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Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious (Moritz Geiger and Vasily Sesemann)

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Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious (Moritz Geiger and Vasily Sesemann) STUDIA PHÆNOMENOLOGICA XV (2015) xx–xx Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious (Moritz Geiger and Vasily Sesemann) Dalius Jonkus Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas Abstract: Th is paper deals with the approach to self-consciousness and the unconscious found in the work of Moritz Geiger and the little known philoso- pher Vasily Sesemann. Th e aim of this presentation is to provide an account of Sesemann’s disagreement with Geiger regarding the concept of unconscious- ness as well as to introduce his phenomenological explanation of the non- objectifying self-consciousness. Th e fi rst part of this paper explores Geiger’s concept of unconsciousness. Th e second part is concerned with Sesemann’s conception of the non-objectifying self-consciousness and its relation to the unconscious. Th e last part of this paper argues that Sesemann’s concept of self- awareness is similar to the concept of self-consciousness developed by Husserl in his phenomenology. Keywords: Unconsciousness, Self-Consciousness, Self-Awareness, Refl ection, Phenomenology. 1. Introduction Sesemann was born in 1884 in Vyborg, Finland into the family of a Swedish father and a German mother. He studied philosophy at the Uni- versity of St. Petersburg and with the Neo-Kantians Cohen and Natorp at the University of Marburg1. Upon his return to St. Petersburg, Sesemann 1 Interpreters of Sesemann’s philosophy relate it to Neo-Kantians (Botz-Bornstein 2006), but in my opinion Sesemann’s conception of self-consciousness is clearly more associated with 226 Dalius Jonkus taught philosophy and classical languages at a high school until the out- break of World War I. From 1914 to 1915 he was a volunteer in the Russian army. From 1915 to 1917 Sesemann taught philosophy as a Privatdozent at the University of St. Petersburg, and from 1918 to 1919 at the Viatka Pedagogical Institute. From 1922 to 1923 he held a teaching position at the Russian Institute in Berlin. In 1923 he was invited to teach at the University of Lithuania in Kaunas and became a professor there. In 1950, during the Soviet period, Sesemann was arrested and spent six years in the Gulag. After being released, he was permitted to work as a professor of logic until his death on March 23, 1963 in Vilnius. Th e philosophers of the Munich phenomenology circle, such as Moritz Geiger and Alexander Pfänder, were also interested in psychology, a fi eld that became an object of debate in the early XXth century. Geiger was one of the fi rst phenomenologists to explore the issue of the unconscious by draw- ing a distinction between the conscious will’s choice and the unconscious will’s behaviour. In his research on the unconscious (1921), Geiger criticized psychological explanations of behaviour that interpret a living experience as consciousness only. Geiger argued that some part of psychical reality exists independently of a living experience. But this conception of consciousness presupposes that the ego functions as a fl ashlight illuminating the transcen- dental psychical reality from the outside. Sesemann in his study, “Objectifying and non-objectifying knowledge” published in Kaunas 1927 rejected this ap- proach. He proposed that Geiger did not understand the true nature of self- consciousness because he identifi ed it with the subject-object relationship. According to Sesemann, it is impossible to divide self-consciousness into a subject and an object. Every act of consciousness is characterized by a direct self-awareness; but consciousness becomes an object only during the act of refl ection. Refl ection is a secondary act of consciousness based on a pre-refl ec- tive self-awareness. Every act of consciousness implicates self-consciousness, but consciousness is multidimensional and it is impossible to talk about an entirely conscious consciousness2. In his epistemology Sesemann developed the notion of a non-objectifying self-awareness based on the philosophy of Husserl and Max Scheler. the phenomenological rather than Neo-Kantian philosophical tradition. Sesemann never stud- ied with Husserl, but he was quite familiar with the early phenomenological writings. He often cites Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Moritz Geiger, Edith Stein, Wilhelm Schapp, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexander Pfänder. 2 Sesemann was well acquainted with the Freudian concept of the unconscious, but unlike Freud, he believed that the unconscious is not separated from consciousness. According to him, the contents of the unconscious can only be revealed looking at how the unconscious expresses itself in consciousness during either hypnosis or psychoanalytic talk therapy (Sesemann 1987: 307). In this respect, Sesemann’s critique of psychoanalysis is similar to the one described in Sartre’s book “Being and Nothingness”. Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious 227 2. Th e Conception of the Unconscious in Moritz Geiger’s Philosophy In his study “Th e Unconscious and Psychical Reality” Geiger distinguishes the “psychology of living experience” (Erlebnispsychologie) from the psychol- ogy that he calls “realistic”. Th e description of the former (“living experience”) is based on the experience of fi rst person singular or egoic psychical reality, whereas “realistic” psychology attempts to depict an “objective psychical real- ity” (Geiger 1921: 5). Geiger believed that personal or subjective experience is not substantive but always accidental. Th erefore, the psychology of living experience is not reliable. He compares the “living experience” with personal memories that are incapable of revealing the necessity of historical events. Like a historian, a realistic psychologist should never rely on personal experi- ences but, instead, try to recognize the necessity of historical processes. Th us, one should study not the subject’s personal experiences but the subject herself, ruled by real psychical processes. Even though Geiger still calls this a subject, it seems to be more appropriate to call it an object. Geiger feels it necessary to abandon the study of psychology based on egocentric experience in favor of a realistic understanding of the subject herself. Aber wenn auch alle Psychologie daher Wissenschaft vom Subjekt ist, so ist sie doch nicht egozentrisch, nicht um das erlebende Subjekt zentriert, sondern das reale psychische Subjekt wird zum Gegenstand, dessen Gesetze studiert werden sollen. (Geiger 1921: 6) Th e reason Geiger criticizes psychology that focuses mainly on a subject’s experience is that this kind of psychology has consciousness as its main object of research and thus completely disregards the vital role of the unconscious psychical reality in a psychological study. In this kind of study, consciousness completely subjugates the unconscious. So sind für die Psychologie als Bewußtseinswissenschaft die unsichtbaren un- bewußten Vorgänge nur Hilfe und Zurüstung für das Bewußte. Der eigentli- che Sinn des psychischen Lebens ruht für diese Anschauungen im Bewußtsein. (Geiger 1921: 14) According to Geiger, it is wrong to assume that the entire psychical life is the life of conscious activity. In order to study the psychical life systematically, one needs to recognize the existence of the unconscious and its important infl uence on consciousness. Geiger claims that one cannot conclude from the fact that the unconscious cannot be experienced, that it doesn’t exist: the eff ects of its doings can be observed in the outcome of the inquiries into consciousness. Gegen den Erlebnisrealismus, der die Existenz des Unbewußten leugnet, stellt sich so eine zweite Lehre, die ein Unbewußtes durch Schlüsse aus den 228 Dalius Jonkus Erlebnissen gewonnen werden läßt: der erschlossene psychische Realismus. (Gei- ger 1921: 18) Th is outcome-based approach resembles that of the German philosopher Paul Natorp’s method of reconstructing psychical reality. Th is neo-Kantian philosopher believed that the psychical reality cannot be experienced direct- ly; rather, it can be inferred using the method (matienai) of references. Like Natorp, Geiger avers that it is a mistake to try to understand consciousness solely on the grounds of personal experiences. Geiger also fi nds fault with the theories of consciousness that identify it with the act of being conscious. Geiger believes that the process of consciousness is never fully conscious. Th e examples that Geiger provides of the unconscious echo the points that Hus- serl makes in his phenomenology of passive syntheses. Sebastian Luft proposes that Natorp’s method of psychical reconstruction is similar to Husserl’s so- called genetic method used in his “Passive syntheses“ (Luft 2010: 62). I claim that there are similarities and diff erences between Husserl’s “Passive syntheses“ and Geiger’s realistic psychology. Both analyse memories based on uncon- scious associations in a similar fashion. Geiger, for example, thinks that the memory of yesterday’s sunset or someone’s forgotten name suddenly coming back to consciousness show that there exist so-called “bridges of the soul” that we are not aware of. Th ese hidden, imperceptible acts of unconsciousness eventually solidify into the structures regulating in one way or another the actions of consciousness itself. Th is perhaps explains why in very similar situ- ations people react diff erently, exhibiting huge individual variation in their inclinations, temperament and character (Geiger 1921: 19). Geiger and Husserl describe the mechanisms of the unconscious associa- tions in a similar way. However, unlike Geiger,
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