension, gratuity or other allowances to the former kings and Constitutional Heads of Districts whose positions had been abolished when the 1967 Constitution came into force. As a result Muteesa throughout the three years in exile before passing on lived like almost a beggar. In the long run, the humiliations were inflicted on the Baganda and their Kingdom. A number of Baganda left dead, injured, homeless, destitute, and their human rights abused as a political consequence of the
883 S.R. Karugire, Roots of Instability in Uganda ,p.73
884 P. Kavuma ’s memoirs, Buganda got nothing;The 1967 Republican Constitution, p.164
225 Battle of Mengo was significant to the Baganda and in the end would affect their social and economic progress for many years to come.
226 CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The year 1962, when the East African country of Uganda attained independence, symbolized hope, and freedom. Independence represented an opportunity for the country to becoming a sovereign nation and for all Ugandans to occupy an equal footing with their former opponents within the country and within the changing global arena. Beyond this, lay self-determination, promise, peace, stability and a unified nation. However, four years later these hopes were dashed. Indeed, the year 1966 was an incredibly tumultuous year in the history of the Ugandan nation, as the country was plagued by a range of tragedies that ended the period of relative peace and stability the country had achieved and also witnessed the destruction of the 500 year- long civilisation of a quarter of its population.
This research underscores the fact that the political turmoil of 1966 was an outcome of multiple of factors at play; that included but not limited to the misdeeds of an ambitious first generation of politicians and the enduring heritage of the kingdom of Buganda, whose leaders were determined to protect and the preserve their traditions. The study however, further argues that there is overwhelming evidence of the role played by colonial legacy in the occurrence of the crisis and therefore many of the factors at play must be understood in the light of the effects the seven decades of British rule had on Uganda.
A useful starting point of the study has been the period of the establishment of colonial rule in Uganda. By tracing the historical facts of the outbreak of the 1966 constitutional crisis, the establishment of colonialism in Uganda, the study sought to analyse the political and social-economic forces that had been created during the sixty eight years of colonial rule that were to have a bearing on the post-colonial state. The study examined the outbreak of the 1966 constitutional crisis the lens of colonial legacy, misdeeds of Uganda’s first post-colonial politicians and the Buganda factor.
227 7.2 COLONIAL LEGACY
The debate over the actual impact of the colonial legacy in causing conflicts in Africa is endless. However, in the Ugandan context with the occurrence of the crisis, the effects of colonialism on her political development cannot be merely wished away. Indeed, even those who wish to down play its impact simply just differ in the degree to which they attribute colonial legacy to the occurrence of the conflicts in Uganda in general and the 1966 constitutional crisis in particular. The legacy of colonialism in reference to the antagonistic relations it created and eventually culminating into the political turmoil in 1966 in this study was examined specifically in three closely related areas; the after effects of the system of indirect rule, the preferential treatment of Buganda and heightened ethnic rivalry amongst Ugandan communities arising from the nature of colonial rule.
Significantly, communal loyalties built around a shared ethnic allegiance played a significant role in Uganda’s tumultuous post-colonial history. Ethnic ties permeated the pre-independent political parties that led Uganda to independence and influenced the composition of the army. Moreover the political struggles in the early 1960s also made reference to ethnic structures and a concomitant access to resource allocation. Although the extent to which ethnicity was an attributing factor in the cause of the 1966 crisis may not be debatable because ethnicity clearly was an important factor, the contiguous argument was whether ethnicity was actually part of the colonial legacy, or whether it was just exploited by unprincipled leaders to bring about the 1966 constitutional crisis. This study has revealed that though ethnicity was awakened by effects of colonialism both the above factors were at play in the build up to the 1966 mayhem.
The 1966 crisis revealed how the failure of colonialism sought to transform a multiple aggregation of different Uganda ethnic communities into a viable political state. The Ugandan community as indicated in the study was a heterogeneous nation composed of several nationalities and sub-nationalities which at independence the British attempted to bring together as one political unity. However, it is not easy to create nation states over night; as a result there was ethnic incompatibility which as noted by
228 Burchard became a source of conflicts.885 This same view is supported by other prominent scholars like Obbo and Ingham who also, state that ethnic violence in modern Africa has very distinct and specific origins that can be traced to the period of colonial subjugation by European powers and the legacies of colonial rule and decolonization.886 Mugaju on his part states that during the British colonial period in Uganda, the problems of ethnicity were compounded by economic distortion which created regional imbalances and ethnic specialisation.887
In addition, probably through a combination of ignorance and intent, colonial administrative policies strengthened divides, sharpened boundaries and inculcated localized political systems, which had a significant impact on post-independence Uganda and later culminating into a constitutional crisis. Upon taking over Uganda, the British employed the policy of indirect rule as a way of addressing the colonial dilemma of how to dominate and exploit vast numbers of indigenous inhabitants with limited numbers of colonial agents. Accordingly, when the time came to establish the colonial administrative system elsewhere outside Buganda, the Buganda monarch played an important role. The Baganda chiefs who had been employed as administrative agents in the initial administration in such areas like Bunyoro, Toro, Kigezi in the west of the country, Teso, Busoga, Bugishu in the east and Lango in the north had been granted regional control by the British endowing them with bureaucratic functions.888 The fundamental consequences of indirect rule were as noted by Mamdani the institutionalization of a “bifurcated state”, with dichotomous types of state structure and modes of power.889 Under such circumustances it became hard to sustain the artificial unity attained at independence.
Also the British indirect rule in reality had mobilized Ugandans on the basis of linguistic and cultural similarities that formerly had been irrelevant. 890 The use of the Baganda to preside over other ethnic communities solidified ethnic divides in Uganda which
885 S. Burchard , Colonial Legacies and Development Performance in Africa, p.38 886 K. Ingham ‘Uganda’s Masque of independence’ African affairs Vol.62, pp.29-39; J. Mugaju, Uganda’s Age of Reforms: A critical overview, p.57; C. Obbo, What went wrong in Uganda, in H.B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds.) Uganda Now between decay and development, p.205 887 J. Mugaju, Uganda’s Age of Reform: A critical overview, pp.14-15 888 D. Welsh, Ethnicity in sub Saharan Africa in International Affairs, Vol. 72, No 3, p.479 889 M.Mamdani, Politics and Class formation in Uganda, p. 13 890 B. Berkely, Race-,Tribe, and Power in the Heart of Africa in World Policy Journal, Vol.18, No 1 pp.79-87
229 unfortunately worked against the Buganda as her superiority created animosity and divisions to the rest of other ethnic communities as they had been left out. As Safty notes when the British used Buganda tribal structures as the primary apparatus for extending their oppressive colonial rule to the rest of the protectorate two dialectically related but contradictory responses to this policy emerged. While the use of the Baganda as administrative agents and the adoption of their structure filled them with immense pride, the same process caused the unrest among other people in the rest of the country.891 They felt a sense of deep humiliation creating dissent against Buganda. In further support of this argument Kasfir states, that it was largely responsible for the regional inequality within Uganda and a major cause for of resentment towards the kingdom of Buganda by other ethnic groups.892 The subsequent political history of these areas of Bunyoro, Toro, Bugishu and Lango had been a product of rebellion against the Baganda as illustrated by occurrence of the turmoil in 1966.
Nevertheless many other ethnic communities in Uganda had faulted Baganda for working with the British; however this could not have been their problem, the Baganda simply fitted in the British system of indirect rule unlike many other communities at that time. Indeed Gingyera notes that; two important factors that traditionally operated to put Buganda apart from the rest of the country namely; the patterns of European penetration into Uganda through the south and the pattern of economic change in the country that made Buganda stand economically apart in which case Buganda found itself in a favourable position to be picked upon by the British. 893 In addition to the above Berber also observers that;
“No tribe in Northern Uganda had an effective central organisation, which made it powerful enough to capture the attention of the British. The tribes were seen neither as potential threats to established British interests nor as potential allies to share the burden of administration.”894
891 G. Safty, Colonialism’s Deadly Legacy: Ethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.6 892 N. Kasfir, The Shrinking Political Arena; Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics with a Case Study of Uganda, p.141 893 Gingyera –Pinchwa, Apollo Milton and His Times, p.22 894 J.P. Barber, The Moving Frontier of British Imperialism in Northern, 1898-1919,
230 It was largely on the above basis that the British had picked on Buganda. However, Kabwegyere writing on the same issue of how on colonialism laid a foundation for post- colonial conflicts notes that;
“The differences among (Africans) were aggravated by the colonial practice of divide and rule, a practice that was designed to reduce social interaction and the emergence of a collective consciousness among the oppressed. At policy level, it promoted disunity, ethnicity and parochialism which sowed the seeds of conflicts in the post-colonial period.”895
The study has highlighted that Uganda’s Political fragmentation, however, was not only the result of the system of indirect rule but also the different levels of social economic progress witnessed during the colonial era among the different regions within the protectorate. For instance, the impact and conscentration of the Christian missionaries in particular regions especially in Buganda and had led to the provision of health and educational services which had a direct impact on which ethnic group would easily access political and public service jobs. This broadly stratified the emergent political elite along religious lines. In addition, the geographical and social division of labour alongside regionally distinct and uneven patterns of recruitment of labour force, and of trade too became another prominent feature in the post-colonial Uganda emanating from the colonial era. This had important political consequences.
Furthermore, the crisis also demonstrated one of thorniest problems which bedevilled the relationship among Ugandan ethnic communities in the period immediately after independence. This had been the ethnic disputes arising out of the territorial changes made by the British during the colonial era. The most severe being between the two most powerful kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro arising out of the transfer of the latter’s territory to the former. Many African scholars such as Bujra, Amadife and Warhola have pointed out that the method in which Colonial administrators’ irrevocably altered ethnic realities across Sub-Saharan Africa through territorial adjustments has been a cause of conflicts in Africa.896 The transfer of the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi which are popularly known as the ‘lost counties’ from Bunyoro to Buganda
895 T.B. Kabwegyere, The Politics of State Formation: The Nature and effects of Colonialism in Uganda, p.44 896 E.N. Amadife and J. M. Warhola , Africa’s Political Boundaries .Colonial Cartography, the OAU, and the Advisability of Ethno-Nationalist Adjustment in International Journal of Politics, Culture and society, Vol. 6 No4, p.534
231 during colonial times and later reverting to the kingdom of Bunyoro in 1965 indeed became an issue of controversy during the early years of Uganda’s independence.897 This colonial problem acted as catalyst in bringing about the political turmoil that befell the country four years into independence. Lwanga-Lunyiigo while tracing the historical roots and structural causes of Uganda conflicts argues strongly that the administrative boundaries enacted by the British … provided for the institutionalization of parochial tribally-oriented local governments. This according to him made the unity of Uganda extremely difficult to achieve, and was to be a potential cause of conflict in post – independence decade.898 Indeed the enmity between the Kingdom of Buganda and Obote created arising out the issue of the disputed territories had further drawn Kabaka Muteesa II and his Mengo Establishment to Obote’s opponents within the Uganda Peoples’ Congress leading to the outbreak of the crisis.
Also British colonial authorities in Uganda like in many other parts of Africa treated various Ugandan communities differently in which the Baganda were singled out for favours thereby enhancing the policy of divide and rule that created seeds of ethnic tension and a recipe for conflict in Uganda. Buganda, for instance, during the colonial era retained its own system of government. It was because of these discriminatory tendencies pursuid by the British towards the regions that the colonial era served as the starting point of new tensions and conflicts.899 At independence, many were firmly opposed to the special position occupied by the Kingdom of Buganda and wished Buganda’s special privileges to end. The three kings of Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro, for instance strongly advocated for a united Uganda as compared to the federal status being advocated by the kingdom of Buganda. The same view held by the kings applied to any adversaries from the other non-kingdom’s regions in Uganda especially from the north and eastern parts of the country which named Buganda an agent of British imperialism. According to Mudoola and Karugire upon decolonization these communities who dominated the first post- independent Uganda government sought revenge against the Baganda and to reverse Buganda’s domineering role. It’s against this background that they also state that the 1966 crisis in Uganda was a direct
897 C.P. Mayiga, The king on the throne; The story of the restoration of the kingdom of Buganda, p.13 898 S. Lwanga-Lunyiigo, The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflicts in K Rupensinghe(Ed), Conflict Resolution in Uganda. pp.24-44 899 LCA, A/L/135, Munster Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, p.63; T.V. Sathyamurthy, The Political Development of Uganda 1900-1986, p.314
232 outcome of the colonial legacy. 900 Under this system the Baganda who were a section of the country population were elevated to a special status and given preferential treatment. About this favouritism and how this brought about the crisis in 1966, Mugaju notes;
“...the British colonial authorities treated various Ugandan communities differently. Buganda was singled out for favours.... Buganda retained its own system of government...by treating Buganda as a state within a state, the British created seeds of ethnic tension and conflict in Uganda. The Baganda developed a high sense of ethnic tension during the 1950s and 1960s. Buganda sought to maintain its identity while the central government was determined to keep Buganda an integral part of Uganda. This clash of interests exploded into the crises of 1953 and 1966.”901
However, ethnic identity within Uganda was never created or ‘invented’ by the British. In pre-colonial Uganda division among Uganda communities existed. And it was this group identity which existed that roughly corresponded to labels later applied by British. Instead in attempt to establish firm control over the Uganda’s heterogeneous society what indirect rule did was to accelerate these internal divisions. Indeed the Uganda colonial state comprised of ethnic groups held together by colonial power rather than nationalism. These ethnic groups had been made not only to compete with each other but also fight against each other. Instead of a common nationalism, Ugandans coalesced into sub nationalism based on shared ethnic membership. This developed ethnic identity for the in-groups and hostility against the out-groups.902 And the failure of the British colonial policy to transform an aggregation of multiple ethnic groups of people into a viable and cohesive political entity; produced a weak post- colonial state that was incapable of holding together different antagonistic forces and ensuring stability. This situation would be exploited by un- principled political leaders selfishly to their desired goals and in the end was the occurrence of political conflicts that climaxed with the Battle of Mengo.
It was thus, this affiliation between the kingdom of Buganda and the colonial state that left a lasting residue of distrust between Buganda and its neighbours. This gradually
900 D. Mudoola, Religion, ethnicity and politics in Uganda, p.34; S. R. Karugire, A political History of Uganda, p.67 901 J. Mugaju, Uganda’s Age of reforms: A critical overview, p.13 902 J. Katorobo , Education for Public Service in Uganda, P.7
233 became a defined feature of post-colonial Uganda’s social, political, economic, and military interactions.903 The Kingdom’s prominent position within the Uganda Protectorate significantly sharpened the ethnic divide in the country.
7.3 MISDEEDS OF POLITICIANS
The study has also highlighted that much as it seems that ethnic incompatibility and polarisation was basically a product of British colonialism, the inheritors of the colonial state and politics pursued thereafter, as Tanga observes made the situation worse.904 It is a valid argument that ethnicity is neither immutable nor inherently conflictual, it however becomes dangerous as Tanga Observes where people are mobilised on the basis of objective characteristics such as culture language and territory.905 Political manipulation based on ethnic differences became the main means used by Obote to legitimise him in power. Obote relied heavily on the ethnic groups from the north who he considered important in wielding political and military power. Likewise those who wanted to access political power resorted to the same means of using ethnicity to win over sympathy. Thus in conformity with the instrumentalism theory of ethnicity as advanced by Hutchinson and Smith, Ugandan politicians used ethnicity as the main political weapon with which they found convenient to mobilise support for selfish goals.906 The 1966 crisis thus, was a reflection of how ethnicity had become instrumental and a destructive future of Uganda’s politics.
The turmoil of 1966 which was a reflection of a deep seated antagonistic relation of the ethnic divide between the Bantu found in the south and the Nilotic found in the north of the country exposed a failure of Uganda’s post-colonial leadership to unite the Ugandans. The political struggles, for instance, which developed within the UPC between Ibingira and Obote and eventually contributing to the political conflicts in 1966 simply represented deeper historical differences between the south and the north which Ibingira and Obote symbolised that the leaders at that time failed to solve. Moreover prior to their departure, the British had made relatively adequate preparation
903 G. Safty, Colonialism’s Deadly Legacy: Ethnic Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa , p.10 904 Odoi-Tanga, Politics Ethnicity and Conflict in Post Independent Acholiland Uganda 1962-2006, p.12 905 Odoi Tanga, Politics Ethnicity and Conflict in Post Independent Acholiland Uganda 1962-2006, p.42 906 J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, Ethnicity, p.125
234 that would ensure a unified country by the way of putting in place an acceptable constitutional path to nationhood.
The political parties that had become the main political platform for governance in the period running to and immediately after independence had also failed to bring about integrative politics in the country and instead became part of the political forces that brought about disorder in 1966. The parties came to be a reflection of the divisions that characterized the nationalist movement in Uganda. For instance, the driving force behind the formation of the coalition government between KY and UPC had not been based on national interests but the desire for continued Anglican domination of Uganda’s political life. This ended up being disastrous because right from the onset it alienated a large population of Catholics who were the majority in the country from governance of Uganda. This in the later years became one the major source of grievances in the post-colonial era that threatened Uganda’s political stability. Moreover, even the attempted unity between the UPC and KY did not any way bring about the desired goals of unity. Rather than creating cordial working relations between Muteesa II and Obote, the conflicting political roles between the two simply intensified the rivalry resulting into a power struggle would eventually lead to a constitutional crisis in 1966.
In addition, Obote had deliberately used the crisis to intensify the divide among the Baganda and other ethnic groups especially between the Baganda and the northern ethnic groups whom the Baganda accused of destroying their monarchy. The crisis exacerbated the social fragility of the Ugandan state. Given the heterogeneous nature of Uganda, what was needed most at the time were virtues of administrative tact, political tolerance and social justice. These essential ingredients were not provided by Obote and his northern dominated leadership. Instead, the post-colonial leaders were weak, corrupt and unpatriotic. Rather than building national integration and socio- economic development, their attitudes sparked widespread bloody violence, and they failed to forge national unity.
It was also evident that whereas Obote’s slogan in the period to and after the Battle of Mengo was national, his policies towards the kingdom of Buganda had nothing to do with unity other than removing a formidable potential threat to his kingdom. There was no way one could talk of national unity while at the same time seeking to alienate and
235 destroy the Baganda who constituted a quarter of the country’s population. Whatever motivated Obote’s policy towards Buganda, had nothing to do with the achievement of national unity. Thus by perusing a policy of exclusion rather than inclusion Obote failed the test of unifying an ethnically diverse country.
As a manifestation of the misdeeds of the first post-independent rulers, they negatively exploited the power vacuum left out by departed British to peruse their individualistic interest than achieving national goals. The new Ugandan leaders looked on comfortably as they inherited and adopted the autocratic colonial machinery to govern the newly independent country. No meaningful attempts had been made to dismantle the colonial super structure. As a result, the exploitative character of the colonial era continued in different forms long after Uganda had attained independence. The military for instance, still remained ethnically un-balanced; northern dominated army, largely illiterate and an instrument of coercion. The army which was manipulated by the leaders to confront their political opponents was directly involved in the active politics of Uganda in the colonial. The support the army gave to politicians like Obote enabled them to misuse state power and adopted an autocratic style of leadership. His violent reaction to his political opponents other than containing the situation simply escalated it to a crisis level which coupled with other issues culminated into a crisis in May 1966.
Also the study attempted to highlight that a number of various institutions such as the National Assembly (referred to as the Legco during the colonial days), the system of local government, the army and the Public Service Commission had operated effectively. However, the situation changed after independence due to the reckless manner they were managed by the new leaders of the country. In essence the operation of an orderly government was rendered impossible and the resultant effects were instability.
However, due to the nature of the historical evolution of Uganda, it would be definitely wrong to solely blame Obote on the political turmoil that befell Uganda in the mid- 1960s. But on the other hand it is him who blew the situation out of proportion. He militarised Ugandan politics simply for the sake of consolidating and retaining power over his opponents. And like Museveni’s observes the problems of 1966 were of a political nature and only needed a political solution, rather than the use of the military. They were blown out of proportion to reach a crisis level as a result of Obote’s
236 autocratic tendencies.907 The series of political developments that happened in a quick succession in 1966 set in motion on 4 February by the so-called gold scandal motion events such as; the arrest of Cabinet Ministers, the suspension and abrogation of the 1962 constitution and the abolition of the offices of the President and Vice President followed; were all acts of an emerging dictatorship bent on the struggle to change the existing constitutional order. It were these acts of Obote which provoked the Buganda Lukiiko into ordering the central government out of Buganda a pretext he would use to attack the kingdom accusing it of rebellion.
7.4 THE BUGANDA FACTOR
The kingdom of Buganda also featured prominently in the outbreak of the crisis. And in the build up to the attack of the palace at Mengo, Obote had apparently succeeded in creating an impression that the kingdom of Buganda had to be destroyed because of its regionalism which was a threat to national unity. However, it is comparatively easy to illustrate that this had not been the case; instead Obote simply used Buganda as a scapegoat to achieve his desired goal of becoming Uganda’s absolute ruler.
As the most dynamic of the pre-colonial Uganda ethnic groups and owing to Buganda’s long history of accommodative politics and hospitality, the Baganda for generations had welcomed and absorbed ‘foreign’ talent to the Buganda service. Dr. Kunuka a Munyoro from the neighbouring Kingdom of Bunyoro was sent to the legislative council as Buganda’s representative prior to Buganda’s withdrawal in the Legeco in 1958. Later Daudi Ochieng an Acholi from northern Uganda, J Simpson a Briton, and Sugra Visram an Asian were sent to the national assembly as part of the 21 representatives of the kingdom of Buganda. Moreover, this was against the background that at that time the Baganda possessed a greater proportion of educated people in the whole of Uganda than any other ethnic group. Such actions cannot be of a group that is threatening national unity. Instead they depict rather of hospitable people willing to attract talent to irrespective of the source with fear of endangering their integrity.
907 Y. Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda, p.74
237 In addition, owing to this hospitality many her counties like Bugerere, Singo and Gomba had a larger number of the inhabitants from other parts of Uganda outside Buganda who had settled in kingdom undisturbed for generations. Additionally, the first Uganda-wide political parties were founded in Buganda and led by Baganda. These parties did not campaign for Buganda’s own independence but rather actively campaigned for self –government of the whole country. Ben Kiwanuka another Muganda during the pre- independence 1961-62 London Conference, proved to be more of a nationalist than Obote, when he pointed the dangers of Buganda’s indirect elections to the national unity that Obote vehemently supported.
However, this is not to say that Buganda was never a factor in political chaos of 1966. Right from the period of colonial rule, the history between the central government and kingdom of Buganda has always been turbulent often characterised with conflicts of a political nature between the two. The desire by the Baganda to preserve their traditions and customs throughout the road to independence is what makes the kingdom stand out and probably being accused of being part and parcel the political conflicts that befell the country in 1966. Right from the onset of preparation for independence in the 1950s, the Baganda developed a high sense of regionalism with their desire of protecting their cultural identity that had existed for over 500 years. This attitude had threatened the achieving of a unified Uganda at independence. The British determined to keep Buganda an integral part of a united Uganda, were to grant the kingdom special privileges almost to the status she had enjoyed during the colonial era. This would be provided by the federal arrangements of the 1962 Independence Constitution. Unfortunately, the concessions offered to Buganda would have dire consequences in future when they manifested into the anti-Buganda feelings that were exploited by Obote against Buganda in the post-independence era.
The crisis demonstrated that the achieving of independence meant different things to different ethnic groups in Uganda. For the marginalized groups especially from northern and eastern Uganda it meant the continued social, political and economic discrimination at the hands of Buganda as per the independence constitution. On the other hand, for Buganda it was just natural at independence and the period thereafter to wish to continue its superior preferential treatment and as an autonomous entity ending the central government’s interference in her internal affairs. Hence, it was
238 desirable for Buganda to have a constitution that continued to serve the privileged position they had enjoyed since the colonial era. However, the clash of these interests as noted by Mugaju exploded into the crises of 1966 where the ambitions of Buganda nationalism clashed with the allegedly integrative policies of Obote. 908
The study also examined the impact of the constitutional crisis on Buganda and highlighted that though the 1966 crisis had not been the first confrontation between Buganda and the central government it was however, the conflict with the most far reaching consequences on the Kingdom. The implementation of a state of emergency, the onslaught of the military, an extended period of political instability, the loss of life, the extreme abuse human rights and the consequent events that followed gave birth to a repressive regime presided over by Obote. Obote’s treatment of the Baganda in the post 1966 period is indefensible but suits well the observations that the 1966 crisis and its aftermath is a classical example of too many African leaders who have all but abandoned any consideration of human rights of their people through minor political disagreements and resort to repression and gross human rights violation. 909 The disagreement between Muteesa II and Obote were minor issues that would have been solved constitutionally; unfortunately, Obote chose otherwise.
Also the crisis presented Obote with an opportunity to rein-in the Kingdom of Buganda by dismantling its political structures. Firstly, by destroying the political authority of Muteesa II as both the president and the king of Buganda and also subduing the entire Kingdom. Obote at first had narrowed the federal privileges of Buganda and later abolished them. By 1993 when the Buganda’s Monarchy was restored which was twenty six years after the abolition of monarchs in Uganda, the Kingdom of Buganda was only a shadow of its former self. During the Battle of Mengo and the period thereafter, Buganda’s infrastructural facilities were wantonly destroyed further retarding trade and commerce. Significantly, the mindless persecution of the Baganda before and after the mayhem of 1966 that included but not limited to the circumstances that led to their King to flee and die in exile, the institutition of an emergency state; a period characterised by fear, uncertainty, disempowerment and policies of discrimination towards the Baganda, the territorial disintegration of the kingdom and
908 J. Mugaju,Uganda’s Age of reforms: A critical overview, p.13 909 P.Schwab, Africa. A continent self-Destructs, p.67
239 the turning into former palaces and administrative seats into centres of military establishments; had measures clearly intended to humiliate the Baganda. Moreover the general insecurity, uncertainty and violence that had been witnessed would have a great psychological stress on the Baganda.
The 1966 political turmoil also highlighted Obote’s resolve to consolidate his dictatorship on Buganda that was later embodied in the enactment of the 1967 republican constitution. Obote’s leadership culture of coercion, oppression, the arbitrary use of power and usurpation of people’s rights was adopted throughout his regime to further exert political control over Buganda. As Brett writes, many African governments ruled by dictators use force against all those who protest and ask for change, the 1966 crisis was a violent attack on, and overthrow of the 1962 independence constitution.910 In doing so, Obote aimed at forbidding organized effort of the Baganda who sought to resist against his unconstitutional moves. He also sought to frustrate them from organising or mobilizing collective effort of other Ugandans against his regime.
The study further confirmed that socio-economic development cannot be sustained in an environment riddled with uncertainty, violence, instability and general insecurity. The situation that characterised Buganda in the 27 years after the abolition of the monarch which had all the above ingredients has had a lasting impact on the kingdom of Buganda. The region which had been at the forefront of Uganda’s socio-economic progress went into dramatic decline from which it has never recovered. Buganda became unattractive to business, investment and industry which affected production, marketing and investment in agriculture that had been the dominant economic activity significantly reducing the economic opportunities available to the youth in Buganda.
The study also revealed how high expectations of the independence movement could easily turn into painful disappointment to both individuals and institutions. The suffering the Baganda underwent in the post- 1966 crisis era at the hands of Obote is similar to what Ake notes as poor leadership and structural constraints in post-colonial Africa. He observes that reliance of many African leaders on coercion greatly contributed to
910 E.A Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa : the Politics of Economic change p.19
240 the suffering of the people they led.911 Ironically, however, it is also important to note that the post-crisis Buganda poseda significant political problem for Obote and the UPC. For rightly or wrongly, Obote’s legacy suffered, he became the man many Baganda hated most and he lost the mantle of the undisputed ‘father’ of the nation. While at the institutional level, UPC, an innocent bystander, lost. The party became the victim of misplaced indignation in Buganda for decisions and actions which the party had not taken part in. Its members in Buganda were to live in fear yet between 1964 when the Gulu conference was held and 1967 when the republican constitution was enacted, no UPC organ, whether delegates conference nor national executive council meeting had ever sat to discuss let, alone pass any resolution in relation to Buganda.
The crisis also exposed what a dictatorship and personal rule create – a patron-client relationship, largely based on familial and ethnic loyalties and what effect it can have on a community. Those who are on good terms with leaders and the elite are able to get good contacts, jobs and loans while the rest of the population and the country’s economy suffer.912 This is what happened to the Baganda in the post crisis era. They were to lose half of their land to both government and other ethnic groups of people connected to those in power. Many were also to lose their jobs or failed to be appointed to high profile jobs for coming from a wrong ethnic group.
The crisis exposed the dangers associated with constitutional manipulations and violent changes of government and was instructive in showing that political stability of a state can only be built upon a common set of values that reflect equity, tolerance and acknowledgment of the potential of traditional institutions in entrenching community cohesion other than the use of force. The victory of Obote over his opponents especially the Kingdom of Buganda through unconstitutional methods other than bringing about stability instead institutionalised the use of violence in Ugandan politics. In Buganda, immediately after the crisis, it was not uncommon to find people using the period of uncertainty as camouflage, in order to settle personal scores, to rob others, and to perpetuate crimes especially in the Buganda region. At a national level, ever since the military involvement in active politics in 1966, Uganda has never
911 C. Ake The unique case of African democracy in International Affairs Vol.69. no2 pp.239-240 912 G.Meire and J.Rauch, Leading issues in economic Development, p.67
241 witnessed a peaceful changeover of government from one regime to another. All Uganda’s post-1966 leaders after Muteesa II have either used violence as an instrument of change of political power or to consolidate their power. In 1971 Obote was violently removed from power by his army through a military coup organised by General Amin, the army commander. Similarly, the removal of Amin from power in 1979 was through an armed struggle which was to claim a number of lives of the Baganda as most of the fighting occurred in Buganda. The same pattern continued with the other presidents that have ruled Uganda till the ascendance of Museveni to power in 1986 who also used an armed struggle.
It has been clearly well illustrated in this study as confirmed by Karugire that the increasing use of the military to resolve the political affairs of post-colonial Uganda by Obote, led the army to become the arbiter in Uganda’s politics.913 And unfortunately when the army took sides of the political divide, one group of Ugandans had to suffer. This reliance on the army had consequences. First, it rendered the electoral process useless thus removing the possibility of orderly change of government impossible. In the end, the history of Uganda has been characterised with violent changes of government ever since 1966. Ironically, the army which had greatly supported Obote to stay in power by suppressing his opponents was the very institution that twice relieved him of his power.
In 1971, through a military coup, the army took over government under the command of General Amin. In 1979 Amin was overthrown through military means after a number of guerrilla movements waging a war of liberation against his regime. In 1985, there was another military coup led by General Tito Okello Lutwa against Obote II civilian led government. Similarly, Lutwa’s regime was ended in 1986 through yet another guerrilla war that had begun in 1981 by General Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.
In all these successive military conflicts and regimes it is the Baganda that have suffered most in these conflicts that have tended to centre in the Buganda region where the capital city is located. The military regimes have been brutal and ruled by force against the Baganda.
913 S.R. Karugire, The Roots of Instability in Uganda, p.5
242 7.5 CONCLUSION
In retrospect, it is clear that the violent and unconstitutional system imposed on Uganda in 1966 which was symbolized by the 24 May 1966 attack on the palace at Mengo cast a shadow in the nation’s history that needs to be remembered in perpetuity. Although the kingdom of Buganda became the worst victim of the political turmoil of 1966, the crisis leading to the abrogation of the 1962 constitution and the ultimate Battle of Mengo was a chain of coincidences; some remotely connected to the kingdom of Buganda but had nothing to do at all with kingship in Uganda. This was a diversionary tactic used by Obote to garner support from other regions of Uganda where kingdoms did not exist. The crisis that began as a power struggle within the ruling Uganda Peoples’ Congress party went far beyond, to engulf the Kingdom of Buganda which as it has been argued; owing to its influential status in post-colonial Uganda was potentially the biggest threat to Obote’s rise to power. Therefore, what had been at stake was Obote’s position both within the UPC party and at the national level. And with the support of an ethnically imbalanced northerner based army, Obote was able to accomplish his goal. He emerged victorious against his opponents both within the party and outside it.
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261 APPENDICES
Appendix I: A Map of Uganda showing Location of the Kingdom of Buganda alongside other Ethnic Regions
262 NB Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro and Buganda were the four centralized Kingdoms prior to the arrival of the British. The Bugandan influence with the assistance of the British was extended to areas in yellow. Areas in khaki never had centralized kingdoms
263 Appendix II: Two letters
The following two letters which were written by a witness of the Battle of Mengo to a London Friend help to paint a picture of the situation in Buganda in the period immediately after the attack.
Letter I
14th June 1966
Dear friend
I am glad to write this letter to inform you that God has helped me, and I escaped from the war when Uganda army men attacked all Buganda and shoot large number of people, which I think the number over two thousand dead. I am still alive, but condition is very bad for me.
The agent news which I want to Know from you is concerning about Sir Edward Muteesa II, has he reached London or do you know anything about him; Because here we are thinking that he was killed by Army men and that brings to every Muganda who were believers in him to cry day and knight.
How is prince Mutebi (Mutebi is the reigning King of Buganda)and all other friends. If you get a chance to see... advise him to stay there for some more years because Buganda now is no longer a freedom land as it was before, but it’s a land for blood day and knight.
The situation is still very hard because Army men still killing people without favour, soothe all power are in their hands. Kabaka’s palace damaged, all houses which were inside all burnt, all motorcars belongs to him were burnt by fire and all properties which were inside the palace all were taken by Army men and now palace become Uganda Armys Lodge. Large numbers who were living in the palace were killed…(a list)… Thousands of Buganda dead from 23-5-66 up to 29-5-66 and even now Uganda army men still killing people in Buganda.
The Kaitikiro of Buganda missing, I think he was also killed. I hope if it is going to like this for some months Baganda are going to refugees in the neighbouring countries.
264 No one can be allowed to pass on the road which is going around the Palace if the army sees any they shoot at once.
Buganda has been divided in to four districts and it’s no longer a kingdom land. All people who were employed by Buganda are jobless, doing nothing all the time poor day and knight, all and me facing very had future because now we are slaves, all prisons are full up Baganda people, the nation is no longer freedom land and I don’t know whether God will save us from this hard ruling, if the gods wish to change everything I beg him to break this bitter and horrible ruling of this one man whom you know well. I am still collecting all news from the beginning of the war and send them, to you very soon.
I remained here waiting your good reply, which I hope to get soon.
Yours ever
Letter II
28 June 1966
The beginning of the war when central government attacked Kabaka’s palace in the knight time of Monday 23/6
The Saza chiefs of Singo county Mr. Lutaya, Mr. Sebankita of kyaggwe county and Mr. Matovu of Buddu county were arrested by central police……
After when number of 50 ex-service men had those news they came near by Sabagabo get points to Kibuye and they started to guide the palace because they knew that central government trying to preparing to arrest HH in that knight. Also large number of ex-service men was guarding in front or the main get. We were ready inside palace waiting to see what was going to happen. At about 6:00am Lorries full of army men started to go round the palace. After three minute they started to fire in air in order to frighten us. At about 6:45 am they entered Kalala get and shot all five body guard men who were posted to guide that area. When they reached the nearby school
265 building our men were ready to shoot them all. Then they broke all other three gates and entered but all ex-service men were dead by that time. I and about five men were waiting nearby Nkuluze office, but when we understood that our friends were killed we loaded our guns, they fired us and we fired to them they killed three on our side and we killed them also.
Fighting went ahead and I felt that my life was end up but I dint surrender. I went at the back of old Twekobe house I got my I got my new area waiting to shoot, but by that time about six hundred army men were rounded palace with strong weapons and shot everywhere no matter there is a person or no one I left that area and run to the side of Nalongo gate which points to the Kabaka’s Lake, I remembered it was about 12pm rain started to rain very heavy and this was Gods way to help or save people from the edge of death ,every one find the way to get out and myself also but when I was going to gang of ten men came in front of me but good luck they did not see me. What I did I covered under the grass and they passed over me remember that it was raining heavily.
I went out under the grass and I looked on each side I saw some were waiting nearby those offices, some facing the park side.
After examined each side I started to go using my hands and knees, when I reached near the wall of palace I removed all my uniform and I remained in the pijam then I climbed the wall when I was on top one man fired to me but he missed, I jumped out. I run until I reached at home. I think rain helped me also H.H to escape and went out. Large numbers of people were shot dead and those who were able to escape. Some were arrested…(a list including my wife two of my sisters and my sister in law)…But army men did very bad think, to those for ladies.
Some people around Buganda fighted with police and they burnt four police stations. They dig some holes in the roads cutting trees put them in roads in order to unable army Lorries to move freely… (More details of who was dead)…Buganda is not yet recovered back to its normal situation and I hope it will take time Army men increasing habit of killing people in villages and steal properties.
266 Baganda people are faring very hard life for present an future time but if HH get some help and in Uganda we may be safe but if he failed to do so we shall be like slaves in Uganda because now no job poor everywhere all people are in military people.
For me I think I am going to Kenya and wait.
I write so long but read it slowly and correct my mistakes in English
Best wishes
267 Appendix III: THE UGANDA GAZETTE STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS NO 61 TO 68 OF 1966.
STATE OF EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION
Whereas by the provisions of the sub section 1 of section 30 of the Constitution of Uganda the President may at any one time by proclamation declare that the State of Public Emergency exists for the purpose of the provisions of chapter 3 of the Constitution and whereas a public emergency has occurred now, therefore I Apolo Milton Obote, President of Uganda by this my proclamation do hereby declare that a State of Public Emergency exists in the kingdom of Buganda.
A Milton Obote
President of Uganda
268 Appendix IV: Letter to Milton Obote by Sir Edward Muteesa (28 February 1966)
Your endeavors to introduce totalitarian regime in this country in complete violation of the constitution of Uganda which endeavor eliminated in your announcement last night, you must be aware of yourself.
“Your intention are now clear, they are not motivated by the sense of service to one’s country. You would have otherwise realized that the happiness prosperity of Uganda are being Jeopardized by your unconstitutional actions which you have been pursuing single handed since the 22nd Feb 1966. The public in this country and abroad that believers in representative democracy will never recognize the fact of your usurpation of the powers which the constitution clearly rests in the President, whose election is by parliament and by nobody else. I myself, cannot be a party to your present illegal exercise. I would like to add this further point that your current conduct is very harmful to the cause of our brothers in the rest of Africa where every wrong step, we take out here adds to their already un bearable burden. The existing tensions in the whole world today demand that we do our outmost best to reduce them instead of adding to them in any manner
“I should be falling in duty if I left you in the slightest doubt that the people of this country would ever accept your own unconstitutional measure. There are far too many warnings elsewhere already for anybody to think that our people can even accept this insult of their intelligence.
Please read this later alongside mine of 28th February 1966.
Signed
Mutesa Edward
269 Appendix V: SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HON DR.A.M.OBOTE MP, ON THURSDAY 3rd MARCH 1966.
(Partly in response to Muteesa’s letter of 28 February 1966)
Fellow citizen,
We have passed through very anxious moments since early last month. I intend to speak to you this evening in a frank manner without fear or favor. The issues at stake are a challenge to the hopes and aspirations of the masses as opposed to the interests of the privileged few.
The steps that government has taken in respect of the President and Vice President have not been motivated by hatred or anything of that kind. The removal of powers from the President and Vice President was forced upon us as a result of activities of certain individuals which were dangerous to security, under peace and government.
You are already aware that since 1962 I have tried to cultivate within the country the virtues of tolerance and understanding, and I have urged citizens of this country to recognize each other’s qualities and to respect each other’s feelings. I have particularly urged members of parliament and persons in responsible positions throughout the country to realize that they are the first people to face the first impact of the challenging call to make Uganda strong, prosperous and united country. I have also urged them to realize that as leaders of the people, hard practical issues are bound to face them and that it is their responsibility to discover fair and true solutions to such issues.
It is because of this, that government has so far not made any order on the freedom of the individual in spite of the fact that the constitution has been suspended and only part of it saved. The government has found no need for declaring a state of emergence or imposing a curfew, or even declaring a state of disturbed area in some part of the country. This clearly shows that the government has good intentions, particularly in respect of the freedom of the individual and legal processes.
It’s also worthwhile to note that in spite of several press conferences that have taken place as part of relentless of mere campaigns and character-assassination, the
270 government has remained calm and has not retaliated by imposing a press censorship. This is because the government would wish the general public to understand the causes of the present situation and also because the government is fully aware of the fact that, despite attempts by some politicians to cover up their past misdeeds by now pretending to be champions of the constitution. The newspaper editors and the press as whole appear to be must anxious to print and publish what would assistant in bringing about normal condition.
The crucial point in the present situation is that my colleagues and I resolved not to allow the powers of the state to pass into the hands of an individual supported by a few individuals and for him and his supporters to exercise those powers for their individual personal glory
It is here that I must say that, there is no truth whatsoever in what I have read in the foreign press of sectional conflicts either within my party or throughout the country. I would say that these reports in the foreign press are distortions and malicious propaganda for the sake of tarnishing the good name of our country. On our part this is purely a domestic matter and we shall resist any external interference.
In spite of information we have, the government has not attempted either openly or in any other manner to accuse any foreign government as being responsible, or as having supported certain individuals with funds for the purpose of causing instability in this country. Where necessary such information will be disclosed in a dignified manner in the proper place and in accordance with the laws of our country and international practice.
There can be no doubt now that for much of last year and up to the present day, parliament has been used to promote the interests of a few individuals rather than the interests of the country as whole. Parliamentary privilege has been turned into an instrument of character-assassination. The objective being to promote power, pomp and prestige, It was because of this that I told the nation on the 9th of October last year that it will not be the aim of the government to allow the interests of any owekitibwa or bwana to outweigh those of the common man.
271 The present crisis, therefore, is one of a struggle between the interests of the common man and those persons who are highly placed and occupy positions of influence. The constitution cannot, therefore, be allowed to be used to suppress the interests of the common man. Those who would not like the country to understand the reasons behind action taken by the government are doing so in order to hide the truth and the real source of trouble.
Now, I would like you to remember that, it is not very long ago when the President refused to abide by the constitution by refusing to sign the lost countries referendum act. I signed the act under certain clauses in the constitution but not a finger was raised in protest by members of parliament or by any body size, either in parliament or outside it. No one said anything about the past that the President had abdicated from his constitutional duties when he refused to sign the act.
After the referendum was out of the and the inhabitants of the countries had overwhelmingly decided to form part of the kingdom of Bunyoro, the president again refused to sign the Act of Parliament that altered the boundaries between the kingdom of Bunyoro and Buganda.
Again it will be remembered that the President refuse to open the recent session of parliament which began in December 1965. One Buganda member told parliament that the President had refused to open parliament because he disliked certain measures which were due to be passed by parliament in this session. It would take a lot of convincing, it one were to argue that the parliament acted constitutionally.
Worse still, during my recent tour of the northern region, the President recently contacted some ambassadors accredited to this country and made firm requests for military assistance. Nobody can, with any stretch of the imagination, make us believe that this was a constitutional act, and that the President was acting within the provision of the constitution when he summoned accredited ambassadors without notifying the foreign office or any other minister, or I. Yet the people who pretend to be very concerned about the constitution are telling us that these acts were in order and that the President acted constitutionally.
272 As we go to, bed tonight, the parliament secretary to the katikiro was away on the same mission of military assistance.
These are but a few examples and they show quite clearly that the constitution has been used and interpreted by various individuals to suit their needs and in the present situation the government realized that if no drastic measures were taken to stem what appeared to it as arising tide against our existence as an independent sovereign nation, this country would have been plugged into very grave dangers of finding itself invaded by foreign troops for the sake of satisfying the selfish motives of a few individuals.
The wild cries of freedom sound indeed very hollow when one realizes that certain individuals make that cry not because they want to serve the general public but because they the want the general public to serve them
In this way a handful of individuals can, and have used their power to frustrate progressive policy. In some of the federal states large sums of money have been proved to have been miss-spent and the general public is being prevented from knowing what exactly is taking place. Those who have spent such amount without authority cannot be taken to court because of their constitution positions. Some federal assemblies have been requested to vote money` for development projects, but such money`s have found their way into personal overseas banking accounts of certain individuals.
In present day Africa, when the account is on economic development and welfare of society, we find ourselves here in Uganda being at times more concerned with ensuring that some individuals must be paid their salaries and must also continue to get rents and profits from estates that they are supposed to be holding on trust for the good of the people. It is again this emphasis on the “big men” rather than on the small man that has contributed to the present situation.
My colleagues and I believe must firmly that we must do everything make the present situation a temporary one. I shall therefore be engaged throughout next week in holding discussions with a view to preparing the road for a return to normal and greater stability. I must however make it absolutely clear that government will not resitate to
273 take such further measures as it may think appropriate if the situation warrants in the interests of peace, security law and good government.
On the subject of the judicial commission of inquiry, we have already made it public that we do not intend to interfere with the courts of the commission. Every person who has any evidence to give to the commission is free to do so and will not be obstructed in any way. The appointment of the commission was approved by the cabinet on the 15th of Feb. 1966. The learned judges who are to be the commission were approved also by the cabinet before the incident of the 22rd when five ministers were detained.
I would like to add that, when the matters of the debate which took place in parliament on the 4th Feb.It was reported to me the next day in east Acholi, I directed that a judicial commission of inquiry should be set up to acquire into all the allegation. There is therefore no basis in the press reports I have read in some foreign press that the idea to appoint the commission was forced on me.
It is my belief that these allegations, as well as the matter of the detained five ex- ministers must be handled within the provisions of the law of the land. They will therefore be given every opportunity to defend themselves in a court of laws.
The present situation can be summed up as having three aspects. There is first the constitutional crisis. Secondly, the judicial commission of inquiry and thirdly the matter of the detained ex-ministers. These are separate issues but as time goes on there may be connections between them.
The judicial commission of inquiry and the matter of the detained five ex-ministers are matters for judicial process, I am sure the whole country would like them to be handled in that way.
On the constitutional crisis, I intend to carry out the widest consultations and I ask fellow citizens to believe me when I say that the suspension of the constitution was to enable us to arrest a dangerous situation which had developed, and to ensure our dignity as a people and the dignity of our independent status.
Fellow citizens, this is the time to think and act in terms of Uganda and this is your invitation to do so.
For God and your country
274 Appendix VI: THE 18 POINTS GIVEN BY THE UGANDA ARMY UNDER MAJOR GENERAL AMIN JUSTIFICATION FOR TAKING OVER POWER OF GOVERNMENT ON 25TH JUNUARY 1971
(These do help to briefly illustrate Obote’s post 1966 administration)
1. The unwarranted detention without trial and for long periods of a large number of people, many of whom are totally innocent of any changes. 2. The continuation of a state of emergency over the whole country for an indefinite period which is meaningless to everybody. 3. The lack of freedom in the airing of different views on political and social matters. 4. The frequent loss of life and property arising from almost daily cases of robbery with violence and kondoism (Armed Robbery) without strong measures being taken to stop them. The people feel totally insecure, and yet kondoism increases every day. 5. The proposals for National service which will take every able bodied person from his home to work in a camp for two years, could only lead to more robbery, and general crime when homes are abandoned. 6. Widespread corruption in high places, especially among ministers and top civil servants has left the people with very little confidence, if any, in the Government. Most ministers own fleets of cars or buses, many big houses, and sometimes even airplanes. 7. The failure by the political authorities to organize any elections for the last eight years whereby the people’s free will could be expressed. It should be noted that the last elections within the ruling party were dominated by big fellows with lots of money which they used to bribe their way into “winning” the elections. This bribery, together with threats against the people entirely falsified the results of the so called elections. Proposed new methods of elections requiring a candidate to stand in four constituencies will only favour the rich and well known. 8. Economic policies have left many people un employed and even more insecure and lacking in basic needs of life like food, clothing, medicine and shelter. 9. High taxes have left the common man of this country poorer than ever before. Here are some of the taxes which the common man has to bear:
275 DEVELOPMENT TAX GRADUATED TAX SALES TAX SOCIAL SECURITY FUND TAX
The big men can always escape these taxes or pass them on to common man.
10. The [prices which the common man gets for his crops like cotton and coffee have not gone up and sometimes they have gone down whereas the cost of food, education, etc. have always gone up. 11. Tendency to isolate the country from East African Unity, e.g by sending away workers from Kenya and Tanzania, by discouraging imports from Kenya and Tanzania, by stopping the use in Uganda of Kenya and Tanzania money. 12. The creation of wealthy classes of leaders who are always talking of socialism while they grow richer and the common man poorer. 13. In addition, the defence council of which the president is the chairman, has not met since July 1969 and this has made administration in the Armed forces very difficult. As a result of Armed forces personnel lack accommodation, vehicles, and equipments. Also general recruitment submitted to the chairman of Defence council a long time ago has not been put into effect. 14. The cabinet office, by training large number of people (largely from the Akokoro County in Lango District where Obote and AkenaAdoko, the chief General Service Officer come from) in armed warfare has been turned into a second army. Uganda therefore had two armies, one in the Cabinet, the other regular. 15. The Lango development master plan, written in 1967 decided that all key positions in Uganda’s political, Commercial, army and industrial life have to be occupied and controlled by people from Akokoro country, Lango District. Also the same master plan decided that nothing must be done for other districts especially Acholi District. Emphasis was put on developing Aokkoro county in Lango District at the expense of other areas of Uganda. 16. Obote on advice of AkenaAdoko has sought to divide the Uganda Armed Forces and the rest of Uganda by picking out his tribesmen and putting them in the key positions in the Army and everywhere. Examples: the chief General Service Officer, the Export and import Corporation, Uganda Meat Packers, the
276 public service Commission, Nyanza Textile and a Russian Textile Factory to be situated in Lango. 17. From the time Obote took over power, 1962, his greatest and most loyal supporter has been the Army. The Army has always tried to be an example to the whole of Africa by not taking over the Government and we have always followed this principle. It is therefore now a shock to us see that Obote wants to divide and downgrade the Army by turning the Cabinet Office into another Army. In doing this, Obote ND AkenaAdoko have bribed and used some Senior Officers who have turned against their fellow soldiers. 18. We all want only Unity in Uganda and we do not want bloodshed. Everybody in Uganda knows that. The matters mentioned above appear to us to lead to bloodshed only.
For the reasons given above we men of Uganda Armed Forces have this day decided to take over power from Obote and hand it to our fellow soldier Major- General Idi Amin Dada and hereby entrust him to lead this our beloved country of Uganda to peace and goodwill among all.
We can everybody and Government departments in Uganda to continue with their work in the normal way.
We warn all foreign Governments not to interfere in Uganda’s Internal Affairs. Any such interference will be crushed with great force, because we are ready.
We are firm believers in the Unity of East Africa and of Africa in general and we shall cement our friendship with neighbouring and all African countries and the world at large, more than ever before. For the moment a curfew is necessary and will be observed by everybody between 7p.m and 6.30 a.m. From now every day until further notice
Power is now handed over to our fellow soldier Major-General Idi Amin Dada, and you must await his statement which will come in due course
WE HAVE DONE THIS FOR GOD AND OUR COUNTRY
277 Appendix VII: Excerpts of the 1900 Buganda Agreement
Article 15
The land of Buganda shall be dealt with in the following Manner
Assuming the area of the kingdom of (B)Uganda, as comprised within the limits cited in his agreement, to amount to 19,600 square miles, it shall be divided the following proportions:
Square miles
Forest to be brought under control of Uganda administration(Crown land) 1,500 Waste and uncultivated land to be vested in Her Majesty’s Government, and to be controlled by the Uganda Administration 9,000
Plantations and other private property of his Highness the Kabaka of (B)Uganda 350 Plantations and other private property of the Namasole(Note- If the present Kabaka died and another Namasole were appointed, the existing one would be permitted to retain as her personal property 6 square miles, passing on 10 Square miles as the endowment of every succeeding Namasole (Queen Mother) 16 Plantations and other private property of the Namasole, mother of Mwanga 10 To the Princes: Joseph, Augustine ,Ramazan and Yusuf Suna, 8 square miles@ 32 For the Princes, sisters and relations of the Kabaka 90 To the county Chiefs twenty in all 8 square miles each (Private property) 160
Official estates attached to the post of County chiefs,8 square miles each 160 The three regents will receive private property to the extent of 16 miles
Each 48
278 An official property attached to their office,16 square miles each, the said Official property to be afterwards attached to the posts of the 3 native ministers 48 Mbogo ( the Mohamedan chief) will receive for himself and his adherents 24 Kamuswaga, Chief of Koki, will receive 20 One thousand chiefs and private land owners will receive the estates of which They are already in possession, and which are computed at an average of 8 Square miles per individual, making a total of 8,000
There will be allotted to the three missionary societies in existence in Uganda As private property in trust for the native churches as much as 92 Land taken up by the Government stations prior to the present settlements 50
_____
19,600
______
279 Appendix VIII: OLENGA’S TELEGRAM’S AND STATEMENT
FILE NO: 3
OLENGA’S TELEGRAM’S AND STATEMENT
COPY OF INWARD TELEGRAM
SENT: 22. 8. 65
RCD : 23. 8. 65
EN CLAIR IN FRENCH:
FROM: GENERAL OLENGA NICOLAS, 18 EL GIZA AT KHARTOUM.
TO: PRIME MINISTER DR. OBOTE, ENTEBBE.
NO. 00101 /DM /APL /65
Grateful Note That The Congress Revolutionary Movement Have At Its Disposal, Sums Of Money At Different Banks In Uganda, In Particular, Standard Bank Belonging To The Congress Revolutionary People. These Sums Have Been Banked In The Names Of Christopher Gbenye, KanzaThomast, Osua Michel, Okangay Felix, Disguised Name Of Gbenye, The Name Of The Wife Of Gbeye, BensengaOlikaTenzinja, Idi Amin, And The Other Disguised Names Belonging To The Two Men. We Strongly Request The Uganda Government To Withhold (Block Up) This Money Pending The Meeting Of The Congress Revolutionary Congress Next October In Order To Settle The Rightful Owners Of This Money. Any Tampering With This Money, After Having Received This Gable, Would Be, Purely And Simple, Usurping And Stealing Of This Money Which Will Be A Below To Our People.
280 HIGHEST CONSIDRATION==
FILE NO: 3
OLENGA’S TELEGRAM’S AND STATEMENT.
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY QUESTION:
[Meeting commencing 6th September, 1965]
No: 441.
Mr. D. O. Ocheng.
Would the Prime Minister inform this House whether or not the Government is prepared to grant the request contained in Cable No. ZCZCNGU 48/ T 132 KHA 242, from General Olenga Nicholas in Khartoum Sudan, asking the Uganda Government to block the withdrawal of Large sums of money belonging to the Congolese Revolutionary Movement but deposited with Uganda Banks in the names of Christopher Gbenye, Kanza, Thomasi, Osua Michel, Akangy Felix, Mrs Gbenye Bensenga, OlikaTenzinja and Idi Amin?
The Prime Minister (DR. A. M. OBOTE):
Mr. Speaker. Sir, the answer is in the negative.
Q/ 3/ 5/ 8.
281