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Home , History of Mozambique, Mozambican Civil War, RENAMO

Stephen A. Emerson. The Battle for : The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977-1992). West Midlands: Helion and Company Limited, 2014. 288 pp. $35.00, paper, ISBN 978-1-909384-92-7.

Reviewed by Michel Cahen

Published on H-Luso-Africa (January, 2015)

Commissioned by Philip J. Havik (Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical (IHMT))

The British historian Malyn Newitt wrote the And the guns would remain silent” (p. 34). It ap‐ following about The Battle for Mozambique: pears that he does not address the 2013-14 crisis. “Steve Emerson has written the most comprehen‐ Of course, a fully developed “new” did sive account of the civil war in Mozambique that not materialize in Mozambique during these two has yet been attempted,”, and he underlines his years, but local violent skirmishes probably led to statement by explaining that “Emerson’s account several hundred deaths. Renamo was, surprising‐ is largely a military history” (p. 1). If one accepts ly, able to swiftly recover an armed wing, which that a war’s history may merely be the story of a could not be, twenty-one years later, the mere mo‐ battle, Newitt’s observation is correct and can be bilization of some veteran guerrilla soldiers reinforced when he stresses that one of the quali‐ equipped with rusty Kalashnikovs. Indeed, cur‐ ties of the book is the extensive use of interviews rently some Renamo fghters appear to be young with former participants, as well as the sheer men. On October 15, 2014, political competition number of facts, some of them “told” for the frst between Frelimo and Renamo—and the Movi‐ time. mento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM), the This book was published at the beginning of new opposition party created in 2009—took place 2014, although it was probably written a year be‐ again for the occasion of the presidential, legisla‐ fore, if not earlier. At the end of chapter 1, tive, and provincial elections, the frst in which Stephen A. Emerson writes that after 1992, “the the ruling party no longer felded a leader active competition between Frelimo [Frente de Liber‐ in the anticolonial struggle as its presidential can‐ tação e Moçambique, Mozambican Liberation didate. Frelimo ofcially won, but whatever the f‐ Front] and Renamo [Resistência Nacional de nal outcome, including the possibility of renewed Moçambique, Mozambican National Resistance] political instability, it is most certainly the begin‐ would continue, albeit in the political arena now. H-Net Reviews ning of a new historical period for Mozambique, rather than manifest support. Renamo’s contin‐ the “post-post-colonial” period. ued growth is dealt with in chapter 6, “ Following the recent 2013-14 crisis between to the Rescue.” In spite of the new political course Frelimo and Renamo, it is useful to “dive” back in the and the beginning of the end into the day-to-day events of the 1977-92 war, al‐ of after the South African defeat in though its overall social, cultural, psychological, Kuito-Kuanavale in (1988), the tensions etc., history has yet to be written. Emerson works nevertheless persisted, as shown in “The Slugfest at the U.S. National Defense University and as a Continues” (chapter 7), with some indirect negoti‐ consultant for government policy makers—a com‐ ations. The turn of the 1990s, when Frelimo found mon combination in the that is itself increasingly confned to major cities with largely rejected by European academics in their Renamo maintaining a tenuous hold on an in‐ claim for independence. Obviously, the author creasingly sparse countryside, is discussed in had privileged access to classifed sources from chapter 8, “The Hardest Battle of All.” During this these years, but he is not alone in this respect, as period, desperate forms of peasant resistance— João M. Cabrita had the same access for his such as the “Naparama phenomenon”[1]—devel‐ Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy oped as did direct talks in Rome. There is no con‐ published in 2001 and Emerson’s book is probably clusion to the book, except for a very short seg‐ a partial rewriting of several “situation reports” ment, “War’s Postscript.” that he wrote for a number of governmental From the very beginning of the book, we un‐ American bodies. derstand that the author is cautious in not favor‐ The book consists of eight chapters, chrono‐ ing one or the other side of the war—exactly as logically organized. In “Prelude to War” (chapter the U.S. government did in Mozambique but not 1), Emerson classifes the war in Mozambique as in Angola. The fact that the sources on Renamo forming part of the between Washing‐ are more extensively used than the ones concern‐ ton and Moscow, without considering these coun‐ ing Frelimo does not suggest any preference for tries as the source of the confict. The “Birth of an Renamo; it is part of the book’s quality, since the Insurgency” (chapter 2) makes the link between Renamo side has always been more poorly docu‐ the liberation struggle in and the begin‐ mented. Nevertheless, the thesis Emerson defends ning of guerrilla warfare in Mozambique. This —that this “battle” changed in character as it con‐ “Rhodesian period” of the war inside Mozam‐ tinued and was a true civil war from the begin‐ bique came to an end in 1979 as “the turning ning of the 1980s—will not please Frelimo sup‐ point that never was” (p. 50). On the contrary, porters or for that matter Western academics Zimbabwean independence triggered the move of sympathetic to Frelimo. Still, Emerson only “ar‐ Renamo to the Gorongosa Mountains, as dis‐ gues” this point but does not cautiously analyze or cussed in “Battleground Central Mozambique” support it using quotations from books or articles (chapter 3), which led to a deepening of tensions that already defended the same thesis over the with Renamo supported by apartheid South years (except for Newitt’s work). Africa (chapter 4). The war escalated between This is, indeed, a military history book, which 1981 and 1983, in particular with the rebels’ lists and follows “operation” after “operation” crossing of River. Renamo was highly de‐ from both Frelimo/Zimbabwean/Tanzanian and pendent on South African politics—“The South Renamo/ Rhodesian/ South African sides. Conse‐ African Factor” (chapter 5). But the Nkomati quently there is little interest in summarizing the Agreement (1984) obliged to covert events here. Emerson clearly defnes periodiza‐

2 H-Net Reviews tion: the “Rhodesian period” (up to 1980) during vention, using research based only on interviews which the Rhodesian Front Governnment never of Mozambican refugees from Zambezia in imagined any kind of political consistency (let and controlled by international non-gov‐ alone autonomy) for Renamo; the “South-African ernmental organizations (NGOs) (seen as modern period” (1980-88) when the apartheid regime governmental bodies by people thus giving the openly supported Renamo up until the end of “right answers”[2]). This report was based on dou‐ 1984 but simultaneously found that it was in its ble translation—from English to Portuguese and own interest for Renamo to achieve greater politi‐ from Portuguese to African languages—of inter‐ cal consistency, and continuing its support in a views of refugees who supposedly had witnessed concealed fashion after 1984; and the fnal years Renamo’s systematic atrocities. Yet, none of these (1988-92), doubtlessly the worst years during refugees had seen a single Zimbabwean/Tanzani‐ which Renamo, then unable to rely on any exter‐ an soldier or plane or helicopter. Gersony failed nal state support whatsoever, was still able to con‐ to notice that the great wave of refugees from tinue the war in some “liberated areas.” Despite Zambezia to Malawi did not occur after the Ren‐ its apparent clarity, this seems too amo ofensive of 1986 but after Frelimo’s counter- “external.” From my perspective, the turning ofensive in 1987. He applied a mathematical point lies at the time when Renamo was able to method to evaluate the number of casualties, i.e., cross the Zambezi River (1982) and established the quotas method, without realizing that many large “liberated areas” in Zambezia and the Tete refugees from the same area reported the same Province. This evolution forced Renamo to pay incident; indeed, Gersony’s evaluation found one more attention to peasant societies and build a hundred thousand war-related casualties, which civilian apparatus that was to be of greatest im‐ is mathematically improbable. But paradoxically, portance in 1992-94 when Renamo successfully in April 1988, the number was probably far high‐ became a civilian political party. er; in fact, the number of casualties resulting from The book is flled with details about facts and the civil war is unknown, even though the current events. Emerson criticizes some authors, in partic‐ version stands at one million deaths in military ular those sympathetic to Frelimo, for having “sto‐ confrontations and by war-related starvation at ry-told” facts without sufcient verifcation. As a the time of the Peace Agreement in October 1992! historian, I am particularly grateful to him for his Actually, the Gersony Report did not substantiate focus on the and Grupos Especiais (colo‐ its allegations and informed very few. Therefore, nial special troops) often presented as the infa‐ why did Emerson fail to criticize Gersony? Is it re‐ mous origin of Renamo to challenge the new inde‐ lated to the fact that he was a U.S. State Depart‐ pendent, Frelimo-ruled country. I have expressed, ment funded consultant? Emerson also accepts throughout my work in French and Portuguese, Jeremy Weinstein’s afrmation that Renamo was the lack of accuracy of this statement, and it is re‐ responsible for “the vast majority of the incidents warding to read it again in a properly argued text of violence” (p. 165) even though Weinstein’s in English. Yet, while criticizing some authors, book, Inside the Rebellion: The Politics of Insur‐ Emerson could have extended his criticism to the gent Violence (2007), is not principally based on so-called Gersony Report (Report of Mozambican feld research in its “statistical comparison” of vi‐ Refugee Accounts of Principally Confict-Related olence between Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru Experience in Mozambique), authored by Robert but rather based on secondary sources. My own Gersony and issued by the U.S. State Department feld research shows that the responsibility for vi‐ in 1988, which “theorized” about the war as “de‐ olence against civilians was shared by both sides. struction areas” as a result of Renamo-led inter‐ But the production of data was unfortunately not

3 H-Net Reviews well-shared: violence by Renamo against people ization of Frelimo’s politics. However, he express‐ loyal to Frelimo in the South near the capital city es this statement in a single line: the social foun‐ was far better documented by the Frelimo state dation of the war is barely present on the basis of and thus by international news agencies than the the assumption that it was a Cold War proxy con‐ violence in the distant Zambezian hinterland fict rather than a regional confict with apartheid against Renamo’s “liberated areas.” as a mere aspect of the Cold War. Nonetheless, Nevertheless, one must be grateful to the au‐ Emerson does not defend the “externalist” thesis thor for his critical attitude toward the “facts.” regarding the war only as an “aggression war.” He Unfortunately, however, he does not introduce a reiterates throughout the book—similar to other new perspective or new analysis of the war—ex‐ authors who he does not quote—on the one hand cept for the view that negotiations could have be‐ that Renamo would never have been able to be‐ gun and succeeded far sooner, since Frelimo was come what it became without Rhodesian and no longer communist and the war was thus lack‐ South African support; but on the other hand he ing in good reasons. In other words, although it also maintains that without the profound discon‐ was not the principal aim of the book, Emerson’s tent provoked by Frelimo’s policies, it would not social and political analysis of what Frelimo was have been able to transform itself into the impor‐ is weak; a summary of data culled from other tant rebel movement it became from the 1980s studies would have been useful, at least as useful onwards. as the “Historical Context” section in chapter 1. Emerson could have shared more insight into This section unnecessarily begins with the four‐ Frelimo’s social change given the link between so‐ teenth- and ffteenth-century Portuguese explorer cial and military history. Did Frelimo accept the , and repeats such myths as “Lis‐ negotiations with Renamo only because the world bon’s idealist vision of assimilating millions of was changing at the end of the 1980s? Or was it Mozambicans” when the function of the assimila‐ because Frelimo was no longer the state-appara‐ tion legislation was to defne who was not an as‐ tus party it had once been and had turned into the similated person, i.e., 99,9 percent of the African natural party of the most modern sectors of population which should be compelled to forced Mozambican , which opened it up to labor. It continues without quoting any historical imagining other ways of maintaining its domina‐ sources with the “democratic vision” of Eduardo tion? Emerson could also have expanded his dis‐ Mondlane, the president of the Mozambican Lib‐ cussion of the communal villages as one of Fre‐ eration Front in the 1960s, probably an “automat‐ limo’s military tactics from the 1980s onwards; on ic qualifcation” because he is described as a “dis‐ the recruitment of troops (he gives some fgures tinguished US-educated academic” (does Emerson on child-soldiers on both sides, but since he con‐ mean as opposed to the not-so-distinguished lead‐ ducted interviews with ex-combatants, he should ers of the radical Frelimo movement educated in have systematically spoken with them about the or Eastern Europe?). But the historical conditions of their recruitment, including psycho‐ fact is that Mondlane never said or wrote a single logical aspects); on Renamo’s military bases (we word against the one-party state, but for Emerson learn about them while reading about armed con‐ it seems that since he was not a “communist,” he fict but it would have been useful for Emerson to was therefore a democrat (p. 21). carry out a study on their changing typology and The author rightly notes that one of the rea‐ above all their local relations with the civilian sons for some sections of the peasantry to be sup‐ population across the country); and on relations portive of Renamo was the authoritarian modern‐ with traditional chiefs and the pro-Renamo civil‐

4 H-Net Reviews ian militia, the Mujeeba, which was very impor‐ mobilization and demilitarization (1992); and oth‐ tant for the defense system of the aforesaid bases. ers.[3] If he had paid attention to Portuguese-lan‐ There is another point of importance that the guage studies, he would have used books by the author could have addressed. Inside the Frelimo anti-Communist Brazilian soldier Pedro Marango‐ party, its Central Committee, and its politburo, ni, especially his A opção pela espada: Um was Renamo ever considered as a group of brasileiro na linha de frente, em defesa do Oci‐ “armed bandits,” that is, as a non-political body? dente (2004), about the very beginning of Renamo. The book gives the overwhelming impression that He would also have examined the studies of local this was the case within the party. But perhaps it contexts of the war (including the Naparama phe‐ was not as simple: how should one interpret that nomenon) by young Mozambican researchers— the defense minister, General Hama Thai—by only one is quoted—some of which were later chance a Cindau, just like , the published in the ProMedia series in . president of Renamo—gave special authorization When he mentions the Paulo Oliveira case, he in 1987 to the French anthropologist Christian bases his argumentation solely on Frelimo sup‐ Gefray to undertake feld research in the Nampu‐ porter William Minter’s 1989 report in English, la Province, a war zone, to study the social basis The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) of Renamo? Since Emerson interviewed José Luíz as described by ex-participants, telling the story of Cabaço, at the time secretary of Frelimo’s Central a Renamo “defector.” But Oliveira admitted in his Committee, who helped Gefray in obtaining this 2006 book published in Portuguese, Dossier Mak‐ authorization, it is a pity not to have established wakwa – Renamo: Uma descida ao coração das an association—probably an indirect one—be‐ trevas, that he staged his own Renamo defection tween the “small” beginnings of a new vision of when he returned to Mozambique in 1988 as an the war in a few narrow sectors of Frelimo and infltrated Frelimo agent. Furthermore, Portugal the start of indirect negotiations. is almost absent in the study on Renamo, despite the fact that the Portuguese military intelligence These limits are probably linked to another service (DINFO) gave support to Renamo, precise‐ problem: in the “Selected Bibliography”—al‐ ly with the idea of building a “Portuguese” link though “selected,” it actually quotes all of the and alleviating the dependency toward South books referenced in the text, but unfortunately Africa; Dhlakama’s daughter, for example, studied does not reference the unpublished or secret re‐ in Portugal. ports often cited only in footnotes—which in‐ cludes sixty references, there are but two refer‐ What’s more, I was astonished not to fnd ences in Portuguese and not a single one in some specifc references in English, such as David French. Obviously, this is not only a language Robinson’s PhD thesis on Renamo, or Carrie Man‐ problem but also an issue with balancing refer‐ ning’s book.[4] Although he uses some academic ences and sources. If Emerson had paid attention sources from both sides, clearly, the author is not to French studies, he would have found relevant sufciently familiar with key academic studies on elements which he included in his book that were the topic. A “third side” is missing, possibly be‐ already pointed out years ago in other studies, cause the author was unaware of its existence, such as Gefray’s articles in the Politique Africaine namely, the 1992-94 Onumoz ( Op‐ journal and his famous La cause des armes au eration in Mozambique) archives deposited in Mozambique (1990); my special dossier of Poli‐ 1995 at the Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, tique Africaine and 2002 book on Renamo; Chris‐ which include a large number of documents, es‐ tine Messiant and Roland Marchal’s study on de‐ pecially on Renamo at the moment of its demobi‐ lization. Indeed, Onumoz had a complete list of

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Renamo soldiers with names, places of birth, etc., viewees, except for top leaders. From the stand‐ on a CD-ROM! It was probably the frst guerrilla point of historical methodology, the opposite ap‐ group on such a digital data base. One wonders proach should have been adopted: the identity of where this CD-ROM can be found today. almost all interviewees should have been given, The book lacks context and comparison. The and as many details about them as possible author rightly quotes Charles Van Niekerk (the should have been provided. South African responsible for covert assistance to Although I am probably becoming too severe Renamo) who said that supporting Renamo was at this point of my review, I must confess that it is very cheap compared to the substantial support rather upsetting that a book about a former Por‐ requested by the National Union of the Total Inde‐ tuguese colony, an independent country having pendence of Angola (UNITA). But, as the author Portuguese as its ofcial language, is almost com‐ describes, page after page, how pletely based on English-language sources. Is the helped Renamo, one might be left with the im‐ English language adequate to understand the pression that the apartheid regime’s support for whole world? On the very frst page of the book, Renamo was huge, when it was twenty times less Newitt tells us that this confict, in spite of its in‐ than its support for UNITA! Since Emerson does ternational connections, was a “very African” con‐ not study the relations between the civilian popu‐ fict rooted in the . Indeed, lation and Renamo military bases, he fails to men‐ it is important to understand that. But Emerson’s tion the food supply system of the latter, and it book is “very American,” not in the sense of the seems as if some isolated islands were fed only by independent North American academic tradition, resources sent via South African planes or sub‐ but in terms of it being rooted in the tradition of marines. But this was more than a mere fnancial consultancy carried out by academics for mainly problem: on the one hand, the low-level support governmental security bodies. Mixing academic given to Renamo illustrated South Africa’s politi‐ research and situation report consultancy is al‐ cal options, even under Pieter Willem Botha’s gov‐ ways a complicated exercise. ernment, not to overrun Frelimo but to oblige it to I nonetheless do believe that this book should change; on the other hand, South Africa’s aim in be read by all “Mozambicanist” researchers and Angola was actually to overrun the Popular Move‐ advanced students. Despite its limitations, it pro‐ ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) because vides a lot of facts, often disclosing new ones. of the presence of Cuban troops —which can ex‐ Facts are not history, but history needs facts. How‐ plain their high-level support for UNITA. Whereas ever one “fact” is erroneous (p. 135): in Cabo Del‐ the frst type of support was therefore in the gado Province, Renamo never enjoyed popular hands of secret services, the second was con‐ support among the Makonde, but it did among the trolled by the army. Indeed, this dichotomy closely Macua and Mwene people—Makondes supported matches American analysis, which never consid‐ Frelimo during the anticolonial war and have re‐ ered Frelimo as Communist even during the radi‐ mained overwhelmingly faithful to Frelimo. We cal phase, while considering the MPLA Commu‐ cannot but agree with the last sentence of the nist, up to 1992. book: “Any peaceful resolution of diferences—no Finally, with regard to interviews of former matter how imperfect—is always preferable to combatants, Emerson tells us that few intervie‐ the cost of violence” (p. 205). But will a peaceful wees asked for anonymity, which he obviously resolution of diferences be possible when, in an had to accept. But one could question why he ex‐ imperfect country, there has never been sharing panded this anonymity to almost all of the inter‐ of power or wealth? Is history a question of good

6 H-Net Reviews intentions? These past days (late October 2014) in post-election Mozambique illustrate that it cannot thrive without justice, peace, and democracy. Notes 1]. Naparama insurgents were peasant groups ritually inoculated against gun shots and fghting against Renamo in the North of the country, soon recovered by Frelimo’s secret services. [2]. It is very important to fully understand that civil war in Mozambique was, at least partly, a war between two populations: one living in the sphere of the modern state and the other using Renamo guerilla warfare as a way to protect itself against the authoritarian modernization process led by the Frelimo state. The modern state, NGOs, and foreign diplomats, centered on urban areas, were largely perceived as one and the same thing by the latter section of the “population.” Their re‐ sponses should be appreciated in accordance with this context. [3]. Christian Gefray and Mögens Pedersen, “Nampula en guerre,” Politique Africaine, 29 (1988): 28-40; Christian Gefray, “Fragments d'un discours du pouvoir (1975-1985): Du bon usage d'une méconnaissance scientifque,” Politique Africaine 29 (1988): 71-85; Christian Gefray, La cause des armes au Mozambique: Anthropologie d'une guerre civile (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1990); Michel Cahen, “Mozambique: Guerre et na‐ tionalismes,” Politique Africaine, 29 (1988): 2-86; Michel Cahen, Les Bandits: Un historien au Mozambique, 1994 (Paris: Publications du Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 2002); and Roland Marchal and Christine Messiant, Les chemins de la guerre et de la paix: Fins de confits en Afrique orientale et australe (Paris: Karthala, 1997). [4]. David Robinson, “Curse of the Land: A History of the ” (PhD diss., University of Western Australia, 2006); and Carrie Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Confict Democratization, 1992-2000 (West‐ port, CT: Praeger, 2002).

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Citation: Michel Cahen. Review of Stephen A. Emerson. The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle (1977-1992). H-Luso-Africa, H-Net Reviews. January, 2015.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=42879

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