The Sino-Soviet Struggle in Cuba and the Latin American Communist Movement
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THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN CUBA AND THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT CIA IRSS D D I ISTA F F STUDY REFERENCE TITLE: ESAU XXlll-63 I Off. Ser. No. 5 7 THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN CUBA AND THE LATIN ABdERICAN COMMUNIST MOVEhENT This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff. Reflecting developments through the first week of August 1963, the paper considers chiefly the competition of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties for influence with Castro and the Cuban Communist party, while the Appendix discusses in less detail their competition elsewhere in Latin America. or Deputy Chief of the staff I THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN CUBA AND THE LATIN AMERICAN COMNlUNIST MOVEMENT SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS. ............................... i-xiii I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION .*................................1 Landmarks in Latin American Participation in the Sino-Soviet Dispute... ............................. 1 Effects of Castro's Activities on the Sino-Soviet Struggle in Latin America......................... 9 11. CUBA AND THE COMMUNISTS, 1957-1960... ................17 The Early PSP Attitude toward Castro ................ 18 The 26th July Movement Before the Fall of Batista...20 Initial Soviet and Chinese Attitudes toward Castro. .23 The Changing Soviet Position toward Castro, 1959-60.25 Chinese Relations with the Castroites, 1959-60. .28 The PSP Between Castro, Moscow, and Peiping, 1959- 1960 ............................................... 35 111, CUBA AND THE COMMUNISTS, 1961-1962 ...................47 From the Bay of Pigs to the 22nd CPSU Congress ......47 The Abortive PSP Coup and Its Aftermath.. .56 Cuba and the Sino-Soviet Struggle ...................69 IV. THE MISSILE BASE FIASCO AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1962-1963.75 Castro's Anger at the Russians.. .................... 75 Intensified Call for Revolution in Latin America.. .85 Chinese Efforts to Exploit Castro-CPSU Differences..88 Manifestations of Cuban Neutrality ..................94 Soviet Concessions, February 1963................... 95 Renewed Chinese Efforts to Subvert the Cubans.. ....107 V. APPERDIX: OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WHICH CHINESE INFLUENCE IS STRONG.. .............113 Venezuela... ....................................... 113 Ecuador .............................................. 128 Peru......... ..................,....,..............138 Other Pro-Chinese Dissidents (in the parties of Mexico, Brazil, Colombia) . , . .. ,144 THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE IN CUBA AND THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT Summary and Conclusions Soviet influence over the Latin American Communist movement, at one time universal and uncontested, has in recent years been subjected to a gradually increasing chal- lenge from the Chinese Communist party, which by now has made serious inroads in Soviet authority. Although the majority of Latin American Communist leaders still support the CPSU against the CCP in the Sino-Soviet conflict and continue to look to Moscow rather than to Peiping for guidance and leadership, factions of various sizes sym- pathetic to the Chinese position nww exist in almost all of the Latin American Communist parties, creating internal pressures upon pro-Soviet party leaderships which have grown steadily more serious as the Sino-Soviet conflict has progressed. The Chinese challenge to the Soviet posi- tion has thus far had its greatest effect on the Communist movements of Cuba, Venezuela, and Ecuador, all of which, for different reasons, have moved to a position of neu- trality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In addition, pro- Chinese internal factions or external competing splinter groups are believed to represent a particularly severe problem to the pro-Soviet leaderships of the Communist parties of Peru, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay. The prospects appear to favor a further increase in Chinese strength in many of these parties over the long run. While Chinese influence among the Latin American Communist parties was introduced, with Soviet approval or acquiescence, after the 20th CPSU congress in 1956, the first massive Chinese effort along this line came in February and March 1959, with the visit of a large group of Latin American party leaders to Peiping after the 21st CPSU congress. One purpose of this new effort was to assist in a general Chinese attempt to increase pressure on posi- tions of the United States in every ‘part of the world; an- other purpose appears to have been to lay the groundwork for the coming Chinese challenge to Soviet authority over the international Communist movement The CCP at this time is reported to have arranged for the participation of many Latin American parties in Chinese training courses, and to have begun attempts to indoctrinate Latin American Communists with aapects of the Chinese foreign policy line not shared by Moscow. The leaderships of the Latin American Communist parties gradually were forced to deal with the problems raised by an overt Chinese challenge to the Soviet party after the pub1 icat ion of Peiping 's "Long Live Leninism" articles in April 1960 and the subsequent Chinese attempts to disseminate brochures containing these attacks on the CPSU in Latin America. Latin American party leaders were present at the Sino-Soviet clash at Bucharest in June 1960, at the Fourth congress of the Cuban Popular Socialist party in Havana in August 1960 (where intensive Chinese attempts were made to win them over), and at the 81-party meeting in Moscow in November 1960. At this point, CPSU strength in the Latin American parties was still overwhelming, and these parties are believed to have supported the Soviets almost unanimously at Bucharest and MOSCOW, although with some wavering on the part of a few. Most Latin American party leaderships, how- ever, made fairly successful efforts to keep the details of the dispute from the attention of their rank and file at this time. A more serious test of CPSU strength took place at the 22nd CPSU congress in October 1961; at this time Latin America again proved an important center of support for the Soviet party, since nearly every Latin American party repre- sented at Moscow followed the Soviet lead with at least a token attack on Albania. Many parties in the next few months issued formal statements at home reiterating such condemna- tion, but the strength of pro-Chinese minority factions by now was such that ten parties--including the important parties of Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia--were unwilling to do so, The CPSU by this time is reported to have requested the Latin Americans to send no more party members to China for training; this injunction appears to have been obeyed by some parties and disobeyed by others. At a congress of I the Chilean party in March 1962, the CPSU delegate is reported to have attempted to halt the slow erosion of his partyPs posit ion by distributing among the Latin herican delegates to the congress a CPSU letter to each central dommittee t1 warning it against the Chinese. The outcome of the Cuban crisis of October 1962, taken in conjunction with the hostile Cuban reaction and the vio- lent Chinese attacks upon Khrushchev's "Munich, '' is believed to have caused a general weakening of the CPSU position, with widespread dissension reported in many Communist parties and a considerable growth in the strength of pro-CCP factions everywhere. Although the great majority of the Latin Ameri- can party leaderships nevertheless remained loyal to the Soviets, and responded to Soviet lobbying at the East Europ- ean party congresses in November and December by joinidg in the chorus of denunciation of Tirana and Peiping, the Chbans and Venezuelans conspicuously refused to do this, and again in January 1963 were the only two Latin American parties which failed to associate themselves with a statement read at the East German party congress by the Chilean delegate supporting the CPSU line. The Chinese at this point began an enormously expanded campaign against the CPSU publicly and privately in every part of the world. They made intensive efforts to promote their views among the Latin Americans at the East German party congress; they apparently sent private letters to cer- tain Latin American parties; they began vigorous efforts to flood Latin America--as well as other parts of the world-- with anti-Soviet literature; and they made direct attempts to subvert or split Latin American party leaderships loyal to Moscow, notably including those of the Mexican, Ecuadorean, and Brazilian parties. At the same time, the Chinese sup- plemented this with continuing efforts to maintain contact and support among the multitude of radical and Castroite groups outside of the Communist parties of Latin America. In its open letter to the CPSU of 14 June 1963,.the CCP ac- knowledged and defended what it was doing in this regard, in effect proclaiming its intention to split the existing Communist parties and to unite the factions favorable to it with forces outside those part ies as true "Marxist-Leninists .'I This process has barely begun, and the pro-Soviet leaderships of some of the Communist parties involved have meanwhile begun to fight back with attempts at purges--some success- ful, and some not--of the pro-Chinese dissidents. A major complicating favor throughout this struggle has been the effect of Cuban policy. While the Cuban revolu- tion was initially hailed by the Latin American Communist parties as providing them with an opportunity to attract a much broader spectrum of leftist sympathizers than had pre- viously been possible,