d ^
H. .0,' i L^i^
Translation froa the f'trrk by "optain Lareh^r^ Frtticl1 Translation from the French by Captain 7*.y.« Banite^t vR -OLlEGJi, WOV'-offilS 1925. .' D^ L:, OJt^Di-: Gi),;;ilH£H, Vol. - 5*1 ;./V/ J
V Z
UVTRQJU^TIQN. 1. The Gallipoli i«ninsula« 1 2, The Coast of Anatolia* 5 S« the Defensive Grgani«atiomof the straight and their Reinforcement. 5 4, The Allied Pleat /attempt© to Form the Straight. 8
1* The Destruction of the Fortifications at the Entrance of the atraight* (Peb« 19 and 26, 1915). 9 2. Bombardment of the Inner Mefenecs ana the Clsaring of the ISin*! Fields. (?efc, 26«.^r^ 17)* 11 3. The naval Action of &irch XSth* 12 4. Results. 14 5* Oosments on the Subject Matter of i-art I- 14 i-ART 11. 1. The Attack on th© Dardanelles by Land, (Defensive i-reparations ^arch 19-April 25« 17 2. Landing tlans and i-reparations by the allies* 19 3. The landing (April 25# 19.15)• 21 4« The /*ri Bournou C-oabats. 23 5. First Battle of Krifchia* /Lpril 28. . 25 6« rUf;;ht attacks on the 3eddul l&hr Pront. (M^ht i*ay 1-2 and "Say 3—4,? • 26 7* Second Battle of Krithia, u.y 6f ? and @« 28 8. The Ari Bournou Combats fey 10, 29 9. Third Battle of Xrithla, Jt»n« 4-6. 31 lOrCombat of Hill 839 Jtine 21-22 33 11,Combat of Zighin were, June 28-July 5* 34 12. Combat of K#revez L»ere, -.jxily 12-13. 30 13.0oiata«nte on the subject ^iurt of Part 11. SS (A.llieo Operationu}* 14. strategic situation of the defenders. 42
1* The straight of Dardanelles and the Oallipnli . eninsula. 2 2. The iedaul Bohr Region. 3 3# fhe Ari-Bournou-.'i-nafarta Ke^ion* 4 4. The Dardanelles defenses at th« period of Mobilixation. 6 5« The Dar
fi W THE DARDaHBLLBS CAMPAIGN.
The Straight of the Dardanelles, called Hellespont in ancient times, tenda to the South »eat from Tchardack-Gallipoli to Koum Kale-Seddul Bahr, and i» about $3 kilometers (34 nautical miles) long. Its width varies from 7800 to
1400 meter»•
The Gallipoli peninsula extends from the isthmus of Boulair to Cape Flailes, ia about 90 kilometers long, and has a width of five and one-half kilometers at the isthmus of Boulair, which is its narrowest place. From the isthmus on, it gradually widens, attaining a width of 20 kilometers between AkBach and
Euijuck Guecdkli, then it becoraes narrow again, and ends at Cape Helles. The isthmus of Boulair, between K'avack «3ouyou and the Sea of &armora, is formed by a chain of mountains which extond from the northeast, gradually sloping down to the isthmus, and th@n rising again to the South ,v*st terminate at Kdj©
Limaury. Another line of elevations extends to the Waot of Anaforta, ending at
Cape Helles. There are aever?il small beaches along the steep and precipitous coast at the foot of the Northenn range, between the bay of Kainardja and the bav of 5?dje I,i8aury» ^ ie Coastal rcsgicm l^stween the bay of Kttlnardja and Cape
Iridje is not so mountainous* The country at the sourc© of th© Kavak Souyon is
Eiarehy, Th© territory near Cape Guemilik is not v&ry hilly, but many difficult and narrow valleys a»r:y b® found on the West aide of the Southern range. The
"Touzlu Guel" and the southern part of the peninsula is, ^n the ether hand, flat and sandy* Further to the South, tonr&rds the bay of fepe between (iaba T H R ACE 0 Bairamitch Kwjja Tchesmi^
Memlahalar^-^ ^-~ fTHdje {jo** ^v a S]ava tenk i Kei^ /ios 1 8aie (fe f s\ 1 JM^J 0BoulaIr ^ ISTHME OC j^^ OespotUmaai^ o G^'ri / MARMARA Koyoun limawv-^^/ >.-rf EdjeUmanW^ / ^I^U > § ^Tcha^Jak 4^ 1 —7 A v ^*La0aekie
Kutchuk Gueraikli \^«£i&rta^ ° ^r> f '.•••'
I ft WoTalva / o' men Arif O £
Koum Kale/^ OrMianie £ ^
Yeni Keuy/ ouY. Chehir/
P^Bechika/ ^/^ /
Grande Bs/e y • (fe 8ec/>ifo f Q (0 1 20 \0 <>0 so Km. !.,..!
THE STRAIGHT OF DARDjJli: _THL_uALLiPOLl
/rant Wtghts eo /fit tout 191S. (a/ovte i iiirg
-4 Tepe and Kouia Dereai, the terrain becomes very abrupt. There are not great rivers in the interior of the peninsula, although there are ravinsswhich are their dry in i\* majority.
TjilC COAST OF ANATOLIA.
The region from Koum Kale towards the South is, in general, flat or a little hilly. The ttenderes rune from South to North, to the Saat of this region, and flows into the Straight to the East of Koum Kale. To the West of this river, on the coaet of Y#ni Chehir towards th© South, there are roar shoe, unpaasable without bridges and which are never dry, not oven in autumn. The bushy range
Of Nal Buyan stands further to the South. The right shore is very bushy and lacking in roads.
S 0KQANIMT10HS OF THK STRAIGHT, ANiJ THj$R JIB
At the beginning of the mobilization (a), the existing fortifications for the defense of the Straight were very deficient.
In general, tho intrenchraents 7/ere of earth and masonry, most of the guns were of obsolete models, of slow rate of fire and short ranges, and the ammuni tion supply was limited.
The batteries at the entrance ot the straight w@re ©quipped with twenty guns, varying in calibre (15-28), Only four of those pieces w©rs in condition waa te fire. Their r-aximum rangeM4,800 Dieters, that of the others was 7.500 meters.
The batteries of the inner defenses w&r& ©quipped with 78 guno of various calibres (15-35.5). Of this number, only 5 guns calibre* 35 and 3 of 34, were in condition to fir© at lonr ranges. Their maximum ranges were 16,900 und
14,800 meters respectively. The naxiioura rang© of the gun© under 22 centimeters
Was 7,500 meters. From the entrance of the Straight to the heights of Dardanos,
(x) NOTE - Prior to August 1914. War was declared on Nov. 2, 1914.
.5. Batteries et torpilleurs KedatA&s et ezews t* serrfct *t> debut dt h mobilisitJoa Redoytes et catwnsufs ta 'service^ cotrv b mebijGitfOB et Is dec/sraOon Den bitrages de mifitt Legendc (tea s»grvea fetlertf a lir ap/Jt y de 8iUarie itir rtpide T SoUen'e de csnons K/vpp onfioabxs \ UrO'JMne } \mqfrj>ue. ytessct/s d I is *** O£ KARAMIYK thLLer/cs BiUcnes mob/fes f Batteries cwtrtsrio fo PrcjccUuri 'jm le caltbre est wdigoe #D dcssous el fc/rombrc de pieces J cvte i. tetfifae up cspon CJfibres THE DARDANELLES ^oS S AT TilS PERIOD OF MOBILIZATION. -6 there were only 7 guns of balibres anywhere from IS to 7.5 centimeters. Six months had elapsed from the arrival of the English Fleet (August 9, 1914) to the beginning of the attempt to force the Straight, (Feb. 20, 1915). During this tin*©, the straight hud been fortified in the following manner: It was recognized that the enemy fleet couldi take poeition out of range and silence the batteries at the entrance of the Straight, oven though the latter had been reinforced. Consequently, it was decided, to strengthen the fortifications in the interior zone of the Straight, in order to stop the enemy fleet at the narrowest part of the Dardanelles, The supplementary defense was, therefore, carried out in accordance vrith this plan, %nd was as follows: 1. If the enemy fleet entered the Straight after hairing destroyed the batteries at the entrance, the interior defenses equipped with short range guns, would certainly be destroyed at long ranges, without even having had a chance to open fire. For this reason, 8 alow-rate.of-fire howitzers (10,8 calibres) were emplaeed on both ahores of Karalynk Bay, 2. Lines of Submarine mines.- Utilising all available materiel, nine liftoe ef submarine mines srere gradually planted in the narrowest part ofthe straight and a torpedo tube was placed on the coast of Namazguiah, 3. Rapid Fire Batteries,- Groups of Rapid fir© batteries equipped with rapid fire guns taken from naval gunboats, and other guns typ^s fv'.untelli ami Krupp fouad in the Dardanelles, were ©mplaced 00 as to protect the mine fields against eneisy mine sweepers . Wo at of tn©so guns mr& «upl>ieed in the vicinity Of Kephez, Soughlanly ma Houzlar, 4. Searchlights: Bright search] i^hts wore added to the two searchlights already in service, for the purpose of Illuminating the nins fields. -7 5, Bttmay Batteries: Batteries equipped with guns, type Krupp, were enpl&ced in different places, to eorobat enemy airplanes and also to fill the role of dujnmy batteries. Siamltaneously, while these defensive steps were being taken against a naval attack at the Straight and foreseeing an eaaay landing, six infantry battalions were detached from the 7th and 9th divisions, to guard and defend the eeast from the Gulf of S&ros to Cape Sakl I&tasboul, in front of Tenedos Island. UJF ln& r^m3j*x^i% ^w...Jytiyi4V AO'^jSJr* *•** FUnits* ilia QlftAAwfi vi On the morning of the third of Novosib*r, 1914, the Kn&Lish and French fleets began the attack on the Straight, with a heavy bombardment on the fort8 at the entrance, but did not show aay nere activity until the month of February* It is known that the idea of forcing theDardanelles was suggested by Russia to Great Britain on the Zd of November, 1914. On this date, the Russians having recognised that their situation in the Caucasus had beeeae critical, requested from the English that their burden be lightened by means ef a naval demonstration against tha coasts of Turkey, which would divert the Turkish activities to another son©. The British Oovernment consented to e«rry out this diversion, and the Straight of ttardanelleu, as the most vital point, was seleeted fer this operation* JfingUnd estimated that a total ©* 100,000 wen would be required to occupy th© Straight. However, it was de~ cided to carry out a puraly aaval attack in view of the fact that such force was net available, n&r eould i t be organised before several months had elapsed The Ministry of the Navy thought that the fleet id one could attain sucoess. -B The accessary praparatians wear® undertaken conforming ta this and it waft agreed to Attack the Straight at the beginning of th© »«atb of Febrtt&ry. Kn©l&nd dasignatad 14 araored cruisers, and Fran©*, four fer this attack; beih together asteabl-ed a number of torpedo boats, ^ia* airplanes, hospital ships, subisarinss, ate. Oaa Fr#»ah division and on® English diviaien (about 30,000 mm) d0tail©d, as soon as it was dscidad to attack tlis Straight by s«a9 t« aid fl©«t, by occupying t&@ forts after their daatruetieia, OB th© ©th«r feaad, i a fore® of about 100,000 cum, cemposed of thro© Knglieh divisions and a Russian aray <^©rps to b© organised with the intention of occupying tb© Boe phorus and Constantinople after ths pasag© of th© Dardanelles, The Russian Army Cerpe, \shich was t« asssnbl© at Odessa, yas not to be mobilised until after the Allied fleet had forced the Bcurdatmlles and arrived at OF TH® FORTIFICATIOI© ^r THIS SOTRAMCE G? THE OB the isoming of February 1®8 1015 (x), twelv® warihip© arrived In frost of the Straight and opened fir^ against th© four forte at the sntn&rac©. Due to the range, only ArkhnM© mid ErUgMiai could respond* Tfei» ©n«ssy beabardHieHt laete* uatU 5s30 P.M., or fully tight hours. The enemy aid not mak® any new att«wpt usatil the asth of February, flfeeB a squadron of tea warships appeared before the Straight and again boisbarded the earn* forts for seven and one-half hours. (x) Wei©: The f!e«* had bombarded the fart© on February 2, 7 and 15, 1915. •tL Batteries et torpilla /tetfoktf H anans e»Stir/ct n dedt/tde It aotfuat/m . « Redwtes el aae/xmse* service '£ DC KIUA entss ft mo&if/Tabai et k4icforatit» CAP MAS Aft , 4e gdtrrt . — • *»i <«• Redouts Nagart fiedoutue£ cutout nut en sstnce ttfrrM dtckrttkP Projectours el mint* in senite anat it mohHstiwo -3*0 Mrs enplace eairt b mthtsiUta *t A atchiuUoo dejottrt Mis apkct eotrt b dacbntim de guerre et k Q Pettier fryceteora et IW rages 4e a>/ites (t0Tchanak Kale mis enplaee spros le aforks .—«*• T Legende des slqnes e 3 tir rsp/t/e 4e csopigne SilCer/e j tjr rgp/de T 1e moniagne Ertfiogfirou OtUorie de canons Krupp ordtnsires SeddulBaiir Baltarie de a*~t Canons Itmgt t \trUHe*e Obusicrs \ ynqycnfie to MorLiers \jessoutde CSnon* Qbusier* Morben Nerdenreldt de !*rs Tl Canons Canons de x '/•/ £ j de Sattenes fixes \ fotieries mobiks \ SdUries cvoOx jr/o/>s el /susses, batteries Q> fiy/ectevrs ';sm U cafibre est indigue wttessovs et le n ombre to pieces- j cotA *cxu.i ipdigue un canon de n •» /onft/etrr to calibres THE DARJAIJ/JLLES SS GN FLiLHU^RY 19. 1915. -10 All et the guns of the four fort* w#re put out of service sad the saw •wnitien depots destreyad by these two be»b&rdrae»ts. The casualties inflicted wtre fourteen dead «JI4 eijjhtften treunded. A* a result of this destruction, the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Arafc reinforced the two divisions which coropoeed the land defeases of the Dardanelles, bringing the effectives ef the defensive forces to a total of four divisions, BowBAna^sff or tm immxm mrtmm km run QISU&XHQ OF urn mm fim*m- February 26 - March 17. After the destruction of the forts at the entrance, the enemy devoted all hie efforts to gain possession «f the entrance, by destroying the batteries ef the inner defenses, neutralising the central batteries and nicking up all minos. During the first week, Seddul Bahr and KOUB Kale wore bombarded with great regularity. The enemy repeatedly tried to land demolition parties, but failed due to the vigorous resistance offered by our troops* He succeeded, however, in landing near Sefloul Bahr, on March 5, after an intensive bombardment, but was csapelled to resmbark iranedlately after* A leading was finally made at Koum Kale on the afternoon of the above date, but the landed troops were compelled to r©embark on the following night. la the mean tiae, eneny warships used to enter the straight daily. A squadron bombarded Dardanoa and our ttowitier ba-teriee on both shores of Karalynk, while the enemy mine sweepers were engaging in picking up all wines at the latter peint. Oar *nwy Aid net succeed in destroying our hewitier battories, in spite of repeated efforts, because he was ignorant of their location. Our batteries fired every day, under defilade, from now positions. •11. the bay «f Karalynk was being cleared of elnee during the day, enewy mine eweepera advanced at nltfit under the cover of darknese, and pretested by torpedo boate also triad to de»troy our searchlights, H® failed due ie the deadly fir* of our rapid firs batteries. la the mean while, the emany had cloared the Straight to the line «Jc Tar Tepeler~&eughlanly Der®, picking up tho first line of mines, but could net even touch the others, Beginning with the 6th of March, the enemy..Afloat fro© the vicinity of flaba Tape, and with the aid of observation planea, tried to destroy our can. I tr&l batteries, bombarding to tho r&or with Indirect firvtbut could not sue- • ceed due te our countorbattery work. The largo cruisers entering tha Straight for th® first tlao ea lar«sh 8 and 9, bombarded the central b&tteriofl from this position, but did net attain any results, due to the vigorous resistance offered by us. ACTION OF KARCH 18. The enensy1! activities continued day and ni^t from February 26 to March 17* Believing that he had obtained sufficient reftulte to engage the inner defentee, he decided to enter the whole fleet in the straight and etrike the final blew te force the passage. Te begin carrying eut thie decision, »ix cruisers sind five Inglieh ter pedo beate in combat formation, followed at a diet anee by feur French cru leere entered the Straight on March 18 at eleven ©•eleck AJl. The firet •rml»*r« arriTed at the hal#t» of KhalU 111 and opened fire agalnet the centre batteries. Shortly after, the French came up en the flanke of thie -12 line tmd also opened fire. Our batteries could net respond at first, due it the range, but they opened fire as soon as the enemy had advanced. Another iSngliah squadron composed of six warships advanced at this moment, on the Yeni Keuy-Yeni Chehir front. The French cruisers that had taken positions on the flanks, advanced shortly after XJ? o'clock in a combat formation, and open* ed up an intensive fire, which we, in turn, returned with similar intensity. The six KngpLieh cruisers that had hwn waiting in front of Yeni Chehir, ad vanced towards the Straight at 1:15 P.M. By 2 o'clock P.M., the situation had become critical. Th@ defenses of Tchanack Kale and Kilid Bahr w#r& under fire, all telephone lines had been Cttt, cOEraaunieation with the forte had bean completely interrupted, some of the guns had been knocked out, others mr® half burled, others again w®r® out of action with their breech mechanisms j&&n*d. In consequence, the artillery fire of the defense had slackened considerably. At this moment, an ©noisy torpedo boat was sunk in frost of £renkeuey, struck by a hewitser shell. Similarly, the Bouvet ^r@nt to the bottom after having struck a mine. At this, the FrmQh cruisers fell bac3s, and th© six English cruisers of the second lia®, took their plaeee in combat formation. The Irrestible, that had advanced from th© ontraxice of the Straight to the interior ©tusk at 4:30 P.I., the OCSAN9 following it, roei the 9ar© fate. Th© XHFLEXXBliK after being hit several timos, w®& compellod to fall back at this &m* moment. The AOMiafNOW wa»«fcrwck several time® fey projeetllaa. It was •vldftirfc that the entire fls#t had »«ff©r©d a ravor*©. It l©ft the Straight leaving b«hi»d the IfUUCBTlBt'^ AND TM OCtAM whi*h could not mev®. These two -13 ihips foundered th© following sight. This attack by 16 battleship©, and many cruiser© and torpedo beate, lasted •even hours. The fortification* sustained th© folloisrtng casualties: 4 officer* and 40 soldiers killed and 70 wounded; eigfrt guns wer® dasaaged and sora© asu Munition depoti and barracks wore destroyed. Tchamak Kale and KHid Bahr wera partly destroyed by fire. The anejay'o los&es wore more serious. Tare© battloahips a»d two torpedo boats had beon sunk, and three other b&ttloashipe had suffered serious damage*. After this costly operation, tk& enemy fleet gave up l&® idea of a purely nscral action and n&v&r again onterect th« straight. N THE SUBJSCT M^TTSE OF TK8 F1H6T PART. ATTACKu After the Central Govornnent had confirmed its adiiorenc© to the Coiw tral Powers, and closed the &traightt which wa© the surest and @hortast w«y of c©ijr.unication between Russia and the Allies, the reopening of this passage by force beeone a natter of groat political and military importance. This important question had been earofully studied by a military eesaais* eien of experts before the attack of the Dardanelles• The conclusion reached was, that a decisive result could only be obtained by a simultaneous attack on land and water, and the declaration of the Allies had now clearly vindicated this opinion. On the other hand, ther® was no justification ufhatenmr in try» ing to fereo the Straight by naval reeaisfi alone, or in estimating that a lose ef from 3 to 5 ships would b® sufficient to force the Dardanelles, - a nature! canal TO kilwaetere long by 6 to 7 kilemator* wide, and moreover placed in a stato of defense-, e«4 that this oyoration could b«5 carried out by surprise after -14 tho declaration ef war. It would have been perfectly possible to assemble and transport the necessary troops during the 107 days that eXapsed between the declaration ef war and the firtt navel attempt, and had this been done, the eueay would in all prebatoility, have succeeded in forcing the &trai$vfc with lose leeeefi. Aft a natter of fact, i t may be stated that prior to the 25th of February, only two divisions available for the land defenses of both sides of the Straight, and one of these divisions was used for observation purposes al«mg the coast and it s units mr® scattered all ov@r the peninsula. Xt would have been, therefore, up to the above mentioned date, comparatively easy to have landed on any part ef the peninsula, and the -''capture of the Straight would have been an easy task* A more important mission pertained to the fleet: This was the destruc tion of the inner defenses, which it could undoubtedly have readily accomplished* The enemy fleet entered the Straight at Karalyak Linan on the morning of the 18th of March. Xt should have figured out, that w® had recently reor^ attised our ffiine fields, utilising all means available, and at any rate, it should have cleared the Straight ahead ef it , before entering. In fact, the main factors which cheeked the Allied Fleet on Karen 18 were the mines planted ahead of tine at Karalynk Liman and the Indoaltable energy of our bravo navy officers. ttttFtmvt 1. flit Turkish Hi$* COOT and very wisely decided that for the defense of the Straight, all the available means iand time should bo devoted to the fortification of the interior son®, rather than to ih© entrance, Th« batteries atth« entrance, evan after th«y had been reinforced, were equipped with limited -15 ana partly obsolete arMswsent, which could not resist, for any length of the enemy fleet feigfc power long range artillery, and consequently would have probably been silenced fro* tha very t&glnning. The entrance of the straight could hare boon defended, by using an armament equivalent to th® powerful long rang* gun© of the fleet, and this w* did mt pesftass. 2. In spite of the unce&sisg activity of the fleet, «md the swioue dana^eo it had inflicted, our artiUoryssoa spared ao ®fforte, frequently changing the battery sraplacesaent© to &oa©v the ©n@my aa ififlletlng at the a^asi© time serious los&©@ oa the mmy, thua giving proof of their energy aad reeolutio^ to win. fe may truly »ay that the illustrious defenders of FleTga, Antirinopolift, J&nina aad Scutari, fig^itiag desperately said mmxf tissss with inferior forces and against great odds, stopped and defeated their e»emy for several months, and also showed in tren annals of military history, to be set m an incomparable and glorious exanplo fer fature geseratlone* But now, 40 years later, their heroic deeeea4antet fighting at the Dardanelles against even more powerful forces,posseaaiAg only primitive means much inferior to these of their ®nwai®&f in spite of all thisf heroically repsllad these stoel fortresses, provided with gigantic gans, which like velcaneea, pour forth fire and steel, and erected themselves on the l#th of March an eternal BkeatsBent, adding t© &ur natioaiaX history the moat glorious pages ©f bravery. In tueh ca8©8, our Nation aacl History cannot refuse to eel ebnsfce this wonderful victory, sad expreas its admiration to all soldiers and officers «feo participated ia it, and to their Cersandei* i» Chief, and to his Chief of Staff, Mi AMI, BBY. •16. SJSCQMD PART. ATTACK OF TIM J3i&RiWU«S&y5$ BY hMB. Defensive Preparations i !iar«h 19-April 25 The Turkish General Staff, learned after the battle of itareh 18, that the Allies had decided to force the Dardanelles by land, and with this end im view had begun to concentrate in the islands at the entrance of the Straight (Inbred and Leemos), a force of 40,000 French and 50,000 KagXish solders. Our 5th Anay, reinforced by the 3rd infantry division and a cavalry division, was added to the mobile forces of the Dardanelles (3rd Army Corps, General SMad Pasha, conaaancling), thus making a total of six infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade (84,000 m&n), Licaan Pacha arrived at Galllpeli ea the 26th of March, and assunaod COKJ. a ana ef the 5th Army. He found the land defense of the Straight organised as follows: 5TH DIVISION: Zone of Saree, region of Yeni Keueys Bair Attiteh, Cadi Keuey, Kourou Tchechae. 7TK DIV15X01 ••<: 2e«e of Beiil&ir, Galllpeli, Yen Keuey. The gendarmerie battalions of T&ifeur, Teurchou» Keuey, Q«dli|>«li and Brousse vas acattored to the Southwest of this division, facing the beach. §TH DITI3I0H: Part of thi® Unit #a» in the A»af«rta and Saddul Behr regions, and the remainder between Koust Kale, Haiudie and Yeni Chehir. DIVISION: la r9*Qrv®9 in the neighborhood of Maido and Sorafin* I26TH WtiGM&fti To the South of Tchamak Kale. The gendarmerie battalions ef Constantinople and Qgfcleu Bay were located between thla R©giaj©nt md th® units ef 9th divisioa OR the Aoatolian coast. 13LTH PXVX&IOK: B«hiag th« tw© Bechikas, -17 The gendanaerie of Tchanak Kale vam in Tarakly, The Third Amy Corps had taken position toning the sea, is ordar to pre vent an enemy landing. Its naost import ant units had been selected and assigned to those place* which could bo easily watched, and where an enaeiy landing was considered improbable. All these forces were rxaintaiaed in reserve in rear. OB the 1st of April, Liraan Pacha inspected the 9th division sactor, ordered that ike ceaat be guarded by tho weakest unit a, and that the rest of the troops !>e sent te the rear for training. This same step waa to be taken, simultan eously, by all the other divisions assigned to other sectors. Under these conditions, it was impossible te prevent a landing by an mmy who disposed of such powerful naval means. It became nece&Sjary, therefore, to countarattack after the landing, reinforcing th© oatposts OH shore with the r©#©rv«f kept in rear. The CoBKsanding Ganoral of the 5th Army, after having assumed eftaunand, divided hi» forces iuto threo groups, following ^iai he thought would b® the probable line of action which the anmy would follow. Me divided his army as fell eve: 1ST OHOUP: 5th and 7th divisions . £aroa sons. ZQ GHOUF: 9th division »en©f South of the Peninsula. 3D QMWi 3rd and 11th divisions - Asiatic Coast son©. CAVALRY BKlG&m: Charged with the surveillance'of the Shore to the Herth of the Ottlf ef Saroa. 10TH ffiPTISIOW: l a r*a*rve9 in tho region Maidoe Bi^iali. -18 FLAMS MS* FBgftUUTIOMa QF TffK As a result of th© battle of March 18, the Allies had corn* to the con. elmsien that they e*uid a©t fore© th© Dardanelles with th© fleet alone, aad decided to attack the Straight by land and water, with th© aid of the fleet. Te aeecmpliah this, they had wow decided to use three English division©, be ©Idee the fleet mnd the two division© already i?e»ti©ned (On© French and om English), General HasdltOK, in command ©f the ISxpeditien, decided upen th© follewiag concentration plan: l«t: T© land all forte® at a point to th© South of th© Peninsula (Seddul Bahr) and froas there march towards KLtcki Tepe(x), 2d: A secondary fore® was to be landed to the North of fcaba Tepe, with the sol© object ©f compelling th© iefenders to disclose their positions. This force tfould occupy th© heights of Kodja Tchi»en Oe^h, and advance on Mai Tep©, thu» separating th© Turkish forces at the tferth and South of the Feuineula. 3d: Te liad9 temporarilyp a r&;;iz3dBt of French Infantry at Koum Kale, in order to diver the fire of the batteries at la fepe. 4th: iiaval deisenststati©n vere to be carried out in the Gulf of uares and the bay of Bachika, for tho purpose of deceiving th© ©aemy. After baring decided upon these great offensive lines, th© five divisions prepared in Egypt were transported to Moudros in the early part of April 1915 (aut). The landing began on April 25, 1915. (*) Hill of th© Ambassador. General Hejailtoa gives to his objective th© name ef Atehi-I=aba. fax) Based on General Hamilton1a Report. -19 «•••••»•• Brigade de ' cavalerie I / \ KodraTcTiepm^ I oflaTratnitcnV 1 yd? Division \ G* KaJnardja Limanj / Despot lim3Ti£, f~~^M£R O£ ..MARMARA Baiede fyytv/i^ Edji Wmtn'yr . r pop irchouc fif S L Troupes* An 1 oYatva f meA 6 Aril ournoiT f^^*+^^L^KtachP " ^ X £G££ {J Nagara ATchanak Kale Troupes* ddulBahr J anglaise^ ioum Kale ftafgaisz8 II ) YeniKeuyjjr Legenfo Afrit ( w .* Command Course No.3. SITUATION- April 25, 1911 1926-1927. Rehkopf. A.W.C. Uo. -20 (April 25,"11L5). The British troops landed on this front just before daybreak. They earn© in contact with our only outpo»t battalion (x), driving it back, and advancing a» far as Kernel Yeri. Th© ©naiay left flank advanced and reached Tohunuk Bair, but the 27th Regiment und<*r the coaaaaad of Lieutenant Coloael Ali Chepk B«y, as well as the units of th© 19th Division eomiag trim Bi^iali, hurriedly arrived and their joint counter attack compelled the SagLish to ra. treat to the ridges near the beach. Lieutenant Colonel Moustapha Kemal Bey, in command of the 13th division, planned te repel the enemy to the sea, having failed during the day, he can. tinued the attack during the night, but could not euccsed due to the fact that the terrain was hilly and brushy, the troops ^ere tired and weakoned by the losses sustained and the &mmj had received fresh reinforctt&ente landed under the cover of darkness. On the laerning of the following day, the envy fleet heavily bombarded our front, thi» bOEsbard^oni was isHsiediatoly follovred by an infarrtry assault which only succeeded in forcing back the flankn of th© 19th diviaion. &jL 3fj33Ui jAIIB- SECTOR: The enesy under the protection of a bombardment carried, out after daybreak, began to land troops in five psurts of th® penineula (fctorte Bay» An«e, Eeteghroul, Tekke Bay, Horth of Cap© Tekke, and West of Krithia), The aurveillance and defense of this sector had be#n assigned to the 3rd battalion of the 26th Hegiraent of the tth diviaion. The troops landed at MOTS; (x) Til© 2d Battalion §f the 27th Regimeat belonged to th«j 9th division of the Kaead Pacha1a 3rd Anay Corpa the first three points w«r© deeiraated, either in their ships, or as soon a« they set foot on the beach, and those that succeeded in landing rere held fast to their landing places. Hew landing attempts wer© undertaken just before dark. nesa, but the enemy could only aeise Beyea Tappe, Gueuadja Baba and Redout® ErU gfrroul. The eneiay also succeeded in capturing and holding Kski Hiss&rlick, on V-orto Bay, The two battalions that the ®nm$ had landed to the West of Krithia made soes© progress at first, but were eventually stopped by our artillery fire, driven back by a counter attack* launched right after &n4 compelled to rembark the following morning. Our counter attack at Seddul Bahr did not prove strong enough to drive back the en«isy, who had received reinforcemeats during the nigfrt. On the contrary, on the following morning, our battalion was forced to fall back, due to the great pressure exerted by the enemy. Due to this retreat, the Coraaander of the 9th division began to occupy and fortify the line Kharah Das- Hill 33 in front of Krithia. The 26th Regiment distinguished itself notably in this eonbat. Our losses on this front were 1,898 m&a in two days. 3iU SfiCTOH OF KQCm KAI,g; The enemy bombarded this sector heavily in the after- aeon* At 10 o'clock, in the morning he landed in Koum Kale, captured the village, but could not progrewa any farther* 4 counter attack was executed at night by three battalions of the our 3rd division, and we advanced just to the village, but «mr forces ware compelled to leave this locality in order to seek shelter from the fire of the fleet. The enemy again attacked on the following morning, but without success. •ttr infantry counter attacked and again entered in Kowi Kale. However, our troope were forced to abandon the part of the village upon which the enemy .28. fl#*t wat dir.eiiug It. fire, m* eccupying houses in tH« village continued the combat. 500 of our mm wre made prieeners in this attack. Xn tha afternoon, our troops v*re forced to retreat to the heights of Orifceaic, where they stopped further eneaay progress. The *nmy evacuated the village during the night of April 86.27 and raembarksd. Our lossaa during the two day* of fighting were 1730 isaan, of whom 500 wore missing. The enemy fleet did not see® to undertake anything important on the fifst day of landing at Saras and Bechicka. We iaaaediately irealiaed that theae were only daaenetrationa and that the landing at Koum Kale waa of little iaper tance. Aa a reault, the troeps of tha 5th and 7th diTisions that ware in fraree, the 11th diviaion and part «f the 3rd division that was in the Aaiatie Coast, were gradually transported to th© port a of Akba&h and Kilia; placed up©a arrival untor the conamand of Kssad Pacha (Zmwm&ing th© 3rd &my Corps). They were used as reinforcements in the fronts of Seddul Bahr and Ariboumou, as the situation dssianded. There war© ©neray auXmarinm in tha Straight, and as the»e Eaovementa could only be executed at night, th© iuaana of transportatioa which we had were not sufficient. Twe regiment© wore transported each night, and it become ianpossi. ble to reinforce to any great extent the fronts of Seddul Bahr and Aribournou during iho first days. These circumstances parraittod the enemy to establiah firmly in th@ peninsula. Of Af^BOURNQU. ATTACK OF APRIL 27th. The units of the 19th division that were holding the line Dous Tepe-Top hairi- Foundalykly Syrt- Kekliek Deresi., were reinforced .23. on ili« morning ef April 27, 1915 by two regiment*, and it decided to attack. The enemy at the very start, was compelled to retreat several hundred aietars, and part of the rijst flank was compelled to retreat to the beach itself. the combat lasted all day and also throughout the night. Our ri#t flank made a alight pregreaa, but the exhaustion of the troops, the heavy losses sustained and the nature of the terrain, prevented further success. On the morning of April 38, the enemy fleet bombarded the flanks of the 19th division, that were ahead of the centre. The enemy counter attacked at the ease time, using the troops already landed which had now been reinforced by a brigade of marines, but the only result obtained was that of slightly forcing back our left flank. ATTACK 01* KAY 1st: The Aribournou front was reinforced on the morning of the 1st of May, by units arriving frorr Saros, the Asiatic coast and Constan tinople, all these forces together making a total of 28 battalions, or 18,000 men. The enemy had one brigade of marines and the Ansac Army Corps. Up to this date, the attack against the enemy flanks had been unsuccessful on account of the fire of the enemy fleet. It was,therefore, decided to attack this time against the centre, and as a result of this decision, the fresh units of the 5th division recently arrived from Saros were assigned to the centre. The attack cei^eneed in the morning mid lasted until night. Qwt troops approached the enewy positions, in spite of the stiff opposition and heavy fire, and by an assault carried out at 4 o'clock P.fc. (16h), readied some of the enemy trenches. However, the reserves did not arrive on tiae, and this heroism bore ne fr«it. Aaether similar attack during the flight was equally unsuccessful. .24. On the morning of May 2d, the enemy hs8»»©r©d our front and r*ar with un paralleled intensity, and attacked our ri^ht flank, but w&s replied. Our troepa, in general, wero exhausted by fatigue, while the enemy posi. tlon seeaed to be perfectly organised. We, therefore, realized, that all attacks in the epen would prove useless and dangerous at the $mn© tine, and decided to reeort to a gradual advance. Treneh warfare commenced on this date ©a the Aribournou front, and all operations ceased until Ma# 29. From April 25 to isay 14, our losses in this front were 190 officers and 13,955 enlisted men, while the enemy had lost 3,000 mtm during the same period. FIHST PART OF THE BATTLES OF SCftfTHIA, April 28. The enemy troops advanced en April 27 from. Seddul Bahr and Cape Tekke to the line i.sk i-His sari ik, Hadji Hussein Tchiflui ji, mouth of the ftighin Dere, where they were finally stopped. Our units were holding the line Kharab DainwHill 83. At 8 o1 clock A.&., the enemy fl«#t eomenced a heavy bombardment on the front and rear of the 9th division, while the enemy infantry attacked the center. At 11 o'clock A.li. the 25th and 26th Regiments, to the Kast ef the road to Krithia, began to fall back. Our division did not have any reserves and the enemy continued the attack on the centre, the division commander issued the order for a general retreat towards Atchi Baba, but at this Hwsuent the 3rd Battalion (3 Companies) of the 26th Regisjeat arrived reinforcing our lines, and decisively contributing to stop the enemy. The retreat was net therefore, necessary. ffe counter attacked about 4 o'clock P.M. (16h) with the cooperation of the 19th Infantry and drove the enemy back te the poeitione he foraaly e«eu*>i**. -25. MIQffl ATTACKS ON THR SlfiOBUL EAJ1R of May 1-2 and Hay 3-4. As a result of the enemy landing, our Commander in Ch»if issued orders to the effect that the enemy wuat be prevented from securing a foothold on land and that it raust be driven back to the sea. The fleet continued its bombardment on the Ssddul &ahr front, and since we had not artillery powerful enough to match the sneisy's artillery, had to resort to night attacks. Our forces in this front, reinforced by th© units which had been sent for this purpose, consisted of 21 battalions (18,000 men). Yasey-Tepe-H jar ab, commanding the advanced line at this front, organised two sub-sectors, one on each side of the Xrithia-keddul Bhar road, and assigned the north orn half to the 9th division, and the southern half to the 7th. The attack was ordered for th® night of I1;ay 1-2, at 10 o'clock (22 h). ATTACK V.AY 1-2 THK 9TH DIVISION: Our troops silently advanced at th© de signated hour towards the enemy positions, but were rultod by deadly infantry and machine gun fire. The reserves were then called upon, but no progress could be raade. An &nmy counter attack , latirabed at 3:30 in the morning, drove our division back to its starting point. 7TH DIVISION: This division advanced at tho socio hour, as the 9th division, and captured the enemy trenches between S&uleBs&in Reis Deresi and Kanly Dere, driving some of the enemy units to fctorto Bay shores. The enemy troops at Soki His&arlyk and to the #a»t of Kanly Bere, held their grounii, and etoppsd any further progress on our part by flanking fire, At day break, the fleet artillery &*©ve our division baelc i® its starting point, Th© bombardment on -25 •mr tr«neli*« was continued until the afternoon of May 8d, and eucsceding in destroying meet of them, and inflicted heavy loss©© upon our troops. ATTACK Kay 3-#. The Seddul Bahr front was reinforced on 1^ 3 by the 15th division recently arrived from Constantinople. A new general attack on the enemy right flank was than ordered, to be carried out mainly by this division, 9TH DIVISION; In this attack, the 9th division advanced but waa partly driven back. Uh® rest of the troops hold their ground for a wfell®, but were also compelled to retreat before daybreak. 15tH and TTH BXVXSION&: The two regiments of the 7th divisions, which were holding the first line were reinforced by two regiments of the 15th division, and all together attacked and captured some of the enemy trenches. At daybreak, our troops became the target of the howitzers of the fleet and of bombs dropped by aviators, compelling us to fall back on our original position. Of the troops that took part in this ni$rfc attack,the losses of the 15th division alone ware 5,000 men. Of the troops landed at Seddul Bhar, the English losses alone (the French excluded) were 13,979 m&n. On May 5, Brigadier Qeneral :^sr Pacha, c«mraaader of th@ 15th Ariey, supplanted General Ton Sedsntern, as Commandar of the Seddul Bahr front, the Aribournou front, which was divided in a similar manner t© the Seddul Bahr front, continued under comffiand of the Third Army Couoaander. The Ari bournou, front was designated as the Northern Group and the Seddul Bahr front as tae Southern Group. Conditions were not very Satisfactory when Weber Pacha assumed emmart ef the Southern Group (Seddul Bhar front). The troops lacked •27. a r#al organisation te carry on these continuous encounters, and did net have the nee«a«ary implement*. Of the line troops, which consisted of 31 battalieat, the strength of the infantry forces was about 15,000 men, due to the losses sustained during these attacks. ! or©ov©r, moot of the tactical lines had been broken, and neither the divisions nor the regiments possessed their organic units* There was a shortage of officers, great difficulty in replacing them, and although there was sufficient infantry acEBttnttion, the artillery aramuni. tion supply was limited, Under these circumstances, it became ixipossifolG, even by giving up all attacks, to effect an rgani*&tio» in the terrain of operations, the afjfiA&aity of falling back on Altchy tope was apparent, this view being shared in ammon by the Couaaander of the Southern Group and by the General Staff, who had come to this conclusion as a result of an inspection to the Southern Group, however, shortly after hie return to General Head quarters, Sssad. Pacha, Coiasaander of the Southern Group, indicated the grave consequences that would be brought about by a retreat on Altchy Tape, m<& shewed the necessity of maintaining firm, at any cost. This viewpoint pre vailed, tmd the Cojmonder of the Armies uMued ordere te defend at all coat the occupied positions, and not to fall back one inch, but to advance and dig In. The easily considered the S4ddul Eahr sector of great importance, and launched a series ©f centinuous attacks, utilising all available troops. Th«re were no major operations on the Aribeumou front. 3BC0ND BATTLE! OF KRTTHIA. 6, 7, and 8. After the first battle of Kritfeia, a©neral Hansllten called for freeh *eiftferc«a;«>ate to capture Krlhia and Altchy Tope, The Allies decided to send |0» a IVench division, a British diviaioa (the 42d territorial division), the 2ftM British infantry brigade and a brigade of marines. Of these units, «qp te the 5th of Kay, three brigades (Britieii), and on© French iafantry re giment had arrived at Seddul Bohr, besides some ansaunition. General Hamilton did not desire to give the Turkish troops tiiae to reorganise, as he knew they were exhaueted by the night attacks. Therefore, he transferred twa brigades fro© Aribeurnou to Seddul Bh«tr, aad inaantiiately ordered the attack. The ©ffen. »iv© began on the 6th of May «aad lasted three daya, Th© frsneb aad th& Eagliafe brigade of marines captured on the first day the heights coat?oillug Kerev«z Dere, and on t$ft ftecond day the 29th division captured Krithia, A general attack along the entire front in t«i© dir*otion of Altchy Top® was launched on the third day. Our troops muberad 15,000 m»n» while thoea of the Ingle French numbered 25,000, MAY ^# - The ®a«say aaval artillery eOKea@«icod its fconbordBant on our fronts at 11 ©•deck A*y« The attack on thft 7th division of our left flank bagaa 8h®rt. ly after. This attack executed by tho French and th© Sagliah brigade of marines was easily repellod, but ether attacka, equally unsucceasful followed almost .: eratinucusly until dork, MAT ?th.- The besbardmeiit cooanonced at 10 o1 clock and lasted a quarter of an hour, after' which fellew&d an unauceeaaful attack OH the front of our 9th division, tho eombat on the frosrfc of the 7th division lasted desperately Moon. The French et 12 o'clock sharp, opened up a heavy bombardment on rofft and then dashad to tho asaault, but were repelled by our artillery and infantry fire. The bombardment urafl renewed at 5 o'clock P.I*. (17 H), whea our right flank wae again attacked and our trenches captured, but the .29. was driven back by a counter attack which followed inoediately after. MAY 8— Tfe« enemy, protected by ilia fleet, repeatedly attacked th© frojst of our two aivisions, but without obtaining any practical results. At 5:15 ©•clock P«M.(l7 h:15), the fleet opened up an Intensive bombardment in front and roar of our two divisions, and a general infantry attack against the front jit the 9th division followed this artillery preparation. This attack was stopped la seme parts and repealed in others. Th® attack directed by th® French against the 7th division was sior© violent and they suece%« OF ARIBOURJiOU. ATTACK of May 19,~ The Coiarsander is Cheif of our Arsiiea, arrived at the Dardanelles on the 10th of ICay, and inspected the Front. As a result of this, and upon hia return to Constantinople, he issued telegraphic instructions to the Cfcfsmaading General of the 5th Aray conveying tfe® information that the fighting in the Northern group had reached its timH stages, that the pre vailing situation in that sector could not continue, find thtffc the ©n«»y must fee attack ©B this front upon arrival of the 3d division. This division landed at Afcfc&eh on th© 16th of May, and th© attack was ordered for the 19th at 3:30 AJff, TIJ© 19th and 5th divisions were at th© front and tha 16th was on th© reaorve. For the contemplated attack, the left flank was assigned to th© 16th, division, aft* the centre to th® 2d division (Kauly ®n& Xry^rty &yrt). the w*r© now arranged in this manner from right to left: the 19th, 5th, -30u 2d and Ifith, thu» making the tetel infantry fercee 42,000 men. The main attack was te be delivered by the 2d division againet the enemy's centra. SXSCUTIGN OF TH8 4 TACK. All forces attacked at 3:30 A.*., The ri^it ami coster of th« 19th division advanced as far aa th© enemy's ir©nch©B9 while the center ef the 5th division actually occupied some of them, but the rest of eur troope could net advance against the enemy fire. The heavy lossessustained by. the 2d division prevented th® advance of this unit, which tries again at 5:30 A«M. by calling on its reserve©, but could not make any progress. The l$th division taking advantage of th© terrain succeeded in approaching the enemy position. The 5th and 2d division renewed th© attack at daybreak, but the ©aesy infantry and machine gun fire prevented eny progr© s. In the merniag4 the enemy counterattack ad the right fl&nk of th© IHh division ^iich *&» bent like.an arrow, &nd recaptured th® trenches which had been previously taken by this division* We than decided to atioidoK the trench©5which we had taken at the centre of the IHh diviBien, because they 4id net offer any pretecticn. U& counterattacked desperately until 10 o'clock A.L. but could stake no 'progress in &pit© ©f. the heavy losses euetain&d, Th® Cemaander' of the Nertfecarri Group, realising the situation orderod the suspension of the attacks, tha enorry, protected bytho heavy fire of the fleet eoimtcr&tt&eked In the afternoon &t 3:30 during th© night. »e lost 10,000 men in this offensive, An armistice was negotiated on li&y 24, in order to pick up the dead miQ. weunded which *&re lying in th© trenches, TKIR2 BA1TLK OF KRITHU. June 4-i". Owr frent waft defended by the 9th and 12th division®, reinforeed by tve regiaeats and other aaaller unite held in reserve. The allied forces eoauieted ef twe Frencia divisiono (22,000 mm) and three Xnglleh divisions (31,000 men). -31 Tfcie front was bombarded by th® fleet on June 4th, aided by land batteries, This artillery preparation lotted until th© afternoon, whew at a predetermined hear the enemy attacked with bayonet along the ©ntir© front, capturing three lines of trenchee (between a point to the eaat of Kanly Dere and Zigfein Dere), and Hill 83. The trenches on the right flank as well as Hill 83 were recap, tured by the 12th division, as a result of a counter attack. The Coiaaanding General of the 9th division brought his reserves to th© front, and recaptured the third line of trenches, but th© first two l\n®& remained in possession ef the enemy. The mnmy attacked Krithia dere and Kinly Dere on the Horning of the 5th of June but having completely failed, did apparently decide to suspend the attack and bombardment on this front until the afternoon. Th© 9th division, reinforced by three infantry regiments, attacked the sector between Krithia and kighin ®&r@ on June 6th at 3:30 A.M. Our troops advanced at the pointof the bayonet, recaptured the first line of trenches, without firing a shot, took eleven machine guns, and in spite of the terrific fire, succeeded in recapturing our former position. The combat lasted until dark, and as a result of it, the enemy now only held some trenches to the center of this division. A night attack delivered against the right flank of the 12th and center of the 9th division was unsuccessful. $b lest 9,000 men duriag these three days, while the enemy lost 8,000 net counting the first day of the battle. After tfeie encounter, the exhausted 9th division was sent to K&ial Tepe tor a M0Hth*s rest. This front occupied up to this time by two divisions, was now assigned te three divisions as follows: Th© right to th® 11th, th© center -32 te the n h and the loft to the 3d. The overtaxed 15th division and the 6th division at SFATOS, exchanged places before the middle of June, COMBAT OF HILL 83, June 21.22* Beginning with the middle of June the French cesxaeneed the gradual doe. traction by artillery fire of the defensive work* of the second division in the Kereves Bere region. This bombardment increased in intensity beginning with the 19th of June, and attained its teaxisnra force at midnight June 20-21, when the artillery attack lasted for six hours. This fire was directed against the centre of the division, and all the trenches in this sector were destroyed. The French attacked at 6 o'clock A.&5., and captured hill 83, as veil as the trenches on both sides of these heights, but our vigorous counter attack re gained all lost ground. The enemy, following artillery preparation, attacked few consecutive times, and finally succeeded in capturing the trenches,*, Turkish counter at tack failed, and new only hill 83 remained in our possession. The heavy bombardment continued. Our troops occupying positions en the flanks of hill 83 had no protection against this art^lery fire, and were driven back to the eotaomnication and support trenches. The enemy then occu pied the destroyed trenches that we had abandanned, and which were full of dead bodies, fe captured during the ni#it the trenches to the rigfrt of the flret regimeat, but were ferced to evacuate than once Wre by t|i© eneisny fire. On June £2d, the 0th Infantry repelled a vigerous attack, the fitting lasting «3il-m«raiiig and afternoon of that day. -33. The decimated 3d division was replaced by the 12th division during the night June 23-23d. Our losses during this combat were 6,000 men; those of the French were 2,500, BATTLE OF U(MIU . June 28- July 5* The enely land and sea artillery eoiarnenced a terrific hammering on this front en June 28 at 10 A.M., and after having cof&pleisly destroyed oar trenches by this bombardment, attacked with three brigades at 11 A.M., and captured this sector. The left flank of the Indian brigade advanced from the beach to the neighborhood of Teriandafil Tchiftliyi, and occupied this region facing Ka«t, Our units which had retreated, w&r9 reinforced by sever. JL re»&rve units aad by intrenching themselves to the fest of Ketchi Deresi, succeeded in stepping the advance. Our losses in this combat were 2,000; those of the English were 1750. Although we had been reinforced by on© regiment, all our night attacks were unsuccessful. On the night June 29*30, a reinforcement of two ether reg iments arrived, but the attack, directed this time by Faik P&eha, also failed. Another reinforcing regiment arrived on the 30th (x), but the counter attack failed again for the third tima. Th® 1st division attacked the enerayss left en the afternoon ©f July 2d, but with no better success than the previous attempt*. Th# t«xt reads Jane 10th, but this is evidently an error. The Firemen had in the mean time attacked the Sefcihern Qrmp tlaos, aaid the right of this Group sfoich was bent like on arrow la the south w««t was in th© great danger of being out off. The Army Commander decided that the enemy isust be driven back at all costs, and realising that his do cissated and exhausted forces could not accomplish this task, recalled th© 5th division from the Asiatic Group, entrusted th© cosaaand to th© Coiamandor of the 1st Array and issued instructions to carry out th© contemplated attack. It was understood that the 5th and 3d divisions would be sent back to their former sectors upon completion of this attack. These two divisions were placed in rear of the right wing. It was decided at attack on July 5th at 3:40 A.M. with the 3d division attacking to the West of £ighin Dere and tho 5th division te the East of this locality. Both divisions comprised a total of 13,000 men. The attack coranenced at tho prescribed hour, and was renewed in echelons until dark, but it proved unsuccessful, tfas this failure due to lack of artillery a&xsgaition, which made impossible any artillery preparation? The losses sustained by the 3d and 5th divisions frets June 28 to July 5th, were 4,991 men; t/jose of the other divisions fenasing part of the Southern Group (1st, 11th, 7th, 12th, 2d and 4th), wer© 10,856 men. Tho total losses ef the Army of the Southern Grou^ during the lost week ware 16,000 men, of whom 14,000 men fell in th© Zighin D&re sector, m cay truly say that th© battle of 2i$iin Dere was the bloodiest of all the battles fought in th© southern part of the Peninsula. After this battle (Zigfein Dere) , w© gave up all attacks in th© Ugin Dere sector, and planned on fortifying the line we ware holding. • 35 At the beginning of July it ms decided to sead th© 2d Army to the Bardanelles* relieving th© divisions of the divisions of th© Southern Orotip which bad suffered th* heaviest losses. This Array was composed of the 15th Army Corps (In Constantinople), the 14th Anny Corps (at Adrinople), and the 8th, ICth, 13th and 14th divisions. Its commauacier Vehih Pacha, assumed of the Southern Group on July 9th. The division® of the 2d Array were due to arrive by the 20th of July, but the enaiay attacked before they had lauded. BATTLS OF KBRSVS& UiSasC July 12-13. In the ii^iin sector, the onaay had succeeded after repeated attacks, in advancing its left flank, but his r Igfct hud remained behind. It waft decided to push the latter forward, and to attack on July 12. This attack woe to be directed against that part at out* front b-itroen the source of the Kerevez Dere and the Bay of Kritiiia, and vrai to be carried on by two French divisions and the 52d English division. The English left would make a demonstration. Our forces in this front consisted front ?est to East of th© 1st, 11th and 7th divisions, with the 4th division on th« left. The enemy made a demonstration In the front of the 11th division on July 12, His land and sea batteries bombarded the front of th© 4th division and the left of the 7th fro* 4:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M., firing a total of 70,000 projectiles during this three-hour bombardment. Our first lla©» communication and support trenches a»d all our coraaunicationfe wer© eouaplstely destroyed. After this preparation, th© infantry attacked th© front of the 4th division .36 and ih* left flank of the 7tht and although the latter repelled the attack, the line *f the 4th division was almost entirely carried by the erteg^. The latter advanced between the two diviBiono, cutting off «ai conmiunication be tween them, but was finally stoppod by counterattacks launched by thoee ef our unite that had arrived in rear. After having made several attempt* against the left flank of the 7th division, the enmy finally captured the trenches in this sector. The French again attacked the 4th division, during this night (July 12), capturing the laet portions of the first and second line trenches which had remained in our possession. Our men were driven back to the support trenches, several hundred meters in rear, isfeore they continued to resist the attack* Our 7th division recaptured during -the night a on© ef the trenches on ite left* The 4th division reinforced by the 2d counter attacked on the morning of July 13, but without success. On this asm© morning the enemy attacks on the 4th and 6th divisions, which continued until noon, failed. A similar attack, after a heavy bombardmsnt, at 4:30 ?.!•• against 'th* 4th division and left of the 7th, also failed, (fie* m&p Mo.4), the losses of the 4th, 6th and 7th divisions during these two days of fighting w«r© 9,575 ae»; those of %h& let and 11th divisions *vr« tAl aieo, while the French lost 840 men and the JSaglish a,000. The units of the eecond Army arrived at th© Seddul Bohr sector from th© 13ih to the aQUref July, and began to fortify this front on July 2*th. Of the divisions replaced, the 6th and 7th divisions were transferred to Bares and the 11th division to the Asiatic Coast group. -37, Yeni Keijy THE SITUAriON ON JULY 14, 1915* -38 The loss an of both cftabatairta during this period of operations mop be summarized as follows: Turkey: 58,461 men. Allies: 30,079 men. S ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF TH§ SBOOMO PART. Operations of the Allies. General Hamilton had, in carrying oiat hie plane of forcing the atHkight with the assistance of naval forces, conformed to th® doctrines ©f irilit&ry art by deciding to land his main force© in the acme saoat favorable for ta© establishment of a base of operations, while at th© same time naval deraoEu strations were carried on in ©aros and B^chlcka. Thaae deraonBtrations, should have been ror© realistic, however, and also snail doi&ehmenta should hava been landed in ordar to deceive the defenders and cause the latter to withdraw a large part of his forces tram th© pl&c© where the main landing was to take place. (a) The decision to carry out th© main operations at &eddul Bahr, really placed this front of three shores under the fir© of th© Fleet, and assured to the landing troops the naval support up to the last isoiaent. The defenders could har The causes of the failure in landing at th© Seddul Bahr sector are as follows: 1. The troops were landed before this front and its rear areas had been subjected to an effective and prolonged fire from the fleet, 2, The heroic defense ef the defenders, who in spite of lack of means, fought with indomitable enermy. (ft). It was due to this fact -that it became so difficult for the Allies to extend the landing operations commenced at daybreak of April 25th, and re* newed almest without interruption, until dark* However, had the eneroy begun this landing operations by surprise, and after a more aethodic and effietive preparatiea, these repeated and bloody attemps would not have been necessary, and prebably better results would have been obtained from the very beginning. -40. (b). In respect to the Aribounou front, it may be aald that the first units landed met a weak resistance, and advanced from two to two and one-half kil ometers before they were rigorously counter attacked eight hours after their landing. Unquestionably, the landing operation was difficult, and the nature of the terrain vas unfavorable, which made it impossible the reinforeenent of the first troops landed* Nevertheless, had the first troops landed (about one brigade - 4,000 men), been reinferee^ *t the proper time, they would have undoubtedly wiped out the first of our regiments that advanced to oppose it, and even our second regiment which arrived too late. On the first day, the assailants should have captured the heights facing the straight, and once holding possession of them, they could have dealt a vital blow to the resistance of the Straight. On the ether hand, had the &&my after landing one brigade as the first echelon on this front, accomplished the landing of the ether echelons with the same pretaptn&es, but further to the North or to the South, so as to cut off the 19th division, the end would have been accomplished more promptly and easier. (e) It was necessary to carry out the landing at Kousi Kale, in coordination with a naval demonstration further to the South, and to effect it only after having eluded the surveillance and the Turkish defenses. As a matter of faet, the defenders, net being threatened on the coast of Bechika and Y*ni Kwuey were in a p«»itiea to easily and quickly reinforce the Koum Kale front, and ef «»#«ti»g *h« landing forces at critical situations. -41 (dj, It would have been more advantageous to have carried out a demonstra. ti*» in the oeddul Bahr Sector, and effevted^prineipal landing between Oa&a T«$« and Suvla. At any rate, this statement is worthy of consideration. I» faet a successful landing at this place, which is narrowest part of the Pen insula, would have meant the speedy capture of the strongest and roost important part ef the Straight. (e) There was some justification in effecting a demonstration at *>aro&, but this demoatration vast net realistic enough. Had the enemy started by making a feint landing, the coamander of the defenses would have been compelled to effer resistance, and vouid have been truly perplexed. Undoubtedly, our troops in the Saros sector would have suffered a longer delay in coming te the aid ef the troops in the iSouthern sector• We nay, on the ether hand, make the following remarks: 1, From the time of landing, the fleet mainly took part in the operations at the landing places only, and did not help as it should have done the ad vance ef the treepe that had landed. The ships were too close to shore and the flat trajectery of th©ir guns rendered thorn ef no value against the land defenses, even though the positions of the latter wau known. a# The enemy ffiiled in the offensive, in spite of hio superiority in all respects, because the land artillery which should have prepared the attack, was insufficient, and its mission hud been intrusted te the artillery of th© fleet. Had the eneny possessed heavy land artillery and sufficient acaaunition, no defensive organisation «euld have withstood the attack on this front of limited extent. -42 3. All the succeeding attacks on the Seddul Bahr fr«»t vers totally partial. They tfer* of no value, because all ij&tarost in them had been let* TJflg UBFISNiM* (yORKSY) - &TRAHS0XC- S . 1. The 5th Army did aot see fit tfe# assignment of the majority of its units t» i^» •©uthera fealf of th* Penineulu, wliich w» *h« m»»t daKg®rou» landing son© «f th# Stmi^it, and tho asaigjaffl«nt of th« r«saining ones t« ih« sectors of Saros and Anatolia. Ineteaci of doing thia, it divided th« six. infantry divisions squally, amang tho \hrm following sones: i»ex©&, £ out hern part of th# Foninaula, and Anatolia. Thi* distribution of forces deserves diacu»»iorx. ^o &ay arrange tho»« three aonas in order of importance as follow*; First, the Southern Fart of the feninsula, then &aros and lastly Aa&toliu. It becaaa© naedsaary from the very b&gigraiag to concentrate eaei&y T*r Bahr and tiaba Tape. It was also important to watch other points, concentrate powerful reserves in suitable points to the rear in order to defeat any eu©my attempts at these nointa, and distribute thesae T®mrv®to according te the strategical situation. Following this conception, a logical solution would have been the following distribution el forces: The 1st division to Kodja Bere, Aimfarta, The second division to .>©rafin Tchifliyi-*»oughanly &w&. The third division to the Worth Sast of Krithia, Th* ffturtli division to Maidoa, Big^aali, for general reserve. The fifth division to ISrenkftuey region. -42 eixth division to the Oallipoli region. The Cavalry brigade to the Uorth of &aro*. It was logically 3©und to plan on driving back to sea the first troop© landed at Aribouaou and Seddul Bahr. It became necessary above all, to prevent the ene&y from securing a strong foothold &*ad the crashing ©f the first troops landed, At any rate, it was very important to feroe the reerebarkation. But once the enesy hud gained a foothold and reinforced hie first echelons, the above plan could only be carried out in ease are possessed numerical superiorly of in , arnmcQJit and ammunition. Any counter offeasivs lacking these three eseentlai requirements «ae doomed to fail. The sain factor of the failure of the 19th division oa the 37th of April, vafi lack of artillery. Similarly, the attack of May 19, 1915 on the Aribournou front failed through lack of heavy laad artillery and artillery ammunition. 3. #e sight etate that the failure of this last mentioned attack, was duo to the fact that our troops had become in contact with the enemy before thd attack itself, they were not properly echeloned in depth, and that too many sea were piled up on the first line. The 2d division occupied the assigned seeter oa the night May 18-19, attracting the eaamy#s attention by useless and unnecessary noises, and on the following morning attacked beating the druse and playing airs. It certainly revealed its plan, thereby deducing whatever chancos of success i t had, ffee density ©f tho troops in the fir»t line, handicapped the freedom, of man©#i«vri»gf prevented attaining a superiority of firs, and increased the leases, briefly, they we»e causes of failure. A front of about three kilometers -43 was assigned: to tmr divisions (19tfa, 5th, U and 16th ). Tfcesa divisions eo»j»rised A total of 44,000 men, and the density was, therefore, one man per ^fuaftsO. Ki«t«r. Duo to this density, it was not only impossible to carry on the regular aira unit ion supply at th© front, but the wounded could not fee withdraws. Sueh density of men was not only unnecessary, but 4«*rimd«tal as well. It would have beon wiser, for example^ to have occupied thi» front with two divisions, and left th« other two ia rQa®rv$ for a eoutinuaticm of th# attack. 4. Similarly, it was a mistake to assign the attack of May 19 to the 2d division, entrusting it with the most important ffiission. This division did not know its position and was not acquainted with the terrain. 5. Other remarks, inrsg&rd to the conduct of operations might be made; (a) There was little coordination, both in intention and execution, between the Commander of the 5th Ar-iy who was entrusted with the land defense, and the Cesnander of the fortified region. OR the other hand, the units of our fleet, which were to support the land troops received their orders from Actoiral 5ouchon. The General Staff, to which these three heads were subordinated, should have intervened directly, if the indispensable unity was to be attained, amd should also have put on @nd to all divergencies among these three heads. (fe) The Colander of the 5th kns%t who wa® fear away from th© theatre of ff#ratieBSf should aot have encroached upon th© duties of the Group Cossreanders, who ware on the premises. He should have permitted then liberty of conception i>.nd maneouvre. Instead of doing this, he even designated in the attack of 19, the divisions that were to hold the limss, instead of having left the -44 Commander ef the Northern Oroup In liberty todfctack at the right ©f ttoustapha Kama! Bay, whose division neoded reinforcement. At any rate, he should have given the Group Commander authority to fix the hour of attack. 6. The enormous losoos sustained in our powerful counter attack of June 28 July 5th in £i&hin Dere, was due to lack of artillery ammunition with which te prmpaar* the offensive. For this reason the Southern Group lost 16,000 men In a week without obtaining any results. 7. It must be stated that since th; beginning: of operations, the Seddul Kahr front was not defensively organised, as itshould have been. The Commander of this Group should have given due importance to intrench&ients, instead of wasting our best divisions in continuous and unnecessary attacks. It was very Important that the Groups be provided with reserves. Lack ef ther..- prevented the reinforcements of threatened points at the proper time and also caused failures at critical, raoiaents. The counter attacks were mediecrely executed, because the troops arrived late, and this situation was rendered even verse by losses which we could have limited. The Ansy tomsiander disposed at will of the &roup reserves, detaching them trvm their units and transferring them as he saw fit. To this poliey mere than to anything else rosy be attributed th© causa of all th® mistakes that we have pointed out. (to be continued). .45 PART HI. PAD| 1. The landing at Anafarta. - The Cowfcate of Tohunuk Rmiri, Aribournou and Seddul Bahr 46 2. Seddul Bahr Coiabats (Au£. 6th & 7th, 1915) 47 3. Kanly Syrt Confoat (Auft. ft-9t 1915) 49 4. Combats ©f Tchwnuk Balr (Aug. 6-$, 1915) 90 5. Th« landing at Anafarta (Aug. ^*8) 53 6. Fir»t Battl eof Anafarta (Aug. 9-30) 56 7. Combats of ICireteh Tepe (Aiifr. 15th & 16th) 57 8. Second Battle of A»afarta (Aug, 23st & 22d) 59 9. ISvaeuation of the Dardanelles 60 10. The Coat of our (Turkish) Success at the Dardanelles 61 11. Coraaente on the Operations Covered in Part III 62 12. General Comments on the Attack and Defense of the Dardanelles 66 1. Situation 6 August ISIS 48 2. Situation 15 Aa^ust ins 58 tm LAHPIHQ AT AHAFAKTA. - THE coftSBATa OF raamim BAXKX After th© third battle of Krithin, General Headltoa requested more reinforeemente fro» Kaglaad, The British Government decided to send him the 53d and 54th territorial divisions, besides the 9th Corps which waft composed of the 10th, 11th and 13th division©. The first echelon of the two territorial divisions wae due to arrive da 10 July 1915, and the last echelon of the 9th Corps on 9th of August. General Hamilton adopted the following plan for the subsequent oper ations : reiaforcemeat of the Arihournou froat with pert of hie forces, vigorouely attacking the Turkish right, that ie to say, Son Yataghy, Tchunuk BadA and Kodja Tchimeu Tape* after the capture of these objectives, to advance in the direction G&foa Tepe~?iaidos, sad to eut off all eoEHsuai cation between the Turk® and Constantinople; to latid the regaining troops at Suvla, and organise a base of operations thereat. The sain attaek was to be delivered toy the Arifeoumou troops against the Turkish right and was to cooaaeitee on th© night of Awgust 6*7 1ft order to facilitate the landing at Suvla. Before the commencement of the offensive, feints were to be carried out in the Seddul 3ahr and Arlboumou sectors. A detachment of 300 mtm was to be landed en the northern shore of the Gulf of karos. About the middle of July, the Turks were informed of the operations that the eneiay was preparing. The most important intelligence information received was a telegram sent by the Serasan O.H.Q, on 22 July 1915, as cerdieg to whi** » «f* general attaek against the Dardanelles would be -2 launched towards the early part of August, to be effected in conjunction with a landing on the ooant ©f Saros or that of Asia. According to other intelligence reports received the enemy was concentrating a force of from 50,000 to 60,000 men In the inland of Lemnos. The Commander of the 5th Army became uneasy, especially concerning the Koum Tepe eeetor» hl» «ind became again preoccupied with the Seddul Bohr front, the Gulf of Saras and th® Asiatic Group, but he thought little of the probability of & landing in Anaf art a, contrary to the opinion of the GoR3»ander of the Northern Group who seemed to be convinced that such landing would be eventually attempted* In spite of the probabilities that such operation Blight be carried out, the Turkish Commander assigned three divisions to the Asiatic Group, placed one division in the K'oum Tape sector and two divisions in reserve in rear of the Heddul Bahr front. (See map). An account of the combats which took place, beginning with August 6th, in the aeddul Bahr, Kanly Syrt, Tohunuk Bairi and Anafarta regions, fellows i bAHH (August 6th and 7th 1915). On August 6th, from 2^30 • 4^00 P,K., the ®mmy bombarded and des troyed the trenches of the 10th division, between Zighin Bere and Krithia Derei he then attacked and captured several t&enohes, but was foraed to evacuate them by our counter attack. On the isorning of August 7th, the enesay artillery destroyed the trench es on the right of the 13th division between Krithia Here and Kanly 0ere» re de cavaierii MARMARA Corps d*arrmee Anzac MCR ctltefotk /* OJ. M^r/ifg &*ditete fetfree do frotot Croquis n° 5. — Situation le 6 aout an attaek launched at 9 240 A*M. gave the enemy these trenehes, from wh«ro he was subsequently driven by our counter-attack i this ©«ly left a small strip of land in the adversary's possession. 0» the sum day, the enowy destroyed, in a similar manner, the front o» the left flank of th© 14th division, tout without gaining any ground* Thus the enesjy attacks of the 6th and 7th of August on the Seddul Bahr frost wsre completely repulsed* Combats on this front, although less bloody than those above mentioned, continued taking place until th© middle of August. The losses of the Southern Group trow August 6th to 13th of Sept ber reached a total of 7,500wen. (August 6-0, 1915). On August 6th, at 4*30 ?•*?«, the en&my opened up a V9Kf intense fire on the Kauly Syrt-Merkes T®p© sector, destroying the defensive erg*» animations at Kaaly Syrt (l) with artillery that had been eaplaoed on this front* Kauly Syrt was eapttur«d at 4^30 P." . All th© Turkish coun terattaoks that were lattached during the night and even up to the next aborning, proved unsuoeessful* Kauly Syrt was the theatre of bloody eora bats on August 7 and 3, but the Turks could only reoover a small portion of the trenches that had been previously lost by them* frow August 9th until the morning of the next day Kanly Byrt was (1) tone-Fi^e.- On the Southern part of the Au Bousian front. th* seene of terrific attacks and counterattacks, after which w© gained possession of our former position, with the exemption of the first line, theee three days af fighting had exhausted the troops, BO that the attacks oeased on the 10th of August. From August 5-9, the 16th division (Turkish) had lost 6,930 men, the majority of whora fel l at Kanly 8yrt. The mousy completely attained the expected results from these combats. He epatured the trenches at Kanly Syrt, and sow could, in a very short time, bring to Kanly -yrt, three regiments from the reserves of the North* era Group. 9 T j v r (August• 6'-*, During the night© from August 4-6 5 the English landed mi Aribournou, four brigades of the nm reinforeements plus on® brigade that had been detached from the &eddul Bahr front, naking a total of five brigades. The Aribournau forces were thus raised ts 3^,000 m©nt 20,000 of whom were to atta«k Tchunuk Bair aad Kddja Tehimen tepe. During the aig^it of August 6*7, at 10 P.M. the English at task eon* fggaeed; our outposts were driven back to the crest west of A»ism Dere 5 three columns were attacking tow&rds Tchunuk Bair and further Korth. At th« satae time, fire was &p*m& agednat the left of our l$th division. On August 7th, the enemy repeatedly m& uiafi«c©e©®fully attacked the right «* to the west of Aghyl Bere and &»m& Dere. A* thi© time the Use Tehiwen - Tehunuk Bair was unoccupied. On the raeraiag of the nh t the Cowuader of oar 19th division lftexa* ed thai the enemy w&« in possession of Gtoahin Syrt and that e»»»y troops ware advancing on Tohuauk Help, Th« TurkieSi Ooraraaudo** »e»fe i Balr %he soly reacrv© thai he had In thi« aesior,- &a« battalion* troops established & weak line of ©kirffiiehers on the Beeim Tepe * Tchunuk 3&ir front &nd th« attack on the advancing Knglieh troops coesn&enGftd. Thus, the 1st H«,ttali«na of the 14th Regiment aad two QQtxpmi$>& of the 2d Battalion of the 71st ftegiiasirt «hioh took position ®n the left of the firet named troops, wer© the first units to occupy Tehunuk Bair for the firet time, aa4 to defend it until the arrival of troops from the 9th divieioiu At 9 o'oloelc, the enemy unsuccessfully attacked the 1st battalion 14th Regimeist, to the Beet qf k*m Vmrel the enessy attempted the capture ef Tchunuk Bair by ftttaek® against the right and e«nter. The let Battalion, attacked fey a awaericaliy eu^erior ©nsmy, was *>aa3s;»a w$, bat « feattery in position on Beeias fepe gave material assistance through its accurate fire, while the troope of the Hh division arrived with reinf orcemonte. The attack was etenvmed a»4 no progree® w^s »ade by tH« British until the evening. On the same day, one of the two regiments of the 4th 4fcrl*iea whieh hmA been sent froEJ the Southern Group, was sent to Tchunuk Bair, while the other wa« left at the dispose! of the Q&mr®l Headquarters of the Herth* #ra Group, Also, ea the seme 4nyt a detachment of twelve raadii»« *&» ordered to Tehunuk Bair{ & regiment and a batt&ry that &rri-?© On Auguet 10th »t S'30 A*Ma| th« 23d and 27th ragiianisU «ttn«iti#4 T«hu«uk Bair driving foaok in di@ Nothing of importance took place at Tchunuk Bair and in the sectors ef the 19th and 16th divisions until the nddtH© of Augttet, Frora August 6-10, the Turkish losses in the Kodja Tehioftii - Tehusuk &&ir region were 9,300 Ren in the eeetor of the 19tb division, plus from 1,800 to 3,000 mm at the left of this division* as a wliole, the Turkish losses in Kodja Tchisen, Tchunuk B®dr sjad Oaba tepe were about 17,000 men, the English losses in the eume regies wer© 12,000 (August 6*3), The English had ordered the 11th division and the 10th division (leee one brigade) of the 9th carps to Suvla* with thes© troopo they had decided to occupy the heights oossmanding the bay of &uvla, «m well as Kireteh Tepe, ^estan Tep©, (Oheoelate Hill) and Ismail Oghlou Tepesi. (1) On the night of August 6-7 at 10*30 P.B#, the landing of three brigades of the 11th division on both sides of cape KutcViuk OueMkli and to the south of Kar&kol Baght &tomt'&me&i th« I®tiding had beon eom pleted by ih® morning of the 7th# Th© landed troop® occupied Lala Baba, K&rakol t>agh and later os ^afta Tape, The Turkish troops oaaoeing this (1) T. Notes Sse '-'ap * page 4. -8 landing wer© on© demi«battalion of geadarmee and & battalion of Infantry. Although facing Inferior foreeet, no progress was made by the ensray on August 7th; towards the evening Mestan Tope (Chocolate Hill) fall in the enemy1 e hand©. The defender* of Mestan Tepe (2 battalions) , fell back toward© Ismail Oghlou Tepe and the two companies of gendarznery de fending Karakol Dagh fell back towards Kiretoh Tepe. Two Kngliah bri gades of the 10th division cora-nenced their landing at 10 o'clock P.M. The Cowaander of the Northern Group, not hearing any available troop* s found himself unable to reinforce the Anaf art a detaehment. On the worning of August 7th, the 7th and 12th divisions (Turkish) which composed the Saros group, were ordered to Anaforta under the Command of Colonel Feiai. The 7th division and one regiment of the 12th division could only reach Seidli* In consequence, the attack that had been planned for the morning of August 3th, vm postponed until the evening of that day. The Commander of the Group designated**® west of Tourehon as the preparatory position of the 12th division and the heights te the East of Petit Aaatarta as that of the 7th division* The former was to attack &ottladjik-i£estan Tepe to the north of Asmak l)er© and the latter Dasaak* djylyk Bairi te the south of A*»iak. The two division ootastaiidars, when eunsBtoaad to General Headquarters of the Group, deal are d that the troops were tee tired, the* a large number, of aen had b«en left behind due to length of the marches, that the battalions only had half of their ef~ feeiivG strength and that, therefore, there existed the risk of meeting a disaster if the attack was carried out on that day* In fact, in plain hot ©»&B»B, the fth division hwd Just completed & Jimey of frois SO to 40 kUeewtttm md the lath division from 45-SS kilometers. Thee* troop*t well tested out since the beginning of the *aisptagn» w«r© Juet beginning to reorganis©; to ooop*l then to attack on th&t &me waning and In that •tut* of fatigue, would h«r* probably lad to failure, because they might have gotten out of th© control of their chief e. For theee reaaona, Feiai Bay |»©st$k©aed the attack until the following morning J he gm® ord«tr» to take advantage uf the _ during th© night in order ts approat^i th* position aad to attaek at break. 8* reported this decision to Liuuui P&chaj the army eearttaiider. Lir»an I acha relieved Feizi B*y from hie ©oi^wnd beeause the attack that had been prescribed for that night had been postponed until the following morning. Feisd Bey w«s$ rftplsuesd by Moufftapha K*n*l Bey, the co^SKnder of th© 19th division, who WRB or&med to carry out th* attack on the morning of August 9th. Mouetapha K*B»1 Bey arrived at Tohawli Tekk© at 1 kmU* m th© night of Augiutt 3*9 a*nd aesum-ed itorrarrsaad. The troop© had elr* dy isovod in conformity with* the orders issued by Feifi Bey, and being in the close proidedty of th© »neisyf the new Ooesnander ©ad© no changee in th© orders tor th© attack. On August 8» the English Aid nat mate* any important n,ov«B*vt* *»d only advanced a» far as the &ouladjik~Kufcurtlu Piaar line* they occupied th* heights at Youseefdjyk TCJJQ and Xbrikdje with two battalions* Here they r*«t»& «ald th* attack wa® postponed for th© morning of the following day. Finally, Oener 1 'emiltot* arrived in order to p»r«onaily direct the operations, but the attack that he dorfired «©v«r wee carried out. On August 9th at 3*30 &•& only on* battalion moved in th© dir**ti*n of T*kk* T*p*. FIRST BATTLE OF ASWAKTA. (August 9-10). The two adversaries were prepared to attack th* following £vente developed In the following manner* The 12th division attack ed last of the line Tohiae&l Tohairi-1Email Tepe, in a western direction, drove back two ene^y battalions posted on this front and took several raachine guna and prisoners, Youssefdjak Tepe was then occupied. From 5A.S, until noon, the English attacked four or five times the left of the 12 division, hut were repulsed everywhere, this division lost 1,085 ?f>©n. On the ®a^e day, the oneisy also attacked Kiteoh Tepe and captured Sivri Tepe, but oould tmk& no further progress. The 7th division (Turkish) also attacked at Asm Bere, driving back the eneray and capturing pert of th© D&makdjylyk heights, but an eneisy counterattack drove back the left flank of the division behind Kyadjyk Dere, ngfcere these Turkish tfoops ®uoeeeded in holding their poeitien. The losses of the 7th division were 978 men. The 4th division participated in the attack, but could not gain &&y ground* Oa the morning of 10th of August, two eneisy divisions attacked the front of the 12th division, charging ©everal tim©e, but without maeeeas. k% 5 P.?., the find attack, prepared with the support of fire fro» the fleet, woe launched, but it was also unseececsful. The 13th division lest 413 sen. The total losses of the $th KngLlsh Q&rpa1 tr*m the 9th to th© 10th of August wa« 400 officers and 8,000 i»en« -11 On August lath, the enei»y repeatedly attacked our battalion at Petit Anafarta Ova with on© brigade, but the&e attack© w©r«j pepuletd* The total loeaoa of the 7th and 12th divieiona 'from August 9-13, 3,536 emu COMBATS OF KXflBTCH (August 15 and The English northern wing hid re&ndned to-> far In rear, ®ad in order to ewr« it forward, the ©n©Biy ordered, on August 15th at 3*30 P»U,» two brigades* to attack Klretch Tspe. This attack was preoedad fey a» ittteneive erHilary |ir©p-arittior» mild th© afeov® namd the enasy's hands* .;© countertdteckad during the aight and suac@©d«d in capturing Arslaa T«p©, but could aat hold it aa account of the ©a«niy Oa th© cjoraing of August 16th, th® ©n©iay r®assua© ing Kanly Tep©t but our oounterattaok launched at 3 f».K. ia the after noon recaptured Arelan Top©, About three regiments p«u,*ticipat«d In thie coiabat, th» looses were 1,600 men. As a result of the failure of th© English operations at Suvla, General Liele, who had Wen appointed Goraajaader of the 9th Corpo, quickly reorgaa iaed the 10thf 11th, 53d and 54th divisions (30,000 mm), that were in the Buvla region* He reoelved or&w* directing hlw to undertake another attach on lemoil Oghlou Tepe and Petit Anafarta. Oa 18 August, the ZA Oav&lry divittion arrived from Egypt and waa landed at Suvla* on the 20th, the 29th division, that had boea leithdravH from the ^Mdul Bahr son© was also eent to Suvla* With all the^e forces, the Eaglieh eecided to fcfctaek on U August and adopted the following •12* The 53d and 54th divisions would occupy the front from Eouladjik to Kireteh Tepe; the 11th and 29th divleiaas were to attack on the Immil Oghlou Tepe-Youseefdjak Tepeei front, and afterwards advance on Petit Anaf aria. The 2d cavalry division and the 10th division would retrain in reserve in the Lola Baba region. A foroe of nine battalions was to attack the line D&makdJyXyk-Kayadjyk AghiXi-Sousak Rouyousou* The Turkish troops in this sector consisted of the 5th, 13th and 7th division©. Off (August 21 and 22) See map P.^ The attack unfolded itself in the following Front of the 12th divlaiort, •• At 2 «3Q f•. •-'. the enaray using both his land and naval artillery, cosoaeneed an intensive bombardment on the front of the 12th division ©specially at Youseefdjak Tope and Xenail Oghlou Tepesi. Having partially destroyed the trenches in this sector, the infantry attack was launched at 2 $30 i\K j at the start, the tngllsh captured several trenches at Yousaefdjok Tepef but were driven out of them without delay. At the nom time the enemy oaptured several trenches on the left flank of our division and succeeded in holding them. A little later, the eneny reserves were brought up against Lala Baba and the attack was reaaeumed, but after reoccupying the trenches at Youssefdyak Tepet the 9n»my was again driven out of the . during the night, the 12th division, reinforced ey the 9th division, repeatedly counterattacked the English left, and succeeded in driving the back thus reoecupying the lost trenches. BaTrzmitcfe Yeni Keqy on. — Edie limani ^ ^JoLapsekie Tores Legende \ ooxm A/lies 0 2ft 30 6«Rm. „ ..L. Crocruis n° 6. — Situation le 15 aout 15. -13 fUDtTT fly TH|S TTty jgV&ftM!u After a similar preparation, the enemy attacked the front of this division, to the south of Mmak Dare, at 3 P.m. Although repulsed at our right, he succeeded at the centre captur ing our trenches at Kayadjak Aghili, holding them despite our efforts to drive hist out* In this combat, the losses were as follows! Turkish: 3,600 man, English > 6,558 raen. In order to try to extend the success obtained at Kayadjak, the ensrny again attacked on 27th of August at 5 P.M*, after &n intensive preparation txn& captured several trenches* We counterattacked during the night, recovering part of thtm, but had to give them up* 3n this costbat, our losses wr® 67® men, thofi» of the English 1,000 men* This combat was the last iisport&nt operation in the Anafarta sone» position warfare coti^enced thereafter lasting until the evacuation* OF THE After the failure of the operations at Anafarta, the French Gov ernment decided to aend four divisions to the Dardanelles under the Command ef General £arrai& and the English Gov@rnment decided to send two more divisions» tout before ©ending theee troops, it was necessary to await the results of the offensive that had been planned on the French front for the latter part of September, At this tirae, Bulgaria mad© known that she intended to mobilise and the Austro Germans sommeneed their preparations for an offensive against Serbia. The French and the English decided to send an expeditionary corps to Saloniea in order to -14 help Serbia. The hopes of sucoea© at the Dardanelles were gradually being lost and th© question of evacuation eeraraeneed to be ike subject of discussions. General 8ir Charles .'onro was ©ent to the Dardanelles in October wnd instructed to survey the situation end render & report about it. As a result of hie inspection, he reported that the ©vacua* tion was imperative. Before making a final decision, the British Gov ernment sent Lord Kitchener, who expressed the asise opinion as General Monro. Is consequence, the evacuation of the Dardanelles was officially decided upon; however, only th© sectors of An&f&rta and Aribouraou were to be evacuated, the Seddul dtuhr sector was to be kept as a point of support ioit naval operations. Th© necessary pr©p&ratia*is were made to this effect* en December 19th, 1915, a feint was carried out at $eddul Bahr; during the night &f December 19-20, the sectors of Anafarta and Aribournou were evacuated. The Turkish forces at Anafarta and Aribournou were subsequently concentrated on the Seddul Bahr front in order to attack the English forces in that teeter. Large quantities of aj&manition had arrived from Gennany, As soon as the Allies learned of this, the evacuation of Barh was decided upon* this operation waa carried out during the night of January 9-9, 1916. campaign lasted 329 days frow the date of the first bombard* went (19 February BIS) mad 259 days from the day of the first enemy landing. As far as the Turkish army is concerned, it wa« the bloodiest campaign of the Great War and it va9 an incomparable viciory for the Ottoman farsee. The largest number and the best of our troops parti -15 cipated tn it, and they e©ueltt»ively taanetrated their fighting qualities, Qttr effectives ©a thle front, towards the loiter part of September, exceeded 21 infantry division© or over 310,000 as@rw The total lo&aes of the Turkish foroos on this front baa a©t b©©n ©xaetly determined as yet. #he f ©Hewing figures, have been etwpiled from vttrl9$8 »©ure©s »«4 documeat© and ur®t ia general, very close ta the ecaet numberst Killed •*•-^—— —™«—.•-...»«••« 55,127 -DUM®CI -—«—.—™——..——•.—»-. 100,177 Mi©8i»g —•.**-™™»^«««l-*—^.»,^.«»<^.w 10,067 Deaths esaueed by various diseases ••••»• is th© TOTAL ••••.—*——.«. 186,269. The number ©f se&.«ho w@r© ©vaeuat^d fraas the fro sat during the operations, either through diseaie or hardships, was M,440, We o&n therefore, estimate that our total l$3g&® on the Dardanelles front were 350,709 men. the Allied losses inaluatlag dead* wounded> prisoners and missing were as follows s British ••«. ——i —»—* 216,000 TOTAL — 331,000 (1) QN THK OPlgRAT10iHSr COVEflED IML.PAJg. .XXI. I. The Allied pi cm presenting the landing at Anafarta %nd the limnary operations as eouoeived by the enemy aonforaecl, in priiasipie, te the requiremente of the oituatioru It haraionized with the desired (l) from the b©ok "I** Grand® Guerre 1914*18, p,50, by Civrieux, ef the Fr^nah The Allied lasses and evacuations due to ®i®kn&@® hwre 'not been pwbliehedU Tbe Allies hawe offieiially adeiitted the fallowittg leeeee in combat. {continued on nest •16 end, and Justified, therefore, the landing of a portion of the forces in front of Aribournou, in order to attack the defender® in conjunction with the unite that had already *een landed on that zone, thereby attracting the attention of the defenders, pinning the* down and caus ing thea to use their reserves. These operations were to facilitate the projected landing at Suvla, besides covering the flanking movement directed against the right flank and rear of the Northern Oroup, by way of Anafarta. This sound decision mi^ht have brought results of vast importance, had it been energetically carried out, for, had the Allies begun their offensive in the Anafarta sector, which was only defended by a very weak detachment (one dord-b&ttallow of gendarmes &nd two and one "half battalions of infantry), and where operations could have been conducted in an open country, they could have reached Bighaii by way of Grand Ana farta* Thie objective, once attained, would haveroa.de the invaders masters of the Straight, because all corcrunications between art of the troops defending the Straight (Northern and Southern Groups) with the interior of the country, could have been cut off. (2) Maximum IVtal forces No. of Off re. Ho. of Total, (Killed,Wounded Array Strength participating killed. En.Men and Prisoners) Present. killed. Officers. Enl • Men. British 127,000 468,987 1,785 31,737 5,053 114 ,676 French 30,000 26 ,500 TOTAL 157,000 Ul ,176 What ware the reasons why the assail!anta did net achieve their purpose! The causes may be briefly stated in the following manner'» 1. The various attacks were neither coordinated nor simultaneous. 2. The enemy troops that landed at Anaf arta did not quickly and energetically throw into disorder the weak elements of the defense in that region. II. should the Commander of the defence have considered the iia enewy landing; and ^hj^t fe)tr&te^ic dietributlori of forces should he have made? 4 study of the remarks and conceptions of the Commander of the 5th Array shove that he expected that the imminent new enemy landing would be made at either of the following places: let. On the isthmus of Boulair oa the Gulf of Saros, so as to cut off all communications between the peninsula and Constantinople. 2d. On the Tehata Tepe-Koua Tcpe region between the Northern and Southern Group in order to separate them and to thus plate the Southern Group in a critical situation. 3d. In the souther part of the peninsula in order to reinforce the iieddul Bahr front. the Turkish Commander did n>t think that either the Anafarta region or the coast of Asia were threatened. Based upon the above outlined ideas the Ottswa&n forces were distri buted as shwwn on :'ap. , page In fact, the landing decided upon by the enemy, could have been nade in the following regions: .18 1st* Coast of Anatolia (trm Bechika to Kousi 2dV At Seddul and Ari Bournou, in order to reiinfore© theee fronts. 3d s Between the Seddul Behr and Art Bouraou fronts. 4th 8 Horth of th© Ari Bournou front (An&farta region). 5th i G»lf of S«ro«, FlretT Hypotfreeis *— If th© ©nerny forces landed on thfc coast of Anatolia would not ewet any resistar.ee, they could only go &e fcur as the Eren Keuy huights in Betehlka wrivia^t at this place on the following th© day of landing; starting fro& Kousi Kalet they eriuld got late the above journey and be there, perhaps, ©n the evening of the eaia© dfey. However, th© reeiet»mce offered by cur outpost detachmente, east of the Menderes line, might have doubled thie delay. In consequence, it was reasonable to leave Ine division in the Eren Keuy region, jluet to defend this front at the beginning, another divisio army reserve, on the European coast at Kilid Behr in front of Tehanak Kale, Th© two reserve divisions, could ssove, in oae© of neoeesity, on JSren Keuey or on anjr other ot>nveni«nt^ point further to the rear; they could stop and held the e»©n*y forcee that vould att®pipt to advance after their landing in th© eoatt of Anatolia« Second Hypothesis i~~ It ih«» enemy landed new toree% «t Seddul B»hr and Ari Bournou, in order to reinforce these fronts, it \s?as hardly prob ably that he would draw any considerable adv&ntag® fr©»? it. In f&ftt, these defensive front© could b# rapidly reinforced by the three reserve divisions of the Nerthern and Southern Groupsft and gradually by the six divisions of the zones of Anatolia and SeroaS the ene?ny advance could be thus checked. Hypothesis :— The forces landing between the Northern and Southern groups, were, in all probability, bound to fail. In fact, this front had been organised in advance, with the mean® available, against such eventuality; furthermore, the r&mrv* divisions of the group were closer together and could not only face the enemy, but even surprise him in the very act of landing; finally, the @»e»!$r could be attacked in front by the reserve divisions and on the flanks by the troops of these groups, and could b@ seriously threatened and envelop ed fourth Hypothesis *-- The Northern part of the &ri Bouraou «©n© was the weakest and west dangerous point of the defenders, as a matter of fact, there was no defensive organisation worth while in this region. Moreover the defensive forces were weak In this sector. Finally, the newly landed eneray corps, could cover hie left flank, for example, with a division against our divisions of Saros, envelope the right wing of the northern Qroup, advance quickly and boldly on Baghali by way of Kodja Tchi&en, then destroy the interior defenses of the straight, or cut off the communication© and lines of retreat of the Northern and Southern Groups. That possibility wa© the one that was feared the most by the Turks. Fifth Hypothesis *-- k landing, no matter where, on the coast of the Gulf of Saros, at the isthmus of Boulair, for example, was not of a nature to e&us© any alarm to the ariwy. In fact, this enemy could be easily and quickly disposed ot by the anay reserves in this *on© J its operations weuld lack importance, because they would take place too far may frow the vital parts of the Straight. -30 In accordance with the abov© eonsi derations, the following strategic distribution of forces sight hart been made : Far the coast of Anatolia: one division at Kr©n K«u«y and outposts* In tint KOUSJ T«yi© region! on© of the r^tjei'v© divisions of the Bouth«> era At Tchanak Ksd®: on® of the divisions of Anatolia. At Killd BahrJ another ©f th»s« divisions. For th© zone of Gmros ! two divisions might suffie©, the remising on® of th© three divisions etatioited herein, to h& assigned to tfe® Taiuresoun Keuey region, Th© four division© located at Tehanafc Kale, ttilid BaJtir, Kousi Top© and Tourchoun Kouey, to be placed at the disposal of th® army; according to the circumstances the army eould be used ©iihsr in the eaart of Anatolia, the interval bet«r@en th® Northern and Southern Groups or on the Ansfarte front, III. The enopsy had correefly decided upon an attack in th© general direction of Ksnly Syrt, b®for@ effecting a landing on the Aoafarta front; h© could, as matter of fact hav® fully reaped the benefits that he expected from it . 1st. This Kauly Byrt attack could have broken the liaison between the ??orth«r» and^uthern Group©, thrown th© rear of these groups into confusion, pinning down and ©owpftlliag the Turks t© use th© reserves of the Northern Croup* 2d, from the moment of the landing, the «n«my attack en Tehunuk S«ir was ta overthrow the left wing of th® Northern Group, eorapelling both northern sad Southern groups to use thtir remtft®® and a»sar« tkm -21 e&ay anil rapid execution of the enveloping movement of the Allied troops that were t® land In the An&farta region* The Horthera Sroup faced with plenty of energy and activity the enemy offensive, the progress of which was alarming, at first; it repell ed the enemy with the aid of the reinforcements eent by the Southern Group at juet thie critical moment. The energy &nd activity of the North- era Group and the solidarity of the Southern Group were very remarkable. The bravery and heroisra displayed by the Turkish troops la this couater offensive deserve the highest praise. QKMKRAL COMETS OK, TVS .ATTACK AND BftfETO OF ThVS SITUATION BEFORE TR& QQMKENCKI^m OF THE The General Situation' of the forld War at the tine that the fleet of the Entente made ite first threat against the Dardanelles wae as follow : The Gentian offensive on the western front had been stepped by the armies of the Entente, The combats in the arnet Fioardy, Artois and Flanders continued, without producing any noteworthy changes. The Western front, with one flank refitting en the Worth &fta and the ether en neutral frvltierland, did not offer to either adversary an op portunity for extended military operations. The Kaetern front seemed to be etabilixed on the ausso-Genmn front* ier, along the watershed ae far as the Carpathian mountaina, but the Russians were ia dire straits concerning railways and munitions, eo that the possibilities of the continuation of such conditions, appeared to be doubt ful. Th« situation in the Southern front (Serbian front) had undergone •on» changes at the expense of the Austrian*!, who had boon thrown back, north of the Danube river, by th» 6©rbiiuis. It nay be said, therefore, that, in general, the situation e&emed to be more favorable for the Entente than for th© Central SITUATION OH THIS TURKISH CAUCASUS FRONT.- After the enormous losses sustained by the 3d army on its offensive at Sarykassyeh, this arwy retreated to the heights east of A«ap, behind the frontier and assu&ed the defensive. It had lost for a long time to some, all its offensive capacity, and in order to regain it,this artsy was reinforced by the 5th expeditionary corps and vae being gradually reorganised in Ben and materiel. The Russians did not soew in condition to push back the 3d army any farther, and, therefore, this &rmy was inconveniencing then to a large extent. I RACK FRQHT.- After having occupied Baesora and Oeurna, the English expeditionary corps had momentarily suspended its operations* The Turk ish Command was planning on the execution of a very vast plan; It waft making efforts to assemble the main part of the Turkish forces (Arehiret troops) (1)» in the Naaeirie Region am! to pin down, with secondary forces, the English on the Tigris and the Karoua. (l) *'km Trite troopa, called "irregulars" by the European©. -23 - Aft«r the failur© of th© expedition against the , th* rather aswtll number of Turkish troops in this region, had fallen back, all contact between the two adversaries had been lost. The altuation around tho Ottoman Capital w&a a« follows s The Turkish G.H.Q* , expecting a naval attack against the Dardanelles at most any tine, had kept the 1st, 5th and 6th corps in the region of Constantinople • the mission of these corps was to be on guard in ease that such an attack would take place and fac@ a tiussian attack or a landing on both shores of the Bosphorus. The £d corps remained in the province of Andrinople, ready for any eventuality. The 4th eorps wa@ concentrated on the line Panderma* Balikesair and was teoiinforee the Dardanelles defenses, in ease of necessity. There was not the slightest doubt that the capture of Constantinople, the capitol and center of nearly all the means of warfare of the Ottoman anpire, was one of the aims of the war as well as the strategic objective ef the enemy Powers. The occupation of Constantinople could compel the Subiirse Pert to cease all hostilities or to abstain front participation in the European war. The Entente had plenty of reasons for trying to attain these results, because they then could make eemnon uset and in a large seal©, of the millions of men available and the abundant food resources ef Russia, they could provide Kuasia with the arms, munitions (2) *'•'• See "L'Attaque et l aT>*tma& de Canal de Buee**, Revue de Deux ondea, 15 December 1925. -34 and meiUriel which thle Pewtr needed; they could maintain the js&litary power of Russia, and could thus ssake poacdbl© the prolongation of the war* All this defended the capture of Constantinople and the opening the Straights to the Allied Powers. In fact, the Baltic sea was effectively cloeed by the German fleet* the ice closed the entrsuics to &rkh»»gel during the larger part of the year; the capacity of the ?ranseiberien railway did not ex WM3«, * that of March 13th. To attain such an important end, it would have been »eee©eary to disregard the fear of heavy lessee, make tht •tteiapt ae strong as poflsible, repeatedly renewing the efforts; in this manner the Entente could hare succeeded In the attack using purely -2S naval raeana aloae. The aehieveswrtt of suoh «ai isaportaitk al*a that there weuld not bo any hesitation in surmounting sll difficulties, nor la facing th« worst of coaciitlonfi. Th© second method was preferable, and wa.8s of course, th* surest* But, in either ease, it was unsound to start the operation* with liE&t*4 forces, reirrforeing them afterwards, .'as it was the «a»»; it vac indie* peasable to have calculated the probable necessary cseaii©, in all its , mid as a result of this study, gathered the required forces> the first blows with th© utmost fflMTEg COH)Piy3QH TO .AIJUQT A jv OF LAUD FODCSS.TO THS THKAT«S QF On the 9«tt«m Frd«it» th« importMMS® of whieli was Ttry l«rgs for England sad ?r«moe, ths situation was favorable. It fas natural that the British and the French wo Among the causes of failure of the land and naval offensive opera tions, the following are the most importantJ Heither the number nor the activities of the submarines which pene trated into the sea of Marmara, were sufficient. The eneroy Powers could have cut off the naval communications between the Turkish cavitol and the 5th array, if they had used this redoubtable arm to the maximum This eventuality would have compelled the Stb areay to ask for wore lines of eorarctmications and sup; lies by land, and th© question of supplying this anay would have been ravy difficult and precarious. Moreover, the lines of communications of the 5th army must have necessarily passed by the isthmus of Boulnir and eeuld, therefore, have been cut off or die- organized by the fire of the Allied fleet. -27 2d#- In land operations it was necessary, from the very beginning, especially at Seddul Bohr, to use land artillery against the defenders and their positions, Th© assaillantB repeatedly attacked with obstina cy and herosim, but without success; on© of th© reasons for thier failure, wa» the total lack of heavy artillery during the first period and the email amount of it during th© last period. The as sail I ante tried to make up this defficlency with the guns of fleet, which carried out heavy bom bardment fi preceding Bach attack, but $hia step did not really accomplish the expected results. Three guns of flat trajectory only fired explosive shells thai were inefficient against defiladed infantry positions, so that the assailants ran up against the defenders, whose reelstance regain ed intact. ' Third*— The attacks did not maintain the energy that had been shewn in the first offensive attacks and gradually became weaker. Thus the attacks of ftri Beumou, Kanly Syrt and kn&taria, fro^ the 6th to the 10th of August, were comparatively weaker than the attacks at the beginning of the campaign, so much so, that the landing corps of Ana- fart a hesitated for nearly two daya before* our two and a-hslf battalions (of which one and a half battalions wer© gendarme**), and allowed time for the arrival of the Turkish divisions from Saroe. This was probably due to the fact that the newly arrived units at the front had not been trained in the rear areas. 5th.- During th© Dardanelles campaign, frow beginning to ©nd, the enemy's armies made, in general, remarkable effort*> the xsodical service, In particular, was near perfection* However, sanitary conditions were rendered ^erf mediocre by the climate of the peninsula, the marshy terrain of the tone of the later landings, and the copious rains, all of which contributed to the extension of a dysentery epidemic* It is a fact that these sanitary conditions was one of the leading reason® that leod to the evacuation, 'sl'hy did the Turkish G.H,Q. not increase the forces charged with the defense of the straight after the failure of the first nayal__.attewpt_, when the Turkish Supreme Ooremand received information that the Entente wag planning a siwultaneouMr attack by land and w at or, and was inf orated of the activity with which such an attack was beinff prepared? the following Turkish troops were stationed at Constantinople when the 5th arny was organised s 1st: The 2d aray composed of five corps, was charged with the defense of the omet of the Bluck Sea and BoBphorus. 2d The 1st Army, which was composed of the 1st and 6th corps. The 2d corps had the 4th division at Andrinople, the 6tn division at Karyk Kilisae. The 4th corps was echelonnod on the line Paaderma-Balikessir. The 3d corps was already at the Dardanelles. The 5th and 11th divisions, which formed part of the abov© corp®» wore subsequently seat te that place. The 3d infantry division smd on® cavalry brigade were also seat to the Dardanelles as soon as Liman Pacha arrived at Gallipoll and assumed command of the forces thereat. According te these figures, there remained, besides the forces as signed to the Dardanelles, a total of six infantry divisions : eight of then lit the vicinity of Constantinople (including the 26 corps) and two te the Bast of the Sea of Marmora. The Turkish <2*H*Q. was holding these force® around Constantinople in order to defend the Northern and Eastern coast of the Sea of Sfa In case that the Allies would succeed in forcing the Dardanelles„ and to face the expected Huesian attack» the Turkish Command did not de»ir« to strip tadrinople and Kyrfc Kilisse of their forcse, because the atti tude of Bulgaria was unknown* on the other hand, It is probable that General Headquarter© considered that the forces at the Straight were sufficient to repel the first ©newy attempt, although no official do* ounents that would support a categoric statement on this subject have been found up to date. Be as it may, the Intentions of G*H*Q. were to • tevent an enemy to landing or to compel the ©nessy to r%embark and,prevent him from secur ing a foothold on land* G.H.Q* could, later on, fill up the front of those divisions, with complete or partly organised units, a certain number of which could have been sent to the peninsula in tine to assure the possibilities of counterattacking more effectively the first eneisy troops landed. Froia the strategic conceptions &t the Turkish G.H.Q*, we may cone to the logical conclusion that G.ll.q. far from realised the political and military importance of the Dardanelles* The hypothetical danger of the North had been estiimted as more alarming them the sure and imminent attack from the South, However, the successful defense of the straight was the most efficient means of obtaining the final victory, for the attainment of which we were struggling with the Entente* The Straight of Dardanelles, beside® its general value, is of vital importance to us* The existence of our capital, wherein were centered all our means of warfare and the liason of our European possessions with* -30 Anatolia, demanded that the straight be and fcept under Turkish control. There can never bt allotted a too large proportion of forces for the accQinplishroGnt of the most important airo. According to thin prin ciple, our firet preoccupation should have been the defenee of the Dardanelles, which two great Powers were trying to force by eea and land* Xt was necessary and possible to withdraw at leaet four of the eight divisions that were stationed around the capital en account of the North ern menace,- *. menace of the third order. In accordance with the information received, the Allies attacked i the Dardanelles with our 90,000 men. Had they crushed our six divisions, and passed the Straight arriving in front of the capitol with the fleet, what could have been done, in the face of such a disaster, by our eight divisions that had been kept in re®rt In consequence, the six corps should have been assigned, previous to the firet landing, in the following manner, in order to be strong at Constantinople, Andrinople and, above all, at the Dardanelles• 3d Corps: In the Gallipoli peninsula. 4th Corps: One division at Smyrna; the other two on the line Panderraa-Balifceissir, ready to cooperate in the defense of the Dardanelles or that of Constantinople according to the circumstances. 5th Gorpe ' iiegion of Keehan &n& coast of Baroe. 6th Corps* Asiatic coast of the Straight* 1st Corps! Constantinople (temporarily for th© defense of the coast of the Black Sea and the Bocpharus. 2d Corps: Province of Adrianopl© (facing Bulgaria; could have been sent to the Dardanelles or Constantinople). -31* The first four corpn should have been organized into one amy and the la«t two consolidated into another. The former should have been charged with the defense of the D&rdanellec and the fortified position Of SnyrnaS the latter should have looked after the defense of the Beephorus and the surveillance of the Western and Northern fronts of the province of Andrlneple* The following pointst anong others, should be brought out* (j^). It was shown that the sea and land fronts should have been placed under one supreme consaand, who could hair• been held responsible fer their defense. The oversight of this precaution was the cause that fros the beginning to the ©ndi of the campaign, the artsy did not receive from the navy, the expected important support. (]>)• -ince the Gallipoli Peninsula was to be the theatre of import ant operations9 the Turkish Commander in Chief, should have ordered, at the proper tine, the transfer to the peninsula of heavy guns and howitzers, old navy tieees and all the pieces that oould be found at Andrinople that were in condition to fire. The 12»c» howitzers of Andrinople were sent to the Dardanelles, it is true, but they arrived too late. The work accomplished by the. medical service of the 5th array during the campaign, deserves to be Mentioned, because it was remarkable. the i»G®t difficult conditions, and in spite of the great laok of means, the medical service showed en efficient organisation which proved the great progress that had been made by this service, aft well as by the Turkish vmy ** * whole. Ind.