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Stephen A. Emerson. the Battle for Mozambique: the Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977-1992)

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Stephen A. Emerson. the Battle for Mozambique: the Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977-1992) Stephen A. Emerson. The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977-1992). West Midlands: Helion and Company Limited, 2014. 288 pp. $35.00, paper, ISBN 978-1-909384-92-7. Reviewed by Michel Cahen Published on H-Luso-Africa (January, 2015) Commissioned by Philip J. Havik (Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical (IHMT)) The British historian Malyn Newitt wrote the And the guns would remain silent” (p. 34). It ap‐ following about The Battle for Mozambique: pears that he does not address the 2013-14 crisis. “Steve Emerson has written the most comprehen‐ Of course, a fully developed “new” civil war did sive account of the civil war in Mozambique that not materialize in Mozambique during these two has yet been attempted,”, and he underlines his years, but local violent skirmishes probably led to statement by explaining that “Emerson’s account several hundred deaths. Renamo was, surprising‐ is largely a military history” (p. 1). If one accepts ly, able to swiftly recover an armed wing, which that a war’s history may merely be the story of a could not be, twenty-one years later, the mere mo‐ battle, Newitt’s observation is correct and can be bilization of some veteran guerrilla soldiers reinforced when he stresses that one of the quali‐ equipped with rusty Kalashnikovs. Indeed, cur‐ ties of the book is the extensive use of interviews rently some Renamo fghters appear to be young with former participants, as well as the sheer men. On October 15, 2014, political competition number of facts, some of them “told” for the frst between Frelimo and Renamo—and the Movi‐ time. mento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM), the This book was published at the beginning of new opposition party created in 2009—took place 2014, although it was probably written a year be‐ again for the occasion of the presidential, legisla‐ fore, if not earlier. At the end of chapter 1, tive, and provincial elections, the frst in which Stephen A. Emerson writes that after 1992, “the the ruling party no longer felded a leader active competition between Frelimo [Frente de Liber‐ in the anticolonial struggle as its presidential can‐ tação e Moçambique, Mozambican Liberation didate. Frelimo officially won, but whatever the f‐ Front] and Renamo [Resistência Nacional de nal outcome, including the possibility of renewed Moçambique, Mozambican National Resistance] political instability, it is most certainly the begin‐ would continue, albeit in the political arena now. H-Net Reviews ning of a new historical period for Mozambique, rather than manifest support. Renamo’s contin‐ the “post-post-colonial” period. ued growth is dealt with in chapter 6, “Zimbabwe Following the recent 2013-14 crisis between to the Rescue.” In spite of the new political course Frelimo and Renamo, it is useful to “dive” back in the Soviet Union and the beginning of the end into the day-to-day events of the 1977-92 war, al‐ of apartheid after the South African defeat in though its overall social, cultural, psychological, Kuito-Kuanavale in Angola (1988), the tensions etc., history has yet to be written. Emerson works nevertheless persisted, as shown in “The Slugfest at the U.S. National Defense University and as a Continues” (chapter 7), with some indirect negoti‐ consultant for government policy makers—a com‐ ations. The turn of the 1990s, when Frelimo found mon combination in the United States that is itself increasingly confined to major cities with largely rejected by European academics in their Renamo maintaining a tenuous hold on an in‐ claim for independence. Obviously, the author creasingly sparse countryside, is discussed in had privileged access to classified sources from chapter 8, “The Hardest Battle of All.” During this these years, but he is not alone in this respect, as period, desperate forms of peasant resistance— João M. Cabrita had the same access for his such as the “Naparama phenomenon”[1]—devel‐ Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy oped as did direct talks in Rome. There is no con‐ published in 2001 and Emerson’s book is probably clusion to the book, except for a very short seg‐ a partial rewriting of several “situation reports” ment, “War’s Postscript.” that he wrote for a number of governmental From the very beginning of the book, we un‐ American bodies. derstand that the author is cautious in not favor‐ The book consists of eight chapters, chrono‐ ing one or the other side of the war—exactly as logically organized. In “Prelude to War” (chapter the U.S. government did in Mozambique but not 1), Emerson classifies the war in Mozambique as in Angola. The fact that the sources on Renamo forming part of the Cold War between Washing‐ are more extensively used than the ones concern‐ ton and Moscow, without considering these coun‐ ing Frelimo does not suggest any preference for tries as the source of the conflict. The “Birth of an Renamo; it is part of the book’s quality, since the Insurgency” (chapter 2) makes the link between Renamo side has always been more poorly docu‐ the liberation struggle in Rhodesia and the begin‐ mented. Nevertheless, the thesis Emerson defends ning of guerrilla warfare in Mozambique. This —that this “battle” changed in character as it con‐ “Rhodesian period” of the war inside Mozam‐ tinued and was a true civil war from the begin‐ bique came to an end in 1979 as “the turning ning of the 1980s—will not please Frelimo sup‐ point that never was” (p. 50). On the contrary, porters or for that matter Western academics Zimbabwean independence triggered the move of sympathetic to Frelimo. Still, Emerson only “ar‐ Renamo to the Gorongosa Mountains, as dis‐ gues” this point but does not cautiously analyze or cussed in “Battleground Central Mozambique” support it using quotations from books or articles (chapter 3), which led to a deepening of tensions that already defended the same thesis over the with Renamo supported by apartheid South years (except for Newitt’s work). Africa (chapter 4). The war escalated between This is, indeed, a military history book, which 1981 and 1983, in particular with the rebels’ lists and follows “operation” after “operation” crossing of Zambezi River. Renamo was highly de‐ from both Frelimo/Zimbabwean/Tanzanian and pendent on South African politics—“The South Renamo/ Rhodesian/ South African sides. Conse‐ African Factor” (chapter 5). But the Nkomati quently there is little interest in summarizing the Agreement (1984) obliged Pretoria to covert events here. Emerson clearly defines periodiza‐ 2 H-Net Reviews tion: the “Rhodesian period” (up to 1980) during vention, using research based only on interviews which the Rhodesian Front Governnment never of Mozambican refugees from Zambezia in imagined any kind of political consistency (let Malawi and controlled by international non-gov‐ alone autonomy) for Renamo; the “South-African ernmental organizations (NGOs) (seen as modern period” (1980-88) when the apartheid regime governmental bodies by people thus giving the openly supported Renamo up until the end of “right answers”[2]). This report was based on dou‐ 1984 but simultaneously found that it was in its ble translation—from English to Portuguese and own interest for Renamo to achieve greater politi‐ from Portuguese to African languages—of inter‐ cal consistency, and continuing its support in a views of refugees who supposedly had witnessed concealed fashion after 1984; and the fnal years Renamo’s systematic atrocities. Yet, none of these (1988-92), doubtlessly the worst years during refugees had seen a single Zimbabwean/Tanzani‐ which Renamo, then unable to rely on any exter‐ an soldier or plane or helicopter. Gersony failed nal state support whatsoever, was still able to con‐ to notice that the great wave of refugees from tinue the war in some “liberated areas.” Despite Zambezia to Malawi did not occur after the Ren‐ its apparent clarity, this periodization seems too amo offensive of 1986 but after Frelimo’s counter- “external.” From my perspective, the turning offensive in 1987. He applied a mathematical point lies at the time when Renamo was able to method to evaluate the number of casualties, i.e., cross the Zambezi River (1982) and established the quotas method, without realizing that many large “liberated areas” in Zambezia and the Tete refugees from the same area reported the same Province. This evolution forced Renamo to pay incident; indeed, Gersony’s evaluation found one more attention to peasant societies and build a hundred thousand war-related casualties, which civilian apparatus that was to be of greatest im‐ is mathematically improbable. But paradoxically, portance in 1992-94 when Renamo successfully in April 1988, the number was probably far high‐ became a civilian political party. er; in fact, the number of casualties resulting from The book is flled with details about facts and the civil war is unknown, even though the current events. Emerson criticizes some authors, in partic‐ version stands at one million deaths in military ular those sympathetic to Frelimo, for having “sto‐ confrontations and by war-related starvation at ry-told” facts without sufficient verification. As a the time of the Peace Agreement in October 1992! historian, I am particularly grateful to him for his Actually, the Gersony Report did not substantiate focus on the Flechas and Grupos Especiais (colo‐ its allegations and informed very few. Therefore, nial special troops) often presented as the infa‐ why did Emerson fail to criticize Gersony? Is it re‐ mous origin of Renamo to challenge the new inde‐ lated to the fact that he was a U.S. State Depart‐ pendent, Frelimo-ruled country. I have expressed, ment funded consultant? Emerson also accepts throughout my work in French and Portuguese, Jeremy Weinstein’s affirmation that Renamo was the lack of accuracy of this statement, and it is re‐ responsible for “the vast majority of the incidents warding to read it again in a properly argued text of violence” (p.
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