The Durability of Client Regimes: Foreign Sponsorship And
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The Durability of Client Regimes: Foreign Sponsorship and Autocracies, 1946-2010 Adam Erickson Casey A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy department of political science university of toronto © by Adam Erickson Casey (2020) abstract “The Durability of Client Regimes: Foreign Sponsorship and Autocracies, 1946-2010." Adam E. Casey, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 2020. This dissertation investigates the relationship between foreign support and the survival of authoritarian regimes. Conventional wisdom suggests that great power patrons prop up client dictatorships. However, this is generally assumed rather than systematically analyzed. My dissertation provides the first comprehensive assessment of the relationship between for- eign sponsorship and authoritarian regime survival with the use of an original dataset of all autocratic client regimes in the postwar period. These results demonstrate that patronage from Western powers — the United States, France, and the United Kingdom — is not associ- ated with client regime survival. Instead, only Soviet sponsorship reduces the risk of regime collapse. I explain this variation by considering the effects of differing strategies of foreign sponsorship on client regime coup vulnerability. Not a single Soviet client regime ever lost power to a military coup. This was the result of Soviet assistance in the implementation of highly penetrative coup prevention strategies that rendered militaries incapable of ousting incumbent regimes. In contrast, a fundamental ambivalence toward their autocratic allies and a focus on building Western-style militaries rendered U.S. and European clients highly vulnerable to coups. Western clients did not receive patron assistance in restructuring their security forces to prevent a coup and were abandoned in the event of a successful coup. I test these arguments using recently declassified archival sources, secondary sources in En- glish and Russian, and a series of statistical analyses using both original and newly available data. ii acknowledgements No project on patronage would be complete without a patron and this dissertation is no exception. Lucan Ahmad Way has provided constant encouragement, brilliant feedback, superb advice, and good humor that has made this project what it has become. Lucan has been with this project from the very beginning and has always been the ideal mentor, collaborator, and friend. He truly represents the best of what the academy has to offer. Seva Gunitsky has also been a role model, source of advice, and friend. He has been an integral part of this project from its early days, and he is owed a great deal. Joe Wright was kind enough to agree to join this project early on despite no institutional or personal obligation. His remarkable knowledge of both innovative research methods and the empirical world of authoritarian politics have improved this project substantially. Noel Anderson provided sharp feedback from the moment he arrived in Toronto and is a great source of encouragement. Eva Bellin graciously agreed to act as an external reviewer and provided extremely thoughtful feedback which was a tremendous help. Sean Yom quickly embraced this project and provided early support and mentorship. I have benefited considerably from my work with Steve Levitsky, who has provided sup- port that has improved this project and my research more generally. I have enjoyed the opportunity to learn from Jean Lachapelle over the years, whose knowledge of research de- sign, statistics, and authoritarian politics has been a huge help. Erica De Bruin was kind enough to share her excellent data and has provided great advice and feedback. I owe a great debt to Barbara Geddes, Joe Wright, and Erica Frantz for creating the autocratic regimes dataset around which my data was gathered and for their remarkable accomplish- ments in the field of comparative authoritarianism. I have also received thoughtful feedback from Kristen Harkness, Brian Taylor, Lynette Ong, Shivaji Mukherjee, Carolina de Miguel Moyer, Roy Licklider, Jordan Gans-Morse, Egor Lazarev, Paul Staniland, Noah Buckley, Stephen Hanson, Jakob Tolstrup, Diana Fu, Orysia Kulick, Yoshiko Herrera, Stathis Ka- lyvas, Timothy Frye, Josh Tucker, Oisin Tansey, Vladimir Gel’man, Elizabeth Perry, Ed Schatz, Celeste Wallander, Kurt Weyland, Karrie Kosel, Jeff Kopstein, Juliet Johnson, Alex Fischer, Sean Norton, and Wonjun Song. Parts of this dissertation have been presented and received helpful comments at two Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Associ- ation (Philadelphia and Boston), Yale University, a joint Columbia-NYU workshop, and the Munk School of Global Affairs. My fellow graduate students at the University of Toronto have made this a terrific intellectual home. In particular, I would like to thank Sophie Bor- wein, Kevin Luo, Yao Wen, Zain Asaf, Lama Mourad, Ajmal Burhanzoi, Alexis Lerner, Zak Black, Dan Hutton Ferris, Dan Sherwin, Alix Jansen, Vanessa van den Boogaard, Minh Do, Kirstyn Hevey, and Jason VandenBeukel. I owe a tremendous debt to both Kathleen Collins and Cawo Abdi at the University of Minnesota, without whom I would not have gone to get a Ph.D. Their mentorship and friendship was and remains invaluable. Cawo took me on as a research assistant in my first year of university and taught me so much about what it means to be a scholar. I would also like to thank the Connaught Fund, the Ontario provincial government, Lucan Way and Steve Levitsky’s project on revolutionary regimes funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Trudeau Centre for Peace, Conflict and Justice, the support of whom was critical to my graduate education and this dissertation. My iii undergraduate education relied heavily on the generosity of the Edelstein Family Foundation, and I hope that my modest contribution to understanding the politics of nondemocracies might help further their mission for a more just world. I owe a special thanks to Dan Slater who has offered me a terrific intellectual home at the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies where I will get a chance to turn this dissertation into a book. My largest debt goes to my family. To my grandparents, who offered constant love and encouragement. To my parents, who instilled a love of learning that has yet to abate. To my brothers for their support and friendship. And to my partner, Tayla, who has had to listen to me discuss this project far more than any person should. Without her support and love this project would not have been possible. It is to her that this dissertation is dedicated. The above individuals and organizations are to thank for what works in this dissertation, but the blame for any errors lies solely with me. Parts of this dissertation use material from “The Durability of Client Regimes: Foreign Sponsorship and Military Loyalty, 1946-2010" in the journal World Politics, ©Cambridge University Press (2020), and is reproduced with permission. I thank the editors for allowing me to reproduce some of that analysis here. iv Contents 1 Introduction1 1.1 The Literature..................................6 1.2 The Argument...................................8 1.3 The Plan...................................... 36 2 Foreign Sponsorship and Authoritarian Regime Durability 38 2.1 Identifying Client Regimes............................ 38 2.1.1 Existing Measurements.......................... 39 2.1.2 The Autocratic Client Regimes Dataset................. 43 2.2 Analysis: Foreign Sponsorship and Regime Survival.............. 46 2.3 Analysis: Foreign Sponsorship and Coups.................... 56 2.4 Discussion..................................... 64 3 Vanguard of the Global Revolution: Soviet Client Regimes 66 3.0.1 Strategies of Sponsorship and Client Coup Prevention......... 79 3.1 Case Studies.................................... 84 3.1.1 Ethiopia, 1974-91............................. 85 3.1.2 Afghanistan, 1978-92........................... 95 3.2 Discussion..................................... 108 4 Allies of Convenience: Western Support for Client Dictatorships 110 4.0.1 Strategies of Sponsorship and Client Coup Prevention......... 124 4.1 Case Studies.................................... 131 4.1.1 South Vietnam, 1954-63......................... 131 4.1.2 Cambodia, 1970-75............................ 158 4.2 Discussion..................................... 176 5 Conclusion 178 5.1 Implications of Findings for Scholarship and Avenues for Further Research. 180 5.2 Policy Implications................................ 184 5.3 Sponsorship of Clients in the 21st Century................... 186 6 Appendices 189 6.1 Description of Variables Used in Analaysis................... 189 6.2 Supplementary Materials for Chapter 2..................... 195 v 6.3 Autocratic Client Regimes Dataset Codebook................. 203 6.3.1 Definition, Operationalization, and Measurement........... 203 6.3.2 Soviet Client Regimes.......................... 207 6.3.3 U.S. Client Regimes........................... 224 6.3.4 French Client Regimes.......................... 240 6.3.5 British Client Regimes.......................... 247 6.3.6 Chinese Client Regimes.......................... 251 6.3.7 Vietnamese Client Regimes....................... 253 6.3.8 Russian Client Regime.......................... 255 6.3.9 Yugoslav Client Regime......................... 256 6.3.10 Egyptian Client Regime......................... 257 References 257 vi List of Tables 1.1 Coup Prevention