lethal violence averages for the period 2007–12 2007–12 period the for averages violence lethal presents chapter this database, 2014 GBAV the in information of analysis adetailed on Based of violence. levels increasing or volatile experiencing been have states afew term, long the over decreasing or stable been have rates homicide national most while that reveals look acloser yet decline; in be to appear violence lethal of levels global 2011). Overall, Secretariat, Declaration (Geneva (GBAV) Violence Armed of Burden Global the of 2011 edition the in presented research of basis the formed which 2004–09, period the for data with 2007–12 period the for data gathered newly comparing by violence lethal of intensity and distribution the in changes analyses chapter This drop. to continue may violence of levels that promise the hold trends enduring world, the around countries other many in Meanwhile, concentrated. and short-lived be can lethality great of episodes that reminders as serve Ukraine and Egypt, Republic, African Central the in violence of levels the in Volatility countries. these in found are rates homicide highest world’s the of some fact, In wars. drug and gang ongoing of face the in deaths violent of incidence ahigh exhibiting been have Venezuela and Mexico, Honduras, since. ever lethality of levels high particularly encing experi- latter the with Syria, and Libya in erupted I the Arab uprisings, for instance, violence violence instance, for uprisings, Arab the of aftermath the In headlines. the in firmly remained has violence lethal years, recent n Lethal Violence Update Violence Lethal Chapter

Two

tion of this report. this of tion edi- previous the in introduced was that violence lethal to approach’ ‘unified the use to continues chapter The (2004–12). is available data which for period entire the for rates in changes reviews and and states. states. and groups, communities, people, among events lent vio in sustained injuries lethal of victims on data records chapter 2011). This Secretariat, Declaration (Geneva interventions legal of context the in occur that killings and homicide, unintentional and intentional deaths, conflict direct including settings, non-conflict and conflict both in violence to attributed directly be can that deaths’ ‘violent considers report this edition, previous the Like One). Chapter (see indicators and targets associated and societies, inclusive and peaceful on goal proposed its agenda, development post-2015 the of context the in way under efforts to linked be may 2004–12 period the for violence lethal on data national of monitoring and collection the in improvements 2.2). To Box extent, (see some lence vio- lethal in patterns of unpacking the for and estimates accurate more for allows data refined more of availability the Indeed, data. of lection col- the in improvements to attention draws also chapter the deaths, violent on figures available recent most the as well as violence lethal in changes long-term and medium- highlighting In violence. of forms other and conflict, homicide, on sources of variety alarge from data includes and violence of forms interpersonal and criminal, 1 The approach covers conflict, conflict, covers approach The - 49 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 50 2015 ARMED VIOLENCE of GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL proper sanitation. proper or water, clean care, medical to access of a lack including violence, of consequences the ing from result those as such deaths, indirect of issue the cover not does GBAV the of edition This Republic. African Central the in crisis recent the and Syria in conflict ongoing the to related those as such review, under period the after reported were that counts death violent significant considers also it 2007–12, years the on focuses chapter this While The chapter finds that: finds chapter The n 2012, the latest year for which data is avail data which for year latest the n 2012, periods the for data GBAV of mparison death violent highest the with countries 18 he the around deaths violent ten in one than ore a as annually died people 508,000 t least rates higher than 10 per 100,000. Only 13 of Only 100,000. 10 per than higher rates violence lethal exhibited countries 37 able, I 70,000). to 55,000 (from deaths conflict in direct increase asignificant but 19,000), to 21,000 (from interventions legal during killings and 42,000), to 54,000 (from cides homi unintentional 377,000), to 396,000 (from homicides intentional of numbers the in reductions reveals 2007–12 and 2004–09 A co world. the in deaths violent all of cent) per (24 one-quarter nearly for account but population world’s the of cent 4per amere to home are rates T world. the in deaths violent four of out three nearly for account homicides Intentional settings. conflict in occurs world M interventions. legal to due deaths 19,000 and homicides, unintentional 42,000 homicides, intentional 377,000 deaths, flict con- direct 70,000 approximately comprises figure This population. 100,000 per killed sons 7.4 of per- rate average an to corresponding 2007–12, period the in violence lethal of result A 2 - - -

Panos Pictures Panos Rose/ ©David 2014. February Kiev, Ukraine, in Independence Square, police the with clashes during the barricades Photo Photo 

Protestors man Protestors 51 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 52 these countries were experiencing a conflict These variations undoubtedly have an impact on or had recently emerged from one. GBAV estimates. In particular, the absence of In 2012, the countries with the highest rates of national recording and reporting of violent deaths lethal violence per 100,000 were Syria (180.2), in many countries in Africa continues to preclude 2015 Honduras (90.4), and Venezuela (72.2). the generation of accurate estimates of lethal violence in that part of the world (see Figures 2.3 The sub-regions most affected by lethal and 2.4).3 Second, underreporting skews data on violence are—in decreasing order—Central violent deaths, especially in conflict settings, as America (with a rate of violent 33.6 deaths per these tend to be inaccessible. Underreporting can 100,000 population), Southern Africa (31.2), also be an issue in non-conflict settings, espe- the Caribbean (20.5), and South America (17.0). cially if public health systems do not record violent

ARMED VIOLENCE The sub-regions with the greatest increase in deaths as homicides. Third, variations in defini- of the violent death rates per 100,000 population tions and methods can prevent comparisons. from 2004–09 to 2007–12 are Northern Africa Sources do not necessarily share one definition (94.8 per cent increase), Central America (15.7 of ‘armed conflict’, nor do they always take the per cent), and Southern Africa (13.8 per cent). same approach to recording conflict-related cas- Globally, firearms are used in 46.3 per cent of ualties (see Box 2.1). all homicides and in an estimated 32.3 per cent In view of the shortcomings in the data, GBAV of direct conflict deaths. That means that fire- GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL estimates are conservative. One such estimate, arms are used in 44.1 per cent of all violent based on selected sources covering the Syrian deaths, or an annual average of nearly 197,000 conflict, indicates that the number of lives lost in deaths for the period 2007–12. Syria between March 2011 and December 2013 Central America, the Caribbean, and South was 80,000. That figure is markedly lower than America suffer from the highest firearm homi- the estimate of 92,000 killed by March 2013, cide shares (above 50 per cent) and exhibit published in a report commissioned by the Office the highest firearm homicide rates. of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Price et al., 2013, p. 3; see Box 2.3).

Approximately 508,000 people died violently A global snapshot of lethal violence each year in the period from 2007 to 2012. This As noted above, this edition of the Global Burden figure includes 377,000 intentional homicides of Armed Violence continues to take a ‘unified (74 per cent of all the deaths), 70,000 direct con- approach’ to armed violence. This framework of flict deaths (14 per cent), 42,000 unintentional analysis allows for the generation of an overall homicides (8 per cent), and 19,000 deaths due estimate of violent deaths at the global level and to legal interventions (4 per cent) (see Figure 2.1). for a comprehensive update on lethal violence in These estimates are 3.4 per cent lower than those both conflict and non-conflict settings. presented in the 2011 edition of the GBAV, which Yet the use of GBAV data also entails a series of reported an average of 526,000 violent deaths challenges. First, the quality of data varies across annually for the period 2004–09 (Geneva Decla- countries, especially with respect to lethal violence. ration Secretariat, 2011). The overall reduction in battle deaths per calendar year; the UCDP classification of ‘armed ‘armed of classification UCDP the year; calendar per deaths battle at 25 lies set data (UCDP) Program Data Conflict Uppsala the of threshold The deaths’. ‘battle or casualties of number overall the on definitions and classifications their base often sets data Large-n 11). p. 2013, Casey-Maslen, and Giacca, (Karimova, situations of spectrum a wide encompasses and interpretation to open remains ‘conflict’ of notion general more 2 (Geiß, violence of levels fluctuating with intermittent, be may tilities o Instead parties. conflicting more) (or one by rejected be may nation c for requirements the meet necessarily not do states fragile in flicts con Low-intensity 12). p. 2013, Martino, De and Frate del (Alvazzi sensitive politically be often can but resources, and assistance international to access as well as standards legal of applicability the govern aconflict constitutes what of determinations Legal 11). p. 2013, Casey-Maslen, and Giacca, (Karimova, aNIAC’ of organization’ of a‘minimum and sity’ inten of level ‘minimum a reach parties conflict more or two which in (NIACs), conflicts armed non-international and force, armed a international between distinguishes IHL conflicts. armed rize catego to used often also is (IHL) law humanitarian International 6). p. 2013, Casey-Maslen, 10–11; pp. 2011, Miall, and Woodhouse, (Ramsbotham, time in coincide or overlap may conflicts of types different and sources, different between differ often classifications a Martino (De casualties of number the by measured generally flict, con the of intensity the on non-state—and or belligerents—state the of identities the on based are conflict of definitions Most of of intensity fighting. r others while instruments, legal on based are definitions some disciplines; across and within differently defined is Conflict underestimated. be not conflict should defining words: of definitions of politics he significance political the context, this In conflict. armed of definitions varying the from stems violence lethal of scope full the estimating in difficulty One B n elements the detail in out set not do IHL] [of ‘treaties the IHL, of tion applica the for precondition is a conflict armed an of existence the ely on numerical values, conflict resolution perspectives, or levels levels or perspectives, resolution conflict values, numerical on ely lassification as an NIAC to which IHL may apply, and the determi the and apply, may IHL which to NIAC an as lassification rmed conflicts, in which two or more states resort to the use of use the to resort states more or two which in conflicts, rmed nd Dönges, 2012). Conflict typologies are reviewed regularly, regularly, reviewed are typologies Conflict 2012). Dönges, nd 009, p. 135). Apart from the IHL definitions of armed conflict, the conflict, armed of definitions IHL the from Apart 135). p. 009, ecessary to determine that a situation has reached the threshold threshold the reached has asituation that determine to ecessary f sustained combat or large-scale military operations, such hos such operations, military large-scale or combat f sustained ox 2.1 ox

T 4 (ICRC, 2008, p. 5). While While 5). p. 2008, (ICRC,

------A category. this into fall actors non-state between combat or strators, demon against violence state massacres, by about brought deaths Civilian state. the of involvement the or number great their despite deaths combat or battle as deaths violent count not does UCDP circumstances, certain Under n.d.c). (UCDP, astate of government the be to parties conflicting the of one least at requires conflict’ p conflict the between communication and actions of aspects ous vari measure to seek conflict armed of assessments Quantitative 2.5). Box see 21; p. 2011, Secretariat, Declaration (Geneva deaths conflict as counted been not have Tunisia and Libya, Egypt, in protests Spring Arab initial of quelling during the lost lives of hundreds and 2007 in Kenya in violence post-election Hannah Dönges and Keith Krause Krause Keith and Dönges Authors: Hannah 5). p. 2013, Rodgers, and Goodfellow, (Beall, delivery’ service absent or poor as such failures state over protest violent or riots spontaneous and rebellions, sectarian and religious terrorism, warfare, gang crime, violent including ‘organized settings, in urban and groups’ individuals c of micro-dynamics the of study the in example for literature, demic aca and sets data some in reflected also is focus A sub-national 2 Lucade, 3; p. 2008, (Glasl, violence of occurrence the of hood likeli the and control, under conflict a of keeping difficulty the escalation, of risk the reflects that acontinuum on them analyses approach this numbers, cut-off on based conflicts classifying d internal the and escalation of stages the as well as siderations, con strategic and attitudes, concerns, main parties’ conflict the out map and identify to aims which approach, resolution conflict the of part as undertaken be may diagnosis’ ‘conflict A broader 8–10). pp. 2014, (HIIK, persons displaced internally and refugees c of number the personnel, of employment weapons, of use the ing analys by conflicts violent of intensity the assesses instance, for e conflict’ ‘civil or violence’ ‘political as such terms requirements, organization’ of ‘minimum to contrast In NIACs. of definition legal the beyond violence armed of forms broader captures often work This 2014). ACLED, 2008; Kalyvas, (see project (ACLED) Data ivil wars or conflicts, or in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Event and Location Conflict Armed the in or conflicts, or wars ivil asualties, the degree of destruction, and the overall numbers of of numbers overall the and destruction, of degree the asualties, ncompass ‘diverse but recurrent forms of violence between between violence of forms recurrent but ‘diverse ncompass 012, pp. 12–13). 12–13). pp. 012, arties. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Research, Conflict International for Institute Heidelberg The arties. ynamics between stakeholders and conflict parties. Instead of Instead parties. conflict and stakeholders between ynamics s a result, the more than 1,000 fatalities that resulted from from resulted that fatalities 1,000 than more the s aresult,

------53 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 54 Figure 2.1 Distribution of the victims of lethal violence per year, 2007–12

DIRECT CONFLICT DEATHS Victims of extrajudicial killings NON-CONFLICT DEATHS

CIVILIAN Battle-related deaths 2015 CONFLICT Civilian deaths DEATHS Victims of terrorism INTENTIONAL HOMICIDES

Victims of legal interventions

UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDES ARMED VIOLENCE of

Victims of legal Direct conflict deaths: Unintentional homicides: Intentional homicides: interventions: deaths deaths as a result of deaths as a result of deaths as a result of inter- of civilians by law armed conflicts, political ‘accidental’ killings personal violence, gang

GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL Note: The figure is not enforcement and state violence, and terrorism (42,000) violence, and economi- intended to reflect security forces during (70,000) cally motivated crimes proportions. legal interventions (377,000) (19,000) Source: Geneva Declara- tion Secretariat (2014)

Figure 2.2 Changes in lethal violence by region, 2004–09 vs. 2007–12 violent deaths has also been observed in other Homicide and conflict deaths Homicide only relevant studies. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes in its Global Study on Homicide Percentage change 2013 that the homicide rate declined substantially 15 in Europe and Oceania between 2010 and 2012 10 (UNODC, 2014, p. 21). Similarly, the literature shows 5 Africa Europe Oceania that there was a general trend of reductions in 0 Americas Asia direct conflict deaths, until the high number of -5 casualties in Syria in 2012 drove numbers upwards -10 again (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013, p. 510).

-15 Although homicide rates are decreasing in many -20 parts of the world, as discussed below, a com- -25 parison of the number of violent deaths for the -30 periods 2004–09 and 2007–12 reveals significant -35 regional variations (see Figure 2.2). It highlights Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) how changes in the number of homicides can be GBAV, the of editions previous on building to addition In decade. past the comprehensiveness—in and coverage both of terms significantly—in improved has availability Data 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Number of countries region per database, GBAV the in Figure d homicide of disaggregation at attempt afirst sents pre also edition 2011 The interventions. legal during killings and manslaughter as such data, homicide’ ‘intentional classical in recorded not violence assess to used were studies case Furthermore, 29 countries. for deaths conflict direct on data as well as territories v lethal on data national cover to expanded had sis analy the 2011, in GBAV, the of edition second the By analysis. the into integrated be to enough complete series data national were Nor circumstances. or firearms, sex, on based disaggregation for allow to information enough contain not did database the published, was volume the time the At deaths. conflict and homicide on data sub-regional presents GBAV the of edition 2008 The data. GBAV of quality the enhance and scope the broaden to efforts ongoing made has violent on data of Secretariat availability he Declaration Geneva the data-dependent, highly is deaths violent of analysis the that Given deaths B International iolence (intentional homicide) for 186 countries and and countries 186 for homicide) (intentional iolence ata by sex, based on data for 111 countries. 111 for data on based sex, by ata ox 2.2 ox fiaAmericas Africa 2.3

T

this volume widens and deepens the the deepens and widens volume this C National riminal justice sources included included sources justice riminal

International and national International Asia uoeOceania Europe 5

- - Irene Pavesi and Matthias Nowak Matthias and Pavesi Authors: Irene c a represents thus it violence; lethal of levels porary contem in changes maps that database integrated 2000–12. period the for available is data l national the at series data violence lethal of ment establish the is improvement Afurther 2.3 2.4). and ries. territo and countries 189 covers globe, the around violence lethal on information and data in increase an from benefits which GBAV, the of edition This Four). and Three (2014) Secretariat Declaration Geneva Source: Crime). and Drugs on Office UN the and Organization Health World the as (such agencies international as well as ries) observato- and health, of ministries police, the as (such sources national from collected data present 2.4 2.3 and Figures Notes: gress in human security around the world. the around security human in gress b in causes, of range awide from resulting deaths lent vio combines it that in unique is database GBAV The u sub-national by and killing, of mode by sex, by gated disaggre data featuring by notably analysis, of scope 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Number of countries region per database, GBAV the Figure o regions most in level national the at gathered atically evel for the period 2004–12; in addition, homicide homicide addition, in 2004–12; period the for evel International ore contribution to measuring and monitoring pro monitoring and measuring to contribution ore f the world, with the exception of Africa (see Figures Figures (see Africa of exception the with world, f the nit of analysis, such as the urban level (see Chapters Chapters (see level urban the as such analysis, of nit oth conflict and non-conflict settings. It is the only only the is It settings. non-conflict and conflict oth 6 A key improvement is that data is now system- now is data that is improvement Akey fiaAmericas Africa 2.4

P National ublic health sources included in included sources health ublic

International and national International Asia uoeOceania Europe 7

------55 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 56 attenuated by, for example, an increase in direct Americas experienced the greatest upsurge in conflict deaths, demonstrating the utility of a lethal violence—in homicides as well as direct comprehensive approach to armed violence. conflict deaths which combined increased by In Africa, for instance, the number of homicides nearly 10 per cent. 2015 dropped by more than 20 per cent between the Map 2.1 presents the global distribution of vio- two periods; if conflict deaths are included, lent death rates per 100,000 population for the however, the overall reduction in lethal violence period 2007–12. The average global annual vio- stands at only 13 per cent. lent death rate is estimated at 7.4 per 100,000 In Asia, the number of homicides increased by population for the period under review. Reflecting less than 1 per cent from one period to the next; a reduction in lethal violence at the global level, yet when conflict deaths are included, the this average annual rate is slightly lower than ARMED VIOLENCE

of change in lethal violence swells to 6 per cent, the previous estimate of 7.9 deaths per 100,000 largely reflecting the high number of deaths in population for the period 2004–09 (Geneva Syria. The comparison also makes clear that the Declaration Secretariat, 2011).

Map 2.1 Average annual violent death rates per 100,000 population, 2007–12 GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL

LEGEND: Number of violent deaths per 100,000 population ≥30 20.0–29.9 10.0–19.9 3.0–9.9 <3 No data

Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) the 18 countries with the darkest shade darkest the with countries 18 the rates— average highest the with countries The Asia. Western and Africa in countries affected conflict- do as rates, high very and high exhibit Africa Southern and America Latin in countries afew that shows It elevated. are violence of rates where illustrates 2.1 clearly Map Nevertheless, Four). Chapter (see regions border and tral cen between or areas, urban and rural between as such states, within variations significant hides ably unavoid- it however, averages, national employs map this Since (<3.0). low’ ‘very and (3.0–9.9), ‘low’ tion), (20.0–29.9), ‘high’ ‘medium’ (10.0–19.9), ( high’ ‘very categories: five into grouped are rates The violence. lethal of rates average their to according territories and countries 2.1 colour-codes Map lent deaths. Brazil and India, for example, account account example, for India, and Brazil deaths. lent vio- of share mammoth the represent homicides why illustrate further can data Selected Libya. and Syria in conflicts the of severity the to due largely 2007–12, in cent per 14 to rose 2004–09, in deaths violent all of cent 10 per over just at stood which deaths, conflict direct of proportion the contrast, In worldwide. deaths violent of cent) per (74 ity major vast the for account to continue Homicides population. world’s the of cent 50per is almost which people, 3billion exceeds countries six these of population the deaths), yet violent all of cent per 27 approximately to lent is equiva- (which 137,000 year of per average an total States United the and Pakistan, Indonesia, India, China, Brazil, in deaths violent Specifically, populations. large very but deaths, violent of numbers absolute high have countries some contrast, In deaths. violent world’s the of cent per 24 experience population global the of cent 4per just to home are that countries that means This annually. deaths violent 121,000 estimated an and people million 280 about of atotal for ≥ 30.0 violent deaths per 100,000 popula- 100,000 per deaths violent 30.0 8 —account —account

- - 2008, p. 225). 2008, Gleditsch, and (Buhaug conflict’ in is involved bors neigh- its of one least at if conflict of outbreak an experience to likely as twice is nearly country ‘a that finding the support neighbours Syria’s in effects’ ‘contagion These 2014). (Reuters, 11 people killed Tripoli of town the in clashes related 2014, March in regime; Assad the of nents oppo- and supporters among high remain sions ten 2012). Lebanon, In (BBC, dead several leaving troops, Syrian on fire opening by retaliated Turkey children, three and women two Turkey,in killing town aborder shelled forces government Syrian after borders; national Syria’s beyond spread also year, violence That population. 100,000 per deaths 180.2 of arate with 2012, in world the in country violent most the was Syria that shows figure The is available. data which for year latest the or 2012 in rates death violent their to according ranked violence, lethal by affected most are that ries territo- and countries 37 the 2.5 presents Figure war. civil afull-blown into lated esca- rapidly protests 2011). Syria, In (BBC, 800 than more at toll death protest-related the mates esti coup Egyptian the after produced report 2.5). Afact-finding Tunisia in Box (see protests mass 2011 in with began which uprisings, Arab the of impact the reflects map the Similarly, 2014). Nowak, and Díaz, Sánchez, 2014a; (ICG, violence of levels shape groups criminal where Honduras), and Guatemala, Salvador, (El Triangle Northern America’s in Central drugs of trafficking the to linked those as such violence, regional of terns pat broad highlight to serve also 2.1 can Map 2012. year the for 74,000 over is just database, GBAV the in registered as year, per deaths conflict direct global of number highest The year. per deaths conflict direct of ber num global the exceeds alone figure that deaths; violent 86,000 than more of total annual an for

- -

- - 57 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 58 Figure 2.5 Countries ranked by violent death rate per 100,000 population, 2012 or latest year available

Syria* Honduras 2015 Venezuela Swaziland Afghanistan* El Salvador Belize Jamaica Lesotho Colombia* Guatemala ARMED VIOLENCE South Africa of South Sudan* Somalia* Puerto Rico Brazil Iraq* Bahamas Dominican Republic Panama GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL Lesser Antilles** Botswana Mexico Guyana Seychelles Namibia Democratic Republic of the Congo* Kyrgyzstan Yemen* Central African Republic* Libya* Nicaragua Iran* Gabon Cape Verde Pakistan* Ethiopia*

200 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION Notes: * Emerging from or experiencing armed conflict. ** Given the small population of the Lesser Antilles, the eight sovereign states of the region were grouped together and their rates averaged to produce a regional estimate. The countries in question are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) ( category high’ ‘very the in countries of group The steady. relatively remained rate death violent average their and 34 to 44 from dropped 100,000) per deaths (10–29.9 violent categories ‘high’ and ‘medium’ the in countries of number the time, same the At slightly. decreased rates death violent 137, to average 128 their that and from increased categories these in countries of number the that reveals comparison The population). 100,000 per deaths (<10 violent categories ‘low’ and low’ ‘very the in rates witnessed countries the of thirds two- over Well 2007–12. and 2004–09 periods the in rates death violent average to according countries of distribution the compares 2.6 Figure deaths. associated of number ahigh with crises severe into slipped states of number asmall tion, addi- In time. of periods extended for high very remained have or rise the on been have deaths violent where ones the are violence lethal of rates and levels severe exhibit that countries the that reveals also data The Africa. Southern and America Central of exception the with world, the of parts most in low remaining or is decreasing violence lethal that shows 2004–12 period the for Data 2004–12 violence, lethal in Changes lethal violence since 2004 (see Figure 2.7). Figure (see since 2004 violence lethal of increases highest the with regions the Africa, Southern and Americas the in were population 100,000 per 30 exceeding rates with countries nine other The Syria. and Colombia, Afghanistan, conflict: experiencing were countries violent most these of three Only population. 100,000 per deaths more or 30 of rates exhibited 37 the of Twelve conflict. armed from emerged recently had or experiencing 2.5 were Figure in territories and countries 37 13 the of writing, of time the At ≥ 30 violent deaths per 100,000) increased from from increased 100,000) per deaths violent 30

death rates per 100,000 population, 2004–09 vs. 2007–12 2007–12 vs. 2004–09 population, 100,000 per rates death 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Number of countries Figure and Pridemore, 2012). Pridemore, and Shchitov, Lysova, 2010; Restrepo, and (Aguirre deaths violent of number the in declines significant witnessed recently Federation—have Russian the and Colombia as violence—such lethal of levels high by affected formerly were that countries some 1981). Even 2013; Gurr, al., et (Goertzel decline along-term to points also Europe in homicide on 2013). Research Wallensteen, and (Themnér decades past the over deaths battle-related in decline long-term the stresses instance, for Program, Data Conflict Uppsala The decreasing. is violence lethal of incidence the general, in that, agree data and trends long-term of Observers violence. lethal of levels declining steadily or stable relatively and low either experienced ter chap- this for reviewed territories and countries the of majority the that reveals also 2.6 Figure slightly. increased deaths violent of rate average group’s the 18; to 14 Source 2004–09 Rate of group 2004–09 group of Rate : Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) 2.6

≥30.0 2007–12

D istribution of countries and territories by average violent violent average by territories and countries of istribution

Rate of group 2007–12 group of Rate 02. 10–19.9 20–29.9 Category V iolent death rate per 100,000 population 3–9.9 <3 100 80 60 90 20 40 30 50 70 10 0 59 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 60 In contrast, some countries have suffered from An examination of the distribution of lethal vio- sustained high violent death rates. In Brazil, for lence across sub-regions shows that the Americas example, annual homicide levels increased and Africa suffered from the highest rates of steadily from 14,000 deaths in 1980 to close to lethal violence in both periods under review (see 2015 50,000 deaths in 2002; since then, these levels Figure 2.7). Central America continues to exhibit have not varied significantly (Waiselfisz, 2013, the highest rate of violent deaths, which rose from p. 14). The relative consistency, however, hides 29.0 to 33.6 per 100,000 population; the next important shifts within the country, as violence highest rate is that of Southern Africa, which levels decreased in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, rose from 27.4 to 31.2. Rates dropped slightly in but increased dramatically in the Northeast region the Caribbean (from 22.4 to 20.5) and in South (see Chapter Four). America (from 18.0 to 17.0); while these averages

ARMED VIOLENCE are not as elevated as those of Central America of or South Africa, they are still more than twice the Figure 2.7 Average regional violent death rates per 100,000 population, 2004–09 vs. 2007–12 global average of 7.4 per 100,000. 2004–09 2007–12 A few major findings emerge from these compari- sons. First, the Central American and Southern Central America African violent death rates have increased, reflect- Southern Africa ing protracted instability in both regions. Honduras, Caribbean GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL in particular, endured an ongoing spiral of vio- South America lence in 2004–12, although the rate of increase Middle Africa in homicides began to slow in 2011 (Sanchez, Northern Africa Diaz, and Nowak, 2014). In contrast, El Salvador

Southern Asia witnessed a discernible drop in the homicide rate in 2012, in the wake of the highly publicized—and Eastern Africa polarizing—gang truce (see Box 2.4). In Southern Western Asia Africa, rates of lethal violence in small countries Western Africa remained high and increased in 2007–12, despite Central Asia a marked reduction in South Africa. The compari- Oceania sons also reveal a significant increase in the levels Eastern Europe of lethal violence in Northern Africa—from 6.7 to

Eastern Asia 13.0 per 100,000 population—particularly follow-

Northern America ing upheavals and conflicts in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia (see Box 2.5). South-eastern Asia

Northern Europe Figure 2.8 focuses solely on countries whose

Southern Europe average violent death rates were ‘high’ or ‘very high’ (≥20 per 100,000 people) for the period Western Europe 2007–12. The figure presents the violent death 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 rates for the years 2004 and 2012—the earliest Average violent death rate per 100,000 population and latest years for which the data is available in Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) the GBAV database—as well as the average rate This figure features only countries whose average violent death rate was at least 20 per 100,000 population for the period 2007–12. 2007–12. Source period the for population 100,000 per 20 least at was rate death violent average whose countries only features figure This Note: Lanka Sri Côte d’Ivoire Sudan Libya Republic African Central Congo the of Republic Democratic Botswana Republic Dominican Bahamas Iraq Brazil Rico Puerto Somalia South Africa Guatemala Colombia Lesotho Jamaica Belize Salvador El Afghanistan Swaziland Venezuela Honduras Syria rates. death violent in decreases exhibited have which and increases, steady experienced have which volatility, high from suffered have countries which of picture clear a provides it doing, so In 2007–12. period the for Figure 2004

: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) 2007–12 2.8

C hanges in violent death rates per 100,000 population, 2004, 2007–12, and 2012 and 2007–12, 2004, population, 100,000 per rates death violent in hanges

2012 04 08 0 2 4 6 8 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Average violent death rate per 100,000 population in 2012 alone, which translates into a rate of of arate into translates which alone, 2012 in killed were people 39,000 least at that shows 2.3), Box data (see GBAV contested is highly conflict Syrian the in toll death exact the While 2.8. Figure in outlier is aconspicuous Syria

61 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 62 B ox 2.3 Measuring violent deaths in Syria: a complex case Figure 2.9 Total number of fatalities in Syria, The counting of fatalities in the Syrian conflict, which began in March 2011, is May 2011–June 2014 both a complex and a highly politicized issue. Recording casualties is complicated VDC SNHR SOHR 2015 not only by the country’s forbidding security situation, but also due to the increas- Number of violent deaths ingly fragmented nature of the conflict. Casualty figures in Syria have featured 170,000 prominently in the international news media and have been the subject of con- 136,000 tention among all the parties that take an interest in the conflict, including the 102,000 international community. 68,000 34,000 In an effort to call attention to the severity of the conflict and the magnitude 0 05/2011 01/2012 05/2013 06/2014 of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights commissioned the independent Human Rights Data Analysis ARMED VIOLENCE Figure 2.10 Total number of ‘civilian’ fatalities

of Group to arrive at an aggregate casualty figure by compiling all known sources. in Syria, May 2011–June 2014 While this research produced estimates that became widely used, the group’s methodology has since drawn a significant amount of scrutiny and criticism VDC SNHR SOHR (Narwani, 2013). In response, the UN stopped releasing the casualty figures, Number of violent deaths citing issues of access and an inability to independently verify the information 85,000 as the principal reasons, while also expressing concerns over the impartiality 68,000 and credibility of the sources used (Heilprin, 2014). 51,000 34,000 Although there are many sources of casualty data in Syria, the international 17,000 GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL community and the media have largely relied on civil society organizations 0 05/2011 01/2012 05/2013 06/2014 that compile casualty information from a variety of primary and secondary Note: VDC categorizes its fatalities into two sub-categories: sources. Among these, the most prominent are the Violation Documentation 1) deaths of martyrs, meaning individuals who opposed the Center (VDC), the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), and the Syrian regime or supported the revolution, and 2) deaths of regime Network for Human Rights (SNHR). Operating mainly as human rights organiza- supporters, including civilians and combatants. SOHR includes tions, they gather data on casualties to support survivors in seeking justice and Syrian Army defectors in its civilian count. as part of a future transitional justice mechanism. Figure 2.11 Total number of ‘combatant’ Their methodologies are similar: they all rely primarily on a network of infor- fatalities in Syria, May 2011–June 2014 mation gatherers who collect data on conflict-related deaths in the country’s VDC SNHR SOHR various governorates and districts (see Box 1.4). These recorders gather basic Number of violent deaths information, such as the names of victims, their sex, where they died, how they 170,000 died (which weapons were used), and, on occasion, additional demographic 136,000 details. The information gathered by these networks is usually sent to a central 102,000 database, hosted outside of Syria, where it is processed and compiled. The 68,000 recorders submit reports on an almost daily basis, with the aim of being as 34,000 0 comprehensive as possible. 05/2011 01/2012 05/2013 06/2014 Despite their similar methodologies, these organizations have differing total Note: The SOHR ‘combatant’ count includes the following categories: rebel fighters, regular soldiers and officers, non- casualty figures (see Figures 2.9–2.11). As discussed below, the disparities are Syrian fighters in various Islamic groups, Hezbollah fighters, partly due to operational challenges, yet they also reflect problems related to popular defence committees, national defence forces, shabiha accessing sources as well as variations in the classification of the data. (pro-regime militias), and pro-regime informers. Sources for figures 2.9–2.11: Karimi and Abdelaziz (2014); Operational challenges. The networks of information gatherers are rarely able Winstanley (2012); Zenko (2013); VDC and SNHR casualty data to maintain complete coverage of all events taking place in the country, largely shared with Every Casualty © Aris Messinis/AFP Photo Messinis/AFP © Aris Photo Photo 

A shell explodes in the Syrian city of Kobane, near the Turkish border, November 2014. 2014. November border, Turkish the near Kobane, of city Syrian the in explodes A shell

p alimited accessing be only may gatherers tion informa Individual sources. to access Uneven area. that in incidents violent about information their share or record to unable be thus and time, of periods long for m gatherers information areas, some In zone. flict acon in working of risks security the of because q to observers lead can and ambiguity additional Hana Salama, Every Casualty Every Author: Hana Salama, themselves. organizations the of even r locally of kind this of use The ‘martyrs’. as bases t classify VDC and SOHR, SNHR, forces. ernment r to term the uses ‘martyr’, defines that zation organi only the is which VDC, revolution. Syrian the of name the in died have who those to refer to (martyr) shuhada term the of use frequent the to related is problem Another greatly. differ thus can and definitions legal on based always not are why and acombatant or acivilian constitutes ( organizations various the from figures ualty c their to relation in especially victims, of zations categori varying The Conflicting classifications. access. to difficult is information of type this that admit organizations other the while members, Army Syrian of deaths the about information receives and government r SOHR Indeed, others. the from different cantly signifi are figures SOHR’s why reason the be may sources of range wider to a Access figures. similar VDC—report and SNHR as organizations—such opposition-aligned the of some why explain also may gatherers data primary as activists of use The activists. opposition are they if especially certificates), medical or (death documentation see Figures 2.10 and 2.11). Their notions of who who of notions Their 2.11). and 2.10 Figures see he majority of fatalities recorded in their data their in recorded fatalities of majority he efer to anyone who was killed by Assad’s gov Assad’s by killed was who anyone to efer Assad the in sources to access has eportedly elevant yet highly subjective term causes causes term subjective highly yet elevant ombat status, complicate assessments of cas of assessments complicate status, ombat uestion the impartiality of the information and and information the of impartiality the uestion ool of sources, such as witnesses or official official or witnesses as such sources, of ool ay be cut off from electricity or Internet access access Internet or electricity from off cut be ay

------63 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 64 180.2 deaths per 100,000 population. In stark Dramatic improvements in security levels may contrast, Syria’s average for the period 2007–12 also take hold in a short period of time, as was is 36.3, a figure mitigated by low rates from before the case in El Salvador. In 2009, the country’s the outbreak of civil war in 2011. The rate for 2004 homicide rate had reached 71 per 100,000 popu- 2015 is lower still, at 2.4 deaths per 100,000. lation; by 2012, this figure had dropped to 41 per 100,000, following a truce between El Salvador’s After Syria, the three countries with the next two major gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha and M-18 highest violent death rates for 2012—Honduras, (see Box 2.4). From 2011 to 2012 alone, the number Venezuela, and Swaziland—all experienced of homicides sank by more than 40 per cent, from increasing levels of lethal violence. In Honduras, 4,366 to 2,567 (IMLS, 2012; 2013; Sampó and the rate nearly tripled from 31.9 in 2004 to 90.4 Bartolomé, 2014; see Box 2.4). in 2012; meanwhile, the number of homicides ARMED VIOLENCE

of doubled from 3,200 deaths in 2007 to more than A few other countries also exhibited improve- 7,000 in 2012—a rate only surpassed by the Syrian ments in the period under review. In Sri Lanka, conflict deaths. Over the same period, Venezuela’s for example, lethal violence rates improved sub- violent death rate experienced a two-fold increase, stantially following the end of the conflict in 2009, from 37.0 to 72.2 (see Figure 2.13). In Swaziland, after which no further direct conflict deaths were the lethal violence rate more than doubled, from recorded. While the average annual violent death 21.4 to 49.2 deaths per 100,000 population rate for 2007–12 comprises the conflict period and GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014). thus stands at 30.4 per 100,000 population, the rate plummeted to 3.3 per 100,000 in 2012, dem- Following the military coup in Honduras that onstrating that peace pays significant dividends. deposed President Manuel Zelaya in 2009, the United States suspended counter-narcotics During the period 2004–12, Iraq also witnessed assistance. A ‘cocaine rush’ subsequently took a significant reduction in lethal violence. The year shape, giving rise to struggles for the control of 2006 was the most lethal during that period, with Honduran drug routes. The country’s ‘flow events’ close to 30,000 violent deaths, followed by 2007 shot up from 20 in 2000 to 233 in 2011, reflecting (Crawford, 2013, p. 3). However, in 2013 and 2014 the southward shift of the battle over cocaine the situation deteriorated dramatically. routes, which was partly brought about by Mexico’s Among the countries whose average lethal violence drug war (UNODC, 2012, pp. 19–20). Drug trafficking rate remained below 20 per 100,000 population is strongly associated with violence in Honduras, for 2007–12, a few have experienced significant particularly regarding territorial disputes over gains in security. In Uganda violence linked to routes, especially in border areas with Guatemala operations of the Lord’s Resistance Army as well and ports, which are some of the most lethal as to the ‘cattle wars’ in the Karamoja region areas in the world (UNODC, 2012, p. 70; ICG, decreased significantly over the period under 2014a). The recent upsurge in lethal violence in review. In 2004, Uganda’s violent death rate stood Honduras—where the violent death rate rose at 12.9 per 100,000 population. Lethal violence from around 70 per 100,000 in 2009 to more levels reached a low in 2012 (5.5) and the average than 90 per 100,000 in 2012—may reflect an rate for the years 2004–12 was 8.5—after a peak increase in such competition. at 12.2 deaths per 100,000 population in 2009. t 7, to on and then 10, to 14 from dropped had ures fig homicide daily truce, the of days afew Within ( concerns security widespread address to and wars gang of toll human the reduce to ways viable identify devil’—to the with ‘deal initiative—a controversial and abold on embarked had Salvador El 2011, in people 100,000 per 69.0 reached had that rate ahomicide of view In 2013). Figueroa, Ayala 2012b; 2012a; ( involved Munguía—were David minister, and justice security the representatives—including official that clear became it soon but place, taking were talks the denied sources government Initially, violence. in acutback for exchange M-18—in and Salvador El in truce gang he Salvatrucha Mara the gangs, prominent most Salvador’s El with atruce negotiating was government the that news the to up woke Salvadorans 2012, March 14 On B c a take to refused Cerén Sánchez Salvador didate can presidential left-wing grew, controversy the As 18). p. 2013, Whitfield, 2012; (Farah, robberies and extortion as such crimes, other in engaging while clandestinely more kill simply would gangs that arguing truce, the opposed had that groups Salvadoran strengthened discovery The 2014). (Robbins, disappearances of use discreet more the towards victims of display open the from away shifted had tactics war gang because only n the possibility: aworrisome raised Salvador San of outskirts the on grave amass in bodies membered dis 44 of discovery the 2013, December In however. sustained, been not have results positive These 2.12). Figure see 18; p. 2013, ( measures’ w gangs by committed homicides remaining the that ing argu minister justice and security the day—with free homicide- first its witnessed had country the Soon cent. per 60 by deaths reduced had truce the that claimed authorities Salvadoran days, 100 first the 2( to plummeted they facilities, by mid-2014, he had rejected the truce as president president as truce the rejected had he mid-2014, by he Monday after the transfer of gang leaders to new new to leaders gang of transfer the after Monday he lear position on the truce, fearing political fallout; fallout; political fearing truce, the on position lear umber of recorded homicides may have decreased decreased have may homicides recorded of umber ere according to their own ‘internal disciplinary disciplinary ‘internal own their to according ere ox 2.4 ox

Economist T El Faro El , 2012c; Farah, 2012; Whitfield, Whitfield, 2012; Farah, , 2012c; , 2012; Farah, 2012; IMLS, 2013). 2013). IMLS, 2012; Farah, , 2012; El Faro El , 2012c). Within Within , 2012c). El Faro El , - - - - o attacks coordinated well very of aseries with larly particu government, the on pressure increasing be to seemed gangs However, 2014). (COHA, country the of 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Number of monthly homicides 2013 vs. 2012 Figure Author: Matthias Nowak 269). p. 2014, (Wennmann, cesses’ pro transformation political and social broader in embedded be must ‘they however, sustainable, be to processes such For crime. of forms organized to related issues security solving for pathways suggests Salvador El in truce the aside, public Salvadoran the by reception its and negotiation the of complexity The 269). p. 2014, (Wennmann, negotiation’ and g the had died have would who today alive are dorans Salva 5,539 least ‘at setbacks, current the Despite a Martínez 2014; (Lindo, negotiating continue to istries min and officials government pressuring are gangs that but over, be may truce the that indicate reports recent most The killings. 32 least at perpetrated and Friday’ a‘Black announced country the in gangs Southern Pulse (2013) Pulse Southern Source:

nd Sanz, 2014). 2014). Sanz, nd ang violence not been curtailed through dialogue dialogue through curtailed been not violence ang n police patrols (Bargent, 2014). On 23 May 2014, 2014, May 23 On 2014). (Bargent, patrols n police 2012 Jan

2013 2013 2.12 Feb Mar

M onthly homicides in El Salvador, Salvador, El in homicides onthly Apr Truce May

Jun Month Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec - - - - 65 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 66 Libya had a lethal violence rate just above 3.0 per These changes are not necessarily linked to con- 100,000 population in 2004, and by 2012 that rate flict dynamics, as evidenced by rates of countries stood at 14.1. However, the country’s average rate with no recent or ongoing armed conflict, such as for 2004–12 was 34.6 violent deaths per 100,000 Honduras and Venezuela. 2015 population—due to the war, the subsequent In Figure 2.13, the explosive nature of the conflicts destabilization, and high levels of violence in 2011 in Syria and Libya is clearly reflected in the sharp and 2012. At the height of the conflict in 2011, increases to 180.2 and 276.5 violent deaths per the lethal violence rate in Libya peaked at 276.5 100,000 population, respectively. Both Honduras deaths per 100,000 population. This is the high- and Venezuela display steadily growing death est rate of violent deaths recorded in the entire rates, symptoms of their security crises. In con- database for the period 2004–12. trast, the trend lines of Afghanistan and Somalia ARMED VIOLENCE reveal volatility, with Afghanistan suffering marked

of Figures 2.13 and 2.14 reflect data for selected countries that experienced significant increases increases in the death rate while Somalia exhibits and decreases—more than 50 per cent in either strong fluctuations. direction—in lethal violence for the period 2004–12. Sudden eruptions of lethal violence are typically linked to armed conflict or episodes of political Figure 2.13 Countries with significant increases in violent death rates, violence; they tend to lead to a rapid deterioration 2004–12 of the security situation and can cause a high

GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL Afghanistan Honduras Libya Somalia Syria Venezuela Yemen number of violent deaths. Recent upheavals and extremist violence in Nigeria and Ukraine are tell- Average annual violent death rate per 100,000 population ing examples of how, within a few weeks, tensions 300 can escalate and generate large numbers of vio- 250 lent deaths. In Nigeria in early 2014, at least 1,500 200 people were killed in Boko Haram-related violence 150 (AI, 2014). Around the same time in Ukraine,

100 clashes in Kiev claimed 100 lives, while subse-

90 quent fighting elsewhere in the country caused as many as 5,000 deaths (Cumming-Bruce, 2014; 80 ICG, 2014b, p. 1). In mid-2014, Israel’s Operation 70 Protective Edge in Gaza claimed the lives of more 60 than 2,000 Palestinians, of which an estimated 69 50 per cent were civilians, as well as 64 soldiers of 40 the Israel Defense Forces (OCHA, 2014; Jerusalem 30 Post, 2014). 20 In some cases, security threats remain high fol- 10 lowing initial upheavals, as has been the case in 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Syria. In other cases, security can improve after

Note: For 2012, these countries had a violent death rate per 100,000 population that was at least a peak of violence linked to conflict and political twice as high as the lowest rate recorded for any given year in the period 2004–11. violence. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) political violence is exhibiting a ‘shift away from in Libya and Syria (see Figure 2.16 and Box 2.5). 2.16 Box and Figure (see Syria and Libya in wars ensuing and Spring Arab the to attributed be largely can deaths in rise The review. under period the of stages later the in especially increased, have to appears settings conflict in violence lethal trends, long-term of identification the for allow to aperiod short too covers series data the Although 100,000. per 10 deaths than less to plummeted Sudan’s rate Meanwhile, 2010–12. in 100,000 per deaths 30 averaging violence lethal of rates annual recorded which Sudan, South of independence of declaration 2010 the to is linked violence lethal of rate the in 3.3. Sudan’s to drop sinks rapidly rate Lankan Sri the whereas population, 100,000 per deaths 25 violent over just hover to seems Iraq in rate the 2010–12, In 2009. in Lanka Sri in and 2007 and 2006 in Iraq in as violence, in peaks intense followed gains these cases, some In review. under period the during point some at security human in gains significant from benefited 2.14 Figure in ones the 2.13, Figure in countries the Unlike p. 201). 2012, (Straus, resources’ vital to access to related violence local and violence electoral as such violence, political important but lethal less of forms other of a‘continuation as well as wars’, eral periph more to smaller, conflict armed large-scale than 74,000 deaths (see Figure 2.15). Between 2.15). Between Figure (see deaths 74,000 than more to doubled almost had figure this 2012 by yet 40,000, over just was deaths conflict direct of ber num global the 2010, In elsewhere. and Syria, Libya, Egypt, in crises and wars civil the to is attributable deaths conflict direct in rise the above, indicated As 2011). Secretariat, Declaration (Geneva 55,000 at stood which estimate, vious pre- the than higher significantly is thus 2007–12 period the for annually deaths conflict direct 70,000 of average The deaths. conflict direct for account to continue also Somalia and Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, in conflicts armed Ongoing - 9

- 2004–12 Figure review. under period the during deaths such in hike greatest cent—the per 85 approximately by increased deaths conflict direct 2012, and 2010 Source 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Global number of direct conflict deaths (thousands) Figure Source 2011. and 2004 between year given any for recorded rate highest the Note 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 Average annual violent death rate per 100,000 population Côte d’Ivoire Côte : For 2012, these countries and territories recorded violent death rates that were less than half half than less were that rates death violent recorded territories and countries these 2012, For 0420 0620 0820 0021 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 : Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) : Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) 2.14 2.15

Ecuador T C otal direct conflict deaths per year, 2004–12 year, per 2004–12 deaths conflict direct otal ountries with significant decreases in violent death rates, rates, death violent in decreases significant with ountries

Iraq

Russian Federation Russian

Sri Lanka Sri

Sudan

Uganda

67 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 68 B ox 2.5 Violent deaths and the Arab uprisings associated with violence against civilians has been high across During the first half of 2011, uprisings and popular protest spread the Middle East and North Africa (ACLED, 2014, p. 5). throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Protest movements According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 2015 and civil resistance, followed by varying reactions of governments, Project (ACLED), the dominant conflict events in Egypt, Morocco, ‘brought about unexpected transformations on the ground’ (Burgess and Tunisia have been riots and protests, while battles are most and Constantinou, 2013, pp. 365–67). Violent clashes between prevalent in Algeria and Libya (ACLED, 2014, p. 5). state forces and protestors have taken on different forms across the region and led to a variety of security concerns among men The cases of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are instructive in two ways: and women during and since the uprisings. first, in that different approaches were applied to record casualties and events and, second, in that different states of instability arose Initially, violent clashes between government forces and demon- in the aftermath of the uprisings (ACLED, 2014, p. 5; see Figure 2.16). strators often led to civilian deaths. These fatalities do not fit neatly

ARMED VIOLENCE into the standard data set categories of homicide or conflict deaths, In Tunisia, violence was initially limited and sporadic. Security of partly because the killings may not meet the minimum requirements forces appeared to do no more than contain the demonstrations— for armed conflicts (see Box 2.1). until it became clear that the challenge to the regime was serious (Johansson-Nogués, 2013, pp. 399–400). In times of regime change, state security structures are often weakened, while political factions and security agencies may be In the week prior to President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s ousting on absorbed in power struggles. Sustained collective violence is 14 January 2011, security forces killed at least 300 people and unusual during such transition periods, yet the physical security injured hundreds during mass demonstrations. As Amnesty Inter- of citizens has often been threatened by transition-related con- national reports, many ‘protesters were shot dead by security forces

GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL flicts (Gledhill, 2013, p. 709). Indeed, the proportion of fatalities using live ammunition’ (AI, 2012).

Figure 2.16 Quarterly conflict events and reported fatalities, January 2011–December 2013 Events Fatalities

Number of events Number of fatalities

1,200 2,400

1,100 2,200

1,000 2,000

900 1,800

800 1,600

700 1,400

600 1,200

500 1,000

400 800

300 600

200 400

100 200

0 0 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia Source: ACLED (2014, p. 1) departure (UCDP, n.d.b). n.d.b). (UCDP, departure Mubarak’s Hosni President after 62 fatalities and to prior fatalities 316 counts UCDP nevertheless, sets; data UCDP the in included not were Egypt in fatalities protest Tunisia, in case the was As 28). p. 2011, (AI, injured others 6,467 and killed been had people 840 least at ( Square Tahrir at demonstrations the of stages initial the in testors pro the against violence using from refrained army The peaceful. Egypt In i). p. 2013, (ICG, Tunisia in widespread been not have incidents such however, violence, Salafi of instances striking 6). p. Despite 2014, (ACLED, 2014 to 2010 from events conflict Tunisian of cent per 80 up made protests and riots that noting uprising’, the since averages pre-uprising their than higher much remained have unrest of levels A n.d.a). (UCDP, violence one-sided or violence, state-based flict, con- armed of categories the into fit not do that fatalities 86 ters regis it but sets, data its in demonstrations during perpetrated violence include not does Program Data Conflict Uppsala The Johansson-Nogués, 2013, p. 400). Yet, by the end of the uprising, uprising, the of end the by Yet, 400). p. 2013, Johansson-Nogués, CLED finds that ‘[w]hile conflict events spiked in January 2011, 2011, January in spiked events conflict ‘[w]hile that finds CLED , the beginning of the ‘25 January Revolution’ was mostly mostly was Revolution’ January ‘25 the of beginning , the - - C 2013. in resurgence asharp by marked but 2012, throughout and 2011 late in low relatively were Egypt in violence of levels The Hannah Dönges Dönges Author: Hannah 719). p. 2013, McQuinn, 4; p. 2014, (ACLED, institutions security weak of advantage take to sought a political among only not dynamics explosive potentially and bility ( conflict armed six-month the in killed been had people 30,000 least at that 2011 September in estimated Council National Transitional Libyan The widely. vary war civil subsequent Libyan the in deaths of number the of Estimates t exceeded far which events, conflict of number the in rise cant signifi by a reflected as force, military heavy with met were Egypt military operations. Yet they gradually increased, reflecting insta reflecting increased, gradually Yet they operations. military NATO-led the during witnessed levels fatality below remained 2013 and 2011 between deaths and events conflict of number The 2014). (Ploughshares, loyalists’ Gadhafi 3,300 to 2,200 and 7,500 to rebels 5,500 civilians, 7,000 to 5,000 including 17,800, to 12,700 ‘from range 2011 for fatalities Recorded hose of the previous peaks in January 2011 (ACLED, 2014, p. 5). 2014, (ACLED, 2011 January in peaks previous the of hose nd military actors, but also among local extremist groups that that groups extremist local among also but actors, military nd ountrywide demonstrations and a growing insurgency in eastern eastern in insurgency agrowing and demonstrations ountrywide © Hassan Ammar/AP Photo Photo Ammar/AP © Hassan 2013. July Egypt, Cairo, Morsi, Mohammed President ousted of opponents and supporters between Photo Two injured people are carried during clashes clashes during carried are people injured Two uprising and and uprising Haaretz

, 2011). , 2011).

- - 69 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 70 Furthermore, the updated version of the GBAV direct conflict deaths data set covers countries that had not previously recorded conflict-related fatalities. These include Libya and Egypt, where 2015 troops and pro-government armed groups opened fire and killed many people; Mali, which experi- enced an intervention and rebellion; Côte d’Ivoire, where post-electoral violence escalated into armed conflict; and South Sudan and Syria, where civil war erupted and intensified.

The country that suffered the highest number of ARMED VIOLENCE

of direct conflict deaths in 2004–12 is Iraq, with an estimated 110,000 total fatalities. During the same period, Pakistan witnessed the second highest number of deaths: 46,000. In Syria, 44,000 people were killed between March 2011 and the end of 2012 alone; in 2013, a year not under review in this edition of the GBAV, another 36,000 people

GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL met violent deaths in Syria (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014).

The number of conflict-related deaths in Iraq fell significantly after the upsurge in violence in 2006–07. Yet the number remained high and increased again in 2012 and 2013, such that the latter year was the deadliest in Iraq since 2008, with an estimated 8,868 deaths (7,818 civilians and 1,050 security personnel killed) (Salaheddin, 2014). In September 2013 alone, close to 1,000 people were killed in a surge of sectarian vio- lence and due to a spillover of the Syrian conflict (BBC, 2013).

In Afghanistan, the rate of violent deaths actually began to increase in 2009, underscoring that the

Photo  Residents look conflict was far from over. In particular, an increase on as French soldiers take in attacks and casualties in the Afghan military part in security operations and police drove direct conflict deaths upwards in response to unrest in Bangui, Central African (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013, p. 512). Republic, December 2013. © Miguel Medina/ Other conflicts and crises erupted in 2013 and AFP Photo 2014, but the recording and tallying of related 71 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 72 fatalities remains distinctly flawed, as evidenced Firearms and lethal violence by the cases of Mali and the Central African Repub- This edition of the Global Burden of Armed Vio- lic. In Mali, a military coup destabilized the politi- lence benefits from a marked improvement in the cal landscape in early 2012 and Tuareg rebels

2015 availability of nationally recorded and reported joined forces with Islamist militants to take over absolute values of firearm homicides across the the north of the country, triggering military inter- globe. The firearm homicide data set comprises vention by French (and Malian) soldiers in early a total of 175 countries and territories.10 Much of 2013 (Heisbourg, 2013; Théroux-Bénoni, 2013). the information gathered in the GBAV database As noted by the media, the height of the conflict is drawn from two types of sources: 1) national- was characterized by a general information black- level sources, including international repositories out, during which the collection and retrieval of based on national data, and 2) Global Burden of ARMED VIOLENCE data on conflict-related deaths was extremely 11

of Disease and other public health estimates. difficult (Marthoz, 2013). That lack of information is reflected in the underreporting of casualty fig- The estimates presented in this section are sub- ures for 2012, such as in the War Report 2012, which ject to substantial limitations as the focus of the records only 212 deaths for the year—a figure that data collection and analysis is on firearm-related remains difficult to verify (Casey-Maslen, 2013, homicide. Although some of the conflict-related p. 117). The sources consulted and compiled for data provides details about the use of firearms, the GBAV database record a total of 213 deaths conflict settings generally prove more difficult for GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL for Mali in 2012, which is very close to the War the gathering of such information. Consequently, Report estimate (see Box 1.4). this section is based mostly on homicide data provided by national records or reports, from In the Central African Republic, a coalition of rebel either public health or criminal justice sources. forces (Séléka) ousted President François Bozizé in 2013, triggering an escalation in violence. It should also be borne in mind that this edition Many of the rebel fighters reportedly engaged of the GBAV covers fatal events only. Due to this in serious human rights violations, such as mas- focus, the analysis excludes a wide range of vio- sacres and systematic rape (HRW, 2013b). After lent events whose outcomes are not fatal, such the rebel leader took over as the republic’s presi- as robberies at gunpoint12 and non-lethal gun- dent and dissolved the coalition, violence levels related injuries (see Box 2.6). increased again as reprisal attacks with an increas- An analysis of the data on the mechanisms of kill- ingly sectarian taint swept across the country. ings reveals that firearms remain the instruments In a very short period of time towards the end of that are most widely used to commit homicides 2013, an estimated 400–500 people were killed worldwide. Based on the data for the countries (HRW, 2013a, p. 6). and territories under review, this report finds Recording deaths in ongoing situations of conflict that close to half of all homicides are committed and civil unrest represents a challenging task. with a firearm (46.3 per cent), meaning that guns The data collection effort for the GBAV database are the mechanism of violence in about 174,600 intends to overcome some of the issues of updated homicide cases every year. Recent research shows information by integrating records from a wide that sharp objects such as knives and machetes range of sources. are used in about 24 per cent of all homicides, tion process, the above-mentioned number of of number above-mentioned the process, tion collec data the in weaknesses of ahost of view In p. 65). 2014, (UNODC, killings all of third estimated an for force—account physical and objects blunt means—including other all while Hannah Dönges and Matthias Nowak Matthias and Dönges Authors: Hannah year. each occur injuries firearms non-fatal 754,000 least at that suggests (377,000) homicides intentional for estimate GBAV the to rate fatality case average this Applying 3). p. 2013, Martino, De and Frate del (Alvazzi homicide every for injury non-fatal one roughly or cent, per 48 approximately is countries all for rate fatality case the available, is incidents firearms fatal and non-lethal both on data which for countries 26 the of rate fatality case average the on Based extrapolation. using estimated be can injuries firearm non-conflict intentional, for rate fatality case global average The wounds. their from die who victims gunshot of proportion the higher the rate, w other In 3). (p. violence’ firearm all for rate ity fatal case its higher the rate, homicide firearm ( time of amount certain a over injury of type cific p the of indicator arough provide to employed be can rate The incidents. firearm-related non-fatal and fatal between relationship the on A 1). p. 2013, Martino, De and Frate del (Alvazzi society’ and munities, com families, their survivors, on burden heavy a ‘place that recovery and treatment require can which injuries, firearm of consequences lethal c non-lethal homicide: eyond recorded and numbers homicide on based cally typi are violence armed of levels of Estimates violence firearm B t and countries 26 for available data of A review erritories indicates that ‘the higher a country’s acountry’s higher ‘the that indicates erritories Alvazzi del Frate and De Martino, 2013, p. 2). p. 2013, Martino, De and Frate del Alvazzi onflict deaths. Yet this approach excludes non- excludes approach this Yet deaths. onflict roportion of people who do not survive aspe survive not do who people of roportion nalysts use ‘case fatality rates’ to shed light light shed to rates’ fatality ‘case use nalysts ords, the higher a country’s firearm homicide homicide firearm acountry’s higher the ords, ox 2.6 ox

B

- - - - - killing people in conflict situations is available available is situations conflict in people killing in used mechanisms the on data some elusive, remains deaths firearm on data comprehensive Yet although collection. data to challenges of sets own their pose settings conflict above, noted As deaths. firearm-related of prevalence global the of calculations the in errors significant introduce thus can statistics tice jus- criminal and health public in Undercounting p. 15). 2014, Flom, and Lodola, (Fleitas, cides homi- or accidents, suicides, as classified be not deaths—could firearm of number total the of third one- than more comprise events—which latter the that meaning intentionality’, ‘unidentified of deaths firearm 1,050 afurther and homicides 1,787 include for 2009 deaths firearm-related on tistics sta health Argentina, In p. 114). 2011, Marsh, and (Jackson adeath’ of context the ‘misreport habitually members staff medical if severe be may counting under- sector, health public the In data. of ability reli- the weaken further underreporting and Mis- totals. national in cent per 3–5 of error an add potentially can they small, seem may ures fig- these p. 7). While 2013, (IMLS, Salvador El in total) the of cent 5per (roughly cases homicide 126 in killing of means the identify not do year same the for records n.d.). Similarly, Brazil, (MoH identified been not has mechanism the which for homicides) all of cent per 3.5 (roughly homicides 1,801 includes 2012 for data health public whose is Brazil, example One limitations. some with data, disaggregated publish countries other Still killings. perpetrate to used mechanisms by it disaggregate not do homicides on data publish do that countries certain Meanwhile, database. GBAV the in covered not are countries these a result, As reports. crime release they do nor morbidity, or mortality on data any produce not do world the in countries Many estimate. aconservative as treated be should homicides firearm-related annual - 73 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 74 from case studies. Analysis of this data shows 44.1 per cent of all violent deaths—were caused that the share and role of firearms are highly by firearms every year. This figure comprises dependent on the context and nature of a conflict, 174,600 firearm-related homicides (46.3 per cent including the types of armed actors, their access of all homicides) and 22,380 firearm-related direct 2015 to materiel, the capacity of weaponry used, and conflict deaths (32.3 per cent of all direct conflict the fighting strategy employed. deaths). The global firearm death rate for the period was thus 3.0 per 100,000 population The Lebanon war, for example, was conducted (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2014). largely via airstrikes and shelling, which is reflected in the low proportion of firearm deaths recorded Yet these global figures hide significant sub- in 2006; only 5 of 1,109 deaths—less than one- regional and national variations. Figure 2.17 shows half of 1 per cent—were due to firearms (HRW, regional variations for 2007–12. In Central Asia, ARMED VIOLENCE Eastern Europe, Eastern Asia, and Oceania, for

of 2007, pp. 172–78). In Gulu province, Uganda, however, 168 of 397 deaths—more than 40 per instance, only about 10 per cent or less of all homi- cent—resulted from gunshots in the period 1994–99 cides were firearm-related—a very low proportion compared to those of other sub-regions. Even in (Kreutz and Marsh, 2011, p. 51). These Ugandan Western Europe, which is among the sub-regions figures and data from other selected case studies with the lowest homicide rates in the world, listed in Table 2.1 suggest that close to one-third 26 per cent of homicides were firearm-related. of all direct conflict deaths around the world are In Southern Europe that rate stood at 40 per GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL firearm-related. cent, the highest in all European sub-regions, For the period 2007–12, this edition of the GBAV despite its low firearm homicide rate of 0.6 per estimates that almost 197,000 violent deaths—or 100,000 population (see Figure 2.17).

Table 2.1 Estimated firearm deaths in conflict settings

Location Total deaths Firearm deaths Firearm deaths as a share of total deaths (%)

Syria (child victims only; 10,586 2,806 26.5 30 months of the war, 2011–14)

Iraq (2012) 4,594 1,624 35.4

Croatia (1991–92) 4,339 1,463 33.7

Various conflicts 1,364 1,165 85.4 (June–October 2004)*

Gulu province, Uganda 397 168 42.3 (1994–99)

Lebanon (2006) 1,109 5 0.5

Total 22,389 7,231 32.3

Note: * The ‘various conflicts’ took place in Aceh, Algeria, Burundi, Chechnya, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Nepal, and Uganda. Sources: ICRC (1999, p. 10); Iraq Body Count (n.d.); Kreutz and Marsh (2011, p. 51); Kuzman et al. (1993); ORG (2013); Wille and Krause (2005) in violence associated with gangs and organized organized and gangs with associated violence in instrument important an are firearms that indicate may comparison This pp.90–93). 2011, tariat, Secre- Declaration (Geneva use firearms of share lower asomewhat with violence, family-related or partner- is intimate homicides for context mon com- most the Europe in contrast, In high. is also firearms with perpetrated homicides of share the where Americas, the in frequent more are cides homi crime-related organized and gang example, For firearms. of use the and contexts homicide to regard with emerge variations regional Additional 2012). (Gilgen, firearms with committed cides homi- of share the greater the rate, homicide the greater the that suggests regions two those for data Indeed, regions. Caribbean and American Latin the in correlated seem they although linked, necessarily not are rates homicide firearm of severity the and firearms with committed cides homi of proportion the that 2.17 highlights Figure firearm-related. homicides of portion pro- a small only is rate homicide firearm a high exhibits that sub-region no in Yet firearm-related. are homicides of proportions high Asia, eastern South- and Africa, Northern Europe, Southern in notably low, are rates homicide firearm where countries 2.2). some In Figure (see review under period the over violence lethal in increase est great the experienced that region is the Americas the that mind in kept be should It respectively. firearms, with committed are homicides of cent per 69.0 and 65.0 population, 100,000 per 28.8 22.5 and are rates homicide firearm the where America, Central in and Caribbean the In related. firearm- are homicides of cent 52.7 per population, of 10.3 rate 100,000 per homicide afirearm has which America, South In firearms. with committed homicides of proportions high as well as rates cide homi firearm high exhibit Americas the of regions sub- the all spectrum, the of end other the At - - - - related homicides, per sub-region, 2007–12 sub-region, per homicides, related Figure Central America Central Caribbean South America Africa Southern Middle Africa Africa Western America Northern Asia Southern Africa Eastern Asia Central Asia Western Africa Northern Asia South-eastern Europe Southern Europe Eastern Europe Western Oceania Asia Eastern Europe Northern used to commit homicide, Figure 2.18 excludes 2.18 excludes Figure homicide, commit to used means the on based data disaggregate countries of number alimited only Since threshold. that below rates homicide firearm exhibit sources data national available with territories and countries other the rate); death violent firearm-related global average the above or to (equal 2007–12 period the for people 100,000 per 3.0 least at of rate homicide firearm average an report that territories and the 20 countries shows figure The homicides. firearm of reports national on exclusively based 2.18 is Figure in presented ranking country The firearms. of presence the from stems that risk relative the assessing to is key violence lethal of contexts country-specific of standing under- an that underscores also It groups. crime Source Percentage of firearm-related homicide firearm-related of Percentage : Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) 2.17

A verage firearm homicide rate and percentage of firearm- firearm- of percentage and rate homicide firearm verage 01 20 15 10 5 0 01 20 15 10 5 0 Percentage of homicides that arefirearm-related Firearm homicide rate per 100,000 population

Firearm homicide rate homicide Firearm 25 03 40 35 30 45 05 065 60 55 50 25 035 30 075 70 75 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 76 Figure 2.18 Average firearm and non-firearm homicide rates, by country or territory, selected countries, 2007–12* Firearm homicide rate Non-firearm homicide rate

Honduras 2015 El Salvador Venezuela Jamaica Guatemala Colombia Belize South Africa Brazil Puerto Rico

ARMED VIOLENCE Bahamas

of Dominican Republic Panama Lesser Antilles Mexico Ecuador Nicaragua Paraguay Costa Rica United States GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75

Homicide rate per 100,000 population Note: * This graph features only countries whose firearm homicide rates were at least 3.0 per 100,000 population for the period under review and for which a national data source was available. Given the small population of the Lesser Antilles, the eight sovereign states of the region were grouped together and their rates averaged to produce a regional estimate. The countries in question are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014)

many parts of the world, especially countries in Africa and Asia. The fact that Latin American and Caribbean states provide quality data that is readily available may in part explain why they feature more prominently than other countries whose violence levels also appear to be high but whose data on

Photo  A forensic the mechanisms used in homicide is scarce. expert takes notes after an 18-year-old man was In total, 18 of the 20 countries in Figure 2.18 are stabbed to death during located in Latin America and the Caribbean. The a fight between two remaining two countries are South Africa (with a groups of youths in central London, December 2011. firearm homicide rate of 16.5 per 100,000 population) © Finbarr O’Reilly/Reuters and the United States (with a rate of 3.1 per 100,000 i used mechanism leading the represented arms fire Honduras, in 2012 In Americas. the of parts large in acts violent perpetrate to used commonly most weapon offensive the represent Firearms statistics. health and violence lethal and nives crime of basis the on measured is bottle, broken a or scissors as such weapons, bladed other and knives of use the with associated mortality The B Author: Irene Pavesi deaths. violent of burden global the to contribution their understand to necessary is violence lethal in knives of role the into research Further 2014). al., et Hilal 2014; (BBC, China in particularly place, take to continue stabbings mass firearms, involving killings mass to attention much devoted have may media Western the While 17). p. 2013, (AIC, cent per 24 or rate, that half about was murder of a commission the in firearms of use the victims; their all of cent) per (47 half almost kill to knives used murderers 2011, in Australia In 2013). (Scotland, 1man only kill to used was afirearm while 2012–13, in 3women and men 23 kill to used were instruments sharp total, In fi contrast, in country; the in violence lethal of tims vic all of half about kill to used are objects sharp that suggest Scotland from statistics crime Recent 2012). (Berman, 2010–11 period the in victims female of 39.3 cent per and victims male of cent per 35.2 for accounted instruments sharp 2.3). fig Specifically, 2014, Office, (Home women and men both kill to used method main the represented which instruments, sharp involved cases homicide all of one-third than more instance, for 2012–13, in Kingdom United the In killings. of proportion alarge commit to used are weapons bladed Oceania, and Asia, Europe, as such Americas, the of outside regions In 2012). (FBI, afirearm with out carried were cent per 69 while instruments, sharp or knives with committed were murders of cent per 12 States, United the in period same the In 3). p. 2013, (IUDPAS, cases of cent 9per only for responsible n causing violent deaths, while blades were were blades while deaths, violent n causing rearms are used in less than 2 per cent of cases. cases. of cent 2per than less in used are rearms ox 2.7 ox

K - - 77 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 78 population). Based on the data available for this and territories for which data is available. The review, Honduras had both the highest average location of each point in the graph is determined rate of lethal violence for the period 2007–12 by a country’s average annual homicide rate per (73.4 deaths per 100,000 population) and the 100,000 population and by the percentage of 2015 highest firearm homicide rate for the same period homicides committed with firearms during the (60.1 per 100,000 population). period 2007–12.

The category of non-firearm homicides comprises As discussed below, correlations are a contested incidents involving the use of other instruments, area of research. Nevertheless, Figure 2.19 such as those referred to as ‘bladed weapons’, shows a clustering of data points. First, numer- which include knives and other sharp objects, ous data points are grouped together tightly in such as broken glass. The United Kingdom is one the bottom left corner of the graph—where both ARMED VIOLENCE country in which these instruments are of particu-

of the homicide rates and the proportion of homi- lar relevance (see Box 2.7). cides committed with firearms are low. Many of Figure 2.19 correlates homicide rates with the these data points represent countries in Western proportion of firearm homicides for 175 countries and Northern Europe, regions characterized by

Figure 2.19 Average annual homicide rate per 100,000 population and percentage of homicides committed with firearms for 175 countries and territories, 2007–12 GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL Percentage of homicides committed with firearms

100

90

80

70

60

50 Trendline

40

30

20

10

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Homicide rate per 100,000 population

Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2014) 2012, pp. 136–37). pp. 136–37). 2012, (Jaynes, level national the below coverage vides pro- data the that noted be should it although objects, sharp by caused are deaths violent of cent per 42 that indicates data its why; to as hint a offers System Surveillance Mortality Injury National The firearms. with committed are cides homi- of cent 50per most at that shows sistently con- data Service Police African South Indeed, used. violence of mechanism the as firearms of involvement low arelatively with violence of incidence high arelatively show Swaziland—and and Africa, South region—Lesotho, African Southern the in countries to correspond points data These firearms. with committed are cides homi- of cent per 60 than fewer but 100,000) per ( high is very rate homicide the where countries represent points data afew line, trend the below abit area, graph the of centre the Near afirearm. with committed were which of all respectively, cide, homi- of cases five registered each Montenegro and Maldives the example, for 2008, and 2007 In firearms. with committed homicides of portion pro the up drive dramatically can cases homicide several or one in afirearm of use the countries, these In low. very or low are rates homicide while firearms with perpetrated are homicides of percentages large where countries represent example, for corner, left top the in points data The categories. two these of either into neatly fit not do points data of groups Yet some 2012). (Gilgen, unusual not are rates elevated such where countries, Caribbean and American Latin represent points data these of Many firearms. with committed homicides of shares and rates homicide increasing of direction the in it, above line, trend the to parallel run to seems points data of group Another rates. low such ≥ 30 deaths deaths 30

- to establish. is difficult correlation the of causality the rates, homicide and firearms to access between link a be to appear does there while that suggests literature the of chapter,areview this of scope the is beyond debate the of exploration an While 2010). Restrepo, and (Aguirre lence vio- armed and firearms to access on controls, and laws restrictive more of introduction the as such legislation, firearms of effects the assessing involves p. approach 182). A third 2004, Wille, and (Florquin firearms of absence the in violence of tools or means other seek would actors whether asking question, substitution the on focuses second The violence. deters or increases arms fire- to access easy that hypothesis the testing question, accessibility the around revolves first The approaches. research broad three into ized organ be can relationship this around debate The contested. remain firearms of accessibility the to deaths violent link to efforts above, mentioned As firearms. with committed are homicides of proportion agreater countries, affected highly in 100,000; per 30 above increases rate the as stronger appear links the Conversely, population. 100,000 20 per below drop rates homicide the as weak be to seem firearms with perpetrated homicides of tion propor the and rates homicide between links Any de Mello, 2014; Restrepo and Villa, 2011). Villa, and Restrepo 2014; Mello, de Pinho and (Cerqueira homicides of levels overall and homicides firearm of rate the in in decreases ushered have Colombia in ban agun-carrying and Brazil in Statute Disarmament the Specifically, changes. legislative to responsive are violence lethal of rates high from suffer that environments that confidence relative with indicate legislation firearms of impact the of assessments Yet recent firearms. illicit to access about information cient insuffi by and accessibility, and holdings arms fire- on especially data, disaggregated to access 13 Studies are hampered by limited limited by hampered are Studies - - - 79 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 80 In contrast, attempts to identify relationships Among these countries, the average rate of lethal between firearm violence and firearm possession violence is decreasing, confirming that already low through cross-national comparisons have yielded levels of violence are continuing to fall. inconclusive results. Possession rates are compara-

2015 Improvements in security levels are also appar- tively low in Latin America, even with estimates ent in countries that were previously affected by on illicit firearms holdings taken into considera- high or very high levels of violence (20 or more tion: in 2007, these rates stood at 4.7 per 100 deaths per 100,000 population). Specifically, the persons in the Caribbean, 6.8 in Central America, past decade has seen marked reductions in the and 12.1 in South America. The possession rate rates and levels of lethal violence in Colombia, in Western Europe is much higher at 24.9 per the Russian Federation, and South Africa. Yet 100, yet the homicide rate is considerably lower other countries, such as Brazil, have maintained ARMED VIOLENCE than in Latin America (Gilgen, 2012, p. 32). In

of high levels of lethal violence over extended peri- this context the United States appears as an ods of time. anomaly: although it has the highest possession rate in the world (88.8 firearms per 100 persons), Still other parts of the world have experienced its homicide levels are relatively low—although severe volatility in terms of lethal violence. In they are very high when compared to those of Syria and Libya, relatively sudden eruptions of European countries with similar income levels lethal violence resulted in high numbers of direct conflict deaths—the only category of violent deaths

GLOBAL BURDEN BURDEN GLOBAL (Karp, 2007). that registered an increase in the period under review. Meanwhile, lethal violence rates in some countries that are not experiencing armed con- Conclusion flict—such as Honduras and Venezuela—have The availability of quality data on lethal violence been rising, reaching levels characteristic of coun- is increasing, as revealed by the data available for tries at war. Although the 18 countries with the the period 2004–12. Not only does that tendency highest violent death rates in 2007–12 account facilitate more refined analyses and more accurate for only 4 per cent of the global population, they estimates, but it should also serve to enhance witnessed almost one-quarter of the lethal vio- efforts to measure and monitor progress towards lence in the world. a goal for achieving peaceful and inclusive socie- For a country that has experienced repeated ties within the post-2015 development framework. cycles of violence, the escape to a ‘virtuous cycle’ The data shows that in most parts of the world may require complex, time-consuming steps to lethal violence is either decreasing, or low and build resilience. As the World Development Report stable, as reflected in a slight decrease in the 2011 highlights, such steps include restoring average global number of violent deaths per confidence in collective action, transforming the year, which dropped from 526,000 for the period institutions that provide security, and reducing 2004–09 to 508,000 for 2007–12. The majority the risk that external stresses can pose to the of countries and territories—137 of the 189 under process (World Bank, 2011, p. 103). A thorough review—exhibit very low or low rates of lethal vio- understanding of the factors that drive lethal lence (below 10 deaths per 100,000 population). violence is essential in these types of structural VDC UCDP SOHR SNHR NIAC IHL G ACLED List of abbreviations decline. to continue will rate death violent global the that ensure to designed cies poli informing to is key understanding better That practices. recording and gathering data enhanced thus and data, of disaggregation further requires rates— death violent high very by affected areas in world—especially the around violence lethal in play firearms role the of understanding A better 2013). (Moloeznik, security of militarization the on heavily rely still gangs and crime organized of impact the reduce and prevent to policies where Mexico, in case the been has as promising, than less prove results if adjusted be should approaches policy time, same the At levels. international and regional, national, the at programming and policy-making inform better to least not settings, ‘peaceful’ so-called in violence lethal of analysis and monitoring, coverage, media the up stepping for case astrong build chapter this in presented findings The conflicts. armed of settings outside occur to continue world the in deaths violent Most 2012). (Stamatel, democracy to transitions levels dropped significantly followingtumultuous violence and crime whose states, Europe Eastern several in case the was as swiftly, obtained be sometimes can security in Gains is high. violence or conflict renewed of risk the if especially processes, BAV

V U S S Non-int Int Globa Armed C yrian Network for Human Rights yrian Observatory for Human Rights iolation Documentation Center ppsala Conflict Data Program ernational humanitarian law l Burden ofArmed Violence ernational armedconflict onflict Location & Event Data Project

- 12 11 10 9 8 7 5 4 3 2 or afull presentation of the‘unified approach’, seeGeneva 1 Endnotes 6

deaths database, seeIHME (n.d.). www.genevadeclaration.org. more details, seetheonline methodological annexe at Antilles region, which is counted as one‘country’. For cides for 183 countries andterritories, including theLesser www.genevadeclaration.org. For details, seetheonline methodological annexe at flict orasevere crisis that results inahighnumberof deaths. registers 35‘focus countries’ as experiencing armedcon- Sudan, and Sri Lanka. Belize, Syria, Côte d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, South Africa, South Swaziland, Guatemala, Colombia, Somalia, Lesotho, Iraq, rates, Honduras, El Salvador, Venezuela, Jamaica, Libya, annexe at www.genevadeclaration.org. and theavailability of data, seetheonline methodological www.genevadeclaration.org. details, seetheonline methodological annexe at discusses atotal of 189 countries andterritories. For each of these regions as one‘country’; this chapter thus populations below 100,000, however, this study counts Since countries intheLesser Antilles andMicronesia have can sustain military operations (ICRC,2008,p. 3). possess armedforces under acommand structure that non-governmental groups involved intheconflict must against insurgents. To meet the‘minimumof organization’, the government uses military force, instead of thepolice, hostilities inaconflict are collective in nature, orwhen declaration.org. see theonline methodological annexe at www.geneva F 2008, p. 32). porary armedconflicts (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, there are at least four indirect conflict deaths in contem- The GB Declaration Secretariat (2011,pp. 44–51). F ies involving firearms (Fleitas, Lodola, andFlom,2014, p. 9). Latin America andtheCaribbean have been victims of robber demonstrates that 4.9 percent of theentire population of The pr F The GB F The 18c F The GB F A ‘minimuml or additional information ontheGBAV database, sources, or theGlobal Burden of Disease firearms-related violent or theperiodunder review, theconflict deaths database or details, seeGeneva Declaration Secretariat (2012). or details onthesources used in theGBAV database, oportion of suchoportion crime is not negligible. Research AV database contains information onfirearm homi- AV database covers 201countries andterritories. AV 2008finds that for each direct conflict death, ountries are, indecreasing order of violent death evel of intensity’ can bereached whenthe

- 81 2 3 4 5 1 LETHAL VIOLENCE UPDATE 82 13 See, for example, Aguirre and Restrepo (2010); Cerqueira —. 2013. ‘Iraq Violence: Police Killed in Anbar Attacks.’ 22 October. and Pinho de Mello (2014); Florquin and Wille (2004); Jackson and Marsh (2011); Killias and Markwalder (2012); —. 2014. ‘China Mass Stabbing: Deadly Knife Attack in Kunming.’ and Restrepo and Villa (2011). 2 March. 2015 Beall, Jo, Tom Goodfellow, and Dennis Rodgers. 2013. ‘Cities and Conflict in Fragile States in the Developing World.’ Urban Bibliography Studies. Special Issue, Introduction: Cities, Conflict and State Fragility in the Developing World, May, pp. 1–19. ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project). 2014. SG/4304. Amended 3 April 2014. London: House of Commons. Aguirre, Katherine and Jorge Restrepo. 2010. ‘El control de

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