AIR rcmewU N I V E R S I TY THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Reflections on Air Power in the Vie t nam War ...... 2 Gen. George J. Eade, USAF Spac e Propulsion: L et s Do It Better Electrically...... 10 .Vlaj. Richard S. Batv, USAF T he Effects of Ionospheric Scintillation on Satellite Communications . . 26 Allen L. Johnson PENS TO PlERCE THE MlGHTY -AND DEGRADE THE S w O R D ...... 32 Brig. Gen. Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret) SoVIET DlSSENT: I t S S o URCES -AND SlGNIFIC.ANCE...... 45 Maj. Ralph C. Gauer, USA Militarv Affairs Abroad Phases of Subver sio n: the Cast r o Drive on Latin Ame r ica...... 54 Jay Mallin Air Force Revievv T he Changinc Scene in Education...... 63 Maj. Charles W. Mitchell, USAF 552d Air bo r ne Ear l y W.ar ning and Control Wing l \ Southeast Asia ... 70 Lt. Col. Jerold R. Mack, USAF Capt. Richard M. Williams, US.AF The De f init io n of Ope r .at ion.al Requirements for Co mmunic at io ns...... 79 Maj. Chris N. Wilcox, USAF In Mv Opinion F.ast Bur ner : D oes He Hear a Dif f e r e nt Drummer? ...... 88 Lt. Col. Charles W. Roades, US.AF W hy Mil it .ar y Air pl .anes Cost So Much .and What Can Be Done About It . 94 Maj. Frederick T. Stark, USAF Acçuisition and Id e nt if ic at io n of Ground Tar g ets...... 102 Maj. Dan Eliason, USAF Books and Ideas Swords int o Bal l point s: A N ew Out l et for Mil it ar y Expression...... 105

Col. Harlev* E. Bamhart, USAF W rjtten Pellmell? ...... 108 Col. Don Clelland, USAF The Co nt r ibit o r s ...... 110

the cover Addrc&i nunincripb to Editor, Air Univervlv Dtviorm, Bldg 1211, Miuwell A EB, AL. In light of our experiente in the air action M1I2. Pnnted by Covrmmenl frínting Office. in ETO during World War II. which led Addrest tuhicnptioTB to Superintendcnt of the í'S Stra/t:(fú' Bombing Survey to oon- Documenta, CPO. Washington IX 20402 vearly clude that "no nation can long survjve the Vi.On d om rtK , 910 00 foreign. f h,g|c copy 91.50. free cxploítation of air weapons over its Home* land. General George J. Eade refletis on the il sc of uír power in Vietnam and «Iraws a similar conclusion: limited applieation of force yieldcd indccisive results where- as appropnate Application contrihnted to Vol. XXV No. I V-AEMurnOr/ 1973 > the achicvcrnent of the Alliod objectlves. REFLECTIONS ON AIR POWER IN THE VIETNAM WAR

General George J. E ade fnll backing and support of our nation. The large-scale strategic bombing campaign against Germany and Japan proved to be a decisive factor in bringing the war to an end. In its most comprehensive con- clusion on conventional strategic bombing that applies to the air war against both Japan and Germany, the World War II United States Strategic Bombing Survey States that “ heavy, sustained and aeeurate attacks against carefully selected targets are required to produce de- cisive results when attacking an enemy’s sustaining resources.” It fnrther concludes that “ no nation can long survive the free exploita- tion of air weapons over its home- land.” The introduction of nuclear power at the close of World W ar II brought about the realization by policy- makers that the application of unrestrained military power could produce catastrophic results. The relatively unconstrained use of mili- tary power that prevailed during W orld War II was replaced by the tense atmosphere of the Cold W ar years, which led ultimately to the concept of limited war. The limitation of war has been a key concern of U.S. Defense OR an examination of U.S. objectives in policy for many years. Much has Southeast Asia, the role of air power in been written on the dilemma of F achieving those objectives, and the reasons how to use m ilitary power to achieve for success or lack of success in that achieve- a national objective in the face of ment, an appropriate departure point inight an armed challenge without allow- well be a brief examination of World War II ing the conflict to escalate in in- and the intemational elimate at that time. The tensity through the spectriun of overall objective of the Allied forces was warfare. As the strategy of massive rather simple and straightforward: the uncon- retaliation gave way to the doctrine ditional surrender of the Axis powers. To of Hexible response, the United achieve this objective, air power was allowed States developed conventional capa- to operate with little coastraint and with the bilities for deterring or coping with

3 4 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW plexing decision in Vietnam. Concern over limited conflicts. These capabilities were Chinese military reaction in the event of intended to provide the decision-maker direct U.S. intervention was acute. There with options which would be credible in was a laek of public awareness in the United terms of the various leveis of military con- States of Hanoi s involveinent in South Viet- frontation. It is essential to recognize that nam. The political situation in the South to gain the initiative from an aggressor re- quires the national will and readiness to was unstable, and underlying the entire select options that make the aggressor s Indochina question was the unknown risk and cost incompatible with the ob- quantity of the Soviet commitment to jectives the aggressor hopes to aehieve. North Vietnam (nvn). One must, on the other hand, be fore- Given the political and military environ- warned that it is possible to select options ment of early 1965, the administration at which, in order to insure against drawing that time chose closely controlled air attacks other nations into the conflict, oíFer a rel- to signal U.S. intentions. The problem the atively lower probability of achieving mili- administration faced was how to make tary or political success. such a signal cie ar and yet not risk un- Let us examine the Southeast Asia con- wanted escalation. There was inherent con- flict. Some analyses of air power in the cern that the attaeking of high-value targets Vietnam conflict, particularly those done in the North could carry the same risks on the 1965-68 time period, have been as a full-scale eampaign. The international criticai of aerial bombarclment as an in- political climate was against widening of strument of national policy. These retro- the war. Rationale for the early decisions spective analyses, applying their own that limited the employment of air power interpretations of the intended objeetives in nvn appeared in a speech by President of the bombing eampaign, conclude that Lyndon B. Johnson on 7 April 1965 when air power fell short of realizing these ob- he stated: jeetives. Our objeetive is the independence of South Viewing these criticai analyses, pro- Vietnam and its freedom from attack. . . . ponents of air power are much tempted to We have no desire to devastate that which the take issue with the conclusions and to offer people of North Vietnam have built with pointed rebuttaLs in an effort to exonerate toil and sacrifiee. We will use our power the principies and concepts of air power. with restraint and with all the wisdom that To do so would, in essence, be engaging in we can command. the same sort of xVlondav morning quarter- The objeetives of the air eampaign backing that was employed by those ana- launched in 1965 were defined by President lysts who have produced the stinging re- Johnson: views of air power. It would seern more —To back our fighting men and our fighting appropriate to consider objectively the allies by demonstrating that the aggressor bombing eampaign during the 1965-68 time could not bring hostile arms and men to bear period, present the facts as we know them, against South Vietnam from the security o f a compare results of that earlier period with sanctuary. the recent successful results of the 1972 air —To exact a penalty against North Vietnam eampaign, and arrive at conclusions based for her flagrant violations of the Geneva on our comparative analysis. Accords of 1954 and 1962. The administration in late 1964 and —To limit the flow, or substantiallv in- crease the cost, of infiltration of men and early 1965 faced an uncertain and per- materiel from North Vietnam. AIR POWER IN VIETNAM 5

In my judgment the manner in which the inconsequential supply caches. Our forces air strikes were conducted did not signal were asked to do several things that they strong intentions. Air operations in nvn had not been designed or structured to do. were initiated under strict Controls and These were to locate and track sinalI tar- specific guidance. The air campaign from gets in difficult terrain, and to attack them 1965 to 1968 undulated with phases of at night and in adverse weather with muni- gradual expansion and reduction. Our na- tions that had been designed for other tional leaders provided significant interludes purposes. in the hombing, to which it was hoped the It is appropriate at this point to refer enemy would respond bv reducing the scope to the objectives of the 1965-68 campaign and levei of the conflict; there were pauses as set forth by President Johnson. Those for Vietnamese national holidays; long objectives were, by their nature, limited in periods of poor weather reduced our air scope, and the application of air power efforts and gave the enemv respite. Beeause over the North was in eonsonance with the of political constraints, the campaign oper- goals perceived by the administration. ated under a set of firmly defined ground Lhilike the full-scale employment of air rules relating to target selection, areas to be power in World War II, the early bombing bombed, levei of effort, and tactics to be campaign had specific, limited objectives. used. As General Maxwell Taylor wrote, “ The Oiir limited application afforded the overall purpose was to apply limited force North Vietnamese some significant advan- with limited means to gain limited results. tages. In 1965, nvn had made little prep- A review of the record reveals that air aration against air attacks: military tar- power was quite effective in achieving gets such as petroleum, oil, and lubricant these limited objectives. Allied military ( po l ) facilities and factories were not dis- forces and the people of South Vietnam persed; her labor force was not mobilized were strengthened with the knowledge for logistical repair and movement. The that air power was striking the enemy in gradual application of air power allowed his own territorv. The North Vietnamese, nvn to correct these deficiencies and denied with the conflict brought into their own us the capability of fully exploiting them. homeland, had to devote criticai resources Additionallv, the North Vietnamese and to defense and repair. Moreover, the inter- their al lies demonstrated how rapidly a diction campaign was effective in limiting rudimentary air defense system can be- the ffow of inen and materiel to the South; come significantlv imposing. greatly increasing the cost of nvn’s aggres- The compounding effects of the political sion; and reducing the ability of the North constraints and a strategy of graduated Vietnamese to conduct offensive operations response resulted in the United States’ in the South. Weapons limitations and launchingan inconclusive, though expanded, political constraints notwithstanding, there bombing effort in hopes of persuading the is good evidence that the bombing of enemv to capitulate. criticai chokepoints resulted in significant Limited to relatively less lucrative, less blockage of the nvn supply lines. Beeause meaningful targets, air power had the of the role air power played in curtailing difficult task of carrving out an interdic- the southward How of men and materiel tion campaign against a target system con- and the reduction of stockpiles brought sisting of jungle trails, mountain passes, and on through increased groimd action by the vvidelv dispersed and, in relative terms, allies, the North Vietnamese were forced 6 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW and, in the latter stages, Cambodia. Their to withdraw several of their units from the intransigence signaled long-held inten- ground battle. This withdrawal was inter- tions of eroding the will of their enemies preted as a gesture on the part of the to resist and ultimately the taking over of North Vietnamese to reduce the levei of all of Indochina. However, after the de- conflict and played a part in the decision cision of the President in 1973 to resume to halt the bombing in the fali oi 1968. the bombing of nvn (this time with de- However, there was the belief in some termined intent and less restrained ap- quarters that perhaps we stopped the plication of air power), coupled with in- bombing at a time when Hanoi s stead- tensified diplomatic overtures, the North fastness had begnn to waver. History may Vietnamese baeked away from their intran- well give credence to that belief. sigence and entered into serious negotia- tions to conclude a peace settlement.

W hile not totallv unrestrained, In actuality the 1972 campaign can be air power in the December 1972 campaign analyzed in two distinct phases. Phase I be- was given the opportunity to strike key gan with the resumption of full-scale targets, some of them of snch significance bombing of North Vietnam following the as to be classified strategic. Not only were Easter offensive in the South and lasted the political constraints less rigid, but we until mid-October when it appeared that had also succeeded in the development peace was at hand. Phase II, in December and employment of some weapons with 1972, lasted only ele ve n days, but those capabilities nonexistent during the 1965-68 eleven days mav well prove to be the most time period. Electro-optically and laser- decisive period of the entire war; a period guided weapons added a new dimension that, when the final accounting is taken, in the art of aerial bombardment. The should provide unprecedented evidence of unprecedented accuracy of these weapons the capability of air power to achieve caused a severe crippling of the North national objectives. Vietnamese logistie System and allowed The difficult reality that the Hanoi leader- air power to strike key industrial targets ship had to face was that its 1972 Easter with little collateral damage. W e have offensive in the South had been a costlv convincing evidence that the early results failure in terms of achieving even minimal of the 1972 campaign were far more suc- militarv objectives. Moreover, the launching cessful than our efforts during the 1965-68 of the Easter offensive precipitated our period. Criticai supplies and Utilities such decision to resume the bombing of the as po l and electrieal power were reduced North, after which the North Vietnamese to a levei that only the minimum essential carne to the conferenee table for serious functions of nvn government and defense negotiations. Patrick J. Honey, an eminent could be maintained. Also the mining of British authority on North Vietnamese Haiphong harbor by air power in the 1972 affairs, in an interview with U.S. News and campaign reduced the resupply to nvn World Report (6 November 1972), was by sea to a triekle. asked the question, “ How important was Throughout this long and impopular war, the bombing of the North in pressuring the North Vietnamese had shown little will- Hanoi toward a negotiated settlement?” ingness to negotiate a settlement, primarily Mr. Honey answered: because they were able to sustain their logistie networks and maintain constant pres- The heavy bombing of North Vietnam was sure on the armies of South Vietnam, Laos, perhaps the vital factor which kept pressures on North Vietnam and maintained their in- AIR POWER IN VIETNAM 7

terest in continuing the negotiations with Dr. air defense system in the world, signaled Kissinger. In 1968, on the advice of Clark again to Hanoi the steadfast resolve of our Clifford [former Secretary of Defense], the commitment to South Vietnam and our bombing was stopped. This removed any willingness to employ air power to its sense of urgency on the Conununist side. As maximum effectiveness in an effort to move a result, the negotiations got nowhere. But the peace negotiations off dead center. It now the North Vietnamese leaders knew the must be emphasized that it was the total bombing would continue. Therefore, they air effort over the North that brought about had an incentive to settle as soon as possible the suecessful results: B-52s, tactical air because the bombing hurt. fighter-bombers, electronic coimtenneasures At the end o f Octob er 1972, the North and chaff aircraft, defense suppression air- Vietnamese indicated they wanted to talk, craft, and mig defende rs working in a con- and we stopped bombing in the North. certed effort to place weapons on targets. However, it soon became apparent that As Charles W . Corddrv stated in the discussions had reached an impasse; not Baltimore Sun (24 January 1973): onlv were the North Vietnamese showing The twin instruments of this strategy were signs of assuming once again their posture the swift, systematic and sustained bombing of intransigence toward meaningful nego- campaign over North Vietnam with greatly tiations but there was clear evidence that intensified pressure in December, and the they were again about to launch a major closing of its ports by naval mining. ofFensive. A decision was reached bv our policy- Joseph Alsop summed up the December makers to resume bombing of the North, campaign this way: this time with the full might of all the U.S. . . . there is no question at all that the re- air power resources in Indochina, including newed bombing got the President what he B-52 bombers. During an eleven-day period, was aiming for. B-52s Hew more than 700 sorties against militarv and industrial targets in the Hanoi- Even some of the political analvsts who Haiphong area in conjunction with about had earlier opposed the use of air power 1600 sorties by fighter-bombers. In an article in the North began to change their minds. in the Washington Post (24 January 1973), Commenting on the political significance Joseph Alsop commented: of the recent bombing campaign, Stewart Alsop stated in Newsweek Magazine (29 The targets chosen, it might be emphasized, January 1973): were all war-eonnected, being military supply dumps, railroad switching and marshalling According to Hanofs figures, the B-52 bomb- yards, electric power stations and so on. ing killed 1,318 people in Hanoi in tw elve Judging by Hanofs figure of under 1400 days. That is a lot of dead people. But the persons killed in the bombing, the B-52s fact remains that the bombing was not mass clearly did a remarkably accurate job. bombing . . . . If it had been, there would have been no more Hanoi. Pointing to the Hanoi casualty reports, the London Economist said the German I have written almost ad nauseam that the supposed omnipotence of air power is “ the Air Force “ killed almost as many in a great American illusion.” But 1 am beginning single night in what now seems to be the to wonder if the President was right and I relatively mild bombing of Britain in 1940 was wrong. . . . It is surely at least possible and 1941. This intensive bombing cam- that it [the B-52 bombing] too has led to paign, flown against the most concentrated important political results—a respectable 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the ultimate end of the war for the United American extraction from a hated war, and perhaps even an end to the Commumsts re- States in Southeast Asia. morseless use of every form of violente, from tank-supported invasion to mass assassina- tion, to impose their rule on South Vietnam. In that case, many more than 1,318 will be T here are several conclusions saved, which is why I begin to wonder ít I that can be drawn from this examination was vvrong. of the role of air power throughout the A postoperation summary of the eleven- Indochina War. First, there is the realiza- day bombing campaign provides irrefutable tion that air power along with other U.S. evidente on the nature of the targets and allied forces had been engaged since struck and the crippling effect that air 1965 in one of the longest wars in U.S. power had on North Vietnam s war-making history. Militarily, a long war is disadvanta- potential. Bombing the rail system alone geous. If we possess a capability to apply resulted in an almost total suspension of force rapidly and massively (massively in rail traffic in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. In relation to the opposition, not in absolute the past when North Vietname.se rail in- terms), presumably we can end a war stallations had been struck, repair crews quiekly. With such an alternative available, were at work immediately building by- if we allow the war to continue over an passes to the damaged areas. During the extended period it is because of a decision eleven-day campaign, the rail system was to impose restrictions on the forces we struck with such intensity and regularity employ—a decision prompted by a desire that, as postmission photography reveals, to limit the scope of the conflict. repair crews made no attempt to restore Nevertheless, from the purely military even token rail traffic. Concurrent with point of view, such restrictions produce raids on the rail system, B-52s and fighter- numerous disadvantages. The enemy is bombers struck major supply depots where given time to study, adjust to, and counter- the North Vietnamese stored war materiel aet our strategy, tactics, and weapons. He is prior to shipment to the South. Resultant given time to deploy new weapon systems damage, confirmed by photography, was the or to perfect and expand existing ones (wit- virtual destruction of several hundred ware- ness the formidable North Vietnamese air houses and storage buildings. Raids on defenses built up during the earlier bomb- North Vietnam’s three major power plants ing campaign); to create different routes of reduced the country’s eleetrical power supplv (the jungle highwavs through Laos output from 92,000 kilowatts to between and sea-fed routes through Cambodia); to 17,000 and 24,000 kilowatts, eausing a train large numbers of people to be effective complete blackout of all but the criticai troops; to redistribute his population; to functions of government and defense that disperse his vital industries; to duplicate and required eleetrical power. Militarily, the build bypasses to criticai Communications December bombing campaign achieved links; to develop and employ successful the intended objective of seriously de- propaganda themes. In short, we may grading the enemy’s capability to wage surrender or seriously compromise the war in the South. Far more significant, initiative and so make the war much more however, is the fact that our nation’s polit- expensive and difficult to win. ical objectives were supported by the rapid, Second, when the political climate re- concentrated application of air power in quires the imposition of constraints on an effort to bring about a cease-fire and military forces, serioxis consideration must AIR POWER IN VIETNAM 9

be given to existing limitations in force about a lessening of political constraints, capabilities. This is not to say that military the appropriate application of military forces can achieve an objective only when power can indeed contribute significantly to unconstrained and given a free rein; but, the achievement of desired objeetives. I rather, a balance must be reached in the believe that the experience of the eleven- decision-making process between political day campaign in D ecem ber 1972 should constraints and force limitations so that provide convineing lessonS in the future the abilitv to achieve a desired objective employment of air power as an effective is optimized. It is in this area that the instrument to be used in support of national “can-do” spirit of the military sometimes policy. Perhaps these valuable lessons will works at cross-purposes to the accom- allow us to update the findings of the World plishment of an assigned task. The over- War II Strategic Bombing Siirvey, to show riding tradition in the militarv is to salute that “ no nation can long endure the swift, smartly and move out even when faced aceurate, coneentrated application of air with limited capabilities. Just as military power and still hope to achieve any measure

leaders must face the reality of political of victorv.”j constraints. so is it important that a nation's The ultimate objective in Southeast Asia policy-makers understand that extensive has been identified as a just and honorable political constraints in concert with force peace. Air power, alone, cannot take limitations may produce an outcome that full credit for bringing the war to an end; falis short of anticipated objeetives. but the establishment of serious peace nego- Finally, as the limitations in force capa- tiations and the long-awaited eease-fire bilities are reduced bv advancing technology agreement that followed were in large and the changing face of the war brings part due to the application of air power. Hq United States European Command HEM ICAL propulsion systems will continue to be the mainstay of space propulsion for the foreseeable future. C Many gains still remain to be realized in this area. Such items as improved paekaging, reusabilitv, reduced costs, and increased durability are major goals of the current Air Force rocket propulsion technology program. This program is structured so as to make potential improvements a reality within the next fíve to ten years. Beyond these improvements, it is necessary to look to other than chemieal propellants to increase propulsion performance substantially. This is where electric propulsion systems offer promise. These systems, through vastly improved propellant mass utilization, have the potential to serve us better electrically. At the present time, electric propulsion devices for Air Force space applications are being developed for utilization at low thrust leveis. This situation is dictated by the fact that the present shortage of available electrical povver aboard spacecraft would prohibit large thrust leveis from being attained by electric propulsion systems. Even so, there are a number of space propulsion functions for which electric propulsion systems

SPACE PROPULSION Let's D o It Better Electrically

Maj o r Ric har d S. Bat y

10 SPACE PROPULSION 11

are becoming prime contenders. Sueh func- regimes for eleetrical thrusting Systems are tions as satelíite attitude control and orbital hypothesized. maintenance appear ideal for certain elec- In any discussion of rocket propulsion, tric propnlsion devices. The attractiveness two parameters are of extreme importanee: of these devices stems from their abilitv to total impulse and specific impulse. Total utilize propellant inass so efficiently at the impulse establishes the magnitude of the necessary thrust leveis. For example, a thrust and the duration of the thrusting time certain satelíite propulsion function could be that are necessary to complete a certain performed using far less propellant through mission. For example, in an orbit-changing employment of electric propulsion. The sav- mission, to transfer from one orbit to an- ings in propellant consiunption could be other, changes in velocity must be imparted realized through launch weight savings, in- to a satelíite. These changes can be accom- creased pavload. longer satelíite missions, plished bv using rocket engines to provide or a combination. These alternatives could thrust for a certain time period. Thus, the potentiallv reap considerable benefit in engines provide the eorrect total impulse terms of launch costs, material utilization, for entering the new orbit. and mission coverage. A very important question now arises: But where should electric propulsion How much fuel will be required to provide ultimately lead us? The answer to this ques- the specified amoimt of total impulse? To tion is that a patient development effort achieve thrust, particles of propellant are could enable us to perform spatial propul- expelled at a certain velocity. A desired sion maneuvers that are not attempted to- thrust levei can be achieved by either ex- day. The abilitv to perform these new pelling more particles at a lower velocity maneuvers will be highly dependent upon or fewer particles at higher velocities. Natu- harnessing more efficiently the vast amounts rally, it is more desirable to accelerate of enerçv that are available in the universe. particles to as high a velocity as practical, At the present time our energy pioneers since fewer particles in the acceleration such as Hannes A lfvén 1 are pointing to process will result in less propellant weight. new sources of untapped energy, solar winds, In fact, some desirable military space mis- for instance. These sources could enable us sions, such as sizable repositioning maneu- to reduce space repositioning and travei vers, would require optimum propellant times significantly through employment of utilization in space in order to maintain specific electric propulsion devices. As we allowable spaceeraft launch weights. Fur- reach these new acceleration regimes, oth- thermore, launch weights have now been er wavs of improving acceleration mecha- transcribed into dollars per pound.2 For nisms will probably be identified. The main these reasons, it behooves us to use each point to remember is that we must retain propellant particle in space in as efficient our pioneer spirit. Indications are that we a manner as possible. have a long path ahead of us in the area W e are now readv to define specific im- of propulsion refinement. pulse, since it is a measure of how eífi- This article briefly describes the electri- ciently each propellant particle is used. cal acceleration processes from the basic Specific impulse is generaíly defined as the electrostatic and electromagnetic aspects velocity imparted to the propellant divided through the fascinating theory of magnetic- by gravitational acceleration. In meter- field annihilation. The role of electric pro- kilogram-second (mks ) units, the velocity pulsion is then assessed in light of postulated is greater than the specific impulse by a military missions. Finallv, future propulsion factor of ten. Thus, by knowing the specific Continued on page 14

14 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

cal example of today’s spatial energy source impulse capability of a system, we know how efficiently the system is using its propellant. is the solar array. The Air Force Aero Pro- Specific impulse has the units of seconds in pulsion Laboratory is currently examining such arrays to generate 10 to 20 kilowatts the mks system. The practical implication of specific im- of power. At this power levei, enough en- pulse can immediately he seen by consider- ergy can be furnished to an electric thrust- ing the amount of propellant needed to ing device to furnish fractions of pounds of provide a certain total impulse. The pro- thrust at specific impulses in the range of pellant weight is determined by dividing 1500 to 3000 seconds. Granted, not all satel- the total impulse by the specific impulse. lites will have this rnuch power aboard, and Thus, if a system vvere operating at a spe- not all the available power will be continu- cific impulse of 300 seconds, 200 pounds of ally at the disposal of the electric thruster. propellant would be required to provide a However, suggested power allocations4 in- total impulse of 60,000 pound-seconds. If dicate that suflficient power is available for the specific impulse vvere somehow doubled, electric thrusters to negate forces which then the corresponding propellant weight cause orbital perturbations and to perform would be halved. repositioning functions in which time con- straints are minimal. The vast propellant weight savings that could conceivably be Facets of Chemical and derived through employment of electric Electric Propulsion propulsion could then be used advanta- Chemical propulsion systems derive their geously in many ways. energy from internai sources. As the pro- Looking ahead to the 1980s, w e antici- pellant ignites, energy in the form of heat pate the availability of nuclear power sup- is given off in great quantities. By expand- plies for space applications. Additionally, ing the propellant exhaust through a noz- solar arrav technology is expected to in- zle, heat energy is transformed into kinetic crease rapidlv over the coming vears. Power energy of the exhaust products. There is an leveis of up to 75 kilowatts have alreadv upper limit to the amount of internai en- been predicted for solar arrays.5 Probablv ergy available in Chemicals. It appears that equally important, new sources of untapped Chemical propulsion systems cannot exceed energy such as solar winds6 are now under a specific impulse of 600 seconds.3 close scrutiny. All these facets add up to the In ontrast to Chemical systems, electric fact that electric thrusters could produce propulsion devices receive their energy substantial thrust leveis as well as high spe- from externai sources. This energy is used cific impulse. The realization of such thrust to furnish a "push" to the propelíant parti- leveis would allow electric propulsion de- cles. Electric systems are therefore not vices to perform repositioning functions in limited to low values of specific impulse. which time constraints were signifieant. In fact, electric propulsion devices have Thus chemical propulsion systems, while routinely operated at specific impulses as capable of attaining high thrust leveis by high as 5000 seconds. Provided that the expelling large amounts of propellant at externai energy is available, the attainment relativelv low velocities, necessitate verv of high specific impulses by electric pro- large vehicles to contain the required amount pulsion devices is not a problem. of propellant. On the other hand, electric In space environments, electrical energy propulsion devices use their propellant much may be furnished by several means. A typi- more efficiently but require externai energy' SPACE PROPULSION 15

sources. The further evolution of electric craft, a neutralizing device is utilized. Tliis propulsion devices. then, will be heavily device produces negative particles, which dependent on the evolution of energy join the propellant stream. The result is that sources. the mass leaving the spacecraft is neutral and will not have further attractive inter- actions with the spacecraft. Electric Propulsion Devices In contrast to the electrostatic device, an High-specific-impulse electric thrusting electromagnetic device works in the follow- devices are of two types, electrostatic and ing manner. An electrical current is estai )-

extroctor needles + + + + + +

+ + +

Figure 1. Colloid lliruster unit

electromagnetic. Electrostatic devices op- lished in a conductive propellant, which is erate by accelerating charged particles in the presence of a magnetic field. The through a difference in electric potential. magnetic field interacts with the current to Figure 1 depicts the acceleration process generate a force on the propellant. This occurring in electrostatic thrusters. The action is identical to the process occurring propellant is first ionized by such means in an electric motor. In a motor, a con- as application of electric forces or induce- ductor is placed on a rotor. The rotor, being rnent of Chemical reactions. Once ionized, in a magnetic field, spins when current is the propellant carries a positive charge. driven through the conductor. Particles of charged propellant are accel- There are presently reasons to research erated by means of a plate that is at nega- both electrostatic and electromagnetic Sys- tive potential. The propellant proceeds tems. Electrostatic systems are higher in outward through symmetrical openings in efficiency, which means they need a lower the plate. To prevent the propellant from amount of input power to perform a certain circling around and reattaching to the space- mission. On the other hand, electromagnetic

SPACE PROPULSION 17

•' » * > i 4*« t • . li« ......

The pulsed plasma tliruster left1 iras t tsed successftdly on the Lincoln Lulwrutonj spacecraft LES-6. . . . The Advanced De- celopment Program for the colloid th rus ter right) is an electro- static device, which, hy a tlif- ference in electric potential, accelerutes charged particles.

thrusters are marked by simplicity of opera- craft. Thus, if a spacecraft is spinning for tion and high energy density. The feature stability purposes, the electromagnetic of high energy densitv allows electromag- thruster can be pulsed at a time that vvill netic thrusters to provide high thrust leveis produce thrust in the desired direction. In with frontal areas of mueh smaller size than contrast, most eleetrostatic systems operate a corresponding eleetrostatic thruster. Addi- continuously over fixed periods. tional attractiveness of electromagnetic Two eleetrostatic concepts are presently svstems is that, by virtue of their pulsing under development by government agen- feature, they apply equally well to spinning cies: nasa is developing ion engines, and spacecraft and three-axis stabilized space- usaf is developing colloid engines. The inain 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Üfference between the ion and the eolloid static systems, pulsed plasma systems are oncepts lies in the charge-to-mass ratio relatively insensitive to parameters such as f the propellant particles. Each of these temperature. Thus thev are free of complex evices has its ovvn operating regime. The eontrol system loops. )n Systems operate verv efficiently at ap- The Air Force is presently developing roximatelv 3000 seconds speeific impulse two speeific pulsed plasma devices: the nd up, vvhile the eolloid is verv efficient at solid-propellant pulsed plasma thruster and jecific impulses of approximatelv 1500 sec- the pulsed induetive thruster. The rationale uds and below. When power is at a pre- is that the solid-propellant (Teflon) device lium, as it vvill be aboard eertain Air Force appears to 1*? optimum at lower thrust >acecraft, the eolloid engine is indeed at- leveis while the pulsed induetive thruster

igniter Figure 2. Pulsed platina thruster

-plasma exhaust

ctive because the tight limitations on appears better at higher thrust leveis. As >ut power prohibit operating at the ex- indicated earlier, the electrostatic systems melv high speeific impulses. are eliminated at higher thrust leveis due Tlie Air Force and nasa, in a closely to their low energy density. However, the >rdinated effort, are also presently work- Teflon thruster is being considered at thrust on the developrnent of electromagnetic ranges that are in direet eompetition with ices. These devices, known as pulsed the electrostatic devices. The issue at hand sma thrusters. look verv attractive for is the simplicity and pulsing feature of the nv space applications, a big plus being solid-propellant thruster versus the lower simplicity of their operating concept. power requirements of the electrostatic entially, all that is necessary is to dis- systems. At present, the involved trade-offs rge a capaeitor bank through a selected make both systems worthwhile to pursue. :1. The propellant is then eleetromag- I he solid-propellant pulsed plasma thrust- icallv accelerated. Unlike the electro- er operates bv discharging a capaeitor bank SPACE PROPVLSION 19

icross a pair of electrodes. (Figure 2) The eurrent and magnetic field energy generates •nergy developed across the electrodes ab- forces by which the propellant is accel- ates and accelerates the solid propellant. erated. This concept is more cornplex thun rhis thrusting concept has already operated the solid-propellant thruster. Ilowever, the eliably in spaee aboard the Lincoln Labo- fiexibility of this device makes it suitable

atory spacecraft LES-6. The function of for operation at elevated thrust leveis. This he solid-propellant thmster aboard LES-6 Hexibility is achieved by varying the density ,vas to produce micropounds of thrust to of the gaseous propellant and varying the rounteract forces on the spacecraft caused capacitor discharge rate through the ac- av the earth’s oblateness. Presently, Air celerating load. Force efforts are directed at evolving this A new and radical electromagnetic con-

power conditioner

Figure 3. PuLseil inductive thruster

propellant

energy storage capacitor spark gap

propellant injection valve

LES-6 thruster into the millipound regime. cept presently under preliminarv investi- At this levei, the solid-propellant thruster gation is known as “ magnetic field annihi- can perform other vital orbit maintenance lation." This fascinating theory is based functions. on the phenomenon oceurring in solar fiares The operation of the pulsed inductive and identifies a more efficient method of thruster is analogous to that of an induction using electromagnetic energy as an accel- motor. (Figure 3) The propellant, Xenon, eration mechanism. Solar fiares appearing is one with conduetive properties. After the on the sun’s surface are caused bv bodies of propellant is sprayed over the face of the hot, ionized gases coming together. The re- inductive load coil, the capacitor is dis- sult is that hot gases (i.e., solar fiares) are charged. The discharging capacitor creates expelled outward from the sun’s surface. a magnetic field. As this field diffuses into Petschek first employed his theory of mag- the ionized propellant, a eurrent is induced netic field annihilation in an effort to ex- in the propellant. The existence of both plain the vast amount of energy that had 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

been observed in solar fiares.' Based on terference. Tests to date with the ion en- Petscheks theory, Charles Lee Dailey has gine aboard the nasa spacecraft SEBT-II advanced an idea for a magnetic field annihi- and the solid-propellant pulsed plasma lation thruster.8 The name of the theory thruster aboard the spacecraft LES-6 indi- derives from the hypothesis that magnetic cate that electric thrusters do have the fields annihilate one another in solar fiare potential to perform orbital maintenance processes. The energy that had been stored functions successfully and to accomplish is then totally transformed into the kinetic repositioning functions in which time con- energy of the solar fiare mass particles. By straints are minimal. As more power be- total utilization of the generated magnetic comes available for space applications, elec- field in an electromagnetic thruster, it is tric propulsion devices should proceed to believed that higher thruster efficiencies even more ambitious functions. can be attained. This will provide pay-offs in terms of the aniount of propellant and Military Space Applications input electrical energy that are required to perform a certain mission. A major goal of military research and de- Probably the most advanced electric velopment is to increase satellite lifetimes thrusting concept presentlv under Air Force significantly. Accomplishment of this feat study is the utilization of the ambient at- can realize substantial savings in terms of inosphere as thruster propellant. Gordon L. dollars and manpower utilization. Exten- Cann, under af contract, is determining if sion in lifetime will require propulsion re- there are sufficient particles available at an finements. The development effort now altitude of 100-200 miles to be eleetromag- proceeding in the electric propulsion area netically accelerated so as to overcome offers promise that the necessary propul- atmospheric drag.9 If there are sufficient sion improvements can be achieved. particles, the implications are awesome. Some tvpical usaf missions in space in- This vvould essentially mean that a low-orbit clude communication relay, navigation aid, satellite could be maintained indefinitely bv and data relay. Satellites performing these electromagnetically accelerating the parti- functions presentlv operate for not longer cles in the atmosphere to overcome drag. than five years.10 Hawk and others have Thus, it vvould not be necessary to carrv presented some conceivable propulsion along propellant to perform this “ secondary” functions, along with representative total propulsion funetion. impulses, which would allow some very In summary, both electrostatic and elec- ambitious missions of the above tvpes to be tromagnetic systems are capable of attain- performed over a seven-year 1 ife.11 Thev ing high specific impulse. The electrostatic considered the post-1975 time period as the systems are more efficient at low thrust earliest opportunity for incorporating elec- leveis and require less input energy for a tric propulsion systems into operational specific mission. The electromagnetic sys- usaf satellites. Their fíndings are listed in tems have the advantages of simplicity of Table I. operation, applieability to spinning satel- The propulsion functions listed in Table lites, and the ability to extrapolate to high I are necessary for acquisition of the correct thrust leveis reasonably. Both tvpes of sys- orbit, overcoming forces that would remove tems are in development. Questions yet to the satellite from the proper orbit, orient- be answered regarding electric propulsion ing the satellite for means of communi- systems include lifetime and spacecraft in- cation, etc., and performing a small re- SPACE PROPULSION 21

Total Impulse necessitates larger transition times. How- (Ib-sec) Function Orbit ever, for many orbit-raising requirements, 1,000 Attitude conlrol Sync Eq time consideration should be minimal. For 3,000 E-W slationkeeping Sync Eq these cases, a large payoff in propellant 5,000 Inítial acquisition Sync Eq weight savings can be realized through the 12,000 Reposition (A V — 200 fps) Sync Eq employment of electric propulsion.

N-S slationkeeping Sync Eq 60,000 .Another advantage that electric propul- 100,000 Conlrol apsidal drifl 30c, e = 0.25* sion presently can offer is in the area of very fine attitude control. The fact that the i, orbil inelmolion; ' V Is « b it eccentr.cit),. capability to point antennas very aecu- Table /. Propulsion functions and total im- pulse for 2000-pound satellite/seven-year life rately permits significant reductions in trans- mitter power lends great impetus to the search for new methods of achieving the positioning function. As can be seen, the necessary degree of control. A likely candi- performance of these functions requires date for this application is the pulsed plasma large total impulses. Successful develop- thruster. This type of thruster can provide ment of electric propulsion will enable ex- very small average thrust leveis for very tended life without degradation of the short periocLs of time, with the result that satellite mission. a satellite can be rotated in terms of arc With the advent of the space shuttle, seconds. Possible competitors to the pulsed another ideal mission for electric propul- thruster are meehanieal devices such as sion becomes identified. Through use ol the gyro-controlled platforms or momenturn wheels. Whether or not these meehanieal shuttle, usaf satellites could be lifted to an altitude of approximatelv 100 miles. How- devices will have the necessary lifetime for ever, certain satellites for such purposes as long-duration satellite missions is under communication can operate best from debate. synchronous orbits—those oceurring at ap- The employment of electric propulsion proximately 20,000-mile altitudes and char- devices for high-total-impulse space mis- acterized by remaining fixed with respect sions will allow significant savings in terms to a point on earth. That is, the satellite in of utilized propellant mass. Thus, a sub- synchronous orbit and the earth rotate at stantial payoff can be realized through the same rate, thus enabling two-way com- longer satellite missions, launeh weight sav- munication between the satellite and fixed ings, inereased payload, or a combination antennas on earth. of these. As man learns to harness more The transitioning of a 1000-pound satellite effectively the vast amounts of available from a 100-mile orbit to a 20,000-mile orbit energy, electric propulsion systems could would require approximately 365,000 pound- provide the capability of allowing extensive seconds of total impulse. Heavier satellites space repositioning to be accomplished in would require a correspondingly greater a reasonable amount of time and for a impulse. In this large total impulse regime, reasonable expenditure of propellant. the high specific impulse fumished by elec- tric propulsion devices is certainly at- tractive. As mentioned previously, the lim- Hypothetical Future Electric itations on available satellite power mean Propulsion Regimes that electric propulsion devices are pres- In his article entitled “ The Relevance of ently thrust-limited. This thrust limitation Space,” Arthur Kantrowitz strikingly points 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

out the payoff to be derived through the multiple of the presently available power utilization of more effieient propulsion Sys- of approximately one thousand. Thus we are tems.12 He indicates that, if the energy talking in terms of space power break- consumed in lifting payloads into space were throughs. used as efficiently as consumer electricity Should we be optimistic that these power on the ground, the cost of the energy neces- breakthroughs can and will be achieved? I sary to put a 6600-pound spacecraft into low think so. The reason for this optimism is orbit would be less than $150. The high cost that man is presently being pressed to de- of space launches results partially from the velop new energy sources. As Peter Glaser relatively low energy available from Chemi- points out, the limitations on fóssil and non- cal fuel, which causes the launching vehicle fossil fuels will force us to develop options to be mueh greater in size and weight than for the future.13 Hopefully, the technology the actual payload put into orbit. Through developed to provide the necessary energy employment of very-high-thrust electric options will also allow us to make the de- propulsion devices, the launching vehicle sired advancements in space propulsion. could conceivably be reduced to about the Adequate magnitudes of energy could be same size as the payload. furnished to a spacecraft by two means. En- Once in space, the ability to operate at ergy sources, such as nuclear-electric de- high thrust leveis and correspondingly high vices, could be put aboard the craft. Al- specific impulses would enable the realiza- ternatively, energy from a power plant could tion of sustained, large-scale maneuvering. be beamed to the spacecraft. There is in- At present, Chemical rockets can rapidly terest in each of these concepts at present.14 maneuver on a relatively low total impulse A development effort based on any of basis. Aíter that, their fuel will have been these concepts should concentrate on weight exhausted. The evolution of electric pro- and size. At today’s levei of technology, pulsion into the high thrust regime would C. L. Dailey estimates that an on-board enable rapid and sustained maneuvering. energy system capable of supplying 10 The major impediment to the realization megawatts of power would weigh about of high-thrust electric propulsion devices is 80,000 pounds.10 He also estimates that the the present lack of adequate energy sources receivingequipment necessary to implement for space applications. Solar arrays are the beaming concept would weigh about presently thought capable of providing be- 40,(X)0 pounds but with a greatlv increased tw e e n 10 and 20 kilowatts o f pow er. This area requirement. The receiving equipment, levei would allow fractions of a pound of which could be “ rolled up” during launch, thnist at a few thousand seconds specific would need a deployed area encompassing impulse to be produced by an electric pro- about 210 meters on a side. Spacecraft relv- pulsion device. As mentioned earlier, this ing on these energy systems could certainly thrust levei would allow aeeomplishment be launched with a Saturn V into a low of certain repositioning maneuvers in which orbit. However, for purposes of faster re- time constraints were minimal. At 50 to sponse and greater maneuvering capability, 100 pounds o f thrust, e le c tric propulsion it would be highly desirable to have systems devices would begin entering the rapid reduced bv a factor of 10 in weight and size. repositioning regime. To attain this levei, Rough estimates of the possible avail- approximately 10 megawatts of input power ability of these energy sources have been would be needed. This levei represents a made by several prominent individuais. SPACE PROPULSION 23

Lavton estimates that an on-board nuclear remembered that input energy to an elec- power source could be ready for spacecraft tric propulsion device can be traded off utilization in about eight years at a cost ot between thrust and specific impulse. $2 to $3 billion.16 Glaser and Krafft A. The idea of having a backup spacecraft Ehricke, although not specifically thinking in orbit would also be highly desirable for in terms of spacecraft applications, advo- another reason. In case an unforeseen mission cate the developnient of spatial power Sys- were to arise quickly, the backup spacecraft tems that could be used for a wide variety could be temporarily repositioned to under- of functions.17 Once deployed in space, take the new mission. It is the flexibility of these svstems could furnish beamed energy this eoneept that could yield substantial to a spacecraft when rapid repositioning payoffs. maneuvers were desired. Through utiliza- The repositioning functions of interest tion of the space shuttle, Glaser and Ehricke would be orbit plane shifts, orbit raising or predict that their svstems could be ready lowering, and position shifts in a certain or near-readv by the 1990s. orbit. Dailey has assessed the feasibility of Exactlv what would be gained by oper- performing large-scale orbital maneuvers ating in the previously mentioned thrust in times of the order of a few days to a range o f .50 to 100 pounds or altern atively few months by means of a compact elec- using the available energy to achieve spe- tromagnetic thrusting system.18 The en- cifíc impulses as high as 30,000 seconds? ergy for this system is derived from a beamed The answer to this question is that many source. Dailev’s results are summarized in new repositioning regimes would become Table II. available to militarv spacecraft. For instance, The figures listed in Table II indicate that it might be desirable to station a backup thrust leveis in the 50- to 100-pound range spacecraft in a certain orbit; then, if a cer- do indeed begin to allow us to enter the tain primary satellite serving a criticai func- regime of rapid repositioning, even for very tion such as data relay became inoperative, large spacecraft. However, much is to be the backup spacecraft would be repositioned gained by moving up to thousands of pounds by using the maximum thrust levei. Alter- of thrust. Chemical rockets are already at natively, if it were only necessary to repo- this levei, but with specific impulses in the sition slowlv, then the higher specific impulse 200- to 400-second range. Thus, chemical could be utilized at a greatly reduced rate rockets are highly effective for relatively of propellant consumption. It should be low total impulse maneuvers. The sustained

Table //. Approximate repositioning times for Fuel Consumed Thrust Specific Impulse Time Function (pounds) (pounds) (seconds) (days) an electromagnetic thruster operating in 50- 100-pounil tlirnst aml/or high specific impulse 180 position chonge 330 26.6 10,000 1.5 regime. Ten-megawatt input power is assumed; in low orbit spacecraft weiglit is 125.000 pounds. The 2400-mile orbit 25,000 55.5 2,000 9 difference between the power weight o f 40.000 roise (low initial 5,000 31.0 10,000 19 pounds and the spacecraft weight is comprised orbit) 2,500 15.5 20,000 35 o f the electromagnetic thruster configuration, propellant, strueture, Controls, and patjload. These figures are hased on estimated technology 90 orbit plane 25,000 45.7 4,375 26 shift 11,150 31.0 10,000 40 and would require the developnient of the power 4,167 10.3 30,000 112 equipment and liigh-tlirust electromagnetic de- vice.

maneuvering capability will require Systems the area of launching vehicles by electro- that can more efficiently utilize their pro- magnetic means, Alfvén is advocating trans- pellant. fer of readily available power from a ground This discussion has concentrated on the network to a spacecraft in much the same payoffs that could he realized through the manner that lightning is transferred between employment of high-thrust electromagnetic a cloud and the ground. He is calling this devices for repositioning. But how about concept “ energy transfer à la Zeus.” 19 The the actual launching of vehicles by elec- possible advantage of this concept would be tromagnetie systems? As mentioned at the that very little airborne weight would be first of this section, the use of high specific chargeable to either the power or propel- impulse devices to perform the launching lant required by the electromagnetic thrust- function could reduce the size of the launch- ers. As an alternative to this method, Kan- ing vehicle to roughly the size of the pay- trowitz feels that the use of lasers will load. For example, to place a satellite into appear as an important possibility in the low orbit, an orbital velocity of approxi- next decade. He contends that nothing we mately 8000 meters per second is required. now know would rule out transferring the If the launch vehicle propellant were given needed amount of energy to a spacecraft a specific impulse of approximately 2400 via advanced laser technology. seconds, then the system at launch would In the area of space repositioning, Alfvén vveigh only about 1.4 times as much as the advocates “ sailing in the solar winds.” These weight placed into orbit. If a chemical winds are caused by disturbances on the system operating at 400 seconds specific surface of the sun and contain a great amount impulse were used, then the system at launch of electrie power. The earth s magneto- would weigh approximately IVi times the sphere extracts about 1012 w a t t s f r o m t h e weight placed into orbit. solar winds. If a spacecraft could extract Again, however, the bugaboo of the elec- even a small percentage of this magnitude, trie propulsion systems is power. Accelera- sizable thrust leveis could be aehieved. As tion leveis of approximately 8 g’s would be Alfvén points out, extracting energy from desirable to place, say, a 1000-pound satel- solar winds could, in principie, give a space- lite into low orbit. If an electromagnetic craft specific impulses of up to 40,000 sec- thruster were tasked for the launch phase, onds.20 Thus, the potential exists to boost then an input power of approximately 1.67 spacecraft up to 100 times as fast as the X 108 watts would be required. This power chemical roekets of today. supplv would weigh approximately 1.3 Concepts such as these, although still in million pounds. Thus, means must be devised the elementary thought stage, could some- either to greatly reduce the weight of power day allow us to enter into the operating supplies or leave the vast majority of them regimes for which we are searching. They on the ground. definitely deserve serious consideration. These examples show that learning to har- ness the vast amount of energy in the uni- verse effectivelv will be paramount to the Electric propulsion devices now appear continued refinement of electrie propulsion. ideal for low-thrust, large-total-impulse Whereas the previously discussed concepts space missions and missions in which space- to harness energy could be considered “ clas- craft pointing must be verv accurate. As sical, Alfvén and Kantrowitz are presently more power beeomes available, it is con- advocating some totally different ideas. In ceivable that high-thrust electrie propul- SPACE PROPULSION 25

sion devices could become a reality. The difficult. Yet all the significant technological advantages of elevating electric thrusters breakthroughs of the past have required their into the high-thrust regime vvould be that fair share of effort. If the same amount of sustained, rapid maneuvering in space effort is allocated to achieving our high- would be possible and the costs of space- thrust electric propulsion goals, 1 feel the craft launches could be reduced. To move necessary breakthroughs will come. I be- into the high-thrust regime, many times lieve the propulsion department of the patent the presently available power will be re- office is going to be busy for many years to quired. The task will undoubtedly be very come.

Air Fon e Rocket Propulsion iMboratori/

Notes |. Hanues Alfvén. “ Spacecraft Prupulsion: New Methods/' Science, 14 Ap r i l 11. Cl a r k W . Ha wk et o/., “ System Study of Electric Propulsion for Military 1972. Space Vehícles,” A1AA paper nr 72—193, Apr il 1972 2. Árthiir Kantrowitz. “The Relevance of Space,” Bulletin of Atomic S< r- 12. Bulletin o f Atomic Science, April 1971 tnce. April 1971. 13. Peter Glaser. "A New View of Solar Energy.” presented at 1971 Inter- 3. T. O. Dobbins, "Thennodynamics of Rocket Propulsion and Theoretical society Energy Conversion Engineering Conferem**. Boston, Massachusetts. Evaluation of Some Prototype Propellant Comhustions.” Wright Air Develop- August 1971 ment Center Tech Report 59-757, December 1959. 14. J Williams and K. Kirby, “ Exploratory Investigaiion o! an Qectric 4. Daniel S. Goldin. personal communication. Power Plant Utilizing a G&seous Core Reactor with MHD Conversion pre- 5. Hughes Aircraft Company. FRUSA report presented at Space and Missile sented at the Nuclear Power for Tomorrow Conference sponsored bv the Systems Orgauization (SAMSO), December 1971. American Nuclear Society. 24 August 1972; W. Brown “ Transportation of 6. Alfvén, op. cxt Energy bv Microwave Beam,” procedures of the Intersociety Energy Con- 7. Harry Petschek. “ Magnetic Field Annihilation,” Proceedings of AAS-NASA version Engineering Conference. August 1971. Symposium on Physics of Solar Fiares. NASA SP-50. 1965. 15. Dailey, personal comimuiication 8. Charles Lee Dailey, “ Magnetic Field Annihilation of Plasmas for Ad- 16. J. P. Layton. personal communication. vanced Engine Design,” AFOSR TR -71-0328, 31 March 1971. 17. Gl a s e r . Astronautics mui Aeronautlcs; K. líhrich:. 9. Peter Claser, as interviewed in Astroruiutics atui Aemnautics, February 18. Dailey. personal commiinicatkm. 1973. p. 10. 19. Alfvén. op. cit. 10. Ed Barth, personal communication. 20. Ihid. o

IONOSPHERIC SCINTILLATION ON SATELUTE COMMUNICATIONS

Allen L. Johnson

O M E TIM E in the not too distant fu- ture, a modern sac bomber, flying Sa routine mission, reports aircraft status to the command post via uhf satel- lite communication relay link without conv plication or problem. But toward the end of the mission the aircraft develops an emer- EFFECTS OF IONOSPHERIC SCINTILLATION 27

gency. A crewman piuiches the buttons to served is due to the behavior of the iono- send a “ Mayday” call, with aircraft posi- sphere. More speeifieally, ionospheric scin- tion information, via the satellite link. The tillation appears to be due to irregularities

com m and post receives the message, but in the F layer of the ionosphere. This layer, for some reason it is unreadable. Where which extends from 60 to 500 miles above has the system failed? Is it an equipment the earth s surface, does not appear to be problem or maybe an operator error? No, completely uniform. Shortly after sunset the answer is probablv “ generation gap." small irregularities in the ionosphere are Each new generation of Communications amplified as the ions interact with the mag- —from semaphores to smoke signals, to the netic lines of force. It is believed this in- wireless, and now to satellite Communica- teraction causes the ions to concentrate in tions—brings on a set of unique problems. cylindrical shapes that align along the mag- While the smoke signal provided greater netic line of force. These cylinders are communication distance than the sema- tvpically 100 to 1(K)0 feet in diameter and phore, it was susceptible to wind and rain 10 to 100 miles long. effects. The wireless overcame these ob- The behavior of ionospheric irregularities stacles but was affected by multipath and is a verv complex function of a number of static. Satellite communication solved mul- variables. The gross factors that appear to tipath and static but generated a set of influence the behavior include location on its own problems. With the advent of the the earth, sun spot activity, season, and Air Force Satellite Communication Sys- time of day. A host of minor factors also tem and the Navy’s fleetsatcom system, affect these irregularities. The ionospheric the problems of satellite Communications scintillation model becomes more complex are being recognized as operational limita- and less predictable as a result of the large tions of a new generation of communication number of variables. technology. While ionospheric scintillation occurs all One of the new problems that must be over the globe, scintillation associated with contended with is “ ionospheric scintilla- the equatorial region has received the most tion.” Scintillation of a star is the twinkling attention for a number of reasons. First, the that results from light ravs bending as they depth of fading caused by equatorial iono- pass through the inhomogeneous atmo- spheric scintillation is generally greater sphere. Scintillation of a radio signal is the than for mid-latitudes or polar regions. The “ twinkling’ that results from radio waves fading often reduces the signal to one one- passing through an inhomogeneous iono- thousandth of its unfaded value. A second sphere. This twinkling can cause erratic reason is that there is more opportunitv to reception of a radio signal and can disrupt observe the effects in the equatorial region, vital Communications for hours. as it is more densely populated than the In order to develop techniques that cir- polar region. Since the satellite is starting cumvent the problems associated with iono- to play a progressively greater role in mili- spheric scintillation, an effective model must tary communication and navigation, the be developed. Much previous work has Air Force is funding equatorial testing. Also, been done in this area, especially by radio since the effects of scintillation are less in astronomers. But, in general, the models the mid-latitude and polar regions, it is fail to describe fully all parameters asso- generally agreed that, once the scintillation ciated with observed scintillation. problem is solved in the equatorial region, The particular type of scintillation ob- these Solutions can l>e used in other regions. 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Researchers have learned much from the airborne terminal. A disturbed ionosphere host of experiments that have been per- area as small as 25 miles in diameter or as formed. It is known that equatorial scin- large as 2000 miles in diameter drifts at tillation activity increases during the spring speeds approaching 100 miles per hour. and fali equinox periods and exhibits a broad Within this disturbed area are many dis- decrease during the summer and winter continuities or fade-causing irregularities. solstice periods. The scintillation is pri- A ground terminal sees the eífect as slow marily a nighttime effect. fading, during which the station may be The onset of scintillation fading nornially blanked out for several seconds each time a begins abruptly one to two hours after sun- discontinuity goes by. An airborne terminal set. As the radio waves penetrate the dis- generally is moving several times as fast aí turbed region, they are focused by the high the irregularities and therefore sees a fade discontinuities resulting from ionospheric that is much shorter in duration. Since the irregularities. (Figure 1) These irregulari- disturbed area varies greatly in size, the ties tend to drift in an east-west direction, periodic fading mav occur for minutes oi causing the fading to drift by a ground or hours as the irregularities pass by. The effect

The USAF Aeronáutica! Systems Division 's C-135 test aircraft tised in taking scintillation measurements. Several UHF antennas used for the measurements can I» seen ou the top and side of the aircraft. The white radome on top contains a super-high-frequency (SHF) antenna System for satellite Communications. The aircraft was flown to Guam for the scintillation measurements from its home base at Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio.

Figure 3. Comparison o f ampli- 8 ---- V * tude distríbution for uirbome 21 Se Dtei nbe 971 mui ground data. Íbis figure is 6 V A rcra Ft \ eac .n 45° a plot of the amplitude of the G oun d c ata fi om Sa pan js V signa! received during a scintil- -o 4 ' irbc rn B d a t a lation fade. similar to the one rou id data shown in Figure 2. If the ampli- 2 s N tude is sampled about 100 times ToJ * per second for the five-minute 0 1 fade period. the cumulative per- \ ■V centage of the time the signal -2 was at various leveis follous the k -V- plot of tliis figure. The curve for -4 o the airliorne data laken ia the •t -Oo sam e areu andat tliesame ti me as "õ -6 the ground data is statisticalhj o> •. \ tliesame as for the ground ilata. -8 1 \ -10 .01 .1 1 2 5 10 203040506070 80 90 95 9899 99.9 99.99 percentage of lime that signal amplitude exceeded ordinale

problems unique to the mobile terminal. In order to confirm the ionospheric scin- Bv coordinating the data at the airborne tillation model and to determine the length and ground stations, we have developed a of time an individual irregularity remained clearer picture of the ionospheric model. identifiable, data were recorded simul- In a reeent joint Air Force/Navy test in taneously in a ground and airborne terminal the western Pacific, airborne and ground in the same vicinity. As predicted, the data data were collected from the 250 mega- showed the fading in the aircraft to be iden- hertz (MHz) downlink beacon signal from tical to the fading occurring on the ground the tacsat satellite. Severe fading was re- if the effect of the aircraft velocity was corded on 12 of the 17 night test periods. considered. To do this airborne data were During about 7 percent of the total time, digitized and “ slowed down.” With Com- the fading was severe enough to disrupt nor- puter analysis, various ainounts of “ slow- mal satellite Communications. This averaged down” were tried as the airborne data were more than IV2 hours a day, which could con- compared with ground data taken in the litute a serious operational problem. Dur- same area. Finally, the correct “ slowdown” ing the severe fading period the signal did was determined, and good correlation of not always remain in a faded condition but the airborne and ground data was obtained went through periodic fade and enhance- by comparing the original ground recording ment at such a rate that normal communi- with the “ slowed down” airborne data. cation could not be carried on. During the (Figure 4) These results showed that the fading period the signal amplitude followed irregularities that caused the fading re- a curve, depicted in Figure 3. This plot mained “ coherent” for a period of more than shows that the signal was enhanced by 8 10 minutes as they drifted some 10 to 20 decibels (db) over its average value about miles over the earth’s surface. 1 percent of the time and was faded 10 db A more complete model of the ionosphere below its average value 3 to 5 percent of has been developed with the results of this the time. testing. However, there are still manv unj 30 EFFECTS OF IONOSPHERIC SCINTILLA TION 31

Figure 4. Comparison of airbome and ground scintillation fading data. The airbome fade data, tuken in the vicinity o f the ground station, display a much faster fade rate than the ground fading beca use of the aircraft velocity. I f the effect o f the aireraft velocity is removed from the data. the exact fade that occurred on the ground can beseen in the airborne data. The tu o sets o f data correlate vertj well on the left-haiul side o f the plot but start be- coming uncorrelated at the right side of the data.

known factors in the model, which will receiver, likewise, Stores the segments and continue to surprise users of communica- looks for a repeated segment that would get tion satellites. Using the new model, how through during the unfaded portion of the do we propose to overcome the effects of time. These recognized portions are re- ionospheric scintillation fading? It appears combined and represent the complete mes- that frequencv diversity, the teehnique of sage. Such a teehnique slows down message transmitting the same information on two transmission rate by the number of times frequeneies, will not improve the communi- the segments are repeated but should pro- cation reliability. Likewise, using two an- vide a reliable means of overeoming the tennas to receive the signal would require fading. antenna separations of several thousand feet In the future the satellite will plav a more to improve the reception. These distantes prominent role in military and civilian are clearlv impractical on an aircraft. One communication and navigation systems. .Air teehnique that does offer promise is mes- traffic control satellite communication Sys­ sage repeating or very long error correction tems will provide a reliable means for coding. When a communication terminal monitoring aircraft status and location dur- is in a disturbed area and experiencing peri- ing overwater flights. Military systems such odic fading, the communication signal is as the Air Force Satellite Communication lost for only 10 to 25 percent of the time. System will allow positive control of the The remainder of the time the signal is airbome forces worldwide. With satellite normal amplitude or enhanced. A simple Communications come the phenomena of repeat teehnique would be to store the ionospheric scintillation fading. Since satel- message and transmit a small segment, pos- lites will play a dominant role in future sibly a one-second portion, for 10 to 20 communication systems, problems such as times in a row. The next segment of the ionospheric scintillation will continue to message is then sent and so on until the receive considerable attention. complete message has been transmitted. The A ir Force Avionics Laboratori/ / / Barnet and his fellows dig their native land only to turn up the dirt." NE of the most understandable of Gabriel Kolko, The Politics o f War; Noam great contemporarv poets, W. H. Chomsky, American Power and the New Auden, writes in his new Epistle to Mandarins; William Fulbright, The Penta- O gon Propaganda Machine; and finally the a Godson: “ You don’t need me to tell vou what’s going on: the ochlocratic media, producers of the cbs tv extravaganza, “ The joint with under-the-drver gossip, process Selling of the Pentagon," it is clear that they and vent without intermission all to-day’s all relate to Auden’s vvidelv shared dismay. uglv secrets. . . . if what is to happen oc- Not all these men agree with each other curs according to what Thucydides defined on every issue, nor do they deal ahvays as ‘human’, we’ve had it. are in for a dis- with “ ugly secrets” ; but they all flaunt a aster that no four-letter words will tardy.” haughty indignation that might be called Auden was not referring to Richard J. “ the new school tie.” Their comments on Barnet’s recent book, Roots o f War, nor to past and present American diíficulties are the published and broadcast work of Bar- not usually couched in four-letter words, net’s sources and ideological colleagues who but they are frequentlv so translated at cam- are the authors of similar products. Yet, puses and conventions. T o their credit it since these include Neil Sheehan, The Penta- should be said that these writers and speak- gon Papers; Tristram Coffin, The Armed So- ers do not themselves advocate mob rule ciety; Ralph Stavins, Richard J. Barnet, and (ochlocracv), although they and the media Marcus Raskin, Washington Plans an Ag- seem at times to encourage it. In most cases gressiue War; Robert Crichton, “ Our Air these disconsolate specialists in adversity do War,” in the New York Review of Books not fix blame on fate or on supematural (Januarv 4, 1968, pp. 3-5); William Apple- forces, as Thucydides did not. They ascribe man Williams, The Roots o f the Modem responsibility to universal human nature American Empire and lhe Tragedy of Ameri- as Thucydides did. They blame onlv the can D ip lo m a c y Sevmour Melman, Our De- United States government—sometimes all pleted Society and Pentagon Capitalism; government—and all its agents.

33 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW On the other hand, prolific foreign policy In Roots o f War (Atheneum, 1972), Rich- critic Ronald Steel, lengthily reviewing and ard Barnet presents a splendid example of approving Barnet’s book in the recently the common tendency among the writers famous New York Times, says that while the and “ communicators” in question to focus Pentagon managers “ decide from their desks their censure on a small but influential group of adininistrators who work in large and push buttons which governments shall buildings on opposite banks of the Potomac be overthrown and which nations destroyed River. These inen are labeled by Barnet as , they are, Barnet holds, deeply moral “the national security managers.'’ He says men who are convinced that what they are there have been 339 men and a woman in doing is best for the nation and by exten- this category since World War II. There is sion, best for the world. They are always some confusion in Barnet s and similar writ- saying so and there is no reason to believe ings as to whether these managerial types they do not mean it.” Steel, who might well are representative of “ American society, be considered something of a competitor in which also takes many licks. There is even the increasingly crowded occupation of more confusion as to whether these blame- damning both banks of the Potomac, goes worthy State Departmentalists and E-ring on to praise Barnet as “ one of our most Pentagonians are outright malicious or just perceptive young political analysts. Roots clumsy; whether they are misguided or mis- of War is an eloquent, important and timely guiding; knowing criminais or miserable study that breaks new ground. It clarifies carriers of some psychic American social the issues, stimulates the mind and enriches disease; and, fínally, whether they are all the debate it is certain to trigger.” too human or just plain inhuman. Although Steel’s final sentence seems An example of this confusion is provided heavy on the trigger, Barnet can scarcely by E. B. Tompkins s laudatory review in the top this accolade when he reviews SteePs once prestigious Saturday Review, which next book, a not unlikely circumstance since interprets Barnet’s description of these na- gentlemen of this criticai school are eustom- arily asked by friendly editors to comment upon each other. The claim that the book . , these writers and speakers “ clarifies the issues” is questionable. There is a crucial difference of opinion between do not themselves advocate mob admiring commentators on the central point rule (ochlocracy), although they of whether the villainous national security managers chose those black hats or just and the media seem at times to pieked them up by mistake. Careful read- encourage it." ing indicates that despite what the Library Journal calls Barnet’s tendency to be “ ram- bling and repetitious,” his picture of the powerful Pentagonians is definitelv that tional security managers: “ Drawn primarily which the Saturday Review commentator from law and banking, they were well edu- saw as “ overdrawn.” Barnet had his tongue cated and power-hungry. Barnet views them buried in his cheek when, like Shakespeare s as amoral, insensitive, ruthless, and hypo- Mark Antony at Caesar’s funeral, he praised critical men with a predilection for violence these men as honorable and upright—only and fascinated by lethal technology.” Tomp- to add that their children call them “ up- kins admits the picture may be overdrawn. tight. Even as he credits them with nor- PENS TO P1ERCE THE MIGHTY 35

mally happv marriages and sexuality, Bar- is truly a prince. The most princely Luci- net finds this most surprising, since Hitler fers in his inferno are the ‘‘best and bright- was sexually abnorinal. est” sons of privilege and costly universities The other principal point of variance who descended upon Washington with the among Bamet’s svmpathetic interpreters is brothers Kennedy to “ plot aggressive war.” whether the “ lawvers and bankers” who As most of the admiring commentators ever since World War II have been respon- on Roots o f War have observed, the chap- sible for, as the once judicious Library Jour- ters on the “ crisis managers who created nal puts it, “ America’s persisting plans to the crises they mismanaged during the engage in permanent war in the name of Kennedy-Johnson era are the book’s princi- permanent peace,” are freaks or just tvpi- pal contribution.” With all reluctance, it cally ailing members of our sick society. must be admitted that they are a contribu- Williain Pfaff, a wddely published associate tion. Barnet and his friendly source (every- of Herman Kahn, writes in Book World that body’s source for the saddest items of this Barnet’s is the “ best book we possess on the s u b j e c t . . . o f th e c o l d w a r . ” H e finds it “ convincing” and says these national se- . , Bamet views [national se- curity managers “ were no narrow elite. curity managers] as amoral, in- They were representative of their genera- tion.” On the other hand a reviewer in the sensitive, ruthless, and hypocritical Xation sees Bamet as searching for the rea- son “why this nation with its conviction that men with a predilection for vio- it means onlv to do good, has brought such lence and fascinated hy lethal misery to the world in the last quarter cen- tury,” and along with most other commen- technology." tators he sees Barnet’s ‘ ‘critique of the na- tional security managers” as the most important clue. unhappy period, Daniel Ellsberg) were Much of the confusion on this latter point themselves among the “ best and brightest.” arises from Bamet s generositv with blame. They were among the first to leap into the Since blame is his profession, so eager is he Kennedy dragnet for new and unprecedented to spread it that he and his fellow “ new talent. left” interpreters of past and present now Despite Ellsberg’s penchant for solitary make an entire nation the target of their labor at night and his singular productivity blunderbuss charge. Somewhat at variance with a photocopy machine, Barnet’s is much with Voltaire’s advice to cultivate one’s the superior talent. Unlike Ellsberg and own garden, Bamet and his fellows dig their other hawk-dove mutations who screamed native land onlv to tum up the dirt. No with the eagles before turning pigeon, Bar- probing is necessary for the “ roots of war” net appears to have been reasonably con- since he feels them all around him. In a sistent as a man of sincere pacifist inclina- society as rotten as he finds ours, it becomes tions from the start. Like other job-jumpers difficult to fix upon the source of infection. culled from the Eastern ivy, Barnet man- Nevertheless, despite the confusion he causes aged to spend enough time in the Pentagon among even his most eager readers, Bamet or thereabouts to gain the usual escalator- indicates that in the country of mindless rider’s clause in his record: “ consultant to villains the single-minded homicidal villain the Department of Defense.” Yet he seems 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

boasted that his personal role in selecting to have spent most of his time on disarma- Kennedy appointees was to find “ liberais” ment, in the State Department and the U.S. who were “ tough” because toughness in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Possessing aeute powers of observation and all appointees was prescribed as the in- a keen cynicism behind his barrage of uto- dispensable quality. Barnet now says some pian slogans, Barnet saw and carne to de- of these appointees, “ looking back on their scribe clearly his fellow members of the experience, talk about the ‘hairy chest syn- Kennedy intellectual elite at their dismal drome.’ ” In such an atmosphere, “ Bureau- worst. That high-level groups management cratic machismo is cultivated in hundreds o f the Vietnam effort in the early 1960s vvas of little ways. There is the style of talking so miserable in its results that few now rise to a subordinate—the driving command in defense or explanation. Barnet’s observa- masked by superficial informality—or to a tions offer a bitter but thoughtful foretaste superior— fact-loaded, quantitative, gutsy. of the coming flood of literatnre on how it The Kennedy operators, particularly, cul- could possibly have happened. tivated a machine-gun delivery. . . . Speed As Barnet reports it, the great issne re- reading too became a kind of badge of peated throughout Kennedy’s campaign was prowess. To be an operator is to be active América s falling prestige. The Eisenhower in ‘putting out fires,’ . . . The ambitious administration vvas said to be “ made up of and suecessful bureaucrat . . . specializes miserly old men . . . the torch must now be in the crisp, uneomplicated, usually mecha- passed to the yonng and vigorous who would nistic analysis of a problem . . . .” fight the Communists with the courage and Seldom if ever in modem history has so subtletv so lacking in the quiet clubhouse powerful a group of men suddenly culti- atmosphere of the Eisenhower VVhite vated so self-conscious a “ style." Not sur- House.” prisingly, the first to be taken in by the The most damning phrase in the Kennedy new-establishment style were the tradition- lexicon, as Theodore White observed, was ally skeptical and “ tough-minded" news- to call a man “ ordinarv" or to describe men. Their favorite word for these smooth him as “ common." Those who have listened yet stern performers was “ steely” : “ M cNa- more than once to discourses by McGeorge mara had a steel-trap mind, McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, or Bundy had steely nerves, etcetera." Mc- second-level personalities such as Alain Namara, appropriately pedestaled on an Enthoven and Adam Yarmolinsky, will un- automobile, shouted at Harvard students, derstand Barnet’s description of their atti- “ I am tougher than you are." Barnet calls tude in Calvinist terms: “ They are the McNamara “ the leading specimen of homo elect; . . . The arrogance so characteristic mathematicus . . . always looking for the of the Kennedy advisers, a quality that made faets, usually the wrong facts.” He first it so easy for them to dismiss unwelcome broke others and final ly himself with over- advice by dismissing those who proffered it, work and “ was by the time he was relieved was the pride of the men who believed that from olfice given to weeping in public.” they were the chosen.” Since the key to all value judgments was One such speech, not mentioned by Bar- measurement and since a manager’s output net, was Adam Yarmolinsky’s appearance could scarcely be measured, prestige was before a capacitv audience at the Univer- measured by effort. For the Kennedy crop sity of Colorado, which even his sponsor of ivy-clad professors, suddenly “ fatigue be- c haracterized as arrogant. Yarmolinsky came a badge of importance. Òfficials could PENS TO PIERCE THE MIGHTY 37

measure their significance bv the demands Ralph L. Stavins’s designation of “ Kennedy’s their offic-e inade on their time. The favor- Private War” (New York Review of Book.s, ite word of the self-important bureaucrat July 22, 1971), largely because of Kennedy’s to describe his immediate plans on leaving instructions, to national security agencies office is ‘to decompress.' This charade of shortlv after taking office, to “ make every pretentious dynamism led directly toward possible effort to launch guerrilla opera- the supercharged push to “ fínish,” not to tions in Viet-Minh territory at the earliest sav win, an obviously endemic struggle in possible time.” the ever resistant jungle of Vietnam. This and other evidence is said to show Perhaps the most sacrificial figure, for that actions against North Vietnam and in whom even the Kennedys showed less re- spect than for anvone else except Vice President Lvndon Johnson, was Dean Rusk, ". . . whether the villainous na- who, after a seemingly interminable period in office, finallv left “ broke and unem- tional security managers chose ploved.” Why did he and others, such as those black hats or just picked the wealthv NlcGeorge Bundy and Robert S. M c N a m a r a , w h o g a i n e d n o t h in g but them up hy mistake." dubious fame, endure all these strains, these “ drearv meetings and sleepless nights” ? Bamet quotes one unnamed “ managers” Laos, ostensibly to stop infiltration, were explanation: “ Plaving for high stakes.” unjustified, sinee there was no infiltration, This seems a vastly oversimple answer, but the case as he presents it briefly here especially for a whole group. Bamet goes is inconclusive. More convincing are quotes on to say that, having tasted “ Promethean from Arthur Schlesinger and Theodore power," thev found it difficult to go back Sorensen, Kennedy’s house “ intellectuals,” to “ corporate bonds, . . . making raincoats, who wrote their own more or less balanced lecturing students, ... In the Kennedy era accounts of various “ secrets,” which are in they called themselves ‘crisis managers’ . . . some wavs superior to stolen documents their ‘finest hour.’ as manv of them have selectively presented. written, was the Cuban missile crisis, . . . Sorensen revealed that even Maxwell Like Henry V on the eve of the battle of Taylor, the Billy Graham of the earlv Coun- Agincourt, the modern militarized civilian terinsurgency Faith, had stipulated that believes that he will be remembered and 8000 regular U.S. troops also would be measured bv the great contests in which he needed if the original guerrilla operations participates. . . . His tests are, of course, were to have a chance of success. Yet Ken- not tests of bravery but of toughness. . . . ” nedy turned Taylor down, possibly because Anyone who witnessed at too close hand the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with him, the openly cultivated and often mthless and continued his own Jungle Jim strategy. machismo (Irish Mafia tvpe) of these years General Taylor, as Chief of Staff of the may readily approve Barnet’s designation Army under Eisenhower, had served as of Kennedy himself as supremelv responsi- Kennedy s man in the Eisenhower camp, ble for the early misjudgments and blame- and in fact the Kennedy Brothers had some- ful blunders of the Vietnam involvement. times visited Taylor in his quarters at Fort Evidence is cited which carne, apparently, Myer, privately, under the purposely in- from the Ellsberg xeroxes. Barnet accepts conspicuous guidance of Senator Stuart 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

universities, and turned his personal atten- Symington. A considerable portion of tion to improving the technology of guer- Kennedy’s campaign attacks against Eisen- rilla warfare. At his carved oak desk he howers military policies reflected Taylors pored over the design of a new sneaker inside information and his official rebuttal against those policies. Eisenhower had for America’s jungle warriors.” repeatedly rejected Taylor’s continuing All of this fits well into other pictures requests for more money to fight future developed from previously revealed or “ brushíire wars” ; but Kennedy was con- “ news leaked” sources and especially the verted to the rather vague theory of “ flexi- lengthy works of Sorensen and Schlesinger, ble response,’ which has turned out, as most who wrote laudatory accounts of Kennedy’s military men vainly warned, to be consid- deep personal involvement in the events of erably more flexible in all respects than was Vietnam before the military “ newthink” originally meant by the ambiguous “ brush- that he decreed was finally seen leading to fire” slogan. Barnet condenses the story now a dead end. Maxwell Taylors memoirs de- becoming familiar: Kennedy carne to office pict Kennedy, after being shown the prom- convinced of the importance of the “ Third ised land of “ flexibilitv,” as taking his cues World” whose “ fate would be decided by from supercharged activists, such as Roger the ordeal of guerrilla warfare. Shortly after Hilsman, who were more committed to the his inauguration he appointed Taylor a spe- jungle than was Taylor himself. He liked cial White House Assistant and put him in their spirit as they sought to rescue failing charge of ‘Special Group Counterinsur- doctrines through increasingly desperate gency.’ ” In this new enthusiasm, Kennedy operations. * was supported by Walt Rostow and also by Inexperienced in administration, Kennedy “ the energetic commitment of his brother failed to recognize the chain-reaction effect Robert.” He “ vigorously backed those bu- created by his decree that enthusiasm for reaucracies committed to unconventional the new cause in all the Services be used as warfare and personally restored the Green a criterion for promotion and that skeptics Beret” as the symbol of a new elite force, a be removed from areas of influence. Mc- sort of “ President’s own” force, against Namara, who had come into office even more ignorant of military matters than was Kennedy, had no ideas or principies of his . . Since blame is his profes- own other than to establish himself as the sion . . . [Barnet] and his fellow toughest possible executor of the Presiden- tial will. Armored in layers of charts, graphs, 'new left' interpreters of past and and linear projections, behind a barrage of self-convincing statistics gathered by all present now make an entire nation the overworked staffs of the Pentagon, he the target of their blunderhuss overawed both the press and the Congress so completely that the pleased President charge." spoke of making him Secretarv of State. It now appears that the thoughtful and principled Rusk was more influential, for Army opposition. The President “ was briefed good or ill, than the man of numbers whose on the euphoric literature on counterguer- true function was that of a cipher, blankly rilla warfare then beginning to emerge extending and multiplying the thoughts from the ciA-sponsored research in leading and plans of others. But it is impossible for PENS TO P1ERCE THE MIGHTY 39

a man of such prominence as McNamara machine, was immortalizing some earlier to function in a conceptual vacuum. Who work of Ellsberg the hawk, ghost-written was his principal idea man? In Barnet s for his maligned and now dead boss! account, another figure emerges rather The unknown is not more fantastic than ominously from previous obscurity, John the known, if we are to believe one of Ells- T. McNaughton, who died in the crash of bergs own stories as told by Barnet: an airliner vears ago and is no more able “ In September 1964 Assistant Secretary to defend himself todav than is the living of Defense John T. McNaughton asked his McNamara. McNaughton’s xeroxed memo- assistant Daniel Ellsberg to look into what randa show him writing of “ symbolic” losing in Vietnam would mean. ‘You realize,’ deaths and of the importance of “ spilling Ellsberg recalls him saying, ‘to work on this American blood” in Vietnam. He seems to subject is to sign your own death warrant.’ have taken more seriouslv than most of the McNaughton did his own typing on this staff Kennedv’s reported instructions to high-risk assignment.” It may be futile to read the worlcs of Machiavelli. Some of wonder who did the typing on less fatal his “ hairy-chested” working papers speak memoranda. In any case it seems sadly of the war as being fought almost entirely ironic that this story, if true, shows poor for American interests rather than to help McNaughton mistrusting his no-doubt loyal the Vietnamese, and he wondered how to secretaries and trusting Daniel Ellsberg. provoke North Vietnamese reactions so we In only one notable instance does Barnet could retaliate. Barnet calls him “ Mc- raise the question of personal as well as Namara’s trusted lieutenant” and his “ lead- official disloyalty. He says that the Viet- ing thinker on the war.” McNaughton is nam war makes an excellent case study of reported to have radiated toughness in all the relationship between a President and directions and to have been more disliked his principal advisers “ because it was a than his boss, yet there is a strange cireum- conspicuous failure. At least one hundred stance about his caustic writing that bears bureaucratic accomplices in the tragedy notice. have rushed into print with their own Working papers, in the Pentagon at least, exculpatory versions of the story. One of are often written by assistants. McNaugh- them, John Roche, grandly declassified a ton’s assistant was none other than Daniel secret memorandum written by Assistant Ellsberg himself, who, it will be remem- Secretary of State Roger Hilsman in the bered, was once so exhibitionist a hawk pages of the New York Times Magazine that he had himself photographed in the [Jan. 24, 1971] the better to impeach the his- act of pretending to be a inachine gunner torical testimony of his bureaucratic rival, at the front. So we have in McNaughton s along with his character. Anyone inter- notes the “ bloodiest” ideas, with McNaugh- ested in understanding the phenomenon of ton dead and his supersecret memoranda bureaucratic homicide can onlv welcome now broadcast by his former trusted as- such public display.” sistant. The question of authorship arises. This entire statement is an inexcusable What was a bright, informed, and over- performance by Barnet. While evincing dedicated mind such as Ellsberg’s doing nothing but praise for Wholesale character to assist McNaughton if not at least par- assassination and other damage by Ellsberg ticipating in the writing of working papers? and others (even the self-righteous Ellsberg It appears possible that Ellsberg the dove, expressed public concern), Barnet picks on in his nightly vigils over the secret xerox John P. Roche, of all people. Roche was 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Nevertheless, remembering the preten- in no sense a planner of the war but was Johnson’s historian-in-residence or intel- tiously positive Bundy and the theatrically lectual. He replaced Kennedy s historian self-confident McNamara, who at his peak Arthur Sc-hlesinger, who eulogized his boss emploved as speech writer a Ph.D. in phi- rather clumsily, and Johnson’s earlier his- losophy to help him weep in words before torian Eric Goldman, who later was to he wept in person, one finds it difficult to write The Tragedy of Lijndon Johnson. resist Barnet’s all too simple summary: Roche took no advantage of Johnson and “ Proclaiming that there is no alternative still manages to explain the man better to peace in a world of atomic weapons, the than anyone else. national security managers waged a gener- Roche is a most readable and reasonable ation of ‘brushfire’ wars under the cover of columnist for the Hearst newspapers, who a ho r r e n d o u s nu c l e a r ar ms ra c e . . . . Wr i n g - might be called a reformed radical. This ing their hands in public about the human could explain Barnet's castigation oi him, failure represented by every bullet and tank since no one infuriates a radical so much as produced, they poured money into the mili- a reformed radical. Roche wrote not to at- tary and strained the civilian economy.” tack Hilsman’s character but to set the These brief sentences roughly represent a popular public view of the Kennedy- Johnson operators, and it is partly because . . no one infuriates a radical of such statements that the public view is as it is. For this reason it is important to so much as a reformed radical" note that the statement, like Barnet’s book and others, is heavily booby-trapped. The Vietnam failures led to loss of confidence record straight. He handled the subject in in certain high officials, and this disillusion- the manner of a historian and not that of ment has been extended by Barnet and oth- an “ ideological warrior masquerading as a ers to include all governmental operations, historian,” such as were the “ radical re- past and future, the United States govern- visionist” historians who flourished for a ment itself, and, incredibly, all government, while. as we shall see. Barnet’s lack of credibilitv in this and other instances tends to vitiate confidence in his judgments of the Kennedy-Johnson A fter each serious failure of operators, yet this was a cast of characters a major governmental policy in foreign he knew well, and his observations are gen- affairs, the participants divide into various erallv in harmony with those of a number groups. Some sell public confessions of er- of others. Except for examples of excep- ror, while others defend themselves. Many tionally articulate analysis such as we have remain tight-lipped, at least for a w'hile, examined here, Barnet parallels David Hal- and of these some seek academic or organi- berstam’s The Best and the Brightest and zational shelter until the storm subsides. other works that hold up the Kennedy- Barnet comments on these shelters, two of Johnson briefcase warriors to gleeful ricíi- which had already served during and after cule. Once the record is set straight, these the unpopular Korean War: “ A few former men should yet be examined with the un- officials such as Paul Nitze in the 1950’s derstanding and compassion they themselves and a number of Kennedy intellectuals in failed to demonstrate. the 1960’s took academic cover on leaving PENS TO PIERCE THE MIGHTY 41

office and helped during Republican ad- began to be in serious political trouble when ministrations to convert such Washington the ‘credibility gap’ itself became news.” institutions as the Johns Hopkins Schooí for There is nothing new about the practice Advanced International Studies and the of cultivating friendly newsmen, and Ken- Brookings Institution into occasionally in- nedy could handle it reasonably well. The fluential governments in exile." He does practice became unforgivable only when not mention certain crusading “ foundations” he started punishing uncooperative news- nor the peculiar double role played by the men and applied the stick to publishers who Brookings Institution, which served as a spurned his carrots. Bamet says that he tried crowded shelter for Kennedy partisans after to get the New York Times to recai 1 David Johnson took office. These dropouts and Halberstam from Vietnam and that he ejectees under Johnson were said by some called in a Fortune editor to rewrite with to be the intended heirs of the voluminous McGeorge’s help an unfavorable article secret study ordered by McNamara that about Bundy. became famous as “ the Pentagon papers.” Bamet overlooks another occasion when In one explanation the papers, which none the President sent General Maxwell Tay- of the principal remaining operators with lor to persuade Henry Luce to discharge McNamara ever had time to read, were Charles Murphy as Fortune's Washington originally intended to be used, very selec- editor beeause of Murphy’s detailed account tively of course, in the Robert Kennedv of the mishandling in Washington of the Presidential campaign. When this was not Bay of Pigs invasion. Kennedy had canceled to be, the more cynical and unstable of the appointments with all Luce magazine re- exiles began dealing with remaining mal- porters beeause one had written a story he contents under McNamara and Rusk for did not like. Luce finallv compromised by secrets and even for doeuments. This pro- protecting his employees but cautioning cess reached its climax when an ideologically them to write favorable stories. For this, oriented high official of the nonpolitical struggling Life got exclusives on Jackie, rand Corporation, who has since been dis- White House redecorations, and such. One missed, wras careless in trusting highly clas- Life repórter who had previouslv written sified papers to his more radical friends, critically of McNamara commented after thus allowing Ellsberg to escape with the his later favorable story: “ I didn’t like it, entire bundle. but McNamara liked it so my boss liked it. Whatever truth there is in this obviously W e are welcome in the Pentagon again and inadequate explanation must await further that is important to me,” Abraham Lincoln unraveling as the divisive radical crusaders observed a hundred years earlier that such continue telling on each other. Roots of War methods do not always work, especially in helps lay some of the groundwork for this times of trouble, and time ran out on Lyn- process. Bamet describes the Kennedy policy don Johnson after Kennedy had gone. of monitoring news stories. Lyndon Johnson, Neophytes in high government establish- he says, devoted as much energy to mem- ments have more trouble than newsmen in bers of the press, two of whom, Drew Pear- drawing the line between the publie inter- son and William S. White, “ wrote glowinglv est and their own or their boss’s private of his daily triumphs, but the President’s interests. Yet most newsmen identify with continuing larger-than-life performance be- the publie interest well enough to become came less and less convincing against the highly suspicious of officials who place it background of an escalating war. Johnson second. True, they tend to be prejudiced 42 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

in favor of those who give them usable ideology, was unwilling to go along with stories, but they like to be convinced that certain sensational but meaningless tech- those stories are serving the public interest niques: . . the television networks have and not just that of the official who released never had an analysis in depth of the ne- them. Barnet comments that the Washington gotiating positions of the various sides of Post, during the controversy over its use of the Vietnam war. When I tried to bring up the Ellsberg papers, complained that cer- the subject on an nbc ‘special’ right after tain officials had made a practice of show- the Tet offensive of 1968, the producer kept ing newsmen secret papers. In truth, Mc- passing me notes to say something juicy Namara regarded secrets as his personal about the cia in Laos. She was against the property and used them for his own pur- war, but she knew she would receive no poses so consistently that he banished from plaudits for a serious, probably dull, discus- Washington certain other officials who were sion of the issues. Th e program would be personally known by members of the press, counted a success only if it made ‘hard and more than once he hired previously news’ in the Monday morning edition of criticai members of the press in an effort to the New York Times. " Sometimes the pres- make them personally loyal. It was this sures from all sides seem to converge, with gradual erosion of the self-discipline of news the troubled as w e ll as troubling media in media through their declining respect for the middle. leadership that opened the way for Ells- Again Barnet all but destroys the value berg. Barnet reveals that Ellsberg had tried of his perception by spreading his judgments to peddle his papers to a major tv network back across history, which he little knows a year before the New York Times accepted and less understands. In arguing that present them. difficulties arise from previous homicidal Not all the “ media, joint with under-the- policies, ad infinitum, he charges Dean Acheson, whose stubborn honesty almost matched his brilliance, with practicing con- "The Vietnam failures led to sistent deception. To justify simplified statements of com- loss of confidence in certain high plex problems, Acheson wrote in his re- officials, and this disillusionment cently published memoirs that, since the average educated American spends prob- has been extended . . . to include ably less than ten minutes a day thinking all governmental operations, past about the world outside his country, “ points to be understandable had to be clear. If we and future, the United States did make our points clearer than truth, we did not differ from most other educators and government itself, and, incredihly, could hardly do otherwise.” Barnet claims all government. ..." that Acheson’s doing this in his descriptions of the Communist threat led to alarmism, to “ right-wing backlash” and thence toward dryer gossip,” were willing to “ process and “ preventive war,” which Barnet calls “ the vent without intermission all today’s ugly prescription of the right wing.” This, he secrets.” A vast amount of restraint was says, is comparable to a famous remark of shown, at some cost. Barnet, anxious as he General Maxwell Taylor’s which can be is constantly to advance his rather mystical interpreted to mean that all a Citizen should PENS TO P1ERCE THE MICHTY 43

be told about foreign policy is what he needs Rusk approved a stepped-up defoliation in order “ to be a good Citizen and to dis- program in 1965 he was told it would dam- charge his functions.” age only Viet Cong areas, and thus he found Do national security managers “ find it a way “ to resolve inner moral doubts and necessarv altemately to frighten, flatter, to legitimize the ordering of a crime.” The excite, or calm the American people” ? Bar- purpose of the “ crime” was to make the net says they do, and that “ several planners leaves of trees fali. sav privately of the Vietnam W ar that their A similarly Calvinist obsession with origi- greatest miscalculation was excessive con- nal American sin was displayed recently by fidence in their ability to manage public opinion.” He tries to relate Acheson’s honest facing of the problem to the performance of ". . . Barnet all but destroys the Phil Goulding, McNamara’s Assistant Sec- value of his perception by spread- retarvj of Defense for Public Affairs, who “ gives several examples of outright lies ‘to ing his judgments back across his- protect the national interests’ and several more of making events clearer than truth.” tory!, which he little Jcnows and Since Goulding has tumed anti state’s evi- less understands." dence, Bamet has no quarrel with him, but he cannot resist an ironic comment. One of many such passages in Goulding’s Confimi one of Bamet’s select “ thinkers,” William ar Deny admits that he “ told an untruth Appleman Williams, historian of the “ Ameri- to the American people” and, he goes on, can E m p ire ” as w e ll as its principal dis- “ Worse than that, I also misinformed some coverer and explorer. Williams, who writes 235 million people of the second most pow- as though “ American imperialism” were a erful nation in the history of the world, the single word, was asked to comment on a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. . . . paper presented at the U.S. Air Force Misleading the puny-armed French . . . was Academy by a Princeton University history one thing, but walking the Soviet Union professor. Williams’s comments ignored the down the garden path was another.” Says paper and instead called upon the cadets Bamet: “ His apology is interesting.” to refuse to discharge their responsibilities, An ex post facto conscience, explained at in other words to mutiny, since the Ameri- book length, can become a thing of mystery. can ship of State was unfit to navigate, thus It might be that humor was Goulding’s in- unwittingly providing an appropriate bit of tent, but there is no humor for Barnet in humor that almost passed unnoticed. intemational relations since nations them- Sigmund Freud is also listed as one of the selves are all evil bureaucracies. Barnet ex- thinkers most influential on Roots o f War, plains at length how our national leaders, though his theories are less in evidence than though practitioners of violence, are able Williams’s. Barnet is repeatedly scandalized to reassure each other that they are all by the fact that the national security man- honorable men. As with other “ criminais,” agers somehow avoid guilt feelings (this the fault is not their own but that of Ameri- despite Freud’s contention that everyone can society, which must be changed at once. should avoid them). Barnet writes bitterly: Dean Rusk is exceptional in that he is seen “ The war planners . . . never betrayed a by Bamet as once having displayed a con- trace of remorse. Perhaps one can under- science, which he quickly overcame. When stand the pride that would keep them from 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

issuing public mea culpas. But it is harcl to American war was nothing less than a stern understand how some of them, upon hear- duty to 'uplift and civilize and Christianize’ ing the revelations of the Pentagon papers, the Filipinos.” This is one example of a would address one another at cocktail par- technique closer to Goulding’s methods than ties with a breezy Hi, war criminal.’ Did to Acheson’s. Despite this and similar state- Ellsberg “ sacrifice” his obscurity in vain.^ ments by Barnet, McKinley was forced into The answer, of course, is no. Despite the the Spanish-American War by public opin- breezily concealed embarrassment of vic- ion in support of Cuban rebels, and any tims exposed in mental undress, and despite motivation to “ uplift” the Filipinos arose certain balefnl consequences, historians will after the Spanish-American struggle was benefit, provided they can get enough other over. documents declassified to achieve a bal- In another strained attack on a now his- anced view. torical figure, Barnet twice brands Lyndon One reason why Barnet and the Revi- Johnson as “ racist” because once in telling sionist historians fail to make the objects of a storv he used the term “ Mexican” in un- their preaching squirm in agony is lack of complimentary context and he once used focus. True, their huge supply of under-the- the term “yellow" in a manner that might xerox-dryer secrets gives them ample reason be interpreted as applying to Orientais. He to condemn their erstwhile Pentagon asso- says that Johnson employed “ homicidal ciates. But “ homicidal bureaucrats” and technology” in Vietnam so that he would “ bureaueratic killers” have dominated not have to “ admit that he, the President America since George Washington as they of the United States, was as powerless to read, or tell, their country’s history. Their influence the dangerous outside world as he treatment of various episodes, most of them was to change America.” These are false shameful in their eyes, is surprisingly uni- judgments of a U.S. President who changed form, since a common lack of inspiration the United States by achieving more im- causes them to approach American history portant social and civil rights legislation with a sophomoric sneer: than any other President. For \\ illiam McKinley, the Spanish- San Antonio, Texas

General Parrish s article will be continued in the next issue o f the Review. 45 ESTERN military and political not follow in the eall of the spontaneous analysts interested in Communist movement.3 W systems continue to pay con- Through the years, subsequent party siderable attention to citizens’ demands leaders and documents have reasserted as evidence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction this basic theory. But there appears to be within the political system, “ demands’ a significant gap between theory and prac- meaning the citizens’ expression that a tice. value decision with respect to a given sub- ject should, or should not, be made by Citizen Demands: those in authority.1 This continuing analysis Smolensk and After of Citizen demands is now concentrating on the widely reported expansion of the Soviet The conflict between the theory of Com- “dissent movement." 2 munism and the realities of the day became However, many current studies of the evident to the non-Communist world with function of Citizen demands in Communist the publication of Merle Fainsod’s Smolensk systems seem to have a serious inherent under Soviet Rule.4 This work, based on weakness within themselves. As they focus documents captured bv invading German on dissent, these studies acquire a negative forces in World War II and subsequently quality, and at times they convey the un- captured by U.S. forces, shed important expressed belief that the current Soviet new light on the workings of the Smolensk political system is inherently less capable Oblast (“ Province” ) Party (rsfsr). Fainsod of response to valid Citizen demands than demonstrated that citizens’ demands served is the democratic model. These studies two vital functions: (1) they exposed and, likewise appear to assume that the domestic therefore, inhibited misconduct at the lower environment surrounding the democratic administrative leveis; and (2) they tended to model is or should be equally valid and diffuse popular discontent and direct that applicable to the Soviet political system. discontent from the center to specific local Further, our traditional conception of a officials.5 Communist State challenges the thought While a second study of the magnitude that citizens perform an important func- of the Fainsod work is not possible because tion in levying demands on Communist of a lack of data, other somewhat more political systems. Lenin s assertion that the oblique efforts by Milton C. Lodge6 and Communist party was and should remain James H. Oliver' continue to demonstrate the “ vanguard of the proletariat” was a the capacity of Communist systems to re- clear rejection of the idea that the masses ceive and process demands from a broader- should direct the party. Quite the opposite than-party base. was to be true; the party, acting as the Lodge’s content analysis of selected only repository of socialist truth, was the periodicals concludes that five reasonably single-minded leader. Stalin is quoted as distinct categories of Soviet elites (mem- follows: bers of party apparatchiki and the economic, The party cannot be a real party if it military, legal, and literarv communities) limits itself to registering what the masses claim expanding roles in policy-making of the working ciass feel and think. . . . The within their professions. O livers examination party must stand at the head of the work- of lower administrative leveis of the bu- ing class; it must see farther than the work- reaucracy indicates that citizens continue ing class; it must lead the proletariat, and to levy numerous demands upon the regime. 46 SOVIET DISSENT 47

One might expand upon these efforts and evaluate these components as they receive assert that Citizen demands also serve to and process total demand. As an equation, identifv systemic problem areas which these components and total demand would require corrective action in sort of a man- appear as follows: agement-by-exception method; expand the citizens’ conscious or unconscious identi- /ideological material \ ^ \ component component/ fication with the political system; co-opt the dissenter to the extent that he or she “ par- ticipates” in the system; exercise the bu- quantitative sum value of \ _ total component other demands/ demand reaucracy by forcing it to function; promote internai communication between and All political systems are being tasked con- among various authorities and their agen- tinuously to process total demand. cies; and provide a continuing source of W e can graphically illustrate both the ideas, some of which will be incorporated ideological and material components of a into the goals of the polity. single demand and total demand as well as If Fainsod, Lodge, Oliver, and others have a levei of maximum possible demand. demonstrated that the Soviet political (Figure 1) Our purposes in doing so are system has the capacity to process some threefold: First, in the cases of both single forms of citizens’ demands, how is it pos- demand and total demand, such an illustra- sible that the system appears incapable of tion permits us to observe aspects of the Processing demands associated with the exchange required in demand processing “ dissent movement” ? The answer to that as the regime balances ideological and question rests in the nature of Citizen de- material considerations. This exchange may mand itself and the nature of the “ dissent require some trade-off of the ideological movement.’’ component in favor of other components. This trade-off is not always singularly signif- icant and may involve the sacrifice of what Some Characteristics of Demand has been defined as “ petty ideologv” ;8 Whether voiced in a democratic, authori- however, it can be cumulatively significant. tarian, or other political model, Citizen Second, in the case of total demand, such demands are multidimensional entities. an illustration provides an indication of the Their multidimensionalitv includes an ideo- direction in which the regime is moving as logical component (conformity to a belief, it processes total demand. Third, again in or set of beliefs, which may or may not the case of total demand, such an illustra- be verifiable but which are accepted as tion demonstrates the finite limitations that verified by the group because they perform can exist with respect to the maximum de- social functions for that group), a material mand processing capabilities of a regime. component (resources which would be set It may appear from this graph that de- in motion toward the accomplishment of mand is static, but this is absolutely not the goal or objeetive), a quantitative com- the case. Demand is dynamic; the com- ponent (the numbers of politically relevant ponents are continuously subjeet to change citizens voicing the demand), and finally, and flux as citizens participate in their a previously established sum value com- political system. ponent (the sum value of all other demands How does the Soviet “ dissent movement’’ being voiced at that point in time). All fit into this eoncept of demand? What are political Systems are required to assess and the ideological and material dimensions of X - Moximum demond arc is not o specific point, but o broad threshold. A, B, & C represent theoretical ex- amples of trade-off between ideo- logical and m aterial components, based on total demand (sum of all demands being levied on a po­ litical system at any one point in time).

Figure l. Selected dimensions of demand

the dissent demand? What is its quantita- doms. The best-known of the democratic tive component? Finally, how do the de- or scientific dissenters are Andrei Sakharov, mands of the dissent movement impact Roy and Zhores Medvedev, and Andrei upon the sum of other demands (total Amalrik. demand minus dissent demand) being levied —the religious dissent movement, focusing upon the Soviet political system? To answer on religious freedoms and freedom from State these questions, we must examine certain interference in church-related matters. Ele- qualities of the Soviet “ dissent movement.” ments exist within the Orthodox, Uniate, and Baptist churches and Jewish syna- The Soviet Dissent Movement gogues of the rfsfr, the Muslims of Central Asia, and among residual Catholicism in There is no single “ dissent movement” Lithuania. in the Soviet Union; there are dissent move- —national minorities dissent movement, ments.9 Western scholars and journalists focusing on their ethnic identity and cul- have observed the resurgence of dissent ture, on freedom for themselves and their in the Soviet Union since 1965 (the date of lands from the U.S.S.R., or, alternatively, the Daniel-Siniavskv trials, frequently cited on the lessening of enforced Russification. as a milestone in the post-Khrushchevian This category encompasses Tatars, Turks, return to authoritarianism) and have at- Kazaks, Ukrainians, Georgians, Lithuanians, tempted to specifv its composition. Zev Latvians, and Estonians, among others. Katz, in his 1971 study o f dissent,10 cate- —the Great Russian nationalist move- gorizes participating elements as follows: ment, focusing on Russian (versus Soviet) —the literary dissent movement, focusing traditions and culture and in some cases on contem por ary Soviet life and/or the calling for a return to a “ Slavophile” 11 injustices of current or fonner authorities. attitude. This movement finds support in The best-known of the literary dissenters is many areas of old Rússia. Nobel Laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The dissent movements comprise a highly —the democratic (sometimes called scien- fragmented body of citizens whose views tific) dissent movement, focusing on human often coincide only to the extent that thev rights, the rule of law, and scientific free- are all in disagreement with the existing SOVIET DISSENT 49 authorities or regime. Significant differences tive eomponent) partieipating in the dis- exist not onlv among the five categories sent movements within the Soviet Union? (for example, those favoring a return to Great One British observer of the Soviet scene Russian nationalism and those opposing reported in 1970 that . . dissidents prob- Russification of ethnically different laneis ably comprise no more than one percent and peoples) but also within categories. of the intelligentsia, and perhaps one half One of the principal modes of communi- of one percent in other groups. And most of cation among the dissent movements in these are not against Communism or Social- the Soviet Union is the samizdat (literallv ism. They are more in nature of a loyal translated. “ self-published” ) literature, a opposition. They want the system to work principal element of which is the continu- more efficiently and they want the Con- ing Chronicle o f Current Events (Khrorxika). stitution to be observed.” 14 The samizdat literature expresses a full A more recent estimate shows from range of citizens’ demands, from the politi- “ several hundred” active dissents in the cal left to the political right. Some authors literary movement, to “ thousands” active condemn the existing order for being too in the democratic, ethnic minorities and lax and call for a return to Stalinism and Great Russian nationalist movements, to the concentration camps. Others call for “ several score of thousands” active in the the spread of international Communism religious dissent movement.15 At present and/or international saber rattling. Still there are approximately 250 million citizens others issue demands for civil and social in the U.S.S.R. rights in the manner of social democrats This fundamental weakness, an inability and libertarians. to achieve a wider base, has been recognized The Chronicle now serves as if it were a by members of the dissent movements central joumal of all movements of dissent. themselves. Andrei Amalrik, in Will the It provides information on arrests of mem- Soviet Union Survive until 1984?, analyzed bers of all movements; it prints appeals and the 738 dissenters who had protested the letters of protest in behalf of all types of Galanskov-Ginsburg trial and estimated the dissent, as well as summaries of all joumals core of the movement to comprise no more and their views. than a few dozen active participants, these Recently, the overall impression of this literature has been somewhat similar to the overwhelmingly intelligentsia, with only press of a nontotalitarian country; the various 40 workers (6 percent) and no peasants.16 joumals represent widely different points of Thus another observer could report that, view and interests; they editorialize on each for all their cool determination, “ Amalrik other, reprint items from each other, criti- and his friends—and even Sakharov and his cize and attack each other.12 more influential colleagues—are nonenti- Except for collective condemnation of the ties to most Russians.” The average Soviet existing order, there appears to be little Citizen belongs to a “ silent majority” of area on which virtually all samizdat authors such awesome docility that, by comparison, agree.13 the conventional American might almost It may be concluded that we are dealing be considered a Weatherman.17 not only with a number of dissent move- This observation begins to blend with ments but also with significant fragmenta- the impact of prior political norms and tions within several of these movements. values on today’s Soviet Citizen and on his Notwithstanding fragmentations, what desire to levy certain types of Citizen are the total numbers of citizens (quantita- demands. 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

constitutional principies recognized by the The Soviet UniorTs Czarist Roots Citizen as legitimate. The “ rule” of the It is impossible to understand the Soviet czar was an abstraction; the rule of his Union without examining the Russian ground agent was reality. Political power in the on which it is built. It is also impossible to hands of such agents neither needed nor examine the conduct of the various dissent claimed support of the peasant. This his- movements of 1973 without having an ap- torical fact gives birth to the present-day preciation of the role of the individual citizen’s attitude toward his State: the Citizen and prior authorities, for that is Russian peasant views the State as being precisely the milieu in which that Soviet concerned with its own survival, against Citizen perceives himself to be. foreign and internai enemies.29 John Keep, commenting on Andrei Ainal- Liberalism in the Western sense has rik and the absence of any traditions that never been relevant in Rússia. would suggest a citizenry capable of voicing Russian history impacts upon dissenters VVestern-style participatory demand, States: in still other ways. Even the best-known Amalrik is doubtlessly justified, however, of the dissenters, Solzhenitsyn, cannot es- in noting the limited social basis of the [lit- cape the fact that he walks in the paths of erarv and scientific] opposition, which is Dostoevski, Pushkin, Chekhov, and other almost wholly an intelligentsia phenomenon. The broad masses of the Soviet population Russian writers. Solzhenitsyn, the mathe- can only rise to “ passive discontent. . . direct- matician-turned-author, is comparecí with ed not against the regime as a whole but Dostoevski, the engineer-turned-author, against particular features of it. They have with Pushkin, the civil-servant-turned-au- no appreciation of freedom in the Western thor, and with Chekhov, the medical-doctor- sense: [they] feel respect for force, authority, turned-author. Although they span the two or even, ultimately, for intelligence or educa- greatest branches of Russian literature, the tion, but that human personality of itself arts and the Sciences, they continue to rep- should represent any kind of value—this is a resent thoughts which the general popu- preposterous idea in the popular mind.” 18 lace may or may not read but upon which George L. Yaney, in an article entitled they generallv will not act. “Law, Society, and the Domestic Regime in Rússia, in Historical Perspective,” cor- rects those who would even ask: Is the W hat can be said in conelu- Soviet Union remaining totalitarian, or is sion? What forecasts can be made with it becoming “ liberal ’? 19 Yaney examines respect to the dissent movements and the ground on which the Soviet State is their political relevancy? built, and he finds Russian soil. He advises Andrei Amalrik s forecast is for an “ in- his reader that because political freedom, evitable” international war between the as Americans use the term, is an attribute Soviet Union and China. He sees this war of a society, not an individual, and because as providing the outside force that finallv individual rights repose in the comrnon permits democratic change, which the recognition o f them by the general citizenry, Soviet Citizen cannot achieve unassisted.21 such a question indicates a serious lack of A forecast of Sino-Soviet war for these understanding of Russian history from medi- reasons appears to be insufficiently founded, eval times. just as is a forecast of a successor Western- Yaney observes that, in Rússia, neither style democratic regime. On the one hand, freedom nor law has meanings based on it would appear rash to assume that the SOVIET DISSENT 51

Soviet regime will prove incapable of de- dissenters’ demands fully may be more visinç measures to moderate its dissenting than regime authorities are prepared to citizens. On the other hand, we should not make. But more important, dissenters’ de- expect a successor regime to grow in other mands are greater than the general citizenry than Russian soil—now a somewhat Soviet is prepared to demand. The general body of soil. Soviet citizens is levying demands that As Soviet authorities continue to receive move the system in a different direction. and process citizens’ demands, they will Within the literary dissent movement, continue to assess also the ideological, the it is difficult to forecast when the pen may material, and the quantitative components b ecom e as m ighty as the sword. It is not of these demands. They w ill be obligated the sword alone with which the pen must continuously to make decisions with respect compete. Pens must compete with ballets to trade-offs between and among these com- and boxcars, toasters and telephones, pure ponents. At times, the material or the Science and puree. There is little to in- quantitative components may suffer in dicate that the way today’s average Soviet favor of the ideological; but at other times, Citizen views the Soviet literary dissenter the ideological component must give way to is significantly different from the way his other forces. Elements of the petty, and at Russian forebears viewed earlier Russian times the grand, ideology must be sacrificed. literary dissenters, or that the dissenter’s Referring to the concept of dem and pre- message is more important than “ proper” sented earlier, we can illustrate these ex- attention by the authorities to the average changes and observe the direction in which citizen’s needs (“ proper,” that is, in his the regime is moving. (Figure 2) terms). The ideological and material mix of de- Within the democratic or scientific dis- mands levied by the ongoing dissent move- sent movement, the conditions are some- ments is clearly inconsistent with the sum what different. There is less of a czarist of demands levied by the rest of society. tradition of unscienee, and, as Zhores The amounts of sacrifice required to meet Medvedev carefully observed, when one is

A • value of dissent demands alone B - value of all demands minus dissent demand C - value of all demands (dissent and other) X • microimpact of dissent de­ mands on total demand

Figure 2. Exchanges to meet demands 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

unscientific, progress (criticai to U.S.S.R. Citizens’ demands viewed as invalid in the development) is random or worse.22 To Russian tradition may be valid, indeed restrict Science as Lysenko did is to insure appropriate, within an ethnic or religious failure. This the Soviet scientist-dissenter minority. This would seem to be the fun- opposes. To the extent that the scientist damental reason for the Soviet Union’s opposes unscientific conditions within his intensification of national unity programs profession, Lodge and others indicate that and for the regime’s dealing most severely his dissent and demands for alternative with ethnic and religious dissent. sets of conditions will increasingly be pro- Amalrik saw the credibility of ethnic cessed favorably. To the extent, however, dissent when he forecast the creation of that the scientist steps outside his disci- several ethnically homogeneous States from pline, he will be viewed by the regime s the ashes of the Soviet Union.24 authorities as a member of a literary, re- Several final observations are possible: ligious, ethnic, or other dissent movement. First, the Soviet dissent movements are The Great Russian nationalist movement not politically significant in any macro may now be in the process of being wholly change sense. These movements are not or partly co-opted by the regime. Initially observable tips of icebergs that continually the movement began with younger Rus- threaten the Soviet ship of State. In a micro sians searching for their own past. However, sense, the dissent movements carve out the movement has been co-opted by both expanded new areas of political pluralism, the Yoimg Communist League (Komsomol) at the same time strengthening older areas. and other agencies of government.23 Second, a statement that Soviet citizens Herein is an example of the problems do not meaningfully participate in their of trade-off between the ideological, mate- political system is misleading. One must rial, and quantitative dimensions of de- ask, meaningful to whom? Studies from mand. The Soviet Union is established in Smolensk forward demonstrate that Soviet its ideology as a Marxist internationalist citizens do participate but that this partici- State, embracing all peoples and negating pation is limited not only by what the regime the need for any further search for mean- views as permissible but by what the Citi- ing in life, whíereas the title Slavophile zen views as appropriate. Military and would carry the State back to the ingrown, political observers of the Soviet political purely Russian nationalism of the past. system can expect this slow but steadv Ye the regime felt it appropriate, in this process of political pluralism to continue. case, to compromise on ideology in favor Finally, Soviet dissent should not be of validating linkages with the past. interpreted outside its Russian milieu. A Looking finally to the ethnic and re- Western-style democratic movement is not ligious minority dissent movements, we see imminent or even foreseeable. Citizen partic- that pre-Soviet czarist traditions do not ipation as the United States and Western apply. Lithuanians or Ukrainians should Europe have experieneed it is as foreign be expected to act more as Lithuanians or to the average Soviet Citizen as is Thomas Ukrainians than as Russians or Soviets. Jefferson or Alexis de Tocqueville.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Noles 1. For a detailed examinalion of the function of demand. see David 2. \s exaniplcs. see Peter J. Potichnyj. editor, Papers and Pmccedings of Easton, A Systim. Analyns of Political Life (New York: Wiley. 1965) es- pecially Part Two. the McMwrter Conferem e on Dissent in the Soviet Union i Hamilton. Ontario: 1972); Zev Katz, Soviet DissenttTs and Saiiul Structure in the USSH (Conter SOVIET DISSENT 53

for International Studies. Masachusetts Institute of Technology. Canibndge, Freoch and British influem* in Rússia, asvertiiig tlial Kuvsian civilization was Massachusetts. 1971); Abraham Brumberg, editor. In Qutat o f Justice Protest fundamentally superior to Western European civilization*. whích the Russian arui Dissent in the Sooiet Union Today (New York; 1970), and Max Hayward cducational community was then courbng. This conBict between Western Europc and WtUúun C. Fletcher. edtors. ReÜgion iwui the Soviet State A Dilemma of an and Russian traditions continues neur the hcart of severaJ of the ongoirig Poucr (London 1969). For Soviet, or Russian. pouits of view. see Andrei dissent movements, Amalnk. WÜl the Soviet Union Suwtvc u n ti l 1984 J (New York; 1970). Andrei 12. Katz. pp. 26-27. Amalnk. Involuntary Joumey tu Sibéria (New York; 1970); Zhores Medvedev. 13. One possihle exception can be seen »n samizdat' handluig of the TV Ruc and Faü o f T. D. Lysenko (New York; 1968); Roy and Zhores Peoples Republic oí China. There are no reported pro-PRC eommenlanes Medvedev. A (Juestwn o f Stadness (New York: 1971). .Andrei D. Sakharov. appearing in samizdut literature. possiblv demonstrating an unwillingness to Piogrexs. Coexistence, and hxtellectual Freedom (New York: 1968). Alexander go outside the party oii intrapartv matters, or in reaction to 300 years of Solzhenitsyn. One Day tn thc Life of Ivan Denisovich (New York; 1969); and Tatar mie. .Alexander Solzhenitsyn. First C irtlt (N e w York; 1968) 14. U.S. Naus and Wmld Repor t. IA LX. 44, 30 Novembcr 1970. 3. Quoted in Merle FainsocL How Rtisxia Is Ruled (Canibridge: Harvard 15. K at z , p. 26. Univemty Press. 1963X p. 137. 16. Amal ri k. W ill the Soviet Union Saruiue until 1984? pp. 76-77 4. Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York Vintage Books. 17. Newsweek, 1 Febniary 1971, p. 33. Solzhenitsyn inay be an exception, 1963). to the extent tliat his works are apparently widcly read. and the effect oí botli 5. Ibid.. Chap. XX Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe in publicizing Solzhenitsyn within his 6. Milton C. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes since StaJin (Coliunbus. Ohio: own country has been great. However, the political effect of Solzhenitsyn is Charles E. Merrill Co.. 1969). subject to serious tjuestion. 7. James H. Oliver. "Citizen DemancLs and the Soviet Political System." 18. John Keep. "Andrei Amalrik and 1984." The Russian Review. XXX, .American Political Science Revieu. June 1969. 4 (October 1971;. 341. 8. D. Jarovsky. “ Soviet Ideology." Soviet Studies. July 1969. pp. 3-20. 19. Ceorge L. Yaney. "Law, Society. and the Domestic Regime in Rússia, 9. See Lewis S. Feuer. "Intelligentsia in Opposition," Probletns o f Com- in Historical Perspective," Amcncan Political Science Review. June 1965. munism. XIX. 6 (November-Deeember 1970), 1-16; John Keep, “Andrei Amalrik pp. 379-90. and 1984," The Russxan Revieu., XXX. 4 (October 1971), 335-45; Bohdan R. 20. Ibid., pp. 386-87. Bociurkiw. ‘The Voices of Dissent and the Visions of Gloom." The Russian 21. Amalrik. W ill the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? Revieu . XXIX, 3 (Juíy-August 1971). 328-35; and Kat/.. op. cit. 22. Medvedev. The Rise and Fali o f T. D. Ly senkv. 10. Katz, pp. 2-29. 23 Geórgia Aiuie Geyer, “ A New Quest for the Old Rússia," Saturday 11. Slavophile: During the reign of Czar Nicholas I (1825-1855). a Slavophile Review. 25 Decemlier 1971. p. 16. movement arose around Moscow University. This movement revolted against 24. Amalrik. Will the Soviet Union Suwive until 1984? Military Affairs Abroad

PHASES OF SUBVERSION

The Castro Drive on Latin America

Jay Mal l in

54 EW COUNTRIES in the world in recent stay in a Panamanian ja.il, the invaders F history have carried out programs of were sent back to Cuba with a stern warn- subversion with the consistency and deter- ing. One Cuban stayed behind; he decided mination of Communist Cuba under Fidel to marry a Panamanian girl he had met at Castro. Subversion, directed especially Nombre de Dios. against other Latin American countries but Cuba was not deterred by this fiasco. In also reaching as far away as África and even June 1959, coordinated air and sea landings into the United States itself, has been a of expeditionaries, armed in and launched primarv policy of the present Cuban gov- from Cuba, took place in the Dominiean emment almost from the dav it carne into Republic. All but a few of the invaders power. were killed by Dominiean forces. In August Less than a month after the revolution- 1959 another invasion group infiltrated ary movement took control in Cuba early Haiti from Cuba, and it, too, was wiped in 1959, Ernesto “ Che” Guevara declared, out. In Nicaragua also an insurgency, “ The Revolution is not limited to the Cu- which had received an arms shipment by ban nation." 1 And in Mareh 1959 Fidel plane from Cuba, was quelled. Castro stated, “ The Caribbean is ours.” 2 In These four attempts to establish guerrilla July 1960 Castro bluntly declared, “ W e operations in Caribbean-area countries hav- promise to continue making [Cuba] the ing failed, the Cuban government devel- example that can convert the Cordillera of oped more sophisticated subversive tech- the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the niques. No more filibustering expeditions American continent.” 3 This was not mere would be launched from Cuba. Instead rhetoric; the Castro regime matched ac- other tactics were employed: Cuban dip- tions to words. Exiles of diverse nationali- lomats provided financial aid to pro-Castro ties and political stripes flocked into Cuba groups in the Latin American countries. following the rebel victory, and those Cuban fishing boats slipped weapons deemed to be ideologically acceptable— ashore to be used by insurgent movements. especially by Guevara, the government s Propaganda was beamed from powerful in-house intemational expert—received mor- Cuban shortwave stations, circulated through al support and military assistance in the Cuban diplomatic missions, and distrib- form of training and equipment. uted by the Prensa Latina news Service. The fírst Cuban aggressive effort was (.Prensa Latina was organized by Jorge directed against Panama. In an amateurish Ricardo Masetti, an Argentine friend of and near-comical venture 84 expedition- Guevara’s who would die a few years aries, 82 of whom were Cuban, landed at later leading a Castroite guerrilla move- Nombre de Dios, an almost inaccessible vil- ment in Argentina.) lage on the Caribbean coast of Panama. The greatest emphasis, however, was on The invaders had to be “ rescued” by the the instruetion of Latin Americans in guer- Panamanian National Guard, which uti- rilla warfare. To this end, hundreds, and lized a landing barge borrowed from U.S. then thousands, of men were brought to authorities in the Canal Zone. After a brief Cuba, trained in special schools and camps,

55 56 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW

and retumed to their homelands to start and break its hemispheric isolation. Ven- insurgencies or join campaigns already ezuela was a particular target of Cuban under way. Venezuela, Colombia, and subversion because of its vast oil reserves. Guatemala were among the nations most Obtaining access to these would have made seriously affected by Cuba-assisted guer- Cuba less reliant on the Soviet Union, rillas; however, few countries in Central Cuba’s sole provider of vitally needed pe- and South America escaped at least minor troleum. Blas Roca, a leading Cuban Com- outbreaks. munist, stated in 1963: Guerrilla courses in Cuba lasted from If their [Venezuelan] struggle is a help to us three to six months and occasionally as today, their victory will give us an even long as a year. Manuel Celestino Marcano more tremendous help. Then we shall no Carrasquel, a Venezuelan who received the longer be a solitary island in the Caribbean training, later described it to an investiga- confronting the Yankee imperialists, but tive committee of the Organization of rather we shall have a land of support on the American States. He reported: mainland.0 Because of its geographical proximity, I took courses in guerrilla and counter- the Dominican Republic was another prior- guerrilla tactics, theory and practice; as- sembling and disassembling short and long ity target for Cuba’s insurgency program. weapons, especially some of the ones that First carne the abortive June 1959 expedi- were easiest to acquire. . . . In explosives I tions. Then, in Novem ber 1963, another was given a course that covered home-made guerrilla operation was launched with full bombs using chlorate, grenades, booby traps, Cuban support. Cuba had trained a num- “ Molotov cocktails” of various kinds. . . . ber of the guerrillas who participated and They put a great deal of emphasis on blow- attempted to send them a shipload of ing up pipelines. . . . I took a course in weapons; these were intercepted by Domin- mapmaking and mapreading, including read- ican forces. This guerrilla movement also ing of tactical maps. . . ,4 was defeated. In 1965 an unexpected op- The first Cuban efforts at subversion in portunity for Cuban subversion occurred. 1959 appear to have resulted from a com- Late in April of that year the government bination of factors: the exuberance of the of Dominican President Donald Reid Cabral revolutionaries after their victory against a was overthrown as the result of a military regime considered to be militarily superior; uprising. No clear-cut change of authority a belief on their part that it was up to took place, however, and the situation in them to set right what was wrong in other the capital city deteriorated rapidly. Mobs countries; a desire by Castro to become, as swirled through the streets, Stores were signs in Havana proclaimed, El líder de las looted, policemen were killed. Américas; and the eagerness of Guevara to Rebel elements, including some army export Marxist revolution. As Cuba moved troops, controlled the downtown area of toward Communism and became alienated Santo Domingo. The air force, which had from the rest of Latin America, the support its own tank and troop units, held the big of insurgency developed into an integral San Isidro air base across the Ozama River. part of Cuban foreign policy. It was a pol- Air attacks were carried out against the icy which aimed at the communization of rebels, but the air force’s troops were un- other countries, but it had practical as well able to force their way across the Duarte as ideological motivations. Cuba needed bridge and into the insurgent stronghold. allies that could provide it with support Within the city, foreign embassies were MILITARY AFFA1RS ARROAD 57

fired upon, the Guatemalan ambassador tries, too, the subversive efforts failed to was threatened by a mob, and U.S. diplo- achieve their objectives, the establishment matic personnel gathered Americans and of pro-Castro Communist regimes. The other foreigners at the Embajador hotel in Latin America of the sixties was not Cuba preparation for evacuation. of the fifties, where the army of strongman There were three Communist parties in Fulgencio Batista was unable to cope with the Dominican Republic, including the the guerrilla movement. Farsighted Latin Castro-aligned Agrupación Política Catorce American governments were undertaking de Junio, named for the date of the 1959 significant social programs. Armies, acutely expeditions. The chaotic situation in Santo aware of the danger inherent in guerrilla Domingo was made to order for the Com- movements, moved with determination to munists, particularly those who had re- wipe these out whenever they appeared. ceived training in subversive teehniques in The United States, on its part, developed Cuba. Thev armed themselves and assumed counterinsurgency concepts, including civic control of the Street crowds. Several thou- action, and instituted eífective means of sand weapons were trucked in from a rebel teaching these to the Latin American mili- army camp and distributed among civil- tarv.6 ians. Castro, however, was not discouraged. The Communists helped organize para- His regime was, in faet, prepared to make militarv units and set up strongpoints at stra- an attempt to institutionalize subversion. tegic locations. Directing the Communist What could only be termed an interna- military aetivities was Manuel González tional conference to foment subversion was González, a veteran of the Spanish Civil held in Havana from 3 to 15 January 1966. War who was believed to be an agent of Officially, it was called the “ First Confer- Cuba’s intelligence Service. Approxiinately ence of Solidarity of the Peoples of África, a thousand troops of the regular army had Asia, and Latin America,” but for brevity’s participated in the revolt. The Communists sake it carne to be known as the “ Triconti- hurriedlv armed themselves and other civil- nental Conference.” From 82 countries ians whom thev controlled, and these par- carne over 600 representatives, chosen by amilitary forces soon outnumbered the local Communist parties and “ liberation troops. As a result of this burgeoning pow- movements.” The tone and purpose of the er, the Communists within a few days were conference were indieated by the agenda, generally dominating the rebel leadership. which included such phrases as “ Struggle (Titular leader of the revolt was an army against imperialism . . . Struggle for com- colonel named Francisco Alberto Caamano plete national liberation . . . Intensification Denó.) The United States, supported by the of all forms of struggle . . . Ways and Organization of American States, inter- means of aiding the liberation movements vened militarilv in the conflict, probably in África, Asia, and Latin America . . . preventing what might have become a Burning issues of the struggle.” 7 The Tri- Communist take-over of the entire country. continental adopted 73 resolutions aimed The Dominican uprising was an aberra- at “ the system of iinperialist, colonialist, tion—a move bv* militarvé men which de- and neo-colonialist exploitation against generated into near-chaos and a resulting which it has declared a struggle to the opportunity for the Communist movement. death.” 8 Castro told the delegates that the Other countries suffered Cuba-directed or conference had been “ a great victory of the -assisted insurgencies, but in these coun- revolutionary movement.” 9 The Bolivian Expedition

After Castro cume to power in Cuba in 1959, lie followed a jjolicy o f active ly attempting the subversion o f otber Latin American countries to his brand o f Communism. The series of attempts to instigate Marxist ret> olution met with failure, a final conspicuous instance taking place in Bolivia in 1967. There Castros lieutenant, "Che” Guevara, and a small band o f guerrillas met with insuperable difficutfíes in their attempt to spread insurgency from their mountain bases. In these rare photographs of them, Guevara directs and observes the operations, aiui the group is seen awaiting a meager mess (Che is fourth from the right). MIL1TARY AFFAIRS A BR O A D 59

Tw o permanent organizations grew out of the conference. The first, created by resolution of the conference as a whole, was the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of África, Asia, and Latin America, whose task was “ to unite, coordinate, and fnrther the stniggle” on those three conti- nents.10 The second organization was created by the 27 Latin American delega- tions; on 16 January they announced set- ting up of the Latin American Organization of Solidarity (Organización Latinoamericana

de Sol i da rí d a d—o l a s ). The olas was of special interest to Cas- tro. Through its establishment a facade of international respectabilitv, at least in Communist eyes, was given to the subver- sive efforts Cuba directed against other Latin American countries. The headquar- ” Vv i uv\^ j ^ L**+A .^c j • W fcvi - f' *. *v k J “ ^-|4K-, Lj. k.-*»- k« claimed “ that it is a right and a dutv of the w—. *r*«# ^ k-o jf^ . /-v x j br* - ik V u^-% i w * £*. »*— J*v- ^ -« peoples of Latin America to make revolu- -» W *»^ *- * * v v ^,‘^) / ikd^,*— l*^U*A l*—S tion.” 11 -1 V wl t í ^4 U_/N *W—-* UjL»-s «U f •/ »*^-o *J.~* f U ^JLQp^ _ lf44iL ^ w—^ r——s. -* >------>\/^. •—.-»*.A. I • >4^ kUMíl^í,kti ii. ÍAiA|1 < ^[ ^4— «© A. u . ^pr; £££*-- W ^ K *• , «^ A smiling Guevara on muleback belies our knowlcdge that a few days later tlw Bolivian anmj wauld capture him and wauld execute him the next ilay. 9 October ?J»~ *’ - • » 25 m . 1967, thus ending Castro'* reliance on guerrilla tactics— but not his policij of subversion by other means. . . . x ^ —»- ^—< i-—^-^c, Xç V». I a ^ i¥» ^ . . . u______4—* t w i Curvaras diary summary for September 1967 (sliown -" v-- . p~>v~I— v-i•.— *------*-**-» A - _ , _ „--_____- ______A/ 1__»1 i in liis lumdwriting) is a gloomy harbinger of his impending • , — Hn %* “va *** disaster• "It was without a doubt tlia worst montli we ^ ^ ----,•n i^ 2^ ,/ * r ha ve hatl so far in the war. The loss of all my . . . docu - y c^A< *-<». u ^i /i w > V,*^ “< • • L V W ^ ^ V* —A v ÍUao ments and medicai supplies was a liard blow . . the 7 loss of two men during the latter part o f the tnonth anil the subsequent fast march demoralized the front Unes— 29 fr planting deep roots of loss .... The lack o f contact witli the exterior, . . . the fact of prisoners takcn—and that 30 Si they have talked—also somewhat demoralized the troops. My illness made others o f my troop uncertain, and all j 31 5o was evident in our encounter in which we shoultl have infiicted several deaths to our enemy, all we did was wound one. . . . We are at a time when our morale is losing ground." 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The holding of the Tricontinental confer- more. He chose África as his new battle- ence graphically demonstrated that Cas- ground, feeling that this continent waí tro^ subversive interests extended beyond comparatively far from the United States’ Latin America. In the Guevara-Castro sphere of power and influence and close tc view, undeveloped nations were particu- Communist and other sympathetic coun- larly susceptible to Communist take-overs tries. Leading a group of Cubans, Guevara via guerrilla moveinents. Acting in accor- involved himself in the struggles in the dance with this concept, Cuba has given a Congo. full measure of attention to África. As early The African adventure also failed— as 1961 a Zanzibar National party office, Guevara was evidently there six months— headed by a former Mau Mau, John Okello, so Guevara returned secretly to Cuba. was opened in Havana. By mid-1962 men where he began preparations for yet an- from at least nine African countries, includ- other guerrilla movement. This one woulc ing Zanzibar, were receiving subversive be in Bolivia, where he believed the govem- training in Cuba. In January 1964 a rebel ment of President René Barrientos coulc movement in Zanzibar led by Okello over- be overthrown much as that of Cuba’s threw the pro-Western govemment and set Fulgencio Batista had been brought down up the “ People’s Republie of Zanzibar.” in 1959. Furthermore, Bolivia was centrally Cuba has also been involved in the Congo and strategically located so that, in Gue-j (Brazzaville), where Cuban troops help vara’s view, it could serve as a base for maintain the leftist government in power, spin-off operations in adjoining countries. and in Portuguese Guinea, where Cubans especially Argentina. serve with the guerrilla forces (eight Cu- A high-level military group was orga- bans were reported killed early in 1973 nized and trained in Cuba and then when they were intereepted trying to infiltrated into Bolivia. There a farm had infiltrate the colony). been purchased in an isolated area near the The United States hardly qualifies as an town of Camiri, and this was to serve as undeveloped country, but even here Cas- the base eamp for the guerrilla operation. tro’s agents have been active. In November Guevara, in disguise and using two L^m- 1962 the fbi arrested three Cubans in New guayan passports, traveled to Bolivia via York, including an attaché of Cuba’s Spain and Brazil. On or around 7 Novem- United Nations mission, and charged them ber 1966 he arrived at the base camp, and with planning to place bombs in Stores, oil the insurgency was imder wav. An indica- refineries, and the New York subway Sys- tion of the importance given to it bv Cuba tem. A cache of explosives and ineendiary was the presence with Guevara of sixteen devices was seized. In 1968 two other Cuban militarv men, including three com- Cuban representatives at the U.N. were andantes (highest rank in the Cuban army) barred from the United States because they and six captains. Three of the officers, in had been providing guidance and financial addition to Guevara, had been members of assistance to American black extremist the Central committee of the Cuban Com- groups. munist partv. Through the first half of the sixties On 23 March 1967 the guerrillas staged Guevara masterminded Cuba’s operations their first attack. They ambushed a Boliv- abroad. Then, apparentlv tiring of the iaii army patrol, killing seven soldiers and successive failures in Latin America, he taking eighteen prisoners. Other guerrilla decided to go into the fíeld himself once actions in the following months were simi- MllJTARY AITAIRS AHROAD 61

arlv successful, but eventually the tide tenants, had led a guerrilla movement airned against Guevara’s group. The peas- which was part of the revolution against ints of the region did not provide the sup- Batista. The movement was a major factor jort Guevara expected and needed (Bolivia in Batista s eventual overthrow, but it was íad had an extensive agrarian reform in not the only factor: effective operations by 1952. and Guevara had little to offer). A urban clandestine organizations, a substan- dandestine apparatus in the cities vvhich tial decline in the Cuban economy, and the might have supported the guerrillas was United States’ cutoff of arms and support jroken up bv the Bolivian authorities. for Batista also eontrilnited to his fali. Even the local Communist parties, refusing Upon coming to power, however, Castro to accept leadership from Guevara, a for- and Guevara overlooked these other fac- signer, failed to provide assistance. The tors, preferring to emphasize the guerrilla Bolivian army encircled the area in which role in the revolution. Out of this grew a the guerrillas operated and effeetively iso- mystique of guerrilla invincibility, a inys- lated them. The United States, rather than tique in which Castro and Guevara really permit itself to be sucked into a potential believed (so much so that Guevara staked Vietnam-like situation, did not send com- his life on it, and lost). It was this mystique bat troops but, instead, gave four months of that was the coneeptual foundation for much training to a Bolivian Ranger battalion. It of Cuba’s subversive effort during the six- was this unit that eventually tracked down ties. Start a guerrilla movement, support Guevara and the remnants of his band. it, and it will eventually succeed—thus Guevara was captured 8 October 1967, and thought the planners in Havana. But not the next dav he was executed. one such guerrilla operation in Latin .America The climactic phase of the eight-year succeeded, and with the death of Guevara Cuban insurgencv program had terminated and the failure of the grand plan (Bolivia- in total defeat. The full extent of the Cu- Venezuela), Havana was forced to accept ban operation was revealed later when the fact that other methods were needed. Orlando Castro Hidalgo, a defector from Cuban subversion entered a new phase. the Cuban intelligence Service, disclosed There would be more sophistication and that at approximatelv the time Guevara selectivity in the program. Substantial was preparing to go to Bolivia, two coman- numbers of men would no longer be sent dantes of the Cuban army, both of them abroad to start guerrilla operations.13 members of the Cuban Communist party’s Funds, weapons, and trained agents would Central committee, were infiltrated into still be sent to existing movements, but not Venezuela to assist guerrillas in that coun- on the scale of previous efforts. try.12 Guevara s movement in Bolivia had A doctrinal shift also occurred. In a been part of a two-pronged attack on speech on 13 Mareh 1967 Castro faulted South America. The Venezuelan effort, like Venezuelan revolutionaries because in their the one in Bolivia, ended in failure strategy there had been "an over-estimation (although, unlike Guevara, the two coman- of the importance of the capital and of the dantes in Venezuela eventually got baek to struggle in the capital and an under-estima- Cuba). tion of the importance of the guerrilla movement.’’ 14 The death of Guevara was a severe blow to the guerrilla mystique, v - ast r o , aided by and now Cuba reluctantly turned its at- Guevara, Raúl Castro, and other able lieu- tention to the cities of Latin America as 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

a potentially fruitful battleground. A case hundred” persons in Cuba were being in point was Montevideo, Uruguay, where trained in urban terror tactics.15 the Tupamaro clandestine organization Castro’s persistence in pursuing a policy was growing in strength, boldness, and of subversion has a direct bearing on rela- operational capability. A number of Tup- tions between Cuba and the United States amaros were trained in Cuba; an inter- These relations were broken in Januarv rogation manual used by the Tupamaros 1961, and American officials have repeat- was written in Cuba or by a Cuban. The edly stated that they will not be resumec Uruguayan army’s intelligence depart- until Castro, among other things, cease: ment learned that Castro, during a trip trving to subvert Latin American countries through África, met with a Tupamaro Castro, however, has indieated no interesi representative and gave him $265,000 in in doing this. H e stated b lm itly in 1971 eash to support the insurgent movement. “ Cuba maintains its policy of support tc The Tupamaro movement was crushed the r e v o lu t io n a r y g o v e m m e n t s and alsc by the Uruguayan army in 1972. Castro, support of the revolutionary movements o however, seems intent on continuing to use Latin America.” 16 Subversion continues tc urban terrorism as a major method of sub- be an operational policy of the Cuban gov version. In FebruarvJ 1973 a U.S. State ernment. Department official reported that “ several Coral Gables, Floridc

Notes 11. "Declaración General de la Primera Conferência Latinoamericana d« 1. Ernesto Cuevara. “ Proyecciones Sociates dei Ejército Rebelde,” Ernesto Solidaridad,” Teoria y Práctica, Havana, August 1967. Chc Cuevara, Obras 1957-1967 (Havana: 1970), Vol. 2, page 21. 12. Cast ro Hi dal go. p. 48. 2. "Fastest Gun in Havana," Time, 23 March 1959. 13. In special cases Castro seems still willing to try to set up new guerrilla 3. James Monahan and Kenneth O. Cilmore. The Creat Deception (New operations. After the termination of the 1965 Dominican uprising rebel York; 1963), p. 153. chief Caamario went to London as Dominican military attaché. In October 4. Rcport of Committec 1 of the Twelfth Steèting of Consultation of 1967 he took a trip to The Hague, where he disappeared from publio Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Organization of American States (Washington: sight. He went to Paris in disguise and from there was spirited by the Cuban 1967), p. 74. intelligence Service to Cuba via Prague. Evidently Castro wanted to use him 5. Jay Mallin, Fortress Cuba (Chicago: 1965'. p. 73. in the Dominican Republic again one dav. Early in Februarv 1973 Caamaho 6. Willard F Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internai Security atui Military did land on the Dominican coast with a small group of armed men. Pursued Power (Columbus, Ohio: 1966b by Dominican forces, he was killed in battle a fortnight later. 7. Orlando Castro Hidalgo. Spy for Fidel (Miami; 1971). p. 96. 14. Speech transcribed by the Latin American Monitoring Service. 8. Cuba Socialista, Havana, Februarv 1966, p. 101. 15. " ‘Urban Terror’ Experts Reported Cuba-Trained,” Miami Herald, 21 9. Ibid., p. 79. Februarv 1973. 10. Ibid. p. 149. 16. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 20 April 1971. Air Force Review

THE CHANGING SCENE IN EDUCATION

M aj o r Charles W. M it c h e l l

There will ulwatis be a The instructor was perfilexed: frontier where there is New class—what now? . . . First exam shows clistributed ig- an open mind and a willing hancL norance from 20% to 70%—average 50%—standard deviation —C harl es F Ketterint; 10%—A to C. . . . Cant give an F since student failure is seen as teacher failure. . . . Çuestion in review session—repeatedly stressed the answer in lectures since the second day. . . . Why don’t they leam? . . . Whats this? An article saying that in a lecture only 12% listen? 1 I don’t believe it!—must be an invalid experiment—Jones said he understood nothing from prerequisite

63 course—need lectures to compensate fo r bungling o f others. . . . W a i t ! H e r e ’s an article on course design—make leam ing constant and time variablé~ —Ridiculous!— m ight fin d that we have only a tw o-ijear school. . . . W ho left this book on my desk?— Conditions of Leam ing by GagmA—leam ing theory—more unscientific bunk! I m teaching Science, not psychology. . . . Instructional objectives?—something about a book by Mager4—\Vhy? My objectives are obvious from my lectures and exams m ultiple testing on same material?—naive. Everyone would get an A ! . . . so wluit if all o f my students are above average? . . . Someone has to get the low grades— A fter all, there’s the curve. . . . Individualize? Maybe that s the m agic word. It certainly is popular these days—But how?—ca n ’t teach everything to everyone in- dividually—How can they leam if I don t teach them?—self-study?—reading?— self-pacing?—individually guided practice?—behavioral objectives?— What will they think o f next?

HIS hypothetical mental monologue than to the problems of teaching. A learner- T reflects some of the traditional views centered instructor is thought to view that continue to plague the educational society and education as dvnamic and system and professional educators, espe- democratic, the student as a behaving and cially at the higher leveis. In an attempt active partieipant in his own education, to overcome some of these traditional the learning process as interactive experi- educational barriers, an experimental self- ence, and the teacher as a participating pacing program was introduced in the De- guide in the leaming process.5 Obvious partment of Electrical Engineering at the shades of grav exist between these extremes. United States Air Force Academy. It is It would be foolish to say that educators felt that the findings of the program show who tend to be traditional have no con- potential for application beyond the Acad- cern for leaming. The distinction seems to emy and even beyond the college levei of lie in what they do about failure to leam. instruction. The traditional thinker tends to favor the lecture method and curve grading. He will therefore look to himself to improve the D ef ore launching into the an- lecture, which he presumes will improve notated case history, some perspective may learning, and adjust the grading curve be worth pursuing. Traditionally, instruc- accordingly. The modem thinker may re- tion has been “ teacher-centered” ; that is, cai 1 such words as “ . . . The lecture is dead! emphasis has been placed upon teacher Investigations show that information com- rather than learner efficiency. It has been municated verbally without involvement argued that the traditional instructor is has a short retention span; students who likely to view society and education as attend lectures perform no better than stu- static and authoritarian, the student as pas- dents who do not; lecture classes fail be- sive and receptive, the leaming process as cause students are in a passive, nonpar- associative and additive, and the teacher as ticipating role; and lectures in courses tasksetter and drillmaster. In contrast, a requiring higher cognitive skills are notablv modem instructor is characterized as “ leam- less effective.” 6 The modern instructor er-centered” ; he will tend to assign more will therefore seek improvement in the importance to the problems of learning form of methods that demand interaction AIR FORCE REVIEW 65 on the part of the learner. His preferred basic electronics equipment was placed choice is not likely to be an improved lec- in the existing 16-man classrooms (one ture. In his deliberations he may also setup for every two students); the result recall one of the professional educator’s was a combined classroom-laboratory in clichês: “ I hear, and I forget; I see, and I which elementary laboratory activity was remember; I do, and I understand.” integrated into the theoretical discussions In the spring o f 1971 the D epartm ent of the classroom. Instruction was planned of Electrical Engineering at the Air Force so as to include use of the electronic equip- Academy decided to test the claims of a ment when it seemed pedagogically de- growing number of educational innovators sirable.9 Thus, both a standard text and an who advocate a leamer-centered system of integrated classroom-laboratory existed as instruction called “ self-pacing.” ' The meth- initial conditions on the problem-solving od seemed to be a natural for a course on process leading to the self-paced course. which much preliminarv effort had been D uring the summer o f 1971 the course was expended with only modest success. The cast in the self-paced format and offered basic problem, which persisted in spite during the following semester. Because it of extensive attention, was that the core was a first at the Air Force Academy, the curriculum in electrical engineering con- course was dubbed “ experimental.” tinued to be viewed as demotivating or The course was divided into eleven unreasonably difficult by the students and units. Unit study guides were developed to direct the student efficiently to what- inefficient bvj both instructors and students. To understand the background for the deci- ever levei he chose (three possible leveis, sion to “ self-pace” the course, it is neces- corresponding to the three leveis of prac- sarvJ to review about five Jvears of its de- tice items outlined in the textbook). The velopment. essential contents of each study guide were In 1966 one of the more serious depart- the reading assignment, behavioral objec- mental problems was what constituted ap- tives for each of the three leveis of achieve- propriate content for the course. An effort ment, suggested practice activities related was initiated then to develop the text- to each behavioral objective, and appro- book that has emerged, after extensive priate self-demonstrations (equipment exer- and continuing revision, as the course con- cises). Guidelines for developing the be- tent standard.* In addition to prescribing havioral objectives must be credited to R. course content, the text includes a three- F. Mager and R. B. VVaina.10 Mager pre- level hierarchy of student activities at the scribes the basic content of behavioral end of each chapter: elementary “ questions” objectives in an instruetional setting, and (levei 1), intermediate “ exercises” (levei Waina expands on the measurability of 2), and relatively advanced “ problems” objectives, especially as it is affected by (levei 3). These activities suggest leveis of choice of verb. Waina also suggests a pro- achievement and, by implication, define cedure for writing objectives in the form behavioral objectives. Another problem of “ definitive problems,” i.e., required or existing in 1966 was an ineffective labora- suggested student activities in which specific tory program. The traditional two-hour objectives are embedded. Practice activities laboratory was eliminated from the elec- were specified by outlining a hierarchy of trical engineering core curriculum; the interrelationships arnong the various con- lock-step inflexibility of the lab program cepts and student activities involved and had proven to be demotivating. Instead, arranging them in an orderly fashion. Such 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

learning structures obviously involve many • Unit mastery must he demonstrated trade-offs and overlaps and are therefore before advancing to the next unit. The likely to be time-consuming and imprecise; majority of the students were not majoring however, the results were encouraging. The in electrical engineering. Since their need third element of each unit study guide was for depth of understanding was not firmly an appropriate set of self-demonstrations, established and since retention of the letter or minilabs. These were the guidelines by grading system was a specified constraint, which the contiguity of presentation of a unit score of 60% was established as the theoretical and practical concepts was as- minimum requirement for advancing to sured. Their number depended upon the the next unit. Each unit examination could subject matter; the average time required be taken as many as three times; only the for completion of each was 20 to 30 min- highest score was recorded. utes. • Lectures and demonstrations should Of the many ways to individualize in- be used as motivators rather than sources struction, self-pacing is among the more o f criticai information. In the electrical straightforward. Dr. Fred S. Keller, gener- engineering course no lectures were given. allv acknowledged as the originator of the Demonstrations were limited to self-dem- method, identifies five features that seem onstrations, which were related directly to distinguish it most clearly from traditional to the reading material, implemented with- teaching methods.11 (In the following sub- in the framework of equipment usage, and paragraphs, the italicized sentence sum- almost optional. Students were required to marizes Keller’s basic feature; the remain- complete five self-demonstrations (30 to ing comments indicate alterations that 40 were available) and demonstrate results were made for the experimental electrical to the tutor/proctor. Since they were not engineering course and the constraints tested on the material, they did not con- that prompted them.) sider them sources of criticai information. • Go-at-your-own-pace; the student • The written word should be stressed moves through the course at a speecl com- in teacher-student communication. This mensurate with his ability and other de- was not emphasized; in fact, most com- mands upon his time. Some deviation was munication was via the spoken word ex- felt necessary. Tim e constraints were im- cept for examinations. The immediate posed for each unit to insure acceptable critiques of examinations were always con- student progress (upper time limit) and to ducted orally. insure administrative readiness (lower time limit). Constraints were administered by • Use proctors to facilitate repeated offering each of the 11 unit examinations testing, immediate scoring, tutoring, and en- only within a specified span of lessons; for hancement of the personal-social aspect of example, the unit 4 examination was offered the educational process. All of these features during lessons 9 through 14. Students were were realized through the use of fully quali- required to attend class, which was actually fied instructors as proctors. a study period with a tutor/proctor pres- An underlying thought in developing ent, until all course requirements were the testing and grading system was that ex- met. Such constraints were imposed to mini- aminations should be designed to measure mize the threat of incompletes; more lati- achievement of stated objectives rather tude would be appropriate as experience than to discriminate among leveis of student with the method is gained. ability. In other words, student competi- AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

tion should lie with the material and him- Student reaction to the course was mea- self rather than with his peers. Further, ex- sured by questionnaire. All samples (116) aminations were to be aids to learning. Unit were nonelectrical engineering majors since mastery examinations consisted of randomly their reaction to the core course was of selected test items based on the end-of- primary concern. (Responses were grouped chapter practiee items specified in the unit for analysis and comment under headings studv guide. Test items were equallv weight- indicated below. Percentages are rounded ed and distributed in difficulty as follows: to the nearest whole percent.) 12 six at levei 1, three at levei 2, and one at • Course in general. The same or a levei 3. Each individual in the course re- more favorable attitude toward electrical ceived a different examination, and all engineering, compared to the beginning of examinations taken by any one individual the course, was indicated by 99% of the were also different. Computer-generated respondents; 60% increased and 49% showed random numbers on standard ib m cards pro- a preference for further study in electrical vided the mechanism for making the ran- engineering. Total study time per lesson dom choices of test questions; the questions was indicated as 1 to 2 hours by 72%; 81% themselves were contained in booklets. admitted less study time than in other The grading system could loosely be called courses. “ contract grading." The student could prac- • Course material. Above average in tice and continue taking tests, up to three interest: 72%. Above average in difficulty: times per unit within the time constraints, 58%. Above average in practicality: 58%. until he reached whatever levei he chose; he was graded consistent with his effort. • Self-pacing method in general. A strong preference for self-paced study was indicated (90%), apparently based on the feeling that the material was made easier So muc h for the composition of the course. Some have asked the question, (58%), that the amount learned was greater “ Did you really self-pace?” The answer (61%), and that the autonomy offered by was, “ Yes, with realism.” In spite of some- the method was appreciated (89%). Ninetv what rigid constraints, the students were percent felt that the course material was indeed able to pace themselves by studving well suited to the self-paced method. and testing when ready. The time con- • Self-pacing—our version. Motivat- straints could very easily be removed, but ing factors were ranked as follows: multiple until the remaining courses in the overall testing, finishing the course early, choosing environment are offered in a similar for- grade by levei of achievement, no lecture, mat, the upper time limit of one semester and autonomy. Retesting was considered a would have to remain. Others have ques- significant aid to learning by 99%, which tioned the validity of the experiment on suggests a desire for self-improvement the basis of the relatively ideal conditions mechanisms. The data revealed that the at the Air Force Academy; that is, ex- upper and lower bounds on progress had cellent resources, maximum of 16 students little effect on their rates of progress. The with one instructor per section, above absolute grading system was considered average motivation, etc. Although these good to excellent by 90%, 78% indicating conditions do prevail, it is not felt that that they also felt it was a valid discrimina- they detract from the validity or the gen- tor. Tests were rated as average in diffi- eral ity of the observed results. culty by 92%; also fair and representative 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW by 85%. Study guides were rated very use- the most significant observation made was ful by 14%, usefiil by 44%, marginally that the experiment was quite successful useful by 30%. Unit behavioral objectives in spite of such rigid conditions. Student were rated very useful by 13%, useful by acceptance of the course was unprecedent- 32%, and of marginal value by 40%. Prac- ed in the electrical engineering core se- tice items specified in the unit studv guides quence. Instructors were enthusiastic in were found very useful by 21%, sometimes their attempts (for some, their first) to man- useful by .50%, and of marginal value by age the learning process rather than direct 19%. it from the podium. Both student and in- structor reactions to the increased personal- • Integrated-classroom environment. social aspects of the educational process Increased understanding was perceived by were most encouraging. Finally, all of the 86%. The integrated-classroom environment results were generated with no increase in was preferred by 95% to the traditional resources of any kind. classroom and laboratorv environment. In addition to making the course more • Grade distribution. A-57%. H-36%. relevant, motivating, and reasonable, it C-7%. There were no D’s or F’s. was hoped that self-pacing might be more cost-effective, resulting in the same amount

I nstr uc to r reaction to the of learning with fewer instructors. A firm course was varied, although the efficacy basis for such a hope did not emerge from of the method was generally acknowledged, the experience. Given excellent preparation at least for basic courses. Some preferred and smooth administration, probably more the challenge of lecturing. Others welcomed students could be accommodated per in- the challenge of tutoring, which was limited structor (tutor) than the usual 16 per sec- by the practical necessities of testing, tion, but such saving is more likely to be grading, and overall administration; it was achieved in basic courses than in advanced felt that automation would be an invalu- ones. There may be a point in course com- able aid in these latter areas. In general, plexity beyond which self-pacing is not instructors favored the method, especially optimal, either in terms of learning or man- if the administrative kinks could be worked power. out. Initial conditions are the best predictors Conclusions about the program should of the effectiveness of a self-pacing experi- be tempered with the recollection that the ence. The reading materiais should be the experiment was conceived and executed in best possible, since they are the student’s a basically hostile environment. Although primary source of information; poor ma- probably the most liberal of the Service teriais are an imposition to both student academies, the Air Force Academy is not and teacher. Extensive prior preparation, a liberal institution. Caution was the rule; including well-written, measurable objec- every move was carefully considered in tives and suitable practice materiais, should light of the fact that this was the first self- be ready when the course begins. In a paced course at the Academy. Some ex- comparison of the self-pacing mode with pected—perhaps even hoped—that it would the lecture environment, that time which fail and thus end such radicalism for some would normally be devoted to lecture prep- time to come; unnecessary constraints and aration throughout the semester should be limited goals were therefore practical in- expended on course preparation before gredients in the planning process. Perhaps the self-paced course begins. AIR FORCE REVIEW 69

Student accommodation to self-pacing was Finally, no evidence suggests that self- found to be especially sensitive to student pacing is academically sterile or dehuman- background and experience. A student can izing unless its planners make it so. There survive in a lecture/grading-curve environ- are ample opportunities for creativity and inent without understanding much, where- meaningful problein solving, both for the as in a self-paced situation, he must demon- student and (especially) the instruetor. strate mastery before proceeding. Those When imaginatively designed and executed, who were vveak in prerequisite knowledge it is an individually guided method that suffered (with the tutor) through a catch- lends itself well to almost any instructional up period. It is desirable, in the long run, situation and any desired degree of adminis- that self-paced courses with absolute grading trative control. Assuming adequate prep- standards exist in harmonv with other aration and reasonable objectives, its likely courses having similar standards, especially long-term benefits are increased cost-effec- prerequisite courses. Extensive soul-search- tiveness through increased leaming (assum- ing and coordination on both interdepart- ing no increase of resources), greater fulfill- mental and intradepartmental leveis are ment on the part of both students and necessarv if self-pacing is likely to play an instruetors, and greatly improved study hab- important role in an institution's eurriculum its. Indeed, it may start the student on a planning. lifetime of self-education. Air Comniaml aml Staff College

Note» 1 L Ludlow. "At a Lrcturir—Only 12% Listen." Sun Francisco Sundaij 8. R. E. Thomas and D. W. Buehler. SignaU and Systems, vols. 1 and II. Exammer anã Chronicle, Septeinber 1. 1968. USAF Acadcmv. Colorado. 2. C H. Flammer. "Leaming as the Constanl and Time as the Variable." 9. R. E. Thomas and C. \V. Mitchell. An Integrated-Classroom-Laboratory,’’ Engineering Eãuration. Slarch 1971. Educational Research anã Mcthoãs ehm . Publication of a Division of the •3. R M Gagnc. Coruiitions of Leaming (New York. Holl Kmehart and American Socicty for Engineering Eduration iase e ). vol. -4. nr 1. Oetober 1971. Winston. Inc.. 1965 10. Mage r, op. nt. R. B. Wa i na , Evental Spccificatíon of a Curriculwn An 4 R F Muger Prepannt* Instructumal ÜbjecUva (Paio Alto: Fearson OverView. RAND Document No. D-17822-PR. and Specificatlon o f Educational Publishers. Inc 1962) Objectives for System F.valuation. RAND Document No. D 17846-PR (Santa 5 W 11 Burton. The Cuidam ,- of Leaming Activities. 5d ed. ( N e w York Moniea The RAND Corporation. Septemlier 27. 1968). Appleton-Ccntury*Croft\ Inc.. 1962' II F S Kellcr, "Coodbye. Teac her. ” Journal of Applied fíehavior Analysis. 6 L Hamsburger. Self-Paced Individtiullv Prescribed Instruction," Spring 1968. Engineenng Eãucatkm . March 1971. 12. Comments on analvsis of the experimental course are either rjuoted or 7 The ctfort was mitiated and gnided bv the Professor and Head of the paraphr;i.sed from a leltcr cntitled Kvaliiatinu of Self-Paced EE 351. Fali Department of Elettncal Enginecring .it the Air Force Academy, Colonel ‘71.” addressed to DF Dean of the Faculty. USAF Academy) and signed bv RoLnd E Thomas. Course materiais were reseorched and gcncratcd bv Col. Roland E Thomas. Professor and Head, Department of Eleetrical Ma|or Daniel NV Buehler. Major Rn h.trtl N Miller. and lhe author. Enginecring. 552d A IR B O R N E EARLY W A R N I N C AND CONTROL WINC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

a case study in airborne command and control

Lie ut e nant Colonel Jerold R. M ack Captain Ric har d M. W il l iams HE Defense community widely holds The death of traditional Airborne Early Tas axiomatic that basic doctrine is best Warning and Control (aew&c ), eharacter- derived from experience gained in combat ized by its primary emphasis on surveil- operations. Extensive historical programs, lance extending ground-based coverage, both retrospective and contemporary as was not mourned, for with it carne the well as the disciplines of operational and birth of a new era in the discipline of air- Systems analvsis, are testimony to the need borne eommand and control. In the evolu- to exploit this avenue of continuai refine- tionary process, the EC-121 D, mainstay of ment, identifving and capitalizing on les- aew&c , became the “ EC-121D + ,” incor- sons learned in the throes of armed conflict. porating add-on equipment to enhance its The conflict in Southeast Asia (sea) marked capability in sea. L a t e r , e x t e n s i v e re t r o f i t the first combat tactical employment of gave the aircraft a new series designation, an airbome radar platform in a eommand EC-121T, to be known as Airborne Surveil- and control role. Accordingly, the lessons lance and Control System (asacs). The next learned there are especially vital to de- milestone, yet to be realized, is an opera- termining operational doctrine to guide tional Airbome Warning and Control Sys- future employment of current and follow- tem (aw ac s) that will repackage each sub- on airbome eommand and control. system proven essential into state-of-the-art Certainly something can be learned from hardware and a modem airframe. the college eye Task Force (cetf)—the deployed element of the 552d Airbome Earlv Waming and Control W ing—and its Big Eye/College Eye role in Southeast Asia, for deployment of Task Force Formed the task force marked a dramatic departure Sunday, 4 April 1965, heralded the de- from the traditional role of the EC-121. ployment of the Radar Constellations to Designed and optimized for overwater ra- Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Viet- dar detection to provide seaward extension nam. The contingent was initially called of North American Air Defense Com- big eye and existed only as a mobility plan mand’s contiguous radar coverage, the EC- with its chain of eommand as Pacific Air 121 was onlv marginally suited to the Forces/Thirteenth Air Force/Second Air demands of the Southeast Asian tactical DiVision/big eye. I t l a t e r b e c a m e col- environment. Notwithstanding known defi- lege eye when Air Force Manual 205-1 ciencies, the value of such a system was was changed to assign standardized first evident (though not universally recognized): words by eommand for use as project nick- it offered radar surveillance, warning, and names, and after Februarv 1967 it operated autonomous weapons control capabilities from Thailand. where they had not existed. The settling-in phase was an arduous So it was that in adapting themselves to period fraught with resistance from all this environment and aggressively pursuing sides. The big eye capabilities were not the necessarv changes to upgrade their re- widely appreciated, which resulted in an sponsiveness, the hard-core “ believers” managing the task force transitioned an This article on airborne eommand and con- unwanted detachment into an extremely trol is the sec.ond in a series o f articles in viable eommand and control force. The Air University Review conceming roles principal lessons to be studied, therefore, o f the Aerospace Defense Command. are those learned in this process.

71 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

atmosphere of suspicion from both the po- (2) manual, passive, one-at-a-time identifi- tential users of the Service and the com- cation friend or foe/selective Identification mand strueture that was responsible for feature ( if f /sif ) decode; and (3) unreliable operational control. line-of-sight Communications. Through this turmoil and confusion sur- cetf was charged with the responsibility faced the one hidden ingredient that gave of providing radar coverage of the Red big eye an edge: twelve years of experi- River Delta, a pie-shaped sector with its ente in the AEW&c business. Departing tdy vertex northwest of Hanoi, broadening out as combat-ready crews, the large aircrew to the irregular coastline stretching from complement had long since polished inter- Haiphong harbor approximately 60 miles nai procedures. To a man, they demon- to the Southwest. A normal mission profile strated uncommon enthusiasm in meeting with médium flight altitude produced mas- the challenge of this new mission. These sive ground returns that blanked any air- factors contributed to successes beyond the craft radar returns from the area, though expectations of those knowledgeable con- if f /sif coverage was excellent. To over- cerning the system’s limitations imposed by come this handicap, a low-altitude tech- inherent design characteristics and anti- nique was emploved for the second aircraft quated eqnipment. on station, putting the horizon between the The task force was augmented by two airborne radar platform and the land mass aircraft within the fírst month. The initially and thus removing the clutter-producing assigned mission was to fly orbits over the terrain from line-of-sight. The word low is Gulf of Tonkin for surveillance of any hos- emphasized. Station altitude was adjusted tile activity and control of the usaf fighter for each mission to optimize radar perfor- Combat Air Patrol (cap) providing protec- mance for variables in sea State and propa- tive cover for airborne forces in the area. gation. With this method, a clear radar When the initial 30-day period expired, picture was achieved, at the sacrifice of big eye became a very controversial issue. low-altitude coverage over the land mass. Should it stay or go home? Many skeptics Since the nature of surveillance responsi- felt it should leave; but, its initial value to bility knows no beginning or end, the radar the war effort having been established, it crews were occupied with the continuai was retained for an indefinite period. Thus process of detection and identification of began the eight-year tdy of rotational 552 air traffic. With only the AN/APS-95 aew &c Wing elements. search radar and AN/APX-49 if f /sif rec- With such grave equipment limitations ognition set available, manual correlation and command-established procedural con- of radar returns with an offset sif display cepts that did not lend themselves to the was a never-ending process. The volume of task force s mode of operation, actions had traffic was immense, and identification of to be initiated to resolve the deficiencies. friendlv forces became a major workload, further compounded when fighters did not College Eye Task Force Upgrade “ squawk” or meet their flight plans. The task force strove, through a vigorous “ sales The First order of business was to develop campaign," to enlighten all its customers as tactics and techniques to circumvent the to its capabilities/limitations, and by this design shortcomings, at least the most method developed procedures for a significant ones: (1) inadequate radar clut- check-in/check-out to speed the process. ter rejection to allow overland detection; This afforded personalized (by call sign) This EC-121 is typical of the D and T models discussed in the article and represents existing USAF airbome radar command control resources.

flight-following, which saved valuable reac- Concurrent with these procedural meth- tion time if a threat was launched against ods, the task force launched a full-scale them or thev experienced an emergency program to obtain minimum lead-time over hostile territory. retrofit for inadequate hardware plus new, Communication was a constant uphill advanced state-of-the-art “ add-ons” that battle for the task force. Regardless of the would enhance the system in the key areas clarity of the tactical air situation to the of hostile detection, friendly beacon track- on-board weapons controllers, there is no ing, and line-of-sight Communications. A command and control without ability to secure cross-tell capability and other pass this information to those who must classified programs were initiated to greatly react to it. college eye was handicapped enhance on-board threat assessment and by an aging, low-power uhf set, which was lateral information exchange. When real- unreliable in providing this vital link. The ized, this equipment formed the package line-of-sight communication problem was previously identified as the “ D + ” model, further complicated by low-level station- which became fully operational in sea keeping, mountainous terrain, and friend- prior to the bombing liinitations annoimced lies at médium altitude. When on target, by the President on 31 March 1968. Al- the fighters were almost always out of radio though minimal modification in terms of contact with the radar platform. Gravely dollars, lead time, interface, or technical concemed by this situation, the task force sophistication, integration of this equip- started a crusade for assignment of radio ment represented substantial qualitative relay channels dedicated to their use, so improvements. that real-time situation information could In tum, the increased system capability be fed through a high-powered radio relay demanded new autonomous control author- platform “ guaranteeing delivery” to the ity and operational procedures. This is best friendlies. demonstrated by a “ before and after” look 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW at the threat-waming process. Although unacknowledged, which always left receipt threat-warning formats varied in different in question. time frames, those used in the earlier years From the beginning, college eye recog- shared the following characteristics: nized the problems this created for the (1) Given on “ Guard” (243.0 MHz) for strike pilot and could envision the hard- all to hear. ware and procedural changes necessary to (2) Area warnings, tied to ground refer- resolve them. Unfortunately, the changes ence systems such as georef, color-coded could not occur ovemight. With multiple areas, or sectored concentric circles from a transmissions on “ Guard,” air-to-air “ chat- reference point. ter” on discrete tactical channels, which (3) Most often nonspecific as to type, was vital to coordinating final strike quantity, heading, speed, altitude, or ap- profiles, was often blocked. Area threat parent intent. formats required each pilot to estimate his (4) Issued too frequently by the same, or position in the same ground reference Sys- different, agencies without correlation as tem first, then compute relative position of being either updated or additional threat the hostile to assess the threat. This process reports. took time, interrupted concentration on (5) Issued “ in the blind” and therefore other vital in-flight procedures, and unnec-

The Airbonn Wambxg and Contrai System (AWACS) depicted hcrc (right) portriujs the follotthon system being devcloped by tlu: Boeing Company from the hasic 707-320B Intercontinental airframe. . . . US.\F F-102s interrept a Societ Bear. Covtrui o f this type activity is a com- mon occurrence for EC-121 aircrews now in their worldicidc-einploijnient role. REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATIONS 75 essarily concerned flights to which the hos- in exeuses for the shortcomings. They are tiles posed no threat. When analyzed as a important in retrospect, however, if we are potential threat, the large area encom- to learn the lessons. passed vvithin the threat warning (necessary W e required the ability to pass real-time to compensate for its non-real-time natnre) threat warning by flight call sign directly and its nonspecific information left the from collece eye to the threatened air- friendly with little more than a heads-up craft over discrete control channels, giving warning. He had no idea if a challenge hostile position in relative range and bear- would materialize, or when, or if it might ing. This necessitated improved detection come from port, starboard, astern, or capability, rapid identification of friendlies, head-on. Did he jettison his ordnance and reliable line-of-sight Communications, and prepare for aerial engagement? Did he al- other improvements of the D-model ter his ingress/egress route? Did he split “ add-on” confíguration. out his flight? Did he press on as planned? Because of its integration as an extension There was little help in answering these of the semiautomatic ground environment questions. It is small wonder, then, that (sag e), the EC-121 had not been configured out-countrv flvers had little faith in the for the identification responsibility. Where- warnings issued, nor were they interested as the system originally deployecl was lim- 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ited to one-at-a-time passive decode of sif curtailment to extensive modifications in returns, the D + confíguration, with its progress to upgrade the D + to a fully au- AN/GPA-122, allowed each weapons con- tomated EC-121T. This second step in a troller to passively track six discrete sif two-phase transition in system configura- codes, selectively identify any one of the tion followed updated thinking that placed six in real time, and actively read out the airborne command and control resources mode and code of any squawking aircraft in a worldwide role. In response to these as fast as he could “ gate" the return changes and to avoid stereotyping, the name (similar to the light-gnn technique used in was changed from Airborne Early Warning sage and other ground environments). Sueh and Control to Airborne Surveillance and capability was a first step toward realizing Control System (asacs), which would more the discrete warning process discussed ear- closely associate it with the next phase, lier. the Airborne Warning and Control System Similarly, retrofít of obsolete uhf sets (awac s). with the latest inventory item, AN/ARC- The asacs retained all basic EC-121D 109, and assignment o f additional externai capabilities plus those derived from thirty- high-power relay channels gave college three additional major end items of hard- eye the abilitv to communicate with select- ware. Enhanced capabilities include ed elements of the strike force through- —if f /sif beacon tracking/decode through out their mission profiles. When fully im- a real-time on-board digital Computer plemented, the procedures called for three —Computer “ rate-aided tracking of discrete uhf frequencies, assigned to the manually initiated hostile detections wings from which most strike forces were —Addition of symbology to display Sys- drawn. Complementing systems, increased tems lateral coordination, and procedural dis- —Computer-assisted intercept control cipline resolved the few remaining prob- programs lems previously identified. While threat —Computer-formated air-to-air control warning was used as an example, other data link message transmission taskings benefitted equally from the equip- —Software flexibility to tailor tactics to ment upgrade. mission tvpe and geography —Capability for in-flight reprogramming to adjust to dynamic tactical situation Atter March 1968 —Redundant digital data down link (be- yond line-of-sight and relayed line-of-sight The bombing cease did not end the media) college eye efforts but simply altered —Secure, high-power, beyond line-of- their direction. The task force entered a sight voice mode period of tailoring its capabilities to the —New navigation systems and Computer requirements of the remaining combat mis- interface to increase radar stabilization sions in sea. The total Aerospace Defense accuracy in ground reference Command EC-121 force found itself tasked —Other classified complementing subsys- to support jcs-directed commitments tems to enhance real-time battle manage- worldwide, performing many diverse mis- ment, warning, threat assessment, and sions against a number of mobility plans in weapons control functions. support of global eontingencies. The Vision gained in sea toward the Even though the sea employment had worldwide application of airborne com- less emphasis, there was no corresponding mand and control was not lost. asacs is Radarscope. Cretr mcmbern of552 AF. W irC Wing examine lhe presenlation im One o f lhe aircraft's fice radar display consoles. 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

still in the stage of operational refínement. tem development beyond anything ever Expertise derived in the brief but intense envisioned for the EC-121. Originating as a interaction between the add-on configura- by-product of adc ’ s single conus role, air- tion and combat forces is being exploited borne command and control by adc in a to bridge the gap between present-day global role has since become a way of life. resources and the fruition of a state-of-the- art follow-on. T he employment of the 552 aew & c The continuing development of asacs, W ing’s resources in Southeast Asia encompassing the embryonic stages of confirmed without doubt the validity of aw ac s, is gnided by a newly commissioned us.af Basic Doctrine, which States the re- System Support Facility ( ssf ), truly the quirement for airborne command and con- nucleus of the system. trol to exhibit characteristics of survivabili- The ssf was designed to provide organic ty, mobility, responsiveness, and tactical design, testing, production, and analysis of versatility. That employment further de- Computer software, to maximize the sys- fíned the reguirements for follow-on systems tem’s responsiveness to any environmental/ and afforded a proving ground for both tactical changes. It also provides system system employment and procedural tech- diagnostic support and dynamic crew sim- niques. The data base so derived is inval- ulation. Through this facility will come the uable to the current development of follow- reality of interfacing asac s with all major on systems. environments. Such a requirement knows no geographv Ongoing emphasis is being placed on or set scenario. System design therefore conducting exercises with all commands must incorporate the flexibilitv necessary to and Services, from which can be gleaned respond worldwide to dynamic tactical sit- knowledge and skill vital to making asac s uations. In peacetime, caution must be viable to command and control neecLs. exercised to avoid so optimizing the system Throughout this eight-year development, to a particular role that flexibility is lost. one common ingredient is noted. Contin- To maximize the effectiveness of the lim- ued successes have been achieved through ited fleet size that mav be reasonably ex- the dedicated efforts of a small bodv of be- pected in the current fiscal atmosphere, the lievers, charged with single managership. single-manager concept should be main- These specialists, often with an entire ca- tained for current and follow-on systems. reer devoted to this single discipline, ap- Should developmental or appropriation plied their years of experience in airborne milestones slip for the aw ac s, the asac s radar technology within this single- program should be continued to avoid a managership concept to realizing ac- lapse in operational capability and provide complishments not otherwise obtainable. smooth transition into the new airframe. Through single managership, airborne When priorities for future Defense dollar command and control has grown and will allocations are being weighed, airborne continue to grow into a responsive system providing immediate reaction to a dynamic command and control must receive enlight- ened recognition as an essential, cost- threat. The 552 aew & c Wing’s vast experi- ence in airborne earlv warning and control, effective element of any total force struc- ture. teamed with ad c ’ s unequaled knowledge of AW ACS Special Project Office radar command and control systems, has and provided expertise in depth, allowing sys- Hq United States A ir Force THE DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATIONS

NE of the crucial problems in the communications-electronics management area is assuring that systenis and Services reinain responsive to Air Force needs in the face of changing Otechnology, restricted resource climates, and revised concepts of command and control. Solving this problem requires effective planning, which depends in turn on the accurate and timely definition of operational requirements. As used here, the term “ operational requirements” pertains mainly to the basic needs of operating organizations for Communications Services such as command and control channels, data links to computers, air/ground rádios, or telephones that are essential for accomplishing the Air Force’s mission. Operational requirements must include sufficient detail to quantitatively describe the Service required, for example: range, accuracy, reliability, or security. Not included are technical and

79 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW support considerations that pertain to find- and Korea showed the necessity for standard ing the best or most efficient way to pro- Communications equipmeht, for the past vide a Service; these are design considera- fifteen years the growing utility of com- tions. puters and leased Communications Services has led to a lapse of standardization in favor of cost savings and special responsiveness The Requirements considerations. Now the costs of Computer Problem systems, needs for interfaces between previ- The collection and analysis of require- ously separate systems, ând centralized con- ments constitute a complex undertaking, trol of the strategic forces are reversing the hampered by a great deal of inherent un- trend. But the very efforts of making inter- certainty and imprecision. Informed opinion faces and seeking commonality severely often differs concerning the validity of in- eomplicate the requirement process because dividual requirements and the accuracy of of the necessary trade-off and externai Sys- their specifications. While the use of analy- tem considerations. sis and systems engineering can remove Third, decision-makers cannot evaluate some of the subjectivity regarding individual requirements in isolation. To make resource requirements, a number of problems remain, allocations as wisely as possible, they must particularly in dealing with the Communi- have a mechanism for placing requirements cations picture as a whole. within the context of higher missions and First, there is a need for a more aggres- other competing requirements before as- sive approach toward collecting and sifting signing priorities. This is difficult when requirements. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Di- commands develop and forward require- rector of Defense Research and Engineering, ments piecemeal for approval, as current warns that the military must use “ a specific procedures allow. effort bv competent people" to identify In order to address these problems more defíciencies in peacetime so that they will effectively, it is helpful to take a systems not surprise or haunt us in war.1 Clearly, approach toward requirements identifica- such an effort must be thorough and com- tion and analysis. Although there is an iden- prehensive. For example, in addition to tifiable method to the systems approach, it inspections for procedural compliance, there is more properly described as a frame of must be thorough, searching analyses of the reference whereby the planner thinks in procedures themselves. In addition to know- terms of groups of requirements and their ing that systems are operating as designed, interrelationships rather than isolating re- it is important to know if the design itself quirements to simplify the solution. The is still responsive to the mission. Also, it is broader view has an obvious appeal, but implicit in Dr. Foster’s warning that plan- there are significant pressures that make it ners seek to forecast requirements rather easier to deal with narrow rathér than broad than wait until the needs become obvious; requirements. The narrow requirements are otherwise, there may not be time to respond. easier to analyze, understand, articulate, Second, more attention must be paid to fund, and solve. Thus, the planner is tempted relationships between requirements. Con- to simplify his requirement statement, de- siderations of commonality and interoper- fining away peripheral problems, limiting ability tighten the coupling between other- the scope of his analysis. While this sim- wise unrelated requirements. Although our plifies his immediate analysis problem, the experience as far back as World War II method fails to give a complete picture of REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATIONS 81

defíciencies, forces decision-makers to make What are the system boundaries? judgments without a full analysis of the How does it operate? problem, and exacerbates interfacing and Does it work as predicted? Why does it fail to work as specified? commonality problems. Can it be improved? It is neither possible nor desirable to do What are the effects of change?2 away with the analysis of diserete require- ments, but it is necessary to increase that The fírst question is particularly impor- dimension wherein individual requirements tant because we often define our systems in can be considered as part of the larger con- too limited a way. System boundaries are text. In this way commonality can be better sometimes drawn at the point where Com- addressed, mòre defíciencies surfaced, needs munications hardware leaves off. Consid- better tied to objectives, and requirements erations of the user and his operations or of “ prioritized” and compared. systems that must interface with the Com- munications networks are then neglected. For example, commands sometimes re- A Systems Approach duce the number of auto vo n access lines There are basically three steps to require- at air bases when operations and main- ments development: collection, specifica- tenance funds are tight. Although the com- tion, and integration. Collection concerns mands know how much Communications the surfacing of requirements. Specification money is saved, they can only estimate the is the process of determining those qualita- cost of such cuts to the user. The system tive and quantitative parameters that de- boundary for analysis purposes has been scribe the requirement and yield design drawn between the telephone and the user. criteria. Integration involves presenting the But calls take longer to establish, and users requirements in a Consolidated, time-phased spend more time dialing. Who knows what plan and linking them to command objec- this costs in terms of office efficiency? Per- tives and operational concepts. Through haps only a little, perhaps a lot. The costs all three steps, systems analysis and systems may considerably exceed the dollars saved. engineering techniques play a vital role. In any case, the cost of degraded Service to The following paragraphs emphasize the to the user is a valid, essential economie requirements process at a major command consideration. It is easy to lose sight of headquarters, but the same steps apply at such factors when system boundaries are other echelons as well. too narrowly defined in the analysis process. Hare s other questions are more straight- forward. Communications organizations the role o f systems analysis have always been interested in the answers. Disciplined analysis isessential toeach phase However, formal analysis should be in- of the requirements process. If properly ap- creased and used on a continuing basis to plied, the methodology yields quantitative explore the answers in terms of basic op- information about requirements to assist in erational requirements. More attention to establishing priorities, deciding when im- the analysis disciplines can pay dividends provements are needed, determining which by bringing precision to an otherwise sub- improvements are worth the cost, and gain- jective requirements process. The following ing approval for programs. Van Court Hare paragraphs explain the steps and show in lists six basic questions that systems analysis more detail how systems analysis can con- can help answer: tribute. Continued on page 84 82 AIR UNIVERSITf REVIEW Testing some o f the hundreds o f relaij units in thc electronic switcliing center near Pulk City, Floriihi leftK Built. operated, and maintained by General Telephone Company o f Florida, it is one o f about SO links in the D O D AU T O V O X gl o b a l net wor k. . . . T h e st at us co n t r o l bo a r t l mdicates by Computer print-out and flashing lightsany trouble locatcdby the switching eyuipment. 84 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

the aggressive collection of requirements. requirements collection Telephone Service in New York City, for The first step is colleeting requirements. example, has been in relative chãos because They can be surfaeed in a number of vvays: New York T el’s forecasting for the late demand-pull; teehnology-push; analyses of 196()s and early 1970s failed to predict a system operations; study of operations, future siuge in dem and. The company had logistics, contingency, and other kinds of curtailed investments in expanded facili- plans; and, finally, through interviews. Eaeh ties and was not able to respond fully.3 The of these techniques, assisted by thorough result was lost revenue for the telephone systems analysis, can make significant con- company, inability of many customers to tributions to the development of an ac- obtain the Service they required, and a loss curate, integrated picture of Communica- of public confidence. Air Force Communica- tions requirements. Used together in a tions are susceptible to the same problem. systematic way, they can yield the steady Communications planners cannot rely solely How of information necessary to keep the on demand-pull. They need active measures requirements picture current and to allow to ferret out requirements and forecast timely planning and forecasting. resource demands. Demand-pull is the source of most short- Teehnology-push is one means of stimu- range requirements. The customer has a lating requirements inputs. Through a con- specifie problem. Where the need relates tinued awareness of the capabilities avail- directlv to a imit’s mission, justification is able from an expanding technology, the straightforward. Needs for hot lines, closed- communicator is sometimes in a position circuit television, or eommon telephones to suggest technological innovations to im- fali into this category. Some demand-pull prove existing Services or to offer entirely requirements involve the acquisition of ex- new ones to subscribers. Similar suggestions tensive Communications networks or costly will also come from contractors. In either research and development programs. The case, the mechanism is teehnology-push. Semi-Automatic Ground Environment There are some dangers, however. Ac- (sag e), for example, resulted basically from cording to Dr. Foster, a demand-pull requirement as the Air Force W e have met with some success in the past sought a better means for controlling air by using the approach of selecting promising defense operations. new technology and then identifying appli- Although all valid requirements for Com- cations that improve our capabilities. But munications Services and systems would sur- this approach—a solution looking for a prob- face sooner or later bv this method alone, lem—too seldom strengthens our weakest link. there is a major pitfall. If the communicator . . . Unless vve emphasize the programs that relies solely on demand-pull, he will fre- are founded on valid deficiencies and also quently learn of the requirement too late represent demonstrably effective Solutions, to respond to the user’s required opera- we waste millions, we diminish deterrence, and we risk lives and property.4 tional date. Lead times for system design and acquisition are usually measured in Planners can best find the weakest link by years, particularly for nonstandard facilities thorough analysis of existing systems, but to and Services. Further, there is the increased do so they must be careful to define the cost assoeiated with crash programs; sys- boundaries properlv. Most Communications tems come cheaper through orderly plan- organizations employ regular procedures ning. This in turn requires forecasting and for analyzing such functions as switchboard REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATIONS 85 operations, Communications centers, radio cuted in parallel, planners must assess the networks, and maintenance performance. aggregate requirement. Although these procedures yield valuable The last technique, systematic interview- measures of efficiency, responsiveness, and ing, although infrequently employed, is a other factors relating to specific operations good way to survey a command or a head- or svstems, rarelv do organizations analyze quarters to determine how the managers Communications as a whole: relationships and operations personnel view their long- between svstems, user considerations, value range needs for Communications. The re- 0f the Services performed, or the continued plies should be put together in a mosaic to utilitv of Services in a changing environ- form an input to the long-range requirement ment. This can be a serious shortcoming. process. The interview process taps the flow Communications organizations must ap- of unstructured ideas that circulates within plv the analysis disciplines more extensively a headquarters or operational unit. In a to the examination of Communications Sys- sense, the interviewing is like an organized tems in a broader context. They do this brainstorming session with the users of from time to time through special studv Communications. It produces a wealth of groups, but this does not maintain the con- information not otherwise available. tinued emphasis on requirements analysis Each technique for surfacing require- so essential at major command levei. Re- ments yields important results, but the tech- quirements change. Their continued analy- niques are best used in eoneert. No single sis is part of the command planning cycle method gives all the information needed and a valuable input to the decision pro- for accurately projecting Communications cess. The requisite up-to-date knowledge requirements. The emphasis placed on each about them cannot be obtained through a method should vary with the circumstanees. periodic kind of analysis whose results soon At the unit levei, for instance, demand-pull become outdated. and the study of plans would be more use- A fourth source of Communications re- ful than the other techniques. At any or- quirements is the studv of operations, con- ganizational levei these two techniques tend tingency, developmental, logistics, and other to produce the shorter-range requirements. kinds of plans. These plans often specify Interviewing is more fruitful at major com- directly what Communications are required mand levei in the process of developing for support. One must be careful, however, long-range requirements estimates, and then to analyze the plans for any hidden support on a periodic rather than continuous basis. considerations. When the plan is brought Although systems analysis techniques can to fruition, hidden requirements will come be used at any levei, the special expertise out, usuallv on short notice. They are much needed for full application is normally avail- easier to solve in advance. able only at major command headquarters Also, it is axiomatic that planners should and above. Again, to gain the needed insight assess the cu m ulative e ffe c t o f various plans into requirements, commands should use all on the Communications systeins that support five techniques and blend the inputs. them. Taken individually, each of several plans may levv support requirements that specification are well within the capabilities of current Requirements as originally collected are Systems. Taken together, however, the plans not suffieiently detailed to permit program- may call for more Communications than are ming, approval, or systems design. Fully available. If the plans are likely to be exe- specified requirements must answer the 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

familiar questions of who, what, when, tive parameters, especially when specified where, why, and how many. Except for the to be within the range of a few seconds. why, discussed later, these details are called Sensitivity implies that changes in the the parameters of the requirement. Speci- parameter’s value cause significant changes fication is the process of quantifying the in system cost. Very short delivery times parameters, which in turn describe the re- associated with long messages equate to wide quirement. A parameter is defined as “ a channel bandwidths, which cost much more variable or an arbitrary constant appearing than narrow-band channels. Because system in a mathematical expression, each value costs can be sensitive to short delivery times, of which restricts or determines the specific it is essential that such parameters be as form of the expression.” 5 accurate as possible and that the designer Parameters give form to a requirement have some idea of how they were derived. statement in the same manner that they Does one, for example, really need delivery do for a mathematical expression. To en- within ten seconds instead of two minutes? able the designer to find the best solu- If so, the designer can provide it, but at tion, parameters must be expressed in terms significant additional cost. of the requirement and not a possible solu- Parameters may also be operationally tion. For example, required data rates should criticai. Their values make a criticai differ- be specified in terms of what is actually ence in a systenTs responsiveness. Some of needed, not in terms of commercially avail- the most operationally criticai parameters able bandwidths or equipment; the designer are the delivery times required for messages can then best determine how to provide the that launch the sac bomber fleets or wam required data rate. Air Force Manual 1(X)-17 the National Command Authoritv of an im- lists such typical parameters as the request- pending missile attack. Any delay in these ingagency, terminal locations, traffic volume, messages can be equated with the possibility securitv needs, required operational date, of having a portion of the strategic forces operational concept, related plans, and com- destroyed. For these vital messages, time patibilitv and interface considerations.6 is operationally criticai. Delivery times Parameters are the criteria for system de- down to five or ten seconds can be readily sign. Later. when system design and trade- justified, even at greatly increased cost. In off decisions are made, it will be vitally such cases, the systems analysis and systems important to know the basis for parametric engineering disciplines are indispensable values. If they were based on judgments, for determining sensitivity or criticality and designers need to know the confidence levei. in assessing trade-off considerations. Otherwise they might go to imnecessary ex- Although not defined as a parameter, pense or sacrifice of other capabilities in another important element of the require- trade-offs to sustain one parameter at some ment statement is the justification. Essential arbitrary levei. For example, in the design for establishing priorities or gaining approval of digital command and control systems, it and funding, justifications explain the re- is essential, in order to provide sufficient quirement and the consequences of not transmission and switching capacity in the meeting it. Needless to say, the justification network, to know the allowed time to get and impact statements must be strong and a message from sender to receiver. Many vital in order to gain approval in todav’s other things such as traffic volumes, mes- funding environment. In this regard, one sage lengths, and traffic distributions also cannot overemphasize the importance of aífect capacity, but delivery times are sensi- tying requirements closely to command mis- REQUIREMENT.S FOR COMMUNICATIONS 87 sions. It is also criticai, in the approval This part of the plan should discuss relation- arena, that individual requirements be ships among requirements themselves and supportive and not compete with each other. betw een Communications requirements and This is one of the main values of having an the command s mission. If new data systems integrated plan that encompasses all of a are programmed, the requirements plan command’s Communications requirements; should show how Communications support mission and interrequirement relationships w ill be provided. If on-line Communications can be examined and articulated. are required for several data systems, the plan should explore the possibility of pro- integration viding a single, common supporting Com- munications system. If that is infeasible, the The development of a broad requirements plan should develop the rationale to sup- plan is essentially the integration step. In- port the acquisition of special-purpose Com- tegration itself involves a melding of re- munications for those systems that require quirements in such a way that planners can them, both supporting eom m andwide pro- view the entire scope of a command’s needs grams and integrating Communications for Communications Services, identify over- capabilities. laps or shortfalls, show how requirements relate to higher objectives, and spell out actions needed to remedy deficiencies. The process of transforming requirements A systems approach toward Communica- and their parameters into an integrated plan tions requirements and the development of is more of an art than a Science. The goal an integrated requirements plan are essen- should be to portray a commands total re- tial for laying a firm planning foundation. quirements for Communications—say over a Communications requirements determine five-year period—in sufficient detail to guide the missions of Communications organiza- programming actions and assure that plan- tions. The interpretation of requirements ners address problems as a whole. The plan and the way they are defined determine how need not include all parameters for each well Communications will be able to sup- requirement; however, those details should port the primary Air Force mission. This be available elsewhere to furnish guidance interpretation and definition, to be effec- to program managers and design teams. On tive, must be applied on a broad require- the other hand, the plan must include such ments scale so that all deficiencies can be things as required operational dates, inter- surfaced, interface and commonality con- face and commonality considerations, rela- siderations addressed, and requirements tive priorities, phase-out dates, general de- more effectively linked to each other and scriptions of the major requirements, and to higher mission considerations. The result how they are to be satisfied. will be a clearer understanding of Com- Equally important is a narrative analysis munications objectives and better planning of the key Communications deficiencies and to achieve the primary mission. their impact on the command’s mission. Headijuartera Pacific Command

Notes 3. AU.iii T Demaree, “ The Age of Anxiety at A.T.ôcT ." Fortune, May 1970 1 John S. Fajter, Jr., Weapon Systems We May Face—and Better Havc." p. 264 Supplemenl to the Air Force Poticy Letter for Comnuintlen, United States Air 4. Foster, op. dt. Force. M»rch 1973, p 17 5. American Heritage Dlctionary. 2. Van Court Hare. Jr.. Syitrms Analysu A Diagiuntit Appmuch lHarcourt, ti. Air Force Manual 100-17. C-E Eaeility and System Planning, 12 Junc Brace ir World. lnc„ 1967i, pp 237-41 1967, p. 9. FAST BURNER:

Does He Hear a Different Drummer?

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Charles W. Ro .ades In My Opinion

»•••••••

RING together a group of Air Force officers of similar rank, allow them to engageB in casual conversation, and almost without fail the topic of promotions will come up. W hat’s more, once that subject starts being scrubbed over, it’s a cinch that

someone will relate a storvJ about some- body he knows who has been promoted far below the normal zone of promotion eligibility: the deep selectee, or, as such m people are popularly known now, “ the fast bumer.” It s a fascinating topic of conversation, the fast bumer, and if the underlving feel- ings and sensations during such discussions could be identified, there would be among

88 IN MY OriNION 89

them the sense of awe, a feeling of nonbe- make a fast burner. On the other hand, if lieving wonderment, a little reverence, a by sustained performance an officer should good deal of jealousy, some quiet tones of be selected a second time for early prorno- aspiration, regret, incredulity, etc., etc. The tion, or a third, or even a fourth, then gamut from professional acceptance to clearly a fast burner has been identified nonacceptance could be found—and inevi- and recognized. By fast burner, then, and tablv so. Our promotion system has certainly without an officially sanctioned spawmed the fast burner, and certainlv such definition, is meant an officer who has been a phenomenon is to be expected. What is twice or more promoted from the secon- expected, however, is not alvvays under- dary zone of eligibility. He represents an stood. What characterizes the fast burner? established record of demonstrated excel- How did he get to be one? What did he do lence along with the other factors that differentlv to get where he is? What does make up the opportunity spectrum to be he do now? What do I do with one if he considered earlv for promotion. works for me? And perhaps most impor- tant, what if I am one? Fast Burner in the Making These are all questions that need to be objectively considered, to bring the realitv How does it happen? What combination of the fast burner into sharper focus, not of talent and circumstance produces an just for the sake of passing interest but individual extraorclinary enough to leap because the fast burner is a reality in the ahead of his peers? Does he, as Thoreau contemporarv Air Force officer structure suggests, march to the sound of a different and will probably become even more so drummer? under the coming all-volunteer concept. Central to the fast burner s success is his Accelerated promotion is the essence of approach to and performance of his work. the fast burner. Where the temporarv His whole ethic of work is one of the full- promotion system has certain designated est possible understanding of what he is phase points for normal rank progression, expected to do. Work is not an end, it is a the achievement of a temporarv promotion means; it becomes a dynamic involvement before that established phase point repre- that is studied, practiced, performed, and sents a leap forward from the contempo- then assessed for the quality of its comple- rary group. In effect, a man promoted tion. The fast burner doesn t do his work to ahead of his contemporaries acquires a new be done with it; he thrives on it, he gives it group of contemporaries, a group that en- his central energies, and he keeps a con- tered the Air Force before he did, a group stant awareness of how he could and will that is usually older both in age and in do it better the next time. professional experience. This leap in con- Some work seems painfully laeking in temporary groups can be as much as three the sort of stimulation that could motivate years, and with more than one below- an officer to perform at such a pace. But if the-zone promotion an officer could con- that be the case, then the fast burner re- ceivably be as much as seven years ahead sorts to his own Creative capabilities in an of the year group with which he orig- attempt to make the work more challeng- inally entered the Air Force by the time ing. Even to the most routine of tasks, he he reaches the grade of colonel. However, can and will bring the refreshing relief of just as one swallow does not make a sum- these thought processes because he thinks mer, one accelerated promotion does not and thinks seriously about his work, and in 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

doing so he can see it in new perspectives. works for, he appreciates the responsibili- Not, however, without clearly understand- ties that his superiors have, and his alle- ing that new perspectives bring new re- giance to them is firm. Because of these sponsibilities. traits, he himself demonstrates the kind of This application is all very appropriate, leadership that is important at all leveis of because such officers thrive on increased staff and command. responsibility. Not in a self-centered sense A frequent criticism of the fast burner of “See what I have to do now” but with from those who assess his achievements the idea in mind that new responsibilities with something less than objective consid- either bring with them ways to improve eration is that he allies himself to the one the work being done or perhaps lend them- man for whom he works to the exclusion of selves to unifying separate tasks that all others. seemed otherwise unconnected. They pro- Not so. vide new leveis from which the work being This sort of criticism is simply trying to done can be more easily seen in its total substitute the word “ obsession” for “ alle- mission perspective. The fast burner seeks giance.” Little if any work in the Air Force the “ big picture,” not because the shorter is done without collateral responsibilities to focus is less meaningful but because he is agencies, organizations, offices, etc., outside intent on seeing his worth in the entire of the immediate chain of command. The working scheme of activities. What is more fast burner, more perhaps than other significant, however, is that after seeking officers, recognizes not just the need to the “ big picture” the fast burner under- work for his own superior but also the ne- stands it when he sees it and can integrate cessity to work with many others. It be- his responsibilities into the making of such comes a contradiction in terms to criticize a grand view. the fast burner for narrow allegiance—the Does that make him superhuman? No, it very talent that brings an officer to such simply means that, with the finely tuned status includes a broad sense of working abilities he possesses to do his job, the fast responsibility. As a matter of fact, one of burner has a broadened focus not only on the traits that helps an officer achieve fast his known responsibilities but also on those burner status is his awareness of the need which his excellence might create. for working harmony. One very vital quality characteristic of Finally, the fast burner has obviously the fast burner is his firm understanding of needed one very important input in achiev- the leader-follower relationship. In consis- ing his levei of success: a consistent, careful tently demonstrating his ability to work assessment of his work, coupled with a hard, long, and efficiently, he quickly clear understanding of his outstanding po- grasps the most minute nuances of where tential for more responsible jobs. While his leadership lies and to whom he owes these may be the unanimous opinions of most firm allegiance. It is only natural that many who work with him, it falis the task he do this, because, as stated before, he is of one individual to reflect this excellence able to integrate his own position and func- on a rating form. But, more important, tions into the Air Force hierarchy. Further- once that rating document has been sub- more, he is well aware that his achieve- mitted, that same individual, or one sênior ments as a fast burner have been made to him, must continue to monitor the prog- because of the evaluations given to his ress of the fast burner’s career. In other work by his leaders. He knows whom he words, somewhere some one person must IN MY OPINION 91

íbe impressed enough by the excellence dis- fast burner, advancement represents the played that he becomes a sponsoring patron promise of broadened work demands and for the yoiuig officer. This is an absolute an intensification of his involvement within necessity for the simple reason that, in the the general confines of his career field, with competitive system making up the officer an eye toward achieving the highest possi- eorps of the Air Force, individual excel- ble rank and responsibility leveis in the line lence will never surface without the expo- of the Air Force. As he advances, this sure provided by the directed interest of high officer deals more and more with the ab- officials in the hierarchy. Sponsorship is stractions of his career area and less and nothing new to the Air Force; it has been less with the specifics, since he has clearly with us as long as there has been an Air established his excellence in them. He en- Force. It is a necessarv aspect in the se- ters then into positions in which he as- quence of events that surfaces the excel- sumes the responsibility for preparing, lence of fast burners from within the vast- training, and evaluating the specific exper- ness of the officer population. tise of others. The criticisms, mvths, and fabrieations Characteristically, the fast burner recog- about the sponsor system make fit material nizes the limits to which he can advance in for a separate article, but the system does imy one career area, and he begins early to exist; more important, however, is the fact widen his professional opportunity spec- that it must exist and that it renders a vital trum systematically through personal studv, Service to the personnel strueture of the through educational courses, and by care- .Air Force. One of the most important func- fully (not frivolously) volunteering for tions of the sênior military officer is to in- those additional duties and responsibilities sure that capable, effective younger officers that will increase his experience but not are recognized and promoted for their ex- divert it. A career conversation with a fast cellence. burner is inevitably a discussion with a man with a plan for himself. It is one he has carefully considered and structured, Where Does He Go from Herei’ one that he constantly revises. He has pro- The obvious answer to the question of jected for himself a realistic, achievable set where the fast bumer goes from here is up. of time-attainable goals, and he is on track By definition, it should be evident to the to achieve them. He is a producer who officer that his accelerated promotions are clearlv understands that naked, unchecked not occurring bv magic, nor are they some- ambition must be tempered by firm thing he knows little about. To have achieveinents in whatever jobs he has to achieved one or more below-the-zone ad- do. Further, he knows that courage is an vancements has been a central part of the important aspect of his plans: courage to fast burner’s aspirations, and any such suc- set his goals and the foresight to know how cess has naturally whetted his desire for to achieve them. more. Probably the most welcome and refresh- The fast burner will undoubtedlv go to ing characteristic of the fast burner in to- more broadening assignments, to more re- day s Air Force is his positive, assertive, sponsible positions, or to advanced leveis of “ can do” attitude. This is not to say that he assignment within his particular general foolishly believes everything is possible; he (not specific) area of expertise. For an is, after all, a realist. What he does believe officer with the proven effectiveness of a firmly is that everything is worth trying, in 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW order to see if the way exists. The signposts difficulties of the challenges of doing more of this attitude are obvious: first, he refuses •with less are a perfect spawning ground foi to be caught responding negatively to re- excellence in younger officers. The more quests to do anything. He won t make ex- testing the project, the greater will be thd cuses or refusals to do things; rather he will Creative contribution of the young officej question his requester and himself to fínd who is fast burner material. To keep il how he can do the job. And if he caiTt do alive, he must be recognized and advancec it because of priorities or limitations, he’ll in keeping with his demonstrated potential do whatever he can to direct the work And therein lies the greatest responsibilit) where it can be done. Second, he invari- of the sênior officer in assessing the work o ably infuses the sarne sort of working spirit the younger: Not only how much and hov into his people; his determination and well has this officer performed, but what i: theirs become one. Simply stated, the burn- his potential to do more and better in an er is a doer; and God knows, in an envi- ever rising function? ronment of dollar constraints and personnel This naturally requires no small amoun cutbacks, he is more and more the man of objectivity to determine; but as wa vvho makes the Air Force go. implied earlier, the sponsoring officer ha These remarks are by way of a checklist to have an almost purely subjective gu of attributes of the fast burner. If you are feeling for the potential of a younge' one, then you can easily see yourself repre- officer, and he must be willing to act 01 sented here. If vou think you may be one, that feeling in recommending rapid promo then check your own profile against these. tion. The balance of the two is what cre If vou are not one, then you are best ad- ates and will keep creating fast burners. vised to fínd an officer who is one and study his methods. The System Works Having created the phenomenon of the fast burner, the Air Force has made it clear N o phenomenon such as this is wholh that such officers are needed in the system without problems, and here there are to make it function effectively. That need probably many. Three are worth mention continues and will continue even more ing. crucially in the future. Not only will Air First, it is patentlv obvious to anyone: Force sênior officer departures and retire- who studies the structure of the Air Force ments be large over the next three years, officer force that the promotion pvramic but dollar cutbacks will demand that grows very narrow near the top. The laws officer-leaders over the coming years get restrictions, and requirements governin^ even more done with fewer resources than the structuring of the general officer force seems possible at the present. make enlightening reading for anyone whc Perhaps the real “ proof of the pudding” feels that promotion probability is stable of the fast burner system will lie in its abil- right up to the Chief of Staff. As a receni ity to perpetuate itself along with the nor- brigadier general promotee put it: “ Foi mally constituted promotion cycles. If every man who earns his first star, there those who have leaped ahead because of are at least 250 individuais who are con their unique abilities are genuine, then vinced he shoulcln t have!" Perhaps over they clearlv understand the need to look dramatic, but painfully accurate: aboul back to identify and sponsor the talented that proportion of colonels, one in 250, i: younger officers in the force. The promoted to brigadier general each year IN MY OPINION 93

Obviously a number of those 2,50 will be Finally, there is an unnecessarily false fast bumers; and, all other qualifications dilemma created by the fast burner phe- being generally equal, how is the one man nomenon that works to the detriment of chosen? The point is that at the grade of the officer and the system. A fast burner colonel a plateau exists which is not easily who receives two or more promotions be- passed en route to star rank, and if the fast low the zone comes to expect them be- burner who has arrived earlv at colonel cause he has convinced himself that he has watches a number of promotion boards go and is demonstrating great potential. If, at bv without selecting him, he can suffer the first time he is eligible for the next rank from some sobering and sometimes uncom- in the secondary zone he is not selected, he fortable thoughts. He fullv comprehends tends to look on that as a passover and can the structuring of the general officer suffer an immense blow to his perceived grades, but his own personal, prolonged professional competence and self-confidence. assessment of himself and his chances mav Should he be eligible again below the zone cause him no sinall amount of agony. and not selected again, he may be tre- Second, although the percentage number mendously affected and understandably of below-the-zone promotions is strictlv shocked. These sorts of things have hap- controlled, the desirability of being pro- pened—not with great regularity, but thev moted ahead of cycle is very high, not only have happened—and the affected officer for the officer concerned but for the unit may conceive of himself as on the verge of and major command in which he serves. It professional failure. is wholly expected that the sênior officers And there are still other problems, but of one major command will scan a below- not so great that thev damage the intent of the-zone promotion list to see how many the fast burner system. It is, after all, a officers of other commands are there. Cer- process that seeks the best, and as such it tainlv the whole question of retention, could not survive if it were onlv cosmetic motivation, replacement of key positions, in its intent. It is a system that affords the etc., hinges on those numbers. What re- early rise of the most capable officers to sults, however, is an almost predictable positions of higher responsibility, and it inflation of oers in ensuing rating periods, represents the most credible judgment of particularly those just preceding the next sênior Air Force leaders and managers promotion boards. As a consequence, the about the potential of vounger officers. entire shift is toward the 9-4 oer, and any Most important, though, the performance aberration from those numbers can be, but records of those who have become and are will not always be, cat&strophic for hopeful becoming fast bumers demonstrate without officers. When this happens, however, there question that the system works—for the follows (to the betterment of the Service as good of the entire Air Force. a whole) a more careful and reflective scru- Air War Collcge tiny of the ratings being reviewed by both screening and promotion boards. WHY MILITARY AIRPLANES COST SO MUCH AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT

M aj o r Frederick T. Stark

HE COST of growth of military hard- $36 per pound for the P-51 to about $290 T ware is increasingly the subject of na- per pound for the F-15. Even these num- tional debate. Critics of the Department of bers are not precise, since there are other Defense cite massive cost overrnns on ma- variables like produetion rate, amount of jor weapons programs, usually aircraft, as government-furnished equipment, labor pro- evidence of mismanagement and waste. duetivity, extent of avionies, etc. Granted Regardless of why military weapons costs the imprecision of any set of cost num- have gone up, the result is that we are bers, the essential fact remains: aircraft faced with buying increasingly expensive cost growth is impressively large. W e are weapons with a defense budget that is ac- currently paying eight times the cost per tually declining in relation to the gross na- pound for fighter aircraft that we did in the tional product and total federal budget. 1940s. W e are paying four or five times as It is important to understand how much much as we did in the 1950s and just under military aircraft costs have risen when twice what we paid in the 1960s. These are examining this subject. Obviously, one can- produetion costs. Development costs have not compare the cost of a 50,000-pound grown even more. F -111 to that of a 10,000-pound World War The cost growth has some important but II fighter-bomber on any meaningful basis. subtle effects that can be likened to a cir- The eurrent airplane is larger and heavier, cle. As costs increase, we can afford to and for those reasons alone it should cost develop fewer new airplanes. This ineans more. Also, the cost of factory labor during that those we now have must stay in the W orld War II was about one-fourth the inventory longer. When we eventually do cost of labor today. To get an aeeurate have to buy a new airplane, it represents a view of cost change, we should compare greater teehnological change. This change cost per pound in eonstant-value dollars is made by design teams that have had less based on factory labor pay rates. The cost opportunity to gain experience in develop- per pound should be based on empty ing airplanes since fewer airplanes are weight, since this is a truer reflection of the being developed. The result is more devel- materiais and labor that went into the air- opment problems causing higher costs, and plane. Cost per pound is also a good mea- the circle continues. sure of the price of other manufactured Evidence that the circle effect exists can products, such as automobiles, civil air- be seen in the reduced number of airplane craft, and appliances.1 types being developed (Figure 1), the in- Therefore, instead of comparing the creasing cost of airplanes (Figure 2), the $60,000 cost of the W orld W ar II P-51 to increasing length of time aircraft remain the $7,.500,000 cost of the new F-15, we operational (B-52, F-100, F-4, etc.), and the should compare them on the basis of cost well-publicized technical problems in some per pound in constant-value dollars. The of the airplane development programs in comparison then beeomes approximately the recent past.

94 XF-92 XF-91 XF-90 XF-88 XF-87 F-86 F-85 P-43 F-84 XP-42 P-82 Figure i. Amnj and Air Force XP-41 P-80 first fiights of fighter airplanes P-40 XP-79 P-3 9 P-77 P-3 8 P-75 P-37 XP-72 P-36 P-70 P-3 5 XP-67 XP-31 P-Ó6 P-64 P-8 P-30 p_7 P-29 P-63 F-5 P—6 P-26 XP-62 F-4 P-5 YP-24 P-61 P-3 X/YP-23 P-60 F-107 TP-1 XP-22 P-59 F-106 PG-1 XP-21 XP-58 F-l 05 PW-9 YP-20 XP-5Ó F-104 Faithless PW-8 XP-16 XP-55 F-l 02 Firebar PW-7 XP-13 XP-54 F-l 01 Flagon PW-6 P-l 2 P—51 F-l 00 SU7B F-l 7* PW 5 P-ll XP-49 F-94 Foxbal F-l 6' PW-2 XP-10 P—47 YF-93 F-111 YF-12 Flogger F— 15 PW-1 XP-9 XP-46 F-89 1960» 1960» 1970» )920» 1930% 1940» 1950» Sovicl ‘Píototype». Not jhown. subtype%, »uch os P-51A. P-51B. etc.

But costs for other things have increased clined in cost per pound in constant-value in recent years, too, so perhaps military dollars. Comniercial transport aircraft costs airplane cost grovvth is no greater than that have increased only one-sixth as much as of other produets. Unfortunately, it is much fighter aircraft, as indicated in Figure 2. greater. Automobiles have aetually de- Some consumer items, such as appliances

300 F-l 5 O / / / /

F-111 O / / / / / ______traniporli / ______fighter» O F-4 Figure 2. Cost per pound in 1973 dol- lars for transport and fighter aircraft

+ -4- ^------1- 1940 1950 1960 1970

95 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

and electronic devices, have declined in that have little experience as a team be- unit cost in spite of inflation. cause of the infrequency of development The cost growth of military airplanes is programs. This inexperience may lead to most often attributed to the advanced tech- costly mistakes. Technology—or rather the nology required to produce them. Although application of technology too much toward advanced technology is a major factor in end-item performance and not enough cost growth, it tends to be used as an only toward cost reduction—does have an im- excuse for increases in cost. Overall, tech- portant effect on cost increases. However, nology has driven costs down instead of up. there are other important causes. This is reflected in our increased personal When a manufacturer plans for produc- buying power, which is keeping ahead of tion, he normally establishes facilities, inflation. Nearly every product is superior machines, and tooling to produce at a to its equivalent of ten years ago and re- given rate at the lowest possible cost. Of- quires fewer man-hours of work to pur- ten the government plans for this optimum chase because technological advances are rate but buys at a different rate. It seems applied both to the products themselves that to increase the rate beyond the op- and to the means of developing and pro- timum has little adverse effect on unit cost. ducing them. W e have every right to expect This is because the fixed overhead does not that a new airplane developed today will increase in proportion to production rate, be superior in nearly every way to one thus offsetting the increased costs of fac- produced a few years ago. It will be made tory overtime or of adding more shifts.2 on better machines, made of better mate- However, when programs are in financial riais, have better facilities to test its com- difficulty, production rates are often re- ponents, and have a larger base of scientific duced in order to reduce the rate of spend- knowledge available to its designers. These ing. Invariably a sharp unit cost increase factors should tend to drive the costs down. results, since fixed overhead continues over On the other hand we insist on addi- a longer period o f time. tional capabilities or accessories that earlier Changes in requirements normally have airplanes did not have, and they obviously an adverse effect on costs, too. The seem- affect cost. But there is another, less ob- ingly simple addition of a cockpit instru- vious factor that has an even greater im- ment can cause a major rearrangement of pact. W e know from recent experience the instrument panei, cooling ducts, elec- that we are going to have to keep a new tromagnetic interference protection, etc. airplane in the inventory for a long time, Tests that were once completed may need since new airplane programs are increas- to be rerun to verify the compatibilitv of ingly infrequent. In order to delay the the new device with other installed equip- point during its life when it becomes obso- ment. Many of the financial difficulties of lete, there is a tendency to push the State recent programs can be traced to govern- of the art to its limits. It has been esti- ment-imposed changes. There seems to be mated by experts in the industry that, little sympathy from Congress or the when pushing the State of the art, the last public for this kind of cost increase. two to five percent of performance doubles The wav we procure aircraft has evolved the cost. Not only does the cost go up but into a very complex, institutionalized pro- reliability tends to deteriorate, which raises cess. It takes more tlian .500 government total ownership cost. And such develop- people in several commands to buv a major ments are often made by design groups weapon system; there are hundreds of The P-51 o f World Wur II was developed initially for the British in 4 nwnths from go-ahead to first flight. One o f the most effective Allied figliters. it was also one of the least expensive at $60.000, ar $36 per pound Airplanes by the Pound in todaij s dollars. . . . The r - l o is expected to meet its extremely high performance and scliedule goals, but at S7.-5 million (not including R ir D costs) it is expensive— $290 per pound! 98 AIR UNIVERSITl' REV1EW

The DC-4 o f 1947 cost ahout $450,000 or $11.80 per pound in 1947 dollcirs, $40 per pourul in 1973 dollars. . . . The DC-10, developed with privute capital, costs ahout $18 million or $69 per pound. including amortized developinent costs. IN M Y OPINION 99

specifications3 that the contractor must tially the need for “ defensive” documenta- comply with, and these people see to it tion. In addition, the competition for that he does. They must know the status of selecting the prime contractor stressed tech- the program every step of the way. They nical and management approaches above provide incrementai approval for many of other considerations, insuring that the most the contractors actions. They impose man- capable contractor would be chosen. At the agement systems on the contractor, often subsystem levei there were important hard- more to improve their own visibility than ware competitions before selecting subcon- to improve the efficiency of the contrac- tractors. Lastly, the method of contracting tor’s operations. The result of this govern- provides the contractor with profit incen- ment involvement in the development pro- tives for keeping costs down rather than cess is that much of the contractor’s effort rewarding him for cost increases, as often is spent in satisfying government people. occurred under the old “ cost plus fixed fee This takes the form of meetings, reports, contracts. briefings, movies, demonstrations, tests, etc. The F-15 in all probability will not suffer While some of this is necessary, most of it cost overruns that have characterized re- does not contribute to the success of the cent airplane programs such as the C-5, final product.4 F -lll, and F-14. This is a significant ac- It is an unfortunate characteristic of complishment. However, the F-15 is still large bureaucracies that a great deal of going to be an expensive airplane. To at- effort is spent bv some parts of the organi- tempt to reverse the trend to even higher zation in answering investigations con- costs, the Air Force has embraced the “ pro- ducted by other parts. For example, the totyping” concept advocated by former tfx hearings conducted by the Senate re- Deputy Secretary of Defense David Pack- quired thousands of Department of Defense ard. The A-X, lightweight fighter, and the man-hours to support. The threat of other sto l transport programs are being con- such hearings, or of General Aecounting ducted under the prototyping concept. Office or Inspector General investigations, Aetually, this concept is not new but a re- causes protective reactions on the part of turn to the time prior to the 1960s when government agencies directly responsible airplanes rather than paper proposals com- for development and procurement of peted for production contracts. In the weapon systems. Protective measures ulti- case of the A-X, two prototvpes competed mately result in documents, many of which in a fly-off. The winning A-10 was selected are prepared by the contractor. Conse- on the basis of actual performance com- quently, when an investigative agency in- parison with the A-9. The A -10 has now quires into why costs are going up, that entered into a full-scale development pro- agency is itself one of the causes. gram aimed at production. The costs of the In the last two or three years some im- A-X development program will be under portant developments have been intro- $400 million, compared to the nearly one duced to reverse the trends toward ever billion dollars it takes under conventional increasing costs by attacking their causes. procedures to develop one airplane. The The F-15 program is on schedule and cost is substantially lower since the techni- meeting its cost objectives. Increased au- cal risks have been reduced by the fly-off. thority was given to the System Program T o date, prototyping is successful. The A-9 Director, and streamlined lines of authority and A-10 in the A-X program have per- were established to eliminate at least par- formed excellently, and the very low levei 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

of funding has forced the contractors to e. His “ reward” for failing to meet the consider costs as important as any hard- customer’s need is loss of sales, which, if ware performance goal. continued, results in failure of the business. “ Design to cost” is now evolving as a The above are some eharacteristics of a philosophy that is shaping programs of all free enterprise, free market system. No Sys- the Services. Simply stated, “ Cost is a de- tem yet devised has matched its perfor- sign goal just like reliability, weight or per- mance. In recent years it has been widely formance.” Where trade-offs are required, accepted that military weapon systems cost is one of the key considerations. For cannot possibly be proeured in a free mar- example, if a part can be made for one-half ket way. The most obvious reason is that the cost at a weight increase of ten per- there is a single customer, the government, cent, serious consideration will be given to and this customer is very unpredictable in accepting the weight increase. his needs and desire to buy. In addition, Hopefully, these are steps in a new di- the cost of development of a weapon Sys- rection toward lower-cost weapons, not tem is prohibitive for private risk capital. merely a pause during the climb toward If the risk of dollar loss from developing ever increasing costs. It is interesting that weapon systems that are not purchased is the government and weapons industry removed, it is likely that many companies appear to be rediscovering what the civil- would welcome the chance to compete in a ian sector of our economy has known all more or less free market atmosphere. It is along: i.e., competition and the resulting possible to devise a way to do this and cost control are necessary for success. Per- spend no more, and perhaps less, than we haps we can further approach the charac- now spend. teristics of free enterprise in the civilian In all likelihood there is going to be a market and thus begin to approach the continuing need for airplanes, ships, tanks, absolutely outstanding success it has had in guns, and vehicles. These items, like most providing more and better goods for less serially produced, manufaetured items, relative cost. benefit enormously from evolutionary de- Some of the eharacteristics of civilian velopment. Let’s take fighter airplanes as product developments are as follows: an example of how free market characteris- a. With high technology products, the ties might be introduced into development producer more than the customer deter- and procurement. Suppose five aircraft mines what the customer wants and neecls. companies were competitively selected and Based on his perception of customer wants eac-h was provided with $50 million an- and needs, he develops his product. nually to develop prototvpe fighters. Each b. Products are usually evolutionary in company would be required to provide the nature. They are ordinarily developed by a Air Force with two prototypes of a design design team that is experienced with the for evaluation every two years. This is very product type and in working together as a generous funding in light of the YF-16 and team. YF-17 prototype programs, each of which c. The producer recognizes that if his has a prime contract cost of under $50 mil- costs are not kept as low as possible he will lion for two prototypes.5 The determina- lose sales and profit. tion of what makes a good fighter would be d. The producer is unencumbered by left primarily to the contractors. If they customer requirements in determining how guessed wrong about Air Force needs, they he will design and build his product. would not get a produetion contract. IN MY OPINION 101

The prototvpes would be in competition hiring and layoffs depending upon the win- vvith each other and with aircraft already ning or losing of contracts. in the inventory. It would be the responsi- David Packard stated recently to indus- bilitv and desire of a contractor to prove try representatives, “ I am convinced, after that buving his airplane was more cost spending three years in the Pentagon, that effective than keeping existing inventory the [aerospace] industry is grossly over- aircraft or purchasing aircraft from his staffed and very inefficient by any sound competitors. Failure to sell a new airplane management standards.” He went on to would not result in financial disaster, and say, “ I cannot in fairness place all the the unsuccessful design teams could re- blame on the industry, for in many cases main intact, correct their weaknesses, and you have simply responded to what was trv to develop a more salable prototype. asked for by some of the so-called ‘experts’ The advantages to the Air Force would in the Pentagon.” 6 be substantial. At any one time there In the past couple of years some man- would be an inventory of prototvpes of agement innovations have been instituted differing capabilities from which to choose. in an attempt to slow or reverse the trend Should operational needs change, there toward ever increasing costs. Hopefully, would be a strong probability that one of they will work, but they have a certain the prototvpes would come close to meet- familiar “ ring” to them reminiscent of cure- ing the new need, since the contractors all systems of the recent past—concurrency, perception of what the Air Force needs disengagement, Total Package Procure- may be better than our own. (There are ment, pe r t . However, there is one im- such examples in other high technology portant difference: competition of hard- markets.) The contractors, if left relatively ware. Only time will tell whether this is free from detailed specifications, would be a step toward the efficiency of a more more able to innovate. The successful inno- competitive, free market way of buying vations would be of great benefit to the Air weapons or a timid hesitation in the march Force while unsuccessful innovations would deeper into the bureaucratic mire that not cause cost and schedule problems expe- characterizes our present weapons ac- rienced on recent programs. quisition process. If it is only a hesita- But most important, w e would develop a tion, the day may not be far off when Cal- national resource, teams of designers with vin Coolidge s question, “ W hy not just buy experience in developing actual flying mili- one airplane and let the aviators take tary aircraft, as opposed to the current turns?” will be applicable. temporary teams characterized by massive McDonnell Douglas Corporation

Note»

1. There are eiceptioi» where cxtremely higb qualíty or light wetghl is an rapid technological change; in others the specifications are «cessively detailed important consderxtion. For eumple. a *500 watch costs abont fifty times as Sophisticated procedures are sometimes estal)lished to allow a contractor the much per pound as a *10 watch. Spacecraft. satdliles, and ICBM pavload cost freedom not to comply with obsolete or ovcrly restrictive specification require- “ much greater per pound than that of aircraft due to the prcmimn paid for ments. hght weight However. for normal operational aircraft. cost per pound is a •1 A study by E. Gerloff, referred to in an article by Professor All»ert Shape- good measurement tool md is used Iry some manufacturers as a hasis for pric- ro. “Complex Dofense Systems Require Cood Design Teajns.” Defense Manage- ing ment Jtninuil, July 1972, indicates that Üiere is littlc cnrrelation l^etween tlie 2. Fised overhead in this context includes hottsekeeping costs. such as Utili- success of a program ;ind the specifications re

Maj or Dan Eliason

HE ABILITY of tactical fíghters to pene- his Hight path or approximately ten nauti- Ttrate enemy defenses and to acquire, cal miles ahead of his position. The view- identify, and destroy ground targets has been ing area for the crew member in the rear a keystone of success in every United States seat is even more restricted. To acquire aerial campaign from W orld War II until and identify a target within the obscured the present. To improve its air-to-ground area, the pilot must either fly an offset strike capability, the U.S. Air Force has approach to the target or must change air- devoted considerable development effort craft attitude by altering pitch and bank. and resources to the penetration of defense, The offset approach restricts flight path accuracy of delivery, and lethality of muni- planning flexibility, and the maneuvering tions. disrupts tactical formations, alerts the An equally vast area of research and enemy, and increases exposure to his de- development expenditures has been for aids fenses. Higher altitudes not only widen the to target identification under adverse visi- area of obscuration but also increase slant bility conditions, i.e., night and/or bad ranges. At slant ranges greater than 8000 weather. Little attention has been focused feet (the nominal minimum weapon release on the problem of target acquisition under range in a moderately defended area), it is good visibility conditions. difficult to acquire a truck target, even one My experience over a five-year period in in open terrain. Given ideal optical condi- the F-105, including 145 combat missions tions of illumination and contrast, visual in Southeast Asia, has convinced me that acuity is still a function of the angle that simply finding the target during the day- the target subtends at the aircrew's eye. time is our most acute problem. Discus- Simply detecting a truck is only part of the sions vvith people of greater and more var- problem. Once found, a truck must be ob- ied experience confirm that rapid, certain served in sufficient detail to ascertain if it is target detection and identification are the in commission, has been previouslv dam- dominant factors in the success of all aged, or is a decoy. air-to-ground attacks. The employment of standoff weapons The Wright brothers began aerial fhght demands acquisition and identification of observing the ground from very low alti- targets at even greater ranges. In environ- tude at a very slow speed and with a view ments of unsuppressed antiaircraft de- almost completely unobstructed by the fenses, optimal employment of standoff airframe. Over the years, visibility of the weapons necessitates standoff ranges in lower hemisphere has become almost com- excess of 15,000 feet. Probability of detec- pletely obscured by aircraft structure, and tion for a target of opportunitv from this enemv defenses have neeessitated higher range is extremely low. When operating speeds and higher altitudes. As an example, against prebriefed targets whose locations from an F-4 in levei flight at 20,000 feet, and appearances are known and have been the pilot cannot see the ground for approx- studied by the strike crew, the detection imately five nautical miles on either side of probability is only slightlv enhanced. 102 IN MY OP1NION 103

Subtended visual angles and contrast of of small targets. Given the premise that the the complete target area may be sufficient majority of taetical strikes are conducted in to allow detection, identification, aircraft conditions allowing the use of E/O devices, positioning, and weapons release beyond the emphasis on radar and infrared devel- range of ground defenses. However, target opment appears out of proportion. acquisition and identification can still be Eleetrieal-optical devices permit scene impossible if the target scene is complex inagnification, longer stabilized viewing and accurate target designation requires times, and enhanced contrast. Therefore, isolating the target from surromiding back- E/O techniques permit target acquisition ground detail. Currently, the United States and identification at ranges far exceeding is spending a considerable siun on standoff those of the unaided human eye. These E/O and terminally guided weapons. Extreme devices can accomplish this while retain- accuracies are possible, but rapid, positive ing image fidelity exceeding radar or in- visual acquisition of targets at the required frared. These factors suggest the general ranges severely limits full exploitation of desirability of an aircraft subsystem such as these potentials. a trainable E/O telescope with a large In order to extend our visual acquisition off-boresight slewing capability. Such a capabilities, perhaps we need to borrow video telescope system must have high some concepts from Mother Nature. She inagnification for good resolution of the has provided a solution to acuity limita- explicit target area but must be coupled tions while at the same time retaining with a wide field-of-view optical device. field-of-view. The hawk has coverage of The operator could use such a system in almost the entire visual sphere with up to the same fashion as he uses his own eye. eight times the visual acuity of man. The low resolution, wide field-of-view Hawks have other visual advantages over (analogous to periphery of eye) would be man: high sensitivitv to motion of an ob- for orientation, search, and initial acquisi- ject, extremelv rapid accommodation, and a tion of a point of interest. The high resolu- color-filter system to aid in identifying prey. tion, narrow field-of-view would then be We need to borrow from this work of pointed at these areas of the wide Nature. U.S. taetical fighters need a field-of-view that merit closer examination hawk-like system that provides an unre- (analogous to the fovea of the eye). stricted view of the ground and high visual This scheme would permit launch of ex- acuity. tended-range E/O-guided weapons on tar- Recent advances in the art of electrical- gets that have been detected and identified optical (E/O) devices have led to capa- by the pilot, using his video telescope de- bilities that could provide such a system. vice. If a laser receiver and/or a laser illu- An E/O device is essentiallv a tv camera minator were also coupled to the gimbaled looking through a telescope. The target tracking telescope, the system would be image is optically enhanced, received by a usable for delivery of laser-guided muni- vidicon tube, converted to an electrical tions. It could be designed for cooperative signal, routed to the eockpit, and displayed missions, wherein the forward air controller to the pilot in conventional tv format. provides the illumination or it is provided Although radar and infrared devices by the strike aircraft. Reflected laser spot have their utilitv in detection, they do not detection capability would enhance its dis- provide the operator a sufficient bandwidth crimination and also make it usable during of information for long-range identification night or adverse weather. 104 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Incorporation of a large field-of-view, format and appropriate operator-to-sensor high-aecuracy aid could provide the addi- coupling schemes are under investigation tional benefits of an excellent system to but on a very small scale. The mechanical guide visually directed munitions or to and aerodynamic considerations of sensor point other sensors or designators precisely. locations are quite straightforward, but From the defensive standpoint, the system they must receive early attention. Indeed, would provide air-to-air identification at the requirement for a high-acuity, large ranges sufficient to allovv more optimum field-of-view system must be emphasized tactical offensive or defensive decisions and and provided for during the conceptual reactions. phase of aircraft design. Such a system would offer major new In summary, a video telescopic device capabilities in the operations and intelli- will greatly improve aircrew ability to gence fíelds. The video display for the air- aequire, identify, and destroy targets at crew can be preserved on video reeording much longer ranges. It will permit launch

tape and plaved back immecliatelv on a tv of E/O-guided weapons at increased monitor after the aircrew is on the ground. standoff ranges. It can be readily adapted This eapability approaches near real-time to the deliverv of laser-guided munitions. reconnaissance for the tactical user by re- Moreover, this eapability will restrict the ducing the need for special photo recon- enemy s freedom of movement when U.S. naissance missions, which require postflight aircraft are in the area. This eapability can image development or processing. More- provide actual real-time E/O reconnais- over, present data link technology will sance from high-performance tactical fighters allow fighter aircraft video to be teleme- during the entry, attack, and egress phase tered direct to ground monitor stations, of strike operations. thus providing tme real-time, positively The changing nature of tactical warfare controlled reconnaissance eapability. demands improved target acquisition and Other advantages of the high-acuity identification to exploit greatly improved viewing system include improved weapons weapons in the face of harsh intereeptor, release systems, improved sights, and surface-to-air missile, and antiaircraft gun on-the-spot battle dam age assessment. The defenses. Improved standoff capabilities reduetion in number of sorties resulting will lower combat attrition while increas- from these improvements, plus reduced ing force effectiveness. In light of the con- attrition rate resulting from increased tinuing Soviet weapons and technological standoff eapability, indicates the system momentum, we must constantly strive to would be highly cost effective. W hile ini- improve our tactical air power. Davtime, tially oriented toward daylight/clear air good-weather target acquisition, identifi- mass conditions, visual acquisition at night cation, and attack are our primary mode of or through partial obscurations must not be tactical operation. W e lack eapability in ignored. Present developments in E/O Sys- this vital mission area. Great strides can tems for visual capabilities under poor be made quickly at relatively low cost and viewing conditions are promising and are low risk by sldllfully integrating current an obvious follow-on. Plowever, their de- optical, electrical-optical, infrared, and velopment should not delay incorporating a laser technologies in our fíghter aircraft. basic daylight/good-visibiíity system. The This needs to be done now! E/O technology for such a system is here. Wright-Pattersun AIR. Ohio Alternate versions of the required image SWORDS INTO BALLPOINTS A Netv Outlet fo r Military Expression

COLONEL Ha RLEY E. Ba RNHART Books and Ideas

HE first issue of a new quarterly pub- by academicians without military education, T lieation from the United States Strate- training or experience with conflict. . . . gic Institute was distributed to selected this can be a hazard to sound national de- addressees in July 1973. t In an opening f e n s e . . . T h e I n s t i t u t e , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l message, the directors of the Institute ob- “ encourage military professionals and serve that “ Armed Forces seniors, active others skilled in the military art to express and retired” have written little “ on national t h e i r v i e w s . . . T h e u ss i t akes “ n o posi - strategic doctrine and the essential ele- tion other than to make available the pages ments of a sound national security.” Indeed, of Strategic Review" for such papers. most of such writing “ has been contributed To lead the way, five of the seven re-

f Strategic Review, a quarterly publication oi United States Strategic Institute, Suite 1204, 1612 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 (tel. 202-393-1776); Vol. I, No. 1, Spring 1973.

105 106 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

to 3681; in mathematics, from 303 to 1236.2 tired militarvj directors of the Institute have articles in this issue. These include General Government eneouragement of scientific- Bruce K. Holloway’s advocacy of the ur- technical studies, a policy adopted as a gent need to restore U.S. strategic superi- result of our criticai self-examination after ority; an interview with Admirai John S. O ctober 1957, was a factor in these in- íYlcCain, Jr., on the subject of our Pacific creases. More important than such directed

interests; and an extolment of our sl bm measures, perhaps, in our free labor mar- force by Vice Admirai Ruthven E. Libby. ket, was the evidence to secondary and To represent the active duty contribu- college students that scientific and technical tions that Strategic Review will seek, there careers were “ where the action is” and is an article by General George S. Brown, would provide rewards commensurate with outlining some of the realities of r & d lead the effort they required. times and contrasting our dwindling re- Those who thought this way from the search effort with the burgeoning one of mid-60s on are emerging with their Ph.D. certifieates to find nasa phasing down, the U.S.S.R. The reader mav✓ sense that he has been here before as he encounters some military r & d in trouble with Congress, and of General Brown s evidence for the con- experienced scientific-technical people trast, which cites increases in Soviet tech- from Seattle to Boston drawing unem- nological work force and education that ployment payments. They are victims of are entirely disproportionate to our own the 6- to 10-year lead time between a ca- concentration on social “ Sciences.” Statis- reer decision and a contributing role in tics comparing the numbers of engineer- r & d . The lesson will be noted by the more ing, mathematics, and physical Sciences astute young people now entering college. graduates being produced in the U.S. and General Brown expresses concern over U.S.S.R. were a commonplace of our post- the momentum and concentration of the

Sputnik State of national alarm. The com- Russian r & d effort, which is fast eroding parison has lost public interest in the glow the technological superiority we have pre- of our successful space effort since then, in viously enjoyed. If our own military and the State of national unconcern which space r & d continue in a downturn, the re- accepts (and probably, in sum, approves sult could eventually be a cause for alarmed of) the cancellation of the supersonic trans- examination more traumatic than Sputnik. port ( sst) while the Tu-144 goes into pro- Dr. Francis X. Kane, who has contrib- duction, and in the downward trend of uted several articles to the Air University our military r & d while the Soviets are prof- Review dating from his active duty assign- ligate with new and experimental projects. ments with Air Force Systems Command, A look at the early post-Sputnik days is represented in Strategic Review by a is instructive. General Brown notes only a brief and trenchant piece, “ Arms Control .50 percent gain in advanced physical Science and Defense Spending." Kane argues that and engineering degrees in the U.S. be- increased military spending will—or at tween 1965 and 1970. By 1965, however, least ought to—accompany the reaching the effects of the post-Sputnik emphasis al- of arms control agreements that attack the ready had been observable. Between 1960 technological aspects of military competi- and 1970, advanced degrees in a group of tion in the absence of political reconcilia- “ hard core” scientific disciplines1 increased tion. W e have, he observes, from 19,200 to 47,100—a 146 percent gain. . . . inverted the process. Instead of the Doctorates in engineering went from 786 logical flow from national interest to political BOOKSAND IDEAS 107

commitments to military forces to technology unilateral gestures. It is an updated re- programs, we now deny that improved weap- printing of John Erickson’s “ Soviet Military ons are requíred by political differences P o w e r,” originally published in 1971 by the and national interest. . . . If we restrain Royal United Services Institute for Defence nuclear weapons in nuinbers are we more Studies, London. secure? The answer is no, unless we take Republication and widened distribution proper safeguards against Soviet abrogation of the Erickson work are signal Services, of the treatv or against their achieving tech- because there does not exist in the public nological surprise. . . . we need ròcd to pro- print anything close to its fact-filled, in- vide a base from which to produce new weap- ons in the event the treaties are abrogated; formed, perceptive, balanced coverage of to leam where technology will drive security the subject. measures; to investigate how Soviet scientists One thing that emerges from Professor might make breakthroughs; to explore where Erickson s pages is the clear picture of we will find new weapons to replace those Soviet leadership moving determinedly, eliminated or constrained by the arins eon- after Khrushchev, in the whole spectrum of trol measures. military capabilities, to erase areas of in- In the meantime, Kane notes, the concen- feriority to the United States and to assure tration of arms control efforts on nuclear a margin at least of “ suffieiency.” The forces poses for us the problem of coping Soviet doctrine of “ suffieiency,” Erickson with the tremendous conventional forces notes, of the Soviets—a staggering task at the . . . i nvol ves havi ng forces ‘ sufficient’ (both prices that men and machines connnand offensive and defensive) to ensure an out- todav. (Consider our evident inability to come favourable to the Soviet Union should produce a main battle tank at less than war come—that is, if deterrence collapses— $1 million per copy, driveaway price!) and maintaining sufficient strength in peace- Onlv a vastly comprehensive limitation time to have measurable edges of superiority and reduction agreement covering all ap- measured in numerical terms. (p. xii) proaches to firepower could restrain each Erickson finds the Soviet acceptance of side from pursuing qualitative improve- the SALT-1 agreements consonant with ments or making use of existing, nonpro- this doctrine, noting continued and growing scribed forces to seize advantages. Does the Soviet attention to conventional armaments atmosphere created by the “ Spirit of Hel- and qualitative improvements in offensive sinki/Vienna” promise to lead to such an and defensive systems not barred by the agreement, or to the mutual abnegation of SALT-1 treaty and agreement. There is capabilities which has been a hope of arms no evidence that scientists or engineers control advocates since the early sixties? are being disemployed from military pur- Dr. Kane believes that it does not, al- suits. though the pressures for the United States to forego qualitative improvements allowed under the agreement began with its an- I n sum, the pages of this first Strategic nouncement and continue unabated among Review bear the common thread of alert critics of defense spending.3 to the need for adequate U.S. military The major part of Strategic Review, a strength in a perilous world. In the U.S. special supplement comprising 142 of its Strategic Institute’s statement of purpose 182 pages, is not encouraging to those who and in its first editorial, there is promise hope that the Soviets would reciprocate that future issues will enlarge this scope 108 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and serve as a forum for diverse viewpoints Reviews interest have the invitation of the on foreign poliey and national defense. Institute to contribute. Surely there is a place for an independent The ussi is a nonprofit, tax-exempt insti- journal that will afford the responsible tution. Initial financing has come from Mr. military cominentator an outlet for ex- Arthur G. B. Metcalf, who is Chairman of pression, as a plethora of publications serve the Institute and also Strategic Studies antimilitary critics. The expressed intent Editor. of the Institute to “ take no position” is of The Institute invites inquiries regarding course doomed to failure by the necessity membership. (No “ subscription price” for to select manuseripts. Those “ military pro- Strategic Review is announced.) fessionals and others skilled in the military Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama art” who wish to test the breadth of the

Notes 1. BiologicaJ Science, engineering. mathematics. physicaJ Sciences. A "soft Department o f Health. Education. and Welfare. O.E. Bulletin 10024. core” group (English, joumalism. arts, philosophy, psychology. religion. Covemment Printing Office. 1962; and from Statistical Ahstract o f the United social Sciences) went from 83,426 to 239.259 advanced degrees between 1960 States, Department of Commerce, Covemment Printing Office. 1972. and 1970—a gain of 187 p«-cent. 3. See J I. Coffey. "The Savor of SALT." Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists. 2. Data from Dtgest o f Educatúmal Statistics, Office of Education. U.S. May 1973. pp. 9-15.

WRITTEN PELLMELL?

CoLONEL DoN CLELLAND

OR a book bearing the distinguished and Poliey. Nor is it jacketed with the Fauthorship of Senator Claibome Pell, hard-to-live-up-to promise that it will pro- the pun in this review title is probably no vide “ a clear analysis of national self- more pardonable than the book itself, but interest.” its claims are far less. It does not attempt Power and Poliey is a small book, both in to seduce with a portentous title like Power bulk and contribution.f Sixty-two of its 173

f Claibom e Pell, Power and Poliey (New York: W. W. Norton & Com- pany, 1972, $5.95), 173 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 109

undocumented pages consist of a putative Any study of diplo- Clausewitz is no lon- “ model treaty” first submitted to the U.S. matic history, more- ger relevant. War can executive branch and later to the United over, reconfirms the never again be mere- ly “ a pursuit of poli- Nations. The subject of this treaty is State accuracy of Clause- witz’s observation cy by other means.” activitv in the exploration and exploitation that war is merely . . . (p. 99) of ocean space. Senator Pell just happens the pursuit of policy to be the Chairman of the Senate Sub- by other means. (p. Committee on Ocean Space. 23) In his acknowledgments, the Senator refers to “ this little primer on foreign rela- Those things said, what are the book’s tions” and notes that “ it has often been merits? Before proceeding to comment on said that it is easy to make a simple them, I would like to emphasize that this thought a complicated one, but it is a very country still seriously needs a brief, clear difficult job to make a complicated one analysis of its role in foreign affairs. This simpler.” Since by definition a “ primer” is cannot be provided, however, by a book an elementary reading book, Power and that first posits that “ all men have certain Policy is not a primer, nor has it made natural drives which, as we have seen in things simpler. What it has done, in its at- the political and economic spheres, include tempts to do too much, is take a fascinat- the desire for freedom, for human contact, ing subject, weight it down with orthodox and for property” and then ignores certain ideas and weary language, and toss it like other equally natural drives in building its cake from the balcony. case. From Machiavelli to Mein Kampf, Power and Policy is particularly disap- we have seen the evil side of man depicted pointing when one considers the author’s too often to accept without question that credentials. As a college student Claiborne which simply ignores the presence of these Pell traveled throughout eastem Europe; other ch i ves. his father was the American minister to The Senator s chapter headings sweep Hungarv. And, in addition to his work as a from “ What Are the Lessons of History?” member of the Foreign Relations Commit- across “ The Challenges” to “ True Long- tee, Senator Pell has served in eastem Eu- Term Objectives of American Foreign Poli- rope as a Foreign Service Officer and as the cy. And as one reads, he becomes puzzled vice president of the International Rescue at the clichês—not only of language but of Committee to assist refugees of the 1956 thought. Hungarian Revolution. Despite this, how- When the author says, “ The gravest ever, we find him in 1972 announcing, as threat to our well being, however, comes though it were new: “ W e perceive not not from outside . . . but from ourselves only that there are signifícant differences in . . .” he seems to be on the track; then one ideology and practice among the Commu- recalls that he earlier said, “ No Communist nist nations, but also that there has been a power can ignore the costs of Vietnam— subtle yet marked mutation in the nature proportionately far higher for the North of the Communist system . . . .” (Shades of Vietnamese than for as . . .” and wonders Tito and Ho Chi Minh!) if the Senator sees the inconsistency in his Before commenting briefly on some of statements. the positions taken by the Senator, I think Surely his calculations should not be re- it worthwhile to place side by side two di- stricted to dollars and cents. What about rect quotations from Power and Policy: the inestimable damage done to the aver- 110 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW age citizen’s dream of America, his At a time when other Senators are up in thoughts about integrity up and down the arms over the issue of executive privilege govemmental line, his pros and cons on the and reconstructing important lines oi scars of wartime bombs and bmtality, and communication between the people and the lingering national fester of amnesty? those who make policy, this Senator’s solu- These things, and more, are the coin in tion to the problem of narrowing the grow- which wartime “ proportional” costs should ing gap between the Executive and Con- be calculated. gress is: It is frankly puzzling to lay down a copy I believe that as a matter of law we should of Newsweek that has featured an article adopt a requirement that the officers of the on the severity of the world’s energy crisis cabinet and other sênior officers of the execu- and then find Senator Pell saying blandly, tive branch submit themselves to a formal “ With the acquisition of atomic energy question hour in the legislature on a periodic twenty-five years ago, man acquired all the routine basis. energy he can use.” (p. 100) When our system of government is chang- It is disappointing to read the sections in ing radically, and perhaps not for the bet- Power and Policy devoted to the recent ter, one cannot help contrasting Senator growth of executive power at the expense PelPs approach with Dvlan Thomas’s chal- of the legislature. Here one might expect a lenge: spirited attack. Instead, this aecretion is explained away by blaming the technologi- Do not go gentle into that good night, cal revolution and its myriad details as in- Rage, rage against the dying of the light. superable obstacles to eorporate decision- Robins Air Force Rase, Geórgia making.

The Contributors

Staff. Prior to his present assignment General and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), El Eade was Deputy Chief of Staff. Plans and Segundo. Califórnia. He has advanced degrees Operations. and Air Force Operations Deputy in aerospace engineering aml control system to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. engineering.

G en er a l Geo r c e J. E ade is Deputy Com- A llen L. J ohnson M S.E.E., Northeastern mander in Chief, United States European UniverMty M B A . Ohio State University) is a Command. During World War II he Hew 37 Group Leader. Air Force Avionics Laboratory. missions in the ETO. He has spent much of his M ajor Ric h a r d S. Baty (Ph D.. University of AFSC, responsible for Hight test evaluation of military career with the Strategic Air Com- Califórnia. Los .Angeles) is currently a student. the airbome communication Systems devel- mand. as a B-29 pilot. Director of Operations, Air Command and Staff College, following an o pe d b y A F \L. Dur ing the past 13 years at 7th Air Division, England; Commander of 2d assignment in electric propulsion at the AF Wright-Patterson. he has been responsible for Bombardment Wing and 7th Bmnbardinent Rocket Propulsion Lal>orrttory. Previously developing and testing several UHF and mi- Wing; Chief, Single Integrated Operational Major Baty served in the Minuteman program crowave air-to-air ;uul air-lo-satellite commu- Plans Division. Joint Strategic Target Planning at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. and in Spuee nication systems. He was previously einploved by tbe Bell Telephone Laboratones. Hc rc- editor of the Senes on Uneonventional W#r- tems StaH Officer Course, wai avogued to ceixed lhe Soenhfic Achievement Award for fare published bs the University of Miaim 823d Radar Squudron. Spokanr International tbe 1971 l onospbenc Sc i n fillatioo Test. Press. Airport. With the S52 AEWfiiC Wing, he has been Wing Communications Officer. COL- LEGE EYÈ Task Force C&E StaH Officer. and Chiei. (,'ócE Division. 11c ho» served in Com- munications Systems Divbion. DGS/Ops. Hq ADC. and an ASTRA temr in Directorate of Coinmand Control Cominunicatíons, DCS/ Programs atai Resources. Hq USAF.

Bsuc adier Gen er a l Xoel F P ajuush. USAF Majob C harles \V M it c h el l .USM A. Ph D fflet) Ph D Rice University*. is assistam pro- University of Denvert was assigoed to the Air fessor of history at Tiimty Universais. San Force Weapons Laboratorv kirtland AFB. Aatooio Comnusaooed from flight traming in New México, ofter graduatior. from .Air Com- 1932. he served as Bving inStniCtDf and super- mand and Staff College in 1973. He was As- visor and as Commander. Tuskegee Anny sociate Professor of Electrícal Engineermg. Flving School Other oisignmeüts were as Spe- U.S .Air Force Academy. Other assignments eiái Asostant to the Vice Chicf of StaH Hq have been with US \FE and AFCS ui Cerniam (JSAF Air Deputy NATO Defense College. AFSC at Eglin AFB USAFSS m Japan, two and Deputa Director. Miliiary AsãsUnce Di- AFIT tours, and two Air Force ttvhmcal visão. Europe. Assistam for Coordinatioa. schools. DOS Plans and Programs, H q USAF; and Di- rector Aerospactr Studie* Instirute. Air Um- verssty 1961-64. Major Chius N. W il c 'ox BS.EL.. Purdue University; M A, University of Neliraskal is assigned to Ht| Pacific Command, Directorate ot Commumcations-Data Processing (J-6>. Sys- tem» DiVision His last nssignment was with Hq Stratcgic Air Command in the SAC Auto- mated Total Infonnation NetWork tSAT1N IV) Project Office. Other assigninents liavc In-en with the Air Force Technical Applications Center and Aerospace Dcfense Coimnund in comnmnications-electrúnics activities.

Major Ralph C- Gai:* r . líi. Amy, MA-, Umvemty of Maryland r» an uisfructor in L ie c t e n a n t Colonel Jeh o l o R. M ack Í5 oonâict rheorv and the Sovict pobtical mtem Aerospatc Defense Coinmorid Liuison Officer at the U.S Arrnv Institute for Mihtary A»is- to the \WACS System Project Office, Man Ume Fort Bragg. Nurth Caxolina In April vcom Field. Masõchusettl His assignmenU 1973 he was reopient of that iiotitutc i Disiin- have been ui Tactical Air Co mm and. flving guuhcd Instrui for Award. Prior militar) duties F-86* and F-lOík. and with ADC as Weapons havr tncfoded conveotional and uneonven- Contruller ui EC-121. manual and SAGE m - tlonal warfare awignmcnti in Southrast Asm tcim as Wing Stan/Eval pilot. EC-121. and mtelhgent* auigrimcnts in Vfetnam and COLLEGE EYE T*sk Force OpemUons with Headquarterv Department of the Army Officer SEA. 1967-68. Hq ADC* EC 121 Stan/£v*l and as Chicl. Airhome System Braiu-h. Command Control DiviMon. DCS/Opa. Hq ADC L ie o t e n a n t Colosel Charles VV R oades tUSMA; M.A., University of Washington. M.S . Troy State University1 is assigned to the West ern Hemisphere Divísion. Office ol tlu* joint Cluefs of Stafl ij-S). He has l»een a Iramport pilot in the M iIu .ua Airlift Command and wrved as assístant professor of Engltsh. U.S. Air Force Academy He svas Cliieí of Plans. 56th Spccml <)|>crations Wing, Nakhon Plian- om. Tliailond, and Executive Officer. D< IS/Plans. Hq Aerospace Defcnse ( oininand. (Jolonel Roadcs is a 1973 gruduate of Air War Jat M allin A B . Florida Sonthem College o fiollege. an author and ymmalisf who «penalize* in mihtarv aifain He worked in Cuha as a pwir- 1950-61, «nd ante then ha» covered Cdhan drvelnpmmts from Mlami He ha» traveled throuçhmit Lafin Amem a and ob- »<»v«d af fint hand wvrral aspert» of Cubar, C aptais HiriiARn S1 W il l iams . alter COm ««hvemoo mentioned in rhi» artidr MaJlm t« pleting the Communications'Electronics Sys-

ui and project manager with the Aerospaee Med- Commundant of Air Command and Staff Cob icai Research Laboratory. VVnght Patterson lege and is a 1964 graduute of Air War Cob AFB, Ohio. His previous assignments include lege. Fligjht Cornmander, 23d TFVV. McConncll AFB. Kansas. and tactics officer instnictor pilot. and editor of the 188th TFW Tactics Newsletter. Takhli, Thailand. In addition to Iieing an F-105 pilot. Major Eliason has served as an F-I01B radar intercept officer.

NLajoh Freoehk k T Stahk M.S Renssel.ier Polytechnic Instituto) is Chief of F-15 Engi- neering, Air Force Pl&nt Representaiive Office, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, St. Louis. Most of his Service has b e e » in major weapon System R&D programs He was in financial management and Hight test in the Minuteman System Prügram Otfice iSPO' ;uul has served as Flight Control System Project Manager and as a Configuration Control Board Chairman in the F-lll SPO. Major Stork w.is with the mi- tial deplovment of F-llls to Thailand in 1988

C oloxel Don Clelland (M.A., University of Colorado) is Chief of Plans. Hq Air Force Re- serve. Robins AFB. Ceorgia. He flew a tour in RF-lOls in Vietnam and was an F-88 pilot in postwar Korea. He has served in the Research and Analvsis Division. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force at the U.S Air Force Academy as history instnictor. Air Officer Commanding. and Special \ssistant tt» the Coi.ONEI. H \HI.KY E. B.VHNH AHI M A. Stali- Supenritendent. as Executive Assistant to the ford University) is Assistant Editor. Air lrnivcr- U.S. Representative. NATO Militarv Coinmit- sity Revicu;. He was a fighter pilot in World tee; and as Deputv in the Mibtan \ssistance War II. on Air Training Command instnictor Directorate. Hq USEUCOM. and a B-52 cornmander. His staff avsignments include dutv with Deputy Directorate t>f Plans. Hq USAF; with J-5 and Militarv Assis- tance directorates of Hq USSOUTHCOM; and M aior Das Ellason M S.. University of as DCS/Plans. Hq Seventh Air Force. VTet- Southern Califórnia' is a hehavioral scientist nain He has l>een facultv adviser and Vice

V

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The Threat, Foreign Policy, and Cost Control: Parameters for Force Planning” hy Colonel Edward Stellini, USAF, as the outstanding article in the September-October 1973 issue of the Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel Eldon W. Downs, U S A F Editor C olonel Har l ey E. Bar nhar t, USAF Assista nt Editor

Jac k H. Mooney Managing Editor

Maj or R ic h a r d B. C omyns, USAF Associate Editor

E dmund O. Barker Financial and Administrative Manager John A. W estcott, Jh. Art Director and Productkm Manager Enr iq ue Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Languuge Edition L ia Mido si May Pat ter so n Associate Editor. Portuguese Languuge Edition WlLLIAM J. De PaOLA Art Editor and lllustrator

ADVISERS Colonel Arthur C. L y\n Hq Air Force Logistics Command Dr . H ar ol d M. H eleman Hq Air Force Systems Cotnmand Colonel H. J. Dal t o n, Jr . Hq Air Training Command Francis W. Je nning s SAF Office of Information Colonel John W. Wal t o n Hq Strategic Air Command Colonel Boone Rose. Jh. //

ATTENTION Air Universitij Review is published to stimulate pro- fessionaJ thought eoneerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tacties, and related techniques. Its contents reHect the opinions of its authors or the investiga- tions and conclusions of its editors and are not to be constmed as earrving any official sanction of the Department of lhe Air Force or of Air Universitv. Informed contributions are welcomed.