The Phenomenological Movement TO THE MEMORY of ALFRED SCHUTZ one of the brightest hopes for an authentic phenomenology in the United States, whose untimely death deprived this book of its most beloved reader and keenest critic

and

H. L. VAN BREDA

without whom this book could not have appeared Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN-\3: 978-90-247-2535-9 e-ISBN-\3: 978-94-009-7491-3 001:10.1007/978-94-009-7491-3

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

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All Rights Reserved © 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st Edition 1994 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. TO THE MEMORY of ALFRED SCHUTZ one of the brightest hopes for an authentic phenomenology in the United States, whose untimely death deprived this book of its most beloved reader and keenest critic

and

H. L. VAN BREDA

without whom this book could not have appeared TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Illustrations XXI

Preface to the First Edition XXIII

Preface to the Third Edition XXXIV

List of Abbreviations XLIX

Introduction

I. The Phenomenological Movement Defined 2. Unrelated Phenomenologies 6 a. Extra-Philosophical Phenomenologies 7 b. Philosophical Phenomenologies II 3. Preview 19

Part One I The Preparatory Phase

I. FRANZ BRENTANO (1838-1917): FORERUNNER OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT

I. Brentano's Place in the History of Phenomenology 27 VIll TABLE OF CONTENT

2. His Purpose: A Scientific Reformation of 28 3. A New Psychology as the Foundation for Scientific Philosophy 31 4. A New Type of Empiricism 33 5. Descriptive Psychology versus Genetic Psychology 34 6. A New Type of Experience: Inner Perception versus Intro- spection 35 7. "Intentionality": The Basic Psychological Phenomenon 36 8. A "Natural" Classification of Psychical Acts 38 9. A Fundamental Law of Psychical Phenomena 39 10. The Awareness of Time 40 II. An Analogue of Self-Evidence as the Basis for Ethical Knowledge 40 12. Brentano's Fight against "Fictitious Entities" 43 13. How Far Was Brentano a Representative of "Psychologism"? 44 Selective Bibliography 49

II. CARL STUMPF (1848-1936): FOUNDER OF EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

I. Stumpf's Place in the History of Phenomenology 51 2. The Role of Phenomenology in His Work 52 3. General Characteristics of His Phenomenology 55 a. The Subject Matter of Phenomenology Consists of Primary and Secondary Phenomena 55 b. Phenomenology is a Neutral Science or Pre-Science (Vorwwen- schqfl) 56 c. Phenomenology is the First of the Neutral Pre-Sciences 57 d. Phenomenology is Not an Independent Discipline for Specialists, but Rather the First Layer in the Study of Every Established Science 57 e. Phenomenology. while a Descriptive Science. has to be Studied by All Suitable Methods. Including the Experimental One 57 4. Some Concrete Phenomenological Contributions 58 a. The Distinction between Dependent and Independent Parts and TABLE OF CONTENTS IX

the Experience of Substance and Attribute 58 b. The Experience of Causal Nexus 59 c. The Experience of "Feel-Sensations" (Ge!iihlsemp!indungen) 59 d. The Discovery of Structural Laws among Empirical Materials Not Based upon Induction 59 e. The Discovery of the Sachverhalt 59 5. The Relationship of Stumpf's and Husserl's Phenomenologies 60 Excursus: Stumpf's Phenomenology and William James's Psychology 62 Selective Bibliography 65

Part Two / The German Phase of the Movement

III. THE PURE PHENOMENOLOGY OF (1859-1938)

A. Introductory 69 B. Constants in Hussert's Conception of Philosophy 71 I. The Ideal of Rigorous Science 72 2. Philosophic Radicalism 76 3. The Ethos of Radical Autonomy 78 4. The Wonder of All Wonders: Subjectivity 81 5. Husserl's Personality and His Philosophy 81

C. Variables in the Development of Husserl's Philosophy 84 I. The Pre-Phenomenological Period 84 a. The Critique of Psychologism 86 b. The Conception of a Pure Logic 88 Excursus: Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie and Husserl's Logic 89 2. The Beginnings of Phenomenology as the Subjective Correlate of Pure Logic 92 a. Husserl's Semantics 95 b. Husserl's Doctrine of Universals (Essences) 95 c. The Intentionality of Consciousness 97 x TABLE OF CONTENTS

Excursus: William James's Significance for Husserl's Pheno- menology 100 d. Pheromenologicallntuiting (Anschauung and Wesensschau) 104 3. Phenomenology Becomes "First Philosophy" lOS Excursus: and Edmund Husserl 109 4. The Birth of the Phenomenological Movement and the Beginnings of Transcendental Phenomenology 111 a. Self-Givenness - Phenomenology and Positivism 114 b. Phenomenology of Perception and Self-Evidence 116 c. The Phenomenological Reduction 118 Excursus: Santayana's Ultimate Scepticism Compared with Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction 123 d. The Phenomenological Residue: Ego Cogito Cogitata Mea 124 e. Phenomenological Idealism 126 Excursus: Husserl and Josiah Royce 128 f. Phenomenological Constitution and the Consciousness of Time 130 g. Phenomenology and Psychology 132 S. Toward a System of Transcendental Phenomenology 134 Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Monadology 139 6. The Last Beginning 141 The Idea of the Life-World (Lebenswe/t) 144

D. In Place of an Appraisal 147 Postscript 1980 148 Selective Bibliography 163

IV. THE ORIGINAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT

A. The Phenomenological Circles 166 1. The GOttingen Circle 166 2. The Munich Circle 169

B. Alexander Pf(lnder (1870-1941): From Phenomenological TABLE OF CONTENTS XI

Psychology to PhenomenologiCl1I Philosophy 170 1. Pfander's Place in the Phenomenological Movement 170 2. The Place of Phenomenology in His Philosophy 172 3. His Conception of Phenomenology 174 a. Phenomenological Psychology 175 b. Phenomenological Philosophy 176

4. Examples of His Phenomenology 180 a. Directed Sentiments (Gesinnungen) 181 b. Basic and Empirical Essences 182 c. The Perception of Oughtness 184 s. Concluding Remarks 185 Selective Bibliography 186 6. Pfander's Following: Maximilian Beck, Gerda Walther, Herbert Spiegelberg, Josef Stilrmann 187 c. (1883-1917): Phenomenological Ontology of Essences 191 1. Reinach's Place in the Phenomenological Movement 191 2. His Conception of Phenomenology 193 3. Illustrations of His Phenomenology 197 a. A Theory of Social Acts 197 b. Essential Laws Concerning Legal Entities 198 Selective Bibliography 200

D. Moritz Geiger (1880-1937): From Phenomenological Esthetics toward Metaphysics 200 I. Geiger's Conception of Phenomenology 203 2. Illustrations of His Phenomenological Analyses 206 a. Esthetic Enjoyment 207 b. Existential Depth 208 c. The Unconscious 209 Selective Bibliography 211 XII TABLE OF CONTENTS

E. Hedwig Conrad-Martius (/888-/966): Phenomenology and Reality 212 (by Eberhard Ave-Lallemant) I. Conrad-Martius's Place in the Phenomenological Movement 212 2. Her Conception of Phenomenology 214 3. The Phenomenon of Reality 215 4. Philosophy of Nature on Phenomenological Foundations 219 5. Toward an Appraisal 221 Selective Bibliography 221

F. (/893-1970): Ontological Phenomenology 223 (by Guido KUng)

I. Ingarden's Place in the Phenomenological Movement 223 2. His Conception of Phenomenology 224 3. A Phenomenologist's Analysis of the Idealism-Realism Con- troversy 227

4. The Phenomenology of the Work of Art 229 5. Toward an Appraisal 231 Selective Bibliography 232

G. Other Members of the Gottingen and Munich Circles 233 I. August Gallinger (1871-1959) 233 2. Aloys Fischer (1880-1937) 233 3. Theodor Conrad (1881-1969) 234 4. Wilhelm Schapp (1884-1965) 234 5. Kurt Stavenhagen (1885-1951) 234 6. (1889-1977) 235 7. Hans Lipps (1889-1941) 237 8. Adolf Grimme (1889-1963) 237 TABLE OF CONTENTS XJIl

9. Jean Hering (1890-1%6) 237

10. (1891-1942) 238

II. Alexandre Koyre (1892-1964) 239

H. The Freiburg Group 240 I. The New Setting 240 2. Husser!'s Collaborators: Ludwig Landgrebe, Eugen Fink 241 3. Other Husser! Associates: Oskar Becker, Fritz Kaufmann, Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss, Arnold Metzger 247 4. The Central Field: Wilhelm Szilasi, Hans Reiner 249 5. The Periphery: Aron Gurwitsch, Emmanuel Levinas, Theodor Celms, Christopher V. Salmon, Marvin Farber, Dorion Cairns 251

6. Radiations: Felix Kaufmann, Alfred Schutz, Jan Patocka 254 7. Retrospect 257

V. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ESSENCES: (1874-1928)

I. Max Scheler's Place in the Phenomenological Movement 268 2. His Basic Concerns 270

3. Phenomenology in the Development of His Philosophy 273 4. His Conception of Phenomenology 277 a. The Doctrine of the "Phenomenological Controversy" (phanome- nologischer Slreil) 280 b. The Idols of Self-Knowledge 281 c. The Phenomenon of Resistance as the Criterion of Reality 281 d. Scheler's Phenomenological Reduction 283

5. The Place of Phenomenology in His Philosophy 283

6. His Phenomenology in Action 288 a. Value and Oughtness 288 b. Cognitive Emotion 292 c. Ethical Absolutism and Relativity 293 d. Sympathy 295 e. Knowledge of Other Minds 296 XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS

f. Religion 297 7. Toward an Appraisal of Scheler as a Phenomenologist 300 8. Scheler's Following: Hendrik Stoker, Paul-Ludwig Landsberg 301 Selective Bibliography 304

VI. PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE CRITICAL ONTOLOGY OF NICOLAI HARTMANN (1882-1950)

1. Hartmann's Relation to the Phenomenological Movement 306 2. His Philosophical Objective: Critical Ontology 307 3. The Role of Phenomenology in His Philosophical Development 313 4. His Version of Phenomenology 319 5. Illustrations of His Phenomenology 323 a. "Metaphysics" of Knowledge 323 b. The Givenness of Reality 325 c. The Discovery of Value and the Narrowness of Value Conscious- ness 327 d. Activated Ideals (Aktuales Seinsollen) 328 6. Toward an Appraisal of Hartmann's Phenomenology 329 7. Hartmann's Following and Phenomenology 331 Selective Bibliography 333

VII. (1889-1976) AS A PHENOMENOLOGIST

1. On Understanding Heidegger 336 2. His Place in the History of Phenomenology 339 3. The Basic Theme: The Quest for Being, Truth, and Time 347 4. The Development of Heidegger's Thought of Being 353 a. The Preparatory Period 353 b. The Phenomenological Period 358 c. The Turn (Kehre) 371 TABLE OF CONTENTS XV

5. His Conception of Phenomenology 379 a. Hermeneutic Phenomenology 380 b. in Action 386 c. "The Idea of Phenomenology" in the 1927 Lectures 397 d. Phenomenology in Heidegger's Later Philosophy 401

6. Toward an Appraisal of Heidegger's Phenomenology 407 a. To What Extent was Heidegger a Phenomenologist? 408 b. Strengths and Weaknesses of Heidegger's Phenomenology 409 Selective Bibliography 419

Part Three / The French Phase of the Movement

Introductory 425

VIII. THE BEGINNINGS OF FRENCH PHENOMENOLOGY

I. The Soil 428 2. The Receptive Phase 431 3. Phenomenology and 436 4. Phenomenology and Hegelianism 440

5. Phenomenological Existentialism and Literature 442 6. Phenomenological Existentialism and Marxism 444

IX. GABRIEL MARCEL (1889-1974) AS A PHENOMENOLOGIST

I. Marcel's Relations to the Phenomenological Movement 448 2. His Concern 451 3. The Development of His Philosophy 454 4. His Conception of Phenomenology 460 5. His Phenomenology in Action 462 XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS

6. The Phenomenology of Having 464 7. Concluding Observations 466 Selective Bibliography 468

X. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (1905-1980)

I. On Understanding Sartre 470 2. His Place in the Phenomenological Movement 473 3. His Central Theme: Freedom versus Being 478 4. The Role of Phenomenology in the Development of His Thought 481 a. The Pre-Phenomenological Period 482 b. Phenomenological Psychology 484 c. Phenomenological Ontology 488 d. Phenomenological Existentialism 493 e. Existentialist Marxism 496

5. His Conception of Phenomenology 499 a. The Common Ground 499 b. Distinguishing Characteristics 501

6. His Phenomenology in Action 516 a. Imagination 517 b. The Magic of the Emotions 519 c. Absence and Nothingness 521 d. The Gaze (regard) 523 e. The Body 524 7. Phenomenology in Dialectical Reason 526 8. Toward an Appraisal of Sartre's Phenomenology 528 9. His Following: Simone de Beauvoir, Francis Jeanson, Benny Levy 530 Selective Bibliography 534

XI. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY (1908-1961)

I. Merleau-Ponty's Position in the Phenomenological Movement 537 TABLE OF CONTENTS XVII

2. Guiding Themes in His Philosophy 543

3. The Development of His Phenomenology 546

4. His Conception of Phenomenology 549

5. Some Key Chapters from His Phenomenology 556 a. The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of Gestalt 556 b. Perception 559 c. The New CogilO: Being-Within·the-World (Etre-au·Monde) 564 d. Subjectivity and Temporality 566 e. Conditioned Freedom 568 f. The Social World ~ Speech and Language 570

6. Toward an Appraisal of His Phenomenology 571

7. The Meaning of His Last Philosophy 574 a. The New Ontology 576 b. Ontology and Phenomenology 578 8. His Following: Claude Lefort, Alphonse de Waelhens 580

Selective Bibliography 583

XII. PAUL RICOEUR AND SOME ASSOCIATES

A. Paul Ricoeur (born 1913) 585 I. His Place in the Phenomenological Movement 586 2. His Guiding Interests 589 3. His Development 590

4. His First Conception of Phenomenology 592

5. His Phenomenology of the Will 595

6. His Hermeneutic Turn 597

Selective Bibliography 599

B. Mikel DuJrenne (born 1910): Phenomenology oj Esthetic Experience 600

Selective Bibliography 606

C. Raymond Polin (born 1911): Phenomenology oj Values 606 XVIII TABLE OF CONTENTS

Selective Bibliography 610

XIII. EMMANUEL LEVINAS (BORN 1906): PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

(by Stephan Strasser)

1. Existential Experiences 612 2. Levinas's Philosophical Development 614 3. Metaphysics Instead of Fundamental Ontology 615 a. War - Commercium - History, Need and Desire 615 b. Egoism and Aiterity 619 c. Countenance and Ethical Resistance 620 d. Metaphysics of Hospitality 621 e. Freedom Put in Question 622 f. Created from Nothing 623 g. The Verdict about History 624 h. Temporality and Temporalization 625 i. Absolute Future 627 4. Ethics as First Philosophy 629 a. The Other in Relation to Being 629 b. The Ethical Ground of Saying 630 c. The Patience of the Bodily "I" 632 d. Forms of an An-archicaI Responsibility: the Substitute, the Guarantor, the Atoner for the Other 632 e. Trace and Absolute Past 634 f. Ambiguity of the Trace 636 g. Prophecy 637 h. The Scepsis of Discourse 639 i. The Third and Justice 640 5. Levinas and the Phenomenological Movement 641 Selective Bibliography 648

Part Four / The Geography 0/ the Phenomenological Movement

1. Introductory 653 TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX

2. The German Area: "Renaissance"? 654 3. : Continuations and Alternatives 657 4. Italy: Inroads 657 5. Spain: Revival Through Phenomenology 658 6. Latin America: Proliferations 660 7. Portuguese Area: Side Currents 661 8. The British Scene: Ups and Downs 661 9. United States and Canada: Breadth 663 10. : Penetrations 666 II. Eastern Europe: Dialogue 667 12. India: Affinities 667 13. Japan: Resonances 668 14. Assessment 670 a. Today's Status 670 b. Instead of a Prognosis 671

Part Five / The Essentials of the Phenomenological Method

A. Phenomenology and Phenomenological Method 678

B. The Phenomenological Method as a Protest against Reduc- tionism 679

C. The Steps 0/ the Phenomenological Method 681 I. Investigating Particular Phenomena 682 a. Phenomenological Intuiting 682 Excursus: Does Phenomenology Explore only Subjective Phe- nomena? 687 b. Phenomenological Analyzing 690 c. Phenomenological Describing 693 xx TABLE OF CONTENTS

2. Investigating General Essences (Eidetic Intuiting) 696 3. Apprehending Essential Relationships 699 4. Watching Modes of Appearing 703 5. Exploring the Constitution of Phenomena in Consciousness 706 6. Suspending Belief in Existence 708 7. Interpreting Concealed Meanings 712

D. In Conclusion 715

Appendices

Chart I: Chronology of the Phenomenological Movement in 722 Chart II: Chronology of the Phenomenological Movement in France 728 Chart III: Chronology of the Phenomenological Movement in the AnglO-American World 733

Index of Subjects. Combined with a Selective Glossary of Pheno• menological Terms 736

Index of Names 755 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Facing page I. From FRANZ BRENTANO's manuscripts for his Vienna lectures 1888/89. Photo by his son, Dr. John C. M. Brentano, Highland Park, Illinois. - The entry in brackets is by Oskar Kraus 27 2. Bust of young BRENTANO by Kaspar Zumbusch in the possession of Dr. Brentano, who also kindly supplied the photo 28 3. Photo of a lost oil portrait of FRANZ BRENTANO by Rudolf Stumpf, son of Carl Stumpf. Copyright Erna Stumpf, Gottingen 44 4. CARL STUMPF. Drawing by Rudolf Stumpf 51 5. EDMUND HUSSERL (1905). Photo Peter Matzen; Gottingen. Copy supplied by Dr. Theodor Conrad, Starnberg 69 6. Two consecutive pages from the Brentano-Husserl correspond• ence in the Brentano Archives. Photo supplied by Dr. John C. M. Brentano between 81 and 82 7. Publisher's announcement of Husserl's yearbook. Original in the Brentano Archfves. Photo supplied by Dr. John C. M. Brentano 110 8. Announcement of Husserl's Lectures at the University of London. Original in the Husserl Archives, Louvain 134 9. EDMUND HUSSERL (1931). Drawing by Rudolf Stumpf. Copyright Erna Stumpf, Gottingen 148 10. Philosophische Gesellschaft, Gottingen (1912). Photo supplied by Dr. Theodor Conrad 166 II. ALEXANDER PFANDER (1940). Photo by Gerhard Isselmann, Teisendorf 170 XXII LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

12. JOHANNES DAUBERT (about 19(5). Photo supplied by Mrs. Daubert, Mainburg 170 13. ADOLF REINACH (about 1912). Photo supplied by Jean H~~ 1M 14. MORITZ GEIGER (about 1930). Photo supplied by Mrs. Elisabeth Geiger, GOttingen 170 15. MAX SCHELER. Photo supplied by Dr. Theodor Conrad 268 16. NICOLAI HARTMANN (about 1945). Photo from Heimsoeth, Heinz und Heiss, Robert, eds., Nicolai Hartmann, Der Denker und sein Werk 306 17. MARTIN HEIDEGGER (about 1930). Photo by Luise M. Engler 336 18. GABRIEL MARCEL. Universal Photo 3.308, supplied by the Ambassade de France II Bruxelles 448 19. JEAN·PAUL SARTRE (with Pouillon on the POOl Neuf). Photo by H. Canier·Bresson 470 20. MAURICE MERLEAU·PONTY. Photo from Pages de France N° 10.393, supplied by the Ambassade de France II Bruxelles 537 21. PAUL RICOEUR. Photo supplied by Paul Ricoeur 585 22. EMMANUEL LEVIN AS. Photograph copyright David Harali (from Stephan Strasser, Jenseits von Sein und Zeit) 612 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history has itself a history which is pertinent to its objective. It may suitably be opened by the following excerpts from a review which Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, the Head of the Division for International Cultural Cooperation, Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco from 1953 to 56, wrote in 1950 from France: The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental , not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The average American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real impon of what is said into the kind of imalysis with which he is familiar .... No doubt, American education will graduaUy take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophical literature.' These sentences clearly implied a challenge, if not a mandate, to all those who by background and interpretive ability were in a position to meet it. At the time I read it, I personally saw no chance of attacking this task, much as I hoped that someone in closer contact with the main current of phenomenology and with better facilities than I had at the time would tackle it. This chance and the sense of an obligation to try my hand at the task came to me two years later as a result of a semester as visiting professor at the University of Michigan, where I had offered a seminar on the development of phenomenology and existentialism. At the end of this XXIV PREFACE seminar Paul Henle suggested to me very persuasively that I prepare an introduction to the Phenomenological Movement for American readers. This suggestion coincided with an invitation from the National Council on Religion in Higher Education to act as a consultant on phenomenology during its "Week of Work" in 1952. So I finally yielded to the temptation, although I still felt dubious in view of the scope and difficulty of the task and of my own limitations. lowe it to the reader to be frank about these limitations and about the kind of bias which he may expect from me. During my university studies in Germany I had spent one semester at Freiburg in 1924-25, during which I was able to take part in one of Edmund Husserl's advanced seminars.' But I received my main phenomenological training in Munich under Alexander Pfander. At least as far as my point of departure is concerned, I am therefore more closely associated with the so-called Older Phenomeno• logical Movement than with'the Freiburg phenomenologists. In later years, until I left the Continent in 1937, I made at least some efforts to widen this perspective. But I must leave it to others to decide whether this peculiar background has slanted my account in the direction of a "reactionary" deviation of phenomenology or whether it gives me the advantage of being more of a neutral outsider. I certainly cannot claim the objectivity of an impartial historian. Very often it seemed to me that I was more of a witness, though too often only an indirect witness, with the primary obligation of salvaging certain facts as to which I believe I have more authentic information than is usually available, and of counteracting the many legends which have already overgrown the historical reality. My first attempt to tackle the job undertaken immediately after my return from Ann Arbor was anything but an unqualified success. Nevertheless, it made Paul Henle again take the initiative, this time by interesting the Division of Humanities of the Rockefeller Foundation in my enterprise as part of its program in promoting intercultural understanding. This led to a first grant to Lawrence College, which made it possible for me to take a year's leave of absence, The grant included a travel allowance, which gave me a chance, after an absence of sixteen years, to return to Europe for three crowded months, during which I was not only able to collect an unexpected amount of material and information about the pre• war period, but also to become acquainted with the new developments, especially in France. It was this first acquaintance with the second flowering of phenomenology which made me realize - too late - the full magnitude of my assignment. Fortunately, the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation took an understanding view of my predicament and after a PREFACE xxv year's interval enabled me to take another half-leave in 1955-56. To the Rockefeller Foundation and particularly to Mr. Chadbourne Gilpatric belongs the major credit for having made this book possible. It would be hopeless for me to try to list the names of all those who have supported the present enterprise by suggestion, encouragement, intercession, information, permissions, criticisms, and in other ways. A task which really calls for cooperative effort lays its single attacker under all the more heavy debt to those whose services he has to enlist. The abridged story of the book mentions the share of those who had a decisive influence on the birth, the growth, and the survival of this book. Only by way of example do I want to acknowledge some further major debts: to Maurice Mandelbaum for his careful reading of and comments on the first complete version of the text; to the Husserl Archives in Louvain, and particularly to its dynamic director H. L. Van Breda o.f.m., for permission to use its invaluable collection and to utilize it in the present book; to his assistant Rudolf Boehm for repeated investigations and critical comments; to Nathan M. Pusey and Douglas M. Knight, past and present Presidents of Lawrence College, whose sympathetic interest and readiness to release me from academic duties were essential to the growth of the book; to Hastings A. Brubaker, the Librarian of Lawrence College, who helped me particularly with the problem of snowballing interlibrary loans; to my long-suffering main typist, Mrs. Ruth Lesselyong at the Faculty Office; and last, but nearly most, to the unbelievable Bayard Quincy Morgan of Stanford UniverSity for his unfailing assistance, particularly his stylistic criticism, which has often led to a sharpening of the thought behind the expression, and for his unparalleled help with the proofreading; in the latter task Fred Kersten was a great help. No book of this scope could materialize without the sharing of trials, tribulations, and financial sacrifices by one's family. Adding to this a constant moral support, listening as a living touchstone to untested ideas, censoring of early drafts, and non-directive counselling by the clinical psychologist, my wife Eldora Haskell Spiegelberg, gives a faint idea of what the present enterprise owes to her - and to our daughters Gwen and Lynne, whose impatient inquiries "When is Daddy going to finish his book?" were no small incentive for getting on with the job.

My immediate assignment, as I conceived of it, was to prepare an XXVI PREFACE introduction to phenomenology primarily for the benefit of American readers. It should help them gain at least a sympathetic understanding of a philosophical movement which, for better or worse, has become one of the most influential currents of thought in the world outside the Anglo• American and this side of the Soviet orbit. Even a convinced missionary, carrying his own message to the more benighted parts of the world, has at least to be familiar with the superstitions of the unredeemed. Besides, there are alanning signs that Anglo-American philosophy has not been too effective in making converts in the critical areas of the struggle for philosophic al\egiance. Somehow it fails to meet the needs of a fear- and doubt-ridden western world. My first and major concern, then, was to put into the hands of the Anglo-American philosophic public a guide as faithful and concise as possible toward the understanding of one aspect of this territory. Yet, large though such an assignment turns out to be, I confess I would derive little satisfaction from merely supplying a tool for cultural strategy. I believe that phenomenology, properly presented and submitted without the exaggerated fanfare which has done it severe harm in a climate more sober and more critical than the European Continent, has a definite mission at the present juncture in Anglo-American philosophy. I submit that some of its analyses may help in removing certain obstacles which block the way of genuine empiricism. By these I mean specifical\y a narrow positivism and a dogmatic behaviorism, which are largely responsible for a sense of philosophic frustration and barrenness both inside and outside the AnglO-American orbit, in philosophical as wel\ as in non-philosophical circles. There are obvious differences between the situation on the Con• tinent which phenomenology encountered at the beginning of the century and the present situation in the Anglo-American world. But this does not prevent some of its answers from being pertinent even at a different time and place. Suggesting this does not imply that phenomenology is the panacea for al\ of today's philosophical ills; nor is it a substitute for the considerable virtues of non-phenomenological, especial\y analytical philosophy. I am of course wel\ aware of the fact that this is not the first attempt at such an introduction; and it is to be hoped that it will not be the last one. It seems to me proper to pay tribute here to at least some of my predecessors, notably to Dorion Cairns, Marvin Farber, and Alfred Schutz. 3 Had I not been given to understand by the friends who encouraged me to undertake the present larger work that their pioneer efforts had not yet filled the need, I would have preferred, instead of entering this field, trying to do PREFACE XXVII more phenomenology rather than to write about it. But while I would admit that the needs of some readers will be met better by the briefer studies of my predecessors, I felt it my duty to make an independent effort to offer a service which is so badly needed. This duty seemed incumbent especially on one who has had such a unique opportunity as I have enjoyed to collect and present the evidence. In contrast to what has previously been done, my own undertaking is both more ambitious and more modest. For its aim is (1) to give a conspectus of the whole range of the Phenomenological Movement, not only of Husserl's part in it; (2) to help understand the background and the reasons for the phenomenological "teachings" in terms related to today's Ang10-American philosophizing; (3) to take account of, and wherever possible to clarify or answer, the more significant misunderstandings and criticisms of phenomenology. At the same time I would like to point out that I am far from identifying myself with all the doctrines which I shall have to present, not only in view of the fact that a good many of them flatly contradict each other. In fact, I intend to state frankly where I consider the present output of phenomenology unsatisfactory. On the other hand I do not propose to give systematic accounts of the complete views of the thinkers presented. Instead, I want to focus on such guiding themes in their thought as can open to the Anglo-American reader the most direct access to the core of the phenomenological method, and to stimulate him to go on from there on his own. To this extent and in this sense the material offered will even be slanted. I had to simplify and at times to oversimplify perhaps to the point of unfairness and possible offense to the victims. While any selective and critical account cannot avoid this fault, I shou1d at least wish to disclaim any conscious bias.

Next, lowe the reader an explanation of the way in which I shall introduce him to this elusive philosophy. Specifically, I must explain why the present introduction takes the form of a history of the Phenomeno• logical Movement. Among the many misconceptions which this book is meant to rectify is the idea that there is such a thing as a system or school called "phenomenology" with a solid body of teachings which would permit one to give a precise answer to the question "What is phenomenology?" The question is more than legitimate. But it cannot be answered, since, for better or worse, the underlying assumption of a unified philosophy subscribed to by all so-called phenomenologists is an illusion. Besides, "phenomenologists" are much too individualistic in their habits to form XXVIII PREFACE an organized "school." It would go too far to say that there are as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists. But it is certainly true that, on closer inspection, the varieties exceed the common features. In fact, the thought of the founder of the Phenomenological Movement changed so much, and that to the very end, that it cannot be presented adequately except by showing how it developed. The same holds true of later phenomenologists like Heidegger and Sartre; thus far the presentation and interpretation seems to me to suffer from a neglect of the developmental aspect of their philosophies. Under these circumstances the most appropriate introduction to phenomenology would seem to follow the course of its actual growth. Any attempt to determine a common core within its varieties had better be postponed to the end of this account. Even then the identification of such a core will not be easy. It poses the problem of how to extricate the essential structure of phenomenology from its empirical expressions. For not all these empirical expressions are equally adequate manifestations of the underlying idea. Phenomenology itself is given through various appearances. In fact, there is room for something like a phenomenology of phenomenology. But leaving aside such unsettling considerations, we may as well admit that this situation will be a source of disappointment to all those with little time and with the understandable desire for a capsule formula. Alii can do is to refer them to Part Five entitled "The Essentials of the Phenomenological Method," which attempts to organize the variety of phenomenologies into a systematic pattern. But such an organization can be no substitute for the examination of the concrete phenomena which alone can support any final interpretation. There are, however, also more immediate reasons which make me believe that the chief need, especially for Anglo-American readers, is that of a plain and frank account of the origins, the growth, and the ramifications of a movement whose variety is more characteristic than its connecting unity. The Phenomenological Movement is more than Husserl's phenomenology. While it is true that Husserl is the founder and remains the central figure of the Movement, he is also its most radical representative, and that not only in the sense that he tried to go to the roots, but that he kept digging deeper and deeper, often undermining his own earlier results; he was always the most extreme member of his Movement and hence became increasingly the loneliest of them all. But if one wants to know about the Phenomenological Movement in its full breadth, one has to include the thought of those thinkers who are often mentioned as Husserl's "followers" or "pupils," but rarely if ever PREFACE XXIX described by their own views and especially their more or less "heretical" deviations from Husserl's position. Very little of this variety is accessible thus far in English. Thus the most crying need seems to me that of providing an easier access not only to Husserl's own development but to the development of the movement as a whole. Only on the basis of such a fuller picture of its main thinkers does it make sense to reflect on possible common denominators. For it can by no means be taken for granted that the common ·name of phenomenology, whether claimed from the inside or imposed from the outside, and in the latter case whether accepted or rejected, is the expression of a common substance. The attempt to write such an historical introduction must not be confused with the writing of a definitive history of the Phenomenological Movement as such. Quite apart from the limitation of the assignment, which I hope has kept me from being carried away by the fascination of the subject, the time for such a formidable enterprise is not yet at hand. ' Not only is phenomenology itself still history in the making; even its historiography is still in the formative stage. I! is however true, as I have come to realize mOre and more, that there is more than a local need for historical research into the history of the Phenomenological Movement as a whole. There is particular need for continued collecting and securing of the invaluable source material that still exists in the memories and letters of the eye witnesses of the beginnings of phenomenology, an enterprise which the Husserl Archives in Louvain have initiated so magnificently. I have made a special effort to salvage as much as possible of such information, though I do not always utilize it in the present account. The absence of a comprehensive history of the Phenomenological Movement even in Europe has made it necessary to delve into parts of the story which I believe are generally unknown. In fact, a considerable part of the story seems to me unknown even to the protagonists of recent phenomenology. This is particularlY the case with the French perspective of earlier German phenomenology, which usually overestimates the coherence of the Phenomenological Movement, for instance in the relationship between Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger. Also, too much of the best early German phenomenology published in Husserl's yearbook has so far remained practically unknown and hence ineffective. In such cases the lack of information and the very misconceptions of the actual events have themselves been factors, and at times productive factors, in the history of phenomenology. But even if legends are part of history itself, this is no reason to let them completely overgrow the facts, as far as these can still be xxx PREFACE ascertained. I am under no illusion that these legends can still be banished. But the facts should at least be made available to those who are interested not only in the appearances of phenomenology but in phenomenology itself. I confess that, in approaching and in facing the task of selecting the facts and putting them together, I have often felt a peculiar thri11 in seeing a landscape which probably has never been surveyed in such scope before. But I have also become uneasy at the responsibility of laying down patterns for future visitors of the scene. I felt particularly uneasy about the thinkers omitted from the story, even more than about those included. I therefore want to make it plain that my selections lay no claim to finality. In many cases they are determined by considerations of suitability for effective presentation. In this sense and to this extent the present history has been influenced by pragmatic considerations - pragmatic in the interest of optimum intelligibility. But even within the restricted scope of this plan completeness was out of the question. Nearly everyone of the thinkers mentioned might easily and profitably have been made the subject of a monograph. But such completeness would have interfered with clarity and continuity. The compromise I have been striving for is (I) to describe in each case the general framework for the phenomenological work of the thinkers I include; (2) to indicate by way of a bird's-eye view the scope of their phenomenological studies; (3) to present, at least in one special case for each, an example of their best efforts, particularly when these efforts are little known but worth knowing about; (4) to add enough criticism to indicate where work that has been labeled as phenomenology is, to say the least, open to suspicion and should not be considered as representative of phenomenology as a whole. Thus, as far as history is concerned, this book can be at best another step in the direction of the recovery of the phenomenological past. Too many of the relevant facts are not yet accessible, if they ever wi11 be. This is true not only of texts, but particularly of correspondence. A good deal of this belongs to the aU too human side of the story, which often cannot, and even should not, be told. Even though the subsequent account contains more biographical information about the main thinkers than the previous, more idea-focused accounts, it avoids as far as possible the merely personal angle, the mere anecdote, and the chronique scandaleuse. Some of it may be relevant to an understanding of the more puzzling protagonists of my story. But it is irrelevant to the story itself. The present account of the development of the Phenomenological Movement will include only phenomenological philosophy. The original PREFACE XXXI plan was to add a survey of the influence of phenomenology upon non• philosophical studies, such as psychology, psychopathology, and even psychiatry, upon mathematics, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities, and, last but not least, on the study of religion. The omission is all the more serious since in countries such as the United States the impact of phenomenology is perhaps more pronounced and fruitful in these outlying fields than in philosophy proper. All the same it should be pointed out from the very start that, as far as the Phenomenological Movement as a whole is concerned, the present story remains incomplete. As long as the names of Hermann Weyl, Karl Jaspers (as psycho• pathologist), Ludwig Binswanger, Erwin Straus, and Eugene Minkowski do not figure at all in such an account, or do so only incidentally, important parts of the picture are missing. To add them would, however, not only have delayed the completion of the central story, it would also have swelled the bulk of the present manuscript intolerably. At the moment all I can do is to openly admit this shortcoming and to express the hope that someone, if not I myself, will be able to fill the gap.' Finally, something should be said about the proper use of this work. I am well aware of the fact that few if any of the potential readers will be prepared to read a book of this size from cover to cover. In fact what most of them will be looking for is a compact little introduction to what phenomenology is all about and what its main results are. I am sorry that, given the vastness of the actual subject matter and my own limited powers of condensation, I am unable to oblige. All I can suggest to those with moderate curiosity and in an often legitimate hurry is that they turn from the introduction to the last chapter, sampling as much as they can on the way. One of my concerns was to write the individual chapters about the different phases and figures of the movement in such a manner that they can be consulted separately, even though they do not yield the reader all they should without the preceding and subsequent chapters. No chapter is meant to be dispensable, nor is any of them meant to be completely dependent on its predecessor. Such in fact is the connection among the main figures of the Phenomenological Movement. They belong together, but they do not lean upon one another. A word should be added about the bibliographical aids that follow each chapter. Again they are addressed primarily to the Anglo-American reader. Not even in the listing of the original works of the phenomenologists described have I aimed at completeness. But I tried not only to identify all the translations but also to appraise them summarily on the basis of samples I had taken - in view of the crucial role of such translations a XXXII PREFACE badly needed but obviously delicate undertaking. As far as the secondary literature is concerned I mention only the most important works not written in English, adding brief characterizations. However, I did attempt an almost complete listing of the English-speaking literature, often going beyond the published bibliographies. The indexes, particularly the subject index, which tries to incorporate a first glossary of the main phenomenological terms, may speak for themselves; so should the chronological charts.

The ultimate criterion for the success of this introduction will be whether it can entice the reader further, either to the original sources of this account, or, better, to the ultimate source for all phenomenological research, the "things themselves." Appleton, Wisconsin, U.S.A. August, 1959 H.Sp.

NOTES • "Philosophic Thought in France and the United States" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XI (1951), 380. , I have given a partial account of this semester in the centennial volume Edmund Husserl, 1859-1959 (Phaenomenologica 4), pp. 57-59. 3 See, for instance: Dorion Cairns, "Phenomenology." Ch. 28 in Ferm, Virgilius, ed., A History of Philosophical Systems. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, pp. 353-364. Marvin Farber, "Phenomenology," in Runes, Dagobert, ed .. Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools 0/ Thought. New York: Philosophical Library, 1943, pp. 343-370. Alfred Schutz, "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology" in Social Research XII (1945), 77 ff. Also in Collected Papers, I, p. 99 ff. Quentin Lauer's The Triumph 0/ Subjectivity. An Introduction to Transcen• dental Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958) is according to its very subtitle an account restricted to Husserl; it gives only inadequate and often misleading information about his predecessors and successors . • Among the pioneer studies in the history of phenomenology I shall mention only the book by Franz Josef Brecht, Bewusstsein und £Xistenz. Wesen und Wege der Phlinomenologie (Bremen: Johs. Storm Verlag, 1948), an interpretation of the development from Brentano through Husserl and Scheler to Heidegger focusing on the problem of the intentionality of consciousness, which Brecht considers solved by Heidegger's concept of Dasein. An even more authentic but briefer analysis of this development can be found in Ludwig Landgrebe's article, "Husserls Phllnomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung" (Revue internationale de philosophie II (1939), republished in Phllnomenologie und Metaphysik (Bremen: SchrOder, 1949, pp. 56-100). - Julius Kraft's Von Husserl zu Heidegger (2nd PREFACE XXX III edition, : Verlag Offentliches Leben, 1957) is according to its very subtitle a "critique of phenomenological philosophy" given from the standpoint of an anti• intuitionist rationalist, which presents the historical evidence only so far as it supports his negative conclusions. $ For a good but by no means comprehensive beginning of the history of phenomenological psychology see Stephan Strasser, "Phenomenological Trends in European Psychology" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XVIIl (1957), 18-34. [See now (1980) my Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry] PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

In contrast to its predecessor the third edition represents a complete revision of the original text. The second edition of 1965, reprinted with only minor alterations in 1968, 1971 and 1976, could add corrections and additions merely in the form of an attached supplement geared to the text of the first edition by marginal numbers, which thus broke up the continuity of the main text. The present version incorporates these additions, thus restoring the original unity. But it is a revision in several additional respects. In 1960 the first edition could be only a first raid on the total field of the Phenomenological Movement, undertaken with limited access to the original sources from a base far from the main fields of action. Obviously this attempt could be only preliminary and could present only a limited perspective of the total "phenomenon." Thus the book was and is in need of continuous revision. The present version contains further corrections of inaccuracies for whose identification I am indebted to several friends. To a limited extent it also tries to bring the story up to date. I am fully aware that for the Phenomenological Movement the Hegelian dusk needed for the flight of the owl of Minerva has not yet arrived. But some recent developments in the field are sufficiently established to require recording even today. However, the continued growth and widening of the Movement make the idea of a complete coverage more preposterous than ever, particularly if undertaken by one single reporter. But there are other reasons which have made a revision of my original attempt even more urgent - and more problematic. My original book was conceived as an introduction primarily for Anglo-American readers with their special background and interests. I undertook it in the hope that it would soon be followed and overtaken by others who would present the story in different perspectives and especially from the continental PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION xxxv viewpoint. Yet I know only of one such attempt, the much smaller Dutch book by R. Bakker, I which, as far as I can judge, tries to present in more concise form merely the central figures of the Movement from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty. In 1963 Hans-Georg Gadamer had opened his comprehensive review article on "The Phenomenological Movement" in the Philosophische Rundschau with the sentence: "The time seems to have arrived for·writing a history of the phenomenological movement.'" I have been hoping that this assessment would stimulate additional interpretations by more strategically located investigators, beginning with Gadamer himself. Thus far, to my knowledge, no one has risen to this challenge. There is only the still distant prospect for a German alternative. Several years ago my friend Eberhard Ave-Lallemant discussed with me the possibility of a German translation of my book with omissions and additions geared to the needs of its prospective readers. But we came to the not unexpected conclusion that this solution would not do. Instead he conceived of, and laid the groundwork for, a new parallel enterprise enlisting from the very start several expert collaborators. However, the completion of this project is not yet in sight. In the meantime the Movement will have to be kept alive, if only for the benefit of non-German readers. It should also give preference to the Anglo-American perspective. And it might provide the unity of orientation which some users may prefer to the encyclopedic balance of a cooperative enterprise. Nevertheless, in this new edition I have tried to reduce the worst defects of the earlier editions. My original hope was to enlist a younger scholar with international perspective and intercontinental experience in the person of Guido Kilng as co-author, a hope which did not materialize although he did support me freely by checking the earlier chapters of this edition. The main help came when Karl Schuhmann volunteered to examine the entire manuscript and to supervise the final production of the new book, in addition to contributing a detailed footnote about Husserl's adoption of the term "phenomenology." This is why at my request his name now appears as that of my major collaborator on the title page. Ave-Lallemant and KUng also helped me in meeting two new needs: In my first account of the "original" Phenomenological Movement I had given only preliminary sketches of the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Roman Ingarden. Since then both have died, and the increasing importance of their total work calls for a more complete coverage than I had given it. It was therefore particularly fortunate that I found in Ave-Lallemant, Conrad• Martius's last cooperator and editor, and in KUng, an expert on Ingarden's German as well as Polish writings, the most competent helpers to fill these XXXVI PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION gaps. For Josef StUrmann his former student Peter Schwankl contributed a brief sketch. A serious problem had also arisen in the case of Emmanuel Levinas, who in the meantime has emerged as a leading representative of a new type of French phenomenology. Here Stephan Strasser, a phenomeno• logist in his own right, put the German text of his contribution to the cooperative history of phenomenology at my disposal for translation. Unfortunately I was unable to enlist similar help for what I always considered the most problematic chapter of the original book, that on "The Wider Scene" of the Phenomenological Movement. Here, in my attempt to "farm out" the most important regions of the philosophical globe, I could enlist only one expert, Professor Alberto Rosales (University of Caracas, Venezuela) for the Hispano-American area, whose detailed text unfortunately exceeded the frame of my project. So, using his information and other sources, I decided to rewrite my earlier version in a more balanced way, leaving the major job for future cooperative enterprises. However, thanks to Karl Schuhmann's efforts, I could benefit from the corrections of and additions to my drafts by the following experts: Dr. Franco Volpi (Vicenza) for italy, Professor Jan Broekman (Louvain) for Russia and Eastern Europe, and Professor Masayuki Hakoishi (Iwate) for Japan, as well as Professor Thorild Dahlquist (Uppsala) for Sweden. One other gap of the first editions of this book has been closed separately. From the very start I had acknowledged the lack of an account of the significance of phenomenology for areas other than philosophy, especially for psychology and psychiatry. With the help of the National Institute of Mental Health I could prepare a book-size study of Pheno• menology in Psychology and Psychiatry, which was published by Northwestern University Press in 1972 in the series "Studies in Pheno• menology and Existential Philosophy." However, even this work is only an instalment on a much vaster need. For the impact of phenomenology on mathematics, on the other natural and social sciences and the humanities as well as on other areas of human life and culture remains still to be described. This task clearly exceeds the range and energy of one single researcher and definitely my own. My hope is that others will sooner or later feel encouraged and supported as I was in taking on this unfinished business.

The remainder of this preface is addressed mainly to those readers who by their past interest have kept this book alive and who have a right to know where they may expect to find the main changes in this new edition. I PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION XXXVII hope that in this manner I can save them the time and effort of ploughing once more through familiar ground and enable them to turn at once to major innovations in the present version. Besides, I want to be frank about the places where I changed my views and my accounts. I was always aware of my own fallibility. In fact, I remain a historical skeptic in the sense that we can never hope for more than an approach to the irrecoverable past. If there ever can be a "definitive" history of the Phenomenological Move• ment, in which some of my reviewers seem to believe, this "Introduction" is certainly not what they are looking for. Now to the specific changes. First, about the former prefaces: I left the first unchanged mostly for historical reasons. But I dropped the second as no longer pertinent, although some of the information about the first reception of the book and my first attempt to remove some of the inadequacies in 1965 may still be of some interest. The Introduction has remained intact, except for minor reformulations. But I also added some new information about the early history of the term "phenomenology." I replaced the derogatory term "pseudo-phenomeno• logies" by "unrelated phenomenologies" to designate uses which are irrelevant to my enterprise. I also tried to explain briefly why I had paid so little attention in the text to the "phenomenology" of Gaston Bachelard in spite of its intrinsic interest and influence as an independent new sidegrowth. Chapter I on Franz Brentano has remained virtually unchanged except for some updating of the source references and the bibliography. This is also true for the following chapter on Carl Stumpf. However, the central third chapter on "The Pure Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl" had to undergo some major rewriting, not only in view of the continuing flow of new texts and interpretations about his development, but of my own changed understandings. Here the most important change concerns Husserl's Freiburg period. Contrary to my former impressions I now see that one of his guiding motivations during this phase was the attempt to build a System of phenomenological philosophy, though not a system of philosophy in the traditional sense. This ambition, however Sidetracked, underlay his planning until the early thirties. This period came to an end with the failure of the attempt to develop his Cartesian Meditations into such a system. However, it was succeeded by a new approach to transcendental philosophy trying to show its necessity from the "crisis of the European sciences" in their historical development from Galileo, in which the idea of a return to the life world seemed to offer the key for a solution of the problem not only of science XXXVIII PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION but of the entire western civilization. Incomplete though it remained, the inspiration of this last period makes it perhaps J110re significant than its predece~sors. Apart from this new periodization there have been consider• able changes in other parts of this chapter, mostly because of access to new source material and the ready help of such Husserl experts as Karl Schuhmann. Also, while the general structure of this chapter remains unchanged, such sections as the one on the phenomenological reduction have undergone considerable modification. At the end I tried to point out the remaining main gaps in our knowledge of the sources for an adequate knowledge and appraisal of Husserl's achievements. Finally, the bibliography of this chapter has been reconstructed and simplified in order to keep control of the increasing flood especially of secondary literature. Chapter IV has undergone the most extensive revision, although the basic structure has not been replaced. Since the initial adventure of exploring this neglected field, the death of many more of the most significant phenomenologists of this group called for a fuller account of their contributions. Also, much more material about their work has become accessible. One of the major resources for research is now the collection of the papers of the members of the Munich Circle in the Manuscript Division of the Bayerische S/aa/sbiblio/hek in Munich under the directorship of Dr. Karl Dachs, where they were organized and catalogued by Eberhard Ave-Lallemant.' The innovations in this chapter begin with the title. The former adjective "Older" attempted to render the German coinage AltphIJnomenologie used proudly and somewhat facetiously by some of the early Husserl students. But my translation could not avoid the connotation of "old-fashioned" and "outdated." The new adjective "Original" is deliberately multivalent and not only more eulogizing. It is supposed to bring out not only the early date of this phenomenology, stretching from the beginning of the century to roughly the beginning of World War II, but, more important, the innovative and creative character of this phase, stimulated by, but not always originating from, Husserl's phenomenological impulses. As to the structure of this chapter the main change consists in the addition of three sections: one on Hedwig Conrad-Martius (E), now of greater importance even for non• German readers, one on Roman Ingarden (F), whose work now calls for and allows a much fuller sketch. But at least as important is the addition of a special section of what I call the Freiburg Group (H). In previous editions I had neglected Husserl's new following in Freiburg, mentioning only some of them in the chapter on "The Wider Scene," without any attempt to find a frame which would allow to reflect the pattern of this group. Thus far I PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION XXXIX am not aware of any attempt by others to do this. I have tried to structure this unexplored field in a preliminary way using the analogy of concentric shells around the central core of Husser!. Admittedly such a pattern leaves much to be desired, especially in the account of Husserl's closest associates Landgrebe and Fink. Apart from such major expansions, there have been numerous corrections and minor additions in the initial sections about the GOttingen and Munich Circles. In the case of Pfander the publication of two basic posthumous works gives more solid support to the account in the text. There seemed to be little need for changes in the section on Adolf Reinach. However, a recent tome with old and new texts on by Moritz Geiger, including a major group of posthumous manuscripts edited by Klaus Berger, had to be given special consideration. The Max Scheler chapter (V) did not yet call for complete rewriting. The new texts now out in the slowly progressing edition of his collected writings, since Maria Scheler's death under the care of Manfred S. Frings, do not yet include his preparations for the most important missing link, the philosophical anthropology. But since the entire Nachlass is now deposited in the 8ayerische Staatsbibliothek, the catalogue prepared by Eberhard Ave-Lallemant permits a preview of what can still be expected before long, enough for keeping hope of substantial additions but not yet for changing the layout of the present chapter. However, the latest volumes give some better insight into Scheler'S epistemological position, and particularly into his "intuitive voluntarism," his conception of the phenomenological reduction and the general place of phenomenology in philosophy, which required some restructuring and expanding. Also, a good many details, beginning with biographical ones, had to be corrected. The bibliography refers to a growing number of important translations. There was less need for changes in the Nicolai Hartmann chapter, which now follows the one on Scheler immediately as No. VI, instead of VII, formerly the Heidegger chapter; my critics have convinced me that this would be more helpful to the reader, although Heidegger was in much closer touch with Husserl than was Hartmann. His greater philosophical closeness to Scheler also recommends the new arrangement. Otherwise only stylistic improvements and some updating of the bibliography deserve mention. A thorough review of the Heidegger chapter (now VII) seemed to be equally urgent - and impossible. The amount of information that has poured in since the formulation of the original chapter has not only enriched the source foundation relevant to my limited objective but revealed considerable inaccuracies in my account, which needed correcting XL PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION at the earliest opportunity. Moreover the basis for a definitive study of Heidegger's phenomenology has been completely changed, not only by his death but by the beginnings of a comprehensive edition of his writings planned under his own direction four years before his death, two thirds of which are to contain thus far unpublished materials consisting mostly of lectures. Of this edition 55 volumes have been announced by late 1978. At the present rate of publication it will take at least several decades until they are available. Even this edition will not be complete and "historisch• kritisch." This means that any account of Heidegger's total philosophy and especially of its development has to remain preliminary for a long time to come. Fortunately, the first volumes of the new edition contain texts which have particular significance for an understanding of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology. Under these circumstances I left the general structure of this chapter unchanged, while rewriting large sections of the text. But I inserted a special section about Heidegger's "idea of phenomenology" as it emerges from his Marburg lectures of 1927. I also replaced the rather evasive title for Heidegger's second Freiburg period ("Under the Sign of Htilderlin") by "The Turn" (Die Kehre), a more authentic and significant phrase, though by no means a self-explanatory one. I must mention the addition of new information about the relation between Husserl and Heidegger, the expansion of the section on Heidegger's basic theme, more autobiographical data about his way into phenomenology, about the reasons for the abandonment of Sein und Zeit in connection with the "Kehre," and the replacement of the awkward rendering of Seiendes by "things-in-being," mostly by "beings." Moreover, in this chapter I have cut down a great deal on the bibliography, now practically beyond control, and replaced it by references to the best available substitutes. Finally, I have abandoned the attempt to keep track of Heidegger's following, which could have amounted at best to a listing of names. This remains a task to be undertaken independently. Besides, on the whole Heidegger's main students and followers, whose names can be found mostly in the many Festschriften he received after his sixtieth birthday, have shown comparatively little interest in his "phenomenology" and in the Phenomenological Movement as such. Revising Part Three dealing with the French Phase was even more difficult since my access to the changes in the French area was less direct than in earlier years. In the initial Chapter VIII on the beginnings of French phenomenology only minor changes reflect improved information. Chapter IX on Gabriel Marcel called for consideration of his last book and of his retrospective conversations with Paul Ricoeur. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION XLI

[n Chapter X on Sartre, his death, preceded by the end of his literary production except for continuing interviews, meant that the record of his completed philosophy and particularly his phenomenology is now available. However, drafts and unfinished works, for instance of his "ethics," will sooner or later become generally accessible. Also a good deal of new information about Sartre's philosophic development has come out. This allowed me to make several improvements in the chapter on the development of his philosophical thought, but not yet any finalization. Among the improvements are: (I) the removal of such errors, inevitable at the time, about Sartre's studies in Germany; (2) the utilization of new information, some still unpublished, about Sartre's philosophical beginnings, not covered by his childhood autobiography and Simone de Beauvoir's witnessing chronicle beginning with his advanced university record, based largely on interviews; (3) the appraisal of Sartre's adoption of Marxism in the fifties and its significance for his phenomenological existentialism and its limitations, including the evaluation of his new "progressive-regressive method"; and (4) the role of phenomenology in his largest torso, the marxist• existentialist interpretation of the genesis of Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary. My most important tool for technical improvements was the unique Bibliographical Life of Jean-Paul Sartre by Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka. [n the case of the chapter on Merleau-Ponty (X[) a complete rewriting may have seemed to be in order. At the time [ put together the original version Merleau-Ponty was still in full production and had announced major new works. Thus even after his abrupt death in 1961 it seemed premature to revise this chapter. Now apparently all the posthumous works have appeared, and most of them have even been translated, not to mention the snowballing secondary literature. Nevertheless, the revised chapter is not a complete replacement. Since my first account was developmental, not all of it was outdated by the new material. Hence the earlier sections did not have to be replaced. However, thanks mostly to the painstaking research of Theodore M. Geraets [ could incorporate his findings about Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy and especially about his first Husserl studies. The major problem for the reappraisal of Merleau• Ponty's philosophy and phenomenology came from the realization that there had been a change in his position during his last years, foreshadowed in his last publications but clearly expressed only in his fragmentary Le XLII PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

Visible et I'invisible and his related worknotes, and also in the abandonment of the program he had formulated in the early fifties for the completion of his phenomenological system. These changes include the introduction of new titles, concepts and terms and repeated self-criticisms and criticisms of Husserl's position. However, in view of the fact that these changes, especially those in the only developed fragment of Le Visible et I'invisible, were not yet finalized, I have put the relevant information into a special section, leaving the final appraisal of these texts to the reader. For personally I am not yet prepared to agree with those interpreters who see in Merleau-Ponty's beginnings of a "new ontology" an abandonment of his old phenomenology. But I too would not deny that Merleau-Ponty was reshaping his philosophical program at the time when death took the pen from his hand. As in other chapters I have become more selective with regard to the secondary literature, leaving complete compilations to the multiplying bibliographies. Chapter XII, formerly entitled "Current Developments," now goes by the title of "Paul Ricoeur and Some Associates" (Le. Mikel Dufrenne and Raymond Polin). Among these Ricoeur is now the outstanding figure, and might well have been given a complete chapter by himself. If I did not do so, it is largely because giving the same weight to Dufrenne and Polin would have resulted in an unbalanced distribution of chapters. In my preceding editions, the main purpose of this chapter was to show that phenomenology was still an ongoing philosophical trend in France. I wanted to attract attention to three of the youngest generation whose achievements up to then justified special hopes for phenomenology. In the case of Ricoeur these hopes have materialized to an extent that he is now a major figure in phenomenology far beyond France. But this is no reason to ignore the lesser previous phenomenological achievements of his generation-mates, although they no longer figure as prominently. Hence, the main additions had to be made in the case of Ricoeur, especially for his work since 1958. To be sure, he too did not carry out the original plan of his Philosophy of the Will on the basis of a mainly descriptive and structural phenomenology. Increasingly he developed and emphasized the need of a hermeneutic complement, which finally made him characterize his entire enterprise as hermeneutic phenomenology. The significance of this change required a special discussion of some of his relevant production since the sixties. There was less need for examining Dufrenne's later works, in which phenomenology plays only an incidental role compared with his increased interest in an ontology of nature. This applies even more to the account of Raymond Polin, whose new writings in history of political PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION XLIII philosophy and on ethics and politics are not based specifically on phenomenology. The "Affiliated Thinkers" to which I referred at the end of the chapter with a few inadequate characterizations have now been transferred to the final survey chapter. The main innovation in this Part is the insertion of a completely new chapter on Emmanuel Levinas's Phenomenological Philosophy. Previously Levinas had been mentioned only in his historical role as one of the early links between German and French phenomenology and as a co• translator of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations into French. Only a brief note in the Supplement had hinted at his independent philosophical development. Now his academic rise and an additional major work have made it clear that his thought and especially his original type of phenomenology call for fuller treatment. However, I myself saw no early chance of doing this. At this point, I learned that Stephan Strasser, one of the foremost students of Levinas's philosophy and especially his phenomenology, was preparing a chapter for the German composite history of phenomenology. His willingness to let me have this text for an English translation in my book not only put me in his special debt, but made it possible for me to put into the hands of my readers a text that I could not have equalled, especially without considerable additional delay and with the uneasy feeling of having misrepresented important parts of Levinas's demanding texts. Obviously this inserted chapter, not written especially for my book, differs from it in plan, development and style. But in this case this might very well be an advantage. A comparative appraisal of Levinas's phenomenology presupposes a much fuller exposition of his concrete ideas than in the case of many other phenomenologists, which is what Strasser provides. Part Four, "The Geography of the Phenomenological Movement" (a preview) is a complete innovation, taking the place of a chapter which in the preceding editions I had called rather vaguely "The Wider Scene" (Chapter XIII). It had become increasingly clear to me that my earlier world tour of phenomenology, mostly based on chance information and haphazard samplings of the literature, was lop-sided and at times utterly unfair. So I came to realize that such a chapter could be written only by inviting closer witnesses and participants from the scenes. However, after several attempts in the case of the Hispano-American world, of Soviet Russia and Japan, I realized that I was not in the position to assemble the necessary team of collaborators who shared my general perspective sufficiently. This does not mean that the attempt should be abandoned for good, and I am particularly hopeful that the forthcoming German XLIV PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION cooperative history of phenomenology will be more successful in achieving universality and balance through better coordination. In the meantime I decided to adopt a more modest scheme. All it involves is to provide a worldwide background for the main figures to which the previous chapters attempt an introduction in depth. Without this foil the present story would not only be incomplete but too provincial. For today's Phenomenological Movement has clearly spread over most of the philosophical globe. But all I could do single-handed was to present a picture, which I may well call a perspective, as it presents itself for me as an observer from afar. I tried to present it in such a way that it indicates its own incompleteness and invites further exploring and complementing. In calling it a "geography" I wanted to emphasize the locations, rather than the events and ideas they host. As far as possible I also tried to indicate the origins of the present situation in the respective areas as far as I could trace them with my limited resources. In other words, this is merely a particular appearance of the state of phenomenology in the philosophical world today. As such I consider it solely as a preview for a more thorough and more intersubjective perspective, which the future cooperative survey of the situation of phenomenology should reveal, both in space and in historical time. In its briefness it is at best a bird's-eye view without sufficient detail for a fair evaluation, but with enough for first identification. The last part (now Part Five, formerly Chapter XIV), the attempt to draw a conclusion from the historical varieties of phenomenology, posed a particularly difficult problem for any possible revision. Certainly, it would have allowed for any number of changes and improvements in the light of my own growing insights. But I doubt that rewriting the chapter could give much help to the reader of the revised book. So I decided to let it stand, if only as a monument of my heresies. I have removed only obvious inaccuracies and outdated references. The most important change concerns my previous reference to 's relation to phenome• nology, which at the time I assumed to have been one of indifference, if not hostility. Since then I have become aware of incidental remarks in his writings between the Tractatus and the Blue Book showing a positive interest in a certain kind of phenomenology to which I referred in the Supplement to the Second Edition. But now even more explicit evidence from the period of the Philosophical Grammar has come to my attention, which calls for careful examination once the texts are generally accessible. In any case there is more than mere parallelism between a wider phenomenology and Wittgensteinian analysis, if only a coincidence in terminology. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION XLV

I would also like to repeat here a warning which I had put before into the preface to the separate edition of this chapter: In distinguishing several "steps" of the phenomenological method, based on the degree to which they are shared by members of the Phenomenological Movement, I did not mean to suggest that these steps have to be taken in rigid sequence in every concrete phenomenological investigation. They are "steps" only in order of importance and spread. Whether or not they should be carried out one by one, as my examples might suggest, will depend on the concrete phenomena. But I know of no better term to suggest the relationship among these components of the phenomenological approach. Further• more, I would like to point out that by putting "intuiting" first among the "steps" of the phenomenological approach I do not mean to suggest that a phenomenological investigation has always to begin with unprepared "looking." This may very well be the case where we meet completely new phenomena, such as new smells or pains, for the first time, which we find difficult, if not impossible, to describe. But in most areas of our ordinary life language has already prepared the ground by articulating the phenomena, however roughly and arbitrarily. In such cases the best approach may be by the starting out with a study of ordinary language and its meanings as guides to the phenomena in the sense in which John L. Austin had suggested and practiced it in his "linguistic phenomenology." Only this approach has to be followed by intuiting, analysing and describing in a way in which the linguistic analysts rarely if ever have done it explicitly. I have since tried to give an example of such a phenomeno• logical investigation starting out from linguistic analysis in a study of the meaning and the corresponding phenomenon of the pronoun "we.''' While the chapter on "The Essentials of the Phenomenological Method" was meant merely as an attempt to formulate the core and the periphery of the varieties of phenomenology, it does not and cannot reflect my own stand, as it has sometimes been misunderstood. For my own position I would like to refer the reader to my essays on Doing Phenomenology. But I would also like to stress one "idiosyncrasy" which reflects a development in my own perspective on the "phenomenological reduction." I have not yet abandoned my opposition to the prime emphasis on the "phenomenological reduction," as I expressed it by giving it only sixth place in order of importance for phenomenology in the wider sense, as contrasted to Husserl's strict "transcendental phenomenology." However, I now believe that the distinction between "epoche" and "reduction" proper, of which I have become increasingly aware, makes it possible to restore the epoch/: to its basic role in doing phenomenology. XLVI PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDmON

There is indeed a need for a radical suspension of belief from the start and in fact all through the performance of phenomenological investigations. This is why there seems to me no need for formulating this attitude as a separate "step" rather than a constant accompaniment of all the other phases of the method. However, the important thing is that this "suspension" does not include and necessitate a reduction to subjectivity and specifically to the origins of the phenomena through constituting acts. There is good reason for undertaking such investigations too. But their proper place comes after the steps mentioned before. And they are to be carried out in a manner uncommitted to any idealistic or realistic presuppositions as to the "origins," subjective or objective or mutual, from which they spring. I do not intend to present this personal perspective as part of the essentials of the phenomenological method. It can serve here only as an example of how my preceding analysis can become the basis for a reasoned selection and reformulation of one's own method in accord with one's insights and the requirements of the "phenomena." Finally, I would like to draw attention to a new collateral volume of essays which will appear at the same time under the title The Context of the Phenomenological Movement in the series Phaenomenologica. It contains comparative and historical studies which had grown mostly out of the main "text" of this book, but had outgrown it. Without claiming that they will provide the complete background for the Movement I believe they can support and enrich its picture in important directions as indicated in several )ootnotes of the main book. They are not essential enough to include them in a second volume. But they may be considered supplements to the original enterprise.

A major problem for the present revision has been the handling of the snowballing secondary literature. While from the start I had never tried to give more than selective lists of both the primary and secondary sources, wherever possible followed by some comments, I now find it impossible to maintain even this limited standard and to give fair advice to those in need of a guide through the exploding literature. The only responsible solution I could find was to cut down my selections to those particularly helpful to me. Otherwise I have to refer the more inquisitive reader to the "most comprehensive bibliographies" which I have been able to discover either in the periodical literature or in separate publications. Besides, there is the 'Index, which since 1968 has been assembling all the pertinent American titles, often accompanied by the authors' brief summaries, supplemented since 1978 by a Retrospective Index for the years after 1940, PREFACE TO TIlE TIlIRD EDITION XLVII both included in the Philosophers' Index Data Bank accessed through the Lockheed DIALOG system. In the case of non-American literature the Bibliographie de la philosophie intemationale published with the aid of Unesco by Vrin, Paris, Section I deals with books on Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. What I have abandoned altogether is the attempt to keep track of American university dissertations, which I had listed before at the end of each chapter. In view of the proliferation - in the case of Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty there were around thirty titles for each of them by 1972 - such a mere listing would no longer make much sense and merely add to the bulk of this introductory work. A better reason is that the new Comprehensive Dissertation Index 1861-1972 in its volume 32 (Philosophy and Religion) and vols. 18-19 (Psychology) (Ann Arbor: Xerox Microfilm 1973) offers a more complete and reliable list than I could ever have hoped to achieve; annual editions promise to keep this inventory up to date. Ruth Jackson gave again efficient aid by stylistic editing and proof• reading as a "labor of love." The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University supported me as an emeritus by several research grants.

The new edition carries an additional dedication: "To the memory of Herman Leo Van Breda, without whose generous support this book could not have appeared." It was he who, as founder and chief editor of the series Phaenomenologica, had mentioned as early as 1949 in his Preface to the first volume of HU$$erliana the plan of adding to the edition of Husserl's works that of a series of historical and critical studies, not only about his doctrine but "about the phenomenological current (Ie courant pMnomenologique) in general." And it was he who when he had seen copies of my first manuscript spontaneously offered to publish it in its entirety in Phaenomenologica, thus saving it from a reluctant American university press, which wanted to cut it down to half its size and asked for a subsidy. Without his unstinted and warm interest The Phenomenological Movement could not have survived in its original form. Washington University St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A. March 1980 H.Sp. XLVIII PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

NOTES

I R. Bakker, De geschiedenis van het /enomenologisch denken. Utrecht: Aula Boeken, 1966 . • This sentence now appears in section III of a new version of this anicle in Kleine Schri/ten III (1972), 150-189. Incidentally, here Gadamer replaced his original criticisms of my book by a footnote (p. 160) whose readiness to acknowledge his earlier misunderstandings is unique in my experience. The fact that he still voices unspecified objections to my emphases (Ak:r.entset~ngen) is no surprise to me and oven welcome. The two new first sections of the revised aniele, based on two radio talks, provide an exceptionally vivid background for understanding Husserl's and Heidegger's impact on the German scene. , Die Nachl/JSSe der MfJnchener PhlJnomenoiogen in der Boyerischen Staats• bibliothek, verzeichnet von Eberhard Ave-LaDemant. Wiesbaden: Otto Harras• sowitz, 1975 . • See Doing Phenomenology, The Hague: Maninus Nijhoff, 1975, Ch. 12.