HSBA HSBAFOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Issue BriefAvailable in Arabic Small Arms Survey Number 25 December 2016

Legitimacy, exclusion, and power Taban Deng Gai and the South Sudan peace process

Following clashes in Juba in July 2016, is that the new FVP does not represent yet dead and remained the best chance Riek Machar, the leader of the Sudan the opposition, and that the ARCSS, for peace in South Sudan.3 The inter- People’s Liberation Movement-in- which is a power-sharing agreement, national community is largely in accord Opposition (SPLM–IO), fled the capital; is over, as no power is being shared. with Njoroge and has broadly welcomed meanwhile, the Sudan People’s Libera- Despite Taban Deng’s lack of pop- the appointment of Taban Deng, who tion Army (SPLA) mounted a coordi- ularity in South Sudan, on 28 October, has visited the United States as FVP nated attack on opposition positions in Augostino Njoroge, a former general and spoken at the United Nations and the city, using tanks, heavy weapons, in the Kenyan army and the deputy to the US government.4 and Mi-24 helicopters.1 Having achieved chairperson of the Joint Monitoring Nonetheless, there has been some a military victory in Juba, the leader- and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), disquiet about Taban Deng’s appoint- ship of the Sudan People’s Liberation which is responsible for overseeing the ment. Festus Mogae, the JMEC chair- Movement (SPLM) moved to consoli- peace agreement, announced that while person, acknowledged that the FVP’s date its political control of the govern- the ARCSS was wounded, it was not legitimacy was questionable, but that ment. On 26 July, South Sudanese president Salva Kiir swore in Taban Deng Gai, formerly the SPLM–IO’s chief political negotiator and, until 22 July, the minister of mining in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), as first vice president (FVP), replacing Riek Machar in a move of questionable legitimacy. Taban Deng’s appointment is opposed by most of the SPLM–IO political elite; the former governor of Unity state also has little popularity among the rank-and-file members of the opposition, who believe he has sold out to the government for personal gain. While a small circle of the SPLM–IO’s political leaders in Juba and some of Taban Deng’s old supporters from Unity back the new FVP, most of the SPLM–IO remains loyal to Machar, whose support base, while weakened, is still considerable. In October 2016, Machar announced that the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was dead, and that new political negotiations were needed so that another peace agreement could South Sudan’s First Vice President Taban Deng Gai addresses the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2016. © REUTERS/Eduardo Munoz be reached.2 The SPLM–IO’s position

www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 since diplomats ‘don’t have an option’, This Brief places some of the key find- Kiir and Taban Deng seized on they would work with the Govern- ings of the Working Paper in the con- Machar’s absence as a political oppor- ment of the Republic of South Sudan text of current political dynamics in tunity. On 23 July, at the Crown Hotel, (GRSS), including Taban Deng.5 The the country. With Taban Deng as FVP, a hastily convened meeting of Taban UN Secretary-General’s review of the and ongoing clashes in Unity, the Deng’s supporters in the SPLM–IO— mandate of the UN Mission in South beleaguered state is central to under- including SPLM secretary general Dhieu Sudan, released on 10 November, also standing the challenges facing South Mathok and deputy chairperson Alfred notes that Taban Deng’s appointment Sudan today. Ladu Gore (both of whom outrank ‘blur[s] the legitimacy of the current Taban Deng in the SPLM–IO), as well governmental formation’.6 as Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, the former Despite these doubts, US and Euro- The appointment of SPLM–IO secretary of foreign affairs— pean politicians privately insist that Taban Deng endorsed Taban Deng for FVP.10 Kiir the ARCSS is ‘the only game in town’.7 swore Taban Deng in as FVP on 26 July. Following the signing of the ARCSS As discussed below, members of the The GRSS contends that this in August 2015, there were months of diplomatic community have little appointment was legal. Clause 6.4 negotiations concerning the best form appetite for new political negotiations of the ARCSS states: for the transitional government and and have therefore publicly endorsed the military situation in a putatively In the event that the post of the First the ARCSS; privately, however, they demilitarized Juba. The GRSS did not Vice-President falls vacant during the hold little optimism that the current demilitarize Juba during this period, Transitional Period, for any reason, peace process can succeed. The inter- as was required by the agreement, and including mental infirmity or physi- national community’s public endorse- Machar did not go back to the capital, cal incapacity of the office holder, the ment of Taban Deng was key to the despite growing pressure for his return replacement shall be nominated by GRSS plan to exclude the opposition from both the SPLM and international the top leadership body of the South from power and to retain the legitimacy actors. When Machar finally returned Sudan Armed Opposition as at the that would allow it to embark on a to Juba in April 2016, the city was still signing of the agreement.11 military campaign to dominate South not demilitarized, and neither side was Sudan in the forthcoming dry season. interested in fully implementing the The GRSS maintains that Machar’s The ARCSS was designed to be both peace agreement. Rather, both parties absence from Juba meant that the post a military solution to the crisis in South tried to extract the maximum possible of FVP was indeed vacant, that the Sudan and an elite-level, bilateral political advantage from a selective meeting of the SPLM–IO at the Crown power-sharing agreement between reading of parts of the ARCSS, while Hotel constituted a legitimate meeting two warring parties, the SPLM–IO overall implementation of the agree- of the leadership body of the SPLM– and the SPLM/A, which would result ment stalled, Juba remained militarized, IO, and that Taban Deng was a legiti- in the formation of a transitional gov- and a confrontation between the two mate member of the opposition who ernment. For this agreement to remain forces became increasingly likely. could therefore be nominated for the meaningful after the events of July 2016, This unsustainable state of affairs post of FVP. the TGoNU would have to be a true was the background to initial clashes in In response, the SPLM–IO argues power-sharing government and Taban Juba on 7–8 July 2016. The events sur- that on 22 July, Machar asked Kiir to Deng a genuine opposition leader whose rounding these clashes are contested.9 remove Taban Deng from the transi- participation in the peace process could What is clear, however, is that the tional government and dismissed him lead to a sustainable future for South SPLM/A used these incidents as a from the SPLM–IO, thereby disquali- Sudan. At present, the ARCSS’s poten- pretext for an all-out military assault fying him from the FVP nomination.12 tial to serve as a workable agreement on SPLM–IO positions in Juba on It further contends that while there thus turns on the standing of the FVP. 10–11 July, one designed to consolidate was a meeting of some members of This Issue Brief analyses Taban the government’s military control of the SPLM–IO at the Crown Hotel, it Deng’s history and his current place in the capital. was far from the majority of the oppo- South Sudan. In doing so, it draws on Machar fled Juba during this sition leadership, was not a meeting a new HSBA Working Paper on Unity assault, moving south towards the of the SPLM–IO’s National Leadership state—A State of Disunity: Conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo Council, and effectively constituted Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, and leaving a power vacuum in Juba. a power grab by the faction loyal to 2013–158—which is being released Kiir repeatedly demanded that Machar Taban Deng in Juba. There is no evi- together with this Brief. The Working return to the capital or face removal dence that the SPLM–IO members Paper analyses the continuities between as FVP. Legitimately fearing for his who endorsed Taban Deng had the Sudan’s long second civil war (1983– life, Machar refused to go back to Juba legal capacity to do so. 2005) and the current conflict, as well and indicated that he would only do Nor can Machar’s flight from the as social and military dynamics that so upon the arrival of a third-party force capital reasonably be understood to have emerged since December 2013. in Juba that could ensure his safety. indicate that the office of FVP was

2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 25 December 2016 vacant. Machar has consistently com- Despite its public support for the The current pact of convenience municated his intention to return to new FVP, the international commu- between Kiir and Taban Deng echoes a Juba once the security situation has been nity is aware that Taban Deng lacks a previous alliance between the two men. stabilized. Consequently, the applica- mandate among the SPLM–IO and in As the abovementioned Working Paper ble clause of the ARCSS would not be South Sudan more generally. Yet, given shows in greater detail, Taban Deng 6.4, but rather 6.5, which states: the extent of the international commu- spent much of Sudan’s second civil nity’s support of the ARCSS since its war as a staunch ally of Riek Machar, In the event of a temporary absence inception, there is a deep reluctance to including when the latter split from the of the First Vice President, the First admit that the peace agreement is a SPLA. In 2005, however, Taban Deng Vice President may delegate a senior failure, and neither US nor European became a Kiir loyalist and was rewarded South Sudan Armed Opposition Min- diplomats want to begin a new peace with the governorship of Unity state, ister to carry out the functions and process. As a consequence, the inter- which he held from 2005 to 2013. During duties stipulated in this agreement.13 national community and regional this period, Taban Deng fulfilled sev- Despite its dubious legality, Taban bodies such as IGAD continue to back eral useful functions for Kiir: he split Deng’s appointment was broadly wel- a peace process that no one privately what should have been Machar’s most comed by the regional organizations thinks can work, while publicly accept- solid power base, in his home state of involved in the peace process. In August ing as legitimate what was effectively Unity, and ensured that Unity’s oil 2016, Festus Mogae, the JMEC chair- an internal coup in Juba. revenue did not to go to his principal person, recognized Taban Deng as The acceptance of Taban Deng’s rival. Taban Deng’s governorship also FVP and pledged to work with him appointment by the JMEC, IGAD, and meant that the powerful Bul Nuer com- and Kiir on the implementation of the the international community was cru- manders who had controlled much of ARCSS.14 The JMEC’s claim is that the cial to Kiir. After Machar fled the SPLA Unity during the second civil war could composition of the SPLM–IO and the assault on SPLM–IO positions in Juba, be marginalized and kept out of power. TGoNU is an internal affair, over which the GRSS faced a stark choice: it could The current alliance between the it has no say.15 Such a stance, however, either allow Machar to return to Juba two men again sees Kiir using Taban necessitates recognizing Taban Deng as to restart a transitional power-sharing Deng to attempt to split Machar’s the legitimate leader of the SPLM–IO, government in which it had no interest, power base, this time at the national and believing that the process to choose or else appoint a successor to Machar. level. The international community’s him was a valid internal affair—pre- If the JMEC and the international com- acceptance of Taban Deng as the legiti- cisely what Machar and the rest of munity had not recognized Machar’s mate FVP has also meant that while the the SPLM–IO contest. On 28 August, successor as legitimate, then there would SPLM–IO was previously recognized Festus Mogae clarified that while the have been pressure on Kiir to allow as a legitimate political opposition with JMEC found Taban Deng’s legitimacy Machar to return to the capital and to substantive grievances, its members questionable, it had no choice but to resume negotiations. If the GRSS had are now characterized as bandits or engage with him if it wanted to con- refused to do so and had abandoned terrorists, outside the political process. tinue to pursue a peace settlement the peace process, the government In October 2016, for instance, Lam through the ARCSS.16 would have faced international outcry. Tungwar, the minister of information The international community The appointment of Taban Deng for Northern Lich state—one of the takes the same position as the JMEC. as FVP allows the government to pro- states into which Unity is to be divided On 26 August, the Intergovernmental claim that it remains committed to the according to Kiir’s October 2015 decree Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process. That Taban Deng has —stated that since the SPLM–IO was stated that Taban Deng’s appointment been accepted as the formal leader of under the authority of the FVP, and was legal, as did the US secretary of the SPLM–IO also delegitimizes the Taban Deng was committed to peace, state, John Kerry, in a statement to majority of the SPLM–IO, excluding any armed fighters involved in clashes the press in Nairobi on 22 August.17 them from a place in the peace process. with the SPLA were simply crimi- On 7 September, Donald Booth, the Taban Deng is a safe choice for Kiir. nals.19 In a variation on the theme, on US special envoy for Sudan and South Unlike Machar, he does not have the 9 October, SPLA spokesman Lul Ruai Sudan, said that he recognized Taban nationwide political support necessary Koang asked the international commu- Deng as FVP, employing the same to vie for the presidency, and he is thus nity to recognize those loyal to Machar reasoning as the JMEC. In his words: largely beholden to Kiir for his power. as ‘terrorists’.20 ‘We do not believe it would be wise for For Taban Deng, the appointment allows Such depictions of the SPLM–IO, Machar to return to his previous posi- for the accrual of personal power near and of other opposition groups in the tion in Juba.’18 Taban Deng’s acceptance the apex of the South Sudanese political country, indicate that those who were as FVP was cemented in September and structure. His loyalty to Kiir is provi- once part of political negotiations are October 2016, when he met with officials sional and does not reflect a substantive now denied a political platform, and in the United States and addressed the meeting of minds, nor a unified vision that their demands are characterized UN General Assembly. for South Sudan. as non-political—they are portrayed

www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 3 as mere bandits interested in self- Prior to the events of July 2016, may have gone some way towards enrichment. This means that the Machar struggled with disappoint- unifying it and overcoming rank- ARCSS process, having excluded the ment among the SPLM–IO’s rank and and-file SPLM–IO discontent with vast majority of the country, now only file as well as its political elite. In June Machar’s reign. represents the GRSS in Juba. At the 2015, Simon Gatwich was part of a Due to both Kiir’s creation of an same time, the SPLM/A’s characteri- group of SPLM–IO generals, includ- SPLM–IO leadership in Juba under zations of the opposition indicate that ing Peter Gatdet, Gathoth Gatkuoth, Taban Deng, which is delinked from the SPLM–IO is thought of, and dealt and Gabriel Gatwich Chany (Tanginye), the broader struggles occurring in with, as a security problem. who signed a letter to Sudanese presi- South Sudan, and to the fact that the These depictions of the opposition dent Omar al Bashir requesting that international community has legiti- are congruent with the SPLA’s hopes weapons destined for the front bypass mized the FVP, the actual SPLM–IO is for the upcoming dry season, namely Taban Deng and be distributed to excluded from negotiations concerning that the SPLM–IO will either integrate field commanders.21 Simon Gatwich South Sudan’s political future. Kenya’s under Taban Deng’s authority or else was frustrated by the inadequacy of deportation of SPLM–IO spokesman be eliminated, as discussed below. The the weapons supplies to the SPLM–IO James Gatdet Dak on 3 November, appointment of Taban Deng effectively in the field and also felt betrayed by allegedly after a payment from Kiir confines the legitimate space of politics the SPLM–IO’s political negotiators, into an election fund for Kenyan pres- in the country to Juba, while in the who were perceived as more inter- ident Uhuru Kenyatta, indicates that the rest of South Sudan the SPLM–IO and ested in self-advancement than in GRSS is trying to shut down the spaces other opposition groups are turned furthering the interests of the Nuer from which the SPLM–IO formerly into security problems, to be pacified. community. When Gatdet and Gatkuoth organized resistance; the same can be split away from the SPLM–IO later said of moves made to prevent Riek that year, Simon Gatwich did not join Machar from staying in Addis Ababa Taban Deng and politics them due to pressure from his home and Khartoum that same month.22 in Juba Lou Nuer community. Many rank- In this context, the only way that and-file members of the opposition, the SPLM–IO may be able to imagine When Taban Deng was appointed FVP, however, shared his frustration with returning to the negotiating table is he brought with him a number of the SPLM–IO’s political elite. This through violence. A successful dry- important SPLM–IO politicians, includ- frustration increased over the course season campaign, it hopes, will force ing Ezekiel Gatkuoth and Alfred Ladu of 2015–16, especially within the Nuer IGAD, the JMEC, and the United States 2016 Gore. At the beginning of August , community, as negotiations stalled at to recognize that the ARCSS has failed Taban Deng fired all the ministers whom the national level and the situation for and that Taban Deng is illegitimate, Riek Machar had appointed to the many communities in Greater Upper which may, in turn, compel the inter- transitional government and replaced Nile deteriorated markedly. national community to pressure the them with his own loyalists: Ezekiel Perhaps unexpectedly, Taban GRSS to negotiate with the opposi- Gatkuoth received the Ministry of Deng’s defection to the government tion. The first SPLM–IO meetings Petroleum, and Alfred Ladu Gore, has gone a great way to firming up following Taban Deng’s appointment, the Ministry of Land, Housing, and Riek Machar’s support among the in August 2016 in Khartoum, marked Urban Development. SPLM–IO. Rather than Riek Machar the beginning of preparations for a However, Taban Deng’s support is and Taban Deng, the latter alone has dry-season campaign against the almost entirely confined to Juba. All become the scapegoat, blamed for the SPLA. On 25 September, Machar the active opposition forces engaging venality of the political elite. As Machar called for a reorganization of the in combat with the SPLA in Equatoria is excluded from political negotia- SPLM–IO in order to wage ‘armed either remain with Riek Machar, or con- tions, he no longer has to compromise resistance’ against the GRSS.23 tinue to operate independently, as is his political positions, which can thus The United States immediately true of the SPLM–IO forces in Western become more radical—and more pal- denounced his declaration: State Bahr el Ghazal state. In both areas, atable to his base support. For the Department spokesman John Kirby there is deep, substantive disagree- SPLM–IO forces that are currently stated on 28 September that the US ment with, and distrust of, the GRSS, involved in active combat with the government ‘strongly condemned’ and little respect for Taban Deng. SPLA in Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, Machar’s claims.24 Indeed, the United Moreover, none of the major SPLM–IO and Greater Upper Nile, Riek Machar States cited Machar’s appeal for armed commanders have joined Taban Deng; is the only possible leader, as Taban resistance in an annexe to its proposed Simon Gatwich Dual, the SPLM–IO Deng is heavily under Kiir’s influence UN Security Council resolution, which general chief of staff, remains loyal and does not support armed conflict called for an arms embargo on South to Machar, along with almost all the with the GRSS. In this sense, Taban Sudan and was circulated on 17 Novem- major generals, including Martin Kenyi Deng’s appointment, which Kiir had ber.25 The annexe also set out sanctions Terensio and Maguek Gai Majak. hoped would split the opposition, against Paul Malong Awan, Michael

4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 25 December 2016 Makuei Lueth, and Riek Machar, in a From 2005 onwards, discontent with interested in the composition of the move that, if it had been successful, Taban Deng intensified. In 2008, Paulino future government—and his place in would have further marginalized the Matiep, a Bul Nuer who was a power- it—than in achieving justice for the SPLM–IO.26 ful militia commander during the second events of December 2013 in Juba, or From the perspective of the SPLM– civil war, allied with Riek Machar and in securing a place for the Nuer in the IO, the peace process itself has caused supported Joseph Nguen Monytuil national politics of South Sudan. This Machar to renew his appeal for armed Wejang, the current governor of Unity tension was expressed, for instance, conflict. Denied a space of negotiation state, for the SPLM chairmanship of the during the first SPLM–IO conference by a peace process that has excluded state. Nguen Monytuil was elected at in Pagak in April 2014, at which Taban the vast majority of the opposition, the the state party congress in April 2008. Deng insisted that his negotiating team’s SPLM–IO hopes to re-enter political In the states of southern Sudan, it was acceptance of a Kiir-led government negotiations with the GRSS through a tacit rule that the party chairperson must also be endorsed by the broader violence. would stand for the SPLM in the guber- SPLM–IO—a position that the opposi- natorial elections in 2010. In disregard tion refused to support. Taban Deng was of this convention, Taban Deng refused equally unpopular with the comanders Taban Deng in Unity the implication of Nguen Monytuil’s of the SPLM–IO. He was responsible While Taban Deng has little political election, and the two leaders began to for procuring weapons for the conflict currency as FVP at the national level, compete for power in Bentiu. Juba then in Unity state, and the military wing 28 he is absolutely detested in his home intervened on Taban Deng’s side. of the SPLM–IO contended that arms state of Unity, where the idea that a Nguen Monytuil chose not to run as supplies were neither sufficient, nor man quite so unpopular could be a gubernatorial candidate due to pres- delivered to the right places. anointed as head of the opposition sure from Juba. Instead, those opposed The antagonism felt towards Taban has been met with consternation. On to Taban Deng put their weight behind Deng in Unity increased after the Pagak 29 August, paramount chiefs from Angelina Teny, Machar’s wife, who conference, when Machar replaced across the Greater Upper Nile region was running as an independent can- Peter Gatdet as commander of the condemned his appointment. Nuer didate. Taban Deng won the election 4th Division of the SPLM–IO with his residents of the UN protection of civil- amid widespread allegations of vote deputy, Simon Maguek Gai Majak. ians site in Rubkona speak scathingly rigging and intimidation. Prior to the conflict, Maguek Gai had of Taban Deng’s appointment; they His victory would prove the high been an unpopular speaker of the Unity accuse him of betraying his commu- watermark of his tenure as governor. state legislature; appointed by Taban nity and joining the political elite that Many party members felt that Juba had Deng, he was removed by Nguen so brutally killed Nuer civilians in Juba pushed Taban Deng on Unity and lost Monytuil in September 2013. Many in December 2013 and raped and pil- confidence in the government and the SPLM–IO members claimed that laged their way through southern Unity SPLM’s political bureau. Anger about Maguek Gai was unsuited to his in 2014 and 2015.27 Taban Deng’s re-election also extended new position as division commander, Dislike of Taban Deng in Unity goes beyond the political elite that had as he had primarily been a politician, back to his time as governor. While backed Nguen Monytuil or Teny, reach- rather than a soldier. They also felt Taban Deng’s governorship was sup- ing into much of the state. It was in his appointment was another instance ported by Juba, the people of Unity part Taban Deng’s weakened position of a self-serving SPLM–IO political frequently complained that Kiir had within Unity that then led him to seek elite using nepotism and clientelism imposed him on the state, just as they a rapprochement with Riek Machar. to retain control of the state, to the now accuse Kiir of having imposed This reconciliation improved Taban detriment of the overall opposition Taban Deng on the SPLM–IO. Recurring Deng’s position, but it was also the to the government. allegations of corruption during his beginning of his fallout with Salva The subsequent collapse of the time as governor further exposed him Kiir, who was worried about a united SPLM–IO in the state during the SPLA’s to public opprobrium. While Taban Unity state under Riek Machar. Kiir April–June 2015 assault on Panakuach Deng was governor, there was no finally dismissed Taban Deng in July and the south of Unity led to further accountability for oil revenues marked 2013, as part of a raft of dismissals criticism of Taban Deng. Suspicion of for Unity, and residents of the state designed to shore up his rule against the opposition’s political and military from across the political and ethnic Machar’s challenge. leadership was one of the reasons why spectrums accuse him of having pock- From December 2013, Taban Deng the SPLM–IO found it difficult to recruit eted much of the oil money intended was the chief political negotiator for in southern Unity during the SPLA’s for the state. In Bentiu in 2012, state the SPLM–IO. In this position, he was assault in 2015. officials acknowledged that even they not popular in Unity state. Rank-and- The dislike of the new FVP in his had no idea of the whereabouts of the file members of the SPLM–IO felt that home state is thus clearly linked to his 2 per cent of oil revenue that should he was negotiating in Addis Abba for tenure as governor and to his perfor- have gone to the people of Unity. personal gain, and that he was more mance as a member of the SPLM–IO.

www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 5 The military situation loyal to Machar, including Tito Biel Wiec, ishment of the Bul Nuer in April and the deputy commander of the SPLM– May 2011, burning down their villages in Unity IO in Unity, and Maguek Gai, the and denying humanitarian access to Shortly after he became FVP, Taban SPLM–IO 4th Division commander. Mayom county. The campaign was a Deng vowed to integrate the SPLM–IO In contrast to government claims that prime reason for the creation of power- into the SPLA; to that end, he set up 10,000 SPLM–IO members have joined ful Bul Nuer rebel groups, including cantonment areas for opposition forces Taban Deng, the number of defections those controlled by Matthew Puljang, in Equatoria.29 The SPLM–IO have not in Unity is more likely to number in the currently the most powerful commander moved into these cantonment sites, hundreds, and the south of the state in Unity state. and none of the opposition forces in remains resolutely hostile to the GRSS The Bul Nuer have received Taban Equatoria recognize Taban Deng as and to Taban Deng. Deng’s appointment as FVP with deep their commander-in-chief. Indeed, the discontent. On 7 October, Bapiny SPLM–IO was scathing in response to Monytuil, the governor’s brother and Taban Deng’s pronouncements, and The Bul Nuer a former militia leader, resigned from opposition forces in Central Equatoria Taban Deng’s appointment as FVP the SPLA. In his resignation letter, declared that the FVP had ‘no army could also cause problems within Bapiny argues that the 28-state decree 30 to integrate’. Outside of Juba, few government forces in Unity. Nguen would take away Bul Nuer land and members of the opposition recognize Monytuil, the current governor of the accuses the GRSS of acting to advance Taban Deng’s authority. state—and the prospective governor of Dinka interests at the expense of the 31 The situation in Unity is more com- what is to become Northern Lich state Nuer. However, given Bapiny’s criti- plicated. Several SPLM–IO command- under Kiir’s proposed partition of cism of his own brother in the letter, ers from Guit, Taban Deng’s home Unity—loathes Taban Deng. This loath- this defection should not be taken as county, have declared their loyalty to ing has deep historical roots. In 1997, the beginning of a movement of the the new FVP, including Carlo Kuol, the two men clashed over the gover- Bul Nuer commanders aligned with Dor Manjour, and Liah Diu, who are norship of Unity state, Taban Deng the SPLM towards the SPLM–IO. all Jikany Nuer, like Taban Deng. Yet, with Machar’s backing, and Nguen Taban Deng’s split from the SPLM– the majority of the SPLM–IO, even in Monytuil with the support of Sudan’s IO led to the emergence of four differ- Guit county, does not support the new National Congress Party. Taban Deng ent factions of Bul Nuer in Unity state. FVP. Those who joined Taban Deng left won the governorship and, during his The first comprises a small number of SPLM–IO-controlled areas and went to reign, fought bitter battles with Bul commanders who are loyal to Taban the SPLA stronghold at Bentiu, effec- Nuer commanders, many of whom Deng, such as Makal Kuol. The second tively joining the government forces. now command important places in faction consists of commanders, such Dor Manjour visited Guit county sur- the military forces loyal to the govern- as Bapiny Monytuil and Peter Gatdet, reptitiously at the end of July, in an ment in Unity state. who are hostile to the GRSS, are not effort to convince the SPLM–IO troops Personal rivalry between the two attached to the SPLM–IO, and could there to join the forces of the FVP; men continued after the signing of the be used as spoilers by Khartoum in he was rebuffed. Comprehensive Peace Agreement in future negotiations with South Sudan, A number of Bul Nuer SPLM–IO 2005 brought an end to Sudan’s second if they were to receive weaponry. Bul commanders have also left the SPLM– civil war. Machar and Matiep unified Nuer forces that are loyal to the main- IO to join Taban Deng, most impor- around Nguen Monytuil in 2008 as a stream SPLM–IO constitute the third tantly Michael Makal Kuol, the candidate to run against Taban Deng, group. The fourth faction involves com- SPLM–IO operations commander but Juba intervened in the gubernato- manders and troops arrayed around for Unity. Most of these commanders rial election to ensure that Taban Deng Nguen Monytuil and Matthew Puljang, are drawn from loyalists who had would remain governor and defeat who are the effective rulers of Unity gathered around Taban Deng during the eventual alternative candidate, at present. Both men dislike Taban his tenure as governor. In 2010, for Angelina Teny. Deng intensely. instance, during one of his attempts Following his election, Taban Deng Consequently, Nguen Monytuil to disarm Bul Nuer forces in the state, pursued a disarmament campaign in and Matthew Puljang did not take Taban Deng put Makal Kuol in charge Unity, putatively in preparation for the kindly to Taban Deng’s appointment of attacking Matthew Puljang’s forces. January 2011 referendum. In reality, the as FVP. Both men, however, have con- Like the Jikany Nuer commanders, campaign targeted groups that Taban trol over such large swathes of Unity the Bul Nuer loyal to Taban Deng Deng felt were a threat to his reign, state that his appointment is unlikely have broken off from the rest of the including the Bul Nuer. The process to sway them over to joining the SPLM–IO and joined the SPLA in was extremely violent and left long- SPLM–IO—and put at risk all they Bentiu and Rubkona. standing grievances among the Bul have acquired during the current civil The vast majority of the SPLM–IO Nuer against Taban Deng, particularly war. Indeed, from their perspective, forces in Unity, however, have remained as the SPLA engaged in collective pun- Taban Deng’s presence in Juba is better

6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 25 December 2016 than his presence in Unity; active at a of the political process, is also prepar- 1 UNPoE (2016, paras. 9–12). national level, and without a place in ing a dry-season campaign, with two 2 Sudan Tribune (2016e). 3 Radio Tamazuj (2016g). state politics, Taban Deng does not interrelated goals. The first is to elimi- 4 USUN (2016). threaten their continued domination nate ‘security threats’, or what it other- 5 Lynch (2016). of Unity. As long as Taban Deng does wise characterizes as bandits, as 6 UNSG (2016, para. 3). not threaten Bul Nuer control of the articulated by Michael Makuei, the 7 Author telephone interviews, names and state, his appointment as FVP is not minister of information, and Martin places withheld, October–November 2016. 8 Craze and Tubiana (2016). likely to cause more than the occa- Elia Lomuro, the cabinet affairs minis- 9 See, for example, AI (2016); CIVIC (2016); sional defection. ter, on 5 September, when they warned Pinaud (2016); SPLM–IO (2016); UNPoE that SPLM–IO forces were to be inte- (2016, paras. 9–12). grated or otherwise ‘eliminated’.33 10 Author telephone interviews with SPLM– IO members, August–September 2016. The second objective of the SPLA Conclusion See also Sudan Tribune (2016b). Following Taban Deng’s appointment campaign is to take SPLM–IO territory 11 IGAD (2015, p. 9). as FVP, and subsequent acceptance by in which Taban Deng can be installed 12 Sudan Tribune (2016a). 13 IGAD (2015, p. 9). the JMEC and the international com- as a puppet leader; while Taban Deng is not the substantive leader of the 14 Radio Tamazuj (2016b). munity, the ARCSS is effectively over. 15 JMEC (2016). The UN Secretary-General acknowl- SPLM–IO, the GRSS’s gamble is that a 16 Radio Tamazuj (2016d). edges the problems with the current military campaign might at least make 17 USDOS (2016). arrangement in a report released on him appear so. 18 Booth (2016). The stage is thus set for further 19 Radio Tamazuj (2016fe). 10 November, noting with customary 20 Sudan Tribune (2016d). clashes, as both sides insist that, three understatement that joint transitional 21 Gatwich (2015). institutions are only ‘partially inclu- years after the beginning of the conflict, 22 Author telephone interviews with sive’ and calling for inclusivity to be a military solution is still possible, SPLM–IO members, locations withheld, 23 November. See also Radio Tamazuj restored.32 However, none of the inter- while the international community puts its faith in a peace process in (2016h) and Sudan Tribune (2016f; 2016g). national partners to the peace process 23 Sudan Tribune (2016c). have a plan for how this is to take place. which no one has any confidence. 24 Reuters (2016). There is no desire for a new peace 25 The US resolution was shelved on process, or for bringing Machar back 27 November due to a lack of support List of abbreviations on the UN Security Council and among to Juba. As the proposed US sanctions African member states. ARCSS on Machar indicate, the international 26 Lederer (2016). community seems content to margin- Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict 27 Online author interviews with residents in the Republic of South Sudan alize the SPLM–IO leader, following in the Rubkona protection of civilians site, FVP September–October 2016. the lead of the GRSS. First vice president 28 Taban Deng’s role in Sudan and South It is correct, as many diplomats GRSS Sudan before 2013 is more closely exam- suggest, that when the ARCSS included Government of the Republic of South Sudan ined in Craze and Tubiana (2016, pp. 25–37). Machar, it did not work. Indeed, even 29 Radio Tamazuj (2016e). IGAD if Machar were to return to Juba and 30 Radio Tamazuj (2016a). Intergovernmental Authority on Development 31 Monytuil (2016). the TGoNU, much of the opposition JMEC 32 UNSG (2016, para. 4). to the GRSS would not be assuaged, Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission 33 Radio Tamazuj (2016c). and the ARCSS would still not be SPLA inclusive of the variety of voices in Sudan People’s Liberation Army what is an increasingly fractured SPLM References conflict in South Sudan. That said, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement AI (Amnesty International). 2016. ‘We Did Not the international community’s contin- SPLM/A Believe We Would Survive’: Killings, Rape ued insistence that the ARCSS is the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and Looting in Juba. AFR 65/5028/2016. London: AI. ‘only game in town’ legitimizes the SPLM–IO Booth, Donald. 2016. ‘Testimony of the Special Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in- government’s marginalization of all Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Donald Opposition members of the opposition and puts Booth before the House Subcommittee public faith in a process that no one TGoNU on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Transitional Government of National Unity thinks will work. Rights, and International Organizations: South Sudan’s Prospects for Peace and In the coming dry season, Machar’s Security.’ 27 April. SPLM–IO, in an attempt to regain a Notes CIVIC (Center for Civilians in Conflict). 2016. seat at the negotiating table, will con- Under Fire: The July 2016 Violence in Juba This Issue Brief was researched and written by tinue to attack SPLA positions through- and UN Response. Joshua Craze, co-author with Jérôme Tubiana of Craze, Joshua and Jérôme Tubiana. 2016. A out the country. Its campaign in Unity HSBA Working Paper 42, A State of Disunity: State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity is already underway. At the same time, Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, State, South Sudan, 2013–15. HSBA Work- the SPLA, having secured total control 2013–15. ing Paper 42. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 7 Gatwich, Simon (unconfirmed author). 2015. —. 2016b. ‘Mogae Accepts to Work with Kiir’s —. 2016e. ‘South Sudan Rejects New Peace ‘Text of Letter from Breakaway Command- Government as Machar Leaves Hospital.’ Deal with Machar’s Faction.’ 21 October. ers in the SPLA–IO, Requesting that Presi- 27 August. —. 2016f. ‘Kenya Deports South Sudan Rebel dent Omar al-Bashir of the Khartoum —. 2016c. ‘Makuei and Lomuro Hint at Leader’s Spokesman to Juba.’ 3 November. Regime Send Them Arms Directly.’ Objectives for Next Military Offensives.’ —. 2016g. ‘S. Sudan Rebel Leader Stopped 20 June. 6 September. in Ethiopia, Returns to South Africa.’ IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on —. 2016d. ‘USA and the Coronation of Taban 21 November. Development). 2015. Agreement on the Deng.’ 6 September. UNPoE (United Nations Panel of Experts). Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic —. 2016e. ‘Taban Vows to Integrate SPLM–IO 2016. ‘Letter Dated 19 September 2016 of South Sudan. 17 August. Forces into SPLA.’ 13 September. from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan JMEC (Joint Monitoring and Evaluation —. 2016f. ‘SPLA–IO Reports Renewed Fighting Established Pursuant to Security Coun- Commission for the Agreement on the near Leer Town.’ 17 October. cil Resolution 2206 (2015) Addressed to Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic —. 2016g. ‘JMEC: S Sudan Peace Deal “Wounded, the President of the Security Council.’ of South Sudan). 2016. ‘JMEC Clarifies Its Not Dead”.’ 28 October. S/2016/793 of 19 September. Position on SPLM–IO Leadership Debate.’ —. 2016h. ‘Riek Machar Denied Entry to Sudan UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General). 24 July. at Airport.’ 20 November. 2016. Special Report of the Secretary-General Lederer, Edith. 2016. ‘US Seeks Sanctions on Reuters. 2016. ‘U.S. Condemns South Sudan on the Review of the Mandate of the United South Sudan Rebel Leader, Army Chief.’ Opposition Leader’s Call for Renewed Nations Mission in South Sudan. S/2016/951 Associated Press. 18 November. War.’ 28 September. of 10 November 2016. Lynch, Justin. 2016. ‘Top Diplomat Backs New SPLM–IO (Sudan People’s Liberation Move- USDOS (United States Department of State). South Sudan Vice President.’ Associated ment-in-Opposition). 2016. ‘Statement on 2016. ‘Remarks with Kenyan Foreign Press. 28 August. the Violence in Juba.’ July. Minister Amina Mohamed.’ 22 August. Monytuil, Bapiny. 2016. ‘Letter to the Presi- Sudan Tribune. 2016a. ‘South Sudan’s FVP USUN (United States Mission to the United dent of South Sudan on “Resignation as Machar Fires Taban Deng.’ 23 July. Nations). 2016. ‘Readout of a Meeting Deputy Chief of General Staff (D/COGS) —. 2016b. ‘SPLM–IO Says Leadership Intact, between Ambassador Samantha Power, for Moral Orientation”.’ 7 October. Calls on President Kiir to Stand with U.S. Permanent Representative to the Pinaud, Clémence. 2016. ‘Who’s behind South Agreement.’ 25 July. United Nations, and South Sudanese Sudan’s Return to Fighting.’ African —. 2016c. ‘Machar’s Faction Calls for Armed First Vice President Taban Deng Gai.’ Arguments. 11 July. Resistance against “Regime” in Juba.’ 27 September. Radio Tamazuj. 2016a. ‘New South Sudan FVP 25 September. Taban Deng Has No Army to Integrate: —. 2016d. ‘South Sudan Wanted Machar-led SPLM–IO.’ 14 August. Rebels Declared “Terrorists.”’ 10 October.

HSBA project summary at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK gov- The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) ernment’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, as well as from for Sudan and South Sudan is a multi-year pro- the Danish Demining Group and the National Endowment HSBA ject administered by the Small Arms Survey, a for Democracy in the United States. The Small Arms Survey global centre of excellence located at the Graduate Institute also receives Swiss funding, without which the HSBA could of International and Development Studies in Geneva, not be undertaken effectively. Switzerland. It was developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme, and Credits a wide array of international and Sudanese partners. Through Series editor: Emile LeBrun the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical ([email protected]) research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, Copy-editor: Tania Inowlocki including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, Design and layout: Rick Jones ([email protected]) and security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy- Contact details relevant advice on redressing insecurity. Issue Briefs are designed to provide timely periodic snap- For more information or to provide feedback, please shots of baseline information in a reader-friendly format. The contact Khristopher Carlson, HSBA Project Coordinator, at HSBA also generates a series of longer and more detailed [email protected] Working Papers. All publications are available in English Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment and Arabic at www.smallarmssurveysudan.org. ‘Facts and Small Arms Survey Figures’ reports on key security issues can be accessed at Maison de la Paix www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures.php. Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E The HSBA receives direct financial support from the 1202 Geneva US Department of State, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland Denmark, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the United States Institute of Peace. It has received t +41 22 908 5777 support in the past from the Global Peace and Security Fund f +41 22 732 2738

8 Sudan IssueIssue BriefBrief Number Number 6 25 April December 2007 2016