Air University Review: November-December 1973
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
AIR rcmewU N I V E R S I TY THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE Reflections on Air Power in the Vie t nam War .................................................. 2 Gen. George J. Eade, USAF Spac e Propulsion: L et s Do It Better Electrically......................................... 10 .Vlaj. Richard S. Batv, USAF T he Effects of Ionospheric Scintillation on Satellite Communications . 26 Allen L. Johnson PENS TO PlERCE THE MlGHTY -AND DEGRADE THE S w O R D ......................................... 32 Brig. Gen. Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret) SoVIET DlSSENT: I t S S o URCES -AND SlGNIFIC.ANCE...................................................... 45 Maj. Ralph C. Gauer, USA Militarv Affairs Abroad Phases of Subver sio n: the Cast r o Drive on Latin Ame r ica............................ 54 Jay Mallin Air Force Revievv T he Changinc Scene in Education....................................................................63 Maj. Charles W. Mitchell, USAF 552d Air bo r ne Ear l y W.ar ning and Control Wing l \ Southeast Asia ... 70 Lt. Col. Jerold R. Mack, USAF Capt. Richard M. Williams, US.AF The De f init io n of Ope r .at ion.al Requirements for Co mmunic at io ns.................. 79 Maj. Chris N. Wilcox, USAF In Mv Opinion F.ast Bur ner : D oes He Hear a Dif f e r e nt Drummer? ........................................ 88 Lt. Col. Charles W. Roades, US.AF W hy Mil it .ar y Air pl .anes Cost So Much .and What Can Be Done About It . 94 Maj. Frederick T. Stark, USAF Acçuisition and Id e nt if ic at io n of Ground Tar g ets........................................ 102 Maj. Dan Eliason, USAF Books and Ideas Swords int o Bal l point s: A N ew Out l et for Mil it ar y Expression................... 105 Col. Harlev* E. Bamhart, USAF W rjtten Pellmell? ............................................................................................ 108 Col. Don Clelland, USAF The Co nt r ibit o r s .....................................................................................................110 the cover Addrc&i nunincripb to Editor, Air Univervlv Dtviorm, Bldg 1211, Miuwell A EB, AL. In light of our experiente in the air action M1I2. Pnnted by Covrmmenl frínting Office. in ETO during World War II. which led Addrest tuhicnptioTB to Superintendcnt of the í'S Stra/t:(fú' Bombing Survey to oon- Documenta, CPO. Washington IX 20402 vearly clude that "no nation can long survjve the Vi.On d om rtK , 910 00 foreign. f h,g|c copy 91.50. free cxploítation of air weapons over its Home* land. General George J. Eade refletis on the il sc of uír power in Vietnam and «Iraws a similar conclusion: limited applieation of force yieldcd indccisive results where- as appropnate Application contrihnted to Vol. XXV No. I V-AEMurnOr/ 1973 > the achicvcrnent of the Alliod objectlves. REFLECTIONS ON AIR POWER IN THE VIETNAM WAR General George J. E ade fnll backing and support of our nation. The large-scale strategic bombing campaign against Germany and Japan proved to be a decisive factor in bringing the war to an end. In its most comprehensive con- clusion on conventional strategic bombing that applies to the air war against both Japan and Germany, the World War II United States Strategic Bombing Survey States that “ heavy, sustained and aeeurate attacks against carefully selected targets are required to produce de- cisive results when attacking an enemy’s sustaining resources.” It fnrther concludes that “ no nation can long survive the free exploita- tion of air weapons over its home- land.” The introduction of nuclear power at the close of World W ar II brought about the realization by policy- makers that the application of unrestrained military power could produce catastrophic results. The relatively unconstrained use of mili- tary power that prevailed during W orld War II was replaced by the tense atmosphere of the Cold W ar years, which led ultimately to the concept of limited war. The limitation of war has been a key concern of U.S. Defense OR an examination of U.S. objectives in policy for many years. Much has Southeast Asia, the role of air power in been written on the dilemma of F achieving those objectives, and the reasons how to use m ilitary power to achieve for success or lack of success in that achieve- a national objective in the face of ment, an appropriate departure point inight an armed challenge without allow- well be a brief examination of World War II ing the conflict to escalate in in- and the intemational elimate at that time. The tensity through the spectriun of overall objective of the Allied forces was warfare. As the strategy of massive rather simple and straightforward: the uncon- retaliation gave way to the doctrine ditional surrender of the Axis powers. To of Hexible response, the United achieve this objective, air power was allowed States developed conventional capa- to operate with little coastraint and with the bilities for deterring or coping with 3 4 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW plexing decision in Vietnam. Concern over limited conflicts. These capabilities were Chinese military reaction in the event of intended to provide the decision-maker direct U.S. intervention was acute. There with options which would be credible in was a laek of public awareness in the United terms of the various leveis of military con- States of Hanoi s involveinent in South Viet- frontation. It is essential to recognize that nam. The political situation in the South to gain the initiative from an aggressor re- quires the national will and readiness to was unstable, and underlying the entire select options that make the aggressor s Indochina question was the unknown risk and cost incompatible with the ob- quantity of the Soviet commitment to jectives the aggressor hopes to aehieve. North Vietnam (nvn). One must, on the other hand, be fore- Given the political and military environ- warned that it is possible to select options ment of early 1965, the administration at which, in order to insure against drawing that time chose closely controlled air attacks other nations into the conflict, oíFer a rel- to signal U.S. intentions. The problem the atively lower probability of achieving mili- administration faced was how to make tary or political success. such a signal cie ar and yet not risk un- Let us examine the Southeast Asia con- wanted escalation. There was inherent con- flict. Some analyses of air power in the cern that the attaeking of high-value targets Vietnam conflict, particularly those done in the North could carry the same risks on the 1965-68 time period, have been as a full-scale eampaign. The international criticai of aerial bombarclment as an in- political climate was against widening of strument of national policy. These retro- the war. Rationale for the early decisions spective analyses, applying their own that limited the employment of air power interpretations of the intended objeetives in nvn appeared in a speech by President of the bombing eampaign, conclude that Lyndon B. Johnson on 7 April 1965 when air power fell short of realizing these ob- he stated: jeetives. Our objeetive is the independence of South Viewing these criticai analyses, pro- Vietnam and its freedom from attack. ponents of air power are much tempted to We have no desire to devastate that which the take issue with the conclusions and to offer people of North Vietnam have built with pointed rebuttaLs in an effort to exonerate toil and sacrifiee. We will use our power the principies and concepts of air power. with restraint and with all the wisdom that To do so would, in essence, be engaging in we can command. the same sort of xVlondav morning quarter- The objeetives of the air eampaign backing that was employed by those ana- launched in 1965 were defined by President lysts who have produced the stinging re- Johnson: views of air power. It would seern more —To back our fighting men and our fighting appropriate to consider objectively the allies by demonstrating that the aggressor bombing eampaign during the 1965-68 time could not bring hostile arms and men to bear period, present the facts as we know them, against South Vietnam from the security o f a compare results of that earlier period with sanctuary. the recent successful results of the 1972 air —To exact a penalty against North Vietnam eampaign, and arrive at conclusions based for her flagrant violations of the Geneva on our comparative analysis. Accords of 1954 and 1962. The administration in late 1964 and —To limit the flow, or substantiallv in- crease the cost, of infiltration of men and early 1965 faced an uncertain and per- materiel from North Vietnam. AIR POWER IN VIETNAM 5 In my judgment the manner in which the inconsequential supply caches. Our forces air strikes were conducted did not signal were asked to do several things that they strong intentions. Air operations in nvn had not been designed or structured to do. were initiated under strict Controls and These were to locate and track sinalI tar- specific guidance. The air campaign from gets in difficult terrain, and to attack them 1965 to 1968 undulated with phases of at night and in adverse weather with muni- gradual expansion and reduction. Our na- tions that had been designed for other tional leaders provided significant interludes purposes. in the hombing, to which it was hoped the It is appropriate at this point to refer enemy would respond bv reducing the scope to the objectives of the 1965-68 campaign and levei of the conflict; there were pauses as set forth by President Johnson. Those for Vietnamese national holidays; long objectives were, by their nature, limited in periods of poor weather reduced our air scope, and the application of air power efforts and gave the enemv respite.