WikiLeaks Document Release http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 February 2, 2009

Congressional Research Service Report 97-799 and : Aegean Issues – Background and Recent Developments Carol Migdalovitz, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

August 21, 1997

Abstract. For many years, NATO allies Greece and Turkey have been adversaries in bilateral disputes which have produced crises and even brought them to the brink of war. One series of disputes involves the Aegean Sea borders. The two disagree over the border in the air, continental shelf, and territorial sea, over the status of islands in the Sea, and over the ownership of Aegean islets. http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 CRS ReportforCongress Aegean Issues—Backgroundand Congressional Re Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Received throughtheCRSWeb Recent Developments Specialist inMiddle Eastern Affairs Greece andTurkey: search Service Carol Migdalovitz August 21, 1997

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The Library ofCongress 97-799 F http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 the outlookdetrimentally. years, butdomesticpoliticaldevelopments with the parties to apply the Madrid declaration inJuly 1997. TheUnited States andreachedfruitionwiththeMadrid persevered change to beaforceforpositive Turkeypreventedtheand United States fromengaging immediately. The U.S.desire neutrality inthe crisis,however,was Imia/Kardak crisis,sought tobecome tomatch policygovernment’s spoke primaryforeign former Prime Minister BulentPrime Minister Ecevit and isnowDeputy the Greece, affectsthecurrent Papandreou, Andreas Minister political constraintsonpolicy change. rapprochement withAthens bilateraldisputes.Thein in weapon andtostopGreekuse be partofEurope its relationscirclesand withTurkey are an impediment.to Turkishsecularistswant threat” recedes.Greecealso control defense spending todoso. It can EuropeanMonetary the forjoining andmust criteria Union meet the to Greece wants toresolveand resolve exist. the Aegean disputes isuncertain. Strong motivations Aegean disputes. to equalanon-aggression pact.Theprincipl United States instigated a jointGreek-Turkish decisive overtureth Turkey suggested ways addressAegean Ayear to issues. a Greecemade later, are exchanging who committees ofexperts ofwisemen,whichwasaccepted a committee ThePresidentoftheEur implemented. military-related confidence-building measures, some ofwhich are being disputeresolutionin islet, various Sea, andovertheownershipofAegean islets. border inthe air, continentaland territorial shelf, sea, over the status ofislands inthe war. Oneseriesofdisput bilateral disputeswhichhave Summary Greece andTurkey: AegeanIssues—Backgroundand The prospects for Aegean resolutions are better now than they have been in been theyhave nowthan arebetter for AegeanThe prospects resolutions The UnitedStateswantsstability in th relations their GreeceandTurkeyof ornot changeWhether nature to the want Inthe aftermathofaJanuary 1996crisis For manyFor years, NATOalliesGreeceand that ofAthens. at accelerated bilateral diplomacy. Finally,at acceleratedbilateraldiplomacy. inJuly 1997,the es involves Aegean Sea borders Sea es involvesAegean Recent Developments government’s mane . In bothcountries,however,theremay domestic be wants to cultivateamorepositiveimage inEuropean wants produced crisesandevenbrought themto the brink of who assertedthatTurkey isthegreatest threatto principlestospecificdisputes. itiatives wereundertaken.NATOproposed opean Union Council of Ministers proposed Ministers opean UnionCouncilof perceived inGreeceasfavoritismtoward perceived more activeindisputeresolution.U.S. only cutdefensespending ifthe“Turkish fluential Turkish In Greece,thelegacy offormerPrime of thevetoinEuropeanUnionasa in bothGreece andTurkeyaffect could views viathePresident.In March1996, is determinedtostaywork oncourseand e Eastern Mediterranean and,afterthe Mediterranean e Eastern over thesovereignty oftheImia/Kardak sman, andthereisnonewthinking in es have yet to be applied to specific es haveyet tobeapplied declaration of principles that issaid declarationofprinciplesthat uverability. In Turkey, nationalist in theformofGreekandTurkish Turkey havebeenadversariesin . Thetwodisagree over the military may favora http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 Prospects ...... 15 U.S. Policy ...... 13 Constraints on Change ...... 10Motivations for Change ...... 8 Dispute Resolution Initiatives The AegeanIntroduction Issues ...... 1 Contents Turkey ...... 12Greece Turkey ...... 10Greece The MadridBilateralEuropean DeclarationNATO Diplomacy ...... 4 Union — ...... 5 ...... 6 U.S. DiplomacyIslets ...... 4 Islands ...... 7 ...... 3 TerritorialContinentalAir ...... 1 Sea ...... 3 Shelf ...... 2 ...... 11 ...... 8 ...... 1 ...... 4 http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 , di improve Greek-Turkishrelations.Other crisis-prone northesubject reasonable accommodation. AsidefromCyprus and the allies, competition sometimes forregional complicate the search fora community inTurkey, Muslim(mainly Turkis 2 1 forthe control (ICAO) traffic assigned Greeceair Organization Aviation Civil sometimes resulting inplane crashes. intercept the Turks. Continuousmock,a accuses Turkey ofairspacevi immediately islands. Greece Greece’s airspaceclaimby flyingGreek milesof towithinsix miles. Greekairspaceasonlyrecognize six sealimit.Therefore,ot claims asix-mile A country’s airspacerights us Air rocks. been disputed inthethe air, continental inthe sea,in shelf, and onislands, islets, and Aegean Seatooktheneighbors tothebrinkofwar, anisletinthe over troubling incendiary potential.SinceaJanuarycrisis 1996 Often, however, the twoalliesare antagonists in bilateral disputes which have a East. unsettled Middle and the bordering aregion Mediterranean, Eastern the 1996, by CarolMigdalovitz. Negotiations The subject ofaseparateCRS product:Issue subject Brief89140, The See CRSReport96-140, Air trafficcontrolissuesparalleltheai Since 1931,Greecehasclaimedairspaceex GreeceandTurkey borderbetween The longest Aegean andhas the Sea in is The UnitedStatesandNATOlooktoGreeceTurkeystability toanchor in 2 the Ecumenical (GreekOrthodox theEcumenical Background andRecentDevelopments Greece andTurkey:AegeanIssues— , by CarolMigdalovitz, updated regularly. Greece andTurkey:theRockyIsletCrisis ofcurrentdiplomacy. The AegeanIssues ually coincide with its territorial searights. Greece ually coincidewithitsterritorial Introduction nd potentially dangerous “dogfights” ensue, her countries,including theUnitedStates, rspace dispute.InInternational 1952,the visive issues,notably thoseconcerning olations andscramblesitsplanesto h) citizens ofGreekThrace,theKurds, citizens h) ) Patriarchate Turkishmilitary aircraftchallenge tending to 10milesovertheAegean.tending , however,theseotherissuesarenot 1 effortshavebeenmadeto Cyprus:Status of U.N. and GreekOrthodox , UpdatedMarch7, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 and exercises over the Aegean. overthe and exercises ofsovereignty aircraft asamatter Turkish restrict to andexploits Greece interprets Aegean. overthe resumed In general, that issue FIRTurkey atechnical that is claims resolved in 1980,whenthepre-1974statusquo was areas.Thesituation other to Sea overthe flights air commercial affected GreeceandTurkey. between Aegean ofthe detrimentally flights Closure direct responsibility forairsafety overtheAegean. from aggressors. FIR onits impinged authorityGreece this and said that abrogated median line inordertoenablemilita Aegean 1974, Turkey requiredallplanesapproaching nationa Aegean Turkish overthe upto airspace Aegean Flight Information Region (FIR), i.e., international and Greek domestic threatened to take all necessary all Greece’s take to protect sovereignty. to threatened measures The crisis than in the1970s. escort naval smaller afar work,with to went ship ATurkish Greek nearthe waters island of Samothrace. in the continental shelf near its island ofThasos and Turkey granted similar rightsin consent ofbothpartiestoadispute. failure toshowirreparableharm.It also courtswould measures, whatU.S. call forinterim Greece’srequest recourse.TheICJ rejected andjudicial negotiations passed anambiguously wordedReso the ICJ foradeterminationofcontinental Council toaddress Turkey’s violations of by awarshi accompanied research vessel accord apparent Ankara, however,renderedthe dispute tothe International instability (ICJ). CourtofJustice Governmental in Prime Ministers, Turkish of the Greekand an with research vesselintothearea, the area was part ofitscontinental shelf. That May, the Turkishgovernment sent a Aegean, adjacenttoseveralGreek islands Turkey granted rights oilexploration inwhat itcalled international waters inthe fundamentally in is asignatoryTu but Conventions, ofboth Greece shelves. generate continental islands that recognize which Sea, ofthe and Convention ontheContinentalShelf Inmainland. supportofits Turkish a coast Turkish the between line a median thatclaims islands have continental shelves and thatis theborder continental shelf the between two mainland coasts. line Greece amedian borderis shelf continental Aegeanits Anatolia isan extension of resources aswellsovereignty. Turkey Continental Shelf The second crisis occurred in1987,when crisis The second The continentalshelfdisputehaspr The disputeoverthedefinitionofth equitable. position,Greececitesa1958UnitedNations escort of 32 warships. AtaMaywarships. 32 1975summit of escort CRS-2 a temporary injunction,becauseofGreece’s lution 395(1976),calling forbothdirect declined jurisdiction, which dependsonthe Greek Prime Minister Greek PrimeMinisterAndreas n orAsiaMinorla itssovereignty and nd easternGreekislands,whichfringe the claims that the continentalshelfunder . In February 1974,Greeceprotestedthat p. Greece appealed to the U.N.Security the to p. Greeceappealed ovoked two crises. Incrises. November1973, ovoked two the morerecentU.N.Conventionon rkey isnotandrejectsGreece’sclaim as shelf rights. TheU.N.Security Council shelf rights. Turkey appeared toagree tosubmitthe International airlinesreacted by ceasing e continental shelfinvolvesmaritime continental e ry radar todistinguish innocentflights its airspacetoreportafterreaching the Greecegranted rights oilexploration was restoredandin l l airspace. Cyprus the of After crisis andTurkeyobsolete another in sent nd massandthatthe unilaterally petitioned ternational flights http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 disputing establishedGreeksovereign rights. Greece maintainsthatTurkey mustinitiate comp arbitral an andaccept for aresolution Aegean disputeforwhichGreeceiswilling of continental shelf limits.The demarcation ofthe continentalonly shelf isthe wouldonlythat exploration occurinits abated after intense NATO and U.S. media abated afterintenseNATOandU.S. constitute a an extension ofGreek territorial watersthat to12nauticaltime miles would of the continental shelf dispute(above), Turkey had formally declared for the first ensure othercountries’righ thirds of Turkey’s commercial traffic transits the Sea. Greece says that itwould Overtwo- waters. international accessto its Aegean threaten ofthe could control Turkeylake.” Greek “Greek that a believes into AegeanTurkey the andtransform contendingtimes, that a Greek“strangle” territorialwould nautical seamiles of12 two-thirds over it wouldclaim never affirmatively the rightexercised to incr theright to12miles and exercised Greece government authority totake all necessary measures, including military ones, if 8, Greek parliament’saction,onJune notasignator is As notedabove,Turkey Territorial Sea Turkish positions,however, may be more political irritation than military threat. before itreducesitsmilitary presencear saysGreece that the Fourth Armyof seizing Greek mustbe islands. redeployed theory, ArmyAegean in TheFourth force capable, coast. landing hasanamphibious establisheTurkey After the fact, in1975, military trafficthrough theStraits.Greece also Convention of1936,whichauthor Montreux relevantprovisionsofLathe argues that Greece Treaties. Paris and Lausanne the violate Greece’sactions that contends Turkey. Greece ofgreat concernto is Dardanelles, ofthe Straits the to entrance the at Samothrace, the program aftertheCyprus crisisof are inhabited. The1923Treaty ofLausanne Islands Convention ontheLaw oftheSeawhichth right to claim a 12-nautical-milea— rightlimit later codified in the U.N. as well.Greecebegan eastern militarizing Islands toGreeceby the Treaty of Paris easte the Greecein given to then islands Greece proposesthatbothcountriesjoin There areabout2,400islandsintheAeg In 1936,Greececlaimedaterritorialseaof casus belli militarized the Dodecanes the militarized (cause ofwar). Turkish officials reiteratedthis positionmany ts ofinnocentpassage. of the Aegean Sea. On June 12,1974,inthecontext the Aegean Sea.OnJune of 1974. Greece’s militarization ofLemnos1974. Greece’smilitarization and CRS-3 in 1947,whichrequiredtheirdemilitarization own,undisputedterritorialwaters. 12miles.If Greececlaims12miles,then usanne weresupersededin1936,withthe ound Turkey. Therespective Greekand y oftheConvention.In responsetothe rn Aegean. Dodecanese ceded the d itsFourth Army based in Izmir onthe 1995, theTurkishparliamentgave its tion, witheachcountryother the assuring Aegean islands in 1960, andaccelerated in Aegean islands e Greekparliament a petitionforlegalr mandated thedemilitari e for“self-defense”after1974.Turkey to petitiontheCourtjointly withTurkey ean; almost allareGreekandabout100 eased itsterritorialwaters.Greecehas tlydetermination petitiontheICJ fora romise. On all other Aegean other issues, Onall romise. ized Turkey tomilitarizeandcontrol claims thatitsactionsaredefensive. six nautical miles.It reservedthe nautical six ratified inMay 1995. ecourse because itis ecourse zation ofseveral http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 to Ministers, respectively.Foreign In th Understanding between and Mesut Yilmaz, the Greek and Turkish Turkey deny ithadclaimstoGavdos. They latersaidthattherewere130such rocks, notspecifically mentioned intrea Turkishofficialsbeganquestion, to political Although theTurkishForeign Ministry sa sovereignty of the island ofGavdos, near Crete, at a NATO planning session. confidence-building measures(CB intercession. Subsequently, aTurkishna and military involvement.Th was Turkish. Turkey) to hesaid Kardak that Greece, (Imia islet to nearanuninhabited Greece ship 1995, whenaTurkishmerchantcaptainrefu Islets 3 NATO leave. Greeksto and confiscatory forcedmost instead policies andproperty.non-Muslim persons Accord TreatyLausanne of the granted Turkey. to TheTreatyTurkeyguarantee required to that Straits the to entrance the near Aegean northern the in and Tenedos(Bozcaada), Imvros islands, (Gokceada) Greek-inhabited predominantly previously two of fate the the Aegeanthe disputes. See, CRSReport 96-140, national andreligious holidays. 1andmain ofJuly period 1-September tourism peak during the airspace 3) avoidconducting military activities inthehigh seasa 2) avoidinterfering withshipping Aegean; ofthe airspace high seas andinternational usethe to rights sovereignty the integrity1) respect andtheir ofeach other andterritorial Soon after thecrisis,NATOSecretar after Soon WhenTurkscomplainaboutthemilita Since theImia/Kardak crisis Sovereignty andro overAegean islets

3 Both countries’ media exploited Both countries’mediaexploited Dispute ResolutionInitiatives Greece and Turkey:theRockyIsletCrisis nd internationalairspace;and e parties returned to status quo ante after U.S. e partiesreturnedtostatusquoanteafter , severalinitiatives exercises in the high high seas and the international in exercises Ms) based on aMayon 1988Memorandumof Ms) based e Memorandum,Turkey andGreeceagreed that CRS-4 andairtraffic ties, whosesovereignt islets and rocks. Greece demanded that isletsandrocks.Greecedemanded val officerappearedtoquestionGreek ing toGreece,Turkey’s discriminatory cks wasnotindisputeuntilDecember id thatGavdoswasatechnicalnot rized Greekislands,someGreeksraise referto“grey areas,”i.e.,isletsand sed to have hisvesselrescuedbyhave a to sed y Solanaproposed GeneralJavier the situation,prompting government have been undertakentoresolve while conducting military y mayunresolved. be , citedabove. http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 activity toNATOheadquartersinNaples. February 1997,thetwosidesbegan atest and NATOand TurkeyAthens and NATO.Beginningto hotlines between in Greecereportedly bearmed. not would flights training agreed that said but airspace, its FIR responsibilities. Greecerefusedtodi of aninfringement Aegean, considered Greecealso which the concerning in flights it saidappliestoallcountries.Turkey rejected use of IFF a carvedout becauseit itwoulduseIFF during thattime.Asithasdonefordecades,Greece said and 15 on military for the proposedperiod,whileTurkey exercises agreed toJuly 1-August Turkey agreed to the proposals,withmodi inter alia, forthe parties toact inconformity withinternational regulations. andIncidents and Accidents High Seas onthe International called, which Airspace, In September1988, 4 to procedural,Dutch notpolitical or binding. The handed experts the inreports to government andtechnical explained that the committees’be conclusions would Greek-Turki a to (PASOK) voiced opposition de 32 counterproposal. After common ground. Turkey andtheGreek acceptedtheDutch proposal would reporttotheDutchPresidency, whic who experts committees ofnon-governmental Turkish and Greek separate of creation sovereignty issuesortheinvolvementof be perceivedasawillingness tonegotia Aegean dialogue adirect with Turkeyissues. either want not Greece did that might “w the Netherlandsproposedacommitteeof supported by theUnitedStates,calledfor Defense Department brie Solana renewed his CBM effort in CBM Solana renewedhis Duringth its1997turnasPresidentof Aegean operations. airspace monitor to at center 5) establishmentofa and offices; 4) directcommunicationbetweenGreek and Turkish air defense operations interceptors, anddecreasethenumberofmockdog fights; submittingflightplans) topreclude intercepts, reducescramble theto need frie identification, 3) planestouse 2) combattraining missionsonly by unarmedplanes; 1) a moratorium onmilitary exercises between 15-September June 15; Papoulias and Yilmaz signed Guidelines for the Prevention of fing, May 15,1997.Reuters. puties oftheruling Pan-He NATO Command HeadquartersinNaples NATO CRS-5 fications. Greeceagreed tothemoratorium special exception to the the to FIR, exception which special nd orfoedevices(IFF) (insteadof called for an exchange of information of calledforanexchange February 1997.Hisproposals,strongly te whatitviewsasitsnon-negotiable te thirdparties.It Union CouncilofMinisters, European e program of sending pictures of Aegean of program ofsending pictures 4 h then would evaluate the reports for reports the h thenwouldevaluate sarm its combataircraftin national

ise men” todealwithGreek-Turkish men” ise sh dialogue inany form,theGreek llenic Socialist Movement counterproposed the counterproposed http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 and anti-drug smuggling. Oncewereach and anti-drug “there is no organizedis dialogue ornegotia“there meetinSwitzerland. For experts domestic Foreign Minister 1996, theGreekandTurkish slackening ofthetwocountries’ neighborliness topromotecoope legalin terms. we Next, canagreement revive the committees ongood by stepsolutioninstead.Hesaid,“We later welcomedYilma found theproposallacking acommitment. wereGreeks notyetsensitivities. The ready toadvance and initially said that they million in European Unionaidin to Turkeymillion Marcha that hadof beenpart promised as conditions forimprovedrelations and fo wants ittodoso.” beto must “Turkey’s ultimateobjective belongs toEurope.”He saidmake inWashington a positive that “Turkey gestureAnkara, toward certainly the Papoulias-Yilmaz measures. well asgovernmental instability in Anka Turkeywherein incidents appearedto Pangalos-Gonensay meeting becauseofwhat orrocks. islets ofother ownership Greece’s disputing that hisTurkishcounterpartatthetime, Bilateral Diplomacy give to theotherparty forcomment. The 8 7 6 5 comprehensive processof avoidance ofunilateralst framework agreement, agreement on military-related confidence-building measures, establishing thestatusquoinAegea andagreements law forinternational ofrespect basis onthe asawhole issues withGreecewithoutpreconditi negotiations fall. the in place take could ameeting Presidency, that accepted Greekofficials over toLuxembourg attheendofitstenur mission agreed, Presidency Greecerefused.TheDutch but handedanincomplete March 21,1997. p. 1. Pangalos onTurkish-Greek Ties, Greek foreign minister anxiousabout “Shocked’Nation by Greece: Turkey’s Aegean Claims. Turkish Embassy pressrelease,March24,1996. Yilmaz madehisoffertoosoonafte On March 6, 1997, Foreign Minister Pang On March6,1997,Foreign Minister On March24,1996, Turkish Prime Minister 8 Prime Minister Costas Simitisand Foreign Minister Pangalos set z’s suggestionsz’s as “agreat imp amplified the point to a Turkish journalist on March 21, March on amplified thepointtoaTurkishjournalist peaceful settlement,including eps and actions that could increase tension, and a and eps andactionsthatcouldincreasetension, Yeni Yuzyil ration inmutually benefici military presenceintheAegean.” Turkish invasion. Reuters,May 8,1996. CRS-6 should create a joint committeetodiscussthe question Greece’s sea and airspace rights, as rights, Greece’sseaandairspace question Emre Gonensay, hadspokenof“grey areas,” n. Theproposalincludedtalks on a political r GreecetoliftitsvetoonaboutU.S.$475 ra. GreececalledonTurkeyimplement to Dutch wanted the experts to meet; Turkey integrate withEurope.Greecedefinitely tions.” Pangalos la consumption,Pangalos underscoredthat , March21, 1997, translated by FBIS online, e. After exchanges of comments via the via comments e. Afterexchanges of that level,itmight Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos ForeignTheodoros Minister it termedTurkey’s “provocations,”i.e., ons withaviewtosettling allAegean r the Imia/Kardak crisisforGreek r theImia/Kardak s agreed tohavetheirMinistries’ MesutYilmazoffe alos, proddedby U.S.officialsto rovement,” butproposedastep 7 The European Greece canceled a June 1996 GreececanceledaJune thirdparty arbitration. al areas:trade,tourism ter expressed concern expressed ter facilitateamutual . April4-10, 1996, 6 red toenterinto On April 26, On 5

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 3, 4,translatedby FBIS, May 5,1997. with Turkey. 5,Pangalos saidthatGreecelikewis June interpreted thisasTurkeyde a abandoning Greek analyst One Aegean quo. achange want the status Ankara doesnot in Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller may have been especiallyencouraging, saying that committees(above)andtheMadrid experts contactsministers than had previously, more cordial which prepared forthe EU provide for Affairs Kornblum andhisteamworked John said amounttoanon-aggression pact.A Minister SimitisandPresidentDemirelth counterpart Ismail princi Cem toagree onsix Albright invited Greek ForeignMadeleine “spirit ofunderstanding.” to resolveGreek-Turkishdifferences.In saying itcanlivewiththecurrentsituati renounce violence,i.e.,retractitsthreatof 1995 EU-Turkishcustomsunionaccord. The 11 10 9 The MadridDeclaration—U.S.Diplomacy Suleyman Demirel said hecouldagr borders. of aredelineation engage to leading not Greece would negotiations overall in of bilateral disputes. Toassuage domestic critics, government officials insisted that discussed; and recognize the ICJ as a judicial mechanism withjurisdiction for settling pertaining tointerpretation and imple immediately; acceptbordersdelineatedby to 12nauticalmiles,eventhough Greece Greece PressReleases,April 4and24,1997. Greece threatensto veto Turkey customs Athens TV InterviewsAthens TV Turkish President.English text:FBIS online,May 27,1997. Nikos Marakis, Pangalos-Ciller Istanbul Meeting, In theGreekandTurkish April1997, agreements; agreements; international 3) respect forthe principlesand ofinternational law sovereignty; foreachother’s 2) respect of good-neighborly relations; 1) mutualcommitmenttopeace,secur NATOsummitinMadrid,U.S.SecretaryOn Julythe ofState 8,1997,at Finally, inaMay 19interviewwith Finally, 9

10 ee toanon-aggression pactwith Greece. CRS-7 on, and that war was not among themeasures was on, andthatwar union aid,Reuters,Ma mentation ofthisframeworkcouldbe mentation response,Pangalos acknowledged anew mand that theAegean regimemand bereviewed, e was readywas to signe anon-aggression pact en endorsed the principles,whichSimitis en endorsed war if Athens extends war ifAthensextends ssistant Secretary of ityand thecontinuing development Minister Pangalos andhisnewTurkish international treatie international ples togovern bila toachievetheaccord. The principles deputy foreign ministersandforeign Greek officialsdemandedthatTurkey Greek television,TurkishPresident did not intend to exercise itsright did notintendtoexercise declaration (below).ThenTurkish declaration Tis Kiriakis Tis To Vima

rch 21,1996;Embassy of teral relations.Prime StateforEuropean its territorial waters s, although matters , May 4,1997,p. 11 On http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 edition, http Control and Disarmament Agency, persist intheiroutreach toTurkey,persist knowin orientation, PrimeMinister billion dollararmsprogram. Nonethele the Simitisgovernment, otherwisefisca Inpropels theexpenditures. thewakeof however, canmakesuchcutswithoutalso control,Greecemustcutmilita under them neighborhood. convergence withEuropeandthatthe 13 12 defense, on GDP EUmemberstates,Greecespendsthehighest proportionofits Among anditsg to be6.2%ofGDP is expected a government debtofnotmorethan deficit ofnotmorethan include abudget with Europeancountrieswhichmeetth joining the European Monetary Union(EMU)and toincrease itscompetitiveness outlookandwantsto distinctly Eurocentric Greece primary bethe appears to forceforchange. inte their influences thatcouldbenefit the hard task willbe intheir application. casus belli nautical mile territorial sea, while Turkey promises nottouse force, eliminating the to refrain fromunilateral acts —which may includeright theits toa exercise 12- of because they addressmatters In 1995,Greece spent5.5%of its GDP on defense, while Turkey spent4.0%.U.S. Arms A littleEMU enlightenment, 4) respect for each other’s legi foreachother’s 4) respect In contrast torecentgovernmentsIn in contrast Both countrieshavebecomemotivated to two provisionsmay The final haveth consent andwithoutuseofforceorthreatforce. tosettledisputesby6) acommitment peacefulmeansbasedonmutual respect and a willingness toavoid conflicts arising frommisunderstanding; acts onthe basis ofmutual unilateral 5) a commitment torefrain from Aegean; 13 and thisexpenditure manifestly contri . The principles do not address or resolve specific Aegean disputes and disputes Aegean specific addressorresolve donot . Theprinciples ://www.acda.gov/wmea Motivations for Change Simitis and Foreign Minister Pangalos arelikely Simitis to that have been most provocative. Greeceiscommitted provocative. thathavebeenmost The Economist World MilitaryExpendituresand Arms Transfers t96/w96tbl1.pdf. 60% of GDP. For 1997,Greece’sbudget deficit 60% ofGDP. timatevital interests and concerns in the CRS-8 overnment debtisforecastat108%ofGDP. 3%ofGrossDomes rnal development.TheEuropeanUnion the Imia/Kardak crisis, in June 1996, even theImia/Kardak1996, crisis,inJune lly conservative, announcedanewmulti- e criteria beforeGreece.Thosecriteria e criteria diminishing the“Turkishthreat”which Athens,theSimitisgovernment hasa only alternativetoitispeaceinthe ss, largely becauseoftheirEuropean , February 22,1997,p. 88. meettheEuropeanUnioncriteriafor g that a costly arms race could block g that acostly armsracecould ry spending. NoGreekgovernment, e greatest potential todeter conflict improvebilateral relations by external butes to deficits and debt. To get To butes todeficitsanddebt. tic Product(GDP)and , online 12 http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 Morocco, thePalestinianAuthority, Syria, andTunisia. Christianity ontheonehandandOrthodox and new conflicts. He drew a cultural and newconflicts.Hedrewacultural goals bygoals contributing tothedevelopmen to innocent thirdcountriesaidintended They wereangere EUmembers other and France, Spain, and Italy conceived ofMEDAas a major EU foreign policy initiative. included and accord. union aid Turkey customs to ofthe aspart waspromised that c assistance program forMediterranean January 1996islet crisis, thenewSimitis byled anindependent Cyprus,is which Turkey,1995 onlyin relenting whentheEU accordwith union EU’scustoms the blocked years,had eight Greece For partners. Each Turkey disputes. forbilateral 17 16 15 14 Huntington had somehowlinkedtheAeg Greece’s positioninEuropewhenhesaidthat feared thatthey wouldbebeyond thepale Turkeythe declaringcould notbe partof when ’s Christian Democratic party leaders appeared tofollowHuntington by Europe andhasoutragedWestern Greek This theoreticaldivisi statement. exaggeratedGreece and impact Turkey, inboth although itisnota U.S.policy forrapprochement. criteria seekpragmatic Greece to Greek-Turkish relationsconstr shapefuture onGreeceto called Papandreou obstructionist. longer beconsidered no would it Greece mustpresentamorepositiveimage ofitselftoEuropesothat needforapolicy the George haselaborated Papandreou Minister change, arguing that of achange Greekperceptions require in options other than using itsEUveto fordealing withTurkey. Thislikely would rethinking itspolicy toolsandapproaches the veto willcontinue until“Turkish aggressiveness” ends. It has,however,continuedtovetothe cu complaints fromits European partners, Olin Institute forStrategic Studies atHarvard University. SimonProfesso is Huntington & Schuster,1996. pp. 22-49; also by FBIS 1. onJune Foreign Affairs Samuel P.Huntington, The clash of civilizations? George Papandreoucommentary in In addition to Turkey, MEDA aids Algeria, Cyprus, , Israel, Jordan, Malta, Greece hasuseditsvetopowerwithinth Finally,of SamuelHuntington’s “clash anenlarging may EU,it within ofanoutsider beless to be As Greeceseeks 16 Huntington forecastthatculture The Clash ofCivilizations andtheRemaking ofWorldOrder , pp.29-30. on places Greece outside of and in potential oppositionto on placesGreeceoutsideofandinpotential uctivelyrelyvetoes. Heurged andnot on Turkey and To Vima Tis Kiriakis Tis Vima To veto has distanced Greece from its European its Greecefrom hasdistanced veto CRS-9 Greece lifted its veto of MEDA in MayGreece lifteditsvetoofMEDAin 1996. t andstabilizationofthosecountries. advanceEuropeaneconomicandsecurity Europe because it is Muslim, some Greeks some EuropebecauseitisMuslim, fault line across Europe between Western acrossEuropebetween line fault d by denied ofMEDA,which Greece’sveto academics andpoliticia Turkish aggressiveness.Turkish Alternate Foreign stoms unionfunds.Pangalos hassaidthat ean neighbors, Greecewoulduse the bond ountries (MEDA)becauseTurkey was Greek Cypriot government. After the aswell.Thus,Pangalos wasdefending toward Turkey. It may consideringbe Christianity andIslam ontheother. government vetoed bothanewEU agreed tobegin membershiptalkswith r of Governmentof r andDirectoroftheJohn will producearedivisionoftheworld e EU asaweapontoretaliateagainst e Turkey must bepartofEurope.If must Turkey civilizations” thesis has had ancivilizations” Foreign Affairs 15 , June 1,1997,p.14, translated , June , v. 72,summer 1993, ns. In March1997, , New York, , New 14 After 17 http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 signed the1930Treaty ofFriendship, Non- whenthey did andGreekleaders, Turkish andrespected respective the Venizelos, way andEleftherios the Ataturk Kemal Mustafa which in in problems resolve General Karadayiand soldiers toshow“common sense” to called onpoliticians said thathewas“forcing response toPangalos ata Ismail Karadayi official Hakki Staff first the made General recently, ofthe Chief Greece’s reintegration withNATOfrom Turkish complaints about the FIR. More governmentsmilitarya move, had the blocked junta inAnkara delinked the issue of them.In 1980,af improve to and wants Greek-Turkish and position onAegean issues Greece.The with Turkish relations better Greece. provides an Turkstoseek incentive toresolve forsome bilateral disputes with of the main barriers toimproved Turkish re Turkey European.Turkey’s fact, in is, noted above, andw the Huntington thesis, membership in the EuropeanUnion. Some seek to reinforce Turkey’s modern, European identity through ties withand especially Turkey Turkey. with relations bilateral its improve Greece must remained inside.In ordertobeina positi drawEuropeanborderswidely,to Turkey encompassing Greece andensuring that 20 19 18 bilateral relations and specific initiatives toresolve Aegean disputes. Islamistthe Refah Partywhich headed the national government. been aclosecallwithIslamism — ayear, 1997,in June fromJuly 1996through 1997. April 11,1997. not advocated Turkey’s EUmembership perse. TRT TelevisionNetworkTRT report,March25,1997, See CRSReport97-462F, althoug Itthat shouldbenoted Unlikely as itmaythe seem, influential Turkishmilitary may be a force for In Greece andTurkey,Greece In domesticpolitics whatexperienced they The Turkishsecular elites consider have tohave just thisdoor(toGreece)open.” Constraints onChange reception at the Greek Embassy inAnkaraonMarch25. Embassy reception attheGreek Turkey’s Unfolding Political Crisis h Greekh officialssay Turkey ispartofEurope,they have CRS-10 tortured relations with Greecehavebeenone with relations tortured on topullTurkey intoEuropethusdefined, General Staff generallymoderate Staff a General takes ould liketodisproveitby showing that in Turkey alsoarevery preoccupiedwith lations withEurope. Aggression, andArb Aggression, ter years inwhichTurkishcivilian relations (perhaps excepting Cyprus)relations (perhapsexcepting constrain overalleffortstoimprove translated by FBIS online, March16, 20

18 , by Carol Migdalovitz,, by Carol Europe,therefore, itration. Karadayi 19 Thesecularists http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 16 July 1997,translation carriedby FBIS online,July 18,1997. 1997, carriedby FBIS online,July 14,1997. legalization ofAnkara’sex was “gradually slipping intochoicesTurkish claims, that result inrecognitionof deputieslatercharged th PASOK 22 Some theycommittee ofexperts, signalled the the of Greece’sacceptance questioned deputies 32PASOK program. When its out of 300seatsintheGreekparliamentand in GreeceandPASOK,nowledby Cost party as losers andlackfollowing topos losers as party foreign policy a innovation.Tsokhatzopoulos rapidlydecreased to22a The 32dissenters ties. forimproving asadisincentive acts And itisheard in Turkey, where itbreeds skepticismGreece’s sincerity about and effort toleadandshapepublicopinion dissidents and rivals rhetorically, however, may and Pangalos’ constrain Simitis’ mandate.experts’ Playing He and others stillresort toanti-Turkish rhetoric. to offered a restrictive definitionPangalos ofthe committees dissent of was voiced, wasa Tsokhatzopoulos close Pa Minister YerasimosArsenisareknownfo ally,NATO wasthegreatest threattoGreece. Greece’s Turkey, Turkey.toward that hadasserted Papandreou Thecharismatic ahead oftheirparty rivals,parliamentaria advantage ofafailure. partyinternal and generaltake for Simitistostumble inorder domestic political Simitis andPangalos haveta leader. Although they havepublicly suppor in JanuaryMinister Prime 1996andTs as andArsenisintheintern Tsokhatzopoulos may reinforcehis Defense hisanti-Turkism. Simitisdefeated portfolio both “harmful for Greece, for our territorial integrity, interests.” forGreece,ourterritorial andforournational “harmful the government ofopening the road toceding national rights, calling the agreement accused mantle, Papandreist the to heir an himself considers who Tsovalas, Dimitrios smaller oppositionparties Greece 23 22 21 Minister, Greece: Opposition Party Leader Scores Greek-Turkish Accords, Athens ET-1 Television, ET-1 Athens Accords, Greek-Turkish Scores Greece: Opposition Party Leader Greek PASOK Deputies Criticize MadridCommunique, Athens News Agency, July 11, 1981-88, 1993-96. Simitis and Pangalos may overcome domestic beto able political constraints. thegovernment,Within DefenseMini Prime MinisterSimitisandForeign Mini The legacy ofAndreasPapandre 21 may Simitisgovernment’sthe maneuverability impede initspolicy were more alarmist.Democr were pansionist status,andan ken sofar,Tsokhatzopoulos pandreou associateandthe CRS-11 potential politicalrisksofpolicyinnovation. ou, founder of PASOK andtwicePrime PASOK of ou, founder okhatzopoulos in a June 1996 vote for party for 1996vote inaJune okhatzopoulos e arealchallenge. isas Tsokhatzopoulos al PASOK contest tosucceedPapandreou PASOK al as Simitis. PASOK hasamajority of 162 in support of their policyof in support towardTurkey. ns, andrankfile. at, withtheMadriddeclaration,Greece nd may notbeasolidbloc,threatening r theirhardlineviewstowardTurkey. ted thepolicy steps toward Turkey that must stay cohesiveinordertocarry out Papandreou’sdogma ster Tsokhatzopoulos andEducation Tsokhatzopoulos ster ster Pangalos far cannotget outtoo nd Arsenismay be expiation ofitsexpiation policies.” atic SocialMovementleader and Arsenismay bewaiting security requirementsof Thus,afterparty is stillinfluential perceived inthe 22 Some 23

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 Members of the Parliament ofGreecepr Members oftheParliament asathreattotheirterritorialintegrity.insurgency In April1997,110outof300 leader’s will.Moreover,NewDemocr much a PASOKloyalist as he was a Papandreou loyalist and maydefer tohisparty gloomy. Cyprus stymie could thus Aegean peacemaking. resumed theCyprus negotiations, butthe traditionally hasbeenaGreek preconditi would produce a Greek-Turkish reconciliati sentiment inTurkey. denyEU helps Ankaradearly sought cl championshipGreekMoreover, ofKurdishhuman rights Muslims inEurope.the focusing ontheKurdsandnototherissues appearshighlyBut Greecesometimes sel which Athensdenies.Turkey hasarecord PKK, the of arming and Turkey camps Greece PKK accuses havevisited Greek MPs Ocalan toAthens.The government quickly particularly soursre to Turkey’s perceptionof “encirclement Tu whichwith have problematic relations has signed, milita and seeks, disputes. Greece Greek actions which harm attempts toimprove bilateral ties and resolve Aegean their influenceshouldnotbeunderestimated. important elements inthe Greekhave made press common cause withSimitisand support oftheinternationalist reservedlyto theTurkishoutreachand,theref EU’s announcement ofmembershiptalks w partial “integration” of(Tur constrain him.Shortly after taking power this time, Ecevit initiated a move toward depends onEcevit’s party tostay inpower and has little ability orperhaps wishto Ecevit’s nationalism onCyprus with the Aegean could opening. interfere Yilmaz intervened in/invadedCyprus andrema charge ofCyprus policy. PrimeMinisterin1974,whenTurkey Ecevitwas party spokesman, andhis controlstheFore Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has emerged as the government’s main foreign policy overture toGreeceinMarch1996afterthe coalitionmismatched ofright and left isled bythe Mesut Yilmaz, whomade an if because itsrankandfilehadlittle, toward theEastandselectedMuslimcountri The Islamist-led government thatwasin leaveand their weak domestic coalition consumption little roomforcompromise. instability may affectrelationswithGreece and an1995, early December election may be held in1998.This governmental Turkey Finally, there is a strong Cyprus lobby inAthensopposedtoany initiativesthat Nevertheless, thePapa Ankara now has its third g Ankara nowhasitsthird lations. Turks viewthe13-y ndreou legacy ofantipathy towardTurkey produces other kish) northernCyprus withTurkeyresponse tothe a as Coalition oftheLeft forthepolicyFinally, isagiven. overnment since aninconc overnment CRS-12 acy, the main opposition party, hasreacted acy,main the oser ties with Europeandfeedsanti-Greek with oser ties .” Greece’sconductontheKurdishissue ins proudofwhatheaccomplished then. office through June 1997wasdirected through June office rkey, notably Syria andArmenia,adding on for a rapprochement. The U.N. has U.N. on forarapprochement.The oposed to invite PKK leaderAbdullah PKK oposed toinvite such asthetreatmentofTurksandother of human rights abuses toward Kurds. ofhumanrights abusestoward es. It paid almost noattentiontoGreece es. Itpaid as politicians exploit foreign policyas politiciansexploit for outlook fora solutionisuncertainoutlook or ith the(Greek) Cypriot government. ign Ministry andtheStateMinistry in said that itdidnotintend toinvite him. ective initshumanrights advocacy, Imia/Kardak crisis.However,Deputy ry agreements withTurkey’s neighbors on before a Cyprus settlement, which ore, mayThe beinclinedtosupportit. y, interest.Thecurrentseemingly ear Kurdish Workers Partyear KurdishWorkers (PKK) lusive nationalelectionin http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 carried by FBIS, July 8,1997. veto is the impediment to aid. On the ot the On veto istheimpedimenttoaid. with EuropeandharmedTurkis imbalance commitments and b because bereviewed accordto union customs in Europe Turkeyreject andsomewantto Greece. DespiteTurkey’s agreeing tothe Aegean initiativeshavenotproducedareac disposed tolookbenevolently onimproving tiestoGreece. potentially reinforcingidentity, Western Greece’s policy of Turkey’s of“veto” relati policy aim of the government, said that speedingtoward fullmembership upefforts inthe EUisa priority foreign Gr incentive forimproving relationswith With himinthe government,may better notbe as ties strong withEurope an not mitigated. mayofficials Turkey to outreach their in not if be is Ecevit’s persist impact to able engaged. paradigm togovern bilateral relations resolution. Tw on behalfofanAegean slowly. establishment revisesviews domestically withIslamism andgovernme relations comparable to that ofPangalos inAthens. Political leaders are preoccupied on the details ofAegeanthinking issues inAnkara orbilateral Turkish-Greek is notclearifit will have a mainsecuritynational threats toTurkish —Islamism and (Kurdish)separatism. It comments inMarch, the military is engrossed in fighting what it refers toas the two settlement re the of may contributetoadisruption Cyprusand his power stronglypolicy. reacted to particular return Ecevit Ecevit’s to precondition forimprovedtieswithTurk 25 24 in localcontrovers embroiled region borderedby conflict 1998 Cypriot presidential election.See,CRSIssue Brief89140,citedabove. York andinSwitzerland onAugust 9.Heightened activity isexpectedaftertheFebruary Rauf Denktashleader onJuly 9inNew President Glafcos Clerides andTurkish Cypriot Yilmaz Presents Government Program, Television Network, TRT July 7,1987, translation For the firsttime inover 3years, theU.N. Finally, Turkey loomslarger in Greek th Ecevit may haveanother,moreindir As noted,aresolutionoftheCyprus The United States wants topreserve stabilityStates inthe EasternThe United Mediterranean, a 24 and,thereby, setbackTurkish-Gr ecause the customs union hasaggravated union customs Turkey’secause the trade sustained andinvolvedinterest zones. It also wants to prevent NATOfrombeing prevent to Itzones. alsowants ies. ies. In States United goals, the these achieve order to 25 many Europeasrepeatedly Turksperceive rejecting U.S. Policy CRS-13 her hand,thosestilllure Although GeneralKara convened direct talksconveneddirect between(Greek) Cypriot eece. Although Prime Minister Yilmaz has and Turkey does not appear to be fully be and Turkeyto doesnotappear Madrid declaration,thereappearstobeno support forIslamists. They may notbe response.Ecevitandotherscallforthe ect, impact on Greek-Turkishrelations. on ect, impact o partiesarerequiredtocreateanew h businesses.TurksknowthatGreece’s newed U.N.efforttoobtainaCyprus ons with Europe as an obstacle to their to asanobstacle Europe ons with ey.in AthensandtheGreek media nt turnovers, and theforeign policy nt turnovers, issue has been a traditional Greek hasbeenatraditional issue tion in Turkey comparable to that in tion inTurkeythat comparableto inking than vice versa. The particular The inking thanviceversa. Europe has failed to live up live to to its (aid) Europe hasfailed eek relations onotherfronts.Greek eek relations inengaging itselfactively d toEuropeperceive dayi madepositive http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 as abonafideintermediary. in deferencetohisvisitor andtorecl seemed President the statement, Inthis welcome Holbrookeand and diplomatically foundhi expend have sufficientpoliticalcapitalto wasweakened temporarily. resolution U.S. the hadaccepted Athens that It did not achievement onImia/Kardak concentrated Greeks oneliminating didnotview his thewar. immediate threat of Aegean.had failed Holbrooke to address the crisis in these terms and instead Turkeyterrito questioning long-established Aegean. But many in differently.Greece it perceived They asoneof crisis sawthe a resolution tothebrokered crisis that appearedthe torestore the priorbalance in end totensionsintheAegean. permanent Holbrooke hadplannedtotravelGreece Secretary Richard forEuropeanAffairs ofState Assistant then when crisis, United StatessupportsTurkey’s on Turkey’s Europebecausethe effect with relations their moderating Greece andin with controversies mediating in services U.S. generally andexpect appreciate and adjacent totheMiddleEastand the Caucas Turks believe that they are the more important regional States, allyUnited ofthe negotiations solely between the twogove from outcome Turkey, favorable amore canobtain larger it asthe power,assumes them inGreece’sfavor.U.S. seek/demand thirdpartyscalesor toweigh orinternationalthelevel to intervention it Turkey that with power balance, player, powerful more asthe necessitates regional the of view Greece’s onAegean issues. (Greek)position right the is believe Turkey benefits stance andignoresthey what U.S. anequidistant that maintain brinkmanship ofImia/Kardak wasnotforg allies, GreeceandTurkey. Yetneutrality ha has tried toremain neutral inandNATO worked toresolvetwo disputes betweenits 26 Simitis’ April9,1996,visittoWhite ofGreek-Turki attention onthetinderbox Transcript, Reuters, April9,1996. Transcript, Although noU.S. initiative onAegean Neutrality evidently interfered withU.S.-Greek relations after the Imia/Kardak arbitration panel. by referring thesituation) matter tothe ICJ orsome other international integrity favortheresolution(ofImia othercountries....We of agreeing andto byrespect agreements the abide territorial to international th without theuseofforce, that alltheseissuesshouldberesolved in theAegean.... believe We Ithe UnitedStatescanbehelpfu hope 26

regretted thatthevisitwascanceled. s tripscheduleinconvenien neutrality failstofulfillthat favorably. Thenewly es entry intotheEuropeanUnion. aim Greece’srecognition of theUnitedStates CRS-14 House, PresidentClintonsaid to accept Greece’s perspective on the Aegean onthe to accept Greece’s perspective He didnotmakethe at thetimeonameeting with Holbrooke us. They U.S.neutrality, donotcriticize rnments andusually callsfordialogue. l in resolving some of the problems l inresolving someofthe and Turkeyand more tohelpthemachievea otten. had The focused islet crisis U.S. e threatofforce,witheveryone s not always been appreciated. Greeks sh relations.During PrimeMinister rial rights andthestatusquoin issues was undert t. Ankarastoodready to need. Ontheotherhand, tablished government in trip. Holbrookehad aken in 1996, the 1996, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 1996, translatedby FBIS online,December 1, 1996. the parties toapply the Madrid principles declaration. Madrid the agreement to GreekandTurkish obtained not passed,aftertheImia/Kardak militarily superior adversary inTurkey. asfacing ademographically and view many Greece, which toward Members aid legislation hasapplieda“balanceof media areforeign policy actorspr Greek-T and canhaveonU.S.-Greek media the impact negative the andhighlights exchanges ofofficial aregularnot subject incongruity isunlikely tobe resolved. Th Athens. Thismatterwillc Eachrestatemen international practice. persistently bait State Department briefers torestate U.S.policy, which conforms to from the airspace Greekjournalists controversy, relations. Greek-U.S. in an irritant themselves. obtain a settlement, theUnitedStatescannot is said withregardWashington tootherwhich international attemptsin disputes to its veto onEuropeanUnioncustomsunionaid.But more work needs to be done. As forGreecelifting exchange in Imia/Kardaktaking the Court controversy World the to and toacknowledge the need fortrade-offs to proceedbeyond it. 1988 Papoulias-Yilmaz agreement mu believes that the States United the that declared Niles GreeceThomas to Ambassador Department building measures. TheState The DefenseDepartmentsupportsthe count Turkish meeting oftenwithGreekand NATO andby itself,withDefenseDepartme 28 27 of Davos,” whereTurkishand Switzerland, 1987 crisisoverthecontinen The successful. aGreek-Turkish rec for disputes and Migdalovitz, updatedregularly. See CRSIssue Brief86065, U.S. Ambassador Interviewed onGreek-Turkish Issues, The State Department views Madrid asan Madrid views The Department State Congress has not weighed inonrecentde may recuseitself haveto States United As Aegean areaddressed,the issues The Administration has workedAdministration toreso The History promptscircumspectionaboutth 27 Finally, the State Department assiduously sought and Finally, theStateDepartmentassiduouslysought Greece andTurkey:Curre ontinue to fester because ontinue tofesterbecause oducing unexpected consequences. oducing unexpected crisis mirroredAthens’position. Prospects CRS-15 st befully implemented 28 forces” policy to Greece and Turkey.forces” policyand Greece It to tilts onciliation. Othereffortshavenotbeen t promptsannoyed officialreactionsfrom Congressional resolutionsproposed,but Congressional NATO Secretary General’s confidence- NATO SecretaryGeneral’s champions these measures and more. U.S. andmore. measures these champions is U.S.-Greekpolicy disputeisotherwise in theresolutionoftheirvariousdisputes . Thefirsttrade-offmay involveTurkey erparts intheregion and in Washington. Greek Prime Minister lve Greek-Turkishdifferencesthrough tal shelf produced the evocative “Spirit tal shelfproducedtheevocative want aresolutionmore than the parties nt and the State Department officials Department State andthe nt urkish relations.GreekandTurkish e prospectsfor a resolution ofAegean velopments. Since the velopments. Since 1970s, foreign important firststep.It is encouraging nt ForeignAidIssues I Kathimerini the territorial sea-airspace territorial the and thatit is desirable s metandbegan a , November 27, , by Carol http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 Newsweek August 11,1997,p.38. July 23,1997. The only remaining conditionconcernsC improved bilateral relations. Turkeyof them withthe Madridtwo declaration.met assuage hard feelings toward Greece in Turkey. Greecein assuage toward hardfeelings to Turkey. scenario,lifting ofthevetowoulddomuchto In apossiblyupbeat have nojustification fornotlifting liftits therebyCourt, forum, Greece Greece’sneedforaninternational would recognizing that Turkey thelead committees can tothe Court. requirement may be met by a meetingobserved ofcommittees when ofexperts he negotiations to precederecoursetheC that itiswilling togoCourt. For tothe their part, World the Turkshad wanted direct say wayPangalos haseasedthe is bydo forcompliance Turkey to sayingall has that Cyprus questionarenotconnected. MinisterPrime Simitisasserted outrightand that Greek-Turkishthe relations and distinguishedCyprus an internationalas issue fromthe Aegeanissue,nationala as Cyprus preconditiontobetter short-lived rapprochement 31 30 29 vital interests inAegean.” “Turkeythat has Greeceaccepts that said Pangalos Forexample, issues. Turkish government, which hasmade dom to suchanassessmentisthestrong in adecadeandmay justifycautious some resolution ofsomea bilateral Aegean issues may be better today than they have been Interview: We have Done a Lot — New to the Job, Yilmaz aLot—New totheJob, Done hashisowndemands, have Interview:We Interview: A Tremendous Step,WhatGreece’s Simitis wants fromTurkey, Pangalos interview, ! ! Further, asnotedabove(p.7),Greeko The outlookfortheresolutionof Nonetheless, the overallprospectsforimp Greece maintains that it is a legal question to be resolved by beresolved to International alegal the question is it that Greece maintains Of the older Aegean disputes, the continental shelf may be ripe forsettlement. its 4thArmy —at least untilgiven l however, isunlikely toberesolvedb byproducts oftheisletcont Madrid underscoresthattheirlackof and may worse.Thetw havemadeit aface-saving find way not could to back down from the notion of “grey areas” a mediacreationthat some consider unintended. GreeceandTurkey blundered waslargely onset becauseits resolution may dispute The islet to beopen , August 11,1997,p.39. Ta Nea 29 in 1988thatfoundered on the , July 21,1007,pp.10-11, translationcarriedby FBIS online, The Simitisgovernment also may be willing toliftthe sweeping, unprecedentedpolicy statementsonGreek- relations withTurkey. Foreign MinisterPangalos roversy. Theseparate 30

CRS-16 estic positionandmotivationoftheAthens vetoonEuropeanUnioncustomsunionaid ourt. PrimeMinist ourt. ong-term evidenceofGreece’sfriendship. optimism.Themajorcontributing factor different Aegean issuesvaries. ourt jurisdiction over the islet dispute. fficials hadlaidoutthreeconditionsfor ecause Turkeychange or willnotmove got outofhand.Turkey subsequently o sidesacceptanceofthestatusquoin interest in perpetuating the unsettling interest inperpetuating the roved Greek-Turkishrelationsandfor into the Imia/Kardakinto crisis,which 31 If Turkey agrees to go to the issue ofmilitarized islands, shoals ofdomesticpolitics. er Yilmaz impliedthat er Yilmaz Newsweek , http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799 This context rendersapositiveoutcome This context consistent, creative,andres anticipated successors willworkwiththe foreignpolicy establishment ona by unleavened principles pragmatism. for caseofEcevit, the advantage or,asin domestic for foreign policy issues compromises among them. It may prove tempting forsome politicians toexploit promise toholdearlyIt has elections. towardTurkey.shift TheYilmaz coaliti and itneeds toworkoncreatinga foreign a soliddomesticpolicyfor consensus externallydriven, mostlyare motivations Greece’s out. it shut actions Turkish unless and may persistinitsoutreachtoAnkara administration that probablyits willserve out governments inAthens and Ankara. The Simitis government isa stable, one-party ! ! The prospectsforasolutionallor manner. rights disconnected fromterritorial sea rights and interprets FIR in a sovereign The airspace controversy likely lin is to its rhetoricandstopthreatening war. As long as itdoes notexercise the right (unilateral move), Turkey will control the right to 12-nautical-miles ofsea, butcontinuing notto exercise the right. less ofanissue.Th be to allowed With regard tothe that territorial itmay sea, Madrid appearedsignal be to compromise and,therefore,anathematosomeGreeks. that wouldnotbecalledadial soluble, withbothparties taking itto ofthe dispute. Asa result, the issue mayvalue the be more diminishing discoveries inthe continental shelf appearperhaps tohave lowered, mineral orother ofoil Innegotiations. decade,expectations past the bilateral —again after Court the to anappeal rejected categorically strategic dispute, requiring a political settlement. Yet, Turkeynot has Court of Justice. Turkey contends that it is also an economic, political, and ponsive approachtoadifferent CRS-17 multiple politicalcomponentsandmust reach Moreover, whether thegovernment andits Moreover, whether frompresentopportunitiesunpredictable. e modusvivendiinvolvesGreeceretaining for some time, weathering upsanddowns forsometime, on government was founded in part on a on on government wasfoundedinpart ogue, awordconnoting unacceptable any ofthe Aegean issues dependonthe the Courtafter some preliminarythe talks full fouryears. It is strongly motivated ger aslong asGreece air space claims Greece is yet tobeseen.