flmnfc. 38011 3167

SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the 8th of JULY, 1947 published by

Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 10 JULY, 1947

NORWAY CAMPAIGN, 1940. H. R. H. Vaughan, Secretary, and Lieutenant- Commander The Hon. D. C. Cairns, Flag The following Despatch was submitted to the Lieutenant and Signal Officer. Lord's Commissioners of the Admiralty on My impression on leaving London was quite the ijth July, 1940, by Admiral of the Fleet clear that it was desired by H.M. Government the Earl of Cork and Orrery, G.C.B., to turn the enemy out of Narvik at the earliest G.C.V.O., Flag Officer, Narvik. possible moment and that I was to act with all ,Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships promptitude in order to attain this result. the following Report upon the recent operations in the Narvik Area of Northern Norway. 2. On April i2th, I embarked in H.M.S. AURORA and sailed at noon for the Narvik SECTION I. area. After an uneventful passage, Skjelfiord was reached at 2000, April I4th. PRELIMINARY STAGES. 3. It had been the original intention to pro- i. On the afternoon of Wednesday, April ceed to Harstad where, as already stated, the loth, I received a message that the First Sea G.O.C. Troops was on passage, as was also the Lord would like to see me and was informed by Military Convoy. him that a combined expedition was to be sent This destination was changed, however, on to Narvik and that I was to go in charge of the receipt of a signal from Vice-Admiral W. J. Naval force, etc. I then accompanied him to a Whitworth, C.B., D.S.O., flying his flag in meeting of the Service Ministers and Chiefs of WARSPITE, in which ship he had carried out Staff where .the whole matter was discussed. his successful raid on the German naval forces On the same evening, I attended a further in Narvik Waters on April I3th. meeting in the First Sea Lord's room on the sub- 4. In this message appeared this sentence: — ject. " I am convinced that Narvik can be taken I' was then informed that Captain L. E. H. by direct assault now without fear of meeting Maund was to go as my Chief Staff Officer, the serious opposition on landing. I consider that officer I had asked for not being available. the main landing force need only be small but Captain Maund who was present at the meet- that it must have the support of Force B or ing left by 'plane .the same night for Scapa, one of similar composition ..." there to join the SOUTHAMPTON, which ship was conveying Major-General P. J. Mackesy, 5. In order to take immediate advantage of C.B., D.S.O., M.C., appointed to command the this situation, I made the following signal: — Military force, to Harstad, in Vaagsfiord, " AURORA and SOUTHAMPTON are to selected as the Military Base. arrive at Skjelfiord by 2000 today, Sun- On the afternoon of Thursday, April nth, day ..." I saw the First Lord for a few minutes, and left 350 soldiers had been embarked in the same night for Rosyth, accompanied by SOUTHAMPTON and it was hoped .that during Commander A. G. V. Hubback and my per- the night it anight be possible to organise a sonal staff—(Temporary) Paymaster-Captain landing force with these troops and seamen and SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

marines of WARSPITE, SOUTHAMPTON, meant that the Navy had a very large area to AURORA, PENELOPE and disabled de- protect against submarines and aircraft, while stroyers. at the same time maintaining offensive patrols to harass the enemy in the region of Narvik 6. Owing, however, to the difficult W/T con- itself. A chart accompanies this report so that ditions peculiar to this region, the message was distances involved and the geographical lay-out not received by the SOUTHAMPTON until too of the campaign may be appreciated. The pro- late to take action, and her whereabouts were tection of Skjelfiord where the PENELOPE and ftot ascertained until communicated by Ad- other damaged ships lay, and had to be miralty, from whence also was received a mes- rendered seaworthy, was a commitment until sage in which appeared : — loth May. " We think it imperative that you and General should be together and act together 2. The unloading of transports was a con- and that no attack should be made except in tinual difficulty. There were but two wharves concert ..." at Harstad and the average rate of discharge was 2 ships in 5 days. Disembarkation of per- 7. The AURORA proceeded for Harstad, sonnel was done for the most part while ships meeting the Troop Convoy carrying the 24th were in Bygden anchorage and to facilitate this Brigade, etc., off the entrance to And Fiord and work PROTECTOR and destroyers had to be leading it into harbour on the morning of the used. Large numbers of local craft were hired for this and other water transport purposes in When approaching the anchorage with the the whole area of the operations but were not Destroyers BRAZEN (Lieutenant-Commander always reliable as, upon sound of an air raid Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, Bt.) and FEAR- warning, they scattered away into the fiords and LESS (Commander K. L. Harkness) acting as took a considerable time to return afterwards. A/S screen, the latter obtained a contact with During the 8 weeks of the operations there were and both smartly engaged and sank U.49, the over 140 air raids in Harstad causing a con- crew being rescued practically intact. siderable loss of time and work. A withdrawal of the warning system resulted in a strike 8. The Convoy was anchored in Bygden among the Norwegian labourers and small craft Fiord and disembarkation carried out at once. men. The subject of A/A measures and pro- This operation was subjected to an air attack tection is dealt with in a separate chapter of the same afternoon, and again on April i6th but this report. In addition to the landing at no damage was sustained. Harstad, troops were put ashore at Salangen in The transports sailed for the U.K. in the Sagfiord on the I5th April and contact was early hcurs of April I7th. made with Norwegian forces in that area. Ad- 9. The disembarkation was effected by use of vance southward was effected from both places; Destroyers and large numbers of local craft the Headquarters of the 24th Brigade being (small steamers and motor fishing ketches called established at Bogen in Ofotfiord later. ." puffers "). Later, in order to expedite matters, the 3. Instead of attempting to take Narvik by PROTECTOR (Captain W. Y. la R. Beverley) assault it was decided for reasons that have was used, and thus began a career of extreme been reported separately to cany out a bom- bardment in the hope that the nerve of the usefulness carried out with conspicuous zeal. enemy already reported affected, might be so 10. On April I5th, I met General Mackesy shattered thereby thatuhe would surrender the for the first time and was astonished to hear town. The expected thaw had not come and that not only was his force embarked as for a the snow still lay everywhere several feet thick, peaceful landing and consequently was unready- rendering movement very difficult by any but for immediate operations but that the orders he experienced and specially equipped troops. The had received, and given to him just prior to AURORA (Captain Louis Hamilton), was sailing, ruled out any idea of attempting an established as Senior Officer in Ofotfiord and opposed landing. Thus the General and my- with the ships under his orders maintained a self left the U.K. with diametrically opposite steady and harassing pressure on the enemy. views as to what was required. The (bombardment took place cm 24th April; n. The arrangement of the remainder of my EFFINGHAM (in which I was accompanied by report is as follows: — General Mackesy and Brigadier Fraser), WAR- Section II. Proceedings from isth April SPITE, AURORA, ENTERPRISE, ZULU to 23rd May, together with an account of taking part. The bitter weather conditions, relations with the Norwegian Government. heavy snowstorms and low visibility prevented Section III. A/ A Protective Measures. any aerial activity on either side. Troops were Section IV. The Development of the Base carried in the VINDICTIVE in case the morale Defences. of the defenders should appear to be so affected Section V. A Summary of the Events in as to give a promising opportunity to land. The the Mosjoen-Mo-Bodo Area. climatic conditions were, however, entirely Section VI. The Final Operations for the against any such undertaking and the low visi- Capiture of Narvik. bility entirely prevented any estimate of the Section VII. The Evacuation. effect achieved by the bombardment. 4. On the 25th April there was further heavy SECTION II fall of snow and, as weather conditions com- pelled postponement of any direct attack on PROCEEDINGS FROM 15111 APRIL TO 23RD MAY Narvik, attention was given to movements of TOGETHER WITH AN ACCOUNT OF RELATIONS troops designed to bring pressure on the enemy WITH THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT. to the north and south of the Narvik peninsula. i. The use of Harstad—itself on an island— Ballangen on the south side of Vestfiord was as Military Headquarters and main point of dis- occupied on the 26th. The first French troops embarkation for military personnel and stores were disembarked on the 28th; two Battalions SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 3169 to Salangen in Sagfiord and one Battalion at ip. Two Battalions of Polish troops march- Bogen. I discussed the position with the British ing from Bogen reinforced the Foreign Legion and French Generals and the latter (General during the day. Enemy aircraft did not appear Bethouart) accompanied me in CODRINGTON during the operation. The French were able to reconnoitre Narvik and Herjangs Fiord. to get into Oydejord almost at once. 5. On the agth April, two weeks after our ii. At a conference on my return to Harstad arrival in the area, there appeared the first reli- on the I3th May, General Auchinleck informed able signs of the long awaited thaw and I could me that he had received orders from the War look forward to the conduct of operations with- Office that he was to assume command of all out the tremendous handicap of snow. On this Military Forces forthwith. day the A.L.C.s* and M.L.C.s* brought out 112. The next military objective was to obtain in the EMPIRE ABILITY were disembarked control of Rombaks Fiord so as to prepare the and started a career of remarkable usefulness, way for a direct attack on Narvik from 6. Affairs to the southward, in the Mosjoen, Oydejord. FAME (Commander. P. N. Walter) Mo and Bodo areas began to attract attention conducted the Naval part of this work in most at this time. They form the subject of a tireless and efficient manner. separate chapter of this report. 13. An account of the actual final operations 7. On May ist, I visited Ofotfiord in for the occupation of Narvik forms a separate EFFINGHAM and a bombardment was carried chapter of this report. out by AURORA, RESOLUTION and 14. Contact was maintained throughout the EFFINGHAM partly in support of troops skir- operation with the Norwegian High Command mishing in the Ankenes area. The thaw had who were naturally very concerned about the now set in so certainly that I ordered plans to withdrawal of troops from South Norway. The be prepared for a direct attack upon Narvik to Norwegians realised that their forces were not be staged for May 8th but, for reasons reported properly armed for modern warfare and they separately, this never materialised. made repeated requests for artillery, especially 8. On May 3rd, the French Foreign Legion A/A, for the defence of Tromso and North (2 Battalions) and the Polish Brigade arrived Norway and also to equip the large number of and on May 5th Rear Admiral A. L. St. G. coasting vessels upon whose movement up and Lyster arrived and assumed control of the down the coast depends .the life of the country. defences and development of the bases. On May These requests I passed on to the Admiralty 6th, the first 3.7 in. A.A. guns (8 in number) for H.M. Government but the Norwegians, who arrived. seemed to imagine that immense reserves of •guns and ammunition, etc., were readily avail- 9. Plans were now developed for a landing able in England, could not understand why by the French at Bjervik. Originally intended their requests were not immediately complied for the night of loth-nth May, this actually with. To ease matters I authorised the issue took place on the night of I2th-i3th. The to them of all the war material, not required forces employed were the two Battalions of the by the Army, taken in .the captured German Foreign Legion and the Military operations Transport ALSTER which was sent to Tromso were conducted by General Bethouart who was on the 23rd April to discharge accordingly; to with me in the EFFINGHAM, as was also meet Article 39 of the Naval Discipline Act, Lieutenant-General- C. J. E. Auchinleck who .the British Consul at Tromso was asked to had just arrived from England. The night watch the discharging and make an affidavit was cold with low clouds but, except for 2 hours of goods handed over; a copy of this affidavit of twilight, daylight lasted throughout. The was sent to the Secretary of the Admiralty troops were embarked off Ballangen, together later. with tanks, f After retiring to the westward to mislead the enemy, the Squadron turned and 15. Towards the end of the period under steamed for a position at the entrance to report dt was possible, but only with the Herjangs Fiord where troops were placed in the greatest difficulty and taking risks, to spare boats from which they were to land. The actual 4 heavy and 4 light A/ A guns for the protection landing was prefaced by an effective bombard- of Tromso. ment (EFFINGHAM, AURORA, RESOLU- 116. On 2'6th May, I met Admiral Diesen, the TION and Destroyers taking part), after which Norwegian Naval Commander-in-Chief, and the 3 A.L.C.s and 2 M.L.C.s landed the first the same day also General Ruge, the Military flight in most spirited fashion in face of an CommanderHin-Chief. Two days later, I was appreciable amount of rifle and machine-gun able to meet Sir Cecil Dormer, H.B.M. Minister fire. The conduct of the soldiers of the Foreign to Norway, on his way to Tromso from Legion, their prompt movements and good England. training that was evident from their action, were much admired. The first flight and supports 17. On 23rd May I went .by Walrus aircraft were followed by open boats towed by ships' to Storsteinnes and there met the British Minis- power boats which landed their men without ter, Sir Cecil Dormer, Colonel Pollock, British any untoward incident. The whole operation Military Liaison Officer, Admiral Boyes, Naval went off very well and at 0600 on the I3th Attache, and .General Rug6, Norwegian Com- General Bethouart and his staff landed. He mander-in-chief; the latter informed me he informed me that he no longer required the sup- had been appointed in command of all the port of H.M. Ships beyond those normally on Norwegian Defence Forces. patrol in that area. 18. From there, I proceeded in company with General Ruge and Colonel Pollock to visit His * Admiralty footnote:—A.L.C. s and M.L.C. s—Minor Landing craft for landing troops and mechanized Majesty The King, whom I found living some vehicles respectively. miles out (i£ hours in car) in a fishing lodge, f Admiralty footnote :—This was the first occasion on approached by a muddy path. The Crown which tanks were landed in a combined operation. Prince was with him. I spent about £ hour A2 3170 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 with His Majesty. He told me he knew what Tjeldsundet passage. The tlaaw was late this I had come about and that I was going to year and it was the 30th April before I was see his Ministers. The object of my visit was sore it had commenced. The flying boat to obtain the authority of the Norwegian Gov- " Cabot " brought Wing Commander Atchefley ernment for (i) far more drastic control in to the area on the 4th May and he then took the military areas over the civilian population charge of the finding and development of aero- and the innumerable small steamers and dromes both to the north and to the south. " puffers" navigating the fiords, etc., and 2. Heavy snowstorms and bad weatther in the- upon which the Me and communications of early period interfered with good work by the the people largely depended; (2) closer col- FURIOUS but her aircraft operated to- their laboration .between Civil 'Government and full capacity at every opportunity. She was British 'Military Authorities to make .this control recalled on April 23rd to re-equip, having then effective. Colonel Pollock had already dis- only eight aircraft fit for service. The urgent cussed the subject with General Ruge", who need for A/A artillery was emphasised in a was understanding and sympathetic and under- telegram to the Admiralty on April 25th. took to insist to the Government that action in .this respect was essential. General Rug6 left 3. After the evacuation of Namsos and Aatndalsnes, the -enemy tair attajcjks in tihe me to go to his Headquarters when I arrived Narvik Vest Fiord and Vaags Fiord areas -were at the King's residence. intensified and the stationing of H.M. Ships '19. On leaving His Majesty J drove back with good A/A Batteries in each area where with Sir Cecil Dormer to Storsteinnes from merchant ships were anchored or troops work- where I flew to Tromso and saw .the Prime ing became more than ever necessary. The Minister, Ministers for Defence, and for Foreign enemy steadily developed the supplying and Affairs. The three Ministers also were cordial reinforcing of bis troops in Narvik by means and friendly, and promised that these matters of troop carrying flying boats and by the should ibe closely gone into—and a Govern- method of parachutes. Minelaying was also* ment representative sent to Harstad to arrange frequently suspected but not actually proved details. This conference was somewhat rudely •until May 2gth; when five enemy aircraft were put an end to by an air attack aimed at seen to do so in Tjeldsundet. Sweepers in- DEVONSHIRE in the harbour. They had vestigated and four mines were exploded. ionly returned to Tromso that day, and the 4- On April 30th, I was informed by the ^attack that evening was unfortunate. I also Admiralty that 48 3.7 in. H.A. Guns and isaw Admiral Diesen on .the subject of the con- 48 Bofors (making 60 in all with 12 already "Itrol afloat wjio undertook to do everything in the area) were to be sent, as A/A protection .necessary. Vice-Admiral Cunningham had was of primary importance and .two A/A ^already taken the matter up with him and Cruisers were also ordered to join me on com- accompanied me to .this meeting. The Nor- pletion of certain other operations. The next wegian .Ministers mentioned the need for A/A day, as if to emphasise the matter, the enemy :artillery and equipment for their troops and •obtained a direct hit on the building used for .also the necessity of refitting their ships which Naval accommodation in Harstad, fortunately 'they had understood the British authorities killing only two ratings. At the same time they would be able to arrange. The Norwegian bombed the Hospital Ship ATLANTIS Ministers showed every intention of being help- anchored wide away from all other ships and ful and anxious to continue the fight, but they a Norwegian Hospital ..iShip, causing many were not unnaturally concerned about the un- casualties in the latter. avoidable delay in meeting their requirements 5. The lateness of the thaw caused a depres- .on these points. sing delay in the preparation of aerodromes.. I had hoped that Bardufoss would be ready SECTION III by the I5th May, in which case Carriers with the necessary aircraft would have left England ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE MEASURES on the nth May but on the 4th May I had i. The enemy commenced attacks by air on to report that the snow was causing insuperable the day that the first convoy arrived and con- delays. Concerning the preparation and use tinued throughout the period of the campaign. of Bardufoss, considerable tact was necessary When, after the withdrawal of our forces from in dealing with the Norwegians, as they firmly South Norway, enemy was able to develop air wished to keep it under their control. The bases in Trondheim and other places the attacks acceptance of Norwegian pilots and other air greatly increased in intensity and frequency. personnel for training in England did much to Our fighter craft of the Fleet Air Arm and bring a convenient working arrangement into Royal Air Force, in those periods when they force. were available, wrought great havoc among the 6. The first 3.7 in. A/A Guns arrived in the enemy and afforded a very welcome relief. area on the 6th May. Bofors Guns reached From the earliest days the establishment of Bardufoss on the 7th. Four of the 3.7 in. aerodrome's was a major preoccupation, but at Guns were in action at Harstad on the Qth and the beginning, the land all being covered by the other four were on their way to Bardufoss. three or more feet of snow, the problem pr&- Men 'bombed on shore could now begin to feel snnted unusual difficulties. The Norwegian that they had some chance of hitting back; a authorities reported Bardufoss as having been psychological factor of considerable importance. used by Gladiators. Lieutenant Francklin, R.N. (F.A.A.) organised much of the pre- 7. The ARK 'ROYAL joined and was able to liminary work in clearing this and also a .suit- commence operations from a position at sea well able ground discovered at Skaanland, the to the northward on the 6th May and the latter having the advantage of being situated presence of her fighter aircraft had an im- adjacent to the merchant shipping anchorage hi mediate and most noticeable effect upon the X&vanga Fiord between Harstad' and enemy's freedom of attack. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE,. 10 JULY, 1947

•8. On the i2th May, I was informed that SECTION iIV. in view of the situation elsewhere no Fighter or A /A reinforcements beyond those already THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASE DEFENCES. promised could be provided. It was now 1. A preliminary telegram asking for Guns expected that Bardufoss aerodrome would be for fixed defences and for harbour defence ready by the ' igth and I accordingly *Asdics was sent on 22nd April and on the requested that GLORIOUS and FURIOUS, 28th April the Admiralty stated that the bringing Fighter aircraft already promised, M.N.B.D.O. would be sent to mount guns should be within 200 miles of the Lofoten and asked for site prospecting to be carried out. Islands by that day ready to fly the machines As a result, the following proposals were made off as soon as they could be received. to the Admiralty on the ist May:1— 9. Every effort was now being concentrated 2. The Main Naval Base to be in Tjeldsundet on preparation of the Bardufoss and Skaanland with a large ship anchorage to the west of aerodromes, even operations taking second Holsflva, other ships in Lavangsfiord and west place in importance. At the same time, the of Skaanland: advanced anchorages at Bogen mounting of A/A guns was being pressed on. and Ballangen. A minefield extending i£ miles The speedy and efficient work of Lieutenant- 3110° from Baroen Lighlt OTL Baroy Island. Cplonfel H. R. Lambert, D.S.C., R.M., and 6 in. Battery south of Lodingen Church. his men of the *iM.N.iB.D.O. in mounting guns 4.7 in. Battery north of Kvitnes. 12 pdr. under difficult conditions merit the highest Battery on west side of Tjeldsundet one mile praise. Group Captain Moore, R.A.F., who south of Staksvollholm. Further batteries are commanded the Air Component was most considered desirable for south and north ends assiduous in the aerodrome development. of Tjeldsundet. Minefields N.E. and south 10. On May i7th, I was again informed of of Steinvaer. Hanbour defence Asdics off the effect of the Western Front situation on, the S.lW. corner of Baroy 'Island and .Rotvaer Narvik iForce; the message from. Chiefs olf Island with control station off Lodingen. Port Staff, stating that my Fighter Force would War Signal Station on Rotvaer Island. B.I be limited to one squadron of Gladiators and Indicator Net and Gate west of Staksvollholm. one of Hurricanes and the A/A artillery to Indicator Net or Mines at northern entrance 48 Heavy and 60 Light Guns. to Tjeldsundet from Taakeboen beacon to Hella. 11. GLORIOUS and FURIOUS arrived off the coast on the i8th and 701 Squadron of 3. On the 27th and 28th May, (fictitious) Walruses flew off and arrived at Harstad, where minefields were declared N.E. and S. of they remained ibased until the final evacuation, Steinvaer Island in Vaagsfiord and between doing most useful work—ferrying, maintaining Rotvaer Island and Baroy Island in Vestfiord. communications and daily reconnaissances, Rear-Admiral Lyster, appointed on the 29th ending with a well planned bombing attack April, arrived by air and assumed command of on Solfolla most efficiently carried out. Com- the Defences and their development on 5th mander R. S. D. Armour, R.N., who was in May. command of the Fleet Air Arm, is much to be 4. IM.L.Cs. arrived on the 25th April and commended. (both MX.Cs., A.L.Cs. on the 2Qth. These 12. On the 2ist of May, 263 Gladiator craft, though not always reliable mechanically, Squadron was flown ashore at Bardufoss from were most useful in the heavy work of trans- FURIOUS, 16 machines landed 'but unfor- porting gear and arms in the development of tunately 2, and i Swordfish were lost. the Base Defences. The MASHOOBRA arrived GLORIOUS had had to return to U.K. on on loth May and the work of the Royal Marine account of shortage of fuel. ARK ROYAL fortress unit under Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. also left for U.K. on 2ist (May. Lambert, D.S.C., R.'M., merited the highest 13. On May 22nd in reply to a question from praise. H have mentioned this also in the the Admiralty concerning possible substitution chapter of this Report covering the subject of of Gladiators for Hurricanes, I stated that un- A/A. less the Admiralty was prepared to provide 5. A scheme for oninelaying by Destroyers to and maintain a sufficient Air Force in this area, 'be sent from England was prepared but for including a Squadron of Bombers, it was my special reasons was abandoned. Attention was opinion that the whole policy should be recon- also given to the matter of using a supply of sidered. some 200 Norwegian Mines at Tromso but 14. On May 26th, the GLORIOUS was back before effective work could 'be done on this the and flew off 46 Hurricane Squadron. The operations came to an end. first flight landed at Skaanland and the re- 6. From first to last, the maintenance of mainder at Bardufoss from which aerodrome Destroyers and Trawler patrols to provide both Squadrons worked for the remainder of effective protection at entrances to all fiords in the time, taking -heavy toll of the enemy when- use as anchorages was a matter of primary ever /they had opportunity. Unfortunately, importance and, whenever Walrus aircraft were however, they were upon occasion fogbound available, air searches were made. at their aerodrome, which gave the enemy 7. The final plan for the defences was as working from the South opportunities he was follows: — not slow to take. Owing to the distance little could 'be done to give fighter protection to the INNER DEFENCES. troops in the Bodo area. Two Gladiators in A. HARSTAD: that area did, however, destroy 4 of the enemy A/S Defence of Harstad Harbour is only in one flight before the Bodo aerodrome was fully possible against close range attacks. Long completely destroyed. range attacks can only 'be guarded against by *Admiralty footnote :—M.N.B.D.O.—Mobile Naval * Admiralty footnote: — Asdics — Anti - Submarine Base Defence Organisation. detectin device SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 H.M. Ships keeping pointed in the direction OUTER DEFENCES. from which attack is expected. A. TROMSO—S. APPROACH TO TROMSO •(i) Northern Entrance. Closed 'by A/T AND N. APPROACH TO VAAGS Baffle. FIORD VIA GI SUND. (2) Eastern Side. Covered by line of B.I •(i) MALANGEN FIORDS. H.D.A.s be- Indicator Net outside from Maagoy to tween Lokvik and Boenoes. Also a heavy Harstad Light. battery (reconnaissance required). A/S •(3) Southern Entrance. Covered toy mine- Patrol. Local protection would be necessary loop if possible. for these defences. (4) Patrol. One A/S small craft, and for (2) Patrol. Less effective but simpler watching Indicator Net. alternative would be patrol of 2 A/S (5) Examination Service. Armed Destroyers. Trawlers. (3) GI SUND. Norwegian patrol vessels watching narrows where S/M must pass at B. TJELDSUNDET ANCHORAGE AND shallow depth. BASE—NORTHERN END: (i) TAAKEBOEN BEACON to HELLA. B. VAAGS FIORD—N.E. APPROACH. Shallow mines. Bottom is unsuitable for One destroyer off Tranoy Fiord, for general nets; any S/M attempting to get in would patrol duties in Vaags Fiord and backing up have to be shallow owing to navigational of other patrols. difficulties. 1(2) TAAKEBOEN to STEGHOLM. 4- C. VAAGS FIORD—N. APPROACH. cable wide channel, 70 to 80 fathoms deep. (i) SANDSOY to LEMMINGVOER. Deep mines or mine loop. Fiord to be closed on this line with ,deep (3) Patrol One A/S small craft. and shallow mines. (4) 4.jinch L.A. Battery, £ mile north (21) Patrol. One destroyer inside mine- of Langkvitneset. field. (5) iz-Pdr. Battery. At Langkvitneset. (6) A IB Boom. At Langkvimeset. D. VAAGS FIORD—W. APPROACH— TOPSUNDET. C. TJELDSUNDET ANCHORAGE AND (1) H.D.A.S. Western End. BASE SOUTHERN END: (2) Mine Loop. Possibly. (1) RAMSUNDET. A/B Boom and (3) 6-inch or 4.7 inch Battery at Western 'Light Battery (further reconnaissance end. required). (4) i.2-Pdr. Battery and A/B Boom at (2) STAKSVOLLHOLM Net. B.I Indica- Eastern end. tor Net and Gate | mile south of Island. (5) Patrols. One A/S small craft behind (3) i2-Pdr. Battery on STAKSVOLL- H.D.A.s and one standby. Detailed recon- HOLM ISLAND. naissance is required for all Topsundet de- •(4) A/B Boom by STAKSVOLLHOLM fences. Island. •(5) Mine Loop. Possibly in Southern E. TJELDSUNDET SQUTH and OFOT Tjeldsundet. FIORD. ° (6) Patrol. Vessel with D.Cs. watching •(i) H.D.A.s. Between Rotvaer and Net. Baroy. 1(2)- Deep Mines. $ mile each side just D. BALLANGEN. inside H.D.A.s. A/S Vessel on patrol outside when required. (3) Shallow Mines. Three lines ij miles long approximately: 310° from S.W. point E. NARVIK—Awaiting capture. of Baroy. (Navigation buoy S.W. of No defences suggested at present. Rotvaer.) (4) Open Channel. North of Rotvaer F. TROMSO—N.E. APPROACHES. Island for small local craft. Controlled by small armed vessel at inner end. W GROT3UNDET. Closed with deep and shallow mines from small island with (5) 6-inch Battery at Lodingen. light off Sjurnes to south shore. This will (6) There is a possibility of effectively leave a narrow channel close to north shore locating another 6-inch Battery in unfinished for local craft and probably warships up Norwegian emplacements at Ramnes but a to and including Cruisers. further reconnaissance is required. (2) KVALSUNDET. Shallow mines, but (7) Patrols. Two A/S small craft with few will .be necessary, owing to its existing H.D.A.s. One destroyer between Baroy (navigational difficulties. and Ramsundet. (3) Patrols. Armed patrol vessel to con- 8. Of the foregoing, the patrols were estao- trol channel by Sjurnes. Patrol at inner lished early and t worked regularly. None of end of Kvalsundet would be desirable. the guns were actually mounted but the sites had (been prepared. All the preparatory plan- G. TROMSO—S.E. APPROACHES. ning work for the mining had been done. The (i) RYOY ISLAND. Narrows controlled B.I Indicator Net had been laid south of by a light battery on the Island and A/S Staksvollholm but both ends still required com- .Patrol craft. ~,Deep mines might also be laid pleting to the shore and the gate had' not been if no A/S vessel was available. laid. A B.I Net, originally intended for Narvik, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 was laid in Skjelfiord early in the proceedings seems most important to hold in force the for the protection of the PENELOPE. The Mo road leading north. From Admiralty A/T Boom lay had been started in Harstad messages it appears the forces being sent are Northern Entrance but not completed. At the hardly adequate for this purpose and with evacuation all nets were sunk and all traces such weak detachments in the air another were removed. naval commitment comes into being. These areas do not, I presume, come under Narvik. 9. The A/S Air Patrols, when the necessary Are there any other allied forces to the south Walrus Aircraft were available, were carried out of me." outside a circle 27 miles radius centred about 5. The Admiralty reply received next day the points 68 35 N 17 10 E. The various outer was to the effect that it was not possible to main- surface A/S Patrols being situated on the tain large forces in face of enemy air superiority circumference of this circle. The sectors, centred well in advance of established fighter aero- in Harstad Harbour being: — dromes and that Bodo was the only place X. Between 060° and 300° to a depth of south of Narvik where such could be estab- 40 miles. lished. That small parties only would be main- Y. Between 300° and 245° to a depth of tained at Mo and Mosjoen with the abject of 50 miles. c'bstructing enemy advance and to prevent land- Z. Between 245° and 225° to a depth of ings by sea and air. On the 7th May I learned 100 miles. that all Independent Companies operating in Q. Between 225° and 190° to a depth of Northern Norway would come under Narvik 80 miles. Command and I was given details of their dis- 10. After the sinking of U.49 on I5th April, position under Colonel Gubbins. Anxiety was no contacts with enemy submarines were made expressed by the Norwegian Commander-in- throughout the remainder of the operations, Chief as to the potential aerodromes in Bode1, though many reports of them being sighted in the Mosjoen area. vicinity were received. An Irish Guardsman 6. On the 7th and 8th the enemy advance fishing at Bogen landed a used Escape north began to make itself felt. A French de- Apparatus belonging to U.64. tachment at Mosjoen first reported the enemy 11. Five enemy aircraft were seen on the 100 miles to the south and on the 8th I heard 2o,th May, apparently laying mines in that Mosjoen was about to be evacuated. On Tjeldsundet South Channel, and in the sub- the 9th the Germans were 10 miles off Mosjoen sequent sweeping operations 4 mines were ex- and Brigadier Gubbins reported that there was ploded, 2 by non-magnetic sweep and 2, later, great concern amongst the Norwegians about the by magnetic. continued enemy advance and that he would withdraw gradually to Mo and eventually to SECTION V. Bodo. A SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS IN THE 7. I suggested to the Admiralty on the 7th MOSJOEN—Mo—BODO AREA. that, if the Division of Destroyers they had originally proposed could not be provided, 2 1. On the 29th April, I received a message Destroyers might be added to my force and I from C.I.G.S. informing me that it was essential would manage the patrol, but on the loth the that the Head of Saltfiord should be occupied to Admiralty required me to reduce my Destroyer ensure that there should be no chance of force by 4 vessels on account of the need for Germans arriving by parachute. The telegram concentration in the southern part of the North indicated that a force to occupy the area would Sea. On the same day, the Admiralty informed "be leaving U.K. immediately. A destroyer was me it was essential to hold Bodo for the present. sent forthwith and was followed by a detach- ment of the Scots Guards, 150 strong. The 8. On the evening of the loth May, the enemy destroyer reported no Germans or shipping of were successful in landing a force of 650 men any sort in the vicinity. at Hemnes near Mo partly from a coasting steamer which came north with aerial escort. 2. On the ist May an order was received from Intelligence concerning the movements of this the Admiralty to send a destroyer to Mo to vessel reached me unfortunately too late for her prevent an enemy landing and the excellent pro- to be intercepted by CALCUTTA and ZULU posal was made by the Admiralty to Com- who were sent for the purpose. CALCUTTA mander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that a Division of sank the steamer at Hemnes an hour and a half Destroyers should be established to patrol the after she had got alongside. Reinforcements coast from Namsos North to prevent the move- with light A.A. guns were embarked in ment of every troopship/s by sea. This unfor- ENTERPRISE for passage to Mo. tunately never materialised. 9. Wing-Commander Atcherley who had 3. Preparations for the embarkation in U.K. visited the area reported to Air Ministry and of Independent Companies of troops for Mo and Admiralty by W/T on the advanced state of Mosjoen were made known to me by signal, and preparedness of the aerodrome at Mo and its I also received information that 2 Flying-Boats great value to the enemy should it fall into their were coming out to reconnoitre aerodromes in hands. the Bodo area. Their life was short. They were caught and put out of action on the water 10. Mosjoen was evacuated, equipment being by enemy aircraft on the 4th May. abandoned, on the I2th May. ENTERPRISE accompanied by CAIRO landed reinforcements 4. On May 4th, I came to the conclusion that at Mo on the I2th and other reinforcements had it was time that policy and responsibility in the reached Bodo on the nth. The enemy was now Bodo area was defined and I accordingly subjecting Mo to heavy air attacks and at the addressed the following message to the same time I was informed that while no fighter Admiralty: or A.A. reinforcements beyond those already " Request I may be informed of the general authorised could be "expected, forces at Bodo policy regarding Bodo, Mo and Mosjoen. It must be supplied from the Narvik area. 3174 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 11. On the I3th, it was decided to add the I2th/i3th May, in addition to establishing con- Irish Guards to the Bodo force and the Head- tact with French troops working south, had as quarters of the 24th Brigade. They embarked its object the occupation of the Oydejord in the s.s. CHROBRY which had brought 3 Peninsula, and the northern shore of Rombaks- Tanks from England for the Bodo Force. While Fiord. This was held by some to be a neces- on passage with STORK and WOLVERINE as sary prelude to any direct attack upon Narvik escort the CHROBRY was bombed and set on itself, allowing, as it would, of the positioning, fire, the four senior officers of the Battalion of field artillery on the peninsula to support being killed. The troops were saved and brought such an attack. As soon as ithe necessary area back to Harstad but their equipment was lost. had been occupied and, with the assistance of It was then decided to send the South Wales H.M.S. FAME, the northern shore of Rombaks. Borderers in the EFFINGHAM but she Fiord had been cleared and occupied as far as grounded and became a total loss during the Lillelerget, General Bethouart felt himself ready night lyth-iSth. The troops were brought back for the next stage, for which he had prepared to Harstad in EFFINGHAM's Escort, his plan, i.e., the capture of Narvik. Com- COVENTRY, CAIRO, MATABELE and mander Hubback was attached to the French ECHO, while the greater part of the Military Staff for this purpose; .his success in this work Stores, with 4 Bren Carriers out of 10 were in connection with Bjervik had been much salved in Local Craft and landed at Bodo. appreciated by the French Command. My EFFINGHAM was finally destroyed by general direction to him was that he was to do- torpedo. everything to further the project and to promise 12. During the next few days the troops after that all possible naval support would be forth- being re-equipped at Harstad were taken to coming. He carried out this work admirably. Bodo by Destroyers, but news from that area It was decided that the attack would take place was of the continual advance of the enemy. on May 23rd/24th or on the first favourable 13. On the i8th Colonel Trappes-Lomax of opportunity after that date. This was the the Scots Guards reported withdrawing from earliest date it was estimated 'the M.L.Cs. could Mo. be released from what, at the moment, was the all important work of preparing Bardufoss 14. On the 2ist General Auchinleck informed and Skaanland Aerodromes for the reception of me that he was proposing to appoint Colonel Hurricanes and Gladiators. The conditions that Gubbins in command of the 24th Brigade and were required to form a favourable opportunity Independent Companies, that is, of all forces were held to be either— in the Bodo area. With this I fully agreed. Brigadier Fraser had had to be invalided oh (a) Such weather conditions as were likely account of a wound received earlier when recon- to largely reduce or abolish any danger of air noitring at Ankenes in the Narvik area. attack; or (6) The ability to provide efficient fighter 15. Enemy air power in the Bodo area protection overhead. steadily increased and with corresponding harassing effect upon our forces. Only on one 2. The weather, towards the date mentioned,, occasion was it possible to hit back and then turned fine and seemed settled and with the (on the 27th May) 2 Gladiators brought down impending arrival of the Hurricanes on the 4 enemy aircraft. 26th/27th it was eventually decided that the 16. A trawler force, to work in the Bodo operation should take place on the 27th/28th area, arrived at Skjelfiord from England on the and that date was adhered to. i8th May under the command of Lieutenant- 3. The plan, in so far as the naval opera- Commander (acting Commander) W. R. Fell, tions were conceined, is forwarded separately R.N. These vessels not being suitable for the and, except in one or two minor details, it was. work, Commander Fell organised a force of local adhereJ to. vessels and took them south on the 24th May where they performed remarkable work and 4. The ships that took (part were CAIRO were almost continuously in action for seven (Flag), SOUTHAMPTON (R.A.i8), days. COVENTRY (C.S.20) and the Destroyers WHIRLIND, FAME, HAVELOCK, WALKER 17. A telegram was received on the 24th May and FIREDRAKE. from the Chiefs of Staff ordering the evacuation of the whole of our forces from North Norway. 5. The plan is open to criticism in details— Plans to reinforce Bodo were then abandoned its great merit, however, was in that it was and instructions were sent to Brigadier Gubbins the plan of those who had to carry it out. The to be prepared to evacuate. weak point in the plan was that owing to the paucity of transport available—a less bold man 18. On May 28 the enemy with a force of 30 than General Bethouart might well-have made aeroplanes bombed the town of Bodo, which to this an excuse for inaction—it was necessary a greater extent than most Norwegian towns to leave the First Flight of 290 men unsup- was built of stone, until it was reduced to com- ported foi an unduly long time as the timetable plete ruin. in the plan indicates. Owing to the hard work 19. The evacuation of Bodo was successfully to which the M.L.Cs. had been subjected in accomplished on the 2Qth and 3ist, 1,000 men transporting guns and plant and stores of all being taken direct to U.K. in VINDICTIVE sorts required for the completion of the aero- and the remainder brought to Harstad in dromes at Bardufoss and Skaanland and the Destroyers and small craft. sinking of one during an air raid, only two- SECTION VI. of these vessels were available—and one of these was only capable of about three knots. THE FINAL OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE The A.L.Cs. similarly were reduced from four OF NARVIK. to three, one of them having been burnt out. i. The landing effected by the two battalions An attempt was made to supplement the means of the Foreign Legion at Bjerkvik on the of transport by using the two picket boats of SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 3175 MASHOBRA. These boats were, however, ment, only one mounting remained fully effec- reported as unfit for action—a common com- tive, two being out of action owing to the dan- plaint among all power boats during the gerous prematures being caused by the state of expedition but perhaps excusable in this par- the guns owing to continuous firing. The ship ticular case, seeing the hard work the also had considerable superficial damage to con- MASHOBRA had recently carried out. tend with and, incidentally, smartly dealt with It had been decided to land the French by her fire and repair parties. I therefore troops of the First Flight on a small beach east determined to send her away and called a des- of Orneset. troyer alongside to" take off General Bethouart The actual attack upon Narvik was to be and Staff. It was also any intention to shift supported by a Polish advance on the Ankenes my Flag to STORK. Peninsula in the direction of Beisford, through 8. I had previously asked General Bethouart which ran the one road affording a line of retreat to let me know when he was satisfied that his to the enemy. troops were established and could dispense 6. The operation began at the appointed time with naval aid, so that the number of ships in of 2340 on May 27th. My Flag was flying in the a confined area could be reduced. Before CAIRO, the CURLEW in which I had intended leaving the ship, General Bethouart told me it to be worn having been sunk the previous that he was quite satisfied and that if he were afternoon. General Auchinleck and General allowed to retain two destroyers that was all Bethouart accompanied me. The ships pro- he asked for. On this, I ordered C.S. 20 in ceeded independently to their stations, effort COVENTRY and 2 destroyers to remain in being made to conceal the intention of con- support of the French forces and the remainder centrating off Narvik until as late as possible. of the ships to withdraw to the westward. The bombardment preceding the landing by 9. After repelling the German counter- ships' fire and that of 75 mm. battery ashore attack, the French continued their advance was effective and the troops landed from the throughout the day and after a few somewhat A.L.C.s and M.L.C.s without, meeting the doubtful messages had been received reports serious resistance so many had thought became reassuring until, by a message timed inevitable. The landing took place practically 2200, General Bethouart reported that Narvik, at one point, the training of the soldiers enabling Fagernes and Forneset were in his hands, them, as at Bjervik, to open out and obtain together with some 200 prisoners, a number cover without apparent difficulty. The subse- subsequently increased to between 350-400. quent transportation of troops was carried out 10. The attack of the Poles on Ankenes had, as fast as the limited means available allowed, after an initial setback, progressed well—a local craft being used to a limited extent in the result largely due to the support received by the later stages. Two tanks were landed at fire of the SOUTHAMPTON which was grate- Taraldvik from M.L.C.s but when ashore found fully acknowledged. the sand and mud too soft and were immobilised for some time. By soon after midnight, a 11. That the carrying-out of this operation battalion of the Foreign Legion and one of the proved more simple than had been expected Norwegian Infantry (the Narvik Battalion) with does not in my view detract in any degree from two tanks were ashore and had made good the credit due to General Bethouart for the progress. The first detachment of the second soldierly way he had undertaken and carried Battalion of the Legion had been landed, and out this attack, following that of Bjerkvik. the remainder were being embarked and ferried He was good enough to give much credit to the across. A considerable rifle and machine-gun naval assistance he had received. That, how- fire could be heard which marked the develop- ever, would always have been forthcoming to ment of a counter-attack by the enemy which, any force that had attempted the task. however, was held by the French troops. SECTION VII. 7. At 0420, the enemy aircraft put in their THE EVACUATION. first appearance, some determined dive bomb- ing attacks being made upon the ships. This i. On the night of 24/25th May, orders was followed up in quick succession by high were received for the evacuation of Northern and dive bombing attacks, lasting from 0420- Norway and were contained in following 0626, the former by aircraft working singly and message: — in formation. Ships for a considerable time " Naval Message to F.O., Narvik, from escaped damage but only by manoeuvring at Admiralty. high speed in such a way as would have Following from Chiefs of Staff. seriously reduced the effectiveness of bombard- . His Majesty's Government has decided ing and covering fire had the attack been your forces are to evacuate Northern Norway delivered earlier. The success of these attacks, at earliest moment. Reason for this is however, was largely due to the unfortunate fact that the troops, ships, guns and certain that our fighters, most conspicuous and equipment are urgently required for defence assiduous in the patrol work until 0400, were of United Kingdom. We understand from after that time fogbound on the Bardufoss military point of view, evacuation operations Aerodrome, some 50 miles distant from the will be facilitated if enemy forces are largely scene of battle. At 0620, CAIRO1 was hit by destroyed or captured. Moreover, destruc- two light bombs cf a pattern which fell all tion of railways and Narvik port facilities round her. One hit was just abaft " B " make its capture highly desirable. mounting, penetrating the deck and bursting Nevertheless, speed of evacuations once among the supply party; the other hit the begun should be of primary consideration starboard .5 machine gun just abaft the signal in order to limit duration maximum naval deck, setting fire to the ammunition and gear efforts. in the vicinity of the gun. As a result, 8 were 2 Officers will be sent at once from United killed and 25 wounded. Of CAIROi's arma- Kingdom to concert Evacuation plans with 3176 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 you and General Auchinleck. Evacuation of 7. Information was received that the ARK all equipment, vehicles and stores will clearly '.ROYAL and GLORIOUS would be in tiie take too long. Following are required to be area between -the dates named for the pro- evacuated in order of importance from point vision of fighter protection and the retrieving of view of defence of United Kingdom—(a) of any aircraft possible. Personnel; (fc) Light A/A Guns and Ammuni- 8. The situation in the Bodo district had tion; (c) 25-pounders; (d) Heavy A/A Guns been causing anxiety owing to the growing and Ammunition. pressure of enemy forces, and the reinforce- Tactical conditions must rule but so far as ment of the 24th Brigade—now intact in that they permit plans should be framed area—had been in contemplation. This idea accordingly. was necessarily abandoned in the face of im- Norwegian Government have not .repetition pending evacuation, and evacuation was not yet been informed." ordered. This was necessary as Brigadier 2. The following morning, I discussed the Guibbins had reported he must retire not later matter with General Auchinleck, and it was than June ist unless reinforced. agreed that safety of the force made secrecy 9. The nights of May 2o,th, 30th and 3ist vital, and the information must only be were selected for this evacuation, whioh was imparted to those Senior Officers it was carried out by destroyers. On the first night imperative should know it. some 1,000 troops were ferried to the 3. The position of the French troops, acting VINDICTIVE in the offing, which ship con- in conjunction with the Norwegian jtroops, and veyed them direct to Scapa. On the two sub- in actual contact with the enemy in the sequent nights, the troops were brought back Gratangen district presented difficulties—as to to the Harstad area in the destroyers which had a lesser degree did that of our own troops in embarked them. It was decided that the a similar position in the Bodo area. That Norwegian Government should 'be informed as position, however, showed signs of liquidating soon as possible that the decision had been itself. In the Anikenes peninsula also, Polish taken by the Allies to evacuate North Norway. troops were pressing East in the face of enemy The decision to do this was comni'uniicated resistance, towards Beisfjord. It was evident to HM. Government. I therefore invited Sir that, in view of 'the wide area from which Cecil Dormer to Harstad for a conference on troops had to be evacuated, under different June ist, the following day, and suggested circumstances, the withdrawal might prove Colonel Pollock should accompany him. This difficult more particularly in view at the in- officer—in his capacity as Liaison Officer—had creasing scale of air attack to which the whole proved most helpful. Sir Cecil was informed district was 'being subjected. Secrecy and of the position, and a copy of the following celerity were both called for. It was apparent message given to him. that a considerable number of A/A guns would have to be abandoned, guns which had only " IMMEDIATE. just been installed after much labour. As, To: P.O., Narvik, From: Admiralty. however, A /A protection must be provided to Following from Foreign Office. the last this loss was inevitable. When Sir C. Dormer arrives Harstad you 4. On May -26th, I invited General Bethouart should explain the situation to him and ask to my house to meet General Auchinleck, and him to speak to King of Norway and Minister he was then told of the forthcoming evacua- of Defence, Colonel Ljungberg in the follow- tion. From every -point of view, it seemed ing sense. essential he should know. The news was re- ceived with characteristic calm, though one H.-M. Government and French Govern- point upon which he was insistent was that for . ment have reviewed general position in light reasons of national honour he could not of recent events in Belgium and Northern abandon the Norwegian Army he had been France. Owing to additional strain on their working with, in the lurch on the field of battle. resources and to necessity to defend Great The whole question was discussed and it was Britain as well as France from invasion it is agreed that pressure on the enemy must be not repetition not possible for Allies to supply kept up until the last, that the attack on sufficient defence 'against German attack, par- Narvik which had originally been fixed for tne ' ticularly air attack, on North Norway. 'What night 24th-25th but postponed 48 hours, must has just happened at Bodo, where you have go on, and that this operation would of itself been obliged to order evacuation at short be the best possible way of concealing our notice, is an example of what must happen intentions from the enemy. elsewhere if this defence cannot be provided: and dangers of air attacks to civilian popula- 5. An outline plan for the evacuation was tion have already been emphasised by forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff at their request. Norwegian Government themselves. In any 6. It was planned that the work should be case restoration of Norwegian independence done at night—this in view of diminishing the depends upon capacity of British Empire and risk of air attack as far as possible. True, France to resist present attack on them, and it was light all night but experience had shown if this purpose is to be achieved all available the night hours were a quiet time as a rule Allied forces will in present circumstances as regards air raids. The whole operation was be required. planned to occupy five periods of ferrying. Allied Governments are accordingly This was agreed to and was the plan followed. obliged to make arrangements for early with- The dates were, however, subsequently post- drawal df their forces from Norway and wall poned 48 hours. The measures taken to ensure •be prepared in doing so to bring away the secrecy worked well, so many plausible reasons King of Norway, Norwegian Government and were available to explain the movements of as many Norwegian troops as may wish to troops that for some davs no suspicion was come to the United Kingdom and continue aroused. the fight with the Allies ^n other battlefields. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

It might be worth while to suggest to 12. The evacuation proceeded according to Norwegian Government, if they think there plan on the dates named. On 5 successive is any chance of reaching an agreement on nights, troops to the numbers of 4,700, 4,900, " Mowinckel Plan," we should see no repeti- 5,100, 5,200 and on the fifth the last and most tion no objection to their attempting this. difficult 4,600, without any untoward incident. They themselves will of course realise any The work was almost entirely carried out by hint to Germans that we had decided on destroyers working under the orders of Captain evacuation would destroy any chance they E. B. K. Stevens, D.S.C., Captain (D), gth may have of reaching an agreement. But Destroyer Flotilla, in H.M.S. HAVELOCK. evidently time for this is very short and our The presence of this energetic and capable evacuation plan cannot be delayed." officer ensured the programme being carried out 10. The whole matter was then discussed punctually and efficiently. The destroyers were between Sir Cecil, General Auchinleck, Colonel working almost continuously arid, as always, Pollock and myself upon the 'basis of this rose to the occasion. RearnAdmiral Command- message. It was agreed that Sir Cecil Dormer ing 2Oth Cruiser Squadron was in direct charge on his return to Tromso should interview of the transports at rendezvous and responsible privately certain Ministers, and that he should for the embarkation. Up to the end, air pro- suggest the revival of the " Mowinckel Plan," tection was afforded by the R.A.F. and F.A.A. as proposed in the Foreign Office Message working in co-operation and to a programme. quoted above: that the King should be told the Owing, however, to the weather conditions that following morning, June 2nd, and the Cabinet prevailed through the 5 days, low clouds and officially informed later in the day. Sub- rain, the enemy air action was weak and spas- sequently, I was told by letter that the con- modic. Dive bombing attacks were, however, versations had gone off well and that, after delivered upon STORK and VETERAN in Ofot his talk with the Foreign Minister, the latter— Fiord during the afternoon of the 7th but the who already had a meeting arranged in Stock- enemy did not appear to have noticed any- holm for the 3rd—drafted a telegram to has thing unusual, for no special effort was made Swedish colleague on the subject of the that evening. The last men to be embarked " Mowinckel Plan," which draft he allowed in the Transports were the Ground Staff of the Sir Cecil to alter as he wished. Colonel Pollock Bardufoss aerodrome. The Gladiators had been on the same day gave the information to embarked in GLORIOUS but it was feared that General iRuge. Vice-Admiral Cunningham was the 8 Hurricanes that remained efficient would also informed and entrusted with making have to be abandoned and destroyed. The arrangements for the passalge of the King, courageous action of the pilots in volunteering Government and others who might wish to to fly their machines on to the flying deck of evacuate should the negotiations break down. GLORIOUS and of Group-Captain Moore in Sir Cecil Dormer asked that there should (be allowing it to be done resulted in all 8 being a delay of a day or two in order to give time safely got away—an achievement which for the negotiations. After ascertaining that deserved a better fate than that which befell the this would entail no -harmful consequences to gallant men who had carried it out successfully. arrangements already made, I agreed to a 13. The actual sailing of the various Convoys delay of 24 hours. The first night of evacuation carrying.the whole expedition to the U.K. was was, therefore, (fixed; as June 3rd-4th. as follows: — Naturally, at first, there was a feeling of sore- Group i. ness and disillusionment among the Norwegians MONARCH OF on learning of the evacuation but on the whole BERMUDA. the decision was received as being inevitable BATORY. under the circumstances and every help was SOBIESKI. With VINDICTIVE. given to facilitate the withdrawal. FRANCONIA. 11. I wrote to Admiral Diesen expressing the LANCASTRIA. hope that he would send all his ships to the GEORGIC. U.K. or assure me that they should not fall into German hands. The following most satisfactory Group 2. 'With answer was received:,— COVENTRY ORONSAY. ' (C.S.20.). " 6th June, 1940. 4 ORMONDE. SOUTHAMPTON "My Lord: ARANDORA STAR. (R.A.iS). My very best thanks for your kind letter. ROYAL ULSTERMAN. HAVELOCK It has been a great pleasure for me to meet ULSTER PRINCE. (D.9). you, my Lord, and so many officers of the ULSTER MONARCH. FAME. grand British Navy. As a Norwegian, I can DUCHESS OF YORK. FIREDRAKE. only present my thanks for all it has done. BEAGLE. I am preparing all the ships that may be DELIGHT. of any use for going to the Shetlands. You may rest assured about the submarines VANDYCK should have been with this as well as of the rest. What cannot be Group but failed to make the rendezvous. evacuated will be destroyed. Storeships (Slow Convoy left Harstad To you personally, my Lord, I send my 2200/7 June). very best wishes for the future of both our BLACKHEATH. countries. God bless them I OLIGARCH. In the hope of a au revoir, HARMATTAN. With Yours very sincerely, CROMARTY FIRTH. ( STORK, (Sgd.) N. DIESEN." THESEUS. ' f ARROW, ACRITY. and 10 Trawlers. The Naval Attache, Rear-Admiral Boyes, also COXWOLD. had the matter in hand. CONCH. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

CAMPBELL, WALTER, ELLESMERE The latter conducted the withdrawal of the and THIRLMERE were sent to find and French and Polish troops that were engaged escort vessels coming from Tromso, viz., OIL with the enemy during the concluding phase. PIONEER, YERMOUNT, ARBROATH 22. The order for evacuation, and the com- (A.S.I.S.), NYAKOA (A.S.I.S.), and some pliance therewith, brought this combined opera- Norwegian Vessels. tion to a close—at a moment when, as a 14. I did not consider that sailing of the ist result of seven weeks' hard work, the Force Group without escort as mentioned in Admiralty seemed to 'be getting firmly established. To 1801/27 was justifiable and had originally in- attain this result many and great difficulties tended to retain the ships at sea in charge of ihad had to be overcome, due to the peculiar VINDICTIVE, in which ship 1,000 troops had hydrographies! and geographical conditions, but been embarked until the whole were ready. On more particularly to the severe climatic vagaries, receipt, however, of Admiralty F.O.N.I77, I all of which were more easily realised on the resolved to sail the group under escort of spot than they could be under totally different VINDICTIVE if adequate protection was conditions elsewhere. obtainable further south. This being guaranteed by C.-in-C., Home Fleet, the 1801/6 and 23. The landing of guns, vehicles, and stores 1506/5 Groups sailed for the Clyde on June 7th of all sorts with a minimum of facilities for at 0300. doing so, imposed great efforts on all of the three Services taking part in this work. 15. The RANEN (Commander Sir Geoffrey Congreve), who had been actively employed 24. Possibly, the outstanding combined effort during the evacuation period delaying the of this sort was the preparation of the aero- enemy advance up the coast from Bodo, was dromes. The initial clearing of the ground, sent on the night of the 7th, accompanied by under three to four feet of snow when work NORTHERN GEM, to destroy the Oil Tanks began, the water transport and landing on open at Svolvaer. This successful exploit ended with beaches of all impedimenta, the positioning of a most spirited engagement, on his part, with the guns for defence, after much work had been the enemy. expended on preparing miles of indifferent roads under " thaw " conditions to take heavy traffic 16. Vice-Admiral Commanding First Cruiser called for and produced great and continued Squadron was in charge of the Tromso Convoy. exertions from all three Services. In this as H.M.S. DEVONSHIRE, his flagship, conveyed in all other activities co-operation was close the Royal and '.Diplomatic parties, the Nor- and cordial—more particularly so in the later wegian Government and other notables who stages of the campaign. This is equally true wished to be evacuated. as regards relations between the Norwegians 17. Prior to final evacuation, the forepart of and the various nationalities of the Allied Force. MASHOBRA, the stern of which was under Excellent and helpful relations prevailed. I water, was blown up, the OLEANDER was have elsewhere placed on record my apprecia- sunk, disabled Trawlers destroyed and an. tion of 'the valuable services rendered by attempt was made to tow away the A.L.Cs. General Bethouart. As already mentioned but finally they and the M.L.Cs. were scuttled. initially there was no means of retaliation for 18. The whole of the Convoy (2nd Group) interference caused by enemy air attack. The were clear of Andfiord by 2300/8th, the rear Fleet Air Arm, however, did all that was being brought up by the A/S Trawlers and possible—to the gallantry and activity displayed Minesweepers. As they proceeded, they were by that branch of the Service I desire to pay shadowed by an enemy aircraft. After seeing tribute. these clear in SOUTHAMPTON, I ordered that 25. The Royal Air Force when they began ship to join the Convoy of which Rear-Admdral to arrive quickly made their efficiency and Vivian in COVENTRY had been placed in courageous skill felt—their advent was very charge. welcome. One Officer of this Service especially 19. For the evacuation, I flew my Flag in attracted me by his zeal, energy, initiative and the SOUTHAMPTON and was accompanied in resource—Wing Commander Atcherley, upon that ship on the return voyage by Generals whom fell the initial work of selection and Auchinleck and Bethouart. preparation of aerodromes prior to the arrival 20. Being clear of Norwegian waters and of Group Captain Moore to the value of whose operations therefore coming under Commander- services I have already alluded. in-Chief, Home Fleet, I hauled down my Flag 26. Of the Army, I feel constrained to call at midnight on June 8th but directed that attention to Brigadier J. A. H. Gammell—an SOUTHAMPTON was to remain with the Officer of obviously great ability whose per- Convoy for passage home in view of the liveli- sonality contributed largely to the harmonious ness taking place in the North Sea. This relations previously referred .to and Colonel passage was uneventful. A. A. B. Dowler, who, in his capacity as 21. The success of the evacuation and the General Staff Officer, was at Military Head- smoothness with which the arrangements worked quarters during the whole period of the expedi- was in great measure due to the unremitting tion, during which hds quiet efficiency and tact work and attention of all the Staff Officers were of the greatest assistance—especially engaged upon it bu£ primarily to those of the through one difficult period. following Officers to whom I particularly wish 27. I particularly desire to mention Captain to call attention. They are: — Louis Hamilton, R.N., H.M.S. AURORA, who Brigadier J. A. H. Gammell, Military Chief proved himself a fine, active leader, and an Staff Officer. Officer who could be relied upon to obtain Captain L. E. H. Maund, Naval Chief •the best results under any conditions. His Staff Officer. sound views on all operational matters were Commander A. G. V. Hubback, Staff a 'great help and support to me, his desire to Officer Operations. harass and distress the enemv never eased uo. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 3*79 28. Captain L. E. H. Maund acted as my 5. Disembarkation at Harstad was carried Chief Staff Officer; lie was assiduous and un- out under great difficulty. Transports had to iiring in his work and in all administrative lie at considerable distances—10 miles and matters of the greatest help. To him can be more—from the harbour and signal communi- .given much of the credit for successful cation between ship and shore was impossible. •evacuation. Air attacks, against which my force had no 29. Finally, I must express my gratitude to defence, complicated the operation. However lieutenant-General C. J. E. Auchinleck in disembarkation of the first flight of the force •whom I could not wish for a 'better colleague. was completed on the evening of i6th April. His sound and soldierly views on all subjects 6. Although nobody without personal ex- were of great assistance and support and the perience of Arctic winter conditions can pos- period of our service together will for me always sibly picture the climatic difficulties we "be a pleasant memory. experienced in the early days, a word or two (Signed) CORK & ORRERY, of description may not be out of place. The country was covered by snow up to 4 feet and Admiral of the Fleet. more in depth. Even at sea level there were several feet of snow. Blizzards, heavy snow storms, bitter winds and very low night tem- APPENDIX" A". peratures were normal. Indeed until the middle of May even those magnificent mountain REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN soldiers, the French Chasseurs Alpins, suffered NORWAY. severely from frost bite and snow blindness. I4th April to i3th May, 1940. Troops who were not equipped with and skilled in the use of skis or snow shoes were absolutely The following Report was submitted to the incapable of operating tactically at all. I had Secretary Fjord, in H.M.S. Southampton at operation. The problem was, of course, not daylight on the I4th April. I was accom- merely one of landing, but one of carrying out panied by a small staff and had on board two a subsequent advance of several miles; yet, companies of the ist Bn. The Scots Guards and owing to the configuration of the ground, not .some details. even during the first mile could support be 3. Having first ascertained that Harstad was given by ships' guns. not in enemy occupation.and having obtained I decided therefore that my first objective some information from local officials at that must be to secure the Oijord and Ankenes place, I proceeded to obtain touch with the peninsulas, North and South of Narvik, from 6th Norwegian Division under Major-General which in due course observed artillery fire could ^Fleischer, whose headquarters proved to foe in be brought to bear on the enemy defences. the Bardu area. The two companies ist Bn. Both these peninsulas were held by the enemy. The Scots iGuards were landed at Salangs- With this in view I moved the ist Bn. Verket and Sjoveien on the Sag Fjord during The Irish 'Guards to the Bogen area and (at the afternoon and were put in touch with a later date) the 2nd Bn. The South Wales •elements of the 6th Norwegian Division. This Borderers to Ballangen. The detachment of -early contact and the subsequent co-operation the ist Bn. The Scots Guards, under Major of this detachment with our Allies had an im- L. Graham, M.C., which I had landed in the portant effect upon the spirit and determination Sag Fjord on I4th April, moved forward to -of the Allied Forces. co-operate with the 6th Norwegian Division in 4. During-the I4th April and the following the Forsbakken area. The state of the roads, • days all available information pointed to Narvik lying under 2 to 4 feet of snow and ice, and itself being stroaigly held and to the fact that the impossibility of moving across country -the naval actiol^of the I3th April had by no without skis, prevented further progress toy means demoralized the garrison as a whole. these forces for the time" being. 'The probability was that the garrison had in 8. On the 20th April Admiral of the Fleet fact been increased by nearly 1,000 good fight- the Earl of Cork and Orrery was placed in ing men from the sunken German ships: this sole command of the operations. It may how- was fully confirmed by subsequent intelligence ever be convenient to have on record a brief • reports. My troops had been -embarked for a summary of the subsequent operations from an -^peaceful landing at a friendly and organized port army point of view. On 24th April a naval and could not be ready for active operations for bombardment of the Narvik defences was .some days. I decided therefore to disembark carried out with the object of making the enemy the Force at Harstad arid to establish my base surrender. The ist Bn. The Irish Guards, : there also in the first instance. embarked in one of H.M. Ships, were held SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 ready to land and occupy the town in the guns. At this point three light tanks from event of such surrender. Other troops were motor landing craft and about 120 infantry at short notice to follow the Irish Guards. The from assault landing craft (followed by bombardment, however, did not achieve the infantry from ships' boats) were able to result hoped for by the naval commander. Sub- land with little loss and so to work their sequent reports indicated that the defences were way round the head of the Fjord to deal with not seriously impaired, though some casualties the remaining machine-guns, on the beaches, were inflicted upon the enemy. which had not been affected by the naval bom- 9. My hopes of prosecuting the land opera- bardment. Distant machine guns were still in tions more vigorously were raised by the arrival action when the second battalion landed on on the 28th April of General Bethouart with a the East shore about 2 hours later. Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs Alpins. Two The operation was entirely successful. With- battalions of these were directed to advance, in out the use of tanks and armoured landing craft co-operation with Norwegian forces, from the it might very easily have ended in a costly Gratangen area to Bjerkvik at the head of failure. It was fortunate indeed that low clouds Herjangen Fjord. One battalion co-operated prevented hostile air attack during the landing. with the South Wales Borderers on the Ankenes Touch was made with the force operating peninsula where the latter had been landed from Gratangen. The Oijord peninsula was without opposition although counter-attacked seized. The stage was now set for the capture later. of Narvik. Even those first class troops, the Chasseurs 12. Meanwhile the situation in the South was Alpins, trained as they are, to snow conditions, causing me some concern. Continued German found themselves very seriously hampered, in- advances in that area were having most serious, deed almost immobilized, by the soft deep results upon our Norwegian Allies and, indeed snow. Their small proportion of ski troops in seemed likely to result hi the withdrawal of all each battalion and a lack of snow, shoes for the Norwegian support from the Allied forces. I remainder proved serious handicaps. They considered that the time had come to stop these suffered severely from frost bite and snow blind- enemy advances and I welcomed Lord Cork's ness. The troops in the front line were sub- suggestion on gth May that troops should be jected to continual low-flying air attacks against despatched with that object. I had been in, which, owing to the state of the 'ground, they constant touch with Colonel Gubbdns and two could not adequately protect themselves either companies of Scissors Force at Mosjoen and by digging or by dispersion. (Later when I with one company of that Force, under Major was enabled to allocate a small number of light May, at Mo. After the abandonment of Mosjoen anti-aircraft guns to the French troops, the I decided that energetic measures must be taken effect was excellent.) Nevertheless they made and accordingly sent the ist Bn. the Scots some progress and took no little toll of the Guards (less one company already at Bodo), enemy. with field and anti-aircraft guns, to Mo. Mo was doubly important as being the terminus of 10. On 29th April I was ordered to send the most northerly road into Sweden and as troops to Bodo. I accordingly despatched one covering the Norwegian aerodrome a few miles company of the ist Bn. the Scots Guards. A to the North. Should this aerodrome fall into few days later developments at and South of the hands of the enemy it would afford him Mosjoen were 'brought prominently to any notice just that extra stepping stone he needed to bring by the serious effects they were having upon further a.ir forces into action in the Narvik our Norwegian Allies, and I soon found myself area. concerned with two fronts—the Narvik area This detachment arrived at Mo at 0400 hours in the East and Mosjoen and Mo in the South. r For the reasons indicated in paragraph 12 i2th Maj without loss. Colonel Gubbins with below, the Southern front caused me increas- his two companies from Mosjoen had mean- ingly greater concern. while wifJidrawn to Bodo. At the same time I instituted arrangements 11. The arrival of a Demi-Brigade of the for reinforcing the detachment at Mo with Head- Foreign Legion and of a Polish Brigade, coupled quarters 24th (Guards) Brigade and ist Bn. with .gradually improving weather conditions The Irish Guards. Before these arrangements and an accession of much needed equipment were completed and put into effect (they were (notably anti-aircraft artillery, a very limited subsequently modified) I handed over command number of landing craft and a French company to my successor. of light tanks) facilitated the undertaking of more active operations on the Narvik front. 13. It will be apparent from the preceding On 8th May I instructed General Bethouart to paragraphs that the period of my command was clear up the Gratangen-Bjerkvik area and to perforce chiefly one of reconnaissance and plan- establish artillery on the Oijord peninsula. He ning and of carrying out such initial offensive was then to explore the possibility of moving operations as the climatic conditions and the through the mountains against the strong Ger- gradual building up of my force to a reason- man concentration in the Hundalen area East able fighting organisation permitted. At the of Narvik. At the same time I instructed the same time the task of setting the administrative 24th (Guards) Brigade (with one battalion of organisation on a sound basis fitted to deal Chasseurs Alpins under command) to hold the with projected operations and with future Northern end of the Ankenes peninsula firmly expansion made tremendous calls upon the and to advance on Beisfjord as soon as weather initiative and powers of improvisation of my conditions should permit. At oioo hours I3th- staff, all under Arctic conditions of great, May, accordingly, General Bethouart landed though decreasing, severity. Subsidiary bases the Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion at were established at Skaanland on Sundet Fjord Bjerkvik. The landing was preceded by a naval and in Ballangen south of the Ofot Fjord. bombardment. An enemy machine-gun on the 14. I wish to place pn record my deep left flank was knocked out by a destroyer's appreciation of the co-operation and assistance SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 3181 afforded by the Royal Navy at all times to the my headquarters at Alresford and arranged troops under my command. Without that help for an advanced headquarters to be established it would have been impossible to make any in the War Office. progress. The Royal Navy carried and escorted 2. For the next week, my staff were fully the Allied troops and, pending the arrival of employed collecting and collating information anti-aircraft 'guns, took over the duties of anti- concerning Northern Norway and the existing aircraft protection under the most difficult situation in that theatre. circumstances. The naval staff, particularly In this task they received every possible Captain 'Maund, R.N., and Commander assistance from the staff of the different depart- Huhback, R.N., worked in intimate and un- ments and branches of the War Office. flagging co-operation with my own staff: I owe these officers a deep debt of 'gratitude for 3. On the 6th May, I received my instruc- their ever close and cordial assistance. tions from the Secretary of State for War. These instructions were to the effect: — 15. Relations with the French were most happy throughout. The loyalty and efficiency (a) That the object of His Majesty's displayed toy General Bethouart were of the Government was to secure and maintain a highest order. It was a very great pleasure to base in Northern Norway from which it be so closely associated with so fine an officer. would be possible: — 16. Major-General Fleischer and the troops i. To deny iron ore supplies to Germany of the 6th Norwegian Division under his com- via Narvik. mand co-operated at all times willingly and ii. To interfere with ore supplies to Ger- effectively with the Allied forces. Without that many from Lulea in Sweden, co-operation the British and French troops en- iii. To preserve a part of Norway as a gaged on the mainland would have been faced seat of Government for the Norwegian with a number of additional difficulties. King and Government. (6) That the forces, assembled for this pur- 17. The period of planning and of consulta- pose were under the command of Admiral tions with the Royal Navy anjd with the Allied- of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery; the Forces threw a -great strain and weight of Military Commander Major-General Mackesy responsibility upon any General Staff. The being subordinate to him, and that this establishment of a 'base and the supply and system of unified command was to remain movement of troops with limited and difficult in being until such time as His Majesty's means of transportation made equally heavy Government decided to terminate it and demands upon my Administrative Staff and revert to the usual system of having inde- Services. All these demands were met in a pendent commanders of the sea and land most praiseworthy manner. All concerned dis- forces. played powers of improvisation of the highest (c) That I was appointed G.O.C.-in-C. order. designate of the Anglo-French land forces 18. I would draw special attention to the fine and of the British Air Component in the work of my General Staff Officer (First Grade), theatre of Operations. Colonel A. B. Dowler and of, my A.A. and (d) That I was to proceed to the area with Q.M.G., Colonel J. F. W. Allen, M.C. These an officer detailed by the Chief of the Air officers were faced with unusual problems and Staff and in conjunction with the Earl of responsibilities They dealt with them all in a Cork and Orrery, report for the information truly admirable manner. of the Chiefs of Staff, the forces required !o 19. That I once commanded an Allied Force attain the objects outlined in sub-paragraph containing such fine troops, British, French and (a), and the area which should be occupied. Polish alike, will for ever remain a source of (e) That I was to consider the possibility great pride to me. of shipping any iron ore now at Narvik to I have the honour to be, the United Kingdom, and of resuming a supply of iron ore from Swedish mines at Sir, Gallivare, and to report on the feasibility Your obedient servant, and desirability of repairing the railway from P. J. Mackesy, Narvik to the Swedish frontier. . " Major-General. 4. I received also an instruction from General Sir John Dill, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the effect that it was the intention of the C.I.G.S. that I should take APPENDIX "B". over command of the Anglo-French forces when His Majesty's Government decided to end the REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN system of unified command, but that, if on NORWAY. arrival in the Narvik area, local conditions I3th May to 8th June, 1940. appeared to me to necessitate the step, I was to .assume command of the Anglo-French The fottowing report was submitted to the troops, placing myself under Admiral of the Secretary of State for War on iqth June, Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery. 1940, by Lieutenant-General C. J. E. Auchinleck, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E. 5. Before leaving London I appreciated the situation in Northern Norway in the light of Receipt oj Instructions. such' information as was available on the spot, i. On the evening of 28th April I was sum- and informed the C.I.G.S. that in my view, moned by the Chief of the Imperial General the implications of the objects given to me Staff (General Sir E. Ironside) to the War Office were: — and informed by him that I, with part of the (a) The establishment of aerodromes neces- 4th Corps Staff, would .be required to go to sary for the effective operation of an air Narvik in the immediate future. T returned to component. These would include one at 3182 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

Bardu Foss, another in the neighbourhood the North from the direction of Gratangen but of Harstad and probably a third further also cleared the country down to Oijord imme- south possibly at Bodo, with the necessary diately across the Rombaks Fjord from Narvik. complement of anti-aircraft artillery. Although I was present in^the capacity of a (6) The protection of the naval anchorage spectator only, I am constrained to express my which could be defended economically admiration for the way in which the whole against surface, under water and land attack, operation was conceived and effected by all and around which ground anti-aircraft concerned. I was particularly struck by the defences could be installed. business like efficiency of the French Foreign (c) The selection and occupation of an Legion which carried out the landing. That area which could be adequately defended the landing was not interfered with by enemy against sea, land and air attack and within aircraft was almost certainly due to the for- which suitable base installations could be tunate weather conditions prevailing at the developed to supply a force of approximately time. At this period, there were no land based three divisions through the port of Narvik aircraft available in Norway with which to and the railway to Lulea. counter enemy air attacks and a bombing raid I estimated that this area would have to might well have turned the operation from a include not only an area South of Narvik at success into a failure. least as far as the Tysfjord (40 miles South ot Narvik) but also an area East of Narvik along 10. I returned with Lord Cork to Harstad in the frontier. Further, that the Northern por- HM.S. Effingham, arriving on the afternoon tion of the area would have to include flatten of the i3th May. which lies 80 miles North of Narvik at the head Assumption of Command. of the Lyngen Fjord and covers the approaches to Tromso. n. Immediately HM.S. Effingham reached Harstad, Brigadier Fraser, Commander of the 6. I submitted also to the C.I.G.S. a pro- 24th Guards Brigade, came on board with visional estimate of the forces which I con- Colonel Dowler of the General Staff, to discuss sidered would be required. These in general, plans for operations in the Mo and Bodo areas apart from air forces and troops required for with Lord Cork. Owing to ill health, Major- administrative purposes, amounted to twelve General Mackesy was not present. infantry battalions, one or two machine gun battalions, a divisional cavalry regiment 12. With the concurrence of Lord Cork I (mechanised) with a due proportion of artillery listened to the ensuing discussion which centred and engineer units. round the question whether reinforcements In conjunction with the technical experts already embarked at Skaanland should be sent available in the War Office, I estimated the to Bodo or to Mo, where an advanced detach- requirements in anti-aircraft artillery at 144 3.7 ment consisting of ist Battalion Scots Guards guns and 112 Bofors Light Guns. and some " Independent Companies" had already been landed under heavy enemy air Departure for and arrived in Norway. attack. At this conference I told Lord Cork 7. I embarked with an advanced headquarters that, in accordance with my instructions from staff at Leith in the Polish liner Chrobry the War Office, I proposed to assume com- on the 7th May and landed, after an uneventful mand of all military forces forthwith. voyage at Harstad on the nth May. 13. I then gave verbal orders to Brigadier 8. Lord Cork was away in his flagship at Fraser that he was to proceed at once with Skaanland when I landed, but I met Major- ist Battalion Irish Guards and other troops to General Mackesy and his General Staff Officer, Bodo and not to Mo, and that he was to hold Colonel Dowler, at once, and learned the situa- Bodo permanently, and Mo, for as long as he tion from them. Hearing that a landing opera- could. These orders were subsequently con- tion by the French contingent was about to firmed in writing. take place near Bjerkvik at the head of Herjangs Fjord, and that Lord Cork was to direct the 14. On landing from HM.S Effingham I at operation in person, I at once went to Skaanland once informed Major-General Mackesy that I with my Brigadier General Staff, Brigadier had assumed command. Throughout my deal- Gammeil, and met Lord Cork. ings with Major-General Mackesy I found him I explained my position to Lord Cork, and uniformly helpful and informative. In fact, with his approval, remained in HM.S. many of my subsequent actions were based on Effingham with him. Neither General Mackesy information and advice received from 'him. nor any member of his staff was present on the Flagship, though General Bethouart, Command- Situation on i$th May, 1940. ing the French Contingent and his staff 15. Briefly the dispositions, on the I3th-I4th embarked just after myself and remained May, were: — aboard throughout the operation. (a) In the Narvik area: — 9. The landing took place under a heavy i. One battalion Chasseurs Alpins and bombardment from the guns of the Fleet in cold the 2nd (Battalion South Wales and cloudy weather in the early hours of the Borderers on the Ankenes Peninsula I3th May, and, in spite of the fact that there in touch with enemy detachments. was now continuous daylight throughout the but not yet in possession of Ankenes twenty-four hours and appreciable opposition itself, from enemy machine guns on shore, was com- ii. The enemy still in possession of pletely successful. The enemy was ejected from Narvik and the whole peninsula on the area North and East of Herjangs Fjord and which it stands, the French landing parties not only effected a iii Two battalions of the Foreign junction with their own troops advancing from Legion and one battalion of the Polish SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

Contingent holding the area Bjerkvik- 17. The policy of the War Office and the Qijord, and in contact with the enemy French Co-ordinating Staff in London by which to the Eastward. the (French, maintenance system was to be iv. One battalion Chasseurs Alpins to welded into the British system and controlled the North of the Foreign Legion, by Force H.Q. had not been fully realised. having advanced from the direction of This was necessary as the items of supply Gratangen, and in contact with enemy common to both and all reserves of ammunition elements about Hartvigvand. and fighting equipment were to be held in a v. The Norwegian 6th Division (5 bns. common Base Area, whilst Force Headquarters of infantry and a few mountain guns) were to be responsible also for forward mainten- under General Fleischer to the North ance. and East of the Chasseurs Alpins and In actual fact the French had been permitted in touch with .the enemy in the to commence the establishment of a separate Graesdalen valley and to the East of it. Base Area at Ballangen, and provided with vi. A -battalion Chasseurs Alpins near water transport under their own control. As Gratangen. the French Administrative Staff was very small, vii. A Polish battalion near Harstad and and had at its disposal only a few issuers and another at /Ballangen on the south checkers, and no personnel for handling stores, shore of Ofot Fjord and a third at there was a great delay in dealing with their Salangen. store ships; in fact 5 had remained near their (b) In the Mo-Bodo area dispositions Base Area only partially unloaded for 16 days were: — or more. i. ist Battalion Scots Guards less one company and one Independent Com- 18. The reserve of supplies, ammunition and pany at Mo and in contact witih enemy general stores was low for the whole force, this forces which had landed on the situation 'being aggravated by the fact that the Hemnes Peninsula 20 miles south of French had not arrived with 60 days' supplies Mo. This force was under the com- as had been arranged. Motor Transport repair mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Trappes- facilities and spares were almost non-existent. Lomax, Scots Guards, and included 19. At Harstad itself, the number of quays also one troop 2O3rd Field Battery available for unloading ships was sufficient for (four 24-pdr. guns) and one troop .the amount of stores 'going through the Base 55th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Port at that time, but the -facilities for clearing (four Bofors guns). and holding the stores up to the scale of re- ii. In the Bodo area, one company serves to be held, was quite inadequate. The Scots Guards • and three " inde- port had not sufficient accommodation for the pendent " companies. number of personnel required to be accommo- iii. En route to Bodo in M.V. dated in the Base Area, nor were there storage Chrobry the ist Battalion Irish facilities available in sufficient quantity or in Guards, H.Q. 24th Guards Brigade dispersed areas. and detachments of the 230th Field The Medical plan for the evacuation of Allied Company, R.E., and I37th Field casualties through British Medical Units back Ambulance. to the Base was working efficiently, but the iv. Brigadier Fraser proceeded ahead of Dumber of beds available in the General Chrobry in H.M.S. Somali to Mo, Hospital at Harstad was inadequate, as only visiting Bodo on the way. At Mo, news approximately 500 beds were available in three of the bombing of M.V. Chrobry buildings. was received, and H.M.S. Somali at once left to render assistance. On the General survey of events during the period. way, however, Somali was bombed 20. The principal military activities during and had to return to Scapa. Later the period under review were the attempt to Brigadier Fraser succeeded in trans- stabilise the position on our Southern front in ferring to H.M.S. Curlew and arrived the region of Mo and Bodo, the establishment back at Harstad. It was evident that in the theatre of war of land-based aircraft, he ihad not recovered from a wound the organisation of a base and its protection received at Ankenes, and it was there- against attack from the Air. fore necessary to convene a medical board. The Board found that he was These activities are dealt with separately in unfit and he had unfortunately to re- subsequent paragraphs. Other events of in- turn to U.K. terest are described briefly in the following paragraphs. 16. The force was maintained through the Base Area which ihad been established from 21. Throughout the period the enemy was the outset at Harstad, the forward delivery to active in the air and carried out numerous Units and Formations in contact being made by attacks of varying intensity and duration against locally procured water transport to Fjord Head, H.M. Ships and other vessels in the area. where approximately 10 days' reserve supplies, Attacks on ships and other craft in the Ofot etc., were held. Fjord and off Narvik were of daily occurence, Inland Water Transport was thus the main and several attacks were made on Harstad itself agency for forward maintenance. Yet, although and on shipping in the harbour. On May 20th a study of the map would have shown that enemy bombers succeeded in setting light to this was so, no provision had been made to an oil tank at Harstad and two oil tankers send with the Force at the outset the necessary moored in the vicinity were also set on fire personnel to organize and operate Inland Water and burned out. On the whole, 'however, Transport in the way that railway units are except for the damage to shipping which was sent to operate railways in a theatre where the considerable, little harm was caused to Harstad railway is the main transport agency. by these attacks and casualties were few. The SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 effect on the morale of the troops and civil Twelve anti-submarine trawlers. population, however, was considerable. Two submarines. Auxiliary vessels as at present. 22. In spite of arrangements made for co- operation with local military and civil authori- (6) Land. ties by 'Major-General Mackesy and his staff One Divisional Cavalry Regt. prior to my arrival, the relations between the One Squadron Armoured Cars. Allied Forces in Norway and the Norwegian One Mounted Infantry Unit (Lovat's authorities, civil'and military, had never ibeen Scouts). regularised through the proper diplomatic Five Batteries Field Artillery. channels, and co-operation with such Norwegian Two Batteries Medium Howitzers. (orces as remained in being was not made easier Thirteen Batteries (104 guns) Heavy Anti- by this omission to place matters on a proper Aircraft Artillery. political footing. On the i6th May, however, 1 Eight Batteries (96 guns) Light Anti- had a cordial and satisfactory interview at my Aircraft Artillery. Headquarters with General Ruge, Commander- Five Companies Engineers. in-Chief of the Norwegian army, and General Seventeen Infantry Battalions. Fleischer, Commander 6th Norwegian Division, One Machine Gun Battalion. acting in close co-operation with the French forces to the North of the iRombaks Fjord. (c) Air. The Norwegian Generals were insistent on Two Squadrons Hurricane Fighters. the need for preventing Mo and Bodo falling One Bomber Squadron. into the hands of the enemy and stressed their One Army-Co-operation Squadron. desire to pass from the defensive to the offensive I also pointed out, that the first object, and recapture Mosjoen. I explained the Allied namely, the denial of iron ore to Germany situation to them fully. through Narvik, seemed already to have been On 15th May Colonel R. C. G. Pollock, M.C., achieved by the destruction of the facilities at Head of a Military Mission sent out to assist the port, partly by the Germans themselves and my Headquarters to maintain close relations partly by naval bombardment; secondly, that with the Norwegian Government, reported to the interference with the supply of ore to Ger- me and was informed of the situation before he many through Lulea did not seem to be a left for Tromso. practical proposition unless the active and full Sir Cecil Dormer, British Minister in Norway, co-operation of the Swedish armed forces could also arrived from the United Kingdom and be assured; and that therefore the third object, discussed the situation with Lord Cork and namely, the maintenance of the integrity of myself before proceeding to take up his post Northern Norway seemed to be the only one of with the King and Government of Norway. the three that required immediate consideration. The opportunity was taken of impressing on The need for Tromso as a base port in addi- him the urgent need of a closer control of the tion to Harstad was also indicated, as was the civil population in militarily occupied areas. urgency of arriving at some adequate arrange- On 23rd May Lord Cork flew tq Tromso and ment with the Norwegian Government so as to discussed the general situation with the King ensure the efficient control of the civil popula- and members of the Government. As a result tion in the theatre of operations and the desira- of these activities relations with the Norwegian bility of placing all the armed forces in Norway authorities began to assume a more (businesslike under a single Commander-in-Chief. and realistic aspect, particularly in respect of The interdependence from a strategical point the necessary provision of facilities for the of view of Bodo, Narvik and Tromso, and the establishment of a base at Tromso. These the impossibility of treating the defence of any one Norwegians were reluctant to concede on the of them as an isolated problem was also pointed grounds that our presence there would expose out, as was the potential threat involved in the the town to enemy air attack; in fact, they went present defenceless state of the landing grounds so far as to stipulate that unless we provided in Northern Norway at Laxelvn and elsewhere. adequate anti-aircraft artillery protection in the 24. Throughout the period I was in constant area, base facilities could not be provided. touch with Lord Cork from whom as Com- With the help of Colonel Pollock these objec- mander-in-Chief I received my general instruc- tions were eventually overcome, but part of tions.. On i6th May Lord Cork established his my already inadequate allotment of anti-aircraft Headquarters ashore, and a joint Navy and artillery had to ibe diverted to Tromso' as the Army Operational Office was set up at Force War Office could not spare any for this purpose. Headquarters in Harstad. Co-operation was 23. On the i6th May I completed and des- greatly facilitated by these measures. patched the Report to the Chiefs of Staff called 25. During this period General Bethouart for in my original Instructions from the Secre- perfected his plans for the achievement of the tary of State for War. The Report was to the objects assigned to him by me, and his troops, effect that provided the situation generally re- assisted by the Norwegians under the Command mained unchanged it should be possible to of General Fleischer on the eastern flank, con- maintain the integrity of Northern Norway tinued steadily to press back the Germans North with the forces outlined below, and, as well, of the Rombaks Fjord and South of the Beis develop a limited offensive so as to deny the Fjord in circumstances of considerable difficulty landing ground at Mosjoen to the enemy. of terrain and maintenance. 26. On iyth May a telegram was received FORCES REQUIRED. from the Chiefs of Staff to the effect that, owing (a) Sea. to events in France and Belgium, my Force Four cruisers. would be limited to 12 French and 3 British Six destroyers. Battalions, with ten independent companies with Four escort vessels. proportionate artillery, engineers and services, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

48 heavy and 60 light anti-aircraft guns, one In actual fact these proposed dispositions did Hurricane Squadron, one Gladiator Squadron not materialize and the distribution of an^ and, possibly, one Army Co-operation Flight. aircraft artillery at the end of May was: — The telegram also stated that only the first Heavy Light object, namely, the denial of iron ore supplies Situation Guns Guns to Germany through Narvik, and the third, the Bardu Foss ... 12 12 preservation of the integrity of Northern Nor- Sorreisa — 2 way, could ibe accomplished at present, but that Elvenes — 4 the possession of a base in Narvik might make Tromso 4 4 the second abject, namely, the interference of Harstad 12 5 ore supplies to Germany through Lulea, possible Skaanland ... 15 10 in time. The telegram concluded by requesting Ballangen ... — 4 f (Protecting my views as to the retention of Narvik in these Ankenes — 4] French circumstances. Bjerkvik ... — 4 | forward [_ troops) 27. On 2ist May, after consultation with Lord Bodo — 2 (Two lost at Cork and Group Captain Moore, R.A.F., I sent Mo) a reply to the effect that my considered opinion Loaded for Bodo 4 4 was that the land forces suggested by His With the Navy ... — i (in a " Q " Majesty's Government might be sufficient with Ship) certain small additions, that the provision of anti-aircraft artillery was unlikely to be ade- The despatch of the guns to Tromso was in quate should the enemy make heavy air attacks response to a Norwegian demand for pro- and that I adhered to my original estimate of the tection as already recounted. minimum air forces required, namely;1 two Hurricane Fighter Squadrons, one bomber 29. On 24th May telegraphic instructions Squadron and one Army Co-operation were received from the Chiefs of Staff that Squadron. Northern Norway was to be evacuated as soon as possible. 28. Throughout this period the installation of The Reinforcement of Bodo. such anti-aircraft artillery as had been made 30. The security of the vital base area round available for the force, namely, 48 heavy arid Harstad was essential to ensure •the success of 58 light anti-aircraft guns, was pushed forward the operations and was now threatened by the with skill and energy by Brigadier Rossiter, rapid Northward advance of the enemy from- Commanding the Anti-Aircraft Defences. Mosjoen. It was necessary, therefore, to check Except at Harstad itself the disembarkation of this advance, and it appeared to me that it these guns had to be carried out by transferring was essential to hold the port of Bodo so as them into motor landing craft and then ferrying to ensure adequate depth in the defence and them ashore. The extremely mountainous because it was the only port available for use nature of the country increased the difficulty of as an advanced base which still remained to finding suitable positions for the guns, and the us, Mo being already 'threatened by enemy indented character of the coast complicated the forces in its immediate proximity. I therefore maintenance of isolated detachments. In spite decided that an adequate force must be of these olbstacles the establishment of the anti- established in the area. aircraft artillery was effected with commend- I determined to transfer the British Contin- able speed and efficiency and materially added gent to that area and to use the French Con- to the security of the Force and its bases. tingent, helped toy the Norwegian Army, to The allotment of the .limited guns available continue the pressure on the enemy in the was made on the principle that it was only Narvik area. I issued instructions to this possible to give a minimum degree of protec- effect to General Bethouart on I4th May and tion to really vital areas and that smaller and gave him as his task the destruction of the less important areas must go without. enemy forces in that area and the capture of On 20th May I decided that the best disposi- Narvik. tion of these guns would be:— . .... 31. It has already been mentioned that the Situation Heavy Guns 'Light Guns ist Battalion, Irish Guards, and other troops sailed from Harstad on I4th May in the Bardu Foss ...... 8 (16) 12 (24) Chrobry. The ship was attacked and Harstad and Skaanland 24 (48) i8 (36) set on fire by German aircraft when nearing Bodo ... 8 (16) -12(12) Bodo. Six officers of the Irish Guards were Tromso 8(24) 16(24) killed, but nearly all the troops were saved by H.M. Ships Stork and Wolverine, whose com- 48(104)- 58(96) plements showed the greatest courage and resource in the work of rescue, and were The figures in brackets show the number of brought back to Harstad having lost practically guns considered necessary ,to give really ade- the whole of their equipment. quate protection to each area. Realizing the urgency of the situation at Mo, In addition, there were demands for anti-air- I then arranged to send the 2nd Battalion, craft artillery to protect French troops in the for- South Wales Borderers, to Bodo as soon as ward areas round Narvik, at Lodingen at the they could be relieved at Ankenes by a French mouth of Tjelsundet Fjord to protect the coast Battalion. This unit left for Bodo in H.M.S. and naval anti-submarine defences there, to Effingham on I7th May. When Effingham cover the R.D.F. stations to be installed in the was within an hour's steaming of Bodo she Lofoten Islands and elsewhere, and also for the struck an uncharted rock and eventually protection of a third landing ground under pre- became a total loss. The South Wales paration at Elvenes, near Salangen. Borderers and other troops on board were SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 rescued by the Navy without loss of life, but Company of 25 millimetre French anti-tank with the loss of much of their equipment, guns, borrowed from General Bethouart were though the Navy by the most strenuous also embarked for Bodo. exertions managed to save much of it, in- 34. On 23rd May reasonably reliable infor- cluding even some Bren gun carriers, which mation was received of the concentration in the was taken to Bodo in a small craft. A dupli- Mo-Mosjoen area of about 4,000 Germans with cate consignment of stores and ammunition was tanks and artillery. This day the Scots Guards at once despatched to Bodo in small Norwegian withdrew from Hieir position and Brigadier fishing boats (" puffers "). Gubbins decided to relieve them by the Irish I also appointed Colonel Gubbins to the Guards. On 24th May the Scots Guards with- command of the troops in the Bodo-Mo area drew under orders from Brigadier Gubbins in place of Brigadier Fraser, who, as already towards Rognan. mentioned, had proceeded to Scapa Flow in On 24th May intimation of His Majesty's H.M.S, Somali. Government's intention to evacuate Northern Norway was received, and I at once sent Colonel 32. On i5th May as the enemy had outflanked Dowler of the General Staff to acquaint Briga- the Scots Guards in their positions, South of dier Gubbins of the new situation and to con- Mo, Brigadier Gubbins ordered them to with- cert with him plans for the early withdrawal draw. of all his troops from Bodo. On the next day this detachment, which was commanded by Lieut. ^Colonel Trappes-Lomax 35. The operations for the stabilization of the of the Scots Guards, evacuated Mo under pres- position in the Bodo area were marked through- sure. Brigadier G-ubbins went to Mo to out by an unrelenting pressure on the enemy's acquaint himself personally with the situation, part, both on the ground and in the air, and by a steady resistance by our troops, handi- and asked for the support of fighter aircraft, capped as they were by an almost complete of which there were none to be had, excepting absence of any support in the air or any means those in the carriers of the Fleet Air Arm which of hitting back at their enemy. could not be made available at that time. The evacuation of our troops from Bodo On the same day I despatched the Head- is described in- paragraphs 72 to 79. quarters of the 24th Guards Brigade (for the third time) and half the South Wales Borderers 36. The reinforcement of Bodo and the main- in destroyers to Bodo which they reached tenance of troops in that area, caused certain safely on 2oth May. They were followed on administrative difficulties. 2ist May by two Companies of the Irish The Chrobry' conveying the Irish Guards to Guards in " puffers", the journey by Bodo having been sunk, the Irish Guards re- " puffer " taking about 24 hours against nine turned to Harstad by destroyer and had to be by destroyers. completely re-equipped, even down to personal Two more Companies of the Irish Guards clothing of Officers and men. There were suffi- arrived the same day at Bodo in destroyers, cient reserves in the Base to carry out 75 per accompanied by Colonel Dowler of the General cent, of this re-equipping, with the exception Staff, sent by me to make personal contact of certain items of personal clothing which were with Brigadier Gubbins. not available. After H.M.S. Effingham conveying the The troops at Bodo were bombed that day South Wales Borderers to Bodo had been sunk by enemy aircraft. the South Wales Borderers returned to Harstad Brigadier Gubbins had now at his disposal the minus their equipment—although much was three Battalions of the 24th Guards Brigade, salved from the Effingham subsequently. This three independent companies, one troop of Field Battalion had to be re-equipped almost com- artillery and one troop of Bofors guns; and pletely as they were required at once. Reserve seemed satisfied with the situation for the stocks were not sufficient to allow of this and moment. There is no doubt, however, that the equipment had to be withdrawn from Base retardation of the reinforcement of the force by Units. Even then the Battalion could not be the sinkings of the Chrobry and H.M.S. completed with all items. The chief deficiencies Effingham had adversely affected the chances were Mortars, Signalling equipment, Web of stopping the enemy in the narrow defile equipment, Revolvers, Field Glasses, Compasses North of Mo. and Bren guns (these were, however, made up Enemy air attacks on the long and attenuated from other sources). line of communications of the Scots Guards at There were considerable difficulties in supply- Messingletten were causing anxiety to Briga- ing " BODOFORCE ". Destroyers could take dier Gubbins, who was also in urgent need of personnel but very small quantities of stores. small armed vessels to prevent enemy landings Puffers could take stores but no guns or vehicles, at will in his rear. He informed me that he and had to have guards on bo'ard. Even then considered the enemy's comparative freedom to the reliability of the civilian crews was doubt- move troops by sea the most serious feature of ful. There was only one coastal steamer which the situation. was capable of carrying guns and vehicles and 33. On 23rd May I formed the troops in this was in constant demand in the Harstad the area into " BODOFORCE " under Briga- area. Any boat larger than a puffer had to dier Gubbins and amalgamated his Staff with proceed with Naval escort, which was not that of the 24th Guards-Brigade. always available at the time required. This Brigadier Gubbins asked for reinforcements of problem of supplying " BODOFORCE " was infantry, field and anti-aircraft artillery and never solved satisfactorily before the evacua- mechanical transport. Arrangements were made tion. to embark these at Harstad, except as regards The Establishment of the Air Component. the infantry, it being my intention to send him 37. On I3th May the Germans had a powerful three more independent companies which were air force in Southern Norway and several ex- due to arrive from England on 30th. May. A cellent air bases from which to operate it. We, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 on the other hand, had not a single aerodrome landing ground there capable of taking two or landing ground fit for use. The enemy thus squadrons and relatively free of snow, but it had complete mastery in the air, except on the was too far from the scene of active operations. somewhat rare occasions when the Fleet Air Arm were able to intervene with carrier-borne 40. Eventually the first Squadron of Gladiator aircraft. The vigour and daring of the pilots Fighters flew off one of the aircraft carriers of the Fleet Air Arm when they were able to on the 2ist May andi was safely estab- engage the enemy earned the admiration of the lished at Bardu Foss, with the loss of two air- whole Force, but even their strenuous efforts craft from crashes into the mountain side in could not compensate for the absence of land bad weather. Just, before their arrival anti- based aircraft owing to the unavoidable relative aircraft artillery, heavy and light, had been weakness of performance of carrier-borne installed at Bardu Foss after much labour and aircraft. energy had been expended in their disembarka- tion and subsequent transport by road from the 38. Shortly before Group Capt. Moore, sea. The importance of giving this one and only R.A.F., who had been selected to command the aerodrome the maximum degree of" protection Air Component, and I arrived in the theatre of against air attack was so great that its defence operations, an energetic and inspiring start in was given priority over all other needs. Twelve the selection and preparation of-possible landing heavy and sixteen light anti-aircraft guns were grounds had been made by Wing Comd. installed there. Atcherley, R.A.F., who carried out this difficult It was not until 26th May, that is two days task with great energy and perseverance. after the orders to evacuate Norway had been Group Capt. Moore pushed on the work with received, that it was possible to receive the the utmost determination and was ably assisted second squadron, consisting of Hurricane by Brigadier Pyne, my Chief Engineer. The fighters, at Skaanland. Even then, this landing work of preparation was hampered by much of ground proved unequal to the weight of these the country being still under deep snow, making aircraft and they too had to be operated from it impossible to determine whether expanses of Bardu Foss which remained the sole landing a reasonable size and flatness would prove suit- ground in regular use until the final evacuation. able for landing grounds in respect of their 41. At the cost of a great amount of skill and surfaces. The mountainous nature of the energy on the part of Wing Commander Maxton, country forced upon us the selection and R.A.F., an advanced landing ground was got development of the most unlikely sites, of which ready at Bodo and used with great effect by that at Skaanland was an example. Few lay- our aircraft in support of the troops in that area men would have thought it possible that this until it was so heavily bombed by enemy air- site could possibly be made into a landing craft as to be unusable without extensive ground for Hurricane fighter aircraft. repairs. 39. The need for some support in the air for 42. Once established, the R.A.F. soon proved both the sea and land forces was urgent, particu- their superiority over the enemy bombers and larly for H.M. Ships which were suffering fighters, and I have no doubt that the com- heavily from the daily and almost continuous parative immunity from air attack enjoyed by attacks made on them dn the narrow waters tiie forces during the later phases of the cam- round Narvik by the thoroughly efficient enemy paign was due to the severe losses inflicted by bomber aircraft. Nevertheless, Group Capt. our aircraft on those of the enemy. The effect Moore rightly, in my opinion, resisted all on the morale of the force as a whole of their pressure to induce him to call for the aircraft to vigorous and successful operations was most be sent before he was quite satisfied that the marked. landing grounds could be said to be reasonably In general terms, my instructions to Group ready to receive them. Capt. Moore for the employment of his fighter The existing landing ground at Bardu Foss, aircraft were: — 50 miles north of Narvik, was selected to be (a) To protect from hostile air attack the the main air base and work to make it fit for following: — fighters was pressed on with the utmost energy (i) The Naval anchorage at Skauland and in face of considerable difficulties, not the and its approaches, least of which was the conditioning of the road to it from Sorreisa at which place all stores, (ii) The base at Harstad. vehicles and equipment had to be disembarked (iii) Allied sea and land forces in con- from the ships in landing craft. tact with the enemy, The preparation of the new landing ground (iv) Airfields occupied by the R.A.F. at Skaanland also presented great difficulties (fc) The primary aim of fighter aircraft and even the laying of a specially prepared mat should be to destroy enemy aircraft approach- brought out from the United Kingdom failed ing the areas to be protected. to overcome the softness of the surface caused (c) To co-operate closely with the land by the peaty nature of the soil. forces operating against the enemy when re- Another possible site was found at Elvenes quired. near Salangen, north-east of Harstad, and was Organization of the Base. ' put in hand as an alternative landing ground, 43. A Maintenance Project had been pre- while work was also commenced at Elvegaard, pared by my Administrative Staff whilst waiting near Bjerkvik, as soon as the enemy had been in London before we sailed. This envisaged the ejected from this area by the successful French creation of a main Base Area at Skaanland with landing on I3th May. a Hospital Area at Harstad, and personnel on The possibility of operating aircraft from the coast road running South. Skaanland would Lakelvn on Forsanger Fjord, east of Hammer- have come under the same A.A. protection as fest was also considered as there is an excellent the Naval Anchorage. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

44. Previous to my arrival, owing to the poor installations was procurable and generally result of a reconnaissance of the Skaanland worked well, though it would not have been Area, a representative party of the Services had sufficient to maintain the roads and assist on proceeded to Tromso with a view to investi- a large scale scheme of hutting. gating what facilities existed there. They had 50. It was soon realised that a comprehen- reported that provided assistance was forth- sive scheme for the control of the civil popula- coming from the Norwegian authorities, Tromso tion and that certain evacuations in the Base was suitable for the handling and storage of and forward areas would be required for security large quantities of stores, and could probably reasons. An added reason was to ensure that provide sufficient accommodation for the Gen- maximum use could be made of existing eral Hospital, but that labour was scarce. accommodation for the housing of personnel Immediately on arrival the D.A. & Q.M.G. and stores during the coming winter in order visited the Skaanland Area after having .seen to reduce the hutting programme to a mini- the facilities available at Bars-tad, and reported to me that Skaanland could not be developed as mum. Negotiations were going on with this in a Base Area before the arrival of the winter view when operations ceased. snows owing to the large amount of construc- General Survey of Events during the Period tional work on unsuitable ground that would from 2$th May to 2nd June 1940. be necessary. It was therefore decided to send 51. The principal military operations during a further reconnaissance to Tromso with a view this period were the capture of Narvik and the to establishing a Base Sub-Area there to include evacuation of Bodo. These are described in the General Hospital, Supply Depot, Ordnance subsequent paragraphs. Depot, and certain reserves, the remainder of the base facilities being located at Harstad with 52. During the period our fighter aircraft an Ammunition Depot at Fjeldal near Skaan- were exceedingly active and caused heavy land. casualties to the enemy. As already mentioned, the Hurricane fighter squadron arrived on 45. This layout was about to be implemented 26 May, and, after an abortive attempt to base when it was decided that the operations were, it on Skaanland, was finally located at Bardu not to be proceeded with. Foss with the Gladiator squadron. 46. During the period Harstad was being Enemy activity in the air was increasingly bombed from the air, i.e. up to the end of the evident at the commencement of the period third week in May, certain dispersion of stores under review and there were several heavy at Harstad was made by increasing the reserves raids on Harstad, Bardu Foss, Skaanland and held forward and moving certain Base stocks Bodo, the newly-prepared landing ground at into the surrounding countryside. the last-named place being so badly cratered as to be unusable. General Remarks on Administration 13-24 May. As a result of these attacks H.M.Ss. 47. As will be seen- from paragraph 16, Southampton and Cairo were damaged and the weak link in the administrative system was sustained a number of casualties in personnel, the locally procured Inland Water Transport while on 26 May H.M.S. Curlew was hit by a which the Navy and Army had improvised. It bomb at Skaanland and became a total loss. was weak because the crafts were owner-driven On 29 May the Mashobra, mobile base ship, Diesel engined fishing craft of 10 to 50 tons and had to be beached as the result of bombing also because of the lack of adequate control or attacks and also became a total loss. organization. In consequence, though willing Towards the end of the period enemy air workers, the personnel could not be relied upon, activity was less noticeable, presumably owing whilst the distances to be covered were great. to the activity of our fighters and the prevalence All immediately procurable craft (" puffers ") of low clouds and mist. and seven small coastal steamers, two of which were used as Hospital Carriers, were located at 53. Throughout this period close touch was Harstad and in the vicinity of the forward Field kept with Colonel Pollock, Head of the Mission Supply Depots. at Tromso, and much valuable information re- garding the trend of Norwegian politics and 48. Owing to the lack of control, the crews opinion was obtained from him. and Dock Labourers at one time stood down 54. On 29th May, after consultation with during the period of the bombing attacks on General Bethouart 'and myself, Lord Cork Harstad. It was decided that the Army should telegraphed to the'Chiefs of Staff requesting take over the running of Inland Water Trans- that the decision, as to how and when the port, and procure British personnel from home intention to evacuate Norway was to be com- for this purpose. In the meanwhile, the Navy municated to the Norwegian Government and would continue to run it under Force Head- military commanders, should be left to him, quarters through the A.D.Tn. with certain Army otherwise the tactical situation might be gravely personnel placed on board to ensure a measure compromised to the detriment, not only of our of availability of the crafts themselves, together troops, but also the Norwegian troops. with their personnel. On the same day information received from 49. Great difficulties were-experienced in the Colonel Pollock at Tromso indicated that owing handling of heavy equipment and stores at to the evacuation of Bodo, the Norwegian places other than Harstad, as there was no Government were greatly disturbed and might means of putting them ashore except by Motor possibly ask for a separate armistice regardless Landing Craft. These were few in number and of the military situation. were also required for tactical operations. In I received an urgent request from General consequence the establishment of A. A. Guns in Fleischer on 30th May to reconsider the decision position and the creation and stocking of aero- to evacuate Bodo and for protection of his troops dromes at Bardu Foss and Skaanland were in that area. In actual fact, all Norwegian seriously delayed. Labour for the creation of troops withdrew from the neighbourhood of the aerodromes and for working in the Base Bodo without loss and escorted by a destroyer. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 3189 On ist June Sir Cecil Dormer, H.M. Minister men in the first landing party had to be reduced in Norway, and Colonel Pollock flew from to 290, the numerical weakness of which caused Tromso and discussed His Majesty's Govern- considerable anxiety both to General Bethouart ment's instructions regarding the procedure to and myself. be adopted towards the Norwegian Govern- ment with Lord Cork and myself and then 61. The operation was originally intended to returned by air to Tromso. take place on the night 24/251*1 May, but at On 2nd June a telegram from Sir Cecil a conference with General Bethouart on 23rd Dormer urging postponement of the commence- May I came to the conclusion that unless the .ment of the evacuation for twenty-four hours weather was very propitious it would be an to enable the Norwegian Government to get unjustifiable risk to undertake it with the into touch with the Swedish Government was support of only one fighter squadron of aircraft, received. Lord Cork discussed the suggestion in view of the strength and efficiency of the with me, with General Bethouart present, and, enemy bombers. I decided therefore that it as a result, the postponement was agreed to. should be postponed until after the arrival of the Hurricane fighter squadron which was due 55. In order to make it easier for the on 27th May. Lord Cork agreed with this Norwegian troops to extricate themselves when decision. the French finally withdrew from the neigh- bourhood of Narvik, I wrote to General 62. After taking this decision the news of the Fleischer on 2nd June asking him to withdraw intention of His Majesty's Government to his battalion in Narvik to North of Rombaks evacuate Northern Norway was received, and Fjord. it became necessary to consider whether the operation was to be proceeded with or not. The Capture of Narvik. After consulting General Bethouart, I recom- 56. After the successful landing near Bjerkvik mended to Lord Cork that it should be carried and the subsequent operations which resulted out as intended on the night of 27/28th May. in the clearing of the Oijord Peninsula and the In doing so I considered that, apart from the North shore of the Rombaks Fjord as far East desirability of making sure whether the as Lilleberget, General Bethouart continued, in facilities for shipping ore from Narvik had in accordance with my instructions, to perfect his fact been destroyed as thoroughly as had been plans for the capture of Narvik. Until the reported, the chances that a successful attack ground North of the Eastern entrance of the would do much to conceal our intention to Rombaks Fjord had been cleared an assault on evacuate the country in the immediate future Narvik would have had to be launched on would outweigh the possible disadvantages in- •difficult beJaches which were believed to be volved in extending our commitments by strongly defended by machine guns. Further- establishing troops in close contact with the more, such an operation could not have come enemy on the Narvik Peninsula, where his main as a surprise, since the ships and landing craft force was thought to be located. would have had to be marshalled in Ofot Fjord in daylight in full view of the enemy. 63. The operations were timed to begin at 2340 hours on 27th May when three cruisers 57. Our hold on the Northern shore of and five destroyers steamed into position in the Rombaks Fjord widened the front on which mouth of the Rombaks Fjord and commenced the attack could be launched and permitted it their bombardment. Admiral Lord Cork flew to be supported by French field artillery, estab- his flag in H.M.S. Cairo in which ship I accom- lished North of Oijord. The first echelon of panied him, together with General Bethouart attackers, with the necessary landing craft could and his Staff. H.M.S. Southampton was de- now be assembled secretly under cover of tached to work at the mouth of Narvik Harbour Oijordneset point and emerge thence less than to afford support to the Polish troops on the a mile from their objective behind the bom- Ankenes Peninsula. The Naval bombardment barding ships of the Royal Navy. on the Narvik Peninsula was on a wide front, 58. After careful reconnaissance, General the targets selected being the mouths of the Bethouart decided to land the first flight at a tunnels of the railway and other suspected beach East of Orneset, and subsequently to machine gun and artillery positions. The fire transfer a total of three battalions,-.including a of the guns of the ships and the French field Norwegian battalion, across the Rombaks Fjord artillery was heavy and accurate, but close from Oijord by motor landing craft. • When support of the attacking troops was hampered established ashore, this force, having first throughout by the broken nature of the terrain blocked the approach of enemy reinforcements and the difficulty of accurate observation in the from Sildvik by securing a strong position birch scrub which covered the lower slopes of astride the railway, was to advance across the the hills. Peninsula and take the town from the rear. 64. The initial landing was hardly opposed 59. The assault on Narvik was to be accom- and was accomplished with little loss, the first panied by an attack towards Beisfjord by the contingent of troops quickly being successfully Polish troops established on the Ankenes established on shore. The subsequent move- Peninsula, with the objects of containing enemy ment of troops across the Rombaks Fjord was troops in that area, and of threatening the hampered for short periods by a small gun firing • enemy's line of retreat from Narvik by the road from further to the East on the South shore. running along the North shore of the Beisijord. This gun caused some casualties, but was soon silenced by'Naval gun fire, and by 0330 hours 60. The landing operation was rendered par- one battalion of the Foreign Legion and the ticularly hazardous by the scarcity ofjanding Narvik battalion of the Norwegian Army were craft which, owing to enemy action and ashore on the Peninsula. mechanicalt breakdown, had been reduced to three assault landing craft and two motor 65. While this operation was in progress, the landing craft. This meant that the number of enemy launched a strong counter attack from 3igo SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 the East, and the forward troops had to fight might well have resulted in failure. Not only hard for a time to maintain their positions; had the strength of the first echelon to be put this forward movement by the enemy enabled ashore to be limited to 290 men, ibut this small him to bring the landing beach under fire for force had to maintain itself unsupported for an appreciable period during which Com- forty-five minutes. Had the enemy been able mandant Paris, Chief of Staff to General to launch an immediate counter attack the Bethouart, was killed in a landing craft. The result might have been disastrous. It must counter attack was beaten off, and the advance always, in my opinion, be unwise to embark inland resumed. Two French tanks were also on operations of this character unless landing ferried across in motor landing craft and craft are available to land a first flight of ade- landed successfully, but unfortunately they quate strength, and, in addition, provide an were bogged on the beach and played no part adequate floating -reserve to meet unforeseen in the operation for the capture of the town. contingencies. Moreover, the absence of bomber aircraft deprived the attack of one of 66. Arrangements had been made for a con- the most effective means of repulsing an enemy tinuous patrol to be flown by our two counter attack, as has already ibeen mentioned squadrons of fighter aircraft over the area the broken and intricate nature of the ground throughout the operation. This was carried out prevented accurate observation by the support- from 1915 hours on 27th May until 1615 hours ing ships and artillery. The risk, however, was, on 29th May with the one brief enforced in my opinion, worth taking, and, as things interval mentioned below. No enemy aircraft turned out, was justified. appeared in the area until about 0500 hours, a 71. I wish particularly to commend the work circumstance which seems to show that the of Commander Hubback, R.N., of the Naval operation came as a surprise to the enemy. Staff, upon -whom rested practically the whole Unfortunately just about this time our own air- responsibility for the co-ordination of the Naval craft became fogbound on Bardu Foss aero- share in the operation with that of the French drome, 50 miles to the North and could no troops. It is no exaggeration to say that the longer protect the ships and troops. From success of the operation was largely due to his 0500 hours to 0700 hours numerous enemy air- unremitting application to the work in hand, craft, often flying in formation, made repeated and his excellent judgment and sound common- bombing atacks upon H.M. Ships round Narvik sense. The work of the Naval officers and and on the troops on shore. By this time, how- ratings who manned the landing craft and super- ever, the task of the ships had been substantially vised the difficult task of embarkation and dis- completed, and, by constant manoeuvring, they embarkation on open beaches, often under fire, succeeded in avoiding serious damage, though was, in my opinion, magnificent and deserving the flagship, H.M.S. Cairo, was hit by two* of the highest praise. bombs and lost 30 men killed and wounded. The casualties to the landing forces from bomb- The evacuation of Bodo. ing amounted to only one small craft loaded 72. Prior to the receipt of instructions from with ammunition. His Majesty's Government to evacuate Northern 67. Once the initial landing had succeeded Norway, it had 'been my intention to use every the progress of General Bethouart's troops was means to reinforce the troops in the Bodo area. steady and continuous. From reports sub- I had akeady in mind a plan to send down a sequently received it appears that the enemy battalion of Chasseurs Alpin, in order to have withdrew in considerable haste eastwards along troops specially trained in mountain warfare to oppose the advance of the German infantry the Beisfjord, and by 2200 hours the whole which was being carried out with great skill and Peninsula west of a line from Fagernes to vigour. Once the decision to evacuate Norway Forsneset was in French hands, together with had been made however, it was obvious thai some 200 prisoners. the evacuation of the troops from Bodo must 68. After an initial set-back the Polish troops be carried out as promptly as possible, as I also pressed forward along the Ankenes Penin- had akeady received reports from Brigadier sula and established themselves on high ground Gubbins that, without further reinforcements, overlooking Beisford. he was doubtful whether he could hold on 69. Thus ended an operation which, in -my for more than a few days. opinion, reflects great credit on the judgment 73. On receipt of the instructions for evacuation and pertinacity of General Bethouart and on from the Chiefs of Staff I therefore immediately the fighting qualities of his troops. Recon- despatched Colonel Dowler, my G.S.O.i, to naissance after the capture of the town revealed Bodo in a destroyer, which was conveying the the full difficulties of landing on the beaches last company of the South Wales Borderers to close to the town and the wisdom of the plan join the rest of its battalion, to concert plans finally adopted. Though he knew of the deci- with Brigadier Gubbins for the withdrawal of sion to evacuate Norway before the operation his force. started, General Bethouart persevered with his 74. In view of the heavy and repeated air plan and the vigour with which the advance attacks which were being made upon the town, eastwards was pressed after the capture of the docks and aerodrome at Bodo, it was decided town drove the enemy back on to his main in consultation with Lord Cork, that evacua- position covering Sildvik and Hundalen, thus tion !by destroyers provided the best chance of making it difficult for him to attempt a counter- evacuating personnel without serious loss. This attack against Narvik at short notice; this en- decision meant abandoning the few wheeled abled the subsequent evacuation to be carried vehicles and guns with the force, but in view of out under more favourable tactical conditions my instructions that the first consideration was than at one time seemed likely. to save personnel, and also in view of the fact 70. Nevertheless, it is 'my considered opinion that no suitable ship for embarking wheeled that the operation was carried out with the vehicles and stores was immediately available, barest margin of safety, and for this reason no other course was practicable. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 •3T(

• 75. Arrangements were therefore made to 78. The swiftness and efficiency with which send two destroyers to em-bark 500 men each the evacuation was carried out reflects great at 2300 hrs. 29th May and three destroyers credit on Brigadier Gubbins and his staff. The on each of the two succeeding nights soth and destroyers of the Royal Navy were very well 3ist May, to embark two further parties of handled and carried out the programme laid 1,500 men each. Early on 26th May when the down to the minute. Four 25-pr. -guns, four orders to prepare for the evacuation reached Bofors guns, and three Bren carriers which had Brigadier Guibbins, the main position held by been salved from H.M.S. Effingham had to be his Force was some 40 miles from Bodo, in abandoned together with such material as could the neighbourhood of Fauske. not 'be moved by the men, but some wireless Orders were issued by Brigadier Gufobins for sets and all the arms and equipment, including two Independent Companies and administrative Bren 'guns and anti-tank rifles, which could be details to concentrate at Bodo at once and for carried by the men, were brought away. the withdrawal firtom the position north of 79. The first echelon to be embarked were Fauske to start next day. transferred at sea from the destroyers to H.M.S. 76. The general plan was that the 1st Bn. Vindictive and conveyed direct to the United Irish Guards and three Independent Companies, Kingdom. Owing to the fact that transports which were all under the command of Lt.-Col. for the second and third echelons had not Stockwell, should withdraw from the position arrived in time to admit of their direct tran- held north of Fauske and pass through the shipment, the troops comprised in these were Scots Guards who were to be placed in position landed at Borkenes to the east of Harstad and on a neck of land between the sea and a lake re-embarked later as part of the general near Hopen. evacuation programme. Having passed through the Scots Guards the General considerations in the evacuation o/ Irish Guards and the Independent Companies Norway. were to move straight to Bodo and embark. The third battalion of the 24th Guards 80. As mentioned akeady His Majesty's Brigade, namely the 2nd Bn. The South Wales Government's orders to evacuate Northern Nor- Borderers, was to be placed in position across way were received by Lord Cork and com- the Bodo peninsula further to the west astride municated at once by him to me. The informa- Lake Soloi. tion was passed on by me to a few selected The withdrawal of the Irish Guards and the senior staff officers. General Bethouart v/as Independent Companies was carried out with- informed by me in Lord Cork's presence. out interference from the enemy's land forces, The news was not imparted to my heads of though the rear party passed through the Hopen services or to junior staff officers until May position less than an hour (before the enemy's 29th. In the meanwhile, though many steps advanced troops, consisting of cyclists and were taken in preparation for evacuation, such machine guns, made contact with the Scots as the loading of arms and stores in ships and the Guards. embarkation of certain personnel, the deception The enemy were at once engaged and the was maintained and fostered by all possible bridge at Hopen was destroyed. This checked means that these activities were concerned with the pursuit and the Germans made no move- the reinforcement of Bodo, the establishment ment during the next day. of the Tromso base or the occupation of Ham- During the withdrawal on the last night the merfest and the landing ground in the far North. enemy again followed up with cyclists and Thanks to the loyalty and" discretion of those machine guns, but no serious pressure concerned, the secret was well kept, and even developed and no delay occurred. those who might have suspected wjere kept constantly confused by conflicting rumours and One company from the Scots Guards and bogus instructions sedulously circulated by one company from the South Wales Borderers those staff officers in the know. with four 25-por. guns were placed in position some 4 kilometres east of the town and formed 81. The successful French operations round the final rearguards. These companies with- Narvik resulted in there being three Polish drew to the quay without difficulty by battalions in the area Ankenes-Beisford in touch previously reconnoitred routes. with the enemy north east of the latter place. East of Narvik the Foreign Legion had made 77. During the three days covering the period steady progress toward Sildvik and had of the re-embarkation several bombing attacks met with increasing enemy resistance. A were carried out 'by the enemy on Bodo and its Norwegian battalion was in Narvik. On the vicinity, but during none of the three periods north shore of the Rombaks Fjord a battalion when the actual embarkation of troops was in of Chasseurs was in close touch with German progress was there any interference from enemy outposts opposite Stromsnes, while General aircraft in spite of the fact that there Fleischer's 6th Norwegian Division (5 battalions) was continual daylight. This was probably due were holding from the left of the Chasseurs to to unfavourable flying conditions during the the Swedish frontier north of Bjornefjell, also first two days. On. the last day however, the in touch with the enemy. weather cleared. General Bethouart was particularly anxious . The times chosen were round about midnight that the withdrawal of his troops should not when enemy air activity was normally at its compromise or endanger the Norwegian troops lowest. in his sector. The original programme of Fortunately the quay at Bodo had not evacuation was timed to begin on the night suffered from enemy air attacks and this en- 2nd/3rd June, but was postponed 24 hours at abled destroyers to go alongside without diffi- the urgent request of Sir Cecil Dormer in order culty. The embarkations were carried through to enable the Norwegian Government to try to with great rapidity, 500 men of one battalion implement the so called " Mowinckel Plan " embarking with their kits in less than ten through the Swedish Government and so ensure minutes. that Narvik should become a neutral area under 3IQ2 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947

Swedish protection. In view of the probability In actual fact, owing to the inactivity of the of heavy enemy air attacks on Harstad I agreed enemy it was found possible to save anti-air- to this postponement with great reluctance. craft guns and to fly all the aircraft on to the aircraft carrier Glorious, which was, however, 82. The Norwegian high command was in- unfortunately sunk later by enemy warships on formed by its Government of the impending her way to Scapa Flow. evacuation and after a very natural display of 85. My chief preoccupation from the tactical great disappointment, continued to co-operate point of view was the disengagement, with- loyally to the end, although they might with drawal and embarkation from open beaches some justification, have decided to lay down into fishing boats, re-embarkation into their arms at once and so gravely prejudice our destroyers and final embarkation into transports withdrawal. It was a trying period for all con- at sea, of the French troops in contact with the cerned, throughout which Colonel Pollock, head enemy round Narvik. This was most carefully of the Military Mission at Tromso, was of the and successfully effected by General Bethouart greatest assistance to Lord Cork and myself; in ably assisted by Commander Hubback, R.N., spite of everything he managed to maintain cor- to both of whom great credit is due. dial relations with the Norwegian authorities to the last. 86. The personnel who had already been sent to Tromso in connection with the organization 83. Bodo having been evacuated there was a of a base and the installation of anti-aircraft distinct though not perhaps grave, danger that artillery at that place, together with the mem- the enemy working up the coast might appear bers of the military mission, the King and on the south shores of the Ofot and Vest Fjords the Government were evacuated in H.M.S. and embarrass our withdrawal from there; all Devonshire under arrangements made by Lord craft carrying French troops from the Narvik- Cork and the authorities on the spot. Ankenes area had to pass through the Tjelsundet The anti-aircraft guns (4 heavy and 4 light) Fjord.past Harstad and beyond before re-em- were handed over to General Rug6, Com- barkation into transports could take place. There mander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Army. was also a risk that enemy detachments, sea or air borne, might effect a landing .on the long 87. The entire process of embarkation, indented coast line of Hinnoy Island on which whether from beaches or quays, in fishing boats, Harstad stands and directly interfere with our destroyers or directly into transport went with main embarkation centre. the greatest smoothness and celerity and re- To counter these possible dangers, patrols by flects the greatest possible credit on all con- warships and aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and cerned. The morale and cheerfulness of the by motorised troops on the island of Hanoy, troops remained high throughout, although were organised and maintained throughout the their destination was not known to them until evacuation period. they were actually on the high seas so well was the secret kept. The telephonic communications with Bodo and the south were also forcibly severed, much 88. The French Chasseurs furnished the final to the annoyance of the local Norwegian autho- rear-guard round Harstad but the actual rear rities who had no understanding of the needs party round the quays was found by the Royal of war. Engineers and Military Pplice. There was no In actual fact the Germans did work up the disorder or unpleasantness of any kind. coast as fast as they could in the face of inter- Evacuation of Personnel. ference by the Navy, but only succeeded in reaching the neighbourhood of Ballangen with 89. The problem was examined in conjunc- a few parachutists on the final evening of the tion with the Navy after an estimate had been evacuation. made of the numbers to be evacuated, and the probable dispositions at the time of 'breaking The weather throughout the evacuation period contact. As a result of this the F.O. Narvik (June 3rd to 8th) remained generally overcast sent an agreed wire to the Admiralty outlining and dull. I can only assume that it was to this the suggested proposals for evacuation. This factor and to the genuine fear which our fighter was agreed to and a sufficient number of large aircraft had succeeded in inspiring in the Ger- liners was despatched from the United King- man bombers that the embarkation of some dom together with three store ships and one 27,000 men was carried out with practically no horse ship. The time taken for us to evacuate interference from the air. the personnel was five days. It was lucky that this was so, as a well directed attack on the quays at Harstad or the 90. In the case of Harstad parties embarked beaches round Narvik might have had a very direct on to destroyers, whilst at Skaanland serious effect on the completion of the pro- and in the Narvik and Sorreisa areas embarka- gramme. As it was, the embarkation proper tion was by means of " puffer " from land to •was carried out without a casualty, though destroyers lying off. The destroyers then pro- there were losses from enemy air attacks during ceeded approximately 70 miles to rendezvous the period. where they loaded direct to liners, three of which were filled at a time. These in turn 84. My instructions from the C.I.G.S. were to moved to anchorages in the Fjords awaiting the effect that the primary object was to save orders for the forming of the main convoy, and bring away personnel, and that the salvage which was done during the night 7th /8th June. of arms, equipment and stores was a secondary At each embarkation place, alternative points object. With this in view I gave orders that if for embarkation were selected in case of bomb- necessary all anti-aircraft artillery was to be ing, whilst a reserve of " puffer " craft was kept in action till the last moment and that all held at each locality to meet all probable fighter aircraft were to be kept in operation eventualities. These craft were formed into till the last man was evacuated and then small fleets with an Army officer in charge, destroved. and two British O.Rs. on board each ship. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 3*93 gi. Troops in contact in the Narvik area were followed almost immediately by landings from embarked on the last day into six destroyers seaplanes in two places on each flank of the under the control of Commander Hubback, peninsula. Once these landings had been R.N., who supervised with the assistance of secured they were promptly reinforced by small certain British officers, the embarkation of the coastal steamers and further reinforcements 2,500 French troops. were brought up to the outflanking detachments by seaplanes on succeeding days. In addition, Losses and Casualties. seaplanes were used to ferry troops for further 92. The total losses apart from Naval and outflanking movements. Bicycles, mortars and Air Force casualties, incurred during the period motor cycles were carried in the seaplanes for I3th May-8th June were approximately 235 all this purpose. ranks killed, 535 wounded and 200 missing. The possibility of the enemy carrying out Of the above French casualties amounted to such outflanking movements caused continuous 170 killed and 360 wounded and missing. dispersion of the troops trying to hold defensive Conclusion—Lessons of the Operations. positions during the withdrawal and prevented 93. The predominant factor in the recent sufficient concentration to enable any of the operations has been the effect of air power. positions selected to be held successfully. In the operations which culminated in the 97. The enemy's ability to supply detach- evacuation of Bodo the enemy had complete ments 'by air enabled him to neglect or over- initiative in the air, and used it, first, to sup- come many of the obstacles put in his way by port his troops: — demolitions. (a) By low-flying attacks. The outstanding example of the supply by (6) By bombing. air is the maintenance of the German detach- (c) By surprise landings of troops by ments in the Narvik area. In this area his parachute and from seaplanes. troops to the number of three or four thousand (d) By supplying his advanced detach- have been successfully supplied by air for many ments by air. weeks, partly by seaplanes landed on the And secondly, to deny us the use of sea Beisfjord, partly by aircraft landed on frozen communications in the narrow coastal waters lakes or small landing grounds, and partly by in the theatre of operations. the dropping of containers attached to parachutes. 94. The actual casualties caused to troops on the ground by low-flying attacks were few, From the repoi ts received, the enemy operat- •but the moral effect of continuous machine- ing in the mountainous country 12 to 15 miles gunning from .the air was considerable. North of Narvik were plentifully supplied with Further, the enemy made repeated use of low- all their requirements. A large number of flying attacks with machine guns in replace- cardboard containers were found in Narvik, ment of artillery to cover the movement of his and it is reported that large quantities of perish- troops. Troops in forward positions subjected able foodstuffs, such as vegetables, ega;s and to this form of attack are forced to ground, butter from Denmark, were successfully and, until they have learned by experience its dropped in Narvik from the air. comparative innoccuousness, are apt not to keep 98. As regards the control of sea communi- constant watch on the enemy. Thus the enemy cations, the enemy's supremacy in the air made were enabled on many occasions to carry out the use inshore of naval vessels of the type co- forward and outflanking movements with operating with this force highly dangerous and impunity. uneconomical. Though it might have been The second effect of low-flying attacks was possible to use high speed coastal motor borts the partial paralysis of headquarters and the armed with small guns to prevent movement consequent interruption in the exercise of of enemy craft in these waters, the use of command. trawlers, owing to their extreme vulnerability Thirdly, low-flying attacks against transport to air attack, was not considered practicable. moving along narrow roads seriously interfered On the other hand, the inshore waterways were with supply, though this was never completely used at will by the Germans, who constantly interrupted. employed local boats and steamers to ferry 95. Bombing was not effective against their troops about thus entailing more dis- personnel deployed in the open, -but this again persion of the defending forces on land. interfered with the .functioning of headquarters In an attempt to send considerable reinforce- and the movement of supplies. ments and wheeled vehicles to Bodo, the Polish The enemy's use of aircraft in these two steamer Ckro-bry was sunk before she methods of offence was obviously most closely reached port. The unloading of large supply co-ordinated with the action of his forward ships which, owing to the limited faculties troops, and showed a very high degree of co- available, would have taken- many hours, had operation between his Air Force and his Army, to be ruled out as impracticable and reinforce- particularly in view of the fact that his aero- ments to Bodo could therefore be sent only by dromes were distant from the actual fighting. destroyer or by small local craft. Thus the provision of adequate reinforcements in guns 96. Surprise landings from aircraft had far- and vehicles was made extremely difficult. reaching effects owing to the ability they con- ferred on the enemy to outflank positions or 99. The second main factor which has take them in the rear. affected the operations in this theatre has been The action on the Hemnes Peninsula, South training. It has been brought out that for of Mo, provides an outstanding example of operations of this nature thoroughly trained these tactics. The sequence of this action was soldiers only are of any real value, and that first bombing and low-flying attacks on our every officer and man must be physically hard *roops holding the position. These attacks were and fit. D 3^94 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 The first need is for troops trained to move a proportion only of fur-lined coats, sufficient freely over hilly country and physically fit to for guards and sentries, need have been issued. carry the " soldier's load " for long periods It is considered that gas masks and steel under active service conditions. The enemy helmets need not usually be worn in operations appeared to be superior to our troops in this of this nature. respect, and his mobility and powers of en- In country such as this, some form of pack durance were remarkable. In this connection transport is essential to ensure full mobility. I wish to record my opinion that the '' soldier's The Germans made considerable use of im- load " is still far too great. pressed ponies, and also of Norwegians The second need is a proper appreciation of impressed as porters. the value of ground and the willingness to quit 102. Such demolitions as were carried out had valleys sind get up on to high ground with surprisingly little result in stopping the enemy confidence and determination. even though effected with complete thorough- The third need is the vital necessity for ness. It is believed that the Germans made ex- initiative and self-reliance on the part of sub- tensive use of improvised rafts and rubber boats ordinate commanders, and the necessity for to cross rivers and narrow fjords. In fact the teaching them that a weak threat to a flank can enemy's thoroughness and foresight in provid- be ignored and need not be a menace entailing ing everything required for fighting were extra- general retirement. ordinary. 100. As regards equipment, the following 103. Co-operation with the Navy in the land- lessons emerged: — ing operations carried out by the French Army (a) The need for an automatic weapon has been close and effective, but the operations capable of producing sustained and accurate have been handicapped to a marked degree by fire at long ranges, that is the medium machine lack of suitable equipment. gun. The lack of such a weapon was severely For the landing in the Herjangs Fjord on the felt, and the Bren gun was not adequate to I3th of May only four Assault Landing Craft perform many of the fire tasks which it was and two Motor Landing Craft were available, called upon to undertake. The Germans and many of the troops had to be taken ashore continually employed overhead fire from long in open boats. range automatic weapons. Thanks to the weakness of the enemy's resist- (b) The Bren gun tripod was found too ance at the points selected for landing and the heavy to move about over the hills for the skill and determination with which the operation " independent companies " which, had no was carried out it was successful, but had the special transport for it. In such theatres as resistance proved to be more serious the results this, pack transport for this purpose would might well have been very different. seem essential. " Tommy " guns were in- valuable, and were successfully used by the Again, the plans for the landing on the enemy. peninsula North of Narvik had continually to (c) The two inch mortar was found to be be changed and postponed owing to the lack of effective, but should have been supplied with proper landing ccaft, particularly of Motor a greater proportion of H.E. bombs. The Landing Graft which were required to land German mortar, which appeared to have a tanks. These Motor Landing Craft were also in range of about 1,500 yards, was reported as constant demand for the vital task of landing being not particularly successful as the shell heavy anti-aircraft guns for the protection of seemed to have very little killing power, the base area. possibly due to over-fragmentation. The landing at Narvik was also successful (d) Bicycles. The Germans made exten- thanks to the most effectivie co-operation of sive use of these for their advanced guards, the Royal Navy, the excellent support given by and the mobility thus achieved was remark- the guns of H.M. Ships and the skill and deter- able. mination of General Bethouart's troops, but (e) Three Bren gun carriers of one of the with the facilities available the transfer of three battalions proved of great value, particularly battalions across a narrow fjord some 1,500 in assisting the withdrawal of rear parties. yards wide took over seven hours, and the (/) 25 pounder field guns proved efficient strength of the first flight had to be limited to and were found to be more manoeuvrable 300 men. • than was expected. No difficulties of crest The landing of such a small advanced party clearance were reported. on a hostile shore entailed considerable risk, (g) Signal equipment. The Marconi sets and in view of the likelihood of such operations supplied to the Independent Companies were having to be repeated in other threatres of war useless. They were too heavy to be carried, it is urgently necessary that an ample supply and had insufficient range. No. 18 set as of modern landing craft should be provided used on the frontier of India, would have been without further delay. It is unfair to expect more suitable. No. n set proved most use- any troops to undertake such hazardous opera- ful, and also the Lucas signalling lamp. Per- tions with such inadequate means. sonnel were insufficiently trained to get the best value out of heliographs. 104. The control of the civil population in a war zone is always a matter of great difficulty 101. The Arctic boots were reported in all and particularly so in an Allied country, and cases too big. Boots two sizes only above the it was found almost impossible to impose any normal are needed to ensure a correct fit. restrictions upon the movement of civilians by Skis are essential for operations in snow, but land or water or upon telephone and telegraphic the men must be really well trained and specially communication. selected. Only a portion of a unit, however, There have been therefore ample opportunities need be fitted with skis if the remainder are for the enemy to obtain military information equipped with snow shoes. The battle dress from agents or to- organize sabotage. Had the and leather jerkin proved most serviceable, but campaign been continued it would have been SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 3195 essential to obtain full powers from the Norwe- Pending the arrival of personnel and staff gian authorities to put security measures into of the Inland Water Transport organization, force, -but it is doubtful whether these measures the steps taken to set up some form of organiza- would have been effective had they'been carried tion were as follows: — out through the Civil Authorities, which is the On his arrival the Assistant Director of ideal method. It is probable that a complete Transportation took over the control of the Military Government would have had to be set improvised organization which had previously up unless the civil population had been com- operated the Inland Water Transport fleet. A pletely evacuated from all areas in close mili- part of the railway operating company was tary occupation. Again, had sustained air used on its arrival to form the nucleus of an attack been directed against towns such as inland water transport organization. All craft Harstad, civil resources could not have met the were numbered, organized into fleets, and demands for hospital accommodation, food, their movements recorded. The captain of light and sanitation which would have resulted. each craft was given written orders each time It is recommended, therefore, that full weight he was detailed for duty, and a system of should be given to these considerations when leave for " puffer " crews was started, other- planning a campaign of this nature, and that a wise they would not work for more than a definite policy of evacuation or military con- limited period. One soldier was placed on trol of all civilian activities in the theatre of war board each " puffer" and most of the should be insisted upon from the outset. steamers were manned by naval crews. 105. The Force relied mainly upon local hired During the evacuation the armed guard in craft, such as Diesel-engined fishing boats, and each " puffer " was increased to two, and small steamers, for the distribution by water each fleet was placed under the command of of food, ammunition and stores of all kinds. an army officer. This system proved very unsatisfactory, and at Even with this amount of control it was one time, after comparatively light bombing of difficult to prevent the " puffer" crews the base area, threatened to break down com- absenting themselves with their craft, pletely owing to the defection of the civilian especially after a bombing attack, and the crews, even though military guards were placed Inland Water Transport situation remained on board. It is unreasonable to expect civilian precarious up to the end. hired personnel to incur the risks inseparable from such work under heavy air attack, and Summary. the replacement of these civilians by skilled and 108. I trust it will be clear from this report enlisted personnel subject to 'military law and that although my command in Norway lasted discipline would have become inevitable. for about four weeks only, the problems which In any future expedition of this nature, this my staff officers and the troops under my com- important subject must receive full consideration mand had to face were complex and unusual. before the expedition is launched and adequate That they were solved and, so far as lay in provision of suitable craft, including fast motor- their power, solved successfully, is, I submit, boats for inter-communication and control, the best tribute I can offer to those who served together with trained crews must be made. under me. 106. In conclusion, the first general lesson to be drawn is that to commit troops to a cam- 109. In the strategical and tactical sphere, paign in which they cannot be provided with the outlook changed rapidly from a situation in adequate air support is to court disaster. which I had every hope of receiving the forces The second lesson is that no useful purpose and resources for wihich I had asked fo enable can be served by sending troops to operate in me to maintain the integrity of Northern an undeveloped and wild country such as Nor- Norway, recapture Narvik and assume the way unless they have been thoroughly trained offensive against the enemy to the southward, for their task and their fighting equipment well to one in which it appeared as if the Force thought out and methodically prepared in would have to fight hard to retain a fringe of advance. Improvisation hi either of these the coast round .Narvik and Harstad with in- respects can lead only to failure. Our prepara- adequate support in the shape of ships, artillery tion and provision for ensuring the comfort of and aircraft. This phase again quickly gave the troops were 'magnificent, too good perhaps; place to the final problem of complete with- it was in respect of fighting equipment that we drawal from Norway in the face of increasing compared unfavourably with the enemy. enemy pressure on the sea, in the air and on the ground. 107. As will be seen from what has previously I fully realise that these changes were in- been stated in this report, the two outstanding evitable and essential, and I mention them difficulties from the administrative point only to stress the efficiency and loyalty with of view, were, first, shortage of ad- which every one in the Force responded to what ministrative transportation and movement must have been to those not in the possession control staffs, and, secondly, the entire of inside knowledge, a bewildering and possibly lack of any organization to operate what disheartening succession of changes of plan on was, perforce, the main transportation the part of the higher command. agency, namely, inland water transport. In the main, although the role of the force since its no. Co-operation between .the three services inception had been changed several times, its and within the Force itself was excellent composition remained substantially as originally throughout, which is perhaps remarkable con- designed. sidering the very mixed composition of the The first difficulty, except in respect of move- Force. ment control staff, was to some extent overcome on my arrival by the additional administrative in. I have already had occasion to mention and transportation staff that I brought with me. certain individuals by name, but I desire 3*96 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1947 specially to bring to notice the services of the 112. I need not again mention the services of following officers: — General JBethouart, commanding the Franco- 1 Captain L. E. H. iMaund, R.N. and"Com- Polish Expeditionary Force, as their outstand- mander G. Hu'bback, R.N. were closely ing nature should be evident from the accounts associated with the operations' and planning -'of the operations conducted by him. I would, side of my headquarters throughout, the however, like to 'bring to notice, the work of operations, and rendered invaluable assist- 'Major D. A. W. Watney, O.B.E., liaison officer ance to me and my staff and to the troops, with General Bethouart, whose fluent know- British and French. • ledge of French and sound tactical sense, added Group Captain M. Moore, O.B.E., R.A.F., to' his. quick understanding and engaging commanded the air component and it is due personality, were largely responsible for the very largely to his energy, determination and cordial and constant co-operation which tactical ability, first that it so quickly and obtained between- my headquarters, French decisively gained superiority over the enemy headquarters, and the Royal Navy. air forces. 113. I have to acknowledge the close and un- I cannot speak too highly of this officer's failing support I received, often in very diffi- services. cult circumstances, from the following Brigadier C. McV. Gubbins, D.S.O. com- Norwegian officers: — manded the forces round GBodo in most diffi- General Ruge. Commander-in-Chief, cult circumstances with the greatest skill and Norwegian Army. determination, and it was largely due to his General Fleischer. . Commander, 6th devoted efforts that a premature withdrawal, Norwegian Division. which might have seriously compromised Colonel H. Finne. Liaison Officer at my the whole campaign, did not occur in this Headquarters. area. Brigadier J. A. H. Gammell, D.S.O., 114. Finally, I wish to record my deep M.C. acted throughout as my Brigadier sense of gratitude to the Commander-m-Chief, General Staff and Chief Staff Officer with Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of Cork and marked success. His energy, determination Orrery, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., under whom I and devotion to duty were remarkable, and served throughout the campaign, for his quick the success of the operations was due in no understanding of the problems before me, bis small measure to his untiring efforts. unfailing consideration, and the generous and ready help which he gave me on all occasions, Brigadier R. M. Wootten, M.C. as my thereby making it possible for me to cany out chief administrative staff officer, bore my task. practically the entire burden of responsibility C. J. E. AUCHINLECK. for coping with the many and varied problems to which the rapid changes of policy gave Lieutenant-General, rise. The results of his work speak for them- General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, selves and, in my opinion, stamp him as an Norwegian Expeditionary Force. officer of outstanding ability ana firmness of London, character. igth June, 1940.

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