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The Necessity of Metaphysics Tuomas E. Tahko Department of Philosophy Durham University Ph.D. Thesis January 2008 ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline – necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one. A crucial issue here is what metaphysics in fact is – the nature of metaphysics. The conception of metaphysics which I support could be called Aristotelian, as opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the first philosophy and the basis of all other philosophical and scientific inquiry. I will argue that this is indeed the most plausible conception of metaphysics. The thesis consists of a brief historical introduction of certain important views concerning the nature of metaphysics, namely Aristotle's, Kant's, Carnap's and Quine's, and of a longer survey of the status of metaphysics in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics. I make some critical observations of recent accounts by people like Hilary Putnam, Michael Dummett, Frank Jackson and Eli Hirsch before launching into a thorough analysis of the relationship between metaphysics and other philosophical and scientific disciplines. The central argument of the thesis is that our a priori capabilities, which I claim to be grounded in metaphysical modality and ultimately in essences, are necessary for rational inquiry. Detailed accounts of a priori knowledge and modality will be offered in support of this claim. In fact, my accounts of the a priori and modality are perhaps the most important contributions of the thesis, as given this basis, the 'necessary' role of metaphysics in other disciplines should be quite obvious. I also pursue topics like the metaphysical status of logic and the law of non-contradiction as well as truthmaking, the substance of metaphysical debates, and the methodology of metaphysics. There is, however, a distinct theme which connects the broad range of topics that I discuss: they are all analysed from a metaphilosophical point of view. Indeed, it could be said that this is a metametaphysical survey of the status of metaphysics. The upshot is an original account of the status of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy – the conclusion that metaphysics is the core of all our rational activities, from natural science to logic, semantics and truth. Preface Preface This thesis is the culmination of a problem that has puzzled me since I was a little boy. I can finally formulate that problem accurately: what is the fundamental structure of reality and how can we reach knowledge about it? To answer this question – to even approach it – we need to turn to a discipline called metaphysics. My sympathies have always been with an Aristotelian, realist conception of metaphysics. During my philosophical career I have repeatedly tried to convince others that this is how we should understand metaphysics and this thesis is my latest effort to establish that. My Master's thesis, Grounding Metaphysics: Metaphysical Necessity and Essentialism (2005), which I did at the University of Helsinki, focused on the technical details of grounding a realist metaphysical system. In this thesis I have developed on many of the same themes, but I have taken a more metaphilosophical approach here. Some of the results in this thesis have already been shared with the philosophical community. I have presented drafts of many of the chapters at international conferences around Europe, including Italy, Greece, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK. I am grateful to the organisers and audiences of these conferences. A paper presented at Metafisica 2006 in Rome in July 2006, 'Metaphysics in Natural Science', which is based on the fifth chapter of the second part of the thesis, is forthcoming in the conference proceedings. Another paper, based on the first chapter of first part, 'The Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian Metaphysics', is forthcoming in the proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Philosophy which was held in Athens in June 2007. 1 Preface A paper entitled 'The Metaphysical Status of Logic', which is based on the 11th chapter of Part II, is forthcoming in the proceedings of LOGICA 2007, held at Hejnice Monastery, Czech Republic, also in June 2007. Finally, a paper based on chapter eight of Part II, 'A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis' is forthcoming in the journal Metaphysica (Vol. 9, No. 2, April 2008 ). My greatest debt is to my supervisor E. J. Lowe. His The Possibility of Metaphysics (1998) gave me hope of defending metaphysics proper, and was in fact the main motivation behind my Master's thesis. I have been fortunate enough to work with the best possible person in regard to the project, and I am indeed very grateful. I would also like to express my gratitude to my friends and family in Finland who have supported me in many ways. The graduate community at the philosophy department in Durham deserves to be mentioned as well, I have had many insightful discussions with Lloyd Taylor, Paul Winstanley and Donnchadh O'Conaill, among others. During my time in Durham, I have received financial support from a number of sources. In 2005 I received an award from Helsingin Sanomain 100-year Foundation to fund the first year of my research. In 2007 I was accepted for a Teaching Fellowship scheme run by the Centre for Science Outreach of Durham University and funded by the County Durham Economic Partnership and the Ogden Trust. Finally, in 2007 I was awarded a prize by the Finnish Cultural Foundation for the completion of the thesis. I am most grateful to all of these institutions. 2 Contents Preface...............................................................................................................................1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................4 PART I: A Historical Survey of Metaphysics..................................................................18 1. The Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian Metaphysics..........................................19 2. Kant and the Possibility of Metaphysics.................................................................35 3. Carnap's Anti-metaphysical Project........................................................................45 4. Quine's Conception of Metaphysics.......................................................................55 5. Beyond Quine.........................................................................................................67 PART II: The Nature of Metaphysics..............................................................................70 1. Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism...........................................................71 2. Metaphysical Realism: the Putnam-Dummett-Goodman Challenge......................82 3. Frank Jackson: Metaphysics as Conceptual Analysis.............................................95 4. Eli Hirsch: Watered-down Metaphysics................................................................111 5. Metaphysics and Natural Science.........................................................................120 6. The Methodology of Thought Experiments..........................................................130 7. The Relevance of Science to Metaphysics............................................................143 8. Metaphysics and the A Priori................................................................................152 9. Modality and Metaphysics....................................................................................172 10. Truth and Metaphysics........................................................................................195 11. Logic and Metaphysics.......................................................................................208 12. Semantics and Metaphysics................................................................................226 13. When are Metaphysical Debates Substantial?....................................................238 14. Towards a New Methodology.............................................................................257 15. The Necessity of Metaphysics............................................................................268 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................274 References.....................................................................................................................279 Introduction Introduction The primary purpose of this thesis is to defend a certain conception of metaphysics. According to this conception, metaphysics is a necessary discipline: whenever we engage in philosophy, science, or any rational activity whatsoever, there will be some metaphysics involved. In fact, metaphysics is a necessary precondition for all rational activities. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument. The first question that has to be dealt with is what metaphysics is. Thus, not only will we be dealing with metaphysics, but also metaphilosophy, or, to use an emerging term, metametaphysics. Having said this,
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