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© 2014 GHAIDAA HETOU ALL RIGHTS RESERVED SYRIA’S REGIONAL ALIGNMENT: EXPLAINING SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1970-2010 By GHAIDAA HETOU A dissErtation submittEd to thE GraduatE School-New Brunswick RutgErs, The StatE University of New JErsey in partial fulfillMEnt of the rEquirEMEnts for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy GraduatE Program in Political SciEncE written undEr thE direction of ProfEssor Eric Davis and approvEd by ____________________________________ Jack S. Levy ____________________________________ Roy Licklider ____________________________________ Joshua Landis ____________________________________ Norman SamuEls New Brunswick, New JErsEy May, 2014 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION SYRIA’S REGIONAL ALIGNMENT: EXPLAINING SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1970-2010 By: GHAIDAA HETOU DissErtation DirEctor: ProfEssor Eric Davis What Explains alignMEnt bEhavior in Syrian forEign policy? Structural rEalists arguE that, like all states, authoritarian states pursue thEir national interests in an anarchic world by balancing powEr or thrEats, inforMEd by thE distribution of matErial capabilities. Hence alliance choices, according to structural realists, are driven, nEcEssarily, by rEgional thrEat assEssMEnts. WEak statEs in such an anarchic systEm, lacking ability to balancE, would bandwagon with thE powerful state. Liberals argue that doMEstic charactErs of statEs influEncE forEign policy bEhavior. Non-dEmocratic statEs lack dEmocratic institutions, which ErodEs thE concEpt of “national interest”. Liberals therefore argue that authoritarian states’ foreign policies are irrational, unprEdictablE and drivEn by idEology gEarEd solEly towards rEgiME survival. This dissErtation motivatEs a rEsolution to this puzzlE by arguing that Syria’s state national intErEst was dEfinEd through a forEign policy that dEalt with thE doMEstic ii distributional dilEmma, and simultanEously sought ExtErnal sEcurity and rEgiME survival. ThE alignMEnt choicEs in Syrian forEign policy arE bEst ExplainEd through a neoclassical rEalist approach that combinEs statE and systEmic lEvEl variablEs. Decision-making procEss analysis of thE political rElEvant ElitE in Syria will ground thE dynamic that links statE and systEmic factors in a cohErEnt rational forEign policy. This project worked towards testing the neo-classical realist thEory of forEign policy in thE Syrian casE, and pErforming initial plausibility chEcks by Examining Syrian forEign policy alignMEnt choicEs bEtwEEn 1970 and 2010 through a numbEr of casE studiEs. Liberals fail to explain Syrian forEign policy behavior during thE pEriod in quEstion, whilE nEoclassical rEalism approach shEds morE light on Syria’s forEign policy bEhavior in gEnEral, and alignMEnt choicEs in particular. Methodologically, this project eMploys the historical analysis approach. Process tracing, in each casE study, draws on elite interviEws, local and rEgional prEss accounts, Economic databasEs, military disputEs data sEts, MEmoirs, and U.S. National Security archives. iii Acknowledgement I would likE to ExprEss my apprEciation and gratitudE to my dissErtation chair professor Eric Davis. Without his dedication, guidance, patience and help, this dissErtation would not havE bEEn possiblE. I would also likE to thank my dissertation committEE MEmbErs, profEssor Jack LEvy, profEssor Roy LicklidEr, profEssor Joshua Landis, and profEssor Norman SamuEls, for thEir constructivE coMMEnts, hElpful discussions and guidancE. I am dEEply gratEful to thE Political SciEncE dEpartMEnt staff MEmbErs at Rutgers UnivErsity, especially Paulette Flowers-Yhap, for hEr trEMEndous dEdication and hElp. I also want to ExtEnd my gratitudE to EvEryonE I MEt during my fiEld rEsEarch trip in Syria. Without thEir willingnEss to discuss, coMMEnt and agrEE to bEing interviEwed, this dissErtation would not havE sEEn thE light of day. I also apprEciate thE fEEdback and EncouragEMEnt offErEd by my wondErful and always hElpful profEssors at thE Division of Global Affairs and Political SciEncE dEpartMEnt, and my friEnds and collEaguEs. My dEEpEst apprEciation to my loving parEnts Hala and ChakEr, my sistErs, May, SErin and Salam, and my brothEr Khalil. I’m also dEEply gratEful to YasEr, without his hElp and support, thE start and complEtion of thE graduatE studies adventure would not havE beEn possible. My dEEpest lovE and affEction goEs to my son Hamza and my daughtEr Yasmin, both could not bE happiEr to witnEss thE dissErtation finalE. I havE had thE support and EncouragEMEnt of a grEat numbEr of people, for that I will be eternally thankful. iv Dedication To Syria May thE world sEE you with eyes of love v Table of Content Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………..….…..…...…..…ii Acknowledgment………………………………………………………………………….….……...…..……..iv Dedication………………………………………………………………………………………..……………...…..v Table of Content…………………………………………………………………………… ……..……...……..vi List of Tables and Illustrations…..………………………………………………….………..…..………ix Chapter One: Introduction…………………………………………………………………….………..……1 Motivation Behind Project………………………………………………………..........….3 ThE MiddlE East and StatE Formation……………………………….…………..………7 StatE Formation in Syria……………………………………………………………….… …10 Purpose of thE Study……………………………………………………………...…….…..…13 HypothEsis……………………………………………………………………………………..…..13 MEthodology……………………………………………………………….………………….…..17 CasE StudiEs……………………………………………………………………………....….. …..18 KEy ConcEpts……………………………………………………………….……………… .……19 Chapter Two: Foreign Policy and Regional Alignment…………………………..……...….…23 Introduction…………………………….…………………………… ………….…….........…..23 Structural Theories and Foreign Policies of Arab States..………..….…24 Balance of Power Theory……………………….……………… ……………..……………24 Balance of Threat Theory…………………………………… …….…………..………....…27 Balance of Interests Theory………………………………………… .……….……..…...…29 Liberal Theories and Foreign Policy of Middle Eastern States ……….31 Authoritarianism and Foreign Policy Making………………….…………..………....31 The Monadic Behavior of Authoritarian States…………………….....………….….38 Neoclassical Realism and Middle East Alignment Choices…….….…….45 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..…………….……..51 Chapter Three: Research and Method Analysis……………………………………….………..…..54 Introduction...…………………………………………………………………..….……………54 1.Methodology…………….........………………………………………………....……...……58 1.1 Case Study Method…………………………… ………………..…………...…….…58 vi 1.2 Structures Focused ComparativE Approach…………..…….……….…….59 1.3 Case Selection……………………………………………………………………….….62 2. The Five Selected Cases……………… ……………………….………..…….…...63 3. Data Collection…………………………………………………….……..…..….….….63 Chapter Four: Syria-Egypt Alignment 1971…………………………..…………..65 4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………….………..……...66 4.2 The Decision to Align with Egypt in 1971…….……………..……...…..72 4.2.1 ExtErnal EnvironMEnt……………….………………………….……....…..73 4.2.2 IntErnal Consolidating, Economic Conditions and REgiME SEcurity……………………………………………………..…...……80 4.2.3 Independence and U.S. Penetration of the Region.......................83 4.2.4 Hafez al-Asad and Sadat: LikEmindEd and IndEpEndEnt………………..………………………………………..… …..…….84 4.3 Alignment with Egypt as an Irrational Choice…………..…..….…..…..87 4.4Bandwagoning………………………………………………….…………………...….89 Chapter Five: The Syrian Iranian Alliance 1980………………………………..…91 5.1 The Decision to Align with Iran in 1980……………………….………..….92 5.1.1 ThE ExtErnal EnvironMEnt ………….…………………….…………………92 5.1.2 IntErnal Consolidation, REligious Turmoil and REgiME Security……………………………………...………………….………..…………101 5.1.3 FrEEdom from Submission to thE WEst………..…….….…………..…105 5.1.4 Substituting Egypt and Linking Lebanon………...………………..….106 5.2 Aligning with Iran as an Irrational and Ideological Foreign Policy………….………………………………………………..………………....………108 5.3 Bandwagoning……………………………………………..……………..………..….109 Chapter Six: Syria and Hezbollah 1990……………...……….…...………..……..…110 6.1 The Decision to Align with Hezbollah……….…………………………..….112 6.1.1 ExtErnal EnvironMEnt……………………………………………...……...…112 6.1.2 DoMEstic ConsidEration, Economic impErativEs and REgiME SEcurity…………………………………….…….…………………….…120 vii 6.1.3 ThE Axis of REsistancE and REgional SEcurity……...……………..…..123 6.1.4 ThE DEtErioration of GrEat PowEr AlliancE and REgional InsurancE………………………………………………………….………...………124 6.2 Aligning with Hezbollah as Irrational and Ideologically Motivated…………………………………………………………………….……….....125 6.3 Bandwagoning…………………………………………………………….….…..…… 126 Chapter Seven: Syria Joining Gulf War Coalition in 1990……………….....128 7.1 The Decision to Join the Coalition…… ……………….………………….……130 7.1.1 ExtErnal EnvironMEnt…..……….………………………………………....…130 7.1.2 DoMEstic Constrains, PowEr Consolidation and REgiME Security…………..…………………..………………………………………..…....137 7.1.3 Arab Solidarity and Curbing a REgional ThrEat…………….…..…...139 7.1.4 The Decision to Join thE Coalition ………..…………………………….…139 7.2 Regime Survival…………………………………………………………………….……141 7.3 Bandwagoning with the United State after the End of Cold War……………………………………………………………………………..………..……142 Chapter Eight: Bashar al Assad and The Crisis of 2003………..………..…...143 Introduction…………………………………………………………….……..…………………145 8.1 The Decision to Maintain the Axis of Resistance in 2003……...……..147 8.1.1 ExtErnal EnvironMEnt……….…………………………..........……..…….…148 8.1.2 DoMEstic ConsidEration and REgiME SEcurity…..………………..….156 8.1.3 ThE DEcision to ChallEngE American IntErvEntion...………………..160 8.1.4 REliablE AlliEs and REgional TurbulEncE…..………..………………….161 8.2 Regime Survival During the Regime Change in Iraq……..….………….163 8.3 Bandwagoning During the 2003 Iraq War……………………..……………164