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Distinction, Domination, and Ethnic Politics: a Theoretical Inquiry Into

Distinction, Domination, and Ethnic Politics: a Theoretical Inquiry Into

CEU eTD Collection Distinction, Domination, and Domination, Distinction, EthnicPolitics:A Theoretical Inquiry submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Central European University, , into Hungarian RomaMobilization into Dr. Alexandra Kowalski Nationalism Studies in the Department of T. Grant Lovellette Dr. Michael Stewart Michael Dr. Dr. Anton Pelinka Master ofArts Master May 2008 May Advisers: A Thesis by at CEU eTD Collection 6. CaseStudy:The National Roma Self-Government ofHungary...... 41 5. ABourdieuian StructuralTheory of Poweras Practice...... 33 4. The Need foraNewUnderstandingof Power in Relation to theRoma...... 28 .NwSca oeetTer:ATer fEhi oiiain ...... 11 ...... 3. New SocialMovement Theory: ATheory of EthnicMobilization? 4 2. TheClassicUnderstanding ofPower: Strategic Resource Mobilization...... 1 1. Introduction ...... iii Acknowledgments 6.2. The Communist Legacy and the Transition: “State Desertion” and Loyalists v. Radicals in 41 6.1. the WhyExamine National Roma Self-Government?...... 40 ...... 5.4. Summary:AStrategy foraResearch Program 38 ...... 5.3. Field 35 ...... 5.2. Habitus 33 5.1. Capital...... 3.3. Vermeersch’s Application of New Social Movement Theory to Roma Mobilization in 3.2. An Inquiry into Vermeersch’s Application of New Social Movement 12 Theory...... 12 ...... 3.1. Barany’sEasily Dismissible of “Concept Marginality” 2.4. Summary...... 9 2.3. Lukes’s Three-Dimensional View ofPower...... 7 ...... 5 2.2. Face Another of Power:“Mobilization Bias” of and“Nondecision-making” ...... 4 2.1. ThePluralist toMarxist Challenge Instrumentalism 6.2.4. Division Among Roma Elites: Loyalists v. Radicals 6.2.3. “State Desertion” or “the Dismantling of the State” 6.2.2. The Collapse of the Socialist Welfare State and the Impact on the Roma 6.2.1. Communist Policy Towards the Roma: Assimilation Through Economic Redistribution 43 Roma the EliteStratum...... 3.3.2. Roma Mobilization During and After the Transition Communism Under “Activism” Roma 3.3.1. 23 Hungary...... 3.2.5. Conspicuously Absent? Resource Mobilization 3.2.4. Framing 3.2.3. Political Opportunity Structure Competition Ethnic 3.2.2. 3.2.1. Two Theories Considered and Rejected ...... 18 ...... 13 ...... 16 ...... Table of Contents ...... 13 ...... 24 ...... i ...... 21 ...... 46 ...... 49 ...... 25 ...... 44 ...... 43 ...... CEU eTD Collection ilorpy...... 100 ...... Bibliography Appendix...... 99 ...... 97 8. Conclusion 7. ReflectionsRoma Mobilization asCapital, on andField: DirectionsHabitus, for esae rils aaieAtce,T n ai eot,adOhrMda...... 110 ...... Newspaper Articles, Magazine TV Articles, and Radio Reports,and Other Media 100 ...... JournalBooks, Articles, Theses, Papers, Legislative Acts,andReports 94 7.6. National/Domestic Politics as the Field ofStruggle...... 91 7.5. International Politics as the Field ofStruggle...... 91 7.4. The NGO Sector as the Fieldof Struggle...... 89 ...... 7.3. RomaPolitics as the Field of Struggle 89 7.2. NRSGas Field The the ofStruggle?...... 85 ...... 7.1. First The Field ofStruggle:Are Who theRoma? Research...... 85 Future 6.6. Postscript: Roma Mobilization Outside the Minority Self-Government System – The 6.5. The Development of the NRSG, 2003-Present: More of the Same, Or a Different Track? 6.4. The First NRSG Election and the Development of the NRSG, 1995-2003: Attempts at 6.3. The Structure of the NRSG: Hungary’s Act LXXVII 51of 1993 and the 2005 Reform...... 6.6.2. An Institutional Response: The Growth and Problems of the NGO Sector 6.6.1. The Failure of the State to Protect its Roma Citizens: Economic and Institutional Discrimination 78 ...... Systematic NGO-ization(and Privatization) ofCollective ClaimsMaking The Democratic Roma Coalition/The Forum of Hungarian Gypsy 60 Organizations...... 54 Empire Building UnderLungoDrom...... and Exploitation ...... 78 ...... ii ...... 81 ...... CEU eTD Collection of this current scholarly enterprise. support both of my past volunteer work with the Roma, which set me on my current path, and translation of the Appendix. Finally, Iwould like tothank Helen Copeland for her munificent English initial rough a provided Bereczk Eszter draft. rough onthe comments editorial provided comments on various drafts, chapters, or proposals. Alison Anderson and Virginia Lovellette Rogers Brubaker, Dr. Mária Kovács, Dr. András Kovács, and Dr. Jon Fox, who provided Dr. Miller, Michael Dr. JúliaSzalai, Dr. to thank like also Iwould guidance. and help their for Stewart, Michael Dr. and Pelinka, Anton Dr. Kowalski, Alexandra Dr. advisers, three my thank comments, and assistance generously given by a number of people. In particular, I would like to Central inContemporary Mobilization only Research recent, excellent, andunder-reviewed mobilization. I particularly want to single out and praise the work of Peter Vermeersch, whose the Roma minority in Europe have enabled me to make my attempt at explaining Roma degree of precision.” a reasonable with described not we have what explain seekto to “It ispointless scholarship: King, Keohane, and Verba provide a wise reminder ofthe need to be aware of the boundaries of Transitions Online (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 44. 2 1 insights, from benefited essayhas this undertakings, academic most with case As isthe When attempting to write about the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, the words of As far as I am aware, not one academic journal has reviewed Vermeersch’s book as of the time of writing; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, has published a cursory review of it. 1 Therefore, I am greatly indebted to those authors whose descriptions of Acknowledgments 2 book, , provided the inspiration for this essay. iii The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Politics Minority The RomaniMovement: Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative CEU eTD Collection Europe Cambridge University Press, 2002), 356. Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004), 6. No. 1, Institute of Economics, HAS, Department of Human Resources, Corvinus University, 2004, 25. “political opportunity structure,” and “framing” – to the phenomenon of Roma ethnic Roma of phenomenon – the to “framing” and structure,” opportunity “political ethnic mobilization. Vermeersch applies new social movement theories – “ethnic competition,” strength, experience, group cohesiveness, and financial resources to explain patterns of Roma organizational politics, in identity accomplishments abilities, inleadership shortcomings Roma’s in Europe. Barany anchors his account to the concept of“marginality,” using what hesees as the Vermeersch, theoretical models to understand and explain this new phenomenon of Roma mobilization. take advantage of these new opportunities, analysts and theorists are also experimenting with life, and to mobilize for political engagement. political for to mobilize and life, opportunities for the Roma to petition the government with grievances, to participate in public On the other hand, the liberalization of the political arena has created unprecedented workers in agricultural cooperatives andfactories weremostly expendable in the new economy. unemployment and economic marginalization among the Roma, since their jobs as unskilled injustice, and exclusion, social discrimination, members of the Roma minority. On the one hand, they continue to experience widespread Hungary, the transition from communism to democracy has proven a mixed blessing for most process of democratic state consolidation, and the expansion of the . In the Roma minority and Roma minority politics in Europe: the collapse of communism, the assimilation, and expulsion, three converging processes have led to an increase in the visibility of (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 28-44. 7 6 4 5 3 Since the advent of this new mobilization, only two authors, Zoltan Barany After centuries ofalternating policies of neglect, persecution, genocide, slavery, forced Cf. Peter Vermeersch, Cf. Barany, 49-80. Cf. Gábor Kertesi, “The Employment of the Roma: Evidence from Hungary,” Budapest Working Papers Zoltan Barany, , European 7 have attempted to give comprehensive theoretical accounts of Roma mobilization The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union 1. Introduction 5 As Roma elites experiment with different ways to 3 1 and market rationalization has led to massive to led has rationalization market and (: Office for (New York: 6 Peter and 4 CEU eTD Collection November 2007). November Prospects for the Future,” Europe Eastern and in Central mobilization of Roma example successful most as the praised often explain Roma ethnic mobilization. The National Roma Self-, which is structural theory of power as practice based on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu in order to alternative an tooperationalize essay proposes this frameworks, theoretical Vermeersch’s have the living standards of Roma steadily declined? so divided? In spite of increased Roma mobilization and political participation in Hungary, why from answering the most pressing questions concerning Roma mobilization: why are Roma elites of this instrumentalist mode of thought in Barany’s and Vermeersch’s approaches prohibits them leads down the theoretically and empirically stagnant route of instrumentalism. The inscription patronage, money, jobs, etc. determines the outcome ofpower relations. This approach to power blackmail, force, favors, political influence, of classes) social or individuals (by use effective the words, Inother mobilization. resource strategic than more tolittle power of exercise running through their literature is an essentially strategic understanding of power that reduces the binary opposition, a critical reading of their works demonstrates that the common theme While these authors have presented their different approaches to power as theoretical set(s) of Lukes. Steven and Baratz, Morton Bachrach, Peter Polsby, Nelson Dahl, Robert of writings understanding of power is the “classic,” strategic understanding of power, as developed in the which greatly hinders the explanatory capability of their theoretical frameworks. Their implicit into their theoretical frameworks a strategic understanding and operationalization of power, model is severely limited by its avoidance of a theoretically problematic, yet critical topic: power. eachtheoretical but usefulness, explanatory ownlimited hasits approach Each mobilization. 8 8 In opposition to the strategic understanding of power inscribed in Barany’s and Although neither theorist addresses power directly, both authors adhere to and inscribe and which Vermeersch analyzes at length using new social movement theory, provides Cf. Project on Ethnic Relations, “Self-Government in Hungary: The Romani/Gypsy Experience and Project on Ethnic Relations , November 1997, (20 2 CEU eTD Collection Roma is to improve. of structural domination that must be exposed and corrected if the situation of marginalized theoretical frameworks with astrategic understanding of power ignore the patterns and currents fundamental dependence on the political and institutional the Roma’s ensures system political domestic theHungarian of the structure how and on (or, more accurately, domination) in which the Roma and the majority population are engaged capital, habitus, and field, sheds light both on the ongoing, reciprocal process of marginalization Roma mobilization. A structural understanding of power, built upon Bourdieu’s concepts of the most suitable case study for testing a structural theory of power as practice in relation to 3 status quo status . Lacking these insights, these . Lacking CEU eTD Collection finds evidence of the existence of a power elite. In Polsby’s words, stratification theory presupposes the existence of “power elites” in every community and that it therefore always theorists’ approach to power is that the stratification theory’s approach is circular, i.e. that it 22, No. 3 (August 1960), 474-484. University Press, 1961); and Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” certain model of power relations limits the ability of new social movement theoryW. to explain Roma mobilization.Mills, not address Michaelseveral important theorists in the field, such as Talcott Parsons, AnthonyMann, Giddens, Michael Foucault, C. Hannah Arendt, and Jürgen Habermas; rather, it focuses on how the assumption of a 2.1. The Pluralist Challenge to Marxist Instrumentalism consequences for its ability of to explain Roma mobilization. movement theory’s assumption of this certain model of power relations has negative they are inapposite to the phenomenon of Roma ethnic mobilization. Consequently, new social may indeed be able to explain certain phenomena within a bounded set of circumstances, but developed by Robert Dahl largely power, of understanding “pluralist” wasthe functioned) actually process this how explain to failed theory the though systems, political control to collude classes] [or elites dominant understanding of power (often referred to by the pluralists as “stratification theory” i.e. that models proposed by Dahl, Polsby, Bachrach, Baratz, and Lukes. power functions in a particular fashion, i.e. in the strategic manner at the collective core of the they bothassumethat Instead, this topicdirectly. addresses norBarany Vermeersch neither mobilization, i.e. the interaction between Roma elites and the non-Roma majority society, yet dynamics of power and domination are fundamental determinants of the shape of Roma The theRoma. works about scholarly role in playany Romararely tothe in relation domination and power of discussions theoretical Europe, Eastern and ofRomainCentral situation the 9 11 10 In spite of the obvious and intuitive relevance of the topics of power and domination to One oftheearliest challenges totheinstrumentalist andstructurally determinist Marxist This essay neither aspires nor claims to be a comprehensive discussion of theories of power, as it does 2. TheClassicUnderstanding ofPower: Strategic Resource Mobilization Cf. Nelson W. Polsby, “How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative,” Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 10 and Nelson Polsby. 4 11 The pluralists’ main criticism of stratification of criticism main pluralists’ The Behavioral Science Behavioral 9 These strategic, rational models (New Haven, CT: Yale 2(1957), 201-215. The Journal of Politics CEU eTD Collection would nototherwise do,” 2.2. Another Face of Power: “Mobilization of Bias” and “Nondecision-making” “allocating rewards,” “building coalitions,” recruiting “subleaders,” and “resource use.” 4 (December 1962), 948; emphasis in original. power” is that“ power” researcher. observing who makes decisions concerning “significant” policy issues pre-selected by the and “outcomes of actual decisions” within a community. They determine who holds power by emphasizing the importance of behavior, i.e. of studying observable, concrete “actual behavior” Pluralists exchange the structural determinists’ language of structure for the language of action, because it implies that the values of analysts are imposed on groups in the community.” the pluralist approach: from a number of authors. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz point out the two central flaws in researchers not build their own biases into their research, their approach faced heavy criticism assumed about power in any community,” about community power.” systematic misreporting of facts and to the formulation of ambiguous and unprovable assertions “encourages research designs which generate self-fulfilling prophecies, and ... leads to the 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 “important” and “unimportant” issues arising in the political arena. [and] the model provides no ... issues, “safe” torelatively decision-making scope of the byconfining exercised The [pluralist] model takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, In spite of the pluralists’ contribution to the theorization of power through insisting that According to the pluralist approach, on the other hand, “nothing categorical can be Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” Cf. Dahl, Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” 202-203. Ibid., 484. Ibid., 479. Ibid., 476. Polsby, 475. 15 The pluralists’ conception of power is obviously strategic: Dahl’s “intuitive idea of A Who Governs? has power over 12 16 , 94-96 and 273-275. and inorder toaccomplishthis,discusses he theimportance of B to the extent that he can get hecan that extent tothe objective 13 and “‘false class consciousness’ does not exist, not does consciousness’ class “‘false and 5 criteria for distinguishing between The American Political Science Review Science Political The American B to do something that 18 17 56, No. B 14 CEU eTD Collection of actual decision-making to ‘safe’ issues.” ‘safe’ to decision-making actual of power rests on the fear of sanctions to be applied: conception of power attempts to operationalize a“conflict of values,” but their understanding of Baratz’s and Bachrach to Dahl, Similar well. issuesas certain of discussion toprevent resources to effect certain policy decisions, political actors (whether individuals orgroups) mobilize understanding of power remains strategic, but instead of strategically mobilizing resources only actors. issues of much greater importance in agiven community than the decisions made by political observable as community decisions are for the pluralists, and these “nondecisions” may concern making,” i.e. “the manner in which the one or more groups, relative to others.” values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of theorization of power the concept of “mobilization of bias,” which consists of “the dominant those issues which are comparatively innocuous to institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only exercised “when making of decisions that affect Bachrach and Baratz acknowledge that “of course power is exercised when 22 21 20 19 because he isfearfulthat he because action between A power relationship exists when (a) there is a conflict over values or course of basic reformists’ the power, of conceptualization expanded this of Regardless To account for this shortcoming in the pluralist framework, they add into the into add they framework, pluralist inthe shortcoming for this account To Ibid., 952. Ibid., 950. Ibid. Ibid. A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and A and B ; (b) B A .” will deprive him of a value or values which he, 19 They see a“second face” of power, however, whichis B status quo complies with complies 21 This “mobilizationof bias” results in“nondecision- 22 For Bachrach and Baratz, “nondecisions” areas 6 oriented persons and groups ... limit the scope A .” 20 A ’s wishes; and (c)hedoesso ’s wishes; and A participates in the B , CEU eTD Collection American Political Science Review Science Political American three-dimensional, respectively). On account of individual moral choices, persons are destined to radical perspective, each of which generates a different conception of power (one-, two-, or notion” evaluative “false class consciousness.” The central problem with this approach is Lukes’s “irreducibly Essentially, Lukes tries to operationalize a pragmatic reformulation of the Marxist conception of interests.” [real] of asa“conflict [non]decision-making) viaobservable (researchable values” of “conflict Baratz’s and Bachrach reframes thus Lukes them. on effects its recognizing from through “collective forces and social arrangements,” behavior” patterned culturally and structured “socially shape to resources their direct actors exercising power and the analysis of “ place.” most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first also exercises power nondecisions.over Conflict, he states, is not the only situation inwhich[ power is exercised, but “[ the observation of “actual behavior,” whether that behavior consists of decisions or some of the problems of the pluralist approach by being overly committed to behaviorism, i.e. relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics,” 2.3. Lukes’s Three-Dimensional View of Power 25 28 27 26 25 24 23 To complete his theoretical framework, Lukes adds a third dimension of power, an Steven Lukes praises Bachrach and Baratz for incorporating “into the analysis of power noncompliance. regards more highly than those which would have been achieved by Ibid., 34. Ibid., 22. Ibid., 24-25; emphasis in original. Ibid., 23. Steven Lukes, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,” latent conflict 28 of “interests”: interests are morally irreducible to a liberal, reformist, or reformist, liberal, a to irreducible are morally interests “interests”: of Power: A Radical View A Power: 23 57, No. 3 (September 1963), 635. , which consists in acontradiction between the interests of those real interests B ] by influencing, shaping, ordetermining [ ofthose they exclude.” (London: Macmillan, 1974), 21. 7 27 thereby preventing the subjects of power 26 24 To accomplish this, powerful this, accomplish To but in his opinion, they retain B ’s] very wants .... The The A ] CEU eTD Collection reformists’ concept: and pluralists’ sameasthe is the power” of concept “ “underlying that his headmits framework; his theoretical to central remains mobilization) resource strategic ofthisessay, terminology explicit argumentation in favor of the radical perspective. Individual agency (or, in the resigned to the fact that many people will not opt for the radical perspective and does not offer radical moral perspective over either the liberal orreformist perspective; indeed, he seems the choosing for justification givesno Lukes forces. structural and agency, individual relativism, power falters precisely because of its cacophonous juxtaposition of rational choice, moral when attempting to explain the non-occurrence of an event. counterfactual” relevant the “justifying of difficulty the underplays) subsequently (and admits stretches the applicability ofrational choice theory past thepoint of usefulness. Lukes himself decision to make (or, conversely, that he or she made a nondecision). In doing so, Lukes to explain non-action in a situation where the actor is not even aware that he or she has a criticized for paradoxically and rather convolutedly trying to operationalize rational choice theory affecting a particular decision and about all consequences of all potential decisions), Lukes can be choice theory rational of criticisms thestandard tofacing Inaddition account. inLukes’s problematic triply (i.e. ifthat he or she knewit what assumes do would individual autonomous his ideal-type, whataLockean of toa model by reference behavior or her real interests that were, the but this actor kind of rational either theliberal or reformist perspective. has choice perfect theory is explanation. He offers no analytical, non-normative justificationfor the radical perspective over information Lukes’sanalytical the realmof beyond that remains –aprocess orradicals reformists, liberals, be about all factors 29 Lukes is careful to avoid the moral absolutism of traditional Marxism, but his account of account his but Marxism, traditional of absolutism moral the avoid to iscareful Lukes actual evaluate and theorize to proposes perspective “radical” Lukes’s Additionally, Ibid., 46. A exercises power over B 8 when A affects 29 B in a manner contrary to contrary a manner in B ’s CEU eTD Collection 2.4. Summary to marginalize structural power and make it into a tool of individual actors: he fails to resolve the tension between individual agency and structural power, choosing instead this dualism, however. Furthermore, these strategic models render the study of historically of the study render models strategic these Furthermore, however. dualism, this to reducible not are relationships human of types of variety and multiplicity The theorists. these thereby confounding the theoretical choice between “rational choice” and “class” posited by collectivize a smaller group (for example, an ethnic minority in the aforementioned country), or a larger group (for example, the majority ethnic group in an ethnically defined country) might individuals might choose to come and cooperate based on common interests and goals, example, –for exists relationships social for possibilities alternative “atypical”) model this a certain standardized type of social relationship, but analmost infinite number of (according to as the determining factor of action, power, and social relationships. This strategic model assumes empirical, over Marxist structural determinism; it merely substitutes “rational choice” for “class” understanding of power does not offer a consequential improvement, either theoretical or relationship. Power (i.e. access to and rational deployment of resources) determines action. This mobilization of those resources in an attempt to secure domination over the other actor(s) in the rational her hisor of and relationship inasocial actor agiven to available resources the of of this approach is the reduction of the analysis of power and social relationships to an account privilege a strategic understanding of power, subordinating structure to agency. The consequence all they and emphases, approaches theirdifferent despite that, –demonstrates and Lukes Baratz, interests.” (specifically, in amanner contrary to their interests).” action or inaction, significantly affecting the thoughts or actions of others of human agents, separately or together, in groups or organizations, through To use the vocabulary of power in the context of social relationships is to speak A critical reading of the works of this diverse set of authors – Dahl, Polsby, Bachrach, 31 30 Ibid., 54. Ibid., 27. 30 Finally, although Lukes attempts to integrate structural factors into his framework, 9 31 CEU eTD Collection usefulness of social movement theory, as is argued in Chapter 4. context. cultural proper the in place to difficult and determine to difficult is often worth relative their but always quantifiable, are asresources difficult, relationships power contextualized variable, 32 32 Alternatively, in Lukes’s terminology, it is difficult to justify the relevant counterfactual. strategic,A reductionistunderstanding ofpower has serious implications forthe 10 CEU eTD Collection about Roma ethnic mobilization. a number of theoreticaldemonstrates that his framework, while a significant improvement over that of Barany, still bears shortcomingscareful reading of Vermeersch’s theory and its application to Hungarian Roma mobilization anda Nonetheless, mobilization. Roma of subject amorphous shifting, the toelucidate failsliterature to answermobilization has considerablesome explanatory potential, drawing onbroad base of theoretical of the mostcapacity, Vermeersch’s creative application of new socialbasic movement theory to Roma ethnic questions explanatory little has framework theoretical Barany’s While Barany. and Zoltan Vermeersch organization that can only respond to these demands with circumscribed cultural tools? toan toapply isappropriate framework theoretical what represents, supposedly NRSG multifaceted demands (which go far beyond the the concomitant realm and face Roma the that problems multifaceted the of considering situation; culture) made by the Roma whom the power is often merely “advisory.” Thislimited capacity further complicates the theoretical Roma, is only nominally empowered within the cultural and educational spheres, and even that the Hungarian of body representative democratically legitimate, asthe government Hungarian Hungary (the National Roma Self-Government, or NRSG), the organization recognized by the often have little or no political power. Even the national representative body of the Roma in government policy or program. In the face of these complex problems, marginalized groups framework of one specific academic discipline, or for that matter, within the framework of one the within encompass to difficult setofproblems the – making etc. medical, social, educational, cultural, political, economic, – multidimensional undoubtedly are face Roma the that problems The framework. analytical lackofacomprehensive Romaisthe as the such groups marginalized A central problem concerning a theoretical inquiry into the ethnic mobilization of Two authors have proposed theoretical explanations of Roma mobilization: Peter 3. New SocialMovementTheory: ATheoryofMobilization? Ethnic 11 CEU eTD Collection 3.2. An Inquiry into Vermeersch’s Application of New Social Movement Theory tool. analytical uselessasan italmost rendering progress, or change for possibility any anddisallows terms, essentialist inabsolute, Roma” “the of characteristics the describes deterministic, and pessimistic in – begging, fortune telling, prostitution – do not show up in statistics.” statement that “the types of income-generating activities that Gypsy women are often involved ofsociologists, a by number indetail explored a problem women, values. and because he has no sympathy for his subjects and shows no interest in understanding their the victims,” i.e. the Roma, for their own problems leadership and organization. lack of ethnic solidarity and social capital, lack of symbols, lack of financial resources, and lack of weakness of Roma identity, lack of past mobilization experience, lack of a common language, mobilization is a consequence of the convergence of a number of strategic shortcomings: the Zoltan Barany, theoretical literature on political mobilization and new social movements and from the “political process” model developed by Peter Vermeersch, which draws extensively fromthe structure and functioning of political mobilization among marginalized ethnic groups is the primarily of“the concept of marginality.” understanding of power and marginalization in his theoretical framework, which consists Marginality” of “Concept Dismissible Easily Barany’s 3.1. Zoltan Barany, 36 Barany quite blatantly integrates a theoretically stagnant and empirically suspect strategic suspect andempirically stagnant atheoretically integrates blatantly quite Barany 36 35 34 33 A much more sophisticated, ambitious, and comprehensive model for explaining the 38 37 For example, Barany callously dismisses theproblem ofunemployment among Roma Donald Kenrick, Book Review of Colin Clark, Book Review of Ibid., 77-78. Barany, 49. Barany, 175. For an in-depth discussion of unemployment among Roma women in Hungary, cf. Kertesi. Ethnic and Racial Studies Slavic Review Slavic 61, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), 591. 34 Other reviewers have criticized Barany because he tends to “blame 26, No. 4 (2003), 762. The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics 33 12 AccordingfailureBarany,Roma thetoof 35 (which is obvious from the above summary) 37 withthe rather incredible 38 Barany’s framework is framework Barany’s by by CEU eTD Collection Tarrow, that people “engage in collective action ... when their social class comes intofully comes class social their ... when action in collective “engage thatpeople Tarrow, ethnicity” model that Vermeersch dismisses –i.e. the Marxist claim, in thewords of Sidney “reactive the as standpoint a similar from begins actually model Bell. This and Crowley, he combines the insights from a number of social and political theorists, such as Marx, Barth, Competition Ethnic 3.2.2. theories on ethnic competition, political opportunity structure, and framing. “political process” model, which is an adaptation of new social movement theory derived from the occurrence of ethnic mobilization.” points out that straightforward “economic disadvantage is clearly nota sufficient condition for differentiated segments of the working class” causes ethnic mobilization, but Vermeersch rightly suspect. empirically and logically both finds he which structure,” cultural of reflection is the mobilization model is unsatisfying for him because of its primordialist assumptions, i.e. that “ethnic perspective” “cultural The model. ethnicity” “reactive the and model perspective” “cultural 3.2.1. Two Theories Considered and Rejected as a homogeneous group seeking “representation through established channels.” electoral participation of ethnic minorities. In doing this, he tries to avoid representing the Roma about political change.” bring to attempt to inorder efforts collective organize actors political which by process “the theoretical literature onidentity and ethnic politics. 43 42 41 40 39 Vermeersch’s first set of elements comes from the “ethnic competition” model, in which hecallsthe what dismisses and considers Vermeersch model, onhis elaborating Before 42 Ibid., 35. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 29. Ibid., 28. Cf. Vermeersch, 28-43, especially 39-43. The “reactive ethnicity” model posits that “economic competition between ethnically 40 His definition is quite broad, encompassing far more than the mere 43 Vermeerschdescribesthenown model,the his 13 39 Vermeersch defines political mobilization as 41 CEU eTD Collection University Press, 1998), 11. the existence of coherent, homogeneous ethno-cultural groups, the composition of which assuming areinstrumentalist, theories two These models. ethnicity” “reactive and perspective” with other economic classes and centered on the communist party’s goals. competition from arising identity worker collective of understanding anincreased for particular articulating that identity. that articulating with other groups helps define group identity, and group leaders play an instrumental role in of trifling claims. mobilization attempts, lest the energy and effectiveness of the movement dissipate into a myriad structure to “vanguard” an elite for need sawthe which theory, Leninist of a part is actually circumstances and provide leadership and direction for the burgeoning movement. economic and political on capitalize must group ethnic the within leaders spontaneously; which is consistent with Marxist theory. conflict, interethnic and mobilization inincreased results groups” disadvantaged previously that economic disadvantage causes people to mobilize; rather, “economic advancement of the dismissed “reactive ethnicity” model. First, the “ethnic competition” model does not claim particular area, geographical region, or political unit. ethnic groups coalesce and then compete with each other over the resources available in a Different class. socioeconomic inaparticular membership of instead solidarity this of basis occurs in relation to [scarce] resources,” developed contradiction with its antagonists.” 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 The “ethnic competition” theory avoids many of the problems that plague the“cultural Vermeersch points out three differences between the “ethnic competition” model and Tarrow, Vermeersch, 36-37. Tarrow, Ibid. Ibid. Vermeersch, 36. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Power in Movement Power in Movement 48 Third, ethnic identity is not primordial. Participating in ethnic competition in ethnic Participating primordial. not is identity ethnic Third, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentions Politics 49 Gramsci recognized a similar need among workers in the West, in West, in the workers among need similar a recognized Gramsci , 13. , 12. 45 but membership in a particular ethnic group forms the 46 44 Second,marginalizedmobilizenot groupsdo 14 Therefore, accordingto Vermeersch, “solidarity , 2 nd ed.(Cambridge: Cambridge 50 47 This insight CEU eTD Collection Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23. Cambridge University Press, 1990), 166. 1999), 8; and cf. Tarrow, (London: Pluto 2002). Press, (London: Pluto Brown Co., 1969); and cf. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, little to say regarding the state’s role in these processes. nations and to the mobilization of these ethnic groups, but the “ethnic competition” model has The Soviet state apparatus was central both to the creation of these various ethnically based assessment: withthis concurs Bielorussians.” the that matter, –or,for peoples Moslem theAsian as among units’, i.e. ‘nations’ in the modern sense, where none had previously existed or been thought of, Hobsbawm concludes that the USSR created “ethno-linguistic territorial ‘national administrative mobilization and the ability of the state to shape mobilization processes. For example, E. J. mobilization. the need for self-awareness as a group, and the importance of leadership in the process of and Leninist theory, the “ethnic competition” model emphasizes the fluidity of group identity, action (as opposed to reactive action) in political mobilization. rational and decision-making, rational leaders, of importance emphasize repeatedly theorists idea that a determinesshared the ethnic mobilization pattern of each group. Anthropologists have criticized the culture necessarily characterizes an ethnic group, 54 53 52 51 nationality were by no means empty forms or legal fictions .... and citizenship .... [T]he institutional crystallizations of nationhood and social categories sharply distinct from the overarching categories of statehood state and its citizenry. It established nationhood and nationality as fundamental existence of multiple nations and nationalities as fundamental constituents of the The Soviet state not only passively tolerated but actively institutionalized the Nevertheless, the “ethnic competition” model largely ignores the role of politics in ethnic Rogers Brubaker, E. J.Hobsbawm, E. Cf. Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Cf. Fredrik Barth, Power in Movement Power in Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference , 15. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives Social Movements: An Introduction 15 52 Borrowing largely fromMarxist 54 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, , 2 51 nd movementsocialand ed. (Cambridge: 53 Rogers Brubaker (Boston:Little , 2 (Cambridge: nd ed. CEU eTD Collection della Porta and Diani, 193-225. John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 26-31; TarrowPerspectives 71-90; and on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press,Comparative 1996), 54. Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings opportunity structure encompasses each other and from Vermeersch’s. movement literature, the typologies offered by other authors differ in certain respects both from the shifts in ruling alignments”). (“cyclical elements of change in the political system, such as the availability of influential allies or structure alliance (d) and movements,” social with dealing in strategies informal “prevailing formal institutional structures (the stable institutional arrangements of the political system), (c) country, which arguably impose important constraints on newly emerging movements”), (b) a in conflicts political established (“the structures cleavage national (a) into it dividing structure,” external (political) dimensions. and the rational, conscious choice-making of social movement actors in response to those structure” emphasizes the dimensions of mobilization that are external to the mobilizing group form social movements.” or political actors which either encourage ordiscourage them to use their internal resources to structure” as “consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social in shaping patterns of political and ethnic mobilization. role andits state the emphasizes perspective This literature. movement social fromnew element 3.2.3. Political Opportunity Structure 58 57 56 55 the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers, the extent to system’s] openness to new actors, the instability of current political alignments, the multiplicity ofindependent centers of power within [a political system], [the Vermeersch adopts Kriesi and Guigni’s four-point typology of “political opportunity Vermeersch solves this dilemma byintroducing the “political opportunity structure” Cf. Doug McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,” in Vermeersch, 39-40. Sidney Tarrow, “States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements,” Vermeersch, in 39. 56 In contrast to the “ethnic competition” model, “political opportunity 57 Although Vermeersch bases histypology on establishedsocial 58 Forexample, TillyTarrow’sand typology ofpolitical 16 55 Tarrow defines “political opportunity , eds. Doug McAdam, , eds. Comparative , eds. Doug CEU eTD Collection original. McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press,Comparative 1996), Perspectives63; emphasis onin Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings within aparticular social movementcan leadto certain strategic choices, but thesedynamics recognizes the validity of the criticism that internal formal and informal organizational processes typology is not without its problems, some of which Vermeersch concedes. Vermeersch protesters’ tactics and policing.” threat or use of violence by both protesters and the state and the “interaction between exclusively onthe state’s policing of protest, but he does stress the importance of examining the protesters and some theorists and “law and order” by the state). Tarrow does not focus has of analysis in-depth “an on rather but framework, structure opportunity political the of variables multiple the on focus not should movements social onnew research that suggests Porta, della Donatella theorist, prominent One variables. research their among repression Zaldlist and McCarthy, McAdam, and Tarrow and Tilly previously, quoted As typologies. authors’ tomost other iscentral consideration althoughthis oppression, influence of these different variables remain points of disagreement among different theorists. therelative and variables exact the but literature, in the found canbe consensus A broad For McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, political opportunity structure consists of a most direct impact on social movements onsocial impact a mostdirect 62 61 60 59 structure” opportunity “political Vermeersch’s usefulness, its potential of In spite Most critically, Vermeersch deemphasizes the state’s ability and propensity for propensity and ability state’s the deemphasizes Vermeersch critically, Most repression. the presence of elite allies, [and] the state’s capacity and propensity for stability of that broad set the relativeof opennesselite or closure of the institutionalizedalignments political system, the that typically undergird [ decisive changes in [the above factors]. [and] making, claim collective facilitates or represses system] political [the which Tarrow, Donatella della Porta, “Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest,” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction,” in Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Power in Power in Movement 60 , 95. 62 Contentious Politics ”: 61 the policing of protest (often called “repression” by 59 17 (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), 57. one single variable single one , eds. Doug McAdam, John D. Comparative Perspectives on Perspectives Comparative , ...avariable which sic ] a polity, ] , eds. Doug CEU eTD Collection structure” approach, Vermeersch claims that 3.2.4. Framing influence that causality becomes exceedingly difficult todemonstrate. the independent variables can beso greatly removed from the social movements they supposedly and interlinked, inextricably often are variables multiple mobilization: political of outcomes the independent variable among the “political opportunity structure” components has what effect on is much more difficult which custom,” “political or culture” “political of understanding vague a and more opportunities to assess empirically.political observable) even (or structural between boundary the obscure to begins movements,” Another difficulty social with indealing strategies informal “prevailing the structure,” opportunity “political his is demonstrating exactly which structure,” blurring important analytic distinctions. analytic important blurring structure,” authors mix cultural or framing components into their definitions of “political opportunity because the concept’s dimensions grow as each author adds his personal interpretation. tool asaconceptual itsusefulness ways threatens different orusedin is defined which it to consensus onwhat exactly constitutes mentioned earlier, Vermeersch’s typology of“political opportunity structure” is one of many; no structure” theory, some of which might have a great impact on the cohesion of his theory. As process of opportunity recognition occurs. first before they will be able to function as such,” as function able to be will they before first In addition, Vermeersch recognizes that opportunities “have to be perceived as opportunities often remain invisible if a theory only considers the institutionalized processes of mobilization. 67 66 65 64 63 In considering how to mitigate some of the shortcomings of the “political opportunity Vermeersch seemingly overlooks a number of other problems with “political opportunity Ibid., 31; and della Porta and Diani, 223. McAdam, 25-26. della Porta and Diani, 223. Ibid., 42; and cf. della Porta and Diani, 223. Cf. Vermeersch, 41. the “political opportunity structure” yet exists. The extent 18 66 For instance, Vermeersch’s third element of 64 but he fails to address exactly how this how exactly address to fails he but 67 65 Some 63 CEU eTD Collection Publishers Ltd, 1997), 157. 1974), 45. kind ofcollectivizing theoretical determinism that characterizes the rejected “reactive ethnicity” the level of the individual. Superimposing his theories onto a social movement would risk the to exclusively refer usually and mobilization collective with connected obliquely only best, at are, collective ethnic political mobilization would be a serious cognitive stretch indeed; his theories individuals. Attempting to use Goffman’s theories about framing to explain and interpret animals playing together, etc. – would probably count as decidedly peripheral to the lives of most addition, most of the examples he uses in his book – pornography, TV commercials, hoaxes, transformation, instead blurring the separate concepts of “frame” and “transformation.” In on.” going is say would it isaparticipant what changes “utterly which interpreted, been already have means for “the organization of [mental] experience” is as an instrument to transform events that of experience individuals have at any moment of their social lives.” structure “the i.e. mind,” his into take can actor individual an that ... experience of organization core matters of sociology – social organization and social structure” in this work, but rather “the widerworld.the in and lives intheir both events label” and identify, perceive, “locate, to individuals enable which Organization of Experience of Organization writings of Erving Goffman, particularly Goffman’s 1974 book, Like most political sociologists, he traces the history of the concept of “framing” back to the 72 Problematically,Goffman never elaborates theon processorganization or of this 72 71 70 69 68 Goffman’s basic argument is that the fundamental importance of frame analysis as a analysisas frame of importance thefundamental is that argument basic Goffman’s been developed in the so-called “framing” literature. have that insights with is integrated perspective structure] opportunity [political associated with [political opportunity structure] studies can be avoided when the many authors on social movements agree that to some extent the problems Goffman, Erving Goffman, Erving Ibid., 21. Goffman, Erving Vermeersch, 42. 70 Goffman himself states quite clearly, however, that he is not discussing “the discussing is not he that however, clearly, quite states himself Goffman Frame Analysis The The Goffman Reader Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience . Goffman conceptualizedframes as “schemata of interpretation,” , 45. , eds. Charles Lemert and Ann Branaman (Oxford: Blackwell 19 68 Frame Analysis: An Essay on the on An Essay Analysis: Frame 71 (London: Harper & Row, 69 CEU eTD Collection supplant as the dominant paradigm in the field.” McAdam, to hadsought McCarthy, mobilization resource which tradition behavior and on the Zald,collective butironically 5. work, on Goffman’s perspective attached to ideas and sentiments. In reasserting their mobilization oftheresource importance, proponents how over little significance scholars movement among Snow discontent growing and his colleagues drew not only Erving Goffman’s“framing” of the concept adapting for the credit of him themajority give even authors Some field. this in authoritative term, to socialto the study movement of social theory: movements, “Indeed, but in notdoing only so helpeddid Snow to coin,crystallize or more and accurately, articulate a modify and apply Society mean by ‘framing processes’ has handicapped efforts to study this important aspect aspect of collective tostudy thisimportant efforts handicapped has processes’ by‘framing mean approach is best. different authors emphasize different approaches, and no consensus yet exists on which theories: structure” opportunity “political to inrelation discussed previously limitation similar process of producing the identity of a social (or ethnic) mobilization movement. elites in power.” in elites constrained by the cultural and political context, including the framing/counter-framing of the mobilizing and counter-mobilizing ideas and meanings, a process which is facilitated or Benford and Snow, he defines framing as “the generation and diffusion by movement actors of framing within the organizational and collective processes that are part of mobilization.” focus away from frames as pure cognition and started to concentrate on the power of deliberate writings of Robert Benford, David Snow, and Doug McAdam, remarking that they “shifted the to the collective, interactive cognitive processes of mobilization. inspiration for social movement theorists, who codified the concept of “framing” and applied it collective entities such as social movements, his theories became important sources of collectives. model described in Section 3.2.1, as Goffman meant to explain the behavior of individuals, not 14, No. 5 (September 1985), 605-622. 76 75 74 73 Although the problem is not quite as severe, the concept of “framing” suffers from a Though Goffman himself probably would not have applied his theories towards Ibid., 43. Vermeersch, 42. Cf. Vermeersch, 42; and cf. William A. Gamson, “Goffman’s Legacy to Political Sociology,” Currently, the writings of David Snow and his collaborators seem to be regarded as the most 76 75 Some scholars admit that “a lack of conceptual precision in defining what we what indefining precision “alackofconceptual that admit scholars Some Defined in this way, the process of framing canalso beunderstood as the 20 73 the reviews Vermeersch Theory and 74 Citing CEU eTD Collection Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 261-262. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings the words of della Porta and Diani, “The capacity for mobilization depends either on the mobilization” is usually described as one of the three pillars of new social movement theory. “resource “framing,” and structure” opportunity “political with together although framework, 3.2.5. Conspicuously Absent? Resource Mobilization variables, each of which has its own analytical advantages and drawbacks. has yet to reach an internal consensus, consisting instead of several taxonomies of relevant “prognostic framing,” and “motivational framing.” adopts Benford and Snow’s explanation of framing in terms of “diagnostic framing,” “realignment frames,” “inclusion frames,” and “revitalization frames.” “revitalization and frames,” “inclusion frames,” “realignment contention. common, but benign, cultural symbols into mobilizing collective identity and frames of “frames of contention,” and he emphasizes the role of movement leaders in transforming and framing,” “media formation,” “consensus cultures,” “emotion frames,” “injustice frames,” activity, competitive processes, mass media, and outcomes. and media, mass processes, competitive activity, astrategic as framing events, historical and contradictions cultural frames, and contention of interplay of movements, framing, and the larger society”: the cultural construction of repertoires potential analytical categories. efforts, frame contests,framing strategic kits, tool (cultural topics” distinct, clearly but “related, five and movement) structure and role of the media, and cultural impact), for a total of ten action.” 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 Rather puzzlingly, Vermeersch omitsresource mobilizationtheory from histheoretical 77 Cf. the following: della Porta and Diani, 7-9; Tarrow 123-138; and McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 3-4. Vermeersch, 43; and Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social della Porta and Diani, 80-81. Tarrow, Mayer N. Zald, “Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing,” in Ibid., 16-19. Ibid., 6. McAdam et al. distinguish between two temporal stages (framing early v. late in the 80 Diani and della Porta categorize framing in terms of “antisystem frames,” Power in Power in Movement 78 , 106-122. Similarly (but not identically), Zald finds six basic topics “in the Annual Review of Sociology 21 , eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer 82 The theorizingframing, on still evolving, 26 (2000), 615. 79 Tarrow describes“collective action Comparative Perspectives on Social onSocial Perspectives Movements: Comparative 81 himself Vermeersch 83 In CEU eTD Collection Democracies Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 195-200. Contemporary Hungary,” in component of new social movement theory? Perhaps he is attempting to avoid accusations of movement theorists’ analyses of social movements, so why would Vermeersch omit acentral mobilization. national (or even regional) informal, internal networks, which form a critical component of unemployed the post-communist welfare policies designed to “divide and pacify” the new masses of a result both of the exclusion of the Roma from the informal economy under socialism networks are generally not suitable for the promotion of mass mobilization along ethnic lines. As extended families, business acquaintances, and personal affinities. The bonds forged in these networks tend to be exclusive rather than inclusive and generally follow thecontours of generally do participate in many informal, extended networks at any given time, but Roma minority oftheRoma Members population. majority the with compared when particularly andsocial resources, economic lack both they 7.1, and 6.2.2-6.2.3 in theSections discussed As organizations.” is the role of informal connective tissue operating within and between formal movement collective action.” in engage and mobilize people which through asformal, aswell informal vehicles, collective McCarthy, and Zald, in addition(authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship) available tothe group.” to resources, a movementmaterial resources (work, money, concrete benefits, services) or on the non-material resources needs mobilizing structures, “those 89 88 87 86 85 84 Consideration of a movement’s resources usually plays a central role in new social As a group, the Roma have few internal resources available for movement mobilization. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006). Cf. Barany, 172-180. Cf. Pieter Vanhuysse, Cf. Júlia Szalai, “Conflicting Struggles for Recognition: Clashing Interests of Gender and Tarrow, Ethnicity in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 3. della Porta and Diani, 8. 88 (in which the Roma were dramatically overrepresented 86 Power in Power in Movement 85 InTarrow’s opinion, “what underlies the most successful [social movements] Recognition Struggles and Social Movements: Contested Identities, Agency and and Power Agency Identities, Contested Movements: and Social Struggles Recognition Divide and Pacify: Strategic Social Policies and Political Protests in Post-Communist , 137. 22 84 89 According to McAdam, ), the Roma have few , ed. Barbara 87 and of CEU eTD Collection around particular issues and then search for opportunities to engage politically, usually against usually politically, engage to foropportunities search then and issues particular around theoretical literature seeks that todescribe social movements that generally organize themselves concepts can be widely and divergently understood and applied. Moreover, his model draws on problems with bothwork evaluating he cites his istheoryin order to explain ethnic mobilization,rather particularly Roma mobilization. Most of the theoreticaland usingyoung it movement theoristsasand and attempting to unify antheir theories into a singleexplanatoryis cohesive analytical model somewhat tool, open as tomany interpretation, of hisHungary potentially3.3. Vermeersch’s Application of New Social Movement Theory to Roma Mobilization in leadingcolossal oversight. to omission of resource mobilization as a component of the Roma movement appears to be a direction of Roma mobilization. Within the context of Vermeersch’s larger argument, his marginalization of Roma is a (if not the) primary influence that determines the shape and 4,the Chapter in as isargued but, mobilization, Roma of cause immediate the isnot Roma economic deprivation of the Roma seems staggeringly naïve – perhaps the marginalization of determinism. When analyzing Roma ethnic mobilization, however, refusing to address the In doing so, he is probably attempting to shun all intimations of Marxist economic or structural mobilization and instead emphasizes the role of rational choice in Roma mobilization: mobilization theory because he rejects economic marginalization as a cause of Roma ethnic strategic and rational in nature. More likely, however, is that he avoids discussing resource criticism (discussed in Chapter 4), since the rest of his theoretical framework is overwhelmingly being overly committed to rational choice theory. If this is the case, he fails to avoid this 90 Vermeersch’s model is quite complex, drawing on the works of a number of social calculations about ways to communicate with the state. spontaneously react to marginality or deprivation, but rather made rational Those [Roma activists] who did attempt to mobilize an ethnic movement did not Vermeersch, 219. 23 90 CEU eTD Collection – Teleki Lászlo Foundation, 2002), 24-27. Definitions of Gypsy Ethnic Groups,” in of Groups,” Gypsy Ethnic Definitions “Self- Szuhay, Peter cf. inHungary, ofRoma groups ofdifferent ontheself-definitions a discussion For name. includes institution or organization particular name ofa the where except term “Roma” the uses essay this Therefore, themselves. bytheRoma connotation any pejorative without andisoftenused widespread remains of theuse however, In Hungary, ofRomaorigin. to people referring when of“Gypsy” instead “Roma” term ( some Roma elites subsequently endeavor to leverage in their favor. The first Gypsy Council of Roma mobilization; rather, it practically always occurs due to some top-down decision, which the result been rarely has Roma the towards inpolicy least) at change, (or “Progress” transition. the since surprisingly, more and, rule communist under both Roma, the of “subjectness” Communism Under “Activism” 3.3.1. Roma his time recounting the evolution of minority policy since the advent of communist rule. authorities in the three countries, mentioning the origins of “the Roma” but spending most of In the second chapter, he discusses the assorted decisions made about Roma by the various (the title of his second chapter) and “Ethnic Politics from Below” (the title of the third chapter). creating an accessible narrative of“TheDevelopment of Minority Policies in Central Europe” specialist largely of collection disparate this hesynthesizes works, secondary or surveys preexisting works and from histext of most derives augments Vermeersch Although politics. Slovak and Czech, Hungarian, them comprehensive overviewwith available in English) of the development of Roma participation in a number of interviewsVermeersch actually apply new social movement theory to the Roma mobilization inHungary? with keyproblems and the other points of theoretical contention discussedplayers, in Section 3.2, how does potential these Given government. majority the with conflict in than onrather dependent thereby social movement and more a construction of the Roma elite, who are practically always the government or institutions of power. Conversely, the Roma movement is less a grassroots Cigányszövetség 91 In the case of the Hungarian Roma, what is truly striking in Vermeersch’s account isthe account Vermeersch’s in truly striking what is Roma, Hungarian caseofthe In the The first half of Vermeersch’s book offers a comprehensive overview (perhaps the most A note on the use of “Roma” and “Gypsy”: this essay follows the emerging convention of using the ), 91 a consultative body formed in 1974,was a government creation that lasted only The Gypsies/The Roma in Hungarian Society 24 , ed. Ern ŋ Kállai(Budapest: Regio cigány in its cigány CEU eTD Collection 99; cf. Vermeersch, 54; and cf. Barany, 147. Cigány Önkormányzat Cigány and Ethnic Minorities (hereafter, Act LXXVII), the National Roma Self-Government ( the minority self-governmentinstitutional development in post-transition Hungary, describing at length the establishment of system through communists. the with themselves allying from abstained Act LXXVII of 1993government-led organizations of the mid-on and late-1980s and those elitesthe who had deliberately Rights of Nationallasting rift formed between3.3.2. Roma Mobilization During and After the Transition those Hungariantraits, the gypsy population does not constitute a national minority.” ethnological certain “despite that 1961 declaration government’s Roma the from divergence striking elites whogroup that the Hungarian government now considered a “nationality.”had This new outlook was a been participantsdevelopment reflected a substantial change in the government’s attitude toward the Roma, a during a time of considerable macroeconomic uncertainty andin instability. the as the non-Roma majority population greatly resented investment in Roma cultural projects effect of strengthening prejudice against Roma and left them exposed to increased discrimination, assisting children programs, folklore organizing centers, cultural ofsmall a couple in establishing groups fromthese needy families, and organizing a few cultural festivals had the perverse Cultural Association ( Association Cultural the National Gypsy Council ( up setting organizations, Roma establishing with experimented again government the mid-1980s, attention to the plight ofHungarian Rom.” a few years, and the final assessment of the body said that its only impact was to “draw more 96 95 94 93 92 In commenting on the transition to democracy, Vermeersch notes that an initial and an initial that notes Vermeersch todemocracy, transition the on commenting In Cf. Vermeersch, 61-62. Ibid., 93. Cf. Crowe, 100-101. Cf. Crowe, 99-100; and cf. Vermeersch, 56. David Crowe, ), the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities ( A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia Magyar Cigányok Kulturális Szövetség Kulturális Magyar Cigányok Országos Cigánytanács Országos 92 During the relaxationof totalitarian control in the 25 ) in May 1985 and the Hungarian Gypsy ) in June 1986. in June ) 96 He then focuses his discussion onthe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.), 95 Nemzeti és Etnikai Kisebbségi 93 successlimited of The 94 Nevertheless,this Országos CEU eTD Collection 155, (17 December 2007). Europe majority of 96.5%. of majority draft ofActLXXVII did noteven include the Roma voted against Act LXXVII, election of Ern recent the trend is tothis Oneexception 1999. Budapest, University, European Central thesis, MA Hungary,” in toasubordinate, relegated were instead theRoma process, in the political proactively participate and to strengthen the position of ethnic living outside Hungary’s borders. institutions supranational European into integration Hungary’s advance –to objectives policy foreign two further to and minorities well-integrated small, other, Hungary’s of identity cultural in 1993, only three members of the Hungarian Parliament were Roma, law in Hungary, practically without the input of the Roma minority. When Act LXXVII passed content ofAct LXXVII, the piece of legislation thatbecame the foundation of minority rights making processes of the Hungarian government. The Hungarian Parliament determined the somewhat lacking), continued to have virtually no effect on the policy-making and decision- elites or participants in mass movements (though evidence of the existence of the latter is individual whether ofRoma, Actions bodies. similar and roundtables” “minority consultative positions. change after the transition. Few Roma have been elected or appointed to important government narrative: the essential “subjectness” of the Roma in thesphere ofminority policy did not called the Minority Ombudsman). Hivatal , ed. Kinga Gál (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002), 175. ), and the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights (often 102 101 100 99 98 97 Instead of beingempowered (either bythe Hungarian government orbythemselves) to his by illuminated point important and interesting most the articulate to fails Vermeersch Ibid., 45-46. Vermeersch, 113. Cf. Vermeersch, 68-69; and cf. Balazs Wizner, “The Development of the Romany National Movement Szalai, “Conflicting Struggles for Recognition,” 201. Kai Schafft, “Local Minority Self-Governance and Hungary’s Roma,” Ferenc Eiler and Nóra Kovács, “Minority Self-Governments in Hungary,” in 97 Instead,Roma havehistorically been“represented” bymembers appointed to ŋ Kállai, a Roma who frequently refers to his ethnicity, to the position of Minority Ombudsman. 100 Act LXXVII was not written with the needs of the Roma in mind (the first 99 though the Hungarian Parliament passed it with an overwhelming 26 101 ); rather, it was written to promote the The Hungarian Quarterly 98 oneand ofthem even Minority Governance in 102 40, No. 40, CEU eTD Collection theory would be applicable to the situation of Roma in any Central and Eastern European country. University of Chicago Press, 2006). case of the Hungarian Roma. (even of Roma elites) and the shortcomings of new social movement theory in explaining the The NRSG provides a case study that illustrates both the “subjectness” of the Roma in Hungary analyzes. also Vermeersch that aninstitution Self-Government, Roma National the of history movement theory regarding the case of the Hungarian Roma, while Chapter 6 recounts the Hungarian political process. Chapter 4 details the theoretical shortcomings of new social when one party “non-participates” to the extent that the Roma “non-participated” in the falters power explanatory andits institutions), (usuallystate targets and their movements social new social movement theory seeks to describe a far richer “cycle of contention” situation. Vermeersch invokes new social movement theory to explain this “mobilization,” but stagnant and dismal a comparatively – from above upon them imposed to policies reactions the state.” marginality ordeprivation, but rather made rational calculations about ways to communicate with reactive position. AsVermeersch claims, Romaelites certainly “did not spontaneously react to 105 104 103 Although this essay focuses on Hungary, its argument about the applicability of new social movement social of new applicability the about argument its onHungary, essayfocuses this Although Cf.Tarrow, Vermeersch, 219. 103 Their rational calculations, however, rarely rose above the level of rather basic, hasty Power inMovement 105 , 141-160; and cf. Charles Tilly, 27 Regimes andRepertoires Regimes (Chicago: The 104 between CEU eTD Collection but this strategic understanding of power severely limits its explanatory capability, particularly capability, explanatory its limits severely of power understanding strategic this but available.” resources ornonmaterial material limited the to in relation action these political opportunity structures, “calculat[ing] the costs and benefits of their collective structures, prevailing informal strategies, and alliance structures. four strategic spheres discussed in Section 3.2.3:political opportunitynational structures. Vermeersch’s typologycleavage of political opportunities consists structures,of the formal institutional circumstances.” “emphasis is placed on the ability of political entrepreneurs to respond to economic and political and conflict;” inter-group of anescalation in can result groups disadvantaged previously resources, and solidarity occursin relations to these resources;” “economic advancement of scarce astrugglefor around revolves “society For Vermeersch, bias. strategic fundamental application ofsocial movement theory to the case of Roma mobilization shares Barany’s order to achieve strategic goals and domination. more than the rational, strategic mobilization ofresources by an individual or an ethnic group in little becomes interaction social frameworks, oftheir lenses the through Examined capacity. of power within their theoretical frameworks, which greatly detracts from their explanatory addressing power specifically, both Barany and Vermeersch integrate this strategic understanding resources to achieve goals and domination within the sphere of social interaction. Without power that revolves around a particular conception ofagency – i.e. strategic mobilization of common element in the models of Dahl, Polsby, Bachrach, Baratz, and Lukes is a conception of 108 107 106 Vermeersch thus inscribes a strategic concept of power into his theoretical framework, Vermeersch’s theoretical framework is more sophisticated than Barany’s, but his As demonstrated by the review of scholarly literature on power in Chapter 2, the 4. TheNeed foraNewUnderstandingofPower inRelation to theRoma Ibid., 40. Ibid., 39-40. Vermeersch, 36. 106 Mobilizationleaders make rational decisions inresponse to theprevailing 28 107 Actors mobilize in response to 108 CEU eTD Collection Ameida (Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 115-130. American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks the fate the of) their“disappeared” children, out find least at (or with reunited to be order in (1976-1983) dictatorship military Argentinean the against protested who women sense) conventional (inthe powerless and poor mostly of agroup PlazadeMayo, ofthe EventheMothers state. the tomobilizeagainst resources has suppress or subvert a social movement, social movement theory assumes that a social movement movements mobilize. No matter how many resources a state or other entity has at its disposal to members, organizations, etc.) and the states, organizations, corporations, etc. against which the assume some kind of relative (but not absolute) power parity between social movements (or their NRSG in particular. general patterns and outcomes of Roma mobilization in Hungary, and to understanding the (in the form of marginalization or, more accurately, domination) is central to understanding the spontaneously mobilize in reaction to marginalization is accurate, the dynamic of power relations Although Vermeersch’s oft-repeated assertion that the Roma in any one particular place did not resources in anattempt to secure domination over the other actor(s) in the relationship. available toa given actor in asocial relationship and of his or her rational mobilization ofthose reduction of the analysis of power and social relationships to an account of the resources when studying the mobilization of the Roma minority. The consequence of his approach is the Roma elite who engage with international bodies and organizations in the way predicted by the explaining Roma mobilization on the international level, as there is a tiny group of international in Section 5.1) to mobilize against an oppressive military regime. The great flaw in Vermeersch’s theory and social movement theory in general is that they 109 New social movement theory may indeed be asuitable theoretical framework for Cf. Elizabeth Borland, “The Mature Resistance of Argentina’s Madres de Plaza de Mayo,” in 109 had “moral capital” (in Bourdieuian terms, discussed terms, Bourdieuian (in capital” “moral had 29 , eds. Hank Johnston and Paul and Johnston Hank , eds. Latin CEU eTD Collection Central andEastern Europe [The roma/gypsies and the invisible economy] (Budapest: Osiris, 2000); UNDP, Poverty,” Central European University, 14 October 2001); István Kemény, Effects of Class and Ethnicity in a Cross-National Comparison” (Paper presented at theSituation workshopof Roma anin Enlarged European “Culture Union and Sociology trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke (New York: Verso, 2003). 2003), 21-32; and cf. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, andPower Agency Identities, Contested Movements: Social “Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reification in Cultural Politics,” in 2005). Romani Voice in World Politics: The United Nations and Non-State Actors always the practically are Roma the studies, statistical and anecdotal numerous by to attested As mobilize. poorest and between themselves and the organizations,least institutions, societies, etc. against which they might educatedmembers of the Roma minority have access to the kind of capital needed to create a power parity membersexplanatory capacity of the social movement model. Researchers cannot simply assumeof that the societiesparties, insubsidies, which i.e. they theideals, accessthe objects of contentionlive. become economic redistribution, welfare policy, housing Roma to education, discrimination, and promotionminority of culture) become concrete and material. Instead of debating non- rights, (human level international onthe etc., deliberated concerns abstract the level, domestic andand any non-Romacorrect toveneer approach Roma mobilization by examining it in different national contexts. On the of power majority, parity between disappears,the contesting thus destroying the rests in any meaningful way only with national governments. engage the topic on the national (i.e. domestic) level, as the capacity for economic redistribution bodies at which this discourse is directed, but practically no“material spoils” are at stake. parity (in the form of universalistic rhetoric) exists between the Roma elite and the international power of semblance some discourse, levelof international abstract, At this culture. Roma of rather abstract, usually focusing on matters of human rights, non-discrimination, and promotion social movement model (excepting a mass constituency component). 8, No. 2 (2002), 54-74; Szalai, “Conflicting Struggles for Recognition,” 188-214; European Commission, 112 111 110 Nevertheless, any truly useful explanatory framework for Roma mobilization must Cf. the following: Kertesi; Éva Havasi, “Poverty and Exclusion in Contemporary Hungary,” For discussions of the need for redistribution in the promotion of normative justice, cf. Nancy Fraser, For a description of Roma mobilization on the international level, cf. Ilona Klímová-Alexander, (Bratislava: UNDP, 2002); Robert Koulish, “Hungarian Roma Attitudes on Minority ; Ivan Szelényi, “Poverty Under Post-Communist Capitalism: The , ed. Barbara Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange 30 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, Publishing Ashgate UK: (Aldershot, 111 A romák/cigányok és a láthatatlan gazdaság Therefore,is quite Vermeersch Avoiding the Roma Dependency in Trap: 110 These discussions remain discussions These Recognition Struggles and Review of 112 The The , The CEU eTD Collection Identity (12 March 2008), 17. Background Members,” Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic, May 6-7, 2008). the conference “The Causes and Mechanisms of the Creation of Educational Barriers ofNational Different Roma Sociocultural Culture: Definitions, Relations, Prospects (The Czech/oslovakian SocialismCase)” (Paper to be presented at No. 2(2002), 173-188; Alaina Lemon, about Roma mobilization: why have Roma activists across the political spectrum continued to questions some the basic most of for answers leadstounsatisfying down and tobreak theory power inherent in social movement theory causes the explanatory model of social movement which they live. Attempting to reconcile this fact with the rational, strategic understanding of in societies themajority and state the –i.e. tomobilize attempt they which andagainst them oppress that societies and institutions, verysystems, the capital from their of vastmajority the receive activists Roma a movement, in tomobilize capital own their furnishing than rather that those elites directly vying for the spoils of ethnic politics in Hungary. Roma social movement are the least likely to participateimplications for Roma mobilization in – preciselysuch those Roma individualsan mostethnic valuable to the movement, except for for the purposes of mobilization. activists concomitantly have difficulty turning discrimination against Roma into “moral capital” identity,” a mobilizing it into turn and stigmas, its allof with identity, Minority Research, 2001). and Kállai Erika Törzsök, Rights: The Symbolic Violence of Ethnic Identification,” achievement, economic and educational with decreases Roma stigmatization or exploitation. Furthermore,Roma groups other than their own with as much suspicion as they view non-Roma. manyprospects for “identity capital” or “solidarity capital” are slim, as many Roma are inclined to view Roma refuse to identify themselves as Roma at all, out of fear of , ed. Thomas Acton (Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press, 1997), 153-163. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); and cf. Marek Jakoubek, “Traditional Roma Culture and 117 116 115 114 Consequently, the truly bizarre and paradoxical characteristic of Roma mobilization is 113 Koulish, 316. Cf. Nicolae Gheorghe, “The Social Construction of Romani Identity,” in Vermeersch, 226. Project on Ethnic Relations, “Roma and Statistics,” Cf. Paloma Gay y Blasco, “Gypsy/Roma Diasporas: A Comparative Perspective,” A Roma’s Life in Hungary: Report 2000 114 Between Two Fires: Gypsy Performance and Romani Memory from Pushkin to Post- Vermeersch notes “the inabilityactivists of to useRomani 116 Finally, Robert Koulish hasfound that self-identification as 31 Europe-Asia Studies (Budapest: Bureau for European Comparative European for Bureau (Budapest: Project on Ethnic Relations 57, No. 2 (March 2005); and Ern 117 whichcritically has important Gypsy Politics and Traveller , May 2000, 115 meaningRomathat Social Anthropology ŋ 10, 113 CEU eTD Collection increased mobilization, interethnic conflict, and claims making as Vermeersch claims, asVermeersch making claims and conflict, interethnic mobilization, increased unconscious choice? If “economic advancement of previously disadvantaged groups” results in Roma choose not to mobilize, or if non-mobilization is not a conscious choice, why is it an accomplish more? If there are not a significant number of “rank-and-file” members, why do members of the mobilization movement not replaced them with leaders who are able to mobilization, to leads rewards” andpolitical] [economic particular for elites among “competition to improve the situation of the constituency they claim torepresent? If, as Vermeersch asserts, prospects have gone on deteriorating”? fundamental life prospects of those in the Roma community in general; indeed, if anything, those establishment more than adecade ago the current system has done “nothing to improve the focus oncurrent institutional arrangements in the face of overwhelming evidence that since its that shape Roma ethnic mobilization. reproduction systemic and domination, ofpower, currents the toexplore foundation sounder relationship, mediated by culturally relevant structures that constrain actions, would provide a far reproduction function? A non-reductionist, contextualized conception of power as a social participate in a system that reproduces Roma marginalization? How does this process of by the authorities.” rather unsatisfying answer that “Romani mobilization was geared to the institutions introduced wealthier and more educated Roma less likely toidentify themselves as Roma? 122 121 120 119 118 Vermeersch’s theory has little to say about these fundamental questions, other than the Vermeersch, 223. Koulish, 316. Ibid., 36. Vermeersch, 220. KállaiandTörzsök, 85. 119 why have the current elites achieved so little, and why have the “rank-and-file” the whyhave and little, so achieved elites current the have why 122 Yet, if Vermeersch’s Roma elites are rational actors, why do they 118 Why do the Roma elite not unite on the domestic level 32 121 120 why are why CEU eTD Collection Press, 1996), 264; emphasis in original. David Swartz, Provocateur 5.1. Capital and in strategic agency theories. social sciences and avoid the pitfalls inherent both in structural determinism/instrumentalism economic analysis to non-economic resources, labor, goods, and services. “Cultural capital” (or, capital” “Cultural services. and goods, labor, resources, non-economic to analysis economic economic/non-economic dichotomy.” explain the complex dynamics of social life, hence Bourdieu’s call “to abandon the as resources. value they function “as a social social, state, and symbolic capitals. For Bourdieu, these resources “only function as capital” when cultural, economic, family, intellectual, linguistic, moral, personal, political, professional, religious, could potentially be mobilized for the purposes of exerting power: types of capital can include economic understanding of capital, Bourdieu extends the idea of capital to all resources that theory of power that transcends the agency-structure dualism. In contrast to Marxism’s purely field theoretical frameworks. A theory of power based on Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, habitus, and rather than the rational, strategic understanding of power implicit in Barany’s and Vermeersch’s much more thoroughly answered through a Bourdieuian structural theory of power as practice, 123 would enable researchers to overcome the agency-structure dualism so prevalent in the 125 124 This essay proposes that many of the fundamental questions raised in Chapter 4 could be 123 This reconceptuatlization is revolutionary because it enables researchers to extend Bourdieu’s reconceptualization of the Marxist idea of capital is the starting point for a (London: Continuum, 2004); Richard Jenkins, Richard 2004); Continuum, (London: Pierre Bourdieu, Pierre Bourdieu, This essay follows the interpretations of these terms provided in Michael Grenfell, Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu 5. A Bourdieuian Structural5. ABourdieuian TheoryofPoweras Practice 124 The Marxist focus on economic capital is incomplete and cannot adequately The Logic of Practice The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power power relation,” i.e. when people struggle over them because of their 125 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 122. 33 Pierre Bourdieu Pierre (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997). , 2 nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002); and (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Pierre Bourdieu: Agent CEU eTD Collection Press, 1991), 164. ed. J. G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 252. Theory 1992), 119; and Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” therefore, is not innocent and cannot be divorced from politics or economics, but through interconvertable. notes relationships between allthat of these different kinds of capital are quite complex, however; Bourdieu capitalopposed to the conceptualization of“culture” in orthodox Marxist theoretical frameworks. The is an “energy of social physics,” multifaceted, interdependent, and promotion and legitimization of the dominant group, culture, language, and hierarchy. systems also become politicized by transforming into systems of domination through the understand and communicate with and in the social world. Perhaps most importantly, symbolic systems become “structuring structures,” most brutal relations of force are always simultaneously symbolic relations.” inequality: inmaintaining role a central play itself, state the or institutions, legal literature, domination. Indeed, “symbolic forms of domination,” Bourdieu introduces the importance of symbolic forms of capital in processes of control and “what kind” and “how much.” capital.” economic symbolic, etc., and that these other forms of capital are “transformed, disguised forms of “economic capital is at the root of all the other types of capital,” i.e. informational, social, a source of power that is not theoretically subjugated inlateranalyses term the he reformulates as capital,” “informational generally, more 12, No. 1 (March 1994), 7. 133 129 132 131 130 128 127 126 By broadening the applicability of Marxism’s economic understanding of capital, Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State,” 8. Pierre Bourdieu, Ibid., 13; and Pierre Bourdieu, Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State,” 12. Cf. ibid., 122-134. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in Bourdieu, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, 127 128 Nevertheless, Bourdieu still gives primacy to economic capital, claiming that claiming capital, economic to primacy gives still Bourdieu Nevertheless, The Logic of Practice Bourdieu thus turns everyone into a capital holder; the questions become questions the holder; capital a into everyone turns thus Bourdieu The Logic of Practice , 122. Language andSymbolicPower , 133. 132 An Invitation Reflexiveto Sociology which determine how individuals are able to able are individuals how determine which 34 Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education a priori , ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Polity (Cambridge: John Thompson , ed. B. 129 whether they consist of art and art of consist they whether toeconomic considerations, as (Cambridge: Polity Press, 131 symbolicThese 126 133 ) becomes Sociological Culture, 130 “The , CEU eTD Collection Press, 1990), 65. Publications, 1977), 9-10. structures either. This is the essence of the agency-structure dualism, and as outlined in Chapter as outlined and dualism, agency-structure ofthe essence Thisisthe either. structures than an aggregation of individual human decisions, but it is not reducible to autonomous rules?” to obedience of product the being without regulated be behavior form of justification. some requires generally ofpower the exercise as systems, these legitimize to its power through relation to politics and economics. Bourdieu’s classification, itseffects canbe empirically studied,independently both from andin quo exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity.” acceptance of domination as legitimate; he defines “symbolic violence” as “the violence which is themselves exercise it.” complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they 5.2. Habitus 5.2. capital. capital, symbolic capital can also be accumulated and then exchanged for other forms of reducible to either economic or political power. As is the case with Bourdieu’s other forms of isnot power symbolic superstructure, butunlike power, and political economic legitimizing as power symbolic sees Bourdieu ofsuperstructure, understanding Marxism’s to Similar , leading to intergenerational reproduction of social inequality: social of reproduction intergenerational to , leading 138 139 138 137 136 135 134 Bourdieu states, “I can say that all of my thinking started from this point: how can Consequently, symbolic capital is central to the maintenance of systems of domination to those power relations. relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force imposeEvery power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to meaning and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power Pierre Bourdieu, Bourdieu, Bourdieu and Passeron, 4. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 167. Pierre Bourdieu, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, The Logic of Practice 134 In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology Language and Symbolic Power 135 Systems of domination exercise symbolic power “only with the with “only power symbolic exercise domination of Systems Bourdieu’sconceptof “symbolic violence” emerges fromthis 137 , 122. , 164. Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture 35 136 Symbolic power legitimizes the legitimizes power Symbolic (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 139 Social life is more is life Social (London: Sage status CEU eTD Collection Theory of Practice (especially of the body) and, in particular, a incessantly. behavior, and of self-aware, rational actors, who from their perspective make conscious decisions integrate the seemingly conflicting perspectives of social scientists, who detect patterns in human being subjugated entirely either to structures or to individual agency and that enables him to two central concepts that allows Bourdieu to explain how human action follows patterns without 2, the “classic” understanding of power prioritizes agency over structure. Habitus is one of the “necessity ... [as] a virtue.” [as] ... “necessity recreates the conditions ofits own perpetuity by recasting social, economic, orpolitical that produce structured actions which, in turn tend to reproduce objective structure.” structures and practices; objective structures tend to produce structured subjective dispositions that unite[s] relations circular of ina“system itself ofhabitus strength and structure the structures,” whether political, economic, or social. Individual actions shaped by habitus reinforce unquestioned in the mind of the actor. Habitus thereby perpetuates the current “opportunity the degree that the behavior, whether beneficial ordetrimental to the actor, becomes to behavior internalize to actors causes which structure, structuring astructured thus is Habitus action covered by the concept of habitus (defined as a system of dispositions). It expresses first the , with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a 143 142 141 action of a conductor. of action all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being at aiming aconscious presupposing without goals totheir adapted objectively and “regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively “regulated” to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and systems of durable, transposable durable, of systems He defines habitus thusly: 140 Bourdieu, Bourdieu and Passeron, 203. Ibid., 72; emphasis in original. Bourdieuadditionally notesthat “theword (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 214; emphasis in original. Outline of a Theory of Practice 143 These dispositions are the historical products of early socialization early of products historical the are dispositions These 141 predisposition , 77. dispositions , 36 tendency disposition , 140 , propensity structured structures predisposed structures structured seems particularly suited to express what is , or inclination .” Pierre Bourdieu, way of being result of anorganizing of result , a 142 habitual state Habitus Outline of of a Outline CEU eTD Collection Press, 1984), 471. have cultural or structural origins. The explanatory potential of habitus is particularly great is particularly of habitus potential explanatory The origins. or structural cultural have among commentators on the situation of the Roma, i.e. whether particular deviant behaviors available tothem, Bourdieu offers a chance to avoid falling into the most common debate By emphasizing the adoption of an entire set of practices in response to the limited opportunities particular behaviors. just not “life-style,” agent’s an i.e. of practices,” set whole agent’s “an encompasses and change through position) to class/social according greatly differs (which impossible and ispossible what of calculations Habitus reproduces and legitimizes social inequality by structuring people’s unconscious household objects, modes of consumption, [and] parent-child relations.” sexes, the of labor between as“division factors suchbanal through classes particular into 148 147 146 145 144 the next generation. order to transmit the inherited power and privileges, maintained in or implements enhanced, group every that to reproduction social and cultural, biological, for and even educational strategies, in words other fromthewhole set of strategies strategies, fertility strategies, inheritance from inseparable are strategies marriage Because of its integration into an individual’s being at an early age, habitus is resistant to isresistant habitus age, an early at being individual’s an into integration its of Because forward,” in short “knowing one’s place” and staying there). dignity,” or on the other hand, refusing to “take liberties” and “put oneself “letting oneself go,” not “becoming familiar,” in short, “standing on one’s dominant than for the dominated), increase it, or simply maintain [it] (by not strategically, whether symbolically oractually, it toreduce (easier forthe it manipulate orto distance” one’s “keep to in order required conduct social space) and correlatively, so many reminders of this distance and of the conjuncturally brought together (in physical space, which is not the same thing as distance between objective positions, that is, between social persons of whicharesomanymarks dispositions so forth from which one is excluded. and places, persons, thegoods, from oneself exclude to leadsone which place” objective limits acquired byexperience ofobjective limits, a “sense ofone’s of anticipation apractical limits, asenseof become limits Objective world. social divisions become principles of division, organizing the image of the social Bourdieu, Bourdieu, Bourdieu, Pierre Bourdieu, Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice Distinction Outline of a Theory of Practice The Logic of Practice 147 For Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste , 170. 148 , 160-161. , 54. , 82; emphasis in original. 145 37 social position social and hence of the social (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 146 144 These CEU eTD Collection field is the locus of relations of force – and not only of meaning – and of struggles aimed at stake in the field itself” field the in stake at always [are] field ... the of limits (“the fields different between boundaries delineate strictly not as afield defines Bourdieu operate. habitus and capital, actors, inwhich setting social the “field” defines then hierarchy, social in the place their to perpetuate inorder actions individuals’ patterns that structure Field 5.3. areas are most often “given over in reality to the regulated improvisation of the habitus.” as these prescriptions,” andlacking“ritual ‘freest’” areapparently areas that “the in influential regarding the relationship between the Roma and the majority, as habitus tends to be especially that are that etc., functions as a “relatively autonomous social microcosm” with its own “logic and ... necessity Each field, whether the field of power, art, science, education, politics, religion, housing policy, In other words, 153 152 151 150 149 If capital determines individuals’ positions in the social hierarchy and habitus isthe andhabitus hierarchy inthesocial positions individuals’ determines capital If potential situation ( impose upon their occupants, agents, or institutions, by their present and positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These types of capital or combinations of capital. Fields maybe thought ofas structured spaces that are organized around specific capital. of kinds different these monopolize and accumulate to struggle their services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held byactors in Fields denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, (domination, subordination, homology, etc.). stake in the field, as well as bytheir objective relation to other positions areat that profits to access thespecific commands whose possession capital) (or specific and irreducible and specific Ibid., 100. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 97; emphasis in original. Swartz, 117. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 97. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 153 ), nor does he characterize them as systems or institutions; rather, “the rather, institutions; or as systems them characterize does he nor ), situs to those that regulate other fields.” other thatregulate tothose ) in the structure of the distribution of species of power of species of thedistribution of structure ) inthe , 20. 38 151 150 152 Nevertheless,doesBourdieu 149 CEU eTD Collection potential, concrete target for research. Bourdieu characterizes relationships between these partake of it and the surrounding social and economic conditions” according to their own internal logic (as the field mediates “between the practices of those who of external influences, own rules,interests, its own experts, its own organizational logic, and its own interests, largely independent or fields. Bourdieu thus emphasizesautonomous.” “relatively previously, the need to analyze fields significant extent by their own internal mechanisms of development” their participation in the field reproduces the field’s structure. Fourth, “fields are structured to a “fields are arenas of struggle for legitimization,” struggle of arenas are “fields each “relationally” of the game and its stakes;” playing ... in conformity with the tacit rules of the game and the prerequisites of the reproduction struggle,” of dominant to defend their positions and privileges. Third, “fields impose on actors specific forms and those in subordinate positions struggle against those in dominant positions, forcing the capital.” are structured spaces of dominant and subordinate positions based on types and amounts of “fields Second, field). business inthe capital economic or field scientific inthe capital scientific legitimate monopoly of symbolic power over the capital(s) central to particular fields (e.g. transforming it.” 161 160 159 158 157 156 155 154 Each field has the potential to (and usually does) develop its own hierarchy of capitals, its David Swartz isolates four universal structural properties present in any field. First, inanyfield. present properties structural universal four isolates Swartz David 157 Bourdieu and Wacquant, 105. Swartz, 126. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 98-99. Ibid., 125. Ibid. Swartz, 123. Ibid., 96. Ibid., 103. The unequal distribution of capital(s) determines individuals’ positions in the field, inthe positions individuals’ determines capital(s) of distribution unequal The 158 meaning that both the dominant and the dominated agree “that the game is worth 154 155 A field is, therefore, simultaneously a site of domination and of resistance, connected with the other. 159 even if the dominated protest the legitimacy of the field’s hierarchy, 39 156 i.e. sites of struggle over the right to exercise a 161 ), and each field becomes a 160 and are, as quoted as are, and CEU eTD Collection “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” constraints driving the actions of the actors in the field. account of the nature of afield, of the power relations within afield, and of the motivations and field ofstruggle? By seeking answers to these questions, a researcher can give a comprehensive In other words, who brings what kind of habitus into the field, and what are they pursuing in the distribution of the capital(s)? Third, isthe what and field, particular tothis important the capital(s) to according is dominated who power.” of field the vis-à-vis studied] capital, habitus, and field. “First, one must analyze the position of the [particular field being 5.4. Summary: A Strategy for a Research Program compete: strategies (both of which connect back to habitus) across the different fields in which they other words, actors tend to share both their relative positions in hierarchies and their functional relatively autonomous fields as “homologies ... [i.e.] a resemblance within a difference.” legitimate form of specific authority of which this field [is] the site,” the [is] field this ofwhich authority specific of form legitimate relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the entirely subsumes) other fields. often of(and principle asanorganizing anditserves interaction, and life social structuring field 168 167 166 165 Bourdieu offers a concise methodology for conducting research based on his concepts of 163 162 consideration a more or less favorable opportunity to become actualized. under field the within trajectory inadefinite find andwhich condition, they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic one must analyze the habitus of the agents, the different systems of dispositions 164 163 Ibid. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 105. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 104. For an example of how homologies function with respect to law and social classes, Ibid.,cf. Pierre106. Bourdieu, Bourdieu, habitus thus becomes “the unifying principle of practices in different domains.” Outline of a Theory of Practice The State Nobility 166 “Second, onemust map out the objectivestructure ofthe 165 Bourdieu considers the field of power to be the principle , 83. , 264-272. 40 The Hastings LawJournal 167 i.e. who isdominant and 38 (1987), 822. 168 164 162 In CEU eTD Collection Roma mobilization could substantially influence the structure and functioning of the NRSG, competencies of the other minority national self-governments. This also implies that effective of the Roma without drasticallygovernment, with relativealtering ease, could alter the system to improve the balance of power in favoreither Act LXXVII the NRSG, itselfjust aset number of representatives (fifty-three). Thisor implies that the Hungarianeven the compositionfor structure is mandated no there In fact, sovague. NRSG are the of and responsibilities rights and well as the customary behaviorplaces.” of the state organs that interactapplicability of which “depends on the numerouswith other specific laws that it refers to in severalthe NRSG, since the law,” “skeleton is aso-called LXXVII Act system. theself-government minority the founded legal inquiry focuses mainly on the NRSG because of two major considerations: 6.1. Why Examine the National Roma Self-Government? explain why Roma mobilization in Hungary has developed into its current form. combines the structural theory of power as practice with the empirical findings in this chapter to establishment and growth of the NRSG under its various chairmen is recounted. Chapter 7 then prioritizes the NRSG over other forms of Roma mobilization in Hungary, the record of the elucidating the phenomenon of Roma mobilization in Hungary. After discussing why this essay study in order to explore the potential of a Bourdieuian structural theory of power as practice for the minorityand system political established the both of outside and parties) political mainstream and Roma self-government(in politics electoral within mobilize to attempted have activists Roma Hungary. in mobilization system (as discussed briefly in Sections 6.2.4 and 6.6). 170 169 170 First, the NRSG is to a large degree constituted separately from Act LXXVII that The National Roma Self-Government (hereafter, NRSG) provides an excellent case Admittedly, the National Roma Self-Government is only one aspect of Roma ethnic Eiler and Kovács, 175. Cf. Vermeersch, 102-149. The powers of the NRSG depend largely on the interpretation of these other laws, as 6. CaseStudy:The National Roma Self-Government ofHungary 41 169 This CEU eTD Collection Special Partner” (3 July 2003). their advance promoting and of Hungary Roma the for in conditions living the theto improve helping in partner a special as social[NRSG] mainstream.” Hungarian News Agency (MTI), (31 October 2007),“Gov’t 19. Says Participation,” National Gypsy Authorityand Human Rights, “The HungarianIs Minority Self-Government System as a Means of Increasing Romani Political Hungarian context. social movement theory and a Bourdieuian structural theory of power as practice in the then it is an optimal subject to examine the suitability of both Vermeersch’s application of new Hungarian Romani movement.” government is concerned. Hungarian least asfarthe at level, thenational oftheRoma on body representative legitimate “consenting” to legislation that affects the Roma minority as aswell houses,” publishing and libraries, museums, theatres, institutions, education secondary stations, radio and as television such institutions minority of activities the “oversee[ing] charged with “protect[ing] the rights of the minority it represents on the national level” and on account of mobilization by Roma activists, leaders, and pressure groups. Hungary, both in the present and in the past, by examining the NRSG’s receptiveness to change practice, in always makesif not law in flexibility, institutional potential This LXXVII). Act of vagueness the the NRSG a goodthe NRSG itself wields considerable influence over itslitmus own structure and functioning because of testor different powers and competencies),for or by forcing the NRSG itself to behave differentlythe (as effectivenesseither byforcing the government tointeract with the NRSGdifferently (thereby granting it new of Roma mobilization in 173 172 171 Second, although the legal mandate of the NRSG is rather limited and vague – it is Vermeersch, 129. On July 3, 2003, Hungarian government spokesperson Zoltan J. National DemocraticGal Institute said, for International Affairs and “TheOSCE Office for Democraticgovernment Institutions views the The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 172 the centerpieceof “the NRSG callsthe Vermeersch Thus, 173 If the NRSG is central to Roma mobilizationHungary,in 42 , October 2006, 171 becomethe has it – de facto CEU eTD Collection Social ResearchSocial Penguin Books, 1979). Present and Future Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 33. of CentralEurope? New Democracies Hungarian Welfare Capitalism,” in underpaid) employment, health care, and other (usually employer-administered) benefits. (if assured wageguarantees, minimum housing, subsidized regulation, price subsidies, food decent lifestyle was the provision of a number of collective benefits through the socialist system: with a decent enough lifestyle as to avoid rebellion. policy’ into the entire system.” the central intention .... [T]he elimination of social policy was accompanied by ‘injecting social economic and society, of private and public life, became imbued with ‘social’ considerations as of segment “every Paradoxically, 1950s. the in abolished officially were policy social and work social problems automatically, rendering separate “social policy” superfluous; all solve would mechanism economic and political socialist the that assumed party communist government was todismantle the pre-WWII system of social institutions and social policies. The Redistribution Economic Through Assimilation theRoma: Towards Policy 6.2.1. Communist the Roma Elite Stratum 6.2. The Communist Legacy and the Transition: “State Desertion” and Loyalists v. Radicals in important source of which was the preservation of artificially low wages balancing act between maintaining a centralized economic surplus on the one hand (the most participation in regular, socialized labor. The maintenance of this collective required a precarious party gradually broadened its scope, and policy administration became increasingly centralized. 179 178 177 176 175 174 After the communists’ ascent to power, one of the first acts of the new socialist Membership in the Hungarian social collective was redefined as (compulsory) Cf. Guy Standing, “The Folly of Social Safety Nets: Why Basic Income In Needed Szikra,in Eastern134. Europe,” Cf. Szalai and Orosz, 150. Cf. Zsuzsa Ferge, Júlia Szalai and Eva Orosz, “Social Policy in Hungary,” in Dorottya Szikra, “Family and Child Support in a Postcommunist Society: Origins of the Mixed 64, No. 4 (1997), 1339-1349. , ed. Bob Deacon (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 149. A Society in the Making: Hungarian Social and Societal Policy, 1945-1975 , eds. Michael Cain, Nida Gelazis, and Tomasz Inglot, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Fighting Poverty and Reforming Social Security: What Can Post-Soviet States Learn from the 175 Far from eliminating social policy, theHungarian communist 43 178 One important component of providing a The New Eastern Europe: Social Policy Past, 177 ) and providing people 174 therefore,social (Middlesex: 179 176 CEU eTD Collection and Self-Protection Against Poverty in Hungary,” Paper presented at EURESCO conference, 2001. Hungary,” might, the passing of leadership to a new generation of liberalizing elites, and the “silent itsmilitary with states puppet communist tosupport U.S.S.R. the of unwillingness increasing and the inability of socialist economies to adapt to the “information technology revolution), the onwards (especially the sharp rise in oil prices, imprudent borrowing by socialist governments, factors. The combination of irresistible6.2.2. The Collapse of the Socialist Welfare State and the Impact on the Roma pressures living standardsfrom during and after the economic transition. the worldRoma in decline precipitous in the role a large market played exclusion this 6.2.2, Section following from the mid 1970swere largely excluded from this second, informal economy, however, and as explained in the and was one of the key mechanisms for economic advancement under socialism. reinvested. The informal economy became an important source of income for many Hungarians household resources could be used to generate capital that could then be accumulated,government’s tacittraded, acquiescence to people’sor participation in the informal economy, in which of limiting contact with non-Roma authorities: mechanism survival Roma historical the dismantling generally and children, Roma for attendance Roma isolation through bringing Roma workers into the wage economy, mandating school of centuries ending quickly at aimed policies implemented government communist The society. assimilating the Roma into the institutions of the mainstream, centrally planned Hungarian 181 180 Socialism failed as a result of the complex interaction among a number of converging In relation to the Roma, this system translated into a rather forcible attempt at Another important component of providing a decent lifestyle was the communist these goods and services can be obtained. become necessary for Roma people to engage with those authorities from whom entitlements, housing, education, health care, legal protection, and so on) it has In orderto secure those resources necessary inmodern society (work, welfare Contemporary Politics For a detailed account of this process, see Júlia Szalai, “Power and Poverty: Socialist Second Economy Martin Kovats, “The Political Significance of the First National Gypsy Minority Self-Government in 6,No. 3 (2000), 248. 44 180 181 Roma The CEU eTD Collection “Introduction,” in poverty was a taboo topic under socialism (resulting in a lack of reliable data from that time) [Yogesh Atal, and methodologies. inclusive definition”transition [Standing, 1342-1343]; and (3) social scientists and economists still do ofnot14]; agree on a “universallypoverty(2) valid, all-governments [Havasi, have occasionally 60], manipulated necessitating statistics to demonstratethat each that povertyresearcher did not increase establish after the his or her own standards jobs occupied by Roma were the most expendable. therefore, when market rationalization dictated that these enterprises become more efficient, the cooperatives; agricultural or in factories laborers as unskilled employed disproportionately Causes of Disintegration of East European State Socialism,” had excluded the Roma from participating in the informal economy. and finding new employment in the burgeoning post-socialist service-based economy: to the informal economy proved to be central to successfully weathering the economic transition wages real of decline that led to a decrease in available jobs (and a concomitant rise in unemployment) employment in the former socialist system and caused serious inflation, a potent combination system tobear. revolution” of participation in Hungary’s second economy proved too great for the socialist Hungary in 2000, only 14.2% of Hungarians declared that they had never been poor been never had they that declared Hungarians of 14.2% 2000, only in Hungary actual poverty 185 184 183 189 188 187 186 182 During the socialist period, both racial discrimination and their own lack of resources them the hope of catching up. from an entirethe formal [socialist]culture, economy .... [T]hose who did not participate were excluded andknowledge and skills that in practice couldno not be learned in the institutionsformal new of acquired participants the it, realizing even without time, same the at while schooling orThe informal economy built up awholesystem of new occupations andservices training program could give Nevertheless, measuring the exact increase in poverty has proven difficult for a number Cf. Havasi, of reasons:54-57. (1) Cf. Kertesi, 8-13. Kertesi, 25. Szalai, “Conflicting Struggles for Recognition,” 198. Szalai, “Power and Poverty,” 12. Havasi, 71. Cf. Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi, “Why Socialism Failed: Toward a Theory of System Breakdown – 185 182 Poverty in Transition and Transition in Poverty and in perceived poverty (perhaps better called “impoverishment” – e.g. in – e.g. “impoverishment” called better (perhaps poverty in perceived and The subsequent transition to a market economy corrected the artificially high 184 inHungary. Predictably, these corrections causedincrease an bothin 187 45 , ed. Yogesh Atal (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), Theory and Society 189 The socialist system had also segregated also had system socialist The 23, No. 2 (April 1994), 211-231. 188 been had Roma 183 186 a toand ). Access CEU eTD Collection European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (FI), Italy, 2000, 11. East-Central Europe,” EUI Working Paper RSC No. 2000/50, Centre for Advanced Studies, European Roma Rights Centre, 1998). government established a complex institutional system to cushion the shock for the “losers” of (or actually decreasing transfers). Towards the beginning of the transition process, the Hungarian providing far fewer services while not providing a proportional increase in government transfers heavy, transfer light” welfare system, Szalai Júlia and Will Guy desertion” (in the words of Guy Standing policies towards Roma, which can only beunderstood within the wider phenomenon of“state 6.2.3. “State Desertion” or “the Dismantling of the State” differences between current Roma and non-Roma unemployment rates: for account the donotentirely settlements Romani characterizing often backwardness educational levels, lack of access to the informal economy, lack of capital, and the regional and that poor Roma are less likely toescape poverty than the non-Roma poor. Nonetheless, low poorest members of Hungarian society, that poor Roma are poorer than the non-Roma poor, economy to this day. Researcherstransition into a market-based economy, and most Roma remain excluded from the new have comeinformal pillar of economic toexistence. Consequently, theythe were completely unprepared for generala conclusion tothe access no had and system socialist in the invested were completely Roma most words, that the other In economy. new ofthe jobs Roma knowledge-based the into transition to needed education are the the Roma in lower-quality educational facilities, 194 193 192 191 190 Unsurprisingly, the violent changes in the socioeconomic system led to radical changes in as a sign ofanything other than discrimination in the labour market. age, schooling, and family background .... much harderIt thanis the employmenthard of tonon-Romany interpret people with the same gender, this phenomenon The crisis of the local economy hit the employment of the Romany population János Mátyás Kovács, “Approaching the EU and Reaching the US? Transforming Welfare Regimes in Júlia Szalai, “Social Outcasts in 21 Standing, 1340. Kertesi, 43. Cf. Claude Cahn et al., “Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern Europe” (Budapest: 193 ) in post-communist Hungary. Communism left behind a “service st Century Hungary,” 194 192 modela was thatquickly abandoned favorin of ) or “the dismantling of the state” (in the words of 46 190 so they were the least likely to have the Review of Sociology 8, No. 2 (2002), 38. 191 CEU eTD Collection coerced), and disability pensions (again, voluntary and coerced). social and economic restructuring: unemployment benefits, early retirement (voluntary and this process worked. real value toevaporate. schemes, and (e) refusing to make government benefits inflation-proof, thereby allowing their insurance private introducing (d) given, still were that services public the of quality the lowering (c) levels, low impossibly tothese benefits linking and low too pensions or wages minimum five general categories: (a) narrowing the size and period of eligibility ofbenefits, (b) setting into fell occurred valuereduction this which through tactics The dramatically. declined benefits contract and the numbers of unemployed, retired, and “disabled” rose, the real value of these Privatization Recognition of Social Tensions,” in forpreviously substitutes low-capacity or low-quality usually are transition the since Hungary organizations” “neo-governmental accurately, more perhaps state abandonment of a number of social spheres. The non-governmental organizations (or, damage caused by the loss of enterprise- and employer-administered services and the subsequent long-term unemployed had already exhausted their period of eligibility for benefits. only forty percent of the registered unemployed received any befits whatsoever, as most of the onwards, unemployment benefits were only paid for twelve months, and consequently, by 1995 per capital unemployment benefits had eroded to less than half of their 1992 value. From 1992 of value real the By1995, benefits. these received unemployed registered the of percent Eighty benefits for twenty-four months, the minimum amount of which was the official minimum wage. Poulantzas attheMillennium,” Poulantzas Unemployment benefits in Hungary provide a particularly illuminating example of how 195 Private initiatives, whether non-profit or for-profit, have not been able to obviate the 198 197 196 , ed. Demetrius S. Iatridis, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 172. Otto Czúcz, “The Social Consequences of the Transition in Hungary and Methods for the Early Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells, “Globalization, the Knowledge Society, and Thethe data Network for this State: example are taken from Vanhuysse, 74-76. Kovács, 11. 197 196 1991,registeredIn a unemployed personreceived unemployment Global Networks Social Justice and the Welfare State in Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of 1, No. 1 (2001), 14. 47 198 195 ) that have proliferated across As theeconomy continued to CEU eTD Collection Glatzer and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 130-152. Post-Communist East-Central European Countries,” in Countries,” European East-Central Post-Communist reached an internal “new consensus” in post-socialist policy towards the Roma, the aim of which essay’s argument. The key point demonstrated by the preceding review is that the government impossible to escape – but the exact consequences of this new system are not essential to this minority in a vicious cycle of institutionalized poverty and dependence from which it is nearly oftheRoma traps members that a system creating Hungary, in welfare racialized effectively concentration of the (scare) resources on those really in need.” more be should there access, and take-up of inequalities diminish do not benefits universal holes in the net. This new system rests on the principle of “targeting,” the idea that “since minorities, the chronically ill, inhabitants of declining regions, etc.) are allowed to fall through the ethnic family, no with elderly the disabled, the unemployed, long-term the homeless, the “truly needy”) who stumble during their performance, while others (the “undeserving poor,” i.e. life.” in offering its citizens safety belts or ropes while performing acrobatic stunts in the “circus of The metaphor of a new “social safety net” is an apt one:“workfare,” linkingthe the payment of governmentbenefits with performance of hard labor for public works. is no longer interested Hungary in policy social extent, a significant To risk. social of individualization the has through privileged degeneratedas the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, intoforemost among them), often implemented at the insistence of international organizations such povertypublic services, or they favor the rich.“relief,” composed largely of social assistance and 201 Instead, society should merely prepare to catch some of people (the “deserving poor” or 202 201 200 199 This new system had a significant negative impact on members of the Roma minority. It Szalai and Orosz, 158. Kovács, 13-14. Cf. Mitchell A. Orenstein and Martine R. Hass, “Globalization and the Future of Welfare Kovács, 13.States in the 199 Privately funded social policy schemes (pension systems Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State 48 200 have tended to privilegealready- the 202 , eds. Miguel CEU eTD Collection Elections,” communist party and others from the democratic opposition. could choose from anumber of potential allies,some from the reformist strand of the communist politicians were open to radical changes in the system, meaning that Roma elites 1980s. in thelate unified was not itself party communist Hungarian demand a nofundamental unified opposition revision v.Radicals Loyalists RomaElites: Among 6.2.4. Division to the socialist governments, ofof which the National Roma Self-Government was the largest and mostthe important. regimeHungarianinstitutions in the post-socialist implementation of this new consensus were the minorityemerged self- onpolitical the Hungarian systempolitical – scenelargely to because the Council ( Council The initial mechanism for the implementation of this “new consensus” was the National Gypsy starting withethnic minorities in Hungary from further losing theireducation identity, and to attempt to make a change Office all theof the wayPrime the of Secretary State Political and Tabajdi (MP Csaba words of in the was, system government from Minister [kindergarten] in 1995),standards of the ever-poorer Roma minority. On the contrary, the purpose of the minority self- “to stop intheliving decline precipitous the and reverse stop to would that polices theunpopular politically higheralready [largely]education.”equality ofHungarian citizens who happened to belong to a minority or to pursue expensive andassimilatedsystem. The purpose of this new minority self-governmentnational system was not to support the and assimilated Roma policy into a broader minority policy based on the minority self-government 206 205 204 203 In contrast to most other countries in Central and Eastern Europe during the transition, formal relationship with (representatives of) an ‘ethnic’ group. of other citizens and towards the less ambitious (and cheaper) one of creating a was shifted away from equalizing the circumstances of Roma people with those Országos Cigánytanács Országos For detailed accounts of these debates, cf. Vermeersch, 123-129; and cf. Wizner, 66-78. Cf. Robert Jenkins, “Stabilizing the Democratic Transition: The 1990 Hungarian Parlimentary Csaba Tabajdi, translated by and quoted in Wizner, 107. Kovats, 250. Szelényi 60, (17 December 2007). ) mentioned earlier. After the transition, the Hungarian Parliament Hungarian the transition, the After earlier. ) mentioned 49 206 The loyalists The 203 205 post-Kádár Some 207 204 called(often central The CEU eTD Collection List provided in Wizner, 67. importantly for this essay, Flórián Farkas (Lungomost and, Drom).Minorities), Ethnic and List National provided for Office the and Forum Democratic in Wizner,the Hungarian by 67.supported Cultural (the Farkas Kálmán Party), the Socialist by supported (theRomaForum, Attila Mohácsi Party), Smallholders’ AllianceAlliance of Hungarian Gypsies), József Raduly (the 100 Member Democratic Náday(the Gyula Daróczi, Gypsy Choli Gypsies), of Hungarian Association Orchestra, (the Cultural Lakatos Menyhért supported by the ofIndependent Hungarian Gypsies), György Rostás-Farkas (the Interest Alliance of Gypsy Organizations, ‘radicals.’” control them as much as possible so as to “avoid a violent ethnic upsurge by Romani proposed to channel exclusivethe Deputy Chairman of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities under János Wolfart, state supportParty and later the principle advisor on Roma affairs to tothe Hungarian Democratic Forumthe and loyalists János Báthory, amongthe prime advisor on Roma affairs to the pre-1990 Hungarian Socialistthe Workers’ Roma elite ( in order to initiatives“moderates” by the government) cooperatedfor with and participated in thevarious state-led Roma during the late 1980s and 1990s, such as the National Gypsy Council The structure of the minority self-government system set the stage for a dramatic series of adramatic stagefor system setthe self-government ofthe minority structure The difficult to discern) was the legal framework for the minority self-government system of Hungary. The main outcome of these discussions (in which the influence of the Roma participants is which met to discuss the features of Hungary’s transition and post-transition minority policies. 1990), 1989-March (June Board Nationalities the of sessions in the participated Phralipe and Hungary, but rather only its members. organization in Hungary and which, rather significantly, did not claim to represent all Roma in an alternative Roma organization, Phralipe, which aimed to be a truly independent Roma they actually belonged to a variety of political persuasions). The radicals unified themselves under control of the NRSG, as the representatives of all Roma in Hungary. Náday’s Democratic Alliance of Hungarian Gypsies and legitimized by their election to and Országos Cigánytanács Országos 210 209 208 207 The loyalists were opposed by a diverse group usually called the “radicals” the usually called group byadiverse opposed were loyalists The Vermeersch, 124. The key figures in this group were Ágnes Daróczi, Aladár Horváth, Béla Osztojkán, Vermeersch, and Jen 124. Key figures (and their respective organizations and supporters) in this group of Roma elite include 208 Báthory planned to recognize this group ofRoma loyalists, united under Gyula ), and consequently, they were assisted by and had access to state funds. state to access had and by assisted were they consequently, and ), 210 Both the DemocraticAlliance of HungarianGypsies 50 209 ŋ Zsigó. (though CEU eTD Collection Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary discrimination: 70/A provides for equal humanrule. its of most for assimilation forceful of apolicy implemented had and civil rights and their implementation,This was a marked change from the approach of the Hungarian communist government, which as well as outlawing compared to Hungary’s neighbors in 1989) rights for minorities living in Hungary: when (particularly comprehensive relatively of a set 68 acknowledges Article Constitution. government system6.3. The Structure of the NRSG: Hungary’s Act LXXVII of 1993 and the 2005 Reform as early adecade. almost for radicals as governments of both the center-left1989 and center-right parties, succeeded in marginalizing the withshowdowns between the loyalists and the radicals in which the loyalists, supported by the the addition of Article 68 to the Hungarian 3. 2. 1. 4. 3. 2. 1. 213 212 The Hungarian government laid the foundations for the Hungarian minority self- 211 through measures that create fair opportunities for all. The Republic of Hungary shall endeavor to implement equal rights for everyone Paragraph 1. The law shall provide for strict punishment of discrimination on the basis of situation, birth or on any other grounds whatsoever. financial origins, social or national opinion, other or political religion, language, gender, color, race, of basis on the discrimination without inthecountry persons The Republic of Hungary shall respect the human rights and civil rights of all bodies for self-government. National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to form local and national and ethnic minorities living within the country. The laws of the Republic of Hungary shall ensure representation for the national languages and the use of names in their native languages. native intheir education languages, native of their use the cultures, their of minorities and ensure their collective participation in public affairs, thefostering The Republic of Hungary shall provide for the protection of national and ethnic State. in the sovereign power of the people: they represent a constituent part of the participate Hungary of Republic inthe living minorities ethnic and national The Hungarian Parliament, “Act XX of 1949.” Barany, 121-122. Hungarian Parliament, “Act XX of 1949: The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary,” , (10 May 2008). 211 51 213 212 Additionally, Article Additionally, The CEU eTD Collection model to be implemented in all of Europe. government structures. self- national and local both organize to right the and activities, educational own their organize languages, theright to political representation, the right ofcontact with kin states, the right to November 2007). November Europe Treaty Office 2007). Hungarian Helsinki Committee Vermeersch, 67. eds. Farimah Daftary and Stefan Troebst (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 176-177; Barany, 326; and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Peaceful Coexistence: Strategies in Regulating Ethnic Conflicts,” in organisational structure and mode of operation, as well as their maintenance,” and “the their itsinstitutions, of establishment “the disposal,” atits channels television and radio feasts of the minority it represents, “the principles and means governing the utilisation ofthe national self-government the authority to decide on such matters as its budget, the nation-wide a grants 4(37) Article activities.” their andco-ordinate institutions establish itmay minority Paragraph 4(36)1 says, “With aview to theestablishment of the cultural autonomy of the the local minority self-governments, belonging to individuals of ethnic groups. as rights just not groups, ethnic to belonging rights ascollective rights these recognizes in Hungary, minorities “historical” recognized thirteen tothe rights of avariety itguarantees because praised widely hasbeen LXXVII Act Minorities. constitution came in the form of Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic governments are conspicuously vague. conspicuously are governments 219 218 217 216 215 The legislative implementation of the principles contained in Articles 68 and 70/A of the 70/A of 68 and in Articles contained principles ofthe implementation legislative The 214 Compared with the relatively detailed description of the structure and competencies of Cf. ibid., Articles 4(31-39), especially Articles 4(35-39). Cf. Hungarian Parliament, “Act LXXVII,” Articles 4(21-30). Cf. Council of Europe, “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Barany,Minorities,” 269. Cf. Hungarian Parliament, “Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities,” Cf. the following: NDI and OSCE/ODIHR, 24; Ulrich Schneckener and Dieter Senghaas, “In Quest of , (16 , , (20 November 215 The Council ofEurope has even recommended Act LXXVII as a 218 Act LXXVII’s provisions for the national minority self- minority national the for provisions LXXVII’s Act 219 216 Unlike many Europe-wide conventions, such as the nationalself-government,minorityRegardinga 52 Radical Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Europe 214 rightassuchuse the minority to 217 Article 3(2) of Act LXXVII Council of , CEU eTD Collection ?ctag=download&docID=14123> (20 November 2007), Articles 4(21-30). Minorities,” October 2002), source from Hungarian TV2 satellite TV, Budapest (21 October 2002).International Reports, “Hungary: Roma Leaders Call for Help to Stop Abuse of MinorityRepresentation Election in Law”Flux (22for the Hungarian Roma,” eiler_ferenc_reforming_the_minority_self_gov_system_1998_2004_eokik_2004.pdf> Minorities National and Ethnic (20 of NovemberInstitute Research 2007). Between 1998-2004 To Reform the Minority Self-Government Electoral System,” unchanged and unclear. governments; the provisions regarding the national minority self-government remained largely the importance of these various reforms, almost all of the reforms pertain to local minority self- successful attemptatreforming Act LXXVII of1993. minority’s monuments. bodies,” and “agree” to legislation concerning minority education and the preservation of the on bills concerning the minority represented by it,” “seek information,” “co-operate with public limits of a national self-government’s authority: a national self-government may “state its opinion the establishes 4(38) Article authority.” its within fall which legally duties ofother performance daily basis as council members, aid administrators, policemen, and social workers.” Barany mentions, “play a crucial role because for ordinary Roma they personify the state on a government. relationship between the local minority self-government and the local municipality system. self-government minority the of abuses spectacular some to led which representatives, minority for vote could citizen Hungarian were actually membersthe electoral process; the reformsof were an effort to ensure thethat local minority representatives minority they supposedly represented. Prior to the reforms, any 223 222 221 220 first the T/9126, BillNo. passed Parliament Hungarian 2005, the 17, October On Barany, 296. Cf. Hungarian Parliament, “Revised Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Cf. the Jászladány case, described in Andrew Burton, “Minority Self-Governance: Minority For a description of the failed attempts between 1993 and 2004, see Ferenc Eiler, “Efforts Made Hungarian Ministry ofSocial Affairsand Labour 222 This clarification was critically important because local government authorities, as ,