Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious (Moritz Geiger and Vasily Sesemann)

STUDIA PHÆNOMENOLOGICA XV (2015) xx–xx

Dalius Jonkus Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas

Abstract: Th is paper deals with the approach to self-consciousness and the unconscious found in the work of Moritz Geiger and the little known philosopher Vasily Sesemann. Th e aim of this presentation is to provide an account of Sesemann’s disagreement with Geiger regarding the concept of unconsciousness as well as to introduce his phenomenological explanation of the non- objectifying self-consciousness. Th e fi rst part of this paper explores Geiger’s concept of unconsciousness. Th e second part is concerned with Sesemann’s conception of the non-objectifying self-consciousness and its relation to the unconscious. Th e last part of this paper argues that Sesemann’s concept of self- awareness is similar to the concept of self-consciousness developed by Husserl in his phenomenology.

Keywords: Unconsciousness, Self-Consciousness, Self-Awareness, Refl ection, Phenomenology.

1. Introduction

Sesemann was born in 1884 in Vyborg, Finland into the family of a Swedish father and a German mother. He studied philosophy at the Uni- versity of St. Petersburg and with the Neo-Kantians Cohen and Natorp at the University of Marburg1. Upon his return to St. Petersburg, Sesemann

1 Interpreters of Sesemann’s philosophy relate it to Neo-Kantians (Botz-Bornstein 2006), but in my opinion Sesemann’s conception of self-consciousness is clearly more associated with 226 Dalius Jonkus taught philosophy and classical languages at a high school until the out- break of World War I. From 1914 to 1915 he was a volunteer in the Russian army. From 1915 to 1917 Sesemann taught philosophy as a Privatdozent at the University of St. Petersburg, and from 1918 to 1919 at the Viatka Pedagogical Institute. From 1922 to 1923 he held a teaching position at the Russian Institute in Berlin. In 1923 he was invited to teach at the University of Lithuania in Kaunas and became a professor there. In 1950, during the Soviet period, Sesemann was arrested and spent six years in the Gulag. After being released, he was permitted to work as a professor of logic until his death on March 23, 1963 in Vilnius. Th e philosophers of the Munich phenomenology circle, such as Moritz Geiger and Alexander Pfänder, were also interested in psychology, a fi eld that became an object of debate in the early XXth century. Geiger was one of the fi rst phenomenologists to explore the issue of the unconscious by draw- ing a distinction between the conscious will’s choice and the unconscious will’s behaviour. In his research on the unconscious (1921), Geiger criticized psychological explanations of behaviour that interpret a living experience as consciousness only. Geiger argued that some part of psychical reality exists independently of a living experience. But this conception of consciousness presupposes that the ego functions as a fl ashlight illuminating the transcendental psychical reality from the outside. Sesemann in his study, “Objectifying and non-objectifying knowledge” published in Kaunas 1927 rejected this approach. He proposed that Geiger did not understand the true nature of self- consciousness because he identifi ed it with the subject-object relationship. According to Sesemann, it is impossible to divide self-consciousness into a subject and an object. Every act of consciousness is characterized by a direct self-awareness; but consciousness becomes an object only during the act of refl ection. Refl ection is a secondary act of consciousness based on a pre-refl ective self-awareness. Every act of consciousness implicates self-consciousness, but consciousness is multidimensional and it is impossible to talk about an entirely conscious consciousness2. In his epistemology Sesemann developed the notion of a non-objectifying self-awareness based on the philosophy of Husserl and Max Scheler. the phenomenological rather than Neo-Kantian philosophical tradition. Sesemann never studied with Husserl, but he was quite familiar with the early phenomenological writings. He often cites Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Moritz Geiger, Edith Stein, Wilhelm Schapp, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexander Pfänder. 2 Sesemann was well acquainted with the Freudian concept of the unconscious, but unlike Freud, he believed that the unconscious is not separated from consciousness. According to him, the contents of the unconscious can only be revealed looking at how the unconscious expresses itself in consciousness during either hypnosis or psychoanalytic talk therapy (Sesemann 1987: 307). In this respect, Sesemann’s critique of psychoanalysis is similar to the one described in Sartre’s book “Being and Nothingness”. Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious 227

2. Th e Conception of the Unconscious in Moritz Geiger’s Philosophy

In his study “Th e Unconscious and Psychical Reality” Geiger distinguishes the “psychology of living experience” (Erlebnispsychologie) from the psychology that he calls “realistic”. Th e description of the former (“living experience”) is based on the experience of fi rst person singular or egoic psychical reality, whereas “realistic” psychology attempts to depict an “objective psychical reality” (Geiger 1921: 5). Geiger believed that personal or subjective experience is not substantive but always accidental. Th erefore, the psychology of living experience is not reliable. He compares the “living experience” with personal memories that are incapable of revealing the necessity of historical events. Like a historian, a realistic psychologist should never rely on personal experiences but, instead, try to recognize the necessity of historical processes. Th us, one should study not the subject’s personal experiences but the subject herself, ruled by real psychical processes. Even though Geiger still calls this a subject, it seems to be more appropriate to call it an object. Geiger feels it necessary to abandon the study of psychology based on egocentric experience in favor of a realistic understanding of the subject herself.

Aber wenn auch alle Psychologie daher Wissenschaft vom Subjekt ist, so ist sie doch nicht egozentrisch, nicht um das erlebende Subjekt zentriert, sondern das reale psychische Subjekt wird zum Gegenstand, dessen Gesetze studiert werden sollen. (Geiger 1921: 6)

Th e reason Geiger criticizes psychology that focuses mainly on a subject’s experience is that this kind of psychology has consciousness as its main object of research and thus completely disregards the vital role of the unconscious psychical reality in a psychological study. In this kind of study, consciousness completely subjugates the unconscious.

So sind für die Psychologie als Bewußtseinswissenschaft die unsichtbaren un- bewußten Vorgänge nur Hilfe und Zurüstung für das Bewußte. Der eigentli- che Sinn des psychischen Lebens ruht für diese Anschauungen im Bewußtsein. (Geiger 1921: 14)

According to Geiger, it is wrong to assume that the entire psychical life is the life of conscious activity. In order to study the psychical life systematically, one needs to recognize the existence of the unconscious and its important infl uence on consciousness. Geiger claims that one cannot conclude from the fact that the unconscious cannot be experienced, that it doesn’t exist: the eff ects of its doings can be observed in the outcome of the inquiries into consciousness.

Gegen den Erlebnisrealismus, der die Existenz des Unbewußten leugnet, stellt sich so eine zweite Lehre, die ein Unbewußtes durch Schlüsse aus den 228 Dalius Jonkus

Erlebnissen gewonnen werden läßt: der erschlossene psychische Realismus. (Gei- ger 1921: 18)

Th is outcome-based approach resembles that of the German philosopher Paul Natorp’s method of reconstructing psychical reality. Th is neo-Kantian philosopher believed that the psychical reality cannot be experienced directly; rather, it can be inferred using the method (matienai) of references. Like Natorp, Geiger avers that it is a mistake to try to understand consciousness solely on the grounds of personal experiences. Geiger also fi nds fault with the theories of consciousness that identify it with the act of being conscious. Geiger believes that the process of consciousness is never fully conscious. Th e examples that Geiger provides of the unconscious echo the points that Hus- serl makes in his phenomenology of passive syntheses. Sebastian Luft proposes that Natorp’s method of psychical reconstruction is similar to Husserl’s so- called genetic method used in his “Passive syntheses“ (Luft 2010: 62). I claim that there are similarities and diff erences between Husserl’s “Passive syntheses“ and Geiger’s realistic psychology. Both analyse memories based on unconscious associations in a similar fashion. Geiger, for example, thinks that the memory of yesterday’s sunset or someone’s forgotten name suddenly coming back to consciousness show that there exist so-called “bridges of the soul” that we are not aware of. Th ese hidden, imperceptible acts of unconsciousness eventually solidify into the structures regulating in one way or another the actions of consciousness itself. Th is perhaps explains why in very similar situations people react diff erently, exhibiting huge individual variation in their inclinations, temperament and character (Geiger 1921: 19). Geiger and Husserl describe the mechanisms of the unconscious associations in a similar way. However, unlike Geiger, Husserl sees the passive syntheses as originating in the subject’s experience of the world rather than pertain- ing to that which is intrinsic to consciousness itself. Moreover, Husserl utilizes consciousness in his explanation of unconscious processes, whereas Geiger places more value on the unconscious that only partially manifests itself in consciousness. Geiger goes even further to say that the systematic explanation of consciousness would have to include the evaluation of the results drawn from unconscious data, thus claiming that the explanation of any conscious activity would have to be reached with the help of the unconscious:

Von den Erlebnissen aus wird der Zugang zur tieferen unbewußten Realität durch Schlüsse gewonnen, das Unbewußte ist erschlossen, wird schließend ge- setzt, um einen systematischen Zusammenhang des Bewußtseins herzustellen, um das Bewußte mit Hilfe des Unbewußten zu erklären. (Geiger 1921: 20)

Geiger would criticize any kind of explanation of unconscious that sees it as an unrecognized, unsuspected part of consciousness. Th is approach, according to Geiger, completely does away with the unconscious because Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious 229 experience is identifi ed with the surface plane of consciousness: “So ist dem Erlebnisrealismus das Seelische nur Bewußtsein – ohne tieferes Schicht, in die die Forschung hinabloten könnte – nur Oberfl äche ist es, nur Ebene, ohne die Geheimnisse verborgener Tiefen” (Geiger 1921: 21). However, is it true that the theories that claim the prerogative of consciousness truly reject the deepest structures of consciousness? Is it true that one can disclose these deep structures by engaging the self-experience of consciousness itself? Does, in fact, Geiger speak contrary to his own assertions when he claims that, on the one hand, the unconscious is crucial in explain- ing consciousness but, on the other hand, we can discover things about the unconscious through consciousness alone? Th e answer to the question as to why Geiger focuses on the sharp dif- ferences between consciousness and the unconscious rather than kinship between the two, is found in his defi nitions of consciousness. Geiger defi nes four distinct explanations of consciousness, but only the fi rst three are important for our purposes here: Th e fi rst one is described as consciousness of something or, in other words, an intentional experience of things in the world; the second defi nition describes consciousness as closely observed internal object (Geiger, however, points out that even though one becomes through close ob- servation aware of these internally observed objects, they, nevertheless, never become part of consciousness) (Geiger 1921: 30). Th e third defi nition of the conscious is adjectival, conveying the level of self-consciousness in the objects of consciousness. For example, self-conscious will is understood not from the perspective of external relationship between the will and the consciousness, but as the self-consciousness of the will itself. Geiger sees consciousness as an act in which consciousness is being con- nected to the perceiving object but, in which nevertheless, that object remains transcendental. In other words, Geiger is a realist who believes that from the perspective of consciousness not only the external objects are transcendental to consciousness, but even the consciousness itself as an object for self- consciousness is always transcendental. Th erefore, Geiger doesn’t approve of the third, adjectival defi nition of the conscious because it supposedly elimi- nates the distance between consciousness and its object. Th e will can become self-conscious only when it becomes an object of consciousness and precisely because it becomes that object of consciousness, the will cannot be identifi ed with it. Th erefore, Geiger has it, the will as a psychical event and the will as an experience are not one and the same thing: “So stehen also zwei Tatsachen gegenüber: Ein psichischen Geschehen, ein Wollen – und ein Erleben dieses Wollens” (Geiger 1921: 37). Th e will is made conscious when it becomes an object, however, for as long as the will is functioning, it cannot become that object and, therefore, cannot become self-conscious. One knows about the will through refl ection only and never through experience. 230 Dalius Jonkus

Th e diff erence between experience and refl ection can be noticed even in Geiger’s early works describing the act of feeling and the feelings themselves. In his paper, “Consciousness of Feelings” (1911a), Geiger assigns diff erent positions for the feelings experienced and the feelings analysed. Th e latter are further partitioned into the feelings themselves (Innenkoncentration) and the feelings as objects (Außenkoncentration). But even in the case of the analysis of the feelings as objects, the feelings themselves can be experienced either unconsciously or consciously and fully enjoying them3. In his paper “Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung bei Landschaften” (1911b), Geiger claims that the subject can have two attitudes regarding feelings, one of analysis (be- trachtende Einstellung) and another one of experience (aufnehmende Einstel- lung). Th e fi rst attitude concerns itself with the description and investigation of feelings whereas the second one delves into the feelings themselves and tries to participate in them in an intimate, unmediated fashion. In the realm of the fi rst attitude, the subjective consciousness experiences the feelings as distanced and objectifi ed, but in the second realm, the division between the subject and his feelings is obliterated precisely because the feelings are not treated as objects of analysis. In one case, we will be dealing with objects, and in the other case, we will focus on the feelings and become sentimental. Geiger believes that the question of the unconscious should be addressed in the study of self-awareness. However, Geiger admits that his study of self- knowing is not original, since the question of self-consciousness (“know thy- self”) has been studied by philosophers since antiquity. For example, Socrates approached the problem of self-knowing from the point of view of ethics. Geiger held, however, that philosophers were not always able to clearly de- marcate between the experience of immediacy in self-knowledge and refl ective self-knowledge. He even admits that the implicit relation to itself that is characteristic of consciousness is the foundation for explicit self- awareness. But even though Geiger allows the relation between self-experience and self- knowledge, he still chooses to pay greater attention to the diff erence between them. He fi nds the essence of consciousness in refl ection:

In Wahrheit ist jedoch dies rückschauende Selbstbewußtsein ein abgeleiteter Akt: es ist im Selbsterleben fundiert, ohne identisch mit ihm zu sein, es expli- ziert das bloß innewerdende Selbsterfassen zum vollen wissenden erfassen des Selbst. (Geiger 1921: 51)

Only through refl ection does knowledge get to know itself and its own foundations. To conclude, in his writings on feelings as well as in those on the unconscious, Geiger draws special attention to the subjective experience and the dualism of psychical reality. Th is dualism can also be found in Geiger’s example of cinema and how the psyche experiences it. He asserts that experience

3 Husserl criticized Geiger’s approach on feelings. For a fuller account see Métraux 1975. Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious 231 should not be explained by way of immanent processes but via causality external to it; just as the images in cinema shouldn’t be used as the explanations of themselves but would have to be understood by means of the mechanical properties of the apparatuses used:

Wie der Ablauf der Filmbilder nicht durch Zusammenhänge der dargestellten Welt erklärt wird, sondern durch das aus dieser Welt nicht zu entnehmende Drehen der Kurbel usw., so braucht die Erlebnispsychologie Erklärungsmo- mente, die außerhalb der Erlebnisse selbst liegen. (Geiger 1921: 73)

Geiger remarks that the images in cinema are determined by the mechanical properties of the equipment used, likewise, the imagery of experience can only be understood by means of the real psychical mechanism that is, according to Geiger, unconscious. Geiger’s attempts to reduce consciousness to the unconscious and experience of the world to the mechanisms of psychical reality are similar to the eff orts of psychologism that tries to explain logic purely in terms of real psychical mechanisms. To illustrate Geiger’s rather problematic reasoning, one could refer to the argument regarding the relationship between counting and the calculator that Husserl makes in his “Logical Investigations” (Husserl 1975: 79). If the internal mechanical structures of the counting ma- chine cannot say anything informative about the numbers themselves and the relationships between them then, by the same token, we cannot explain the linkage among the cinematic images based on the mechanical functioning of the apparatus. Th e reduction of this kind of intentional relationships to the so-called real, unconscious mechanisms conceals the logic of unique and au- tonomous experience of the world.

3. Why does Sesemann criticize Geiger’s conception of the unconscious?

Vasily Sesemann talks about Geiger’s conception of the unconscious in his study, “Objectifying and non-objectifying knowledge” published in Kaunas 1927. Th e main issue that Sesemann is interested in is the question of indeter- minacy regarding the consciousness itself and what is given in it. How to distinguish between the phenomenon and the experience of it? Sesemann notices that Geiger analyses this question in his paper on unconscious and he suggests that Geiger’s description of consciousness is phenomenological and as such provides useful insights for further study of the matter. However, Sesemann seems to draw opposite conclusions from it. According to Sesemann, the sig- nifi cance of Geiger’s inquiry into the consciousness is in that he distinguishes between objectifying and non-objectifying cognition of it. However, Geiger fails, according to Sesemann, to clearly show how the experience itself and its content act on each other inside the experience. Is there a dualistic diff erence between the experience itself and its content? Sesemann thinks that because 232 Dalius Jonkus

Geiger understands the relationship between the experience and its content as external, his argument is not sound: the content is separated from experience itself and thus the understanding of the content can only be achieved retro- spectively through the act of refl ection. In other words, Geiger creates a faulty dualism within the egoical relationships between the experiencing “I” and the experienced “I” as an objectifying refl ection:

Das Ich kann im Erlebnis nicht auf sich gerichtet sein, weil es hier nicht ein Doppeltes, sondern nur ein Eines ist. Das Erlebnis erscheint uns bloss als refl exiv, sofern wir vom gegenständlichen erfassen ausgehen und in Analogie zu diesem letzteren auch vom Erleben behaupten, das Ich sei hier auf etwas gerichtet, allerdings nicht auf ein anderes, wie im erfassen, sondern auf sich selbst. Die Refl exivität ist daher nicht Wesensmerkmal des Erlebens, sondern ein sekundäres Moment, das ihm erst vom Standpunkt des gegenständlichen Erfassens zugeschrieben werden kann. Auch das Bild der Beleuchtung, das Geiger zur Charakteristik des Erlebens verwendet, gibt den Sachverhalt nicht adäquat wieder. Nicht ein erlebendes “waches“ Ich beleuchtet das ihm trans- zendente psychische sein, sondern das psychische Sein, das ja nichts anderes als das Ich in seinen konkreten Äusserungen oder Manifestationen ist, erleuch- tet sich selbst, es ist gleichsam selsbstleuchtend. (Sesemann 1927: 101)

Sesemann suggests two points in Geiger’s philosophy worth criticizing: fi rst, he thinks that Geiger does not clearly show that the experiencing consciousness is identifi ed with the act of self experiencing; second, he disagrees with Geiger’s idea of comparing psychical phenomena with external events and their mechanisms. Sesemann also fi nds it unsatisfactory to reduce the explication of the complexity of psychical life to mere refl ection. Sesemann proposes that the act of refl ection alone cannot show how experience is at the same time the experience of an object and self-experience. Refl ection, according to Sesemann, is understood as starting in the experience itself (because there exist certain primordial forms of it that grow their roots inside the experience itself), rising above it and then returning to it (Sesemann 1927: 102). Sesemann shows that the multidimensionality of psychical life and its complexity cannot be reduced either to the movement of refl ection alone or to any kind of partitioning of experience. As was mentioned above, refl ection starts out as an inseparable part of experience but later, in the process of psychical genesis, it is estranged from it and is made independent; that’s when experience becomes an object of refl ective investigation. It seems that Sesemann rejects experience-refl ection dualism and also abandons the consciousness-unconscious dualism. Consciousness has multiple faculties and is able to open itself up to both, objective self-refl ection and non-objective self-experience. How, then, is the unconscious possible, if consciousness is given together with the psychical being? Where is the place for the unconscious in the theory that claims direct (unmediated) connection between the consciousness and Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious 233 self-awareness? Sesemann talks about the relationship of consciousness to the unconscious in his “Gnoseology” that was published in Kaunas in 1931. In it, Sesemann argues that precisely because there is in the conscious experience a possibility of a non-objectifying self-awareness, the consciousness and the unconscious are not radically diff erent from each other. He maintains, that the acts of consciousness cannot be either fully conscious or fully unconscious: Sesemann doesn’t doubt the existence of the unconscious and that it is in a close relationship with consciousness, but, according to his reasoning, there are many degrees of awareness between them that he calls pre-consciousness. He divides consciousness into central and peripheral. For example, one could be walking and thinking about something completely ignoring the road itself. In that situation, the experience of the road and the fact that one is walking on it are pushed to the periphery of consciousness. However, it doesn’t mean that the experience of walking and the road become unconscious activities. Even in the situation where consciousness is peripheral, it can be recreated later in the memory of it. It turns out that consciousness and its relationship to the unconscious are dependant on the attention and on how one focuses that attention. Th e modes of consciousness in which they are not completely con- trolled by self-awareness are often described by Sesemann as non-conscious (e.g., daydreaming, dreams, hypnosis, etc.), but even in those situations, the consciousness remains intact. Th at’s why, according to Sesemann, the unconscious should be perceived as a plane belonging to the actual psychical reality and not as an entity absolutely separate from consciousness. Th at’s why Sesemann is in favour of psychoanalysis: it tries to uncover the unconscious material via hypnosis or psychotherapy (Sezemanas 1987: 307). To sum up, Sesemann’s theory, unlike Geiger’s, shows that the unconscious cannot be an external factor determining consciousness. Th e unconscious is an integral part of consciousness, the status of which depends on the self-consciousness and on what the subject is focusing his attention on.

4. Non-objectifying self-awareness in the philosophy of Sesemann, Scheler and Husserl

Sesemann provides a critical analysis of those philosophical conceptions of consciousness that argue against direct self-awareness: the fi rst one is Moritz Schlick’s, who insisted that the problem of self-awareness is an invented one and believed that all psychical phenomena are given to us directly via experience (Sesemann 1927: 105); the second is represented by neo-Kantians Na- torp and Rickert, who claimed that any attempt to observe and understand oneself is doomed to fail, because the self-understanding would require self- objectifi cation, or, in other words, would transform the subject into an object. Th e problem with that would be that the subject would no longer be able to understand herself as a subject, but only as an object. Sesemann objects to 234 Dalius Jonkus the arguments of Natorp and Rickert, because they seem to identify all of the experiences with the objectifying awareness (Sesemann 1927: 107). In other words, they do not distinguish the primeval self-awareness from the extrinsic objectifying refl ection. Th e reason those philosophers wouldn’t allow for this self- awareness intrinsic to consciousness, is that these philosophers grant too much power to physical sciences that use objective methods of research. In general it is possible to say that, the subsumption of non-objectifying self- awareness under the category of the objectifying refl ection can also be observed in the study of the unconscious, where it is separated from consciousness and is viewed as the real psyche existing beyond the consciousness. Clearly, the roots of Sesemann’s conception of the non-objectifying self- awareness can be found in Scheler’s philosophy and in Husserlian phenomenology. But Sesemann also criticizes the ideas of these philosophers. In his paper “Th e Idols of Self-Knowledge” Scheler tells us that the acts of consciousness cannot become the objects of self-knowing. According to him, those acts can be known only as non-objectifi able processes. Sesemann agrees with Sche- ler’s notion of direct self-knowing; however, he fi nds it incorrect for Scheler to see these direct acts of consciousness as the acts of refl ection or, in other words, the simultaneous occurrences that eclipse the distinction between the objectifying self-awareness and non-objective refl ection. Sesemann, however, seems to argue that the defi nition of refl ection is not relevant in describing the non-objectifi able self-awareness because refl ection presupposes a distance in the act itself. (127). Sesemann, unlike Scheler, connects all the internal experiences with the self-experience, because he maintains that all experiences in one way or another are associated with the “I” sphere in the broadest sense:

Uns scheint der phänomenologische Tatbestand und die Wesenszusammen- hänge dafür zu sprechen, dass die Erlebnissphäre mit der Ichsphäre (Im weiten sinn) zusammenfällt, und dass daher jede innere Wahrnehmung (Erlebnis- wahrnehmung) wenn auch nicht Selbstwahrnehmung ist, so doch mit der Selbstwahrnehmung wesenhaft verknüpft ist. Scheler meint dagegen, dass die innere Wahrnehmung keineswegs immer an die Selbstwahrnehmung gebun- den sei. (Sesemann 1927: 128–129)

Sesemann carefully analyses the arguments that Scheler provides against the notion that all of the experiences are the experiences of the “I”. For example, Scheler allows for there to be ways of being, feelings and thoughts that are not perceived by the subject as her own. Sesemann fi nds Scheler’s idea unsatisfactory and proposes a revision. Sesemann believes that the internal relationship between an “I” and its experience doesn’t mean that every experience of my “I” is directly perceived as belonging to me. In fact, some of the experiences may even appear as foreign and not belonging to me personally. But any experience, directly or indirectly perceived by my “I”, is still the experience of an “I”. Th e experience that one calls “mine” doesn’t need to be Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness and the Unconscious 235 perceived as “belonging to me,” because the domain of “my” experience is much larger than the sphere of the experiences that “belong to my ‘I’” (129). Sesemann is also critical of Husserl’s conception of refl ection and non- objectifying self-experience. Sesemann refers to Husserl’s book “Ideas con- cerning a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy” where he writes about refl ective and nonrefl ective experiences. Sesemann fi nds Husserl’s conception lacking in that he doesn’t answer the question of how the self- awareness is related to refl ection inside the experience: “Überhaupt bleibt es bei ihm [Husserl] unklar, in welchem Verhältnis Erlebnis und Bewusstsein zu einander stehen, und ob zwischen Bewusstsein (Inne-werden des Erlebens) und Gewusstsein (refl ektierendem Erfassen) ein prinzipieller Unterschied besteht“ (Sesemann 1927: 130–131). In no way does Sesemann suggest that Scheler’s and Husserl’s phenomenology reject the phenomenological conception of consciousness. Th ose philosophers seem to address what a Danish philosopher of mind, Dan Zahavi means by the phenomenological conception of consciousness, as implying direct self- awareness (Zahavi 1999, 2005). Th e problem though is that for a long time the phenomenological conception of self-knowledge was identifi ed with the model of objectifying refl ection. However, a more careful analysis shows that Scheler, Husserl and even Sartre, all discuss the need to talk about the non- objectifying awareness. Th is primeval self- awareness is the foundation for refl ection as well as for the objectifying self-knowledge. In criticizing Geiger, Vasily Sesemann reveals important aspects of the non-objectifying self- aware- ness and his ideas build on the crucial insights off ered by Scheler and Husserl. In rendering his general analysis of the phenomenological self-awareness, he concludes that the awareness of an “I” is immanent to the being of an “I”. Self-awareness is a larger sphere than self-refl ection, which by distancing itself from the experience in turn objectifi es it. According to Sesemann, the kind of self-awareness that becomes self-knowledge is fi rst found in the philosophy of Socrates but is also later explored by platonism, neoplatonism, modern philosophy and, most importantly, it is still being explored in contemporary phenomenology.

5. Conclusion

Geiger’s conception of the unconscious states that consciousness cannot be reduced to conscious experiences alone. However, his opposing of consciousness to the unconscious is faulty. He treats the unconscious as a real psyche, whose job is to determine conscious experiences. But when the emphasis is placed on the real psychical mechanisms, the idea of the intentionality of consciousness is lost. Once again, Sesemann criticises Geiger for his attempt to explain consciousness in terms of refl ective self-awareness. In Sesemann’s view, self-awareness can be found even in the pre-refl ective stage as direct 236 Dalius Jonkus self-experience. In consciousness several levels of self-knowing are diff erenti- ated. Sesemann also criticizes Scheler and Husserl for providing incomplete conceptions of self-consciousness; however, his invented conception of direct self-awareness agrees with the principles of phenomenological philosophy and its descriptions of phenomena. According to Sesemann, non-objectifying self-awareness is absolutely necessary when we deal with the phenomena of human reality. Th ese phenomena cannot be analysed based on the contrast between the subject and the object. A proper analysis of these phenomena requires the subject’s close emotional familiarity with the object of experience. Sesemann fi nds the source of this familiarity in the pre-refl ective awareness which is, according to him, the foundation of any objectifying refl ection.

Dalius Jonkus Mindaugo g. 20-32 LT-03215 Vilnius Lithuania [email protected]

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