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As Taban Deng Does Wise Characterizes As Bandits, As 6 UNSG (2016, Para HSBA HSBAFOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Issue BriefAvailable in Arabic Small Arms Survey Number 25 December 2016 Legitimacy, exclusion, and power Taban Deng Gai and the South Sudan peace process Following clashes in Juba in July 2016, is that the new FVP does not represent yet dead and remained the best chance Riek Machar, the leader of the Sudan the opposition, and that the ARCSS, for peace in South Sudan.3 The inter- People’s Liberation Movement-in- which is a power-sharing agreement, national community is largely in accord Opposition (SPLM–IO), fled the capital; is over, as no power is being shared. with Njoroge and has broadly welcomed meanwhile, the Sudan People’s Libera- Despite Taban Deng’s lack of pop- the appointment of Taban Deng, who tion Army (SPLA) mounted a coordi- ularity in South Sudan, on 28 October, has visited the United States as FVP nated attack on opposition positions in Augostino Njoroge, a former general and spoken at the United Nations and the city, using tanks, heavy weapons, in the Kenyan army and the deputy to the US government.4 and Mi-24 helicopters.1 Having achieved chairperson of the Joint Monitoring Nonetheless, there has been some a military victory in Juba, the leader- and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), disquiet about Taban Deng’s appoint- ship of the Sudan People’s Liberation which is responsible for overseeing the ment. Festus Mogae, the JMEC chair- Movement (SPLM) moved to consoli- peace agreement, announced that while person, acknowledged that the FVP’s date its political control of the govern- the ARCSS was wounded, it was not legitimacy was questionable, but that ment. On 26 July, South Sudanese president Salva Kiir swore in Taban Deng Gai, formerly the SPLM–IO’s chief political negotiator and, until 22 July, the minister of mining in the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), as first vice president (FVP), replacing Riek Machar in a move of questionable legitimacy. Taban Deng’s appointment is opposed by most of the SPLM–IO political elite; the former governor of Unity state also has little popularity among the rank-and-file members of the opposition, who believe he has sold out to the government for personal gain. While a small circle of the SPLM–IO’s political leaders in Juba and some of Taban Deng’s old supporters from Unity back the new FVP, most of the SPLM–IO remains loyal to Machar, whose support base, while weakened, is still considerable. In October 2016, Machar announced that the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was dead, and that new political negotiations were needed so that another peace agreement could South Sudan’s First Vice President Taban Deng Gai addresses the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2016. © REUTERS/Eduardo Munoz be reached.2 The SPLM–IO’s position www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 since diplomats ‘don’t have an option’, This Brief places some of the key find- Kiir and Taban Deng seized on they would work with the Govern- ings of the Working Paper in the con- Machar’s absence as a political oppor- ment of the Republic of South Sudan text of current political dynamics in tunity. On 23 July, at the Crown Hotel, (GRSS), including Taban Deng.5 The the country. With Taban Deng as FVP, a hastily convened meeting of Taban UN Secretary-General’s review of the and ongoing clashes in Unity, the Deng’s supporters in the SPLM–IO— mandate of the UN Mission in South beleaguered state is central to under- including SPLM secretary general Dhieu Sudan, released on 10 November, also standing the challenges facing South Mathok and deputy chairperson Alfred notes that Taban Deng’s appointment Sudan today. Ladu Gore (both of whom outrank ‘blur[s] the legitimacy of the current Taban Deng in the SPLM–IO), as well governmental formation’.6 as Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, the former Despite these doubts, US and Euro- The appointment of SPLM–IO secretary of foreign affairs— pean politicians privately insist that Taban Deng endorsed Taban Deng for FVP.10 Kiir the ARCSS is ‘the only game in town’.7 swore Taban Deng in as FVP on 26 July. Following the signing of the ARCSS As discussed below, members of the The GRSS contends that this in August 2015, there were months of diplomatic community have little appointment was legal. Clause 6.4 negotiations concerning the best form appetite for new political negotiations of the ARCSS states: for the transitional government and and have therefore publicly endorsed the military situation in a putatively In the event that the post of the First the ARCSS; privately, however, they demilitarized Juba. The GRSS did not Vice-President falls vacant during the hold little optimism that the current demilitarize Juba during this period, Transitional Period, for any reason, peace process can succeed. The inter- as was required by the agreement, and including mental infirmity or physi- national community’s public endorse- Machar did not go back to the capital, cal incapacity of the office holder, the ment of Taban Deng was key to the despite growing pressure for his return replacement shall be nominated by GRSS plan to exclude the opposition from both the SPLM and international the top leadership body of the South from power and to retain the legitimacy actors. When Machar finally returned Sudan Armed Opposition as at the that would allow it to embark on a to Juba in April 2016, the city was still signing of the agreement.11 military campaign to dominate South not demilitarized, and neither side was Sudan in the forthcoming dry season. interested in fully implementing the The GRSS maintains that Machar’s The ARCSS was designed to be both peace agreement. Rather, both parties absence from Juba meant that the post a military solution to the crisis in South tried to extract the maximum possible of FVP was indeed vacant, that the Sudan and an elite-level, bilateral political advantage from a selective meeting of the SPLM–IO at the Crown power-sharing agreement between reading of parts of the ARCSS, while Hotel constituted a legitimate meeting two warring parties, the SPLM–IO overall implementation of the agree- of the leadership body of the SPLM– and the SPLM/A, which would result ment stalled, Juba remained militarized, IO, and that Taban Deng was a legiti- in the formation of a transitional gov- and a confrontation between the two mate member of the opposition who ernment. For this agreement to remain forces became increasingly likely. could therefore be nominated for the meaningful after the events of July 2016, This unsustainable state of affairs post of FVP. the TGoNU would have to be a true was the background to initial clashes in In response, the SPLM–IO argues power-sharing government and Taban Juba on 7–8 July 2016. The events sur- that on 22 July, Machar asked Kiir to Deng a genuine opposition leader whose rounding these clashes are contested.9 remove Taban Deng from the transi- participation in the peace process could What is clear, however, is that the tional government and dismissed him lead to a sustainable future for South SPLM/A used these incidents as a from the SPLM–IO, thereby disquali- Sudan. At present, the ARCSS’s poten- pretext for an all-out military assault fying him from the FVP nomination.12 tial to serve as a workable agreement on SPLM–IO positions in Juba on It further contends that while there thus turns on the standing of the FVP. 10–11 July, one designed to consolidate was a meeting of some members of This Issue Brief analyses Taban the government’s military control of the SPLM–IO at the Crown Hotel, it Deng’s history and his current place in the capital. was far from the majority of the oppo- South Sudan. In doing so, it draws on Machar fled Juba during this sition leadership, was not a meeting a new HSBA Working Paper on Unity assault, moving south towards the of the SPLM–IO’s National Leadership state—A State of Disunity: Conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo Council, and effectively constituted Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, and leaving a power vacuum in Juba. a power grab by the faction loyal to 2013–158—which is being released Kiir repeatedly demanded that Machar Taban Deng in Juba. There is no evi- together with this Brief. The Working return to the capital or face removal dence that the SPLM–IO members Paper analyses the continuities between as FVP. Legitimately fearing for his who endorsed Taban Deng had the Sudan’s long second civil war (1983– life, Machar refused to go back to Juba legal capacity to do so. 2005) and the current conflict, as well and indicated that he would only do Nor can Machar’s flight from the as social and military dynamics that so upon the arrival of a third-party force capital reasonably be understood to have emerged since December 2013. in Juba that could ensure his safety. indicate that the office of FVP was 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 25 December 2016 vacant. Machar has consistently com- Despite its public support for the The current pact of convenience municated his intention to return to new FVP, the international commu- between Kiir and Taban Deng echoes a Juba once the security situation has been nity is aware that Taban Deng lacks a previous alliance between the two men. stabilized. Consequently, the applica- mandate among the SPLM–IO and in As the abovementioned Working Paper ble clause of the ARCSS would not be South Sudan more generally.
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