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Electoral Data from Latin American Democracies As Well As Original Survey Data to Answer These Research Questions

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Electoral Data from Latin American Democracies As Well As Original Survey Data to Answer These Research Questions Abstract Ballots, Voting Procedures and Electoral Outcomes By Carolina R. Tchintian This research focuses on the overlooked role that ballot design and vote casting procedure have in shaping voters and elite decisions and electoral outcomes. It seeks to understand how the different presentations of the electoral offering are critical to understanding how (and what) voters choose, as well as whether some voting options are benefited over others. The countries selected for this project (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador and Brazil) offer the opportunity to measure a variety of outcomes affecting representation that result from ballot structure. First, using survey and observation data from El Salvador and Ecuador I analyze whether candidates’ personal attributes observed in their ballot pictures affect the probability of being elected and how this varies with other contextual information provided by the ballot such as length and crowdedness. Second, using Chilean municipal level data, I study the probability of women and incumbent candidates being elected given their location and position in the ballot and how party elites take advantage of these ballot features to increase their vote share. Third, I study how different presentations of the electoral offering affect certain parties and minorities opportunities to win votes using a quasi-experimental research design with Argentine subnational data. Finally, I show how the change in the vote casting procedure affects the level of visibility of candidates in Brazil, increasing intraparty fragmentation and disunity both at the electoral and legislative arena. Given the potential consequences of the different vote casting procedures on descriptive representation, the findings of this research would have implications on the quality of democracy. While many countries resist major electoral change, policy makers may be more willing to undergo ballot design changes to improve representation, improve accountability and the general quality of electoral democracy in a given polity. i Acknowledgments This dissertation is the result of the a most wonderful journey that spanned over the last six years of my life. I had the luxury of counting with the support of family and friends while meeting and working with amazing people who are now part of my life. To all of you, I owe a great deal of thanks. First, I want to thank my advisor and mentor, Mark Jones, who offered academic and professional guidance every step of the way. The list of things that I accomplished thanks to Mark is long and is still a living document. Every single day at Rice, he pushed me to advance my goals. He helped me develop my research project and helped me translate ideas into a doctoral dissertation. He was key to finding the necessary funding for my research and field work in Latin America, which resulted in one of the chapters I am most proud of and will likely pave the way for the work ahead. I had the privilege to work and publish with Mark. I will remain ever thankful for his generosity, for opening the doors that led to this work and my advancement. I am also grateful to the members of my dissertation committee. To Royce Carroll, with whom I shared several hours of intense discussions on the importance of ballot design on electoral outcomes early on at Rice. Many of the initial ideas of this dissertation are product of these most amazing conversations. To Randy Stevenson, who joined my committee in the last stage of the process, but whom I admire for always focusing on the potential of my work and what was next. I hope to explore, in years to come, at least some of the ideas he helped uncover. To Dan Wallach, who generously accepted to be part of my committee and from whom I learned the existence of the most exciting things on vote casting procedures from the computer science perspective. A special thanks to Bob Stein, also a member of my dissertation committee but someone I consider a wonderful mentor and friend. I had the privilege engage Bob early on and owe him my growth in the American Politics field. He helped me develop research ideas in areas that were unknown to me before ii joining Rice, introduced me to fellow scholars and shared academic spaces that became extremely important in my career. I’ve enjoyed working with Bob and hope to continue collaborating and working together. To the Comparative and American Politics faculty at Rice. A special thanks to Lanny Martin, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, John Ambler, Rick Wilson, Keith Hamm, Paul Brace, and Melissa Marschall. All of them contributed to my professional and academic development in different ways. From classes to comments and contributions in the Comparative and American Workshops, all contributed to this journey. This dissertation would not have been possible without the generous contributions received from the National Science Foundation and Rice University’s Social Science Research Institution. The fieldwork conducted in El Salvador and Ecuador was only possible thanks to the support of FLACSO Ecuador, Universidad Centroamericana from El Salvador and the amazing people I was able to meet during my trips to those countries. To all of them, thanks. I was also privileged in having wonderful colleagues from whom I learned, who provided suggestions and paths to improving every research project I undertook, including this dissertation. Special thanks to my friend, brother and a most amazing political scientist, Santiago Alles. I cannot think of this journey without him. Santiago and I embarked on this the very same first day at Rice, and he was with me all along, always ready to help, share advise, offer his point of view, read drafts, show me how to plot amazing graphs, explore new ideas and passionately discuss alternative approaches. We wrote papers, built data bases, and the list goes on: he was there to share lunches, dinners, desks, offices (several), happy moments and not so happy ones too. He was there always. And I say of Santiago what he kindly said of me, I couldn’t have done it without him. To Tiffany Barnes, someone who was always in my corner and stepped up to be a de facto mentor. She believed in my research project since the very beginning. She introduced me to fellow scholars and shared professional spaces to help advance my career. I learned a great deal of things working with Tiffany. She challenged me to think and approach things differently, to think through the implications of our research, to explore new methods. And through it all she was a great friend. iii Thanks to the many friends that Rice gave me thought this years: Matias Kinzurik, Agustin Vallejo, Fernando Yrazu, Mauro Rinaldi, Alex Rodriguez, Agustina Haime, and Andy Carrizosa. We shared great moments and created lifetime memories. Thanks also to the friends Houston gave me: Eugenia Artabe was a great support here this last three years. And Sylva and Rupen Dekmezian, my Armenian family in Houston, who made me feel close to home each time I visited and talked to them. I owe endless gratitude to my parents. I owe them who I am. These six years in Houston would have not been possible without their support and encouragement from Buenos Aires. Their visits to Houston were always refreshing and served as a reminder of how important this all was. From them I learned perseverance and hard work. But more than anything, they thought me the importance of being a good person and the value of generosity. That I try to keep present in in my life. I hope they know, and are proud to know, I tried my best to be a good and generous person here at Rice as well. I also want to thank my sisters, my nephews and niece. They were here with me, through every interaction and conversation we’ve had thought our lives. I do not understand life without them. Finally, nothing, nothing in my life during this years, would have been possible without my one true partner in life, Juani. I cannot say enough about how much of this is on you. You always believed in me, since the day I told you I wanted to pursue a PhD in the U.S. You did not flinch, you were always there, through every state and under all circumstances. You stayed awake when I was working until late into the night. You accepted weekends at home while I was working. You brought me food to my desk when there were pressing deadlines. You made me laugh even in the hardest days. You supported every decision I made personally and professionally. You helped me stand up when I was so exhausted that I couldn’t take another step. You were there to cheer me up when I failed and encouraged me to keep trying. You celebrated each of my achievements. You understood everything. You gave me the most important and meaningful thing in the world: Joaquin and Juan Cruz. To them, who wait for Mamma to come back from the office to play every single day, I dedicate this dissertation. iv Contents Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 | Candidates’ Personal Attributes and Ballot Information. Legislative Elections in Ecuador and El Salvador ......................................................................................................... 9 Chapter 2 | Ballot Order in Open List Systems as Elite Strategy. Councilmember Elections in Chile ................................................................................................................................ 57 Chapter 3 | Vote Casting Procedures
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