DOCSLIB.ORG

Vietnam: the End, 1975

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Vietnam: the End, 1975 Vietnam: The End, 1975 CSC 1985 SUBJECT AREA History ABSTRACT Author: Bibby, Thomas M., Major USAF Title: Vietnam: The End, 1975 Date: 1 April 1985 The purpose of this paper was to examine the reasons for the sudden and total collapse of the Republic of Vietnam Armed forces (RVNAF) in the early months of 1975, and determine if the final outcome was inevitable or if Ameri- can will could have prevailed and insured South Vietnam's survival as a free and independent nation. Also, through a discussion of "lessons learned", the paper addresses the significant impact our experiences in Vietnam will have upon future US actions in foreign affairs. The paper begins with a brief introduction of the events surrounding the final collapse and their interpretation by both the North and South Vietnamese. Virtually everyone concerned considered the crucial turning point in the war was the signing of the Paris Agreements of 1973: the United States viewed the agreements as "peace with honor"; the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolu- tionary Government (PRG) viewed them as the surrender and defeat of the Ameri- can "imperialists" and their "lackey puppet regime"; and the South Vietnamese viewed them as "abandonment" by a strong ally they thought would always be there. The first chapter begins with an examination of the Paris Agreements and describes what each of the parties concerned expected to achieve from the agreements. Chapter two continues to examine the events which occurred after the signing of the agreements and discusses the numerous violations of the agreements, and their overall impact upon the final collapse of South Vietnam. In chapter three, the policy of Vietnamization is discussed in order to evaluate the overall capability of the RVNAF to effectively provide for South Vietnam's defense in 1975. In doing so, both the American and South Vietnamese assessments of the policy and its effectiveness are presented. Chapter four examines the collapse of the RVNAF from the viewpoint of failed leadership and destroyed morale. Although there were many reasons for South Vietnam's collapse, the major ones centered around low morale, un- controlled corruption, incompetent leadership, and lack of US military aid and air support in the period following the Paris Agreements of 1973. Finally, the paper identifies some lessons of the events surrounding our experiences in South Vietnam, and how they will affect future US actions in foreign affairs. They include: the requirement to distinguish between problems which lend themselves to political solutions and those which re- quire military solutions; the requirement for the US to have domestic sup- port for its foreign policy to succeed; and the requirement to understand the needs of the people we are trying to help. Above all, our political and military leaders must do a better job in articulating our nation's foreign policy to the US public and Congress to gain their support, and must care- fully analyze the public's willingness to support that policy over an ex- tended period of time, even under adverse conditions. However, despite US foreign policy failure in South Vietnam, the Vietnam War was for the South Vietnamese to win and not the Americans. The government of South Vietnam needed to quickly implement significant political reforms to rally the sup- port of its own people and soldiers, but simply ran out of time in 1975. VIETNAM: THE END, 1975 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: PARIS AGREEMENTS OF 1973 1. North Vietnamese and PRG Expectations 13 2. South Vietnamese Expectations 19 3. American Expectations 24 CHAPTER 2: BREAKDOWN OF THE AGREEMENTS 1. The Postwar War: 1973-1975 31 2. Violations 56 CHAPTER 3: VIETNAMIZATION 1. American Assessment 67 2. South Vietnamese Assessment 72 CHAPTER 4: COLLAPSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) 1. RVNAF Leadership 74 2. RVNAF Morale 81 CONCLUSION 86 CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 96 CAST OF PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS 99 ENDNOTES 103 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 112 INTRODUCTION The Vietnam War is probably the most analyzed war and, simultaneously, the least understood war involving the United States since 1945. Of all U.S. allies, South Vietnam enjoyed more support from the United States than any other individual country throughout the free world. With over $160 billion in aid and the sacrifice of more than 50,000 American lives, it is difficult to believe that South Vietnam could have had a stronger ally than in the United States.1 Why then did South Vietnam fall? Even more disconcert- ing, why did it collapse so quickly? Unfortunately, there are not any easy answers to why the final outcome of this divisive and costly war for both the United States and the Republic of South Vietnam came to such a devastating conclusion. In this paper, I shall examine the events leading to the final collapse on April 30, 1975. I shall also try to determine if, as the Vietnamese would say, the "fates" were against South Vietnam and the outcome was inevitable; or if American will could have prevailed and insured South Viet- nam's survival as a free and independent nation. In my research, I read numerous accounts of the war on the events from 1972 to 1975 by North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese and American sources. Each tended to present his own opinions with ideological biases; but, on the whole, a common thread of truth emerged. The Paris Agreements of 1973 (more formally called the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam) were viewed by all concerned as the crucial turning point in the war: The United States viewed the agreements as "peace with honor"; the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) viewed them as the surren- der and defeat of the American "imperialists" and their "lackey puppet regime"; and the South Vietnamese saw them as "abandonment" by a strong ally they thought would always be there. It is highly questionable that if the Paris Agreements were not signed that South Vietnam would have survived in 1975; however, the conditions agreed to in Paris by the four signatory parties were not in the best interest of the government of South Vietnam (GVN). In his book, Our Great Spring Victory, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) chief of staff, General Van Tien Dung, presented a biased but extremely detailed account of the final collapse of South Vietnam. During its 21st plenum in October 1973, the Communist Party Central Committee decided that "revolutionary violence" was still the pathway to achieving North Vietnam's goals, despite the terms of the Paris Agreements.2 The following March, the Central Military Party Committee concluded, "the Vietnamese revolution may have to pass through many transi- tional stages, and can only gain victory through revolu- tionary violence--carrying out popular uprisings, relying on our political and military forces, or in the event that large-scale war returns, carrying out revolutionary warfare to gain complete victory."3 According to Dung's account, following the March confer- ence, the military command carefully monitored the battle- fields in the South; over the summer it reported to the party that "the fighting ability of our mobile main-force units was superior to that of the enemy's mobile main-force units." The balance of forces had changed in Hanoi's favor. In addition, resupply efforts were expanded and the Ho Chi Minh Trail was substantially improved by labor battalions working day and night. Arms, munitions and troops were now trucked on a 26-foot wide, all-weather road running from Quang Tri to eastern Nam Bo in the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam. General Dung wrote that their supply system resembled "strong ropes inching gradually, day by day, around the neck, arms, and legs of a demon, awaiting the order to jerk tight and bring the creature's life to an end."4 The North Vietnamese did assess the possibility of renewed American intervention; they decided after a meeting of the Central Military Party Committee in October 1974, that the possibility seemed remote after the Watergate scandal, Nixon's resignation, the economic difficulties following the 1973 Arab oil embargo, and the sequence of Congressional votes against additional U.S. aid to Saigon. With the cutback of almost $2 billion annually in U.S. aid, South Vietnam was now forced to fight "a poor man's war," which put them at a distinct disadvantage in overcoming the overwhelming initiative enjoyed by both the North Vietnamese regular troops and the Vietcong guerrillas. Le Duan, the North Vietnamese Communist Party's First Secretary, stated: "Now that the United States has pulled out of the South, it will be hard for them to jump back in; no matter how they may intervene, they cannot rescue the Saigon administration from its disastrous collapse."5 The October 1974 conference unanimously agreed on five points which favored implementing their Spring 1975 offensive and would insure success: First, the Saigon troops were growing weaker militarily, politically, and economically every day. Our forces were stronger than the enemy in the South. Second, the United States was meeting diffi- culties at home and abroad, and its ability to give political or military aid to its proteges was declining every day. Not only had the United States had to decrease its aid to Saigon, it also faced increasing opposition to any effort to "jump back" into the South. And even if troops did intervene, they would not be able to rescue the collapsing Saigon quisling administration. Third, we had set up strategic positions linking North and South, had increased our forces and our stockpiles of materiel, and had completed the system of strategic and tactical roads. Fourth, movements calling for peace, improve- ment of popular welfare, democracy, and national independence, and demanding that Thieu be toppled, gained momentum in the towns.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Patrolling Fall 2008 75 Th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc
    PATROLLING FALL 2008 75 TH RANGER REGIMENT ASSOCIATION, INC. VOLUME 23 ISSUE II Vietnamese Rangers (37 th Biet Dong Quan), and their US advisors inspect a captured NVA recoilless rifle during the battle at Khe Sanh, Tet, 1968. Trench lines were necessary due to sniper fire and constant incoming enemy rounds. Senior Advisor CPT Walter Gunn is in the forefront, Officers’ Messages ................................1-10 kneeling; SFC Willard Langdon, 4 th from right, with BDQ General ..................................11-24 & 72-80 patch. Unit Reports ........................................25-71 CHINA - BURMA - INDIA VIETNAM IRAN GRENADA PANAMA IRAQ SOMALIA AFGHANISTAN PATROLLING – FALL 2008 PATROLLING – FALL 2008 WHO WE ARE: The 75th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc., is a We have funded trips for families to visit their wounded sons and registered 501 (c) corporation, registered in the State of Georgia. We were husbands while they were in the hospital. We have purchased a learning founded in 1986 by a group of veterans of F/58, (LRP) and L/75 (Ranger). program soft ware for the son of one young Ranger who had a brain The first meeting was held on June 7, 1986, at Ft. Campbell, KY. tumor removed. The Army took care of the surgery, but no means existed OUR MISSION: to purchase the learning program. We fund the purchase of several awards 1. To identify and offer membership to all eligible 75th Infantry Rangers, for graduates of RIP and Ranger School. We have contributed to each of and members of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol the three Battalion’s Memorial Funds and Ranger Balls, Companies, Long Range Patrol Companies, Ranger and to the Airborne Memorial at Ft.
    [Show full text]
  • Patrolling Fall
    PATROLLING WINTER 2007 75 TH RANGER REGIMENT ASSOCIATION, INC. VOLUME 22 ISSUE III Color Guard, Dedication of First Ranger Battalion, 75th Infantry Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, GA, October 18, 2007. Photo by J. Chester Officers’ Messages ..................................1-7 General ....................................8-24 & 67-73 Unit Reports ........................................25-66 CHINA - BURMA - INDIA VIETNAM IRAN GRENADA PANAMA IRAQ SOMALIA AFGHANISTAN PATROLLING – WINTER 2007 WHO WE ARE: The 75th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc., is a regis - We have funded trips for families to visit their wounded sons and husbands tered 501 (c) corporation, registered in the State of Georgia. We were while they were in the hospital. We have purchased a learning program founded in 1986 by a group of veterans of F/58, (LRP) and L/75 (Ranger). soft ware for the son of one young Ranger who had a brain tumor removed. The first meeting was held on June 7, 1986, at Ft. Campbell, KY. The Army took care of the surgery, but no means existed to purchase the OUR MISSION: learning program. We fund the purchase of several awards for graduates 1. To identify and offer membership to all eligible 75th Infantry Rangers, of RIP and Ranger School. We have contributed to each of the three Bat - and members of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol talion’s Memorial Funds and Ranger Balls, and to the Air - Companies, Long Range Patrol Companies, Ranger borne Memorial at Ft. Benning. Companies and Detachments, Vietnamese Ranger Advi - We have bi-annual reunions and business meetings. Our sors of the Biet Dong Quan; members of LRSU units that Officers, (President, 1st & 2nd Vice-Presidents, Secretary trace their lineage to Long Range Patrol Companies that & Treasurer), are elected at this business meeting.
    [Show full text]
  • The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project WOLFGANG J. LEHMANN Interviewed By
    The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project WOLFGANG J. LEHMANN Interviewed by: Robert Martens Initial interview date: May 9, 1989 Copyright 1998 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Vietnam 973- 975 Paris Agreements and U.S. presence in Vietnam Hanoi(s 975 offensive Effects of Watergate ,ole of Soviet Union and China .nternational Commission for Control and supervision Economic and political situation in South Vietnam South Vietnamese military Mathias ,esolution 975 .ntervie0 12 Vietnam 973- 975 March 975 Evacuating Plaiku and 3ontum Evacuation planning Evacuating Consulate 4eneral Early April 975 Evacuating Vietnamese employees to 4uam U.S. relations 0ith South Vietnam Evacuations contractors, dependents, 6 nonessential personnel Problems 0ith evacuations Staff performance ,emoving U.S. documents 8ate April 975 Air attack on flight line ,emoving the embassy(s banyan tree ,ocket attack on DAO compound 1 Operation 9Fre:uent Winds; Decision to continue evacuation at night Final evacuation Conclusion The 0arden system Summary of evacuation INTERVIEW : Wolf Lehmann went to Vietnam in June 1973, initially as Consul General in the city of Can Tho, which is located in the Me,ong Delta. He then went to Saigon in March 1974 as Deputy Chief of Mission to Ambassador Graham Martin. For fre1uent periods he was Charg2 d3 Affaires during that 13 months or so prior to the final fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. This period from the time that Mr. Lehmann arrived in Vietnam was one in which support for the war in the 6nited States was declining. We were getting into the beginning of the second Ni8on Administration.
    [Show full text]
  • Patrolling Fall 2007 75 Th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc
    PATROLLING FALL 2007 75 TH RANGER REGIMENT ASSOCIATION, INC. VOLUME 22 ISSUE II Officers’ Messages ..................................1-6 Beginning of Mass Tactical, August 6, 2007. General ....................................7-24 & 64-73 Photo by J. Chester Unit Reports ........................................25-63 CHINA - BURMA - INDIA VIETNAM IRAN GRENADA PANAMA IRAQ SOMALIA AFGHANISTAN PATROLLING – FALL 2007 WHO WE ARE: The 75th Ranger Regiment Association, Inc., is a registered 501 (c) corporation, registered in the State of Georgia. We WHAT WE DO: were founded in 1986 by a group of veterans of F/58, (LRP) and L/75 During the last five years we have provided financial support to the (Ranger). The first meeting was held on June 7, 1986, at Ft. Campbell, young men of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Each year, through contri - KY. butions from our members and some outside sources, we have pro - OUR MISSION: vided about $4,000.00 to each of the three Ranger Battalions and 1. To identify and offer membership to all eligible 75th Infantry $2,000.00 to the Regimental HQ. These funds enabled the families of Rangers, and members of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol the junior enlisted men, (E-5 & below) to get certificates for toys for Companies, Long Range Patrol Companies, Ranger Companies and the children and turkeys for Christmas dinner. Detachments, Vietnamese Ranger Advisors of the Biet We have funded trips for families to visit their Dong Quan; members of LRSU units that trace their wounded sons and husbands while they were in the lineage to Long Range Patrol Companies that were at - hospital. We have purchased a learning program soft tached to Brigade or larger units during the Vietnam ware for the son of one young Ranger who had a brain War and the 75th Ranger Regiment.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Toledo) While Opcon to the 173D Airborne Brigade, on 14 August - 1 September 1966, in Long Khan, Phuoc Tuy Province, Republic of Vietnam
    UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL Fort Benning, Georgia 1 July 1968 OPERATIONS OF THE III CORPS RANGER GROUP (ARVN), IN A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION (OPERATION TOLEDO) WHILE OPCON TO THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE, ON 14 AUGUST - 1 SEPTEMBER 1966, IN LONG KHAN, PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF A RANGER GROUP STAFF ADVISOR.) (U) Classified By(____________ _, Subject To Get .era i Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652 r\utorn aticai ly Downgraded at Two Ya ar Intervals Declassified on 31 December { Jf?i ) Captain John K. Thomas Advanced Course No 3-68 Roster No 159, Advisory Group No 12 r TABLE OF CONTENTS ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 SCOPE ••••••• •.•. ·•••• - •••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • J INTRODUCTI ON •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 The 173d Ai r borne .Brigade Plan •••••••••• 4 The Existing Situation •••••••••••••• ·•••• 5 The Ranger Group Plan ••••••••••••••••••• 6 Rangers ' Preparation •••••••••••••••••••• 9 NARRATI ON ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10 A Poor Start •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 Disregarde ~ Information • • • • • • ... • • • • • • • • • 13 Slim Pickins •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 15 Mutiny •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 17 Coordination • ••· ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 21 Results •••••••••••••••••••~••••••••••••• 22 ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM •••••••••••••••••••••• 24 TRAINING IMPLICATIONS ••••••••••••••••••••••• 30 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 33 VI SUALS
    [Show full text]
  • The War in South Vietnam the Years of the Offensive 1965-1968
    THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The War in South Vietnam The Years of the Offensive 1965-1968 John Schlight Al R FORCE Histbru and 9 Museums PROGRAM 1999 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Schlight, John The war in South Vietnam: the years of the offensive, 1965-1968 (The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia) Bibliography: p. 385 Includes Index 1. Vietnamese conflict, 1961-1975-Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Air Force-History-Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. I. Title. 11. Series. DS558.8.S34 1988 959.704'348"~ 19 88-14030 ISBN 0-912799-51-X ii Foreword This volume, the latest published by the Office of Air Force History in the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia series, looks at the Air Force’s support of the ground war in South Vietnam between 1965 and early 1968. The book covers the period from the time when the United States began moving from an advisory role into one of active involvement to just before the time when the United States gradually began disengaging from the war. The final scene is the successful air campaign conducted during the Communists’ siege of the Marine camp at Khe Sanh. While the actual siege lasted from late January to the middle of March 1968, enemy preparations for the encirclement-greatly increased truck traffic and enemy troop move- ments-were seen as early as October 1967. A subsequent volume in the Southeast Asia series will take up the story with the Communists’ concurrent Tet offensive during January and February 1968.
    [Show full text]
  • Biet Dong Quan
    he withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps from Vietnam in April 1956 meant that Lieutenant General T(LTG) John W. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel and the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) were the only “foreign” advisors left to support all services in the armed forces of South Vietnam. From 1956 through 1960, LTG O’Daniel and his successor LTG Samuel T. “Hangin’ Sam” Williams patterned the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to resemble the post- Korean War United States Army.1 The problem with this was the ARVN strategic focus became defense against an external invasion rather than fighting an internal insurgency.2 As the level of fighting intensified, Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on 15 February 1960, ordered his regional and divisional commanders to initially form Ranger companies composed of volunteers from the Army, the Reserves, retired Army personnel and the Civil Guard.3 Diem’s plan to expand the Rangers into battalions and groups became a reality in January 1961 after U. S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Elbridge Durbrow, withdrew his opposition to Diem’s BIET DONG proposal to increase the strength of the South Vietnamese Army by 20,000 men.4 Despite the objections of General Williams, General Isaac D. White, the Commander, QUAN: U. S. Army Pacific, and Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, the Eisenhower administration supported President Diem’s Vietnamese Rangers decision to create Rangers. To demonstrate American support, mobile training teams and Their (MTT) from Colonel Donald D. Blackburn’s 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, NC were sent American Advisors to South Vietnam.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on the Situation in Vietnam, 13 February 1968
    Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786604 Y d -- ~~ ret s.5(¢) K MEMORANDUM DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE ‘ The Sitttittion in Vietnam - pwsfi 7’ 12 s.5(¢) | 13 February 1968 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786604 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786604 7) IQ-P-SECITETF \7 3_5<c> N _ Information as of 1200 -A l3_February 1968 _'-_\ / _ s.5(¢) HIGHLIGHTS quiet. 3.3(h)(2) extensive preparations for North Vietnamese offensive operations all across the Demilitarized Zone and southward to Quang Tri .city. New attacks in the western highlands are likely, and rumors of renewed Communist assaults against Saigon continue to circulate. ' Ts The Milifarv Situation in South Vietnam: (reflects preparations 3§%hX2) Hfor new enemy offensive operations in northern I Corps (Paras. 1-7). Morale in Quang Tri_city is -, declining because of the enemy threat (Para. 8). Strong Communist resistance in Hue continues(Paras. 9-10) Other urban centers in I Corps are quiet, but re- ports of impending Communist attacks continue to be received (Para. 11)} A general lull in enemy ac— - tivity prevails in II Corps, but_there are signs of preparations for new enemy offensives in several areas (Paras. 12-18). Saigon has been general1y' quiet but rumors forecast renewed fighting (Paras. 19-23)- Government forces fought Communist troops near My Tho on 12 February, but the night of l2-13 '_ February was generally quiet in IV Corps (Paras. 24-25). South Vietnamese police have doubts whether Commu- nist General Tran Do has been killed (Para. 26). II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: - i 3.3(h)(2) Vietnamese - ofticials charge that some participants in the 1966 Buddhist "struggle" assisted the Viet Cong during their attack on Hue (Paras.
    [Show full text]
  • US Plane Downed by Da Nang Rebels, the Don
    U.S. PLANE DOWNED BY DA NANG REBELS Stars & Stripes May 20, 1966 1LT Donald L. “Don” Johnson Pilot, original Catkiller, 1965-66 PREFACE: Historian Stanley Karnow said of Air Vice-Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ [who became premier of South Vietnam on 19 June 1965] and General Nguyễn Chánh Thi: “Both flamboyant characters who wore gaudy uniforms and sported sinister moustaches, the two young officers had been friends, and their rivalry seemed to typify the personal struggles for power that chronically afflicted South Vietnam. But their dispute mirrored more than individual ambition.” Both were known for the colorful red berets they wore. There were reports that Thi was showing insubordination towards Kỳ. The U.S. military commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, said that Thi once refused to report to Kỳ in Saigon when requested. On one occasion, Kỳ came to I Corps to remonstrate with him in early March, Thi addressed his staff and asked mockingly, “Should we pay attention to this funny little man from Saigon or should we ignore him?” Thi made this comment rather loudly, within earshot of Kỳ, and the Vietnamese politician Bùi Diễm thought that the prime minister viewed Thi's comment as a direct challenge to his authority. Johnson-1 General Thi’s Home in Da Nang: “We walked by this place enroute from our early hooch at 9 Gia Long to the MACV club for evening meal.” Comment and photo, Norm MacPhee Buddhists and other antijunta civilian activists joined together with I Corps units supportive of Thi to form the Struggle Movement, leading to civil unrest and a halt in I Corps military operations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Follow-On to Tet
    1 st Lieutenant Harold L. Vail, Catkiller 27 The Follow-On To Tet Tet was to set the stage for events leading up to 1st Lieutenant Harold Vail’s flight on 27 March 1968. The name of the offensive comes from the Tet holiday, the Vietnamese New Year, when the first major attacks took place. The Tet Offensive was one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War, launched on January 30, 1968 by forces of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam against the forces of South Vietnam, the United States, and their allies. It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian commands and control centers throughout South Vietnam. In the early morning hours of January 31, 1968, a division-sized force of PAVN and Vietcong soldiers launched a coordinated attack on the city of Huế; their strategic objective was to "liberate" the entire city to help sweep the Communist insurgents into power. At 02:33, a signal flare lit up the night sky and two battalions from the PAVN 6th Regiment attacked the western bank of the fortress-like Citadel on the northern side of the city. Their objective was to capture the Mang Ca Garrison (ARVN 1st Division headquarters in the Citadel), the Tây Lộc Airfield, and the Imperial Palace. The PAVN 4th Regiment launched a simultaneous attack on the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound in the new City on the south side of the river. The Viet Cong set up provisional authorities shortly after capturing Huế in those early hours.
    [Show full text]
  • All Eyes on Khe Sanh
    By John T. Correll forward combat base at Khe Sanh land, MACV commander, who persuaded eyes of the nation and the eyes of the entire in January 1968 was rough and tem- President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Joint world—the eyes of all of history itself—are porary, a fortifi ed sprawl of trenches Chiefs of Staff of its value. Westmoreland on that little, brave band of defenders who and sandbag bunkers with a concertina believed in the importance of Khe Sanh, hold the pass at Khe Sanh,” he said. wire perimeter and an airstrip running but he was also using the marines as bait to Khe Sanh was surrounded. The only down the back side. lure the North Vietnamese into a decisive way in or out was by air. The garrison was It was in a mountain valley in a remote set-piece battle. sustained through the siege by airlift and corner of South Vietnam, just below the Such a battle seemed in prospect Jan. airdrop and the NVA—which outnumbered Demilitarized Zone and eight miles from 21 when the North Vietnamese Army the marines by more than four to one— the Laos border. attacked Khe Sanh. It was the precursor came under devastating counterattack by The principal garrison was four US of the Tet offensive and the concurrent air strikes, including carpet bombing by Marine Corps battalions, there at the in- strikes on more than 100 population Air Force B-52s. sistence of Military Assistance Command centers and military installations all over On Feb. 9, the New York Times reported, Vietnam.
    [Show full text]
  • The Air Force in the Vietnam War
    THE Air ForcE AssociATion The Air Force in the Vietnam War 1 The Air Force Association The Air Force Association (AFA) is an independent, nonprofit civilian organiza- tion promoting public understanding of aerospace power and the pivotal role it plays in the security of the nation. AFA publishes Air Force Magazine, sponsors national symposia, and disseminates infor- mation through outreach programs of its affiliate, the Aerospace Education Founda- tion. Learn more about AFA by visiting us on the Web at www.afa.org. The Aerospace Education Foundation The Aerospace Education Foundation (AEF) is dedicated to ensuring America’s aerospace excellence through education, scholarships, grants, awards, and public awareness programs. The Foundation also publishes a series of studies and forums on aerospace and national security. The Eaker Institute is the public policy and research arm of AEF. AEF works through a network of thou- sands of Air Force Association members and more than 200 chapters to distrib- ute educational material to schools and concerned citizens. An example of this includes “Visions of Exploration,” an AEF/ USA Today multi-disciplinary science, math, and social studies program. To find out how you can support aerospace excellence visit us on the Web at www. aef.org. © 2004 The Air Force Association Published 2004 by Aerospace Education Foundation 1501 Lee Highway Arlington VA 22209-1198 Tel: (703) 247-5839 Produced by the staff of Air Force Magazine Fax: (703) 247-5853 Design by Guy Aceto, Art Director 2 The Air Force in the Vietnam War By John T. Correll T By John T. Correll o those who fought there, it seems like yesterday, but it was 40 years ago that the US Air Force deployed in December 2004 fighting strength to Southeast Asia.
    [Show full text]