A HOUSE DIVIDED: CULTURAL BACKLASH AND ECONOMIC INSECURITY IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

By HENRI DANJOLLI

Under the direction of Professor Jan Kubik

April 12, 2018

A senior thesis submitted to the Political Science Department of Rutgers University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts PROLOGUE

The resurgence of populist sentiment across Europe and many parts of the world is concerning and deserves attention because of the powerful influence that populism has in shaping the global economy and international relations. The task of the citizen is to make an educated vote based on the options offered in each election. However, the language that is adopted by populists may sound similar to the rhetoric used by mainstream politicians, therefore it may be difficult to discern who is a populist and who is not. Politicians have often gone up to the podium and proclaimed that they have the ideas that will bend the arc of the moral universe towards justice. The question remains as to whether or not they should have the most important voice in the room when it comes to deciding what is just. Justice is a difficult topic to elucidate because on one hand it is subject to normative social influence and on the other hand, society’s conceptualization on what is just is liable to change as time passes. In other words, in order to change a society’s perception of justice, most people in that society must agree upon the amended definition. A thorough study of history reveals that change does not always come easy. This is exemplified in the Antebellum of American history and more specifically in the period between the Compromise of 1850 to the late 1850s. In the 19th century, the United States faced an existential crisis because it had just acquired new territory in the aftermath of the Mexican War through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the territory had no history of slavery at a time when slavery was the norm in the South. A divided

Congress was conflicted about admitting new states, as this would alter the balance of ideologies between slave and free states in the Senate. At the start of 1850, Senator Henry

Clay, also known as “the Great Compromiser”, put forward a set of proposals that he believed could ameliorate tensions between his colleagues and the rest of the country.

i The complex set of legislative acts that he proposed was then sent to Illinois Senator

Stephen Douglas, a Democrat, who believed that the only way to push the multi-faceted set of proposals through the legislative process was to divide it into five smaller packages. As the name implies, the Great Compromise attempted to appease the North and the South through its offerings. The North would have California admitted as a free state, slave trade prohibited in

Washington D.C., and Texas would lose its boundary dispute with New Mexico. The South would have no slavery restrictions in Utah or New Mexico (both territories at the time), slaveholding would be permitted in Washington D.C., and Texas would get ten million dollars.

After the Compromise was passed, many Southern Whigs broke away from the party’s main figure, Senator Henry Clay. One of the most controversial points of the Compromise was the instatement of a tougher federal fugitive slave law. This was a law that the South demanded from the Compromise, as slavery was vital to their economy. It required all escaped slaves to be returned to their masters regardless of one’s support or opposition to slavery, whether one was a Northern Freesoiler or a Southern slave owner. President Millard Fillmore supported the

Compromise and sent a message to Congress with two recommendations. The first was that

Texas would receive payment and in return it would stop attempting to be a part of New

Mexico. The second recommendation entailed that the Wilmot Proviso be overturned. The

Wilmot Proviso was a piece of legislation that mandated the United States ban slavery in the newly acquired territory following the Mexican War.

In 1852, the Whig party nominated General Winfield Scott of New Jersey for the presidency and William Graham for the vice-presidency. The two Whig nominees both pledged to enforce the Compromise. In the same year, Harriet Beecher Stowe would publish Uncle Tom’s Cabin and the anti-slavery novel is attributed to have been a catalyst for

ii the American Civil War. "Harriet Beecher Stowe's most famous introduction took place on or around Thanksgiving Day, 1862, when she was introduced to President Abraham Lincoln, who allegedly greeted her with these memorable words, ‘So you're the little woman who wrote the book that made this great war!” (Weinstein 2004:1). The same year also saw the rise of the

Native American Party, which was commonly known as the “Know-Nothing” Party. It was a secret organization that did not reveal its ideologies to non-members. When questioned about their beliefs their members would reply with the eponymous phrase, “I know nothing”. The main candidates in the presidential election of 1852 consisted of Franklin Pierce for the

Democratic Party and General Winfield Scott for the Whig Party. Both faced criticism for being anti-Catholic and against slavery even though both candidates sought unequivocal enforcement of the Compromise of 1852.

With the election of Franklin Pierce and growing intraparty division on the topic of slavery, the Whig Party would go into decline. The Native American party also received very few votes. Many former Whigs in the North and the South eventually joined the Know-

Nothing Party. The election of 1852 introduced cultural tensions surrounding the evolving opinions on the issue of slavery as well as anti-Catholic and nativist sentiment from the inflow of immigrants, such as the Irish Catholics who arrived to escape the Great Famine of the early

‘50s. “From 1845 to 1854, some 2,900,000 immigrants landed in the United States, more than had come in the seven previous decades combined” (Anbinder 2005:3). Many immigrants settled in Massachusetts, which may be attributed to the fact that it was on the eastern coast of the US and it bordered the Atlantic Ocean. Further growing pains would proliferate throughout the country. A guerrilla war known as “Bleeding Kansas” was another cultural conflict in 1854 in which settlers who favored slavery and those who were against it fought in an attempt to

iii establish “popular sovereignty”. The Know-Nothing Party may have used this cultural strife to frame an “us” versus “them” narrative that would have been in line with their party’s ideology.

The Know-Nothings greatest rise to prominence had been in Massachusetts and especially in the Gubernatorial election of 1854. Native American Party candidate Henry J.

Gardner would go on to become the Governor of Massachusetts from 1854 to 1857. During this time, he would pass a fair amount of legislation in accordance with the anti-immigrant sentiment of his party. The Native American Party’s influence in Massachusetts was astounding – “after the election of 1854, the governor, all state officers, the entire state senate, and all but three state representatives were Know-Nothings” (Commonwealth Museum, 2018).

They pledged to purify the political arena by ending any influence that Irish Catholics and other immigrants could have had on state legislation. How did the Know-Nothings come to have such an overwhelming amount of power in Massachusetts more so than any other state?

The literature proposes many speculations that revolve around the fear of cultural changes and economic insecurity. “One possible reason was culture; people did not want to be exposed to other cultures” (Commonwealth Museum, 2018). Scholars have noted that Protestants feared that Irish Catholics were being sent by the Pope to take over the United States. “Another reason was economic; immigrants were desperate for money and willing to work for less than

Americans. This second reason would also explain why most of the people opposed to immigration were working class; they were afraid of the competition” (Commonwealth

Museum, 2018).

Governor Gardner expressed arguably the most explicit declaration of his nativist and authoritarian sentiment in the Governor’s Address of 1855. He said that he would focus his efforts to keep Massachusetts pure from the danger posed by immigrants by passing legislation

iv designed to disenfranchise those illiterate in English. In the Address, he states his worries that

“during the present decade… nearly four millions of aliens will probably be poured in upon us… nearly ⅘ of the beggary, two-thirds of the pauperism, and more than ⅗ of the crimes spring from our foreign populations” (Gardner 1857). In his campaign rhetoric and inaugural address, the governor also introduced the language that today would certainly be recognized as populist. He proposed “Americanizing America”, reading the Protestant King James Bible in public schools for uniformity, and sending socioeconomically disadvantaged immigrants back to Liverpool. Much like the current leading right-wing populist in the Netherlands, Geert

Wilders, Gardner permits immigrants to remain in the country but with one stipulation. He reasoned that immigrants must have lived in America for a minimum of twenty-one years before they could vote since the voting age was twenty-one years old. Based on this argument alone, one may argue that this strict constructionist mode of governance had revealed the authoritarian tendencies most likely strongly embedded in Governor Gardner’s beliefs.

Although much of the antagonism toward immigrants seemed contained in the eastern portion of the US, the sentiment was felt nationally. The Know-Nothings ran Millard Fillmore as a candidate in the 1956 Presidential Election and they came in last behind President James

Buchanan and Republican candidate John C. Frémont. While the Know-Nothings were arguably a polarizing force, they seemed to emerge during what may be seen as perhaps the most contentious and divisive period in American history. They emerged in the decade leading up the Civil War when the country was bitterly divided over cultural values in regards to the issue of slavery. Coupled with a heavy inflow of immigration and economic insecurities, the issue of slavery may have left Americans confused about their identity. Many immigrants came from European countries with a more coherent identity. In Europe at the time, one may have

v been able to tell what a German looked like compared to a Spaniard. The clothes they wore, the food they ate, the cultural songs they sang, and the folklore they saw as their own could have been clear indicators of each nationality. However, as noted in Massachusetts, Americans attributed economic fears and job insecurity to the mass inflow of immigrants and they became increasingly challenged on the cultural issue of slavery. The United States was a powder keg ready to explode and soon thereafter, the Civil War began.

vi CONTENTS

PROLOGUE

Chapter Page

CHAPTER I: A PORTRAIT OF POPULISM ...... 1 i. Right-Wing Populism ...... 4 ii. The People, The Elite, and the Volonté Générale ...... 5 iii. The Drivers of Right-Wing Populism ...... 7 iv. Poland and Hungary as Case Studies ...... 11 v. Research Design ...... 14

CHAPTER II: A TALE OF TWO HUNGARIES ...... 16 i. The Hungarian Civic Circles Movement ...... 20 ii Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz-MPSZ) ...... 23 iii. The European Union ...... 24 iv. The Election of 2006 ...... 26 v. The Aftermath of 2006 ...... 29 vi. A Tale of Two Hungaries ...... 30

CHAPTER III: CHILDREN OF SOLIDARITY ...... 33 i. The Fall and Rise of Poland 2006 ...... 34 ii. Polish People’s Republic ...... 36 iii. Solidarity and the End of Communism ...... 37 iv. Third Polish Republic ...... 38 v. Children of Solidarity ...... 41 vi. The PO-PiS Rivalry ...... 46 vii. 2007 Election ...... 50

CHAPTER IV: THE EAST WIND ...... 53 i. 2009 EU Parliamentary Elections ...... 57 ii. 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections ...... 59 iii. Economic Shock ...... 60 iv. The Influence of the Media ...... 63

CHAPTER V: SHADES OF RED ...... 65 i. The Crisis in Comparison ...... 66 ii. 2010 Presidential Elections ...... 68 iii. The Second Wave of the Crisis ...... 70 iv. A Unique Financial Sector ...... 71 v. 2015 Parliamentary Elections ...... 75

vii CHAPTER VI: QUANTITATIVE DATA ...... 78 i. Introduction ...... 78 ii. Results for Poland ...... 79 iii. Results for Hungary ...... 81

CONCLUSION ...... 83 i. Final Results ...... 83 ii. Further Research ...... 85 iii. Policy Recommendations ...... 85 . BIBLIOGRAPHY

FIGURE

viii CHAPTER I: A PORTRAIT OF POPULISM

The language used by Governor Henry Gardner during the mid-1850s should sound familiar today. He spoke of trying to keep Massachusetts pure from the threat of immigrants,

“Americanizing America”, and in his final year, he explicitly stated that he had passed legislation for the sole purpose of undermining immigrants and believed that they were not fit to be in

America. The rhetoric used by Governor Gardner is similar to the bigotry ardently expressed by the victor of the 2016 US Presidential election. During the election season, he called “for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”. He has continuously used similarly moralistic language that seems to serve no other purpose than to fuel his supporters’ emotional outrage. He ought to focus on creating balanced policies and plan out the steps that he will take to implement those policies. He has attacked the media, the Department of Justice, and any criticism he has faced. However, the president cannot be considered a populist like the

Know-Nothings of the mid-19th century. He lacks many of the qualifications.

Nonetheless, populism is a topic worthy of study because of its global omnipresence in public discourse, its impact on the number of democracies that have been growing over the last century (Roser 2018), and the effects it has had on both international diplomacy and the global economy1. The world has seen a revival of populism in the last decade or two of both the left and right variety. Beginning with the arguably less explicit instances of populism, the US election in

2016 and the direction taken by voters in the Brexit referendum both revealed an attraction toward elements of right-wing populism. More serious cases of populism can include the reign of left-wing populist Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and the rise of right-wing populism in elections all over Europe. The rise of right-wing populism is especially alarming because it reveals a

1 As evidenced by the economic effects of Brexit departure from the current course of politics and social interactions. Populism attracts a portion of the constituency whose desires have been neglected by the political system. Along with the international implications involved, there are serious measures being taken by populists upon their election to office. The election of right-wing populists to the highest offices has already proven to produce massive structural reorganization in the legislative, judicial, and executive branches in countries like Poland and Hungary. Right-wing populists in particular have displayed authoritarian tendencies in the countries they represent under the guise that their actions will ultimately manifest the “volonté générale” -- the general will of the people. These changes have been criticized for being anti-democratic and they have proven to be points of heated contention in the European Union.

The general emotions that may come to mind in a discussion about populism include anger, fear, fatigue, anxiety, and nostalgia for “the way things were”. However, one should be careful when using terms like this because it may lead to generalizations that prevent a thorough and detailed study of populism. This is not say that populists themselves do not generalize from time to time but rather that a more scientific approach should be adopted in dissecting the nature of populist leaders and their supporters. According to the populist narrative, they seek to take their country back, rid it of evil, and return it to the people. The popularity of populist parties among traditional parties is unique because the ideology favors a pars pro toto approach to governance that views its sympathizers not as a portion of the population but rather as 100% of the population – the one true people of the nation. Any individual, coalition, or ideology that is not completely in line with the leading populist party’s positions is labeled as disloyal to the state and in most cases, their concerns are excluded from consideration. This approach to governance is interesting because in almost all of the cases of populism in the world today, the

2 parties that share their ideology have only earned a plurality of the votes at most, yet they make grandiose claims speaking on behalf of what the entire country desires. In this regard, populists can be seen as one of the most dangerous contemporary enemies of the essential feature of democracy: pluralism. There is little to no room for divergent thinking under populist leadership.

Populists can also frequently be seen employing moral language in an attempt to connect more deeply and directly with the people. For example, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela demonstrated it when he spoke of the patriotism that is characteristic of “chavismo”.“This is why

Chávez’s campaigns featured slogans such as “¡Chávez es Pueblo (“Chávez is the people!”) and

“¡Chávez somos milliones, tú también eres Chàvez!” (“Chávez we are millions, you are also

Chávez!”) (Müller 2016:34). He attempted to spend more energy working to make people feel empowered rather than producing grounded and well-articulated policies for how he will reasonably execute his ideas. On the right side of the spectrum, right-wing populist rhetoric in the Netherlands is known for its direness and call to action in making decisions. In a 2007 Dutch parliamentary debate on Islamic activism, Party For Freedom (PVV) MP and founder Geert

Wilders has said, “Islam is the Trojan Horse in Europe. If we do not stop Islamification now,

Eurabia and Netherabia will just be a matter of time” (Wilders 2007). As a counter argument, one could claim that there are plenty of non-populist politicians that have used similar language in order to garner support from their constituency. This was especially true during September

2001 when members of the US government sought retaliation against the perceived threats in the

Middle East and needed to garner public support. This study will define exactly what a (right- wing) populist is and subsequently it will attempt to investigate how they rise to office.

3 Right-Wing Populism

In order to study the nature and drivers of right-wing populism, one must investigate the theory through a review of the literature, a conceptualization of the key terms, and the operationalization of the variables to be examined. This research study will define populism using what Cas Mudde refers to as the “ideational approach”. “We define populism as a thin- centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde and

Kaltwasser 2017:6). The simplest form of populism is known as thin populism and it is the very basic “us” versus “them” mentality that is adopted by populists such as FN presidential candidate

Marine Le Pen when she speaks of the Islamization of France or the Alternative for Germany

(AfD) party’s disdain for the EU and other institutions. In truth, the “us” versus “them” mentality has existed outside of the realm of populism and politics in general. The mentality exists in a variety of disciplines in the social sciences and conflict coupled with an “us” versus “them” mentality among humans might be evidenced as far back as the Pleistocene era (Arsuaga et al

2015). Therefore, the core of populism itself is a meaningful topic that is also worthy of study because of its connection to the anthropological origins of human behavior and how this behavior may manifest itself in the modern day political arena. This is not to say that the “us” versus “them” mentality is to be eliminated but rather that it must be contained within a pluralistic democracy.

Thin populism can be “thickened” by adding the necessary elements and transformed into thick populism. Right-wing populism is thickened with nativism and personalistic authoritarianism. Nativism is the belief that there is something inherent in being a certain

4 nationality that makes one better than other nationalities. Specifically, it is defined by the Oxford

English Dictionary as “the attitude, practice, or policy of protecting the interests of native-born or existing inhabitants against those of immigrants” (OED 2018). Authoritarianism relates to the populist determination to attack any institution or organization that hinders or does not fall in line with their ideology. It may also include their tendency to establish absolute laws such as the rejection of a certain nationality or certain forms of speech. While this study will focus almost exclusively on the rise of right-wing populism, it would be beneficial to contemplate how right- wing populism would affect democracy due to the seemingly single-minded nature of their philosophy. The ideology is frequently cited as being anti-democratic because it is anti- pluralistic. It is difficult to contemplate how populism of any sort would be beneficial for society. Nevertheless, conclusions should be drawn only after a critical appraisal of the ideology has been conducted.

The “Pure” People, The “Corrupt” Elite, and the Volonté Générale

The next task of studying right-wing populism lies in discovering how the ideology defines its three core components: the people, the elite, and the volonté générale. In the first definition, “the people” may be denoted as a sovereign entity in society and masters of their own fate. Its usage in this regard finds overlap with populist and non-populist politicians. This meaning of the word can be similarly interpreted in the first sentence of the American

Constitution (We the people…) or in one of Lincoln’s greatest speeches, “… a government of the people, by the people, and for the people”. This definition is also incorporated by populists extending back to at least the Native American party movement of the mid-19th century in

American politics. As the definition becomes narrower, it applies more accurately to populism

5 than mainstream political parties. “A second meaning is the idea of ‘the common people,’ referring explicitly or implicitly to a broader class concept that combines socioeconomic status with specific cultural traditions and popular values” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:10). Right- wing populists often draw distinctions to purposely show their supporters that there are two separate and identifiable classes of citizens that are noted as the people and the elite. One of the ways that populists explicitly and vocally mark these boundaries is by comparing high and low culture. High culture denotes a category in culture that is typically associated with the upper classes: classical music, renaissance art, and designer clothing. Low culture is a derogatory term signifying things that are enjoyed by the lower social classes like fast food, tattoos, and cigarettes

(cdc.gov 2018). The entire purpose for populists to adopt divisive rhetoric is to unite a “silent majority” against the establishment (i.e., the elite, those who vote for mainstream politicians, etc.). Without symbolically dividing the people, it would be nearly impossible for a populist to rise to power.

Stemming from their use of moral language, populists can be heard frequently using the phrase “the pure people versus the corrupt elite”. Much like their usage of “the people”, populists also like to harbor a little ambiguity in regards to who “the elite” are. However, the literature offers some clarification in instances when they have been explicit as to who the elite are in their society. “First and foremost, the elite are defined on the basis of power, i.e. they include most people who hold leading positions in politics, the economy, the media, and the arts”

(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:12). In this respect, populists can’t identify with the elite because they are constantly at war with established politicians, celebrities who comment on the political atmosphere, and perhaps most importantly, the media. In most if not all countries where right- wing populism is on the rise, there is constant friction with the media. In two countries where

6 populists have taken control of the government, Poland and Hungary, there have been steps taken by the government to restrict the media by limiting their access to comments from government officials. Finally, the last step that must be followed in order for a populist to have a distinct voice in the political arena is to spread the ideology that there exists a volonté générale, or a general will, that pervades society and that the people know of this will and that they will help manifest it. It is easier for populists to promote the volonté générale after a distinction is established between the pure people and the corrupt elite.

Two other dimensions that are crucial in understanding how populism arises involves supply-side and demand-side factors leading to the rise of right-wing populism. Supply-side and demand-side factors could be political, societal, economic, and/or cultural in nature. Supply-side factors concern the proposals or actions taken by populists to garner support for their cause.

Demand-side factors focus on the people’s beliefs about society before populists have the opportunity to frame it to their benefit. The people are not populists by nature; they can hold a wide variety of beliefs. Demand-side issues such as economic recession brought upon by the global economy may contribute to shaping the views of many voters to be in favor of populist leadership. It can be argued that all politicians frame situations and policies in a way that benefits their own party but populists in particular are distinct. Where a Republican politician in the

United States may come to terms that voters want more socially liberal policies, populists leave no room for anything other than their own opinion.

The Drivers of Right-Wing Populism

Based on a review of the literature, one of the most important questions about this ideology concerns the major drivers leading to the rise of populism. A working paper by Ronald

7 Inglehart and Pippa Norris titled Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash has provided a seminal foundation for the study of populism because of the meticulous examination and insight it offers into the rise of the phenomenon. A common view in regards to the rise of populism attributes it to two things: economy and culture.

“The cultural backlash thesis suggests that support can be explained as a retroactive reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change”. “The economic insecurity thesis emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies” (Inglehart and Norris 2016:1). In order to examine the two concepts, the researchers first developed a conceptual and theoretical framework toward how they will approach the study. They used the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of 268 political parties in 31 European countries. In part II of the study, the researchers move on to compare the pattern of European party competition at the national-level and then they used the pooled European Social Survey 1-6 (2002-2014) data to examine the cross-national evidence at the individual level for the impact of the economic insecurity and cultural values as predictors of voting behavior for populist parties. Finally, they summarize their key findings and consider the implications.

Ultimately the researchers found consistent evidence supporting the cultural backlash thesis as being more influential than the economic insecurity thesis. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris conduct their investigation of culture and economy from the demand-side, or the views of the people prior to populist framing. They find the distinction between culture and economy to be “somewhat artificial”. “Interactive processes may possibly link these factors, if structural changes in the workforce and social trends in globalized markets heighten economic insecurity, and if this, in turn, stimulates a negative backlash among traditionalists towards

8 cultural shifts.” They hypothesize that it may not just be the case that the two are linked, but that they also interact, with one having more salience than the other. In their conclusion, Inglehart and Norris summarize the results of their findings. “First, the results of analyzing the demographic and social controls confirm that populist support in Europe is generally stronger among the older generation, men, the less educated, the religious, and ethnic majorities, patterns confirming previous research” (2016:4). Furthermore, the working paper argues that if the economic insecurity thesis is correct, “populist votes should be strongest among unskilled workers, the unemployed, those lacking college degrees, households dependent on welfare benefits as their main source of income, and those living in inner-city urban areas, such

London, Paris, Amsterdam and Munich, which typically attract some of the highest concentrations of foreign-born residents”.

It ought to be stated that populism, as noted in the prologue, is not a new phenomenon;

“van Beyme suggests that this movement has historically been experienced in at least three successive waves” (Inglehart and Norris 2016:9) Populism has existed in the world since at least the 19th century with the Russian narodnichestvo, which stems from the word narod, or “people”.

The phrase may be translated to mean “peopleism” and more accurately as populism. Other

19th century instances of populism include the Native American party and the People’s Party in

North America. Following the Great Depression, Huey Long proposed the “Share Our Wealth” program that shared populist ideals. Huey Long adopted the phrase “every man a king, but no one wears a crown” from William Jennings Bryan, another politician that was supported by the

People’s Party. Bryan claimed that the media could not be trusted and so he founded his own newspaper. In his newspaper, The Commoner, he claimed of “fake news” coming from the “city

9 of Lincoln”. Populist sentiment also emerged from the Tea Party movement following the financial crisis of 2008.

In the 21st century, populism has been observed in Venezuela, Holland, France, Italy,

Germany, England, Poland, and Hungary. In the most recent elections, FN candidate Marine Le

Pen ran for president on a platform that opposed globalization supported France’s decision to hold a referendum to leave the EU and NATO, supported the abolition of the IMF, and claimed that multiculturalism had failed. She cited the migrant crisis and the Arab Spring as bellwethers for France to more heavily guard its borders and to withdraw from the Schengen Area. However, she lost to En Marche’s Emmanuel Macron by a sizable amount of votes (~33%). In the recent

German federal elections, the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party came in third behind Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU and Martin Schulz’s SPD. The AfD has been criticized for being Islamophobic, extremist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and racist. An ex-chair for AfD who served until 2017, Frauke Petry, attempted to dispel critics for her use of

“voelkisch”, a word meaning “people’s” or “national”. “The Nazis used the term ‘voelkisch’ to set Germans apart from Jews and others they labeled ‘racially inferior” (bbc.com, 2016). Today, the right-wing populist government in charge of Poland has been working on passing legislation that punishes anyone who uses the phrase “Polish death camps” and makes statements indicating that Poland was complicit during the Nazi regime. The core distinction between “us” versus

“them” remains a constant theme of populism both regionally and temporally.

The Netherlands has also been an interesting case observed by commentators because of Party for Freedom leader and sole-member, Geert Wilders. Wilders, who is of Indonesian origin, may also agree with Le Pen’s view that multi-culturalism has failed. He calls for an end to the Islamization of the Netherlands and argues that the country should leave the EU. “…

10 though Islam remains the main enemy, Wilders and his fellow MPs are also increasingly aiming their attacks at other groups of immigrants, such as Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian workers and immigrants from the Dutch Antilles. Proposals to close the labour market to Eastern Europeans, to calculate the total costs of immigration and to ‘sell’ the Dutch Antilles could be seen as examples of this turn in his thinking” (Vossen 2011:185).

The key quality that differentiates most right-wing populists the most is whether or not they have been elected to office. Furthermore, researchers can gain a deeper understanding of populism when populists are elected to office and have a chance to demonstrate where their priorities lie. In other words, one can observe and compare whether what a populist preaches during the election campaign is representative of what they actually believe in when they take action from a position of power. That is why Poland and Hungary are unique cases – populists in those countries have risen to hold a majority in parliament and highest seat of government, where in most cases populists typically receive a plurality of the votes at best.

Poland and Hungary as Case Studies

Like most populists, the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland and the Hungarian Civic

Alliance (Fidesz) in Hungary believe that the general will of the people is yet to be carried out.

Fidesz, for example, has proven that it will achieve its goals even if means that they must show violent opposition in the form of street protests (following the loss in 2002). When Fidesz won a supermajority in 2010, it achieved its goals of changing the Constitution; it has been revised several times recently without sufficient input from society at large. “Upon his return to power in

2010, [Fidesz PM Orbán] used his party’s electoral majority to force through a new constitution that ensures, in the words of some academic observers, that ‘(t)he current government now has

11 very few checks on its own power, but the new constitutional order permits the governing party to lodge its loyalists in crucial long-term positions with veto power over what future governments might do” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:91). Furthermore, the Hungarian Civic

Alliance has taken away the ability of the Constitutional Court2 to review the constitutionality of and its ability to strike down any laws. In order to better understand Hungary as it exists today, a brief review of its history would be helpful.

In the last decade, Hungary has had two right-wing populist parties vying for a majority in parliament. One which focuses more on elements of conservatism (Fidesz) and the other of which focuses more on nationalism (Jobbik). Fidesz has been in existence for a longer period of time than Jobbik and its methods of gaining supporters have been very different than mainstream

Hungarian parties. For the purposes of this study, the focus will be more heavily on Fidesz as they were the party to rise to office after the Hungarian Socialist party essentially collapsed following the 2006 protests. The leader of the Hungarian Civic Alliance, Viktor Orbán, is also unique due to the impact he has had in shaping and growing his party. Orbán was able to transform the party from a focus on libertarian-oriented policies toward conservatism (and subsequently, toward right-wing populism). Furthermore, he was able to cultivate social capital and convert it into political capital through a product of his own creation, the Hungarian Civic

Circles movement.

To understand the political transformations that have occurred in Poland, one must touch briefly upon the sentiments of the Solidarity movement. “Fundamentally, Solidarity represented

‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ of the Polish United Workers Party (PZSR) in both ethnic

(nationalist) and moral (populist) terms”. (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:89) Lech Wałęsa led the movement in 1980 and it once consisted of almost a third of the working age population in

2 The Constitutional Court is similar to the SCOTUS. 12 Poland. Lech Walesa would later become elected as the first president of Poland following the fall of Communism. Moving forward, Walesa would narrowly lose to Aleksander Kwaśniewski of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in 1995. The first instances of far right and populist ideology would be revealed in the 2001 parliamentary elections. In 2001, the Law and Justice

Party (PiS) was formed by the Kaczynski brothers and the League of Polish Families was headed by Roman Giertych. The League of Polish Families would soon dissipate in the following election cycles leaving PiS as the dominant far right ideology in the political arena.

In recent years, Fidesz has constrained the power of the Constitutional Court, restricted the media, and appointed a Fidesz loyalist to act as President. Furthermore, the Justice Minister was granted the authority to fire judges and the retirement age has been lowered for judges from

70 to 65. All of these actions were proposed in order to give the party more influence in the political arena. The EU has threatened to trigger article 7 in response to the current government’s attacks on the judiciary but the question remains as to whether that is the right step to take when dealing with right-wing populists in power. Why did they not do that to Hungary when they were attacking their own Constitutional Court? Divisive threats will only reinforce the populist narrative that there is truly a conflict between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elite. Poles and Hungarians in particular ought to know better than to allow their governments to hold an excessive amount of power. Many of them saw first-hand what that was like under Communism.

Right-wing populist sentiment is manifested in the world today in both post-communist countries as well as countries that have never experienced communism. How each country experienced communism and how they transitioned to democracy is also important if one wishes to understand the rise of right-wing populism. This is because populists attempt to use elements from those periods to their advantage. For example, Kaczynski in Poland has frequently made

13 reference to the Round Table talks and the “corrupted” democratization process following the fall of communism. He has used it to discredit the political system and tied it in to talks of a

Fourth Republic. A brief history of Hungary is also necessary because religious symbols were incorporated into the newest 2011 Constitution and Hungarian religious identity draw from the symbolism during the time of King Saint Stephen I.

Research Design

The purpose of this study will be to investigate the drivers of right-wing populism using

Poland and Hungary as models because out of the many cases of right-wing populism in the world today, these are two countries where populists have managed to rise to the highest elected offices. In most cases today, populists gain only a plurality of the votes at most, so the methods adopted by Polish and Hungarian right-wing populists in their rise to office have proven to exceptional and unique. Based on the previously discussed literature, it is hypothesized that the most influential drivers contributing to a rise in right-wing populism in Poland and Hungary relate to cultural changes and economic shifts. Culture can be amorphous and difficult to measure directly, therefore it will be measured through the proxies of education and religiosity.

More specifically, the independent variables will be students in tertiary education, church attendance, and the number of people receiving communion in each administrative division. The economy will be studied through GDP per capita and the unemployment rate. Data for all the independent variables will be collected at the voivodeship administrative division for Poland and the megye administrative division for Hungary. Regressions will be conducted to see if there is any interactivity between culture and economy. For Poland, the years that will be given the most focus will be from 2004 to 2015. For Hungary, the years that will be studied will be from 2005 to

14 2010. These ranges were chosen in particular because they include times when the opposition party was in power, any economic decline that may have ensued from the recession of 2008, and a time following possible economic decline when the leading populist party rose to power. In detail, it is hypothesized that:

Hypothesis: Support for the leading right-wing populist party will be higher when unemployment is up, the number of people receiving communion is higher, the amount of graduates of tertiary education is down, and/or when GDP per capita is down or unemployment is higher.

CHAPTER II: A TALE OF TWO HUNGARIES

15 A Brief History of Hungary

Hungary is situated in the Carpathian basin in Central Europe and its culture stems from centuries old customs and traditions. It shares a border with countries like Ukraine on the east,

Croatia and Serbia to the south, and Slovenia and Austria to the north. To understand Hungary’s present, one must learn about its past. This is because populists take elements from its past and frame them to their benefit. Hungary has had plenty of religious influence in society beginning most distinctly from the time of Géza, the Grand Prince of the Hungarians. He was the monarch known for building a good relationship with the Holy Roman Empire and supporting the spread of Christianity from Western Europe into Hungary. However, scholars have noted that his reasons for doing so were mostly political. “He forced large numbers of lords and warriors to convert whether they liked it or not and persecuted recalcitrant ‘shamans’ and pagans” (Molnar

2001:19). Géza had a son who would rule Hungary after him by the name of King Saint Stephen

I. King Saint Stephen received a coronation crown (“the Holy Crown of Hungary”) that had a

Christian cross on top from Pope Sylvester II and like other European Christian monarchs, it symbolized the divine right of kings. This crown would be a prominent feature on Hungary’s flag today.

In the 16th century, the country was invaded and partitioned by the Ottoman Empire after the Battle of Mohács. Over the course of the next 200 years, it was torn by conflicts, cultural strife, and religious divisions both within Christian denominations and between them and the

Islamic faith of the Ottoman Empire. In The Changing Facets of Hungarian Nationalism,

Csepeli and Örkény argue that frequent conflict between Hungarians and the Ottoman Turks stunted population growth and urban bourgeoisie inhabitants of medieval settlements suffered.

These conflicts changed the ethnographic composition of the Hungarian population. “As a result

16 of demographic losses including deportation, the number of ethnic Hungarians in existence at the end of the Turkish period was substantially diminished”. (Csepeli et al 1996:249). The

Compromise of 1867 later established the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

During the period of Austria-Hungary and around the time of World War I, Hungarian nationalists demanded that the education system be taught in Hungarian. Since the official religion of Austria-Hungary was Catholic, nationalists3 came into conflict with the Catholic bishops, who wanted the education system to use Latin in their teachings. Supporters of

Hungarian national independence would frequently be involved in confrontations not only with the Church but also with various champions of other aspects of the Austro-Hungarian dual identity. “From the inception of the Hungarian working-class movement in the late 1860s, some of its leaders had opposed the building of joint organizations with the Austrians” (Van Duin

2009:125). One of the greatest priorities for the country during this time was the formation of a distinct Hungarian identity that was separate from that of the Church or that of other nationalities. Following World War I, the monarchy collapsed and the Hungarian Democratic

Republic rose in November 1918. Furthermore, the Treaty of Trianon was signed, which formally ended World War I between the Allies and the Kingdom of Hungary. The Great

Depression of 1929 and the rule of PM Béla Imrédy in 1938 would be two influences that lead to a growth of right-wing sentiment in the region. It should also be noted that the Kingdom of

Hungary would increase in size during WWII because it gained parts of Czechoslovakia and

Transylvania.

The main leader of Communist Hungary following WWII, Mátyás Rákosi, oversaw the rapid evolution and development of the education system while the number of churches rapidly

3 Nationalists in this context refers to the type of nationalists who fight for the cause of national independence as opposed to chauvinists that exaggerate the glories of their “nation”. 17 declined. He attempted to build a new class known as the “working intelligencia” to replace the nobility and the older educated class. His focus on the education system also served as a great benefit to the proliferation of communist ideology in the country. Pluralism was essentially dismantled as the country crawled deeper into communism in the 1950s.

On October 23, 1956 a group of students led a peaceful demonstration in which they articulated demands against the Soviets and for greater political freedom. They attempted to broadcast their demands but the State Protection Authority quickly intervened. The firing of shots by the SPA sparked the Revolutions of 1956. Protestors brought down the statue of Stalin in Budapest and blood was spilled by the Soviet military intervention that was called in by the government. In response to such turbulent conditions, the Hungarian Working People’s party’s

Ernő Gerő resigned and János Kádár inherited his position as general secretary of the party. Imre

Nagy, chairman of the Council of Ministers4 of the communist party then went on Radio Kussuth and promised the “far-reaching democratization of Hungarian public life, the realization of a

Hungarian road to socialism in accord with our own national characteristics, and the realization of our lofty national aim: the radical improvement of the workers’ living conditions” (Wees

2015:175). Following the events of 1956 to the fall of communism, Kádár continued to be vehemently opposed to revolutionaries and paraphrased Rákosi’s phrase as his own: “He who is not against us is with us”. This phrase could also be meant for institutions or foreigners. The phrase is still salient in Hungary today and would be favored and adopted by the incumbent government because the right-wing populist Fidesz party opposes any person, institution, or ideology does not align with theirs. It can be argued that elements of right-wing populism were bubbling beneath the transition to Western-style democracy toward the end of the 1980s.

4 The Council of Ministers in Hungary was similar to the Cabinet of the United States in terms of its purpose. It was formed in 1949 and it was abolished in 1989. 18 As the curtain on communism came to a close, new ideas that permitted the coexistence of different labor unions and freedoms became more prominent in Hungarian society. The

Hungarian people must have felt that a great weight had been lifted. In the formation of a new system of governance, they pursued freedom of the press, freedom of association, and a revision of the Constitution. The new Constitution also strived to be better connected with the world as it aimed to recognize the relationship between domestic laws with international laws. “In 1989, the

1949 Constitution was changed systematically by the National Roundtable, which included legal experts from both the government and the multiparty opposition. Orbán5 himself took party in the talks” (Tartakoff 2012:363). The Hungarian third republic was marked by the first free parliamentary elections held in May 1990 and it was conducted according to a system proportional representation. Fidesz, known as the Alliance of Young Democrats at the time, captured close to nine percent of the vote. The Hungarian Socialist Party placed just above them by capturing roughly eleven percent of the vote. The first democratically elected prime minister was József Antall of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), a center-right party that focused on Hungarian nationalism. At the time, the party formed a coalition with the Christian

Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and the Independent Smallholder’s Party (FKGP), thereby commanding sixty percent of the seats in the Parliament (The National Assembly).

Fidesz continued to place near the bottom in the 1994 Parliamentary elections with seven percent of the vote but experiences a fairly dramatic shift in electoral position in the 1998 parliamentary elections. In 1998, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), led by Gyula Horn, claimed the most votes but Orbán’s Fidesz Party claimed the most seats in the National

Assembly. Viktor Orbán became Prime Minister and served from 1998 to 2002. However, Orbán would go on to suffer a bitter defeat in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Péter Medgyessy would

5 Viktor Orbán is the leader of the incumbent Hungarian right-wing populist party, Fidesz. 19 lead the Hungarian Socialist Party to a narrow victory with forty-two percent of the vote against forty-one percent of the vote for Fidesz. In 2002, Orbán turned to transcendental and moralistic rhetoric, following his party’s loss in the Parliamentary elections. He began making his right- wing populist intentions explicit as is clearly demonstrated in his 2002 speech. “Our nation is not simply politics, it is our life. Perhaps, our parties and representatives will be in opposition in the

Parliament, but we, here in this square, cannot and will not be in opposition, because the nation cannot be in opposition” (Kopecek and Wcislik 2015:298). Orbán’s determination to rise above his failures is evident in perhaps his greatest achievement – the creation of the Civic Circles

Movement.

The Hungarian Civic Circles Movement

Following the loss of the 2002 Parliamentary elections, Viktor Orbán planned a revival of

Fidesz and a large part of the way he accomplished this is arguably through what he named the

“Civic Circles Movement”. “This movement was militant in terms of its hegemonic aspirations and collective practices; massive in terms of its membership and activism; middle-class based in terms of social stratification; and dominantly metropolitan and urban on the spatial dimension”

(Greskovits 2017:1). This movement was particularly special to Orbán because it was essentially his creation and more importantly this was a way for him to build social capital and convert it into political capital. It served as a way to build a more stable foundation for his party and their message. It was a movement that relied heavily on framing social culture so that people more freely consider the ideas that the Hungarian right was putting forth. Echoing the hypotheses put forward by Inglehart and Norris that culture may be the most important factor in the rise of right- wing populism, Béla Greskovits argues that the socio-cultural movement was vital to Orbán’s

20 election in 2010. Orbán told his supporters to put away their hostility and stay supportive of

Fidesz in the coming elections.

In Rebuilding the Hungarian Right through Civil Organization and Contention: The

Civic Circles Movement, Greskovits highlights two prominent features of the movement: its ambivalence towards formal democratic institutions and its dual, simultaneously civic and hegemonic, strategy to transform civil society. In his 2002 speech, Orbán said to his supporters,

“I ask you in the coming three months to form small groups of people, troupes of friends, civic circles. What we need is not formal organizations, but to get together, join our forces, and be on the alert” (Weaver 2006). After proposing that there ought to be no formal organization, he elaborated that his vision for this movement was for the people who participated in it to

“organically” build connections with one another. At the start of the movement, Orbán warned his followers not to behave rebelliously or violently. However, they were still livid from the

“dishonest” and fraudulent election results. They also distrusted the Hungarian Socialist Party’s coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), so the protests against the former ruling parties continued. Greskovits draws a parallel to the situation in Hungary today, by observing that that the movement became harsh critics of the democratic system early on. He notes that,

“their discontent was exacerbated by their conviction that the government was busy undermining the checks and balances, which could protect the opposition” (Greskovits 2017:4). Furthermore, the very theme of right-wing populism permeates the movement because its members have continuously reminded one another that they should not be seen as a defeated minority that has been deemed irrelevant in the political arena. They have always claimed that they are “the people”, and as such the Hungarian government must not abandon them.

21 The movement planned activities in municipalities throughout the country with varying levels of participation. “The organizers, performers, and participants were typically ‘white collar’ employees of the state or the private and civil sphere: the clergy, entrepreneurs, journalists, pundits, artists, actors, and politicians” (Greskovits 2017:7). They met in casual locations such as churches, community centers, clubs, cafés, “national” bookshops, cultural centers, and party offices. In regards to the spatial features of the Civic Circles Movement, between 2002 and 2006 the most populated location for all events took place in Budapest, followed by smaller towns and villages such as Pest, Fejèr, and Csongrad. The counties that held the lowest percentage of Civic

Circles events were Nógrád, Zala, and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok. Very few organizations were held in small towns and villages outside of the big metropolitan areas. Also, the circles were never formally registered and they were not part of any third party institution. Coupled with massive participation, this lack of a formal registration may have been one of the greatest strengths of the movements. In the vein of right-wing populism, this could have served to reinforce the idea of

“the people” – an amorphous group of fighters who planned to take back their country. It ought to be noted that youth groups were also present in right-wing populist gatherings. Fidelitas and the Association of the April Youth, two parties closely associated with Fidesz, were both present in the events held by the movement. The “Right-wing Youth Community”, which preceded

Jobbik, was present at the events as well.

Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz-MPSZ)

22 “In 2003, when Fidesz transformed itself into a catch-all ‘people’s party’, [it] adopted the new name Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliance, created a new leadership structure, which concentrated decision making power in Orbán’s hands, and reinvigorated its electoral vote- getting apparatus and strategy” (Greskovits 2017:11). Where a mainstream politician will typically consult advisors and take their views into consideration, it is imperative to right-wing populist leaders that their ideas take precedence over the ideas of others close to them. They are especially keen on reducing strife and concentrating power more than a mainstream politician and this is exemplified in the Netherlands today. The leading right-wing populist candidate in that country – Geert Wilders – is technically the only member of his party due to an effort to homogenize his party’s ideology and align it tightly with his views. Right-wing populists are auteurs of their own ideology and Orbán has chosen to shape his party’s structure in a way that reflects Hungary’s social structure. As a result of restructuring the party, Fidesz gained one thousand new organizations and their party’s membership grew seven times as large.

“[Greskovits’s] paper substantiates that the party’s success in reshaping, deepening, and politicizing cleavages hinged on the civic circles’ groundwork for rebuilding the Right’s social base” (Greskovits 2017:14). The author suggests that the strong attachments emerged through the members’ regular encounters with each other and with leading activists, among them professionals, patriots, politicians, priests, and pundits, who, fighting as Gramscian “organic intellectuals” for a hegemonic Right, offered new ways for Hungarians to feel, think, and act as members of “imagined communities” (Greskovits 2017:15). One of the core ideas of the movement was that it needed to be large and diverse. The events held by the movement can be categorized into one or more of these four frames: local patriotism, sacral-medievalism,

23 European Hungary, and “15 Million Hungarians”6. This practice of the movement keeping a broad audience was deemed “versatile nationalism”.

The role of organized religion, specifically Christianity, should also not be underestimated for it played a crucial role in the Civic Circles Movement. “…first and foremost the Roman Catholic, Reformed Calvinist, and Lutheran Churches within and without Hungary, played a prominent role in hosting, organizing, performing at and shaping the agenda and character of civic circle events” (Greskovits 2017:23). 23% of all events in 2004 had at least one link to organized religion, be it an event at a monastery or a religious monument or including a religious ceremony (Holy Mass), etc. The author notes that the restitution of church property culminated under the Fidesz from 1998-2002. The Christian Church’s involvement in the Civic

Circles Movement could have also served as a way to increase its influence in civic society in order to stay relevant in Hungary. A marriage between the organized religion and an ideology that could legitimize subsidies for the Hungarian Churches makes a lot of political sense, so no wonder that religious organizations lend their support to many events organized by the Circles.

The European Union

In 2003, Hungarians voted by referendum to join the European Union. With the social- democratic party MSZP winning the parliamentary elections just two years prior, it can be argued that these results were only natural. However, a deeper look shows that Hungarians weren’t particularly passionate about whether or not they should embrace globalism and draw closer toward solidarity with their fellow Europeans. Voter turnout in the referendum was 45.6% and of the people who voted, 83.8 were in support of the union. Viktor Orbán told the country

6 15 million Hungarians refers to the 10 million citizens living within Hungary’s borders and the 5 million living in neighboring countries. 24 that it did not matter what the outcome of the vote was going to be but rather that as Hungarians, they needed to keep their sights aimed skyward toward being winners of the future. "What binds us together is not whether we voted Yes or No, but that we are Hungarians and that we want to be the winners of the future." However, “Fidesz has warned that up to 100,000 jobs could be lost, as small and medium-sized companies struggle to implement tough EU regulations, and some sectors of the economy - textiles, agriculture, and transport in particular - flounder against foreign competition” (Thorpe 2013). Nonetheless, Orbán continued to support Hungary’s accession to the EU regardless of his party’s harsh criticisms. On the other hand, all of the media, major political parties, labor unions, businesses, the media, and churches were all wholeheartedly in favor of the public voting to join the European Union. One may question why the churches were in support of EU integration when later they became major drivers in the rise of right-wing populism. The possible answer it that the churches in Hungary are subsidized by the state and being the case that MSZP (strong advocate of accession) was in power, there was no incentive for religious leaders to admonish supporters of joining the EU.

According to Brigid Fowler7, the right’s influence on public opinion toward accession to the EU could be seen as a reason for why voter turnout was so low. Other reasons could include the public’s ignorance toward what they had to gain from joining the EU and voter apathy due to public opinion polls that confidently predicted a “yes” vote. In 2004, the European Parliamentary elections were held in Hungary and Fidesz rose to the top again by having claimed 47.4% of the vote. This may have been a bellwether for what was to come in Hungary because this was not a slight difference between Fidesz and the party to come in second, MSZP (34.3%), but rather a large victory. In the same year, PM Peter Medgyessy resigned to prevent a pre-emptive

7 At the time that her article was published, Fowler was a Research Fellow at the Center for Russian and East European Studies. 25 parliamentary motion of no confidence by the party’s coalition partner, the Alliance of Free

Democrats (SZDSZ). Ferenc Gyurcsány took Medgyessy’s place and became Prime Minister.

The Election of 2006

For the first time since the fall of Communism, an incumbent party had been re-elected to power in Hungary during the Parliamentary elections. The Hungarian Socialist Party acquired

43.2% of the vote and Fidesz earned 42% of the vote. With accession to the European Union just two years prior and the fact that a fair amount of people were not sure of its implications, the future of the Hungarian economy was a significant topic of interest. “The 2006 elections saw tangible discussions around economic issues related to Hungary’s convergence with the

Maastricht criteria for Eurozone accession and the forms this required” (Korkut 2007:675).

Many of the major parties in Hungary, at the very minimum, acquiesced to the economic criteria involved for Eurozone accession. The criteria held that those who wished to be part of the

Eurozone needed to attain targets that specifically concerned inflation rates and finances such as the debt-to-GDP ratio, government budget deficit, and long-term interest rates of government bonds. Although it was agreed upon by the major parties as an important goal, Hungary was one of two8 EU countries that had not been compliant with the requirements. At the time, Hungary’s inflation rate was 3.5%, its annual government deficit was 10% of its GDP, and the ratio of debt to GDP was 62%. To this day, Hungary has not yet adopted the Euro and its adoption faces fierce criticism from Orbán because he does not want to give up a portion of Hungary’s economic sovereignty. It is an interesting issue for Hungarians to decide because the EU requires

8 Malta is the other EU country that had not been compliant with the requirements. 26 that all member states9 must eventually join the Eurozone. It is believed to be a crucial part of tightening the EU’s coherence.

Another impetus to join the EU would be the economic safety net that would allow a country like Hungary to continue to grow. Based on the election of 2006, Hungarians did not seem as polarized as they would become ten years later. Korkut argues that “while, so far, there are no studies of what led Hungarian voters to elect Ferenc Gyurcsány for a second term as

Prime Minister, it is at least plausible that contending policy options around competitiveness and solidarity—albeit theoretical—had a major effect on voters’ party preferences” (Korkut

2007:677). To see that concrete policy plans and initiatives could have weighed heavily on the minds of voters might confirm that they did attempt to seek out valid information from different reliable sources. It is interesting to see Korkut state that Hungarians were rather pragmatic and focused on the most concrete policies in the 2006 elections and because of this, it can be argued,

Gyurcsány won on the strength of the economic proposals he claimed to have fulfilled in the past and/or planned for the future. Korkut elaborates, “If so, this is a sign of increasing importance of the pursuit of EU integration to the Hungarian public and their leaders” (Korkut 2007:677). What does this mean for the Hungarians’ view of their own national identity and Hungarian solidarity?

They seem to put aside the prominence of the crown, the cross on their flag, and their religious history if it means economic progress for their people. It supports an argument that forming educated opinions does have the power to overcome an unverifiable dogma that may be promoted by populist parties. However, if it turned out that the economy was not as good as

Gyurcsány claimed, coupled with the intensifying activities of the Civic Circles Movement, voters might choose to elect Orbán into office again.

9 All member states except Britain and Denmark, which have a legal opt-out. 27 “In Hungary, János Kóka, the leader of the junior coalition partner, the SZDSZ, argued that his country needed a competitive EU: according to him, the allegedly left-wing, money- distributing European tradition had lost touch with reality” (Korkut 2007:679). He continued to comment on what he believed to be the Hungarians’ dissatisfaction with current economic developments, the “sickening” European administrative culture, and anxiety towards Hungarian competitiveness. Solidarity and economic competitiveness are contrary to one another according to Kóka. He argues that if Hungary were to give more attention to solidarity and allow competitiveness to wither away then there would be inequality, a brain drain, and a loss of highly skilled services. The researcher further noted that Orbán, while a staunch supporter of a

“Hungarian” form of solidarity, is not necessarily anti-European because he views EU membership as complementary to national revival. He seeks to use Hungarian solidarity to protect people from the negatives of capitalism, not from capitalism itself. During this time,

Orbán stressed that it was up to the people to empower the government’s actions, not the other way around.

As Gyurcsány attempted to balance solidarity and economic competitiveness, Orbán

“asserted that the MSZP, as heir to the Communist-era Hungarian Workers’ Party, was against the people’s interests” (Korkut 2007). He derogatively referred to the left as the “luxus baloldal”, a term which translates to the “luxurious left-wing”. Fidesz emphasized that they were willing to help the people through such social welfare policies as “nemzeti garanciatörvény,” which was a national guarantee of basic economic security that Orbán had asked the National Assembly to pass as law. But “two-thirds majority would be needed to change legislation related to tax advantages for families, the thirteenth monthly pension, and reconstruction of Communist-era apartment blocks” (Korkut 2007:682). Orbán continuously stressed economic policies that were

28 focused on helping the “common Hungarians” the most. Moreover, Fidesz proposed to put much of their time into the “Széchenyi Plan”. The plan would work to stimulate small and medium enterprises and give them a competitive advantage internationally. As Fidesz worked on reaching the people economically, they also promoted cultural themes of the “home”, “family”, and the value of work. Furthermore, in the 2006 election cycle, Orbán attempted to distance Fidesz’s position from that of the MSZP as far as possible. He reminded his voters how victorious the

Law and Justice Party in Poland was in what he defined as solidarity through the embrace of

Christianity and its values, and the volatile shift from a state-owned economy to a market economy.

The Aftermath of 2006: “We lied in the morning, at noon, and at night”

Ferenc Gyurcsány and the Hungarian Socialist Party emerged as victors of the 2006 parliamentary elections therefore marking the first time a party has been reelected since the fall of Communism. However, this was a pyrrhic victory because a broadcast of Gyurcsány’s actions

(and/or lack thereof) over the last four years would send the country into turmoil. On September

17, 2006, in a private speech that was broadcasted by Magyar Rádió, Gyurcsany is heard saying,

“There is not much choice. There is not, because we have fucked it up. Not a little but a lot. No

European country has done something as boneheaded as we have. It can be explained. We have obviously lied throughout the past one and a half-two years” (nol.hu). The infamous Őszöd speech was specifically meant for National Socialist Party members of the National Assembly.

The speech sparked violent protests, massive distrust of government, and demands for

Gyurcsany’s resignation. The protests lasted for about a month and two weeks and resulted in the collapse of support for MSZP, a political crisis until 2008, and a referendum initiated by Fidesz

29 on revoking some medical and tuition fees. There was overwhelming support by a majority of voters to cancel the incumbent government’s reforms.

All throughout the protests, Fidesz was actively involved in shaping public discourse to further discredit MSZP as much as possible and redirect voters to their party. On the first day of the protests in a northern city of Hungary, Miskolc, Fidesz sent a press release to Magyar

Távirati Iroda10 with the title “One cannot build a city on lies”11. They noted that members of

MZSP’s Miskolc committee must’ve known about the lies that the party was keeping quiet. They put public pressure on the Mayor and a couple of Deputy Mayors of the municipality for not speaking up. This involvement and negative propaganda against MSZP at the local level was crucial as it gave Fidesz leverage when there was time for the next local elections. As demonstrations continued through October, protestors admonished people not to vote for the

Hungarian Socialist Party in the next elections. Fidesz sent out political media constantly referencing Gyurcsany’s lies thereby reinforcing the narrative of “the corrupt elite”. Orbán’s

Civic Circles may have also proven to be effective as Fidesz was victorious in many municipalities all over Hungary during the local elections. To further demonstrate its solidarity with all Hungarians, Fidesz held a vigil in remembrance of the 1956 Revolution and to rebuke the police brutality that occurred in Budapest on October 23rd.

A Tale of Two Hungaries

It can be argued that political polarization has been a constant theme in Hungary following the fall of Communism. As previously stated, Hungary fell into turmoil following the

Őszöd speech and subsequent protests. Following the elections on April 9th, 2006, Hungarians

10 A Hungarian Telegraphic Office (news agency). 11 A sardonic response to the MSZP slogan, “we’re building a brand new Mikolc”. The original slogan was a reference to the extensive downtown reconstruction project started by MSZP. 30 were livid to discover that the economic situation in their country was much worse than what

Gyurcsány and his party claimed. Furthermore, they were also upset by the austerity measures that Gyurcsány was going to put into place. However, economic factors and deceit may not be the most important factors in Hungary. In Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary

Hungary, Emilia Palonen discusses the use of polarization as a tool by electoral parties and the emergence of a bipolar hegemony. She cites Kitchelt et al. who write: “…Polish and Hungarian politicians cannot polarize electoral competition around economic issues in the face of reformist post-communist parties that embrace essentials of market capitalism, they have sufficient incentives to construct a single powerful socio-cultural divide on which to divide those to attract voters” (2009:320).

Furthermore, Palonen argues that polarization in these terms is produced at the elite level where politicians have mastered the subtle art of creating it where none may have existed earlier.

Subsequent work has shown that such elite polarization further bifurcates the electoral competition and the politics more broadly, and this constitutes a challenge to the stability of the democratic system. Populists exhibit a clear form of this behavior when they divide the world into the “pure” and the “corrupt”. As previously mentioned, Hungarian politics between the fall of communism and 2006 has also involved polarizing topics such as the slogan “those who are not with us, are against us”, Hungarian solidarity versus economic competitiveness, and

Gyurcsany’s lies to secure the election versus the depiction of Fidesz as saviors. “Zsolt Enyedi has argued that ‘the isolation between the groups comes into existence because the socio-cultural categories (denominations, classes, etc.), collective identities, political attitudes and leadership, strengthening each other, draw a wall between the groups” (2009:320). Culturally, factors like religious faith (which is more so associated with the right), education, and national identity are

31 important in the topic of polarization for the overwhelming influence that they could possibly supply.

CHAPTER III: CHILDREN OF SOLIDARITY

32 Polish nationalists have often deemed their country the “Christ of Europe” during the partitioning of Poland in the 19th century in order to justify their suffering. In order to set up a background for politics in Poland today, and particularly how right-wing populists were able to rise to office in 2015, a brief history of the country is necessary. This is because populists will often refer to the past and give their interpretation of the historical events. 87.5% of Poles identified as Roman Catholic according to Census data from 2011. However, the country disappeared from the map for decades at one point, suffered partitions from different states and experienced a decades-long communist rule. Therefore, understanding part of its roots is important in putting the present into the proper perspective. Poland borders the Baltic Sea and a part of Russia to the north, Belarus to the east, Germany to the west, and three countries to the south: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Up until the 12th century, very few of the

Slavic tribe leaders that were on the eastern side of the Elbe wanted to be Christians. Even then, the reasons for converting to Christianity were fairly political and in some instances it was partly done to avoid being massacred. After the rough outline of Poland was first established in the

Piast dynasty, a process known as the “Christianization of Poland” took place in which the first

Duke of Poland12 – Mieszko I – became a Christian. From this point forward, Catholicism would play a huge role in the history, culture, and politics of Poland. “The Catholic Church contributed significantly to the survival of a sense of unity in the Polish lands” (Lukowski et al 2001:15).

The country was unified spiritually but politically there were still problems. Before his death,

Piast Duke Bolesław III Wrymouth divided the Polish lands among his four sons through the

Testament of 1138 so that they would not start conflicts with one another. Yet they did, and the lands would be fragmented for two hundred years. They would not be unified as the Kingdom of

12 This usage of “Poland” refers to the historical territories that comprise most of modern-day Poland. 33 Poland until the final Piast leader – King Casimir the Great III – would take the crown in the fourteenth century.

The Union of Lublin was a real union between Poland and Lithuania that was signed in the 16th century. The Union established an elected monarchy as well as a Senate and a parliament

(known as the Sejm13). During this period, members of the Sejm were predominantly Catholic.

The Society of Jesus (Jesuits) would be another emerging influence in Poland during this time period because they built the first college (followed by several more), as well as churches, schools, and monasteries in later periods. Protestants of the era attempted to unite the different denominations under the Sandomierz Consensus in order to combat the Counter-Reformation together. Another important event in the 16th century was the Executionist movement. “The

Executionist movement aimed to strengthen the state in its relations with foreign bodies such as the Church in Rome and to strengthen the position of the nobility in relation to the lower classes”

(Stone 2014:41). It was a response from magnates who believed that legislation should be executed in order to restrict the number of illegalities occurring from other nobles. Regardless of the religious growing pains occurring in Europe at this time, the Warsaw Confederation was signed into law thereby allowing religious tolerance in the newly formed Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth. This act was the first in Europe of its kind.

The Fall and Rise of Poland

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth experienced three partitions that would ultimately end in its dissolution in 1795. The First Partition produced a security dilemma related to an imbalance of power in the region. The Russian Empire was rapidly growing and this left Austria

13 The Sejm is the lower house of the Polish parliament. It is comprised of 460 deputies elected by proportional representation every four years. 34 and Prussia fearful of any future conflicts in the region. Following the Polish-Russian War of

1792 and the Targowica Confederation14, the Second Partition served as the penultimate blow to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Hapsburg Austrian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, and the Russian Empire all claimed a piece of land from the commonwealth and this would be the third and final partition. No sovereign Polish state existed between 1795 and 1918. However, that does not mean that there was no nation, because it is more than a state with its borders.

Taking notes from the French of the era, Poles engaged in a series of minor revolts that would subsequently become larger revoltsC in an attempt to undermine the Partitioning Powers and lead the way for Polish independence. The national anthem written in 1797 reflected this outlook:

“Poland Is Not Yet Lost”. Poland maintained a pseudo-presence in the area after Napoleon

Bonaparte established the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807 and Polish culture continued to be passed down under the rule of the Partitioning Powers, albeit informally rather than in public places like schools.

While politics had not produced social assimilation, widespread industrialization occurred in each protectorate of the Partitioning Powers. Consequently, new social classes began to emerge as a result of industry and it can be argued that the multifaceted changes that occurred during this time period played a significant role in the political choices of modern day Poles.

Industrialists, the intelligentsia, and proletariats emerged in this era and their existence would be a cause of class conflict in later years. The three partitions were managed differently and thus may have developed ideological differences in the people that remain to this day. Different geographical settings, level of education attained, and types of jobs could have set a cultural precedent for modern-day Poland. In the 19th century several different political movements

14 The Targowica Confederation was a confederation established by Polish and Lithuanian magnates and backed by Russian Empress Catherine II. The confederation opposed the Polish Constitution of 1791, which had been adopted by the Great Sejm. 35 occurred such as the emergence of the right wing Polish Christian Democratic Party (linked with the Catholic Church) and the 1905 Revolution in Russian Poland (social unrest among the working class).

Polish People’s Republic

A few decades after the establishment of the second Polish Republic in 1918, the effects of World War II on the nation of Poland would lead to monumental changes. Following the

Potsdam Agreement in 1945, Poland would gain what was known as “recovered territories”. The western Polish border was pushed further to the west into Germany and the Oder-Neisse line was established. On the east, the Soviets annexed a large part of eastern Poland and the border was established more or less along the so-called “Curzon line” proposed in July 1920. Poland gained industrial technology from newly acquired German territory but lost most of its oil fields to

Russian annexation in the east.

Following World War II, the communist Polish Workers’ Party (PZPR) rose to power and established the Polish People’s Republic in the 1952 Constitution. While Poland was under communist rule, one year in particular remained fervently anticipated: 1966. Poland was the only communist country where organized religion was not completely suppressed. The power of the

Catholic Church and Polish religiosity was high during the 1,000-year anniversary of the

“Christianization of Poland”. “Every church in Poland displayed the banner ‘SACRUM

POLONIAE MILLENIUM, 966-1966’ (Poland’s Sacred Millennium) together with the slogans of ‘DEO ET PATRIAE’ (For God and Country); ‘POLONIA SEMPER FIDELIS’ (Poland

Always Faithful); ‘NARÓD Z KOŚCIOŁEM’ (The Nation is with the Church)” (Lukowski et al

2001:16). Twelve years later, Poland would see its Archbishop of Kraków inducted into the

36 papacy as Pope John Paul II and this would strengthen Poland’s relationship with the Vatican in the long term.

Solidarity and the End of Communism

In 1980, the Interfactory Strike Committee made a list known as the “21 Demands of

MKS” in which they outlined their demands. They included the right to recognize free trade unions, a day of rest on Saturday, increase in pay, and restrictions on certain privileges of members belonging to the Polish United Worker’s Party. After a series of strikes, their demands were met with the Gdańsk Agreement15. “On September 17th, 35 newly formed independent

Polish trade unions declared their intent to register as a single Independent Self-Governing Trade

Union (NSZZ), under the name Solidarity (Solidarność)” (MacEachin 2011: 9). Lech Wałęsa was the founding leader of Solidarity. The Solidarity movement was populist in nature but it was not as specific in its ideology as right-wing populism (thick populism). Solidarity was a thin populist movement because it comprised of a large working class (us) against the communist government (them). It was estimated that that the labor union had accumulated ten million members at one point – almost a one third of working age people in Poland—therefore they were considered to be a fairly powerful force. The union survived through the regime’s initiation of martial law and fought for rights that were similar in nature to the demands of the MKS.

Furthermore, many of the clergy as well as Pope John Paul II were supportive of the union. In the late 1980s, the number of protests grew larger and the Polish economy had fallen into decline. In 1989, in order to quell increasingly threatening social tensions, the government met with Solidarity leaders at the Round Table Talks. The outcome of the talks was the call of

15 The Gdańsk Agreement was an agreement reached as a direct result of the strikes that occurred in Gdańsk, Poland. 37 partially competitive elections in June 1989, the creation of the Senate, the office of the President

(which shared executive power with the prime minister), and the legalization of unions to exist independently from the government.

Third Polish Republic

1989 was one of the most important years in the history of Poland because of the Round

Table Talks and the subsequent semi-free elections, the re-legitimization of Solidarity. These events are often seen as the initial moves in a cascade of events that led to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. The 1989 Revolutions, resulting in the change of the political system, were triggered by both economic decline and a clash of ideologies between communism and democracy, demanded by many people. “The events in Poland in the late 1970s, from the election of a Polish pope, which galvanized the Poles and created the massive popular demonstrations that led to the creation of Solidarity, to the military coup that seemed to destroy

Solidarity, had set the stage for what was to happen” (Tismăneanu 2005:30).

The election of 1989 was partially free whereby 65% of the seats in the Sejm (the Lower

House) would be guaranteed to the communists while the 35% remaining seats in the Sejm and

100% of the seats in the Senate would be open to election. Much like in Hungary, free elections in Poland were a prerequisite—but not the only requirement—for the transition to a liberal democracy. In the partially free elections, Solidarity won all seats that was up for election in both the Senate and the Sejm, save for one. Of the seats that were not guaranteed to the communists,

Solidarity won 160 out of 161 seats in the Sejm and 92 seats out of 100 in the Senate. The Polish

United Workers’ Party (PZPR) would dissolve the following year.

38 The Church had shown overwhelming support for the opposition (Solidarity) during the election season. Stanisław Ciosek of the PZPR “fulminated to its representatives that ‘The

Church has gone over to the opposition, abandoned its neutrality, taken sides. We were relying on the Church to be a neutral moral strength, a corrective for both sides’ (Kemp-Welch

2016:401). It would be interesting to ask him why that would be the case. It was against the interests of the Church to support an oppressive system that sought to eliminate or curtail independent thought and culture, including religion. This could be an argument why PiS has tried to keep a tight relationship with the Church in Poland today. Catholic Poles are a crucial demographic for Law and Justice and they would fail to win elections without them. Law and

Justice have taken a quid pro quo approach with the Polish Church many times. For example, in

2016, Law and Justice attempted to make legal changes that were rebuked by both domestic and international institutions but they gained the backing of the Church by including stronger abortion laws in the legal changes (politico.eu 2016). In return, this gave them powerful support domestically in order to get these legal changes passed.

In regards to the Church and Solidarity during the fall of communism, Kemp-Welch describes a secret Party document that outlined the plans to assist opposition parties in the 1989 elections. The document notes that public information was available at the pulpit about dates and places of meetings that had been organized by Solidarity and the Church encouraged people to attend these meetings. Furthermore, “the Church displayed Solidarity propaganda, taught people how to vote, and distributed vouchers for the electoral fund of the opposition” (2016:401). The author also notes that teaching Poles how to vote may have been perhaps the most important contribution in support of Solidarity because it helped voters think pragmatically about casting their vote. Solidarity had 63 days to campaign for the election and they were also campaigning

39 extremely hard, despite a lack of resources. One ought to keep in mind that under communism there was only one party, so seeing a large selection of choices may make one fearful or overwhelmed. Choice wasn’t anything exclusive to the voting sheet either. Plurality was returning to Poland and with it came a wealth of information that was being spread out to all corners of the country. Gazeta Wyborcza and Tygodnik Solidarność (Solidarity’s weekly) were two newspapers that emerged before the first partially free elections were held.

The first semi-free elections and the Balcerowicz plan were markers that Poland was making the transition toward a market economy and a political system that reflected western democratic ideals. In fact, Poland rose to be one of the most economically successful countries coming out of communism. Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa served as the first President of Poland after the fall of Communism from 1990 to 1995. The parliamentary elections held in 1991 saw an explosion of 111 political parties vying for seats with 29 parties winning at least one seat.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the Democratic Union (UD), a liberal Christian-democrat party, won the most seats in the Sejm with 12.3% of the vote followed by the ex-communists of the

Democratic Left Alliance. A transition to democracy also brought a transition toward a capitalist market economy. Polish economist Leszek Balcerowicz assembled a commission to put forward a list of ten legislative acts known as the Balcerowicz Plan in order to make the economic transition. Throughout the ‘90s, there was a fair amount of stability in regards to the parties that earned the most votes. However, it should be noted that the 1991 Parliamentary elections saw a special candidate earn 8.7% of the vote in the Sejm with the Center Civic Alliance – the future leader of Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaszyński. The Center Civic Alliance was a party that

Kaszyński personally founded through the Center Agreement. He served as the chairman of the anti-communist, center-right party and he would also have a seat in the Sejm as a MP between

40 ’91 to ’93 and ’97 to ’05. The party would eventually dissolve and Kaszyński would then become the chairman of the right-wing populist Law and Justice party that currently rules in

Poland.

While Law and Justice wouldn’t exist for another decade, thick populism already lurked beneath the surface of the political arena in Poland throughout the ‘90s. Andrzej Lepper founded the agrarian populist Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP) party in 1992. Economically, the party focused more on left-wing policies but combined them with more conservative and religious social policies. Like any populist party, the SRP focused on isolationism and

Euroscepticism as part of their platform. Another far right populist movement was the All-Polish

Youth, who focused on Catholicism, nationalism, and traditionalist ideals. They were not a formal political party but did attract condemnation from the United Nations and prominent

NGOs such as Amnesty International. The party that represented Solidarity immediately after the fall of communism, the Solidarity Citizens’ Committee (KO “S”), dissolved in 1991 but it would survive in a different form until the end of the decade as the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS).

Some core ideas put forth by Solidarity might still have been influential years later because AWS won the 1997 parliamentary elections.

Children of Solidarity

At least three parties would trace their roots back to the Solidarity movement that emerged during the ‘80s. I focus on two of them: The Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and

Justice party (PiS). It should also be noted that two significant right-wing populist parties were also founded at the start of the new century. The League of Polish Families was founded in May

2001 and frequently makes reference to Catholicism. “The LPR uses slogans of Catholic

41 fundamentalism, anti-communism, defense of national sovereignty menaced by the European

Union, defense of the simple man and the Catholic family and so on” (Borejsza 2006: 365). A youth organization known as the All-Polish Youth used to be unofficially affiliated with the LPR and likewise shared similar, if not arguably more radical political and social views as the LPR.

The All-Polish Youth have gone through several iterations of their organization throughout history but their most recent organization was founded in 1989. In regards to membership, the

All-Polish Youth stated, “A member of the All-Polish Youth can only be a person who accepts

Polish national and Catholic values” (mwlubelskie.pl). With the same message as the All-Polish

Youth, many Law and Justice sympathizers interrupted Poland’s celebration of Independence

Day last November with nationalist, xenophobic, and extremely religious rhetoric. On November

11th, 2017, thousands of Polish nationalists marched through the streets of Warsaw with banners,

Polish flags, and a cloud of crimson flares held above them. They held up signs with phrases like

“clean blood”, “white Europe”, “remove Jewry from power”, and perhaps most strikingly, they held a giant white banner that read, “We Want God”.16

In June 2001, twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński founded the Law and Justice party (PiS), a right-wing populist party that rules over Poland today. It was created from a part of the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) and the Center Agreement. The party was cautious not to be too religious and overly Catholic because party leaders felt that they would put off more secular voters. “However, particularly towards the end of the 2005 election campaign, both the party and its presidential candidate made a much clearer pitch for the religious electorate, and both became more closely associated with the influential clerical-nationalist broadcaster Radio

Maryja and its network of associated organizations and media outlets” (Bale and Szcerbiak 2006:

16 We Want God is a reference to a Polish religious song that was chanted in 1979 when Pope John Paul II arrived in Poland. 42 20). Furthermore, the death of then-President Lech Kaczyński in the Smolensk plane crash of

2010 has polarized the country, partially due an intense debate on the circumstances of the crash.

Religious demonstrations emerged in remembrance of the plane crash as well as many conspiracy theories of what occurred. Different sides were blamed, but one side that took a lot of blame was the Civic Platform.

The Civic Platform (PO) was founded in January 2001 and it has often been the main opponent of the Law and Justice Party in at least the past decade. Andrzej Olechowski and

Maciej Płażyński cofounded the party with help from Donald Tusk of the liberal democratic

Freedom Union (UW). Naturally, its values in some areas are vastly different from those of Law and Justice and other right-wing populist parties in Poland. On their website, they state: “Our unchanging goals are improvement of the quality of life for every single Polish family, every man, woman and child. Together, day-by-day, we want to build Poland, a home for all of us. A home where everybody can find a place for themselves.” (platforma.org). There is an emphasis on pluralism and (liberal) democracy in what they stand for. They have often called for crosses and other religious symbols to be removed from public institutions and be reserved for Churches and similar places of worship. For example, following the Smolensk plane crash, many PiS supporters (known as “defenders of the cross”) argued that they should be allowed to mourn by placing religious symbols, roses, and a large cross in front of the Presidential Palace. Bronisław

Komorowski, former PO member and president of Poland at the time, asked that all of the religious symbols (including the cross) be moved to St. Anne’s Church that was close by. The

Catholic Church found it difficult to decide on the issue and PM Donald Tusk even tried to offer a compromise by commemorating the Smolensk plane crash with a plaque on the presidential

43 palace. The plaque was not very effective in calming down the emotions, but eventually all the items of worship related to the plane crash were moved to St. Anne’s.

The parliamentary election of 2001 would see many forms of populism cumulatively gaining a fair amount of seats. However, the most seats went to Leszek Miller and the

Democratic Left Alliance – Labor Union (SLD-UP) with 41% of the vote followed by Donald

Tusk and Civic Platform (12.7%). Three out of the next four candidates who gained seats in the election would all represent some form of populism. Andrzej Lepper and the Self-Defense of the

Republic of Poland spoke on a platform of agrarian populist ideals and nationalism and gained

10.2% of the vote. Lech Kaczyński of the right-wing populist Law and Justice party earned 9.5% of the vote. Roman Giertych of the League of Polish Families would place sixth. The previous

Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) government under PM Buzek had low chances of reelection due to several drawbacks and problems during the administration’s time in power. “Reforms in health care and pensions were not going anywhere, three ministers had to resign due to corruption scandals, and many civil servants left to work for the private sector for better pay”

(economist.com 2001). Nonetheless, it was an important election because its winner had to take on an important milestone in the coming years: Poland’s entry into the EU.

During the 2002 EU summit, Poland was formally invited to join the European Union. A referendum was held in 2003 in which Poles were asked whether they give their country permission to enter into the European Union. According to the National Electoral Commission,

59% of eligible voters participated and 77% voted yes, so Poland ultimately joined the EU the following year. This was important because it reflected something explicit about the way that

Poles viewed the world. It was not as if researchers called Poles at their homes or took a random sample in asking them this question. Poles could have lied in a survey or any other form of

44 qualitative data. Instead, they went to the election centers and in doing so they expressed that they were open to working with other European countries, being in solidarity with a collective

European identity, and demonstrating a support for institutions. With this presupposition, it is interesting to note that in March 2014, one year before the PiS government rose to power, the

Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) data shows that 89% of Poles still supported their country’s presence in the EU. This view remained quite popular despite many people’s support for the anti-EU rhetoric by Law and Justice, who won in the 2015 elections. Moving ahead,

Lezek Miller’s administration proved to be a disappointment as well.

No government since the fall of communism had received such a low public approval rating as that of Miller. Some of the highest rates of unemployment since 1989 (~20%), the

Rywin affair, and the Hausner plan could all be attributed to his dismal approval ratings

(economist.com 2004). The Rywin affair was a corruption scandal where Lew Rywin solicited a bribe from the editor of Gazeta Wyborcza (Adam Michnik) to change a law that would benefit

Michnik. PM Miller, his deputy minister of culture, a high-ranking media policy-maker, and

Miller’s Chief of Cabinet were named as being involved with the bribe. An economist working in the Miller administration by the name of Jerzy Hausner proposed a draft of a plan that aimed to reduce social spending. “Mr. Miller’s economics ministers, Jerzey Hausner, has produced a medium-term plan for belt-tightening that includes bold structural reforms, such as raising the retirement age for women to that for men, and the trimming of automatic indexation of some benefits” (economist.com 2004).

The PO-PiS Rivalry

45 Following the decline of the Democratic Left Alliance due to the debacle of Miller’s leadership and corruption, right-wing populists would gain more votes in the following elections.

The 2005 parliamentary elections saw a close win for PiS but they would soon lose it by a sizeable margin after two years in office. In Negating Negation: Civic Platform, Law and

Justice, and the Struggle over “Polishness” Jo Harper argues that both PO and PiS

“simultaneously speak to non-mutually exclusive subjects and constituencies, inhabiting overlapping symbolic ‘space’” (Harper 2014:17). She elaborates by saying that the legitimacy of the parties is largely determined by how they position themselves in relation to this space, to each other, and to wider discursive and other – political, social, and economic – forces. Though those constituencies are currently more mutually exclusive, the author attempts to show that this overlapping symbolic space exists through a series of categorized texts. The texts that can be categorized into one of five groups: “The Past”, “The State”, “The Nation”, “The People”, and

“Europe”. Harper touches upon PiS and their relation to the Round Table legacy, PO’s portrayal of PiS as extremists, and an argument that PO better helps Poles come to terms with their history.

In regards to the Round Table, Bernhard and Kubik agree with Harper in that “almost from its inception, the Roundtable Agreement has been a highly contested and polarizing issue in

Polish historical memory” (Bernhard and Kubik 2014:61). PiS’s discourse has mainly been a rejection of anything related to the Round Table talks. “This discourse plays on traditional Polish nationalism—the ‘us and them’ talk of the interwar period and earlier—and it silently nods in the direction of elements of the hard-line nationalism and downright xenophobia of the extreme right, without ever going so far as to fully identify itself as part of that mindset” (2014:17).

Furthermore, PiS has traditionally highlighted specific points of Poland’s past, such as the

Solidarity movement, Catholicism, and the Church. In reference to the title, the author argues

46 that PO’s strategy to acquiring legitimacy consists of it allowing PiS to mark itself as an “easily identifiable demonic symbolic entity, which is then easily juxtaposed against its own moderate discourse” (2014:18). This is a poor strategy by PO because it adopts a view that politics is a short-term game in which every election could be a party’s last and this ignores the long term and ultimate goal of politics. It eliminates the end goal that politics should lead to a more balanced society in which liberties, freedoms, and justice is evenly distributed to every member of society. By building a cordon sanitaire17 around the opponent, Civic Platform has reinforced the populist narrative that there genuinely exists a “pure people” who fight against the “corrupt elite”. Harper failed to note that while this gives PO legitimacy, it also unintentionally grants PiS a high amount of legitimacy as well because it proves that one of core populist beliefs of Law and Justice is true.

Harper’s third point argues that PO helps Poles deal with their past and that their success in the 2007 and 2010 elections partly reflects a collective desire to come to terms with Poland’s complex and tangled past. In her view, broadly shared by other experts, PO presents a positive discourse whereas PiS presents a “negative” discourse by negating the Round Table talks. For example, according to Bernhard and Kubik, President Kazcyński frames the Roundtable as a corrupt bargain. PiS claim that the Roundtable has “corrupted” the democratization process for

Poland. In regards to elections, Harper notes that “PO has sought to develop a constituency among younger, more urban, better-educated, and more affluent voters, and its language speaks to them about reconciliation with the past, openness to Europe, a legal-rational state and civic culture, and a pluralistic society” (2014:18). PiS speaks to three main audiences: a “Polska B” audience, a Warsaw elite18 audience, and a “Middle Poland” audience, with the key struggle

17 A barrier that is built to keep infectious diseases out. 18 Harper’s usage of a Warsaw elite over the Warsaw elite signifies PiS’s appeal to the conservative wing in particular. 47 taking place in the nascent middle class. “When PiS speaks of ‘enemies,’ it is clearly seeking to shore up its own constituency—the older, poorer, more religious Poles, collectively referred to here as Polska B” (Harper 2014:20). It is unusual that the second audience that PiS seeks to connect with is the Warsaw elite because it is not in the vein of right-wing populism to appeal to elite, but rather to disavow them. However, there is a sensible strategy behind PiS’s appeal to some of them. The target of this appeal is a class of citizens who want to get rid of post- communist personnel in many different institutions (as they assume that such personnel is still there) and they see PiS as a means to achieving this end. PiS’s reasons for doing this could be to create more openings so that they have a higher chance to hold more positions in the government. Middle Poland is described as the budding constituency that seeks to leave the past behind and look towards the future. They are PO’s natural constituency and they comprise a group of people who do not see Europe as a threat to Polish solidarity.

2005 Elections

If the 2005 elections demonstrated anything, it was that populism would be an important influence in the political arena for years to come. Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice party accumulated the most seats with 27% of the vote. Civic Platform earned 24%, the populist Self-

Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP) earned 11.4%, and the right-wing populist League of

Polish Families earned 8% of the vote. Following the election, the Law and Justice party formed a coalition with the League of Polish Families and the Self-Defense for the Republic of Poland parties. As demonstrated earlier, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) fell out of grace with voters and lost all parliamentary seats by 2015. Economic decline, as the SLD’s case illustrates, can easily lead to the demise of any government. However, what must next be called into

48 question is how a populist party in particular can not only remain as a large force in parliament but furthermore how they are able to win elections. If economic decline can lead to a desire to change government, what dictates the next party that voters choose?

The Moral Revolution

“PiS came to power in 2005 under the banner of a ‘moral revolution,’ which it claimed was necessary to bring about a ‘Fourth Republic’ to replace the existing (post-1989) Third

Republic, and which, according to the PiS narrative, had failed and was tainted by układ, a term that does not lend itself to easy translation” (Harper 2010:22). According to her, its meaning could be interpreted as the communist-era networks of patronage and power (singular form) or a nebulous series of post-communist networks of supposed groups operating in a half-world between (mainly ex-communist) politicians and secret service officials and apparatchiks (plural form). Nevertheless, the aim of using this word is to taint the reputation of the Round Table

Talks between the communists and Solidarity. It is part of the process PiS has come up with to build up their political environment by naming the previously ruling elite “corrupt” and subsequently mobilizing against it people’s “volontè gènèrale.” In typical populist fashion, PiS’s usage of the word is meant to conceptualize complex issues so that they fit neatly within the “us” versus “them” discourse. Furthermore, the fact that no specific names are mentioned as part of the układ added ambiguity to the word in the same way populists reference “the will of the people” without noting a concrete end goal that the will seeks to achieve in society. “This discourse feeds off ritualistic Catholic teaching and plays on primitive fears and ignorance, particularly in rural Poland” (Harper 2010:22).

49 Lech Kaczyński has made reference to a “network of interests” and more specifically proclaimed that the economic interests of the old communist structures do not translate into the economic interests of the nation as a whole. In attempting to shape the orientation of the relationship of PiS versus układ, PM Kaczyński noted during the 2007 elections that PO is nervous that PiS may take apart the communists in the układ. At this point, many voters probably did not like how arbitrarily PiS spoke about the układ. It sounded like a topic that could be brought up at random points in time during the election as a strategic move rather than an actual and pressing issue for Poland. Their use of the term lacked consistency.

In another political-symbolic move, PiS attempted to divide the world into good and evil and to portray Poland as the “Christ of Nations”. “This discourse played on an old set of grievances—a nation seeing itself as governed by foreigners or their local proxies, a society divided against itself, stripped of the power to define itself” (Harper 2010:22). In regards to the

2005 election, the fact that PiS won against PO by only 3% of the vote but more so because it was only able to stay in office for a half of the regular term, this election may not be worthy enough to be placed at the center of this study as it lacks conviction on the part of voters.

2007 Parliamentary Elections

The 2007 elections would be an effective year to begin with because it revealed polarized social divisions across Poland, a fairly large lead for the opposition, and it occurred just before the 2008-2009 global recession. 60% of the voters who went to polls came from urban areas and

40% came from rural areas. “The election results were also split along regional lines, with the poorer rural, mainly eastern, areas (Polska B) won by PiS, and the younger urbanized constituency (Polska A) voting for PO, while the elderly and poor stayed at home” (Harper

50 2010:24). These stark divisions are not new to Poland or politics in general. It can be argued that similar factors which caused political divisions in Poland also caused the red-blue division between the northeast United States and the south. Poland’s acquisition of territory from

Germany and establishment of the Oder-Neisse line allowed it to acquire a lot of industrial technology and that may be why western Poland today is more developed than its eastern counterpart. Similarly, the south was able to become more industrious and economically powerful from the influence of slave labor than their Northern free-soiler counterparts. In

Poland’s case, industry lead to wealth which eventually improved people’s chances to acquire a tertiary education and a high paying job.

In the 2007 parliamentary elections, Donald Tusk and Civic Platform won with a large plurality of seats in the Sejm with 41.5% of the vote. They surpassed PiS, who earned 32.1% of the vote, by a sizable margin. This election had the highest voter turnout since the partially free elections at the end of communism. PiS had formed a coalition with the two populist parties after they had failed to compete in the 2007 election: The League of Polish Families and the Self-

Defense Party of the Republic of Poland. Along with an attempt to consolidate a piece of the right, the Law and Justice party also built a good relationship with Radio Maryja, a conservative, catholic, right-wing radio station with a sizable influence. Radio Maryja’s prime audience consists of those in Polska B, which include the less educated and the elderly. However, Lech

Kaczyński would blame the liberal media for his brother’s loss in 2005, citing that unemployment was low and the złoty19 was strong. This was untrue because unemployment had been in decline for a few years leading up to the 2007 election. Another element that makes the

2007 election worthy study is that this is election that would set an informal precedent for future

19 The złoty is the basic monetary unit of Poland. 51 elections. All elections following 2007 would result in a political system focused on PO and PiS because the left and liberal parties had fallen out of favor.

CHAPTER IV: THE EAST WIND

52 The 2007-2008 global financial crisis originated in the United States and swept through the rest of the world like an invisible force – leaving economic ruin in its path. The roots of the crisis came from severe negligence on Wall Street when several financial firms participated in subprime mortgage lending. In other words, these firms lent loans to people who would have had trouble paying them back. This problem was exacerbated when subprime loans were combined together to form “CDOs”, or Collateralized Debt Obligations. The CDOs continued to receive

AAA ratings even though they were made up of some of the most unreliable types of loans.

Investment banks were in support of subprime loans because they carried higher interest rates and therefore an increasingly large number of banks would continue to engage in predatory lending. Housing prices saw a huge boom and anyone could get a mortgage because of the rampant subprime lending that was occurring. It culminated into a global crisis on September 15,

2008 when the fourth largest investment-banking firm, Lehman Brothers, declared bankruptcy and subsequently collapsed as a result of massive financial losses largely due to subprime lending. This triggered a global financial crisis that rippled through the US, many parts of South

America, the Middle East, and most of Europe and Russia. A recession this size was bound to have made the lives of many people very uncomfortable, and some of them became political active (Simonovits 2018). Tax-paying citizens would have looked toward their government for plans in moving forward and how they were going to pull the country out of the Great Recession.

The crisis is especially distinct because it is the first major economic crisis that post- communist European countries have experienced since their transition to democracy. In East

Europe Rides Out the Economic Storm, Janusz Bugajski notes that “economic analysts have appraised the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe in terms of the impact that the recent recession has had on them and placed the countries into three categories: the resilient, the

53 uncertain, and the suffering” (2010:105). The first category, the resilient, is mostly self- explanatory. This group consists of countries that have weathered the economic storm the best and includes Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Countries in this category continue to pursue responsible economic policies that are the most practical in the long-term. He also notes that domestic politics in these countries has remained relatively stable at the time that they occurred.

However, the case in Poland will be examined more closely because sometimes there may be latent political instability that occurs that can be tied to economic crises. The next group of countries in the “uncertain” category includes Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria. Countries in this category have been affected economically but have made attempts to stabilize the domestic economy and the value of their exports. As the name implies, their futures were unclear and they were attempting to navigate through the storm as best as they could. At the time that the crisis occurred, they did not do as well as Slovakia but they also did not fare as poorly as a country in the “suffering” category such as Hungary.

The Central and Eastern European countries that have suffered the most as a result of the economic crisis include Hungary, Romania, and Latvia. Following political turmoil in Hungary in 2006 and 2007, economic decline only worsened the situation. One party that had been working since 2002 to shift public opinion was the right-wing populist party, Fidesz (through the

Hungarian Civic Circles). In fact, Fidesz was not the only right-wing populist party to gain a foothold in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Jobbik also emerged as a presence that worked to represent the will of the people. Bugajski also notes in his article that the governments of the countries in this group could have blamed international organizations for the economic crisis rather than their own governments and domestic operations. This sentiment shared by post-crisis countries could have been a good impetus for the rise of populist sentiment because right-wing

54 populists often argue that the EU is terrible for domestic societies. This argument is not supported by factual evidence, however, as the European Union can hardly be seen as a viable scapegoat and the main source for all the political and economic turmoil that occurred in Europe at the time. For example, aspiring EU member Albania faced very little economic downturn and actually saw growth during the recession. Moreover, as Bugajski argues, this crisis had less to do with international organizations and more to do with how heavily invested that countries were in foreign debt. This would explain why Albania was mainly unaffected by the crisis – it carried much less foreign debt on its financial statements. Nations with heavy foreign investments that were not in the EU, such as Ukraine, faced heavy losses as a result of the financial crisis.

“Paradoxically, the CEE countries that experienced the fastest GDP growth in the past decade—Latvia and Hungary in particular, as well as Estonia and Lithuania—have since 2008 suffered economic decline most acutely, because they were overly reliant on large-scale lending in the financial markets” (Bugajski 2010:106). If Hungary had a stronger domestic economy and accepted less foreign debt then perhaps it would have fared better during the crisis. No matter how Hungarians would perceive the European Union, they would continue to reap the many benefits that it offered Hungarians and the rest of the European community. The EU, IMF, and

World Bank granted Hungary 20 Billion Euros in assistance following the crisis. It is difficult to perceive international institutions as a threat when they provide so many benefits. For example, some of the benefits of the EU Single Market include increased consumer protection, greater competition, removal of trade barriers, and a reduction of business costs. If Hungary truly felt that the European Union was to blame, they could hold a referendum and leave. However, as the world is taking note from Britain’s divorce with the EU, it will be painful.

55 Nonetheless, right-wing populists continue to attack and threaten to leave institutions like the EU if they do not comply with their demands. It is not the case that institutions are bad per se but rather that they compete against the interests of populists. Referencing its main social policy,

Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán has criticized the EU many times in order to control the waves of migrants that came into Europe. Orbán declared that “Europe will restore the ‘will of the people’ on migration in 2018” (Schultheis 2018). He expressed this idea at a conference for the Christian

Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) just before elections were held and while the CSU was pushing

Chancellor Angela Merkel to be stricter with immigration policies. The more religious and conservative parties in Germany seem to deeply sympathize with Orbán on the issue of

“outsiders” in the country. However, the same conservatives in Germany don’t seem to attack institutions but rather they aim to work through them in order to manifest their own political will.

Nevertheless, Germany currently has its own right-wing populist party that focuses on attacking institutions like the European Union.

While Bugajski has concluded that domestic politics in many countries has remained stable a year after the economic crisis, the 2010 elections in CEE have been closely studied to observe the emergence of extremist parties. In particular, Hungary has become an object of attention due to the massive scandals brought about by Gyurcsańy and the Socialist party. The

Hungarian public’s upheaval against the government and its plans to handle the political and economic future of Hungary made for an especially volatile climate in the wake of the global economic crisis. Gyurcsańy was forced to resign in 2009 and his party’s economic minister,

Gordon Bajnai, replaced him as prime minister. In order to combat the plethora of economic problems that plagued Hungary, PM Bajnai announced austerity measures through higher taxes, public spending cuts, and a freeze of public wages. It should also be noted that he reduced state

56 subsidies for many important sectors of the economy such as radio, television, and public transportation (europeaninstitute.org). Throughout the period when that the scandal took place,

Fidesz was trying to shift public support toward its own party.

2009 EU Parliamentary Elections

Some might argue that the 2009 EU parliamentary elections were a bellwether for the rise of right-wing populism in Hungary. More specifically, it would mark the rebirth of Orbán’s

Fidesz party. Fidesz worked tirelessly to reshape the political, economic, and social aspects of its platform over the past eight years to win over public support. Politically, they were involved in attracting a lost and livid electorate following the scandals of the Socialist administration.

Economically, they put forward various plans and proposals including the Széchenyi plan and the Hungarian fees abolition referendum, the latter of which caused intraparty strife among the

Alliance of Free Democrats and the Socialists. The intraparty conflict resulted in SZDSZ leaving their coalition with the Socialists. Socially, Fidesz attempted to grow its support through the civic circle movement in order to shape public discourse through public meetings in churches and bookstores. Fidesz won the EU parliamentary elections with a majority of the vote (56%) followed by the Socialists with only 17% of the vote. More importantly, it seemed like

Hungarian voters were drawn toward Fidesz for more than the influence they’ve had in shaping public discourse. Hungarians were more increasingly attracted to right-wing populism in general as a new right-wing populist party known as Jobbik made their debut in the public sphere with the EU parliamentary elections in 2010.

While Jobbik are not the primary focus of this study, they ought to be mentioned for the relationship that they shared with Fidesz. Over the years, Fidesz gained legitimacy for how it

57 demonstrated its own strain of fervent nationalism. Since Jobbik is also very nationalistic, this could have been a way for a partial transfer of legitimacy to Jobbik through Fidesz, thus allowing them to make a minor entry into the EU parliament (three seats). In regards to nationalism, when

Fidesz came to power Orbán made a holiday to commemorate the signing of the Treaty of

Trianon20 and permitted ethnic Hungarians that resided in neighboring countries to claim

Hungarian citizenship. The latter provoked anger in Slovakia and Slovaks deemed it a security threat because almost half a million Hungarians lived in the southern portion of Slovakia at the time. The Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister-designate at the time, Zsolt Semjen, issued a statement that this action was meant to validate the identity of the large number of ethnic

Hungarians living outside of the country’s borders. However, according to Jan-Werner Müller,

“[Orbán] started nothing less than a comprehensive Kulturkampf, arguing that Fidesz had a mandate to reshape the political system according to the true values of the “national center”

(Müller 7).

The Hungarian right makes a distinction between “well-rooted” Hungarians and

“foreign-hearted” Hungarians. The latter phrase is used pejoratively. An example of how the

Hungarian right might use the “foreign-hearted” category could be when they address the cosmopolitans and intellectuals in Budapest with disdain. After this distinction is made (in regards to different forms of Hungarianness), the Hungarian right has a perfect tool for propagating its right-wing populist ideology. The usage of the phrases similar to “the corrupt elite” finds its way into the rhetoric of the political sphere on a day-to-day basis in Hungary without the assistance of any populist. However, not everybody who criticizes the elite is a populist. Citizens should actively be skeptical of the claims of politicians and especially

20 The Treaty of Trianon was the peace agreement of 1920 to formally end World War I between most of the Allies and the Kingdom of Hungary. 58 populists. What makes a right-wing populist dangerous is when they distinctly proclaim something along the lines of, “the corrupt elite must be kept under control by the people, and I, the leader of the right-wing populist party, am the only one (and no one else) who can show you the way to achieving this end”. In connection with the true values of the national center mentioned earlier, Müller further notes, “all public buildings were supposed to display a declaration of these values—and an explicit endorsement of Hungary as a Christian nation—are to be at the heart of the new constitution” (Müller 2011:7). Fidesz would go on to create a new constitution with a sizable number of references to Christianity just after they won the 2010 elections.

2010 Parliamentary Elections

The 2010 parliamentary elections resulted in the election of 386 members of parliament, the National Assembly, with Fidesz winning a majority of the seats. There is arguably nothing more rare than a (right-wing) populist party claiming a majority of the vote and this marked the election as an anomaly since the fall of communism. Orbán led Fidesz (in a coalition with the

Christian Democratic People’s party) to claim roughly 53% of the popular vote, followed by the

Hungarian Socialist party (MSZP) with 19% of the vote, and Jobbik came in third by claiming forty-seven seats or about 17% of the vote. While the Hungarian civic circles played a role in making Fidesz seem like an attractive “next choice” after the demise of the Socialists, the economic crisis may have been a catalyst. “…without being penalized by the party, Fidesz member of parliament Oszkár Molnár stated: ‘I love Hungary, I love Hungarians, and I prefer

Hungarian interests to global financial capital, or Jewish capital, if you like, which wants to devour the whole world, but especially Hungary” (Small 2014:227). There is nothing wrong with

59 being proud of one’s country, however it does become dangerous when it is flavored with bigotry, prejudice, or excessive elitism. In regards to right-wing populism, this kind of behavior is not only expected but it is a quintessential prerequisite to being categorized as a right-wing populist since this behavior falls under nativism.

Economic Shock

Gabor Simonovits, et al investigate the implications of the economic crisis in relation to the incumbent government in Hungary in 2018. The researchers ask the following question: what are the consequences of unequal economic conditions on national election results? They found that “the local economic milieu has a substantial effect on incumbent support, and that this effect was especially pronounced in the 2010 election that coincided with the peak of the Great

Recession” (Simonovits 2018:1). This study is relevant because, as the researchers note in the review of the literature, national economic conditions have a strong effect on election outcomes.

However, the researchers also state that “economic shocks are often distributed very unequally within countries and as a result may induce very different voting behavior” (2018:2). In a sense, this study is limited because it fails to take into account other factors outside of economy that may lead to support for any particular political party. The rise of (right-wing) populism is not driven by economy or any single factor alone. Nonetheless, this study is important in understanding the rise of right-wing populism because it offers data on what occurred at the economic level in Hungary. More specifically, the study seems promising in showing that economic decline could be a factor in the rise of right-wing populism. Voters might pay especially close attention to economic proposals in public debates because employment has a direct connection with quality of life.

60 In terms of research design, Gabor Simonovits, et al focus on the national elections in

Hungary between 2006 and 2014 and they study local economic voting through the unemployment rate. The elections of 2010 and 2014 are included in particular because one occurred after an economic decline and one took place after an economic recovery. “Moreover, the measure used here to proxy for economic conditions more broadly (unemployment rate) is found to have strongly predictive effects throughout the period” (2018:5). The researchers have gathered data on the settlement-level unemployment. Next, settlement-level election returns are used and the relationship between local unemployment and the electoral success of incumbent parties is examined. The researchers also utilize an individual level analysis. They take advantage of a large survey containing roughly 100,000 face-to-face interviews conducted by

TÁRKI21. Support for the incumbent party is based on survey responses to the following question: “If the general elections were held tomorrow, which party’s list would you vote for?”

Incumbent Support was measured through an indicator variable with 1 denoting if a constituent voted for the incumbent government. The dependent variable is the vote share of the incumbent party at the level of settlements in the General Elections that took place between 2006 and 2014.

21 A major Hungarian polling firm. 61 Columns 1 and 2 in the above table predict support for the incumbent party by local unemployment. More specifically, local unemployment in the article is defined as the proportion of individuals looking for jobs in the month in the settlement in which the interview took place.

The researchers add a control for individual unemployment status in columns 3 and 4. “If the effect of local unemployment on vote intentions simply reflect the aggregation of an individual level relationship between unemployment and anti-incumbent voting, we would expect the relationship to disappear once we control for individual employment status” (2018:7). In columns 5 and 6, the researchers present a final, possibly more direct piece of evidence for the effect of local economic conditions that exceed concerns about one’s own employment. In the last two columns, the researchers restrict their sample to survey respondents who were employed only at the time of the interview. If local unemployment reduced vote intentions for the incumbent due only to unemployed people turning away from the incumbent in these places, the researchers would expect that the effect should disappear among people who were employed when they were interviewed. The article provides clear evidence of the influence of local economic conditions on national election outcomes.

Observations that took place at each settlement were a weighted proportion of the population size. The 2006-2010 cycle is noted in the first column. “The researchers’ best estimate implied that a 4% increase in local unemployment (the median value for that cycle) was expected to reduce the vote share of the then incumbent Hungarian Socialist Party by about 3%”

(2018:7). The second column reveals that the effect of local unemployment was less noticeable in the 2014 elections (economic recovery). The median settlement in 2014 saw a reduction in local unemployment and it was conjectured that this would lead to a slight increase in support for

Fidesz (incumbent). “The results show both that local economic conditions can prove extremely

62 consequential and that their effect is likely to be contingent on the electoral context.” As originally noted by Powell and Whitten, left-leaning parties are punished more for economic struggles related to unemployment (Powell and Whitten 1993). The findings in this study of economic shock in Hungary fall in line with the theory posited by Powell and Whitten because the data reveals that the left-wing MSZP is more harshly punished for relatively high unemployment than the right-wing Fidesz. Furthermore, the media also plays an extensive role in

Hungary in the years leading up to elections. How the media portrays parties on the left or the right may have a sizable influence in the rise of right-wing populists.

The Influence of the Media

In Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary, former SZDSZ Minister of

Education Bálint Magyar has written about Fidesz’s domination over the media after their election to office. Through its term in office, Fidesz brought down the state-owned public media.

Magyar notes, “It depoliticized (through threats in the form of arbitrarily imposed sanctions and the advertisement tax) the major private televisions (RTL Klub, TV2). It ghettoized any media with a critical voice (official persecutions, scaring away advertisers)” (Magyar 209). Populists have traditionally had a contentious relationship with the media because a truly free media is pluralistic in nature – it is free to report on almost any aspect of the social, political, and economic spheres. This is how it should be if democracy is going to thrive. The media ought to be critical when it is necessary and it ought to be free to deliver praise when the government deserves it. The one thing that should not happen to the media is for it to be restricted by the government. There are theories that the media is responsible for the rise of populism because populists may sometimes intrigue people. The behavior of populists is often distinct and they

63 take stances in public debates that, as some people would say, lack political correctness. As a result, the media covers the threats, promises, and actions performed by populists in an attempt to bring in revenue. However, due to the way that the media are treated after populists rise to power, it is difficult to say that a free media would intentionally support the election of any form of populist.

64 CHAPTER V: SHADES OF RED

Poland emerged as the most resilient country out of all the members of the European

Union in the years immediately following the global financial crisis. In fact, Poland was the only member of the European Union to witness economic growth in the years during and after the crisis. Many attributes both domestically and internationally could be credited for Poland’s resilience during the crisis – from the way it dealt with exports to how its domestic economy and labor market were structured. Surprisingly, the Polish government still requested external economic assistance in 2009 through the International Monetary Fund. It requested 20.5 billion

USD through the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the purpose for this credit line was so

Poland could bolster its economy since its neighbors were suffering from the effects of the economic crisis. Even though Poland was in the eye of the storm, it still had sizable links with other economies like Germany because of a relatively large amount of exports. It is important to cover the internal and external factors that made Poland resilient to the crisis because this would provide a more in-depth insight into understanding what exactly led to the rise of right-wing populist sentiment in Poland. If Poland did not suffer as much economically such as countries like Hungary then how did economic decline affect the population in Poland? It is hypothesized that unlike Hungary, distinct economic decline somewhere within the country could be a factor that explains the rise of right-wing populism in Poland. The entire country could have experienced growth but perhaps there were still regions that experienced decline. In fact, if a sizable amount of regions within Poland experienced economic decline then a populist could make their way to the political arena and use this economic division as part of the “us versus them” rhetoric.

65 The Crisis in Comparison

Duszczyk breaks up the crisis into two waves and seeks to understand what features of

Poland’s political economy allowed it to persevere and remain in the eye of the storm (Duszczyk

2014:370). Again, it should be noted that Poland pursued actions that would help it progress through the crisis because it wanted to preserve its own economic stability. The article also analyses the economic relationship between Poland and the European Union during and after the crisis. After Lehman Brothers collapsed in the fall of 2008, Duszczyk notes that there were two waves of the economic crisis. The first took place from 2008 to 2009 when the negative effects of the crisis began to emerge. It ended when the financial sector was able to achieve more stability and security. The second wave began in 2011 after the economic aid that was given to

Greece proved to be insufficient to help protect it against bankruptcy. “In contrast to the first phase of the crisis, the second one is characterized by problems with solvency of states’ public finance systems instead of issues with the stability of the private financial sector” (Duszczyk

2014:371). The most substantial effects of the crisis will presumably come from the years 2009 and 2011. Duszczyk investigates Poland’s actions during the immediate aftermath of the crisis

(2009) and Poland’s economy in 2011 after Greece’s economy went bankrupt. Furthermore, it was noted that the crisis affected trust in public officials. Constituencies in other countries that suffered as a result of the crisis were hesitant to trust the government’s economists to come up with plans to pull their countries out of the recession. After all, many economists were unable to predict that such a crisis was going to occur in the first place so there was good reason for the public to distrust their government.

The incumbent Civic Platform government was against a stimulus package as its costs would outweigh its benefits but they did implement certain – arguably minor – austerity

66 measures such as raising the retirement age. “As the central approach in the measures constituting Poland’s response to the economic crisis, the government chose intermingling of economic processes and internationalization of the effects of financial and economic policy decisions made in particular states” (Duszczyk 2014:372). The logic behind this decision was a result of lessons learned in regards to the how the crisis moved across the world. Since globalization was a reason that the crisis was able to move so quickly, targeted economic recovery would similarly be able to affect multiple countries but this time with a positive outcome. The incumbent government believed that rather than formally introduce austerity measures (which would likely reduce public approval of the government), it would be better to focus on assisting EU markets in areas that would bolster the growth rate of the Polish economy.

Their first step was to focus on the economic relationship with Germany since 25% of Polish exports were sent to Germany. The Polish government believed that Angela Merkel’s passing of a German stimulus package would likely benefit Poland as well since the German economy shared a relatively sizable link with Poland. It was believed that this stimulus package would help German businesses and that these businesses would subsequently continue to place orders from Polish enterprises. This decision could also have served to benefit Poland’s influence in the

European Union since good economic relationships typically lead to stronger political connections.

“The second factor that determined resignation from pursuance of a stimulus package was the assumption that such a role could be played by transfer from the EU budget in the frames of investments co-financed from Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund22” (Duszczyk

2014:373). According to the Ministry of Regional Development, most of the investments in

22 The Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund are financial tools set up to implement the regional policy of the European Union. They aim to reduce regional disparities in income, wealth, and opportunities. 67 regards to structural funds were focused on road infrastructure and human capital. The government’s faith in Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund seemed to have paid off, according to the chart below (Table 2). Spending from the Cohesion Fund and Structural Funds were a prominent item in regards to cash flows between Poland and the EU’s budget. Around this time, PM Tusk pledged that Poland would enter the Eurozone and while the government has not changed this decision, Poland still has not acceded to the Eurozone. Poland’s lack of participation in the Eurozone coupled with the German stimulus and EU transfers were a strong impetus for maintaining a growing economy.

2010 Presidential Election

A good measure in gauging public approval of the government’s performance is through a major election. The presidential election was held on June 20th, 2010 and major themes that were covered in the time leading up to the election included debates about the global economic crisis, the Smolensk disaster, and the 2010 Central European Floods. Bronisław Komorowski of the Civic Platform (PO) won with 53% of the vote while Jarosław Kaczynski of Law and Justice

(PiS) earned 47% of the vote. Months before the election, the Smolensk plane crash was a major

68 source of controversy and to this day it continues to play a provocative role in Poland’s political arena. According to the facts, as determined by a governmental commission and recently confirmed by another panel23, the crash was caused by a lack of visibility due to fog. However, the plane was carrying President Lech Kaczynski, senior officers of the PiS administration, the president of the National Bank of Poland and 18 MPs. It is important to note that the plane was also carrying Polish clergy and relatives of victims of the Katyn massacre24. The passengers took off from Warsaw and were due to land in Smolensk North Airport (Russia) in order to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the Katyn massacre. The pilots had trouble landing and lost control leading to the death of all 96 passengers on board.

Following the crash a plethora of conspiracy theories sprung up, the most prominent of which may have been the idea that the crash wasn’t an accident, as claimed by the far-right Law and Justice government. “Now in power, [Law and Justice] is led Jarosław Kaczynski, the late president’s twin brother, who believes that Russia brought the plane down—perhaps with the connivance of PiS’s Polish political enemies” (economist.com:2016). The plane crash was the perfect political tool for PiS in promoting their ideology. A head of state and members of the religious community traveled together – on what may be seen as PiS sympathizers as a sort of pilgrimage – in order to acknowledge the massacre of Polish officers by Stalin.

Moreover, another crisis would test the incumbent party’s abilities. Out of all the central

European countries affected, the 2010 Central European floods caused significantly more damage in Poland in terms of the number of lives lost. The floods were noted by PM Donald

Tusk to have been the worst natural disaster that Poland has faced in the past 160 years and the

23 One of the jet’s flight recorders registered “a series of abrupt events, including a momentary slump in vertical and lateral acceleration and a sudden increase in temperature,” according to a panel of investigators known as the Smolensk subcommision. 24 The Katyn massacre was a series of mass executions of Polish nationals approved by Stalin and carried out by the Soviet secret police. 69 government had to request foreign aid from many members of the European Union in order to deal with the issue.

The Second Wave of the Crisis

Civic Platform won the 2011 parliamentary elections with a plurality of the vote (39%), while Law and Justice came in second with 30% of the vote. In third place was a party named

“Your Freedom”, which was led by ex-Civic Platform MP Janusz Palikot. “Your Freedom” may have been responsible for taking voters away from Civic Platform since PO earned noticeably less votes in the parliamentary election. It could have also been the fact that more parties run in a parliamentary election, which as a result means that the number of votes would be more distributed among all of the competing parties. Regardless of which candidate won the election, they would still need to maneuver through a world that was still recovering from the economic crisis. Duszczyk analyzes how the government’s actions influenced the economy during the second wave of the crisis, which began in 2011. “The relative good standing of the Polish economy in the first period of the crisis, particularly compared to other states of the region, afforded hope that also during the second wave spurred by the events in Greece, Poland would not record economic recession, and the situation in the labor market would not deteriorate, particularly because the largest transfers from the EU budget were expected in the period 2011-

2013” (Duszczyk 2014:376).

By 2013, the Ministry of Labor developed a plan of action in order to maintain economic stability in the coming years. The main points included an increase in pro-developmental spending in the expenditure of various sectors of the government, a change of pension reform, and improvements toward the flexibility of employment conditions. According to Duszczyk,

70 economic decisions taken by the Polish government during the two waves of the crisis continued to focus more on international economic factors rather than restructuring the domestic economy.

As a result, Poland weathered the crisis fairly well in relation to its neighbors. If Inglehart and

Norris are correct that right-wing populism arises from economic insecurity, there should be no reason for right-wing populism to emerge in Poland since it was able to weather the economic crisis quite well. However, more information about factors within Poland is necessary before rejecting Inglehart and Norris’s research. In order to further understand the economic situation, I rely on an article by Bozena Leven who provides details about the inner workings of the Polish domestic economy.

A Unique Financial Sector

Leven examines Poland’s unique financial sector as well as structural and policy factors concerning the Polish economy. She conducts this examination in order to understand how

Poland was able to avoid the worst of the economic crisis. In discussing Poland’s financial sector, she begins by noting how Western banks wanted to profit from the “Developed East” transition to market economies through the expansion into other regions while the financial dealings of Polish banks remained largely domestic. Western banks that were proponents of this model include the Swedish, Austrian, and Italian banks. While these banks encouraged subprime mortgage lending, Poland’s overall mortgage market experienced slow growth during persistent and sustained strong demand for housing. “By 2008, mortgages still constituted only 10 percent of Poland’s GDP, as compared to 18 percent of GDP in the Czech Republic, 20 percent in

Hungary, and 70 percent in the United States and subprime lending was virtually nonexistent”

(Leven 2011:185).

71 Along with a unique financial sector, structural factors in the real economy 25were vital to lessening the impact of the global recession in Poland. “One of these factors is the low negative impact of Polish exports on the overall economy – itself the result of several related circumstances” (Leven 2011:185). The first factor of Poland’s economy that made it resilient to the global recession was the fact that Poland had significantly lower current account deficits than other more established Western economies. The next factor concerns Polish exports. Poland exported a more diverse set of products than neighboring countries. Diversification of exports insured that Poland was less vulnerable than if it had only focused on exporting products of a particular industry, like the auto-parts industry. If Poland focused solely on exporting auto-parts and demand for auto-parts went down, then it would have hurt Poland’s economy a lot more than if the country diversified its products by exporting auto-parts, furniture, cosmetics, and clothing.

If the demand for cosmetics is higher than usual then it may be able to offset the losses from the decrease in auto-part exports thus creating a more balanced “exports portfolio”.

“Thirdly, Poland’s freely floating exchange rate regime allowed initial significant nominal and real depreciation of the złoty, positively affecting net exports” (Leven 2011:185). In

2009, Poland’s nominal and real wage growth were both positive, while other countries experienced negative wage growth. To break down the third factor of Poland’s economic structure, a floating exchange rate is when the market (supply and demand) sets the price of the currency in comparison with other currencies. When Leven refers to nominal and real depreciation, she is referring to two things. Nominal depreciation refers to the ability of one currency to be able to buy more or less units of another currency. Real depreciation refers to the

25 The “real economy” is the part of the economy that is concerned with producing goods and services, as opposed to the part of the economy that is concerned with buying and selling on the financial markets.

72 purchasing power of a currency (in this case, the Polish złoty). Along with the freely floating exchange rate regime, the fact that over 25% of Poles were employed in the agro-industrial sector and farming also helped protect against the effects of the recession. In Hungary, a country that was arguably affected the most by the recession, agricultural jobs made up about 5% or less of the economy. Another quarter of employees in Poland were employed by the public sector.

Together, both agriculture and the public sector comprised 50% of the Polish labor force. This combination allowed Poland to weather the effects of the crisis, if at least initially.

The Polish economy has been growing since the fall of Communism and has narrowly avoided the global recession but there was still a sizable amount of disappointment with the domestic economy, specifically with the labor market. “[The economy] has since shown signs of picking up but the recovery has been too weak to significantly bring down unemployment, especially among youths. The jobless rate stands at 13.1 percent, after hitting a six-year high of

14.4 percent in February” (reuters.com:2013). In order to develop a better view of what is truly happening in the Polish economy, it is better to observe the country throughout its different regions.

It is arguably best to observe economy with precision. It is not enough to look at the general picture; one ought to look at the variation between smaller administrative divisions.

While more industrious administrative divisions could be doing well, more rural administrative divisions could be suffering, or vice versa. Specific areas that suffered the most due to economic slowdown could then claim to be the “silent majority” that populists seek to appease. While the national average economic indicators of the Polish economy are positive, certain areas could be facing economic downturn. This situation might cause politicians to overlook a sizable portion of their constituency. The article also notes that Tusk’s government approval rating were brought

73 down to their lowest levels since he came to power six years prior in 2006. That is why 2006 was chosen, because it marked the year prior to the election of Donald Tusk (PO) and it was a year before the effects of the recession manifested in the region. 2014 was chosen because it marked the year prior to the election of Kaczynski’s PiS government – which earned a majority, a rare experience for populism – and it had been a few years after the recession. As noted above,

Poland was argued to have been well equipped to shield itself from the brunt of the economic crisis. However, this may not be the case after a few years. There could be latent economic consequences, as demonstrated by the 2013 demonstrations26.

In 2014, another major event would take place: the canonization of Pope John Paul II.

The ruling populist party and the church in Poland share a friendly relationship with one another.

During the recent attack on the judiciary, the Church remained silent, and it was only until

President Andrzej Duda (PiS) vetoed two out of the three controversial bills that the Church decided to speak up. Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki27 would cite the words of John Paul II in a letter to President Duda after his decision to veto the bills. In an address to the Italian judge’s association, the Pope said that the balance between the judiciary, executive, and legislative branches, “each of which has its designated tasks and responsibilities, so that one never dominates over the other, is a guarantee of the proper functioning of democracy” (opoka.org.pl).

Political affiliations aside, thousands of Poles were very excited for the canonization of Pope

John Paul II. In large cities like Kraków, many people flocked to watch the live ceremony at the

Sanctuary for Divine Mercy. In the year that followed the canonization of Pope John Paul II,

Poles would go out to vote in the country’s next major elections.

26 Around 100,000 workers marched through Warsaw in protest against PM Tusk’s labor reforms. The reforms included a higher retirement age, state control over some private pension funds, and a longer workweek. The unemployment rate at the time was 13% and many called for the PM’s resignation. 27 President of the Polish Bishop’s Conference 74 2015 Parliamentary Elections

Law and Justice party won the 2015 parliamentary elections with 38% of the vote and

Civic Platform came in second with 24% of the vote. Just a few months prior, Andrzej Duda of

Law and Justice was elected president with 52% of the vote. Poland had been economically successful (in terms of GDP growth rate) in comparison with the rest of European Union, Russia, and even the United States. Furthermore, public approval toward the government’s handling of the crisis seemed positive because five years after the crisis took place, Civic Platform won again and with a sizable lead (10%) over Law and Justice. What changed? A clear political division slowly emerged on the electoral map that did not exist before 2007. Support for Law and Justice on the electoral map would slowly begin to bleed into parts of Western Poland. A look at figure28 depicts the division in terms of voting behavior between the more industrial, metropolitan areas such as Warsaw and west Poland in contrast with rural/agrarian areas in the east. This split goes back to the partition of Poland where it gained land from pre-WWI Germany and lost land to

Imperialist Russia. The industrialized land that Poland gained continued to develop while the land that was owned by Russia remained agrarian. Culturally, this split may have become more accentuated due to the influence of the media.

The role of certain forms of media in Poland continue to play a powerful force in the rise of populism due to their ability to spread populist rhetoric throughout the country. Specifically,

Radio Maryja has been described as a source of “religious populism.” Kutyło portrays it as a social movement that helps populists rise in popularity. In his article, Religious Populism in

Poland – The Case of Radio Maryja (Social Determinants of the Phenomenon), he notes that the radio station is characterized by two things that lie close to the values of right-wing populism in

28 Figure 1 is attached. 75 Poland: anti-elitism and the popular character of religiosity. According to the article, the key demographic of Radio Maryja are the more “lonely”, conservative elderly people who are typically against modernity and capitalism. The station draws much of its strength from Polish

Catholicism. “The local religiosity, which often has a superficial and folk character, also preserves the historical memory of the nation, its identity” (Kutyło 2010:212). The name

“Maryja” alludes to the Virgin Mary and the station’s motto is “The Catholic Voice in Your

Home”. In an interview with a counterpart of Radio Maryja (TV Trwam), current PiS PM

Mateusz Morawiecki called for a “rechristianisation” of Europe. “In many places carols are not being sung, churches are empty and are being turned into museums,” he said (economist.com).

Was this the case?

On October 7th, 2017, one million Catholic Poles united together near Poland’s borders while clenching rosary beads and praying for the salvation of Poland. The event, known as

“Rosary to the Borders”, began in nearly 320 churches in 22 dioceses then participants spread out to around 4,000 “prayer zones” which made up the entire length of the Polish border. The event was planned by an organization known as Solo Dios Basta (In God Alone) and the event also gained support from the heads of the Polish Church. “For example, Archibishop Marek

Jędraszewski of Kraków told participants that the massive prayer was a message ‘to other

European nations so that they understand that it’s necessary to return to Christian roots so that

Europe may remain Europe,’ adding that it represents the only way to ‘save its culture’” (Kotwas and Kubik 2018:1). The event was also promoted through various forms of media by many well- known members of the incumbent Law and Justice government, including the prime minister.

76 CHAPTER VI: QUANTITATIVE DATA Introduction

I based the data off of the cultural and historical background that is laid out in the previous pages. In a large research study on populism in Europe, Inglehart and Norris posit the cultural backlash thesis and the economic insecurity thesis. “The cultural backlash thesis suggests that support can be explained as a retroactive reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change”. “The economic insecurity thesis emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies”

(Inglehart and Norris 2016:1). Perhaps more importantly, they specifically note that populist votes should be strongest among the less educated (those lacking a college degree), the religious, and the unemployed, patterns confirming previous research. The following regressions consist of what was observed using the obtainable data.

I based the data off of the cultural and historical background that is laid out in the previous pages. In a large research study on populism in Europe, Inglehart and Norris posit the cultural backlash thesis and the economic insecurity thesis. “The cultural backlash thesis suggests that support can be explained as a retroactive reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change”. “The economic insecurity thesis emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies” (Inglehart and Norris 2016:1). Perhaps more importantly, they specifically note that populist votes should be strongest among the less educated (those lacking a college degree), the religious, and the unemployed, patterns confirming previous research. The following regressions consist of what was observed using the obtainable data.

77 Results for Poland

TABLE 1: POLAND 2006 REGRESSIONS OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DATA ON THE HYPOTHESIZED INCREASE IN RIGHT-WING POPULIST SENTIMENT Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model..4 Model..5 Model..6 Constant 72.76 65.35 32.16 25.56 89.63 37.33 Communicantes -1.79* -1.87* -1.56 -1.52 -0.59 Dominicantes 0.53* 0.61** 0.71** 0.76** 0.35 Education 0.000066 Unemployment -1.01 -1.09 -0.49 -1.72* -0.78 GDP per capita -0.26 -0.15 -0.04 -0.23 -0.1 2 Adj. R 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.48 0.28 0.41 N 16 16 16 16 16 16 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The multivariate analyses for Poland in 2006 are presented in Table 1. Sixteen administrative divisions were studied. The first column presents the fully specified model. The other columns show trimmed models. Dominicantes, or church participation, is statistically significant in all models except for the sixth model. The positive relationship between church attendance and vote share for a populist party is consistent with the argument posited by

Inglehart and Norris that culture plays an important role in the rise of right-wing populism.

Surprisingly, there is a strong, negative relationship between communicantes, or those who receive communion, and the vote for a right-wing populist party. Education also displayed a positive relationship, although it was very small in comparison to other variables that measure culture. 2006 is important because it represents a year that occurred both (1) before the economic crisis and (2) it is one year prior to the parliamentary elections, which Civic Platform (the main non-populist party) won. The data from the 2006 Polish election period suggest that support for

78 right-wing populist parties was highest in areas with larger numbers of church goers. Other possible causes, from my hypothesis, don’t seem to have been significant.

TABLE 2: POLAND 2014

REGRESSIONS OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DATA ON THE HYPOTHESIZED INCREASE IN RIGHT-WING POPULIST SENTIMENT

Model.. Model.. Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 6 4 5 Constant 79.57 61.99 28.77 32.46 25.23 11.21 Communicantes -1.29 -1.34 -1.04 -1.06 1.13 Dominicantes 0.44 0.62* 0.71* 0.71** 0.54** Education 0.00012 Unemployment -0.64 -0.85 -0.19 -0.06 0.41 GDP per capita -0.4 -0.15 -0.073 -0.07 -0.012 Adj. R2 0.53 0.48 0.42 0.45 0.0045 0.39 N 16 16 16 16 16 16 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Another set of multivariate analyses are presented in Table 2. These regressions depict

Poland in 2014. The first column presents the fully specified model. Much like in the regression analyses for 2006, there is a strong, negative relationship between communicantes and the vote for a right-wing populist party. There is a positive relationship between dominicantes and voting for a right-wing populist party. While there is a positive relationship between education and voting for a right-wing populist party, it is relatively small and it lacks statistical significance.

Economically speaking, both GDP per capita and unemployment share a negative relationship with the vote for a right-wing populist party. 2014 is important because it represents a year that occurred both (1) after the economic crisis and (2) it is one year prior to the parliamentary elections, which Law and Justice (the leading right-wing populist party) won. The data from the

79 2014 Polish election period suggest that support for right-wing populist parties was highest in areas with larger numbers of church goers. Other possible causes, from my hypothesis, don’t seem to have been significant.

Results for Hungary

TABLE 3: HUNGARY 2005 REGRESSIONS OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DATA ON THE HYPOTHESIZED INCREASE IN RIGHT-WING POPULIST SENTIMENT Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Constant 48.36 48.12 41.12 Education -0.00009 -0.00009 -0.00008 Unemployment -0.42 -0.42 GDP per capita -0.002 0.042 Adj. R2 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 N 19 19 19 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The multivariate analyses are presented in table 3. The first column presents the fully specified model. The second column tests education and unemployment. The third column tests education and GDP per capita. There is a negative relationship between education and voting for a right-wing populist in all three models. In model 2, the unemployment rate shares a negative relationship with voting for a right-wing populist party. In model 3, GDP per capita shares a positive relationship with voting for a right-wing populist party. None of the variables were statistically significant. 2005 is important because it represents a year that occurred both (1) before the economic crisis and (2) it is one year prior to the parliamentary elections, which the

Hungarian Socialist Party (the main non-populist party) won. The data from the 2005 Hungarian election period suggests that support for right-wing populist parties was not significant in any of the areas of focus.

80 TABLE 4: HUNGARY 2009 REGRESSIONS OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DATA ON THE HYPOTHESIZED INCREASE IN RIGHT-WING POPULIST SENTIMENT Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Constant 56.32 60.83 48.3 Education -0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00007 Unemployment -0.4 -0.51 GDP per capita 0.04 0.091 Adj. R2 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 N 19 19 19 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 4 depicts the multivariate analyses for Hungary in 2009. The first column presents the fully specified model. There is a positive relationship between GDP per capita and voting for right-wing populists in the first model. There is a negative relationship between education, unemployment, and voting for right-wing populists in the second model. There is a negative relationship between education, GDP per capita, and voting for right-wing populists in the third model. 2009 is important because it represents a year that occurred both (1) after the economic crisis and (2) it was one year prior to the parliamentary elections, which Fidesz (the leading right-wing populist party) won. The data from the 2009 Hungarian election period suggests that support for right-wing populist parties was not significant in any of the areas of focus.

CONCLUSION

Data Analysis

The previous pages highlight the importance of religion in growing populist sentiment.

Economy matters, too, though. Religiosity and economic deprivation might be the best way to

81 explain the rise of populism in Poland and Hungary. It might also be possible that education matters as well. A possible explanation regarding those who lack any tertiary education that vote for a right-wing populist party could be they are expressing a backward reaction to modernity.

Economically speaking, the 2007 financial crisis could have been a catalyst for voting in favor of right-wing populist ideals for a few reasons. One of those reasons is that a higher unemployment rate and lower GDP per capita could be blamed on the effects of globalization and the detriments that it may have brought upon the domestic economy. With more people unemployed and salaries being cut, economic deprivation serves as a powerful catalyst to mobilize the people to be politically involved.

Hypothesis: Support for the leading right-wing populist party will be higher when unemployment is up, the number of people receiving communion is higher, the amount of graduates of tertiary education is down, and/or when GDP per capita is down or unemployment is higher.

Final Results

Ultimately, the data for Poland partially supports the hypothesis. The data shows that church participation does play a role in the rise of right-wing populism in Poland. Surprisingly, communicantes, as depicted in model 1 and 2 of table 1, shows that religiosity might work against right-wing populist parties. There is a relatively large negative relationship between those receiving communion and voting for a right-wing populist party in table 1. A conclusion for

Hungary is still unclear, especially because of the distribution of religion in Hungary and the data available for religiosity. Of the independent variables studied in Hungary, no regressions produced were statistically significant. One idea that emerged after conducting the regression analyses is that economic decline may not be a driving force in the rise of right-wing populism in

82 Poland and Hungary. However, variables measuring culture, especially religiosity, deserve further research. A straight correlation between religiosity and voting for Law and Justice was also created. Dominicantes correlates with voting for PiS in both 2006 and 2014. Other factors such as education, communicantes, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate did not yield a correlation in both countries for the years that were studied.

Between the 2005 and 2009 election periods in Hungary, an increase in unemployment was more prominent than a decrease in GDP per capita. However, if one is strictly comparing unemployment to the vote for a right-wing populist party, there is little to no correlation. A megye like Vas—where Fidesz won 62.77% of the vote share in 2010—had an unemployment rate of 11.5 percent in 2009. In a megye like Hajdú-Bihar, which contained the most students acquiring tertiary education in 2009, Fidesz won with one of the highest shares of the vote among megyes (58%). What could this mean for right-wing populism in Hungary? It could all go back to the faults of the Socialist administration. They lied and said the economy was doing well when it was not. According to Gyurcsány, the Socialist administration did nothing for constituents during the entire time that they were in office. Perhaps the rise of right-wing populism can be best explained as a backlash against mainstream politicians. Demand-side factors could stimulate the rise of populism in the Hungarian political sphere.

Further Research

There were many flaws in the research design. An area of concern is the need to gather data that truly matches in the two countries. The availability of church statistics for Hungary was unable to be acquired. Furthermore, the religious data that could be acquired for Poland was not collected by the Institute for Catholic Church Statistics according to voivodeships. It was

83 collected according to ecclesiastical divisions from the location of the dioceses. Individual-level data was needed rather than the aggregate-level data used in the research design. Another issue was the sample size. 16 - 19 cases for each country was far too small a number in order to form accurate conclusions. Another problem with the research design is that it was entirely quantitative. Qualitative data that is used to record attitudes, feelings, and behaviors are important in the study of populism. This is because populism is an ideology that is strongly rooted in nativism. Testing variables that measure attitudes toward refugees, for example, is helpful in understanding exactly what drives right-wing populists to power.

Dealing with Populists: Policy Recommendations

Now that one knows more about populists, one ought to know how to interact with them.

Jan-Werner Müller posits three critiques of the liberal democratic approach to populism and demonstrates ways on how to better engage populists in the political arena and civil society. His first critique targets the usage of the people by populists and nonpopulists. His next critique concerns the relationship between populism and pluralism. Finally, he investigates the methods employed by establishment politicians in engaging populists.

He begins with how the phrase the people is used. “What or who decides membership in the people, other than the historical accident of who is born in a particular place or who happens to be the son or daughter of particular parents” (Müller 80)? A commonly criticized core belief of populists is their exclusionary nature. They decide who is a real citizen and exclude everyone who they believe is not. They take it one step further by setting up a conflict between the “pure” group of citizens against the “corrupt elite”. The issue of dealing with citizenship status and boundaries is aptly known as the “boundary problem”. It has no democratic solution because if a

84 liberal democrat argues that the people should decide then it simultaneously also acknowledges that a group known as the people already exists. Populists engage in a reversal of that thought process. Through moralistic language, populists always divide those who belong and those who do not. Liberal democrats can reason that “true citizens” are simply those that possess American citizenship. However, this reasoning does not result in a normative claim about what constitutes a “true citizen”.

Two answers are proposed by Müller in order to reach a clearer solution. “For one thing, criticizing the populists for excluding parts of the people does not require that we definitively establish who is and who is not a member of the polity” (Müller 2016:81). “Second, and more important, the boundary problem is not the kind of problem that any political theory de haut en bas can solve once and for all” (Müller 2016:81). He notes that addressing the boundary problem is a process in which existing and aspiring members should all be encouraged to voice their thoughts. The boundary problem should be a matter of democratic debate and to an extent it should be continuously refined. Populists in particular should be engaged because their sectionalist ideas should be challenged. A democratic debate would help ground their beliefs into something feasible, if possible. However, just because debate and the idea that this is a process is the prescribed approach does not guarantee that there will be progress made toward a solution to the boundary problem. Müller puts forward the idea that there may be more restrictive definitions of a people after a genuine debate than there would be if no debate were held at all on the topic.

Another issue that arises is the relationship between populism and pluralism. A common criticism of populism is that it is antipluralistic and as a corollary, anything antipluralistic is undemocratic. Pluralism is often presented as a fact and a value so from a liberal democratic

85 approach one is left with a situation similar to the boundary problem. Why should a simple fact have any moral weight? There must be further clarification into the problem with antipluralism and how pluralism and diversity share a relationship with one another. “We might want to say that the real problem with populism is that its denial of diversity effectively amounts to denying the status of certain citizens as free and equal. These citizens might not be excluded officially, but the public legitimacy of their individual interests, ideas of what makes for the good life, and even material interests are effectively called into question and even declared not to count”

(Müller 82).

The last liberal democratic critique of populism involves the ways in which democrats and populists interact with one another. “In a number of countries, the reaction of non-populist parties—as well as occasionally the public media—has been to erect a cordon sanitaire around populists: no cooperation with them, certainly no political coalitions with them, no debates on

TV, and no concessions on any of their policy” (Müller 2016:82). Erecting a cordon sanitaire around the populist only worsens the situation. A cordon sanitaire is barrier that is raised in order to stop the spread of infectious diseases. This isn’t the first time that a barrier was put up in order to stop the spread of an ideology in the political arena. Another similar policy was the policy of containment, which was a prominent geopolitical strategy by the United States during the Cold

War in order to stop the spread of Communism. It may have worked then but this kind of mindset does not work with populism. Such exclusionary policy further reinforces the populist narrative of us versus them and pure versus evil and could also be interpreted as a sign that the political elite ignores the desires of their constituents.

A common recommendation in dealing with populists has been to engage them and support claims made in civil debate with factual evidence. “…As long as populists stay within

86 the law—and don’t incite violence, for instance—other political actors (and [especially] members of the media) are under some obligation to engage them” (Müller 2016:84). However, factual evidence is not a deus ex machina in dealing with populists. There is a good chance that constituents will not change their mind before voting simply because a few facts were brought up to support or reject certain policy proposals. An area where factual evidence could be effective in determining the fate of populist (or non-populist) politicians is the economy. If the Polish economy went into sharp decline, for instance, it is highly probable that Law and Justice would lose their position in parliament. A party can go as far as to change the Constitution or attack the judicial system but they will find it difficult to continue with those actions when there is prolonged economic decline. It is highly probable that people will stop supporting the dogma of an ideology when they lose their job and can’t afford to feed their families.

In a similar discussion about approaches toward populism, Mudde and Kaltwasser cover the relationship between populism and liberal democracy, noting that the former presents a challenge that deserves a more complex response. In particular, they focus on both demand-side and supply-side responses to populism. On the demand-side, they state that major corruption scandals—and specifically systemic corruption—are to blame because they create fertile breeding grounds for populists to emerge. An example of this was noted in Hungary when demonstrators voiced their anger about the deceit of the socialist administration. According to the authors, the worst thing that any party could have done during that time was to prevent a transparent investigation or deny any wrongdoings. “An important part of the legitimacy of liberal democracy comes precisely from the existence of autonomous institutions, which are able to hold state officials and elected politicians accountable to the citizens” (Mudde and Kaltwasser

2017:110). This serves two purposes. The first purpose is that the system (political and civil

87 society) keeps elites accountable for what they do and in return levels of corruption are reduced.

The second purpose that this serves is that it demonstrates to the people that the political system is not a single, homogenous entity that cares only for its personal interests—it is a two-way relationship.

Dealing with systemic corruption in the political system is easier said than done. Case by case instances of political corruption would be easier to resolve. The authors note that strengthening state capacity and rule of law are important in dealing with systemic corruption.

“The stronger the capacity of the state to alter the existing distribution of resources, activities, and interpersonal connections, the higher the odds that the demand for populism stays dormant”

(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:111). As a counter argument, one could say that many Western

European countries don’t suffer from problems of low state capacity yet they still face the emergence of populism in their elections. The authors offer a further explanation. They note that elite unresponsiveness and an agency problem also facilitates the emergence of populism.

Politicians are quick to accept praise for any positive events during their administration such as job growth yet when there is mass unemployment, many are quick to point at globalization or another external factor that is outside of their power. This way of governance is dangerous because it creates space for a populist to step in and say that they are able to control those factors if established politicians cannot. A final demand-side recommendation offered is that of civic education aimed at promoting the values of liberal democracy while simultaneously rebuking extremism.

In introducing supply-side responses, Mudde and Kaltwasser focus on four establishment actors: mainstream political actors, institutions specialized in the protection of fundamental rights, the media, and supranational institutions. They reiterate that the cordon sanitaire

88 approach used by mainstream political actors is not the best course of action. Next, institutions also play an important role in the rise of populism. “After all, in liberal democracies, institutions such as the German Federal Constitutional Court and the U.S. Supreme Court are specifically designed to safeguard the liberal democratic system and to protect minority rights against majority rule” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:114). The judiciary served as a way to halt the illiberal constitutional reforms put forward by Kaczyński in Poland and Orbán in Hungary, but it has recently become more difficult to rely on the judiciary to fulfill this task. Although the judiciary has failed to do their duty in recent times, it is not their fault. When Orbán rose to power in 2010, he actively worked to fill the legal apparatus with Fidesz loyalists thus enabling him to shape the branches of government more easily. A question left unanswered by Mudde and

Kaltwasser is how one could strengthen the role of the judiciary and other institutions. Should justices be allowed to run for election? It should not be left up to the people to elect the judiciary because justices ought to represent the law, not the people. It is up to the legislative branch to craft the law with the people in mind. Even if the people could elect justices, they would most likely end up electing populist justices so this course of action would not be feasible.

The media also play a vital role in the rise of populism. FPÖ (briefly explain in footnotes) leader Jörge Haider gained a lot of favorable press in Austria from the main tabloid, Die Krone, in the 1990s. However, in Germany the media has demonstrated the opposite sentiment toward populists. Even tabloids like Bild harshly criticize left-wing populist parties like Die Linke (The

Left) as well as right-wing populist parties like Die Republikaner (The Republicans). “This odd love-hate relationship between populist media and politicians, sharing a discourse but not a struggle, is quite common around the world and is a consequence of the fact that even tabloid media are almost always owned and operated by mainstream forces” (Mudde and Kaltwasser

89 2017:115). A lingering question would be how one could be able to curtail sympathy for extremism in the media without imposing on the rights of citizens and a free press. Another establishment actor that ought to be taken into consideration when dealing with populists is the supranational institutions.

One of the core duties of supranational institutions like the European Union is to protect liberal democracy. “In effect, institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the EU have on occasion reacted vehemently to the coming to power of populist forces—e.g., the

2000 Austrian coalition government that included the FPÖ—or by some actions undertaken by populist actors—e.g., Fujimori’s decision to close the Peruvian government in 1992” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017:115). However, since they are supranational institutions, they have limited power when it comes to the processes of national governing. Furthermore, populists can draw support from a pool of international populists and nonpopulists. With this being the case, it is most important to keep a strong focus on Europe because of the stockpile of populists in seemingly every European country.

In the end, what is the goal of the populist? Do they truly believe what they preach, or do they use populism as a ruse to execute any hidden motives? If they wish to build a totalitarian state, a brief investigation of the past will show that overly oppressive governments never last.

Absolute power without the stability required to wield it is worthless. It only leads to human suffering and lost time that could have been spent improving policy and legislation. There are no specific universal criteria for the perfect way to govern because by definition a (liberal) democratic, pluralistic society will always vary from country to country. Moreover, every individual will want something different from those in power so these interests will not always

90 align. The best way to stay in power is to continuously improve society little by little, take opposing ideas into consideration, and contribute to upholding a more balanced political system.

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96 97 FIGURE 1. . The upper-left electoral map represents the Polish parliamentary election results in 2005. . The lower-left electoral map represents the Polish parliamentary election results in 2007. . The lower-right electoral map represents the Polish parliamentary election results in 2015.

Note: A “powiat” is an administrative division that is one level smaller than a voivodeship, which is the main administrative division used in this study.

Source: geocurrents.info