i i i i The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases Irene Roswitha Heim Copyright by Irene R. Heim, , All Rights Reserved ( Edition) — typesetting by Anders J. Schoubye and Ephraim Glick i i i i i i i i : Irene Heim’s seminal dissertation from 1982 has been freely available in its original format for some time, but we have oen longed for a retypeset and fully searchable version of this important work. One day, we therefore embarked on the project of typesetting it ourselves and this is the nished product. With permission from Irene Heim, we now make this new version available to interested readers. We have in general attempted to stay true to Heim’s original formatting, but we have made some stylistic changes when we judged that this would improve readability. Should you nd any typographical errors in the text or in the formalisms, please do let us know so that we can correct them. For citations, please refer to the 2011 edition. Anders J. Schoubye Ephraim Glick i i i i i i i i Irene R. Heim e Semantics of Denite and Indenite Noun Phrases M.A., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit¨at Munchen,¨ Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Directed by Professor Barbara Partee Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulllment of the requirements for the degree of September, 1982 Linguistics i i i i i i i i PREFACE In November 1978, a workshop was held at the University of Massachusetts whose title was “Indenite Reference” and whose topic Barbara Partee described in a circular that started as follows: One standard view among logicians is that indenite noun phrases like ‘a tall man’ are not referring expressions, but quantier phrases, like ‘every man’, ‘no man’, and ‘most men’. Yet in many respects, indenite noun phrases seem to function in ordinary language much like denite noun phrases or proper names, particularly with respect to the use of pronouns in discourse. is may be simply a matter of sorting out semantics from pragmatics, but there is not to our knowledge any currently available theory that simultaneously characterizes the logical or truth-functional properties of indenite noun phrases and accounts for their ‘discourse-reference’ properties ... A second installment of the same workshop took place in March 1979, and I was then so preoccupied by the topic that I immediately wrote a paper called “Toward a unied semantics of denite and indenite noun phrases,” in which I treated all denites and indenites as variables. In the following months I grew disaffected with that paper because it did not tell a convincing story about the reasons why denites and indenites, both being variables, were so unlike each other. I wished that all the differences could somehow be made to follow from a difference in the presuppositions of denites and indenites, But it was only in the summer of 1980 that I began to make sense of this idea. en the writing of this dissertation took almost two more years. It still feels like a rough dra, and I hope the reader will view it as such and excuse the redundancies, inconsistencies, and omissions, not to speak of mistakes. e workshop at which my dissertation topic was laid out for me was just one of the many stimulating and instructive events that contributed to my education. I was lucky to be rst a student and then a regular guest at one of the liveliest linguistics departments in Germany, at the University of Konstanz, and I was even luckier to become moreover a student at one of the liveliest linguistics departments in the world, at the University i i i i i i i i | 5 of Massachusetts in Amherst. I am greatly indebted to the people who have made these places what they are, especially to Arnim von Stechow in Konstanz, and to Emmon Bach and Barbara Partee in Amherst. My thinking about linguistics and semantics in general, and about the topics of this dissertation in particular, has been inuenced most fundamentally by the writings of Noam Chomsky, Robert Stalnaker, David Lewis, and Angelika Kratzer, and by the teaching of Edwin Williams and Alan Prince. I also learned a lot from conversations with Arnim von Stechow, Emmon Bach, and Barbara Partee. While I was working on this dissertation, Barbara Partee oen drew my attention to relevant examples and the pertinent literature. Arnim von Stechow thought seriously about every stage of the theory I was developing, always with the attitude of someone who was struggling with the same questions and wanted to see answers that he could believe. Hans Kamp also became a source of moral support: When I rst learned of his paper “A theory of truth and semantic representation” in September 1980 and found it to contain ideas so strikingly similar to my own, I did not welcome the competition. But the encouraging aspect of not being alone with my ideas has prevailed in the long run, especially since Hans, when he came to see my work, overlooked its deciencies generously and emphasized its positive contributions to our common goals. Angelika Kratzer has helped me tremendously. Her comments on earlier dras caused me to reconsider some basic decisions both about the claims I wanted to make and about the form in which I wanted to present them, and I think this has led to considerable improvements. ere were various other people who offered good suggestions and criticisms at one occasion or another. I am grateful to them all, but especially to the four I have mentioned. I would also like to express my gratitude to the friends that have accom- panied me through the years during which I labored over this work. Lisa Selkirk bears most of the responsibility for the fact that these years were much less agonizing than I had feared. Others have contributed to this as well, in particular Elisabet Engdahl, Gertrud Niggl, and Angelika Kratzer. Murvet Enc¸, and Nomi Erteschik-Shir helped me through the nal stages. A long and sad story could be told about the typing of this manuscript. I want to thank Kris Dean, who had the bad luck of wasting innumerable hours of beautiful typing and who remained her most helpful through the bitter end. I also appreciate Daniel Flickinger’s help with the proof-reading. i i i i i i i i ABSTRACT Logical semanticists have standardly analyzed denite and indenite de- scriptions as quantiers, and denite pronouns as variables. is disser- tation explores an alternative analysis, according to which all denites and indenites are quantier-free, i.e., consist of an essential free variable and the descriptive predicate (if any). For instance, “A cat arrived” is analyzed as “cat(x) ∧ arrived(x).” e existential force that such sentences carry in their unembedded (and some of their embedded) uses is attributed not to the indenite article, but to principles that govern the interpretation of variables in general. e primary motivation for this variable-analysis is that it leads to a straightforward account of indenites serving as antecedents for pronouns outside their scope, as in the so-called “donkey sentences.” ese are handled by combining the variable-analysis of indenites with a treatment of quantiers as basically unselective, drawing on work by David Lewis. Since a variable-analysis of both denites and indenites prima facie obliterates the distinctions between the two, it must be accompanied by a new theory of the denite-indenite contrast. is theory must account for the different conditions under which denites and indenites can get bound, and for the exclusive capacity of denites for deixis and anaphora. All these differences can be predicted if the uniform semantic analysis of denites and indenites is supplemented by suitable assumptions about their contrasting felicity conditions (presuppositions): Felicitous denites must be “familiar” variables, felicitous indenites must be “novel” variables. Familiarity may be a matter of having an antecedent in the text, or else of having a contextually salient referent. e underlying concept of familiarity that unites these two cases is best captured in an enriched semantic theory, which includes a further level of analysis, here called the “le” level. A major part of the dissertation is devoted to developing and motivating such a theory of “le change semantics,” and to making precise its relation to conventional truth-condional semantics. i i i i i i i i I Problems Concerning Indefinites and Anaphora 9 1 Do Indenites Refer? ........................................ 11 1.1 Russell’s view ........................................... 11 1.2 Anaphoric pronouns as bound variables . 14 1.3 Anaphoric pronouns as picking up a speaker’s reference . 17 1.4 Anaphoric pronouns as disguised denite descriptions . 24 1.5 Anaphoric pronouns and the ambiguity hypothesis . 29 1.6 Summary ............................................... 34 2 Problems with Donkey Sentences ........................... 35 2.1 Donkey anaphora as variable binding ................... 37 2.1.1 Egli’s proposal ....................................... 39 2.1.2 Evaluation of Egli’s proposal ......................... 42 2.1.3 Smaby’s proposal .................................... 48 2.2 Donkey sentences and pragmatic accounts of anaphora . 51 2.3 Donkey anaphora and disguised denite descriptions . 52 2.3.1 Pro and contra the uniqueness implication . 58 2.3.2 Conditionals ........................................ 63 2.4 Donkey sentences and the ambiguity hypothesis. 68 2.5 Summary ............................................... 69 3 Donkey Anaphora in Game-eoretical Semantics . 70 II Indefinites as Variables 81 1 Adaptability of Indenites and Adverbs of Quantication . 81 2 Logical Forms for English Texts with Indenites and Quan- tiers ....................................................... 86 3 Semantic Interpretation of Logical Form . 101 3.1 Semantic categorization of elements of logical form . 101 3.2 An extensional semantics, based on satisfaction .