SPECIAL ANALYSIS

FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

College Debate Series

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH 1200-17THSTREET, N.W. -WASH/NGTON, D. C. 20036 THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, established in 1943, is a nonpartisan research and educational organization which studies national policy problems.

Institute publications take two major forms: l. LEGISLATIVE AND SPECIAL ANALYSES - factual analyses of current legislative proposals and other public policy issues before the Congress prepared with the help of recognized experts in the academic world and in the fields of law and government. A typical analysis features: (1) pertinent background, (2) a digest of significant elements, and (3) a discussion, pro and con, of the issues. The reports reflect no policy position in favor of or against specific proposals.

2. LONG-RANGE STUDIES - basic studies of major national problems of significance for public policy. The Institute, with the counsel of its Advisory Board, utilizes the services of competent scholars, but the opinions expressed are those of the authors and represent no policy position on the part of the Institute.

ADVISORY BOARD Paul W. McCracken, Chairman Edmund Ezra Day University Professor of Business Administration University of Michigan Karl Brandt Loy W. Henderson Professor of Economic Policy Director, Center for Diplomacy Emeritus and Foreign Policy Stanford University American University

Felix Morley Milton Friedman Editor and Author Paul S. Russell Distinguished Service Professor of Economics Stanley Parry University of Chicago Professor, Department of Political Science University of Southern Mississippi Gottfried Haberler Galen L. Stone Professor E. Blythe Stason of International Trade Dean Emeritus, Law School Harvard University University of Michigan

George E. Taylor Director, Far Eastern & Russian Institute University of Washington OFFICERS

Chairman Carl N. Jo cobs Vice Chairmen Henry T. Bodman Clyde T. Foster H. C. Lumb President Treasurer William J, Baroody Henry T. Bodman

Thomas F. Johnson Joseph G. Butts Director of Research Director of Legislative Analysis Howard Friend Earl H. Vass Director of Public Finance Analysis Director of International Studies FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

College Debate Series

October 14, 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE------ix CHAPTER

I. POST-WORLD WAR II UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY COMMI'IMENTS------

Introductory Essay------1 I. The Legacy of World War II--The United Nations------1

II. From San Francisco to Containment------4 A. The Failure of Cooperation------4 B. The Truman Doctrine------5

III. Economic Commitments------6 A. International Economic Organizations------6 B. The Marshall Plan------8 C. Aid for Economic Development------10 1. Technical Assistance------10 2. East-West Rivalry------11 3. Developmental Financing------12 (a) Public Law 480------12 (b) Development Loan Fund------12 (c) Multilateral Approach------13 D. The Kennedy-Johnson Programs------14 IV. United States Military Policy------16 A. Latin America------'------16 1. The Monroe Doctrine------16 2. The Act of Chapultepec---·------17 3. The Rio Treaty------18 4. Organization of American States------19 5. Rifts Between Good Neighbors------19 6. Security in the 1960's------20 B. United States Military Policy in Europe------21 1. The North Atlantic Treaty------2 1 2. The Mutual Security Act------22 3. German Rearmament------23 4. NATO in the 1960's------23

- i -

1 1 CHAPTER C. United States Military Policy in the Middle East------25 1. The Cold War------25 2. The Baghdad Pact------26 3. The Eisenhower Doctrine------27 4. Continuing Middle East Crisis------28 D. United States Military Policy in the Far East-- 29 1. The Legacy of World War 11------29 (a) China------29 (b) Japan------29 (c) Korea------30 2. The Korean War------30 3. The War in Indo-China------32 4. Geneva Conference------32 5. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization------33 6. The Southeast Asian Dilemma------34 V. Epilogue------36 Bibliography------37 II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSITION------39

Introductory Essay------39 I. Definition of Terms------39 A. "Foreign Policy Commitments"------40 B. "Substantially Reduce"------43 1. Total Abolition of All Commitments------43 2. Renunciation of Certain General Policies-- 43 3. Structural Change in or Abolition of Com­ mitments Without Changing Underlying Policies------44 4. Reduction of the Amount or Extent of Sup- port Without Alteration of the Structural Commitment------44 5. Gradual Reduction of the American Commitment------44 6. Transfer of the Commitment From One Channel to Another------44 7. Reducing the Duration of the Commitment--- 45 II. The Goals and Determinants of American Foreign Policy------45 A. Determinants of the Existence, Strength, and Duration of American Foreign Policy Commitments------46 1. Geographical Position of the United States 46 2. Wealth, Natural Resources, and Industrial Growth------46

- ii - CHAPTER

3. The American Government and Political System------47 4. Presence of Large Numbers of Ethnic Groups in the American Population------47 5. American Devotion to the Democratic Form of Government------47 6. Close Relationship Between Diplomatic and Military Affairs------48 7. Desire for Reciprocal Commitments------48 8. The Emergence of the United States to World Leadership After World War II----- 48 9. American Leadership in the Formation of the United Nations------49 10. American Development of Atomic and Nuclear Weapons------49 B. Current Goals of American Foreign Policy------49

III. The Machinery of American Foreign Policy: How Com­ mitments are Undertaken------51 A. The President and Foreign Policy Commitments--- 51 B. The State Department and Foreign Policy Commitments------54 C. Congress and Foreign Policy Commitments------54 1. Senate Approval of Treaties------55 2. Legislation of Joint Resolution------55 3. Declaration of War------55 4. Appropriations------55 5. Investigations------56 D. Other Branches of the Government and Foreign Policy Commitments------56 1. United Nations Mission------56 2. United States Information Agency------56 3. National Security Council------56 4. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency------57 S. Peace Corps------57 6. Central Intelligence Agency------57

IV. Affirmative Strategy: General Considerations and Questions------5 8 A. By What Standards Should American Foreign Policy Be Judged?------58 B. What Aspects of American Foreign Policy Warrant Criticism?------58 C. Is the Policy or the Commitment the Source of the Failure?------59 D. If the Commitment is at Fault, in What Respect? 59 E. How Would A Change in the Particular Commitment Affect the Whole System of American Foreign Policy?------60

- iii - CHAPTER

F. What Additional Benefits May Follow From the Proposed Reduction?------61 G. Are the Proposed Reductions Within the Spirit of the Resolution?------61

V. Negative Strategy: General Considerations and Questions------61 A. Substantial Reduction of Certain Commitments Might Affect the Value and Credibility of American Commitments Generally------62 B. Substantial Reduction Might Cause Retaliation by Other Nations------62 C. Substantial Reduction Might Upset the Delicate Balance of International Relations or Intro- duce Serious Inconsistencies------62 D. Substantial Reduction Might Create A Vacuum Into Which Communist Power Could Move------62 E. Substantial Reduction Might Have Adverse Ef- fects on the American Economy------63 F. Defense of American Foreign Policy Commitments in the Three Major Areas of Controversy------63 G. Defense of Minor American Foreign Policy Commitments------63

Discussion Questions------·------65 Bibliography------68

III. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES REDUCE ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS------70

Introductory Essay------70 I. United States Participation in the Unite d Nations 70 and Its Affiliates------II. Policy Alternatives for the United States: In What Ways Could American Participation in the U.N. b e "Substantially Reduced"?------7 3 A. Complete Withdrawal From the United Nations and Affiliates------74 B. Withdrawal From Particular Agencies or Branches 74 C. Reduction of the Extent of American Support Of and Participation In All United Nations Activities------7 4 D. Attachment of Conditions to Continued United States Participation------7 4

III. The Peacekeeping Function of the United Nations----- 75 e e e e ------76 A. Th. Chart r and th Machin ry 77 B. The Record of Peacekeeping---�------1. Kashmir------77

- iv - CHAPTER 2. Korea------77 3. Suez------78 4. The Congo------78 C. Proposals For Improving the Peacekeeping of the United Nations------83 1. Permanent Stand-by Force------83 2. Flexible Call-up System------83 3. Greater Participation and Readiness by Great Power Forces------84

IV. The Economic Development and Assistance Function of the United Nations------84 A. United States Participation in the Economic Development Work of the United Nations------&5 B. Performance of U.N. Development Activities: Evaluation of the Record------86 1. Loss of Control Over Aid Through the United Nations------86 2. Particular Objections to the United Nations As An Aid Channel------89 C. Proposals for Structural Change and Improvement 91

V. The Financial Crisis of the United Nations: Costs of Keeping the Peace------92

VI. The Presence of the Soviet Union: General Problems and the Veto------98

VII. Other Problems of United Nations Membership------101 Discussion Questions------104 Bibliography------107

IV. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE ITS ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS------110

Introductory Essay------110 I. The Foreign Aid Commitments of the United States---- 110 A. A Survey of Existing American Foreign Aid Programs------110 1. Development Loans------110 2. Technical Cooperation Grants------111 3. Supporting Assistance------111 4. Contingency Fund------111 5. Contributions to International Organizations------112 6. Commitments to the Export-Import Bank----- 112 7. Food for Peace------112 8. The Peace Corps------113

- v - CHAPTER Page 9. The Alliance for Progress------113 10. Miscellaneous Programs------113 11. Administrative Expenses-�------113 B. To What Countries Does American Economic Aid Go ?------114 C. How is American Economic Aid Dispensed?------115 D. What Are the General Goals of the American Foreign Aid Program?------116 1. Moral or Humanitarian Goals------117 2. Economic Goals------117 3. Political Goals------118 E. In What Mays Might American Economic Aid Com­ mitments be "Substantially Reduced"?------118 1. Total Abolition of the Aid Program------118 2. Sharp Reduction in the Number of Countries Receiving Aid------118 3. Substantial Reduction or Termination of Aid to International Organizations------119 4. Substantial Reduction or Termination of Aid to Particular Countries------119 5. Termination or Substantial Reduction of Particular Programs in All Nations and Regions------119 6. Attachment of Additiqnal Conditions to American Aid Programs------119 II. Foreign Economic Assistance: The General Issues---- 120 A. Foreign Aid Cannot Possibly Do the Whole Job--- 120 B. Economic Assistance Programs Harm the Donor Nations------122 C. Foreign Aid May Harm the Receiving Nations----- 124

III. American Bilateral Foreign Aid: The Particular Issues------126 A. Introduction------126 B. Bilateral Aid Creates Tensions Between the United States and the Recipient Nations------126 C. Bilateral Aid Intensifies East-West Tensions--- 130 D. The American Bilateral Aid Program Represents Relatively Inefficient Use of Aid Funds------131

IV. American Aid to Communist Countries------133 A. Introduction------133 B. Aid to Communist Countries and American Foreign Policy Objectives------134 C. Aid to Communist Countries and Their Internal Policies------134 D. Aid to Communist Countries and Their External Policies------135

- vi - CHAPTER Discussion Questions--� ...- -.-...-.------137 Bibliography------..--- ...------140

V. UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMITMENTS------145

Introductory Essay------145 I. The Defense of Weste� Europe------145 A. Should NATO Be Discontinued?------145 B. Should the United States Reduce Its Troot' Commitment to Europe?------147 1. U.S. Troop Reduction Might Ease Tensions With the Soviet Union---..------.------147 2. One U.S. Division Could Accomplish the Same Mission as Six------147 3. U.S. Force Reduction Could Offer Advantages------149 II. United States Military Assistance Program------150 A. What is Military Aid?------150 1. Forward Defense Programs------151 2. Alliance for Progress Security------151 3. Military Base Rights------151 4. Grant Aid Phase-Out------152 5. free World Orientation------152 6. U.S. Forces Support and Military Assis- tance Program Administration------152 B. The Affirmative Case--to Substantially Reduce U.S. Military Assistance------152 1. Overemphasis on Military Assistance------152 2. The United States Cannot Ultimately Con- trol How Its Military Assistance is Used 155 3. American Military Assistance Works at Cross-purpose with Economic Aid------157 4. Military Aid is Wasteful------158 C. The Negative Case--U.S. Foreign Aid Programs Should Not be Limited to Nonmilitary Assistance------161 1. Withdrawing Military Aid Would Undermine the Security of the Free World------161 2. Suspension of U.S. Military Assistance Would Endanger the Internal Security of Many Nations------162 3. Suspending Military Assistance Would Remove an Important U.S. Diplomatic Leverage------163 D. The Suspension of Cash Sales of Arms and Other Military Equipment Would Weaken Our Balance­ of-Payments Position------163

- vii - CHAPTER Page Discussion Q uestions------165 Bibliography------166

VI. THE SPECIAL CASE OF VIET NAM------·------168

Introductory Essay------168 I. Can the United States Legally Justify Its Position in Viet Nam?------168 A. The United States in Viet Nam and the United Nations Charter------�------168 B. Viet Nam and the Geneva Accords------169 C. SEATO and Viet Nam------170 D. Viet Nam and the Tonkin Resolution------171 II. Is the United States Position in Viet Nam Morally Justified?------172

III. Will United States Policy in Viet Nam Succeed?------176 A. Can We Contain Communism in Viet Nam?------176 B. Are We Over Committed in Viet Nam?------�----181

IV. How Can the United States Substantially Reduce Its Commitments to Viet Nam?------�------185 A. Withdrawal------186 B. The Enclave Solution------186 C. Escalation------188

V. Epilogue------189

Discussion Questions------190 Bibliography------191

- viii - PREFACE

This Special Analysis is concerned exclusively with the issues presented by the 1966.,..67 intercollegiate debate proposition: "RESOLVED: THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE ITS FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS." It is being published by the American Enterprise Institute in response to many requests from college debaters and coaches for back­ ground materials and references on the subject of the debate proposition. The Special Analysis was prepared by Professor John A. Lynch, director of debate at St. Anselm's College, Manchester, New Hampshire, and Professor Robert M. O'Neil of the University of California School of Law at Berkeley. Both authors come to the project with extensive backgrounds as intercollegiate debaters and debate coaches. This analysis should not be construed as reflecting any policy position on the part of the American Enterprise Institute. The authors wish to stress at the outset that they are not experts in the subject matter of the resolution. They have, however, tried to as­ semble, organize, and present authoritative material in such a way as to assist debaters seeking to delineate and explore the central issues raised by the national debate proposition. This _analysis is not intended to pro­ vide a complete ma�al, nor an end to the debater's research but is designed rather to serve as a guide to the start of research and a stimulus to its continuation. To this end, an extensive bibliography has been included at the close of each chapter, listing many more references than those which have been directly quoted or cited in the footnotes which accompany the chapter's text.

Each chapter considers a distinct aspect of the resolution. The first chapter surveys the origin and development of major United States foreign policy commitments since World War II. The second chapter analyzes the proposition and discusses the various problems in planning an affirma­ tive approach--proceeding through the many questions which the affirmative must consider in drafting a workable plan, and the negative must consider in challenging the affirmative proposal. Chapter III deals with our com­ mitments to international organizations. Chapter IV considers our economic commitments. Chapter V examines United States military commitments. Fi­ nally, Chapter VI deals with the special case of Viet Nam. The American Enterprise Institute and the authors wish to express their deep appreciation to the following persons who have read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions in its final pr�paration: Professor George F. Henigan, Director of Debate, George Washington University; Professor Molly Holford, formerly of the Department of Speech, University of California, Berkeley; Dr. Robert P. Newman, Director of Debate, the University of Pitts­ burgh; Dr. William M. Reynolds, Director of Debate, Georgetown University; and Dr. Russel R. �indes, Chairman, Department of Speech, Queens College. The authors also wish to thank the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for assistance in preparing the bibliography.

- ix - CHAPTER I

POST-WORLD WAR II UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS

Introductory Essay

This chapter will survey the or1g1ns and development of the major United States foreign policy commitments since World War II. No efforts will be made to cover all our foreign policy commitments; such a task would·be impossible to accomplish in one chapter or even an entire book. Since it is the authors' belief that our current Cold War-related military and economic policies were responsible for the current inter-collegiate debate topic, this chapter will attempt to identify and trace their development. Even this is a large task because many of our foreign policy commitments encompass two decades of American foreign pol­ icy. For this reason, we shall not attempt an entire history of this period but-rather, to fit our major commitments to this period as they arise. Since many of these commitments are related to the expanded in­ ternational role among nations which we assumed during World War II, we shall begin our survey there.

I. The Legacy of World War II--The United Nations. The most significant change that occurred in American foreign policy resulting from our participation in World War II was our commit- ment to a new role in international politics. The government and a ma­ jority of the American people rejected the idea that the United States could return as it did following World War I to its traditional isolation or at least to a position where we avoided entangling alliances. In the future the United States could better guarantee its security by assuming a more active role in the world community. President Roosevelt, in pro­ posing the Lend-Lease program to Congress, January 6, 1941, described the basic objectives of our foreign policy. He looked forward to ''a world found­ ed upon fQUI'._esse]J._tial.. freedoms." These were the freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear, the last to be achieved by a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point that no nation would be able to commit an act of aggression against its neighbors. 1/ Seven months later, in the Atlantic Charter, these ob­ jectives were expanded in an agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. '!:../ Notable among these objectives were the y U.S.,Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., March 15, 1950, p. 1. (Hereafter referred to as Basic Documents.) y Ibid.

- 1 - "desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned"; respect for "the right of peo­ ples to choose the form of government under which they will live"; and the "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." The Charter contemplated also "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security." The Soviet Union subsequently endorsed the principles of the Atlantic Charter though with a qualification that provided a significant loophole; namely, "considering that the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs, and historical .pecul_farities�Q::fparticular countries." 1/ Shortly after the United States entered World War II, the State Department was assigned the task of cre­ ating the machinery to achieve these principles--the future United Nations Charter. During the war, there were two separate strands of U.S. policy. The first was to win the war against the Axis powers. The second was more long range--to develop methods to harmonize the future interests of the major powers. American planners anticipated two postwar periods. A pro­ gram that would deal with relief in the war-ravaged areas and peace trea­ ties with the defeated nations; a subsequent period would emerge in which the stability, security, and peace of the nations could be on a long-term basis. On the American side there was the view, now often referred to as wishful thinking, that the wartime cooperation achieved within the Grand Alliance (United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) would sur­ vive the destruction of the Axis powers. In other words, we could settle the major difficulties between ourselves and the Soviet Union by political means. The United Nations was envisioned as the best way to fulfill these hopes.

The United Nations Charter was established at the San Francisco Conference which was called for this purpose on April 25, 1945. Actually, the major decisions on the kinds of machinery and powers that the United Nations would include were worked out by the major Allied powers prior to the San Francisco Conference. In effect, the five major Allied powers (U.S., U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, and China) invited some forty- fl ve smaller nations to become Charter members in an international organiza­ tion whose provisions had, for the most part, been worked out in advance. Since Chapter III is devoted to our commitments within inter­ national organizations, we shall present here only· a brief sketch of the United Nations. To the four principal organs worked out previously-­ Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice--the San Francisco Conference added two: the Economic

Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Engle­ wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 669.

- 2 - and Social Council and a Trusteeship Council. Held prior to the final defeat of Japan, the Conference recognized that some important differences had already arisen between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Here, however, we will confine our efforts to one central purpose intended for the United Nations, namely, the creation of peacekeeping machinery to deter acts of aggression.

Not all Americans remember that it was the United States Govern­ ment which held that world peace should be maintained by the "four police­ men," as President Roosevelt called the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and eventually, China. France, which had refused to help sponsor the Conference at San Francisco, was later added as a permanent member of the Security Council. At the time, the idea of the veto power proposed by the United States, was necessary for agreement for none of the great powers was willing to cooperate on any other basis. .!f At San Francisco it became apparent that the Russians conceived the veto power as extending also to discussion. No subject, they claimed, should be brought before the Security Council for consideration without the consent of the five permanent members. To the Americans, and apparently all other delegations not under Soviet influence, this constituted an intolerable infringement on free speech. The issue very nearly broke up the Confer­ ence. An appeal directly to Premier Stalin by President Truman led to a Soviet retreat. The Soviet Union also withdrew its opposition to a movement supported by the United States which made the General Assembly "a townmeeting of the world" by giving it unrestricted freedom to debate and to make recommendations on matters of international concern. �

The fundamental purpose of the United Nations was the prevention of acts of aggression, whether these acts were accomplished by force or the threat of force. Its chief function was to be a policing function. For this purpose the Security Council was empowered, if efforts at peaceful settlement of a controversy failed, to call upon members of the United Nations to sever diplomatic relations and to apply economic sanctions . . If such measures proved inadequate the Security Council was to have at its disposal armed force contingents made available to it in advance by the members, and might use these as it saw fit against the offender.

!/ George E. Taylor and Ben Cashman, The New United Nations--A Reappraisal of United States Policies (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1965), p. 3. 2/ Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 770. � Pratt, op. cit., p. 700.

- 3 - Immediate direction of such forces would be in the hands of a Military Staff Committee, made up of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council. But all actions by the Security Council, it must be remembered, rested upon agreement among the five permanent members; they were subject to veto by any one of them. As it turned out, the intended military contingents were never made available to the United Nations; as was the case with other objectives at this'ti'me, the pro- ject fell victim to the rift which was to develop between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

As events were to prove, the assumptions on which the United Nations was constructed were challenged immediately by the intransigence of the Soviet Union. The close relationship between the United States and Great Britain was not matched by a similar relationship with the Soviet Union. In retrospect, it still seems difficult to create a set of circumstances that would have altered this lack of cooperation. In­ deed, some observers contend that the Grand Alliance could not keep the peace because it never existed in the first place. 1/ It is argued that there was no real collaboration even during the war-itself.

II. From San Francisco to Containment. A. The Failure of Cooperation. The rift between the Soviet Union, backed by its satellites, and the United States, generally supported by the other democracies, began even before the United Nations started its operations. With two decades of hindsight, most Western observers accept the premise that the Soviet leaders had never really given up their aim of world revolution. They used the alliance with the West for the destruction of Hitlerism. Once this was accomplished the alliance lost its value to them, and they quickly abandoned their wartime cooperation. Thereafter they changed their tac­ tics. In many respects United States foreign policy operates in a far different world today than it did in 1945. The period between the final defeat of the Axis (August, 1945) to the Truman Doctrine (March, 1947) is generally described as the period in which the Cold War began. During this period there was a growing an­ tagonism between the Communist and non-Communist worlds that extended to issues that arose around the entire world. Yet some important questions were resolved by political conference between the wartime allies, espe­ cially the peace treaties involving Italy and the so-called "Axis satel­ lites." Perhaps the best cooperation was achieved at the trial of the

1/ See especially John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Viking Press, 1947).

- 4 - Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. Beyond these, whether in the delibera­ tions in the United Nations or the specific disputes as they arose in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East; there was little if any cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the first meeting of the Security Council in January, 1946, nearly every question submitted to it was one on which the United States and the Soviet Union took oppo­ site sides,. 1/ And from the beginning the Soviet Union, which usually was in the minority, used its veto power freely to block action contrary to its wishes. The United States offer to give up its nuclear monopoly and internationalize control of all nuclear development under the United Nations was repeatedly rejected by the Soviet Union.

The Security Council was able, nevertheless, in its early meet­ ings to accomplish something merely by publicity. When Soviet troops re­ mained in Iran after the war contrary to treaty obligations, the issue was brought before the Security Council and the troops were withdrawn. The Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, boycotted a discussion that he could not veto. On balance, Soviet actions in the United Nations and elsewhere con­ vinced the United States Government and a growing number of Americans by 1946 and early 1947 that a "get tough" policy was needed to counter Soviet policy. We do know, however, that the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, marked the beginning of an active policy by the United States designed to "contain" the Soviet Union--to hold the U.S.S.R. and- its Communist satellites within their existing boundaries, in the hope that time and internal strains would eventually sap the strength of the Soviet empire.

B. The Truman Doctrine.

The Truman Doctrine was inaugurated in Ma�ch, 1947, when Presi­ dent Truman, in an address before Congress, asked for an appropriation of $400 million in order to provide economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. Since 1945 the Greek Government had been engaged in an inter­ nal struggle against Communist forces aided by heavy infiltrations from three neighboring countries, all Soviet satellites. During 1946, Turkey was being pressed by the Soviet Union to allow it to establish a naval base in the Dardanelles. There were also demands for territorial concessions at the eastern end of the Black Sea. Fear existed in Washington and London (the British had been giving financial assistance to both Greece and Turkey) of a Soviet drive to make both countries satellites, thus extending Soviet power into the Mediterranean.

President Truman asked for an appropriation for military aid to strengthen Greek and Turkish armed forces, replacing the assistance with­ drawn by the British, and for economic aid for the reconstruction of Greece. In a declaration that became known as the Truman Doctrine, the President stated that "the foreign policy and the national security" of the United

!f Pratt, op. cit., p. 705.

- 5 - States were involved in the plight of Greece and Turkey, and "that it must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

By May 1947, Congress, besides appropriating the funds the President had requested, also authorized the sending of military equip­ ment and American technical and military advisers.

The Greek-Turkish military assistance program was a successful application of the containment policy since Greece and Turkey did not be­ come Soviet satellites. The commitment of American support implied in the Truman Doctrine, and the gradual improvement of Turkish military forces, enabled the Turks to take a firmer stand toward Soviet pressures. The modern American weapons, training, and technical guidance given to the Greek Army contributed to the defeat of the guerrillas there by late 1949. At least as important a factor, however, was Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet bloc in 1948, resulting in the curtailment of important aid to the Greek guerrillas.

The Truman Doctrine, as has been pointed out, involved both military and economic aid. Since this analysis will deal with these separately in Chapters IV and V, we shall deal with them separately in this chapter. And since large-scale American economic aid entered the scene earlier than military assistance (with the exception of the mili­ tary aid given to Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War), let us now turn to the growth of our economic assistance programs.

III. Economic Commitments.

A. International Economic Organizations.

Since the military and economic strength of the United States had play ed a commanding role in the defeat of the Axis powers, this country assumed leadership in the postwar economic reconstruction.

The problems of postwar economic reconstruction, except for the more immediate relief measures to war-ravaged areas dealt with by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), were initially assigned to international agencies which would assure freer trade and monetary exchange among countries. Under the leadership of the· United States, within the proposed United Nations organizational frame­ work before 1945, and within the provisions of the ratified charter there­ after, international economic cooperation was to find expression in three agencies: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)� and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

- 6 - Let us take a closer look at each agency in turn. The first two organizations--the IMF and the World Bank--were established at the Bretton Woods Financial and Monetary Conference in 1944 .. Their purpose was to deal with the problems flowing from the worldwide depression of the 1930's and the war which followed, such problems as national restric­ tions on the movement of goods and capital (exchange controls), quantita­ tive discrimination on imports, and discrimination against American goods.

The IMF is designed to promote international trade and economic stability by assisting member nations to overcome such problems as foreign exchange restrictions and balance-of-payments difficulties. (Our balance­ of-payments difficulties will be explained in Chapter V.) The IMF has built up a pool of gold and currencies, contributed by member states, which is the primary instrument for the achievement of these purposes.

The World Bank agreement provides that .the Bank may lend to its member governments and, with the guarantee of the member governments, to their respective agencies and to private enterprises within the member countries. Loans may not, however, be granted for temporary relief or for political purposes; they must be used for reconstruction and develop­ ment, and must show reasonable prospects of repayment. Finally, the borrower must be unable to obtain the loan elsewhere under conditions considered reasonable by the Bank.

Since its inception in 1947, GATT has been responsible for co­ ordinating the Free World's principal trade agreements. At this initial multilateral conference in Geneva, the United States and twenty-two other nations negotiated trade agreements with one another.

While the GATT is itself a trade agreement, it provides, in addition, ground rules for making subsidiary agreements effective, and a forum for the airing and settlement of trade disputes. The contracting parties have no substantive powers of enforcement; but GATT's sanction is the approbation of its contracting parties, a hearing, and an opportunity to form a judgment.

The essential principles of GATT are: that restrictions on trade should take only the form of tariffs, that tariff concessions be­ tween any two nations should be extended as widely as possible to third countries (the most-favored-nation principle), and that countries should consult with each other before taking tariff action which would be harmful to the interests of others. GATT, however, provides for many exceptions. The most important are: (1) quotas, though prohibited for purely protec- tive purposes, are still permitted (a) for balance-of-payments reasons, and (b) to support domestic farm programs; (2) an escape clause procedure permits withdrawal of concessions if increased imports cause or threaten serious injury; and (3) underdeveloped countries may restrict imports, under certain conditions, to encourage infant industries. From the start, two conditions created serious difficulties for the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT: the tremendous problems of postwar

- 7 - recovery, and the emerging Cold War between the Communist and non-· Communist worlds. Postwar reconstruction was foreseen prior to the conclusion of World War II, but the solutions proved more prolonged, and the problems were more extensive than American and Allied Governments had expected. B. The Marshall Plan.

Soon after the decision to help Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, Americans were forced to face a much bigger foreign aid problem, the failure, for whatever reasons, of industrial recovery in Western Europe. The Marshall Plan which provided direct economic aid to Europe, was devised to respond to a crisis which was thought to affect the larger security interests of the United States. By early 1947, throughout much of non-Communist Europe, the disastrous economic disorga­ nization and stagnation, which the growing Communist parties in some of those countries exploited for their own purposes through general strikes and propaganda, appeared serious to many in this country. In June, 1947, George C. Marshall, the then Secretary of State, proposed that if the European countries would unite in their recovery problems and establish cooperative efforts to assist themselves, we would, within our means, offer the types of assistance which they could not pro­ vide. Marshall's initial offer did not exclude the Soviet Union and its recently acquired Eastern European satellites. For reasons that were, and are now, obvious, the Communist countries did not join the Marshall Plan. From the beginning, Western European Communists denounced the Plan as "an instrument of American imperialism" and, using the political ma­ chinery of the recipient countries, made futile attempts to impede the operations of the program.

A conference called by European nations to consider the Marshall proposal met in Paris in July, 1947. In line with Marshall's suggestion, the conference established the Committee for European Economic Cooperation to estimate Europe's requirements and resources for recovery on a basis of regional cooperation. 1/ The Committee's report contemplated a four­ y.ear program, to be financed by about $19 billion of U.S. aid, and about $3 billion from the World Bank or other unspecified sources. 2/ y The following countries participated in the Marshall Plan: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and West Germany. Committee for European Economic Cooperation, General Report, Vol. I, Department of State Publication 2930, September, 1947, p. 54.

- 8 - The Marshall Plan was adopted by Congress as the Economic Co- · operation Act of 1948. The Act was intended to help participating coun­ tries "to become independent of extraordinary outside assistance" within four years. To obtain Marshall Pla.J} funds, recipient countries were re­ quired to agree to pursue three prescribed methods of recovery: promotion of industrial and agricultural production; restoration or Aai�tenance of confidence in currencies; and stimulation of international trade within Europe and with outside countries by suitable measures, including the reduction of trade barriers. Congress ultimately appropriated a total of $13.15 billion for the Marshall Plan between 1948-52. Many observers take the view that the objectives of the Marshall Plan were achieved within the· four years. In the Marshall Plan countries as a whole, industrial pro­ duction rapidly increased to about 35 percent above prewar levels, and agricultural production rose to about 10 percent above prewar,1/ It should be stressed, however, that the impressive economic achievements under the Plan were achieved primarily through the initiative, efforts, and sacrifices of the people of Europe; and that American governmental grants never amounted to more than a small fraction of the gross national product of the participating countries.Y American aid was critically important, however, in that it paid for essential materials and capital goods, thus enabling the participating countries to maintain a high rate of investment without squeezing their peoples to the point of unrest.

Besides assisting recovery efforts, the United States also supported the principle of European integration because it was convinced that the existence of a broad competitive market in Western Europe would enhance the strength of the Free World. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949, the United States urged and supported military and political unity along with economic cooperation. Most observers trace the European Economic Community (EEC) to these earlier efforts at integration. By 1952, European economic recovery had progressed to a point where the Marshall Plan could be phased out. In this year, our foreign aid program had shifted to meet newer challenges. First, Western European nations (our NATO allies) were now receiving extensive military aid from the United States. The flow of military assistance had actually begun prior to 1950 and it reflected an uneasiness shared by Americans and Western Europeans about the Soviet military threat. Whereas, prior to the Marshall Plan, the main Communist threat to Western Europe was judged to be one of internal subversion or indirect aggression, the threat of a direct Soviet military attack now appeared more likely. The rapid U.S. postwar demilitarization, and the Marshall Plan's emphasis on economic rather than military strength probably contributed to this anxiety. Since this military aid trend is more related to our military efforts rather than economic assistance, we shall discuss that further in the next section.

Lorna Morley and Felix Morley, The Patchwork History of Foreign Aid Y (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1961), p. 22. y Ibid., p. 13.

- 9 - -- A second characteristic, created by the Korean War, was that our Asian allies and friendly nations now began to receive large-scale U.S. foreign aid. Since this was initially rooted in a military challenge, we shall return to this in the next section. The third trend, more related to our economic commitments, was our assistance to developing nations. Let us now turn to our aid to these nations.

C. Aid for Economic Development.

1. Technical Assistance, As was the case in Western Europe prior to the Marshall Plan, American fear of Communist subversion led to the policy of aid for economic development. The initial U.S. aid pro­ gram was developmental assistance, beginning with "Point Four" legisla­ tion.

This initial program--"Point Four," or technical cooperation-­ was proposed in President Truman's inaugural address in January, 1949. The presidential message contained a four-point statement on foreign pol­ icy. The fourth point stated: Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improve­ ment and growth of underdeveloped areas.

.... The United States is preeminent among na­ tions in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can af­ ford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

The legislation implementing the Point Four program was the Act for International Development enacted in June, 1950. Although no time limit was specified, the technical cooperation program, like other foreign aid programs, depended upon annual authorizations and appropriations.

Initially, our developmental assistance programs were confined to technical assistance. The Truman Administration did not advocate loans or grants to the developing countries because it was believed at the time that the initiative of private enterprise, plus loans available from the World Bank or the Export-Import Bank, would suffice for that purpose. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained during congressional hearings on Point Four: By its very nature, this is not and never will be a big-money enterprise.... It involves salaries and ex­ penses of people--not vast purchases of machinery and raw materials. Its objective is to show other people how to meet their own needs, not to attempt to meet those needs ourselves. For this reason. the cost of

- 10 - technical cooperation will always be modest, compared with the cost of other types of for­ eign aid programs. Y

Hardly had the Point Four program been enacted, when the furor of the Korean War eclipsed efforts for development assistance. Militar� :'requirements took priority over the foreign aid J?rogram; there;fore, assistance for economic development played only a marginal role in the total aid pro­ gram for the next few years.

2. East-West Rivalry. While the anti-Communist military coali­ tion was being forged to deter limited wars, the West slowly became concerned w ith Communist nonmilitary challenge in the vast underdeveloped areas of Southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. In 1954, the Communist bloc gave a new twist to the Cold War when it inaugu­ rated an accelerating program of aid for economic development for uncom­ mitted countries in underdeveloped areas. Following the death of Stalin in March, 1953, and the conclusion of the Korean armistice that summer, the Russians launched their trade-in­ aid program for less-developed nations, offering technical and financial assistance, anQ increased trade to a number of non-Communist governments. Thus, a new form of East-West rivalry in the field of economic aid now appeared.

'After a modest beginning in 1954, Communist aid programs outside the Communist bloc have tended to expand in size year by year. Soviet financial assis�ance is provided almost entirely in the form of loans on easy terms, with nominal interest rates of 2 or 2.5 percent, and are often repayable in the borrower's currency. Russian credits have been supplemented by lesser sums from European satellites and Red China, in the proportion of three from the U.S.S.R. to one from the rest of the bloc.

By November, 1960, the Sino-Soviet bloc had extended $4.6 billion in economic and military aid to twenty-one less-developed nations on four continents. 2/ The new Communist aid policy was initially directed mainly to Asia and the Middle East, concentrating on India, Afghanistan, the U.A.R., Iraq, and Indonesia. Until 1960, these countries received about 84 percent of bloc credits and grants. Major Soviet assistance has sub­ sequently been extended to Africa and Latin America.

Following the initiation of Communist foreign aid, a number of Western statesmen urged an expansion of the United States program for de­ velopmental aid to economically underdeveloped areas, in concerted action

Y U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Act for International Development, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., March and April, 1950, p. 13.

� Morley and Morley, op. cit., p. 43. Military aid represented about 20 percent of total bloc aid.

- 11 - ,with our allies in this field, in order to compete with the Communists. During the decade of the 1950's, the old colonial empires had been, or were being, liquidated; and dozens of new and poor peoples were achieving independence. An increasing sense of urgency about economic development, manifested in these less-developed areas, was characterized by the late Adlai Stevenson as the "revolution of rising expectations." In many of these countries sentiment tends to be anti-Western, and, in general, anti­ capitalist. Despite this, leaders throughout the less-developed world reiterated their awareness of modern technology and their resentment of economic conditions formerly accepted as inevitable, and had begun apply­ ing political pressure for more American governmental aid for development. 3. Developmental Financing. In response to the pressures for making more public capital available to needy nations, the Eisenhower Ad­ ministration turned to developmental financing on generous terms, though the trend was away from out-and-out grant aid. The World Bank had been extending credits to less-developed countries, but these were "hard loans," repayable in the currency borrowed (usually dollars or other hard curren­ cies). The World Bank must operate on a profit-making basis; part of its resources is raised by bond issues floated on security markets. (a) Public Law 480. The first American venture in soft loans (repayable in the borrower's own currency) was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480). Under this program, the Department of Agriculture sells surplus farm commodi­ ties abroad for foreign currencies. These proceeds are then used by the United States Government for various purposes', notably as loans for eco­ nomic development. Loans extended under Public Law 480 generally provide for repayment in the currency of the borrowing country, if the borrower so chooses. Operation of the farm surplus disposal program has given rise to two stubborn problems: the question of how to manage the accumulation of foreign currencies which frequently are inconvertible (can only be used in a specific country), and the question of damage to the normal markets of other agricultural exporting countries. 1/ Despite these problems, the program continues, and India, presently faced with f�ine due to drough�, has come to rely on food shipments received under Public Law 480. Presi­ dent Johnson has recently proposed a $3.3 billion "Food for Freedom" plan to be authorized on a five-year basis, rather than annually._;! Two sepa-. rate bills provide $2.5 billion for sales on easy terms of food to countries with food deficits and $800 million for food donations.

(b) Development.Loan F�nd. _To_mee� tne de�and for l�ans on easier terms than were available in existing international lending agen­ cies the Eisenhower Administration proposed the Development Loan Fund (DLF) in 1957. The DLF was established to provide capital for long-'range

!/ Ibid., p. 45. 2/ The New York Times, February 23, 1966.

- 12 - economic development to nations which could not qualify at the World Bank. The capital was to be concentrated in economically plausib�e proje�ts: highways, chemical plants, agricultural machinery, s�eel mills, 7ailroads, power plants, and the like--all to be closely supervised by American engineers. Because many of these Developmen� �oan F�nd d�llars soon turned up in European and Japanese markets, the Administration, in 195�, ordered that most capital goods and technical services for U.S.-underwritten pro- _j ects must be purchased in the United States.!/

(c) Multilateral Approach. By 1959, the multi-national approach to development assistance began to gain support in this country. By this time, the American balance-of-payments deficits had entered the picture. The U.S. payments deficit, i.e., the difference between the amount paid out abroad and the amount collected from foreign sources, be­ came a factor in the outflow of American gold. Foreigners, receiving more dollars than they pay out, exchange some of the surplus dollars for American gold bullion. Other governments and central banks, keeping dol­ lars on deposit in this country, are entitled to withdraw them in gold.

The United States has experienced a balance-of-payments deficit every year since 1958. This situation has raised the issue of whether the United States can continue its foreign aid programs at its earlier levels. In a comprehensive review of the balance-of-payments situation, the final Economic Report of the Eisenhower Administration stated: It is extremely difficult to connect the deficit with any particular category of payments, since the inter­ action of the various components is very complex. By and large, however, the deficits have reflected the postwar economic comeback of Western Europe and Japan together with continued large expenditures for defense and foreign aid which the United States has made in discharging its international responsibilities. 2/

Our substantial excess of commercial exports over imports served to absorb the drain of foreign aid during the first ten years of the pro­ gram. 3/ But as Western European nations and Japan recovered economically, their increased export competition made our export surplus a less reliable factor in redressing the payments balance. Our payments deficit led Amer­ ican officials to seek "a share of the aid" commitment among our prosper­ ous allies.

Actually, aid to the underdeveloped nations had become less of an American monopoly as Western Europe and Japan achieved postwar recovery. Between 1953 and 1959, the United States contributed about two-thirds of

!/ Charles J.V. Murphy, "Foreign Aid: Billions in Search of a Good Reason," Fortune (March, 1963), p. 205. '!:./ Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 115. � Morley and Morley, op. cit., p. 3.

- 13 - the total free-world bilateral economic aid to the underdeveloped coun­ tries. Other non-Communist industrial countries, led by Britain and France, supplied the rest. !f

With all this bilateral aid activity, the need fqr coordinating free-world developmental financing became obvious. In order to spread the cost of development financing more equitably among industrial free-world nations, the United States took the lead in the formation of the Interna­ tional Development Association (IDA), a new affiliate of the World Bank. It came into being in September, 1960. Membership in the World Bank is a prerequisite for joining IDA, which means that the Communist-bloc states have been excluded from this body unless they become willing to join the parent body.

The IDA has been able to mobilize some $1. 6 billion in gold or convertible currencies, of which the U.S. has subscribed one-third, and sixteen other industrial nations the other two-thirds. Through this pro­ gram, low interest soft loans, repayable in whole or in part in the cur­ rency of the borrower, are available to underdeveloped countries.

D. The Kennedy-Johnson Programs.

Before we conclude our review of the history of the American foreign aid programs, there is a need to update these programs as they have evolved in the 1960's under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. A detailed summary of these programs will follow in later chapters. In this section, we will indicate the general trends in recent aid programs. To begin with, during the past six years our foreign aid pro­ grams still have three characteristics, which have alre.ady been mentioned, developed during the Eisenhower Administration: (1) development assistance and other economic assistance have remained greater than military aid; (2) the shift toward loans rather than grants-in-aid has continued; and (3) the United States coordinates its own programs with other free world na­ tions which also extend economic aid. In addition to these, five new features have developed: ,

1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the Agency for International Development (AID), by combining many of our previous eco­ nomic assistance programs--grants, loans, and technical cooperation-­ into a single administrative agency. AID also has responsibility for coordinating economic and military assistance, and for the overseas operations of Public Law 480 (now usually referred to as the Food for Peace program). Development loans, now comprising more than 60 �ercent of AID' s total program, are repayable in dollars (under the earlier Development Loan Fund such loans were repayable in local currencies) and may be made only when there is a reasonable prospect of repayment.

1/-- Ibid., p. 47.

- 14 - 2. Asserting an urgency for economic and social development in Latin America, President Kennedy in March, 1961, called on all the peo­ ple in the Western Hemisphere to unite in a new Alliance for Progress. The Alliance for Progress became a program of "social development in Latin America, concentrating in the fields of land reform, education, health, and housing." United States participation in the Alliance is assigned to and carried out through AID's Latin American Bureau. Growing anti-U.S. feeling in Latin America as represented by the attacks upon Vice President Nixon during his Latin American tour in 1958, and later developments in Cuba under Fidel Castro undoubtedly played an important part in the cre­ ation of the Alliance for Progress. 3. During the past four years, criticism concerning total for­ eign aid spending has mounted in Congress. Of course, some congressmen have always been critical; however, the continuing balance-of-payments deficits and the Clay Report issued in 1963 seem to have added to· the demands for more critical examination of our foreign spending programs. The Clay Report was issued by a presidential advisory committee that was appointed by President Kennedy in 1962, under General Lucius Clay, to examine our entire overseas assistance operation; and to determine how it could be refashioned to do a better job. In general, this 1963 Report endorsed our economic and military aid programs. The Committee complained, however, that many specific programs overextended our resources and were undercompensated in terms of results. The Report found that money had been spent where there was insufficient will or discipline to achieve the in­ tended results. The Clay Report, along with other general misgivings about foreign aid spending, probably has contributed to recent reductions in foreign aid appropriations--from a $3.9 billion level in the 1963 fiscal year to $3 billion in fiscal 1964 and about the same for fiscal 1967.1/ The current Johnson appropriation request is the smallest in eighteen years.�

. 4. Closely related to the spending issue is the more basic issue of reform. President Johnson's foreign aid message to Congress this year has advo_cated "basic changes" in the program.3/The President has put educa­ tion, nutrition, heal th, and population control measures at the head of his list of priorities for recipient countries to undertake if they are to get American aid. He indicated that our aid programs "must concentrate on countries not hostile to us that give solid evidence that they are de­ termined to help themselves." The President. believes that underdeveloped countries must make an all-out effort to meet ,their basic food needs and to attack the root causes of poverty, such as ignorance, disease, .and pop­ ulation growth.

1/ This amount does not, however, cover supplemental requests within the past year for economic development in Southeast Asia or the separate requests made in connection with the fighting in Viet Nam. � The New York Times, February 2, 1966, p. 4. 3/ The New York Times, February 2, 1966.

- 15 - 5. Finally, President Johnson has also requested that autho­ rizations be made on a five-year basis in order to facilitate long-range planning and to reduce the burden of annual appropriations. The long­ term issue has had some congressional and administration support in the past, but Congress thus far has refused to relinguish its power of annual appropriation.

Thus far, we have seen that the objectives of our economic aid program have to a large extent reflected the course of the Cold War. As we have seen in this section and will see in the next section, as European reconstruction was gradually accomplished, the early emphasis on economic assistance was shifted to a growing network of anti-Communist military alliances. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the geographic focus of aid began to move from Europe to Asia. With the inception of the Communist foreign aid programs, the West also began to emphasize developmental aid to poorer countries. A trend in the multilateral management of economic aid from the non-Communist industrial countries has emerged, partly as the result of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficits. Finally there is an effort under way to reshape and reform our aid programs to correct past mistakes.

IV. United States Military Policy. In this section dealing with our military alliances and assis­ tance, we are going to pursue a somewhat a·rbit rary arrangement, as we have already done in separating our military and economic aid programs. We shall begin clo.sest to home in Latin America, move on to Europe, the Mid­ dle East, and conclude with the Far East and Southeast Asia. Our reason is to keep this chapter consistent with the organization of the entire analysis which will deal with the special case of Southeast Asia in the final chapter.

A. Latin America. 1. The Monroe Doctrine. Compared with the Cold War military arrangements which have developed within the past decades, our concern about the security of the Latin American states is far older. One of the traditional cornerstones of American foreign policy has been the Monroe Doctrine. When it was pronounced by President Monroe in 1823, Monroe warned the European powers including Russia, which then was active in the Alaska area, to keep out of Latin America, and to forego further colonization in North America, primarily because he felt that their presence would be dangerous to the . peace and safety of the United States. .!_I During the past century, the United States has invoked y Bailey, op. cit., p. 183. Also most American historians often con­ tend that the Monroe Doctrine did not become an American policy with serious purpose until the late 1840's or early 1850's. See especially Dexter Perkins� The Evolution of American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 34.

- 16 - the Monroe Doctrine whenever we felt that European nations either threatened the security of Latin American states or intended to establish new colonies. Perhaps the two most notable examples were our protests against L�uis Napoleon's efforts to establish Maximilian on the Mexican throne in the 1860's (officially that was as far as_we had to go) and the poli�y o� United States military intervention within Latin American countries in­ augurated by President Theodore Roosevelt_("R�o:evelt Coro�lary" to the Monroe Doctrine). The latter policy was Justified by President Theodore ·Roosevelt on the assumption that "chronic wrongdoing" may, in the Amer- icas as elsewhere, require the intervention of a civilized nation, and the United States' right to assume this international police power was said to inhere within the Monroe Doctrine.I/ The United States formally renounced this right to intervene in 1933 In response to pressures from the Latin Americans themselves. The renunciation became part of the "Good Neighbor Policy" under President Franklin Roosevelt.

. 2. The Act of Chapultepec. When World War II came, two fac- tors drew the United States and its Latin American neighbors together: the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930's and the fear that the war in Eur­ ope would, in one way or another, endanger the security of the Western Hemisphere. The security threat led to a series of defense arrangements between the United States and several Latin American states. After Pearl Harbor, the Latin American Republics, with th.e exception of Argentina, either declared war or broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis pow­ ers. '?:./ The high point in inter-American cooperation during World War II came in an Inter-American Conference held in M�xico City in February and March, 1945. The Conference reaffirmed the solidarity of the American Republics and their devotion to the principles of democracy, non-inter­ vention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In its most important contribution, the Act of Chapultepec, the Conference declared that until the end of the war, any act or threat of aggression against an American state would be considered an act or a threat against all, and would be

I} Bailey, op. cit., p. 505. American military intervention in Latin American nations occurred in every presidential administration from Theodore Roosevelt to Calvin Coolidge. The argument that this pol­ icy inhered within the Monroe Doctrine won little acceptance in Latin America or even among some scholars in this country. See Perkins, op. cit., p. 83. 2/ Generally Argentina, perhaps the most powerful Latin nation, resented U.S. influence and, even more, the quarantine restrictions which the U.S. imposed on meat imports from Argentina. On our side, we were aware of the pro-Axis sympathies in Argentina and the fact that Axis agents operated there. Shortly before Nazi Germany surrendered, Argentina declared war on Germany to qualify for entry into the United Nations at San Francisco.

- 17 - dealt with by whatever measures might prove necessary, ranging from the severance of diplomatic relations with the aggressor to the use of armed force. 1/ For meeting such threats after the end of World War II, the signatories proposed the conclusion of a treaty defining the measures to be used and the procedures for instituting them. The Act of Chapultepec was responsible for United States insistence, with Latin American support, on Article 51 which was added to the United Nations Charter at San Fran­ cisco. This reserved to member nations "the inherent: right of individual or collective self-defense," until the Security Council should have taken "measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Its recognition of the right of "collective self-defense" served to reconcile with the Charter not only the Act of Chapultepec, but the later North At­ lantic Treaty Organization and the numerous other mutual security treaty arrangements to which the United States is a party.

3. The Rio Treaty. The Rio Conference (August-September, 1947) was an important step in the devel6'pment of regional security arrangements within Aricile 51 of the U.N. Charter. Certain South American states had desired the treaty for protection as much against possible aggression by Argentina as against threats from outside the hemisphere-.-the earlier Act of Chapultepec contemplated outside attack. 2/ The Conference therefore rejected an Argentine proposal that the treaty provide only for action against aggression by non-American·states.

As agreed upon, the treaty made it the duty of every American state to assist in meeting an armed attack upon another American state, until the U.N. Security Council should have taken effective measures to repel the aggression. The nature of the action to be taken against ag­ gression was to be determined by a two-thirds vote of a meeting of for- eign ministers, called for the occasion (parties to the dispute not voting), with the exception that no state should be required to use its armed forces without its consent. Thus the United States might be required, by a two­ thirds vote of the American foreign ministers, to suspend diplomatic re­ lations, trade, and communications with an aggressor state, but it could not against its will be required to use its armed forces. The treaty was left open to signature by Canada, which had not joined in former inter-American agreements, and which did not accept the opportunity in this instance or the later Organization of American States. Canada has received these advances politely but coolly. That she felt more akin to Europe than La�in America was apparent in the active part she took in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. �

!f Basic Documents, op. cit., p. 417.

'!:../ Pratt, op. cit., p. 767. � Ibid., p. 773.

- 18 - 4. Organization of American States. The next step in a formal coordination of these defense agreements, and many other previous Latin American arrangements as well, came at Bogota, Colombia, in 1948. The Conference was notable for establishing what now is called the Organization of American States (OAS) and for drawing up an elaborate charter or consti­ tution. Besides the OAS Charter itself, the Conference a1$o incorporated a number of previously established inter-American councils into the frame­ work of the Charter, such as a Council of Jurists, a Cultural Council, and an Economic and Social Council. The old Pan American Union became the Secretariat of the new organization.

5. Rifts Between Good Neighbors. The drafting and the adoption of the OAS Charter at Bogota in 1948 came at a time when ironically the spirit of some of this inter-American harmony began to break down. Several factors contributed to this deterioration and, in this section, we shall deal with the problems only in a general way. Symptomatic of this trend was the temporary disruption of the Bogota Conference in its second week by a violent outbreak of rioting in the Colombian capital. Whether or not Communist-inspired, as many charged, the riots were indicative of the breakdown of the orderly democratic process in Latin America. Between 1948 and 1952, revolution followed revolution, and parties in power were seldom changed except by revolution.I/ Several of th�se changes resulted in establishment of the dictator-president type of regime of which Argentina under Juan Peron was the best-known type. Some, like Peron, represented a narrow nationalism and were ready to join hands with Communists in denounc­ ing "Yankee imperialism" and in working to counteract North American influ­ ence. Others, while strongly anti-Communist and not necessarily anti-United States, sometimes embarrassed Washington because of the repressive nature of their regimes.y

But even groups basically friendly to the United States were unhappy over Latin America's small share in the U.S. foreign aid programs, much of which initially went to Europe and later shifted to Asia. Much of this was military assistance which it was alleged either sustained military regimes or encouraged the military to overthrow constitutionally elected governments.� Latin America, where wartime prosperity (to a large extent created by high prices paid by the U.S. for her raw materials) had been succeeded by a postwar economic slump, often did not accept the U.S. view that it should have a lower priority in receiving aid because it was not, like Europe and the Far East, a war-devastated region, directly exposed to encroachment by the Soviet Union. This distinction, which to the United States seemed reasonable enough, made many Latin Americans feel like abused step children. y Ibid., p. 769. , y The United States presented the Legion of Merit to dictators Odria of Peru and Jimenez of Venezuela between 1952 and 1958. See generally Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 1961), pp. 233-34.

- 19 - The rise of Communist influence within several Latin American countries created a growing uneasiness in the United States, particularly during the late 1950's. The principal indicators of this were the brief establishment of a Communist-leaning government in Guatemala, the rough treatment which Vice President Richard Nixon received from anti-American mobs in Peru and Venezuela and, perhaps most important, the establishment of the Cuban revolution under Fidel Castro as a creature of the Soviet Union. These episodes were taken as a signal to many in this country that we had taken our Southern neighbors for granted. Additional measures were considered necessary if the Communists were not to triumph, as they were doing in Cuba. The Eisenhower Administration did manage to secure congressional authoriza­ tion for stepped-up Latin American aid, and the Alliance for Progress program was launched at the beginning of the Kenne�y Administration.

6. Secµrity in the 1960's. All this brings us to the decade of the 1960's. In this section, we shall conclude by indicating generally what the military problems were.

Most Americans probably regard Castro's Cuba as the principal threat to American security. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 demonstrated the serious threat to U.S. security posed by the Soviet presence on the island. Will the Soviet Union try something like this again? Castro, of course, remains a central problem. The American Government has embargoed almost all forms of trade with Cuba, and put many obstacles in the way of Cuban trade with other nations. It has secured increasing support from other Latin American states, which in 1962 expelled Cuba from the OAS and agreed to an embargo on shipments to Cuba. By 1966, all the Latin Ameri­ can states except Mexico had severed diplomatic relations with Havana.

The military problem in most Latin American countries is viewed primarily as a problem of internal subversion. Our military assistance programs are attempting to provide the weapons and military training nec­ essary to combat this activity. The long-standing problem of how our mil­ itary assistance will ultimately be employed remains, however. Will this aid be used to combat Communist subversion or, as has been charged in the past, used instead to create or sustain military dictatorships? Perhaps one encouraging trend is that the old-fashioned military dictatorship seems to be .less common in Latin America than it was a decade ago. 1/ It has not, however, as recent events have shown in Argentina, disappeared. The temp­ tation for misuse of American weapons sent abroad under our Military Assis­ tance Program is not unique to Latin America as we shall see later in this analysis.

Having said this much about our Latin-American military arrange­ ments, we shall now move on to those in Europe.

1/ Perkins, op. cit., pp. 144-45.

- 20 - B. United States Military Policy in Europe. 1. The North Atlantic Treaty. Earlier in this chapter, we traced the first steps which were taken in the Cold War in Europe. By early 1947, the Truman Doctrine represented an initial step in the policy of containing communism. In the following year, the Communists took over Czechoslovakia in a bloodless coup. Washington and the other Western capi­ tals were contemplating measures to prevent it from becoming a hot war. If the Soviet Union could be warned that an act of aggression against any free nation would mean a conflict with all the free nations, it might be deterred from such acts and thus be contained within its sphere of domi­ nance. It was, of course, to discourage such acts of aggression that the United Nations had been created, but the possession of the veto within the Security Council immunized the Soviet Union from effective United Nations action. Article 51 of the Charter, however, legalized "collective defense" by groups within the U.N., and it was to this article that the Western world now turned. As we indicated in the previous section, the Rio Pact (1947) had already invoked Article 51 in an inter-American defense arrangement. In Europe a beginning was made in March, 1948, when Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) signed the Brussels Pact--a fifty year collective defense pact, It soon became apparent that in order to constitute an impressive warning, such a pact needed the backing of the United States. !f The way for collective action was indicated when the Senate, in the Vandenberg resolution of June 11, 1948, voiced the opinion that the United States should associate itself with such regi0nal defense arrange­ ments when these arrangements served our own security interests. The Vandenberg resolution was the prelude to the North Atlantic Treaty, an important and ambitious adventure in search of collective se­ curity. The treaty was signed April 4, 1949, by twelve nations of the North Atlantic and Western European areas, a number increased to four- teen in 1952 when Greece and Turkey were added. 2/ The parties agreed to settle all disputes between themselves and to develop their capacity to resist armed attack "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The heart of the pact was Article 5, which declared that an attack upon one was an attack upon all, and pledged each member in case of such an attack to assist the party attacked "by such action as it deems nec­ essary, including the use of armed force." This plec,ige did not flatly commit the United States to war or remove congressional power to declare war. 3/ It was, however, a moral commitment to assist the pact members against aggression for at least twenty years.

!f Bailey, op. cit., p. 808. '!:./ The twelve original members were the United States, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Italy. 3/ Bailey, loc. cit.

- 21 - Although the North Atlantic Treaty was subsequently approved by an 89 to 13 vote in the Senate, the pact's implications were clearly seen. Opponents of the pact made a determined effort to relieve the United States of any obligation to rearm Western Europe, but such proposed amendments were defeated. lJ To implement the treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established. Its directing body was the North Atlantic Council, · made up of the Foreign, Defense, and Finance Ministers of the member states. Early in 1951 it set up military headquarters near Paris, known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe), with General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. Its purpose was to build a defense force in Western Europe, not equal to the huge army maintained by the Soviet Union (roughly 175 Russian divisions plus 60 or more satellite divisions), but strong enough to make the Soviets think twice about going to war; and, if war should come anyway, strong enough to hold the Russian armies in check un­ til (it was hoped) the strategic airpower of the United States could des­ troy·the Soviet centers of strength.

By 1951, American foreign aid, which previously under the Marsh­ all Plan had been mainly economic, had now shifted to military aid.

2. The Mutual Security Act. One manifestation of the switch in our foreign aid program from economic to a military emphasis was the creation of the Mutual Security Agency in 1951 to supersede the earlier Economic Cooperation Administration. The new agency supervised the pro­ gram of military assistance to our NATO allies and also to other areas of the world. Yet large-scale military aid had begun earlier: from October, 1949 to the end of 1953, the United States supplied nearly $6 billion worth of arms and military equipment to its European allies, as well as $1.7 billion worth to other countries. 2/ The European allies in the same period spent over $35 billion for their-own defense. The result was an increase in active army divisions available for NATO duty from fifteen to a projected forty-eight; with corresponding increases in air and naval strength. The United States increased its own divisions stationed in Europe from two to six, following a "great debate" in which the Senate approved this increase but advised against sending addttional troops abroad without the consent of Congress.3/

The rationale of U.S. military assistance was, and still is, that dollars spent to help maintain national forces on their home grounds will discourage Communist aggression more effectively than the same dollars spent to expand American forces in the United States. Also, it is cheaper to maintain deterrence by supporting foreign soldiers than by deploying comparable United States formations in other countries, whi9h would be politically and financially difficult.

Ibid., p. 809. Pratt, op. cit., p. 725. During the past fifteen years, the U.S. troop commitment has remained almost constant--approximately 200,000 men at present.

- 22 - 3. German Rearmament. Postwar Germany, of course, has been deeply involved in the Cold War. At the war's end, Germany was divided into occupation zones among the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. When it became apparent that the Western powers could not work with the Soviet Union toward the solution of German pro­ blems, the Western occupiers eventually unified their own efforts. Since the Soviets seemed determined to create a puppet state in East Germany, the Western powers encouraged the establishment of the West German Fed­ eral Republic at Bonn in 1949. In the same year, the United States accepted Germany as a full-fledged member of the Marshall Plan, and the allies discontinued their dismantling of the German war-making industry.

Tile United States soon took the lead in pressing for a German role in the defense of Western Europe. In Washington's view, German man­ power and rising economic strength seemed critically necessary to counter­ a� Communist non-nuc_lear strength. Yet Germ�n guns that shoot eastward against the Communists could also shoot westward against the democracies. The prospect of a rearmed Germany was as alarming to France and the Bene­ lux countries as the �ussian danger. A promising scheme for a controlled .German army, originally pro­ posed by the French, was the European Defense Community (EDC). Tile Germans would merge their troop quota with a six-nation EDC force within NATO, and thus eliminate the threat of a national German army. Tile other nations concerned, including the United States, approved the plan, but the French National Assembly rejected it. At the demise of EDC new negotiations were instituted. Out of these meetings emerged the Western European Union as a substitute for EDC. French misgivings were partially quieted by a British commitment to main­ tain four divisions of troops on the Continent. Under this plan, West Germany was permitted to rearm, though pledging itself to manufacture no atomic, chemical, or biological weapons. United States, British, and French forces were to remain in Germany. West Germany was invited to be­ come a member of NATO (which she did in 1955), and all the Western Eur­ opean Union armed forces were subject to the NATO Supreme Command. Tilus West German armed forces were and still are subject to NATO command. This proposal succeeded by a slender margin in the French National Assem­ bly in late 1954.

4. NATO in the 1960's. Today the North Atlantic Alliance op­ erates in a different setting than it did in 1949. Perhaps the most con­ stant characteristic of the Alliance has been the fact that the United States with its huge nuclear arsenal was far stronger than any of its allies. In fact the Alliance has always depended upon this overwhelming strength of the United States. As it developed, NATO never achieved its full conventional strength--this is even more true today now that France has withdrawn many of its military forces from NATO control. Some observers now contend that the entire Alliance is in serious trouble.

- 23 - Even those who still strongly support the Alliance admit that there are prob_lems. Here we shall review some of them.

. First, during the past fifteen years, most of our European al·- l1es have become stronger and more prosperous and, in many w�ys, they are 1:0 longer as dependent upon the United States. One meastn!'e o·f this strength 1s the fact that they no longer receive any American foreign aid--even military aid has been phased out. The growing strength in many European nations has caused some of our allies to become more restive.

Second, the advance of nuclear weapons has raised political and strategic problems within the Alliance. The Alliance began in a period when the United States enjoyed a monopoly in nuclear weapons. Within the first decade, the Soviet Union not only acquired its own nuclear arsenal, but also the ability, through an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads, to attack the United States directly from its own territory. This development has caused some Europeans to reassess their own national security interests within the Alliance. At the root of this is the gnawing fear of their pver-dependence upon the United States for nuclear protection. Some Europeans (de Gaulle being the most notable example) question whether the United States would really risk its own nuclear destruction in the event of a Communist attack in Europe. The fear that the United States might leave them in the lurch during a purely European showdown was one factor in the decision of the British and French to seek nuclear deterrents of their own. To Americans this duplication of nuclear programs seems wasteful. The Alliance does not require more nuclear weapons; their programs could never begin to match our supply. There is still a need for adequate ground forces, which the Europeans can and should provide. But they have not. From the American point of view, the ideal program has been for a common nuclear deterrent within NATO, rather than a fragmented one with many nervous fingers on many different triggers.

With the advent of tactical nuclear weapons in 1954, the United States created a stockpile of nuclear weapons within NATO. We have worked out a series of bilateral agreements with host countries establishing machinery for dual agreement on their use.:!.f Nuclear weapons cannot be used unless the President of the United States approves. Some Europeans continue to seek a greater voice in control of nuclear weapons. The United States responded to these desires by proposing the Multilateral Force Pro­ gram (MLF). This program proposed a seaborne multinational force within NATO with Polaris missiles capable of striking Soviet territory. The Europeans, however, have not been enthusiastic about this proposal and it has not made much headway.2/ Recently, the British have indicated that they are willing to work with the United States in seeking some work­ able nuclear weapons sharing program within NATO, but the French under de Gaulle push resolutely on with their own program.

Irving Heymont, "The NATO Nuclear Bilateral Forces," Orbis, Vol. IX (Winter, 1966), pp. 1025-41.

Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 1966.

- 24 - Finally, there has been the problem of French withdrawal from NATO. Under de Gaulle, France has not withdrawn all her forces from NATO control, but demanded control of all foreign forces on French soil. This situation has led not only to a current withdrawal of American forces stationed in France, but also the planned transfer of NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels. All this raises implications too complex to con­ sider in this section, and, beyond this, perhaps only time will reveal what all this means to the future of the entire alliance. C. United States Military Policy in the Middle East. 1. The Cold War. In this section, we use the term "the Middle East" in the full knowledge that it is an elastic definition of an undeter­ mined area. We use the term to include the following countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the various protectorates of the Arabian peninsula. On the eastern edge of the area is Pakistan, more often identified as South Asia. Pakistan, however, is a member of the Central Treaty Organization and, as such, has played a role in United States defense plans in the Middle East. In recent times Americans have come to appreciate the significance of this area. Strategically located in water and air communications between Western Europe and Southern Asia it is a treasure house of free world petroleum reserves. The whole area lies within easy striking distance of the Soviet Union.

Except for the operations of a few large American oil companies, the United States was not active in the Middle East until very recent years. Great Britain, France, and Russia, however, have had long-standing interests that began well before the advent of the twentieth century. The first real significance that this area held for the United States occurred during World War II when part of the Lend-Lease supplies to both Great Britain and the Soviet Union were funneled through the Middle East, and when troops and materiel were transferred between war theaters through the Suez Canal. But if the area was important during World War II, it would become no less so in a war, whether hot or cold, with Communist Russia. Russian domination of the Middle East would cut the Free World in two and deprive it of control over the sources of petroleum essential to the peacetime economy and to the war-making potential of Western Europe. Soviet intentions in this area became apparent to the Western world early in the Cold War. First, Soviet troops had remained in Northern Iran after the war and had been withdrawn only after pressure was applied by the Western governments in the United Nations.I/ Second, we have pre­ viously described how Soviet pressure for concessions from Turkey and the Greek civil war were responsible for the Truman Doctrine and the first step in our policy of containment. It was these Communist pressures, and Great Britain's confessed inability to give further aid in the resisting of them that led to the first major U.S. commitments in the Middle East.

y Pratt, o p. cit., p. 758.

- 25 - 2. The Baghdad Pact. From the start the American path in the Middle East, however, has not been an easy one. By 1948, the British had decided to withdraw from their protectorate in Palestine and this touched off a conflict between the Jews and Arabs over the future of Palestine. At the outset of this struggle, the Jews proclaimed the state of Israel, a step to which the United.States gave almost instant recognition. The Arab-Israeli conflict is too complex to deal with here except to state that the support which the United States gave to Israel has always, in one way or another, hampered our relations with other Arab states. From the beginning the Soviet Union has exploited this by siding with the Arabs against Israel.

As it has developed, American policy in the Middle East has had three objectives: (1) to compose the disputes within the area, notably the dispute between Israel and its neighbors; (2) to raise standards of living through assistance in developing the region's unused resources; and (3) to strengthen the area's military potential and to secure bases from which the U.S. and its allies could operate. Toward settling the Arab­ Israeli dispute, no real progress has ever been made. Fortunately for American policy, disunity between Arab states and the fear that many of them have of the Soviet Union has overcome some of their resentment over our friendly policy toward Israel. The United States has provided economic assistance to many of these states since the days of the Point Four Program. Since our topic in this section is our military program, it is to this pro­ gram that we shall now turn.

The Eisenhower Administration which came to power in 1953 under­ took the re-examination of all existing policies for national security, both in the strictly military field and foreign relations generally. The existing regional security pacts which we had in Latin America and NATO provided models that might be applied elsewhere. In an area like the Mid­ dle East, however, no such comparable position of strength had been built.1/ Soviet attempts to infiltrate states in the area were increasing, notably - in Iran, Syria and Egypt. After much preliminary personal diplomacy by the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the United States urged the creation of a Middle East Treaty Organization. The Northern tier states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan with Great Britain added) joined in the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The United States, unwilling to get drawn too far into the clashing ambitions of the Middle East nations, did not for­ mally join the alliance, although it cooperated in the new arrangements in most other respects.2/ The Soviet Union was now confronted with a solid block of anti-Communist territory, on paper at least, all the way from the Mediterranean Sea to India.

John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 1960), p. 49.

Bailey, op. cit., p. 840.

- 26 - The Northern tier powers seemed to offer the best opportunity for such an alliance. The other Middle East states were either unwilling to associate in such an arrangment or were involved in such troublesome problems as Palestine and the approaching Suez Crisis. As to the Pales­ tine problem, an uneasy truce arranged through the United Nations in 1949_ continued to worry Washington. Initially the United States was reluctant to send or sell arms to either side in the hope that some sort of balance of power could be achieved which would discourage attack. President Nasser of Egypt finaliy undermined this American position in 1955 when he arranged to exchange Egyptian cotton for Communist arms from Czechoslovakia. This step by Nasser provoked Secretary Dulles to withdraw American aid for building Egypt's huge Aswan Dam across the Nile. Nasser reacted by seizing the Suez Canal, which had been under European control, mainly British and French. When Britain and France joined Israel in an attack on the Suez zone, the United States led the drive in the United Nations which forced the invaders tp withdraw. One important consequence of the Suez Crisis for our account is that its aftermath disclosed an Anglo-French weakness before the eyes of the world. A power vacuum developed in the Middle East, and if the United States did not move in, it was felt that the Soviet Union would,..!/ 3. The Eisenhower Doctrine. The Eisenhower Administration's response to what appeared to be an emergency situation in the Middle East was the proposal that became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. In January, 1957, President Eisenhower requested congressional authority to provide U.S. economic aid and armed support to any Communist-threatened nation in the Middle East that requested it. Congress subsequently authorized the President to use $200 million for economic and military aid in the Middle East and, if the President determined that it was necessary, "to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting such assis­ tance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism."

The United States thus assumed almost the entire responsibility for the Western defense of the Middle East. No power--friend, potential enemy, or neutralist Arab state--could now assume that the United States would not fight for the Middle East. 2/ In its broader context, the Eisen­ hower Doctrine was another link in the worldwide chain of regional alliances and treaties which the United States was constructing in an effort to con­ tain communism.

Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, the northern tier states of the Baghdad Pact, endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine, but among the other Arab nations, only Lebanon formally welcomed it. Even those Arab states friendly to the United States would not publicly align themselves on the American side against the Soviet Union. Israel officially approved the ij Ibid., p. 844. '?:.! Alexander De Conde, A History of American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. 756.

- 27 - doctrine. The United States noted that approval but would not promise Israel assistance, fearing that to aid Israel would jeopardize relations with the Arab world.I/ Egypt and Syria, which were becoming unique in the Arab world by their closer ties with the Soviet Union, denounced the doctrine.

4. Continuing Middle East Crisis. Despite these American ef­ forts, the Communists continued their political penetration into the Mid- dle East. During 1957, the Soviet Union was supplying planes, tanks, and other weapons to Egypt and Syria. In. December, 1957, the Soviet Union agreed to help Egypt finance the high dam at Aswan with interest on the huge loan at 2.5 percent annually, .a lower rate than that usually charged by the United States. Soviet technicians would plan and supervise the construc­ tion of the dam. In July, 1958, the Baghdad Pact received a severe jolt when a group of army officers in Iraq overthrew the monarchy and announced the founding of the Republic of Iraq. The new regime, headed by General Abdel Karim Kassim quickly signed a defensive alliance with the United Arab Republic. The following year, March, 1959, Iraq formally withdrew from the Baghdad Pact--the northern tier was thus left with a gaping hole. After the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, the alliance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and its headquarters was moved from Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey. · The role of the United States remains the same in CENTO as before; we encourage and support the arrange­ ment, but we have not formally joined the organization.

CENTO, .al ready weakened by the withdrawal of Iraq, continues to suffer its stresses and strains. The Pakistani, angered over the shipment of American arms to India during the China-invasion crisis of 1962, gave disquieting signs of wanting to pull out and to seek better relations with Communist China. More recently, in the aftermath of the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965, Pakistan has begun to reeeive military hardware from Communist China. This present drift toward Communist China raises serious questions as to the future reliability of Pakistan's alliances with the United States and other pro-Western countries.

Currently, the Middle East remains a problem area for American policy. The rivalries which exist among the nations within the area com­ pound the difficulties. Besides the external Soviet threat, there remains the problem of internal Communist subversion. Persistent strife between Israel and her Arab neighbors makes the area a potential powder keg. The United States has tried to damp down these and other potential conflicts, by exercising care in distributing military assistance so as to preserve the status quo. At best this is a difficult policy which has to take into account the fact that the Connnunist nations also continue to supply arms. We shall leave these problems for further examination in Chapter V.

1J Ibid., pp. 756-57.

- 28 - Let us now turn to our final problem area, the Far East.

D. United States Military Policy in the Far East.

Our purpose in this section, as it was in the three previous sections, is not to relate the history of the past 'two· decades in the Far East because this is not our purpose here. Rather our purpose is to describe our military commitments. Because these have their roots in the recent history of the Far East, we cannot completely ignore this history.

1. The Legacy of World War II. As World War II drew to a close, American military commitments in the Far East were primarily concerned with three countries: China, Japan, and Korea. Our roles in these three countries were natural outgrowths of the leadership we exercised in the defeat of Japan. At this point, let us briefly examiQe what these roles were.

(a) China. China, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, fought on the side of the United States in the defeat of Japan. Even before the war in Asia ended, one major American objective was to establish a role for China among the major powers of the world. The fact that the United States assisted China in becoming one of the five_permanent members of the Security Council within the United Nations was one indication of this sup­ port. A second major American objective was to prevent the impending civil war between Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces following the defeat of Japan. Despite American efforts to the contrary, this struggle did begin in late 1945 and, even more tragic for the American position in China, led to a Communist victory on the Mainland of China in 1949. The surviving Chinese Nationalists, still led by Chiang Kai-shek, retreated to Taiwan where a rival regime was established. Despite the frustration of Americans at the collapse of the Nationalist rule on the Mainland, the first impulse of the Truman Admin­ istration was to "wait for the dust to settle." The United States refused to recognize the new Communist government in Peiping and, initially,. did not intend to extend any further material support to the Nationalis'ts on Taiwan. But within a year, a new series of events resulted in new com­ mitments in the Far East that were to last for many years. Before we con­ sider those events, let us briefly turn to Japan and Korea.

(b) Japan. The immediate objectives of postwar American policy in Japan were to uproot and destroy what remained of Japanese mili­ tary power. In the process the United States hoped to reform and educate the Japanese people so that Japan would become a peaceful and democratic nation. Unlike that of Germany, the occupation of Japan was almost wholly American. General Douglas MacArthur became the instrument of American .policy and hence allied policy in Japan under the title of Supreme Alli�d Commander. American occupation of Japan, on the whole, ran smoothly. The Americans directed, sometimes encouraged, a wide range of sweeping reforms that still harmonized with the recent character of the Japanese nation. In addition to assisting the Japanese to draw up a new constitution based upon

- 29 - democratic concepts, the United States encouraged the Japanese to add an unusual provision to the new constitution which stated, "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation." This provision, along with disarmament and other reforms, was intended to create a Japan which could exist in peace with her Asian neighbors. All these steps reflected an early American approach to a future Japan that soon was sub­ ject to re-evaluation. By the end of 1948, another phase of American policy began to emerge, and in the following year, with the Communist victory in China, it became clear. The United States would help Japan regain her prewar industrial supremacy in Asia with the idea of making a future "bastion against Communism" there.]/ As in Germany, the Cold War had thus forced a complete reversal of American policy toward Japan. Since Japan was now weak and had been stripped of her armed forces, she could contribute little to the containment policy, but American policy during this period did not intend to use Japan against Russia, it merely wanted to keep the Soviet Union out. American planners concluded that the Japanese Islands were essen­ tial to defense in the Far East, particularly as bases in the event of war. American policymakers, despite the antiwar provisions of the Japanese Con­ stitution, had also begun to think of encouraging Japan to rearm, because of the menacing Soviet attitude in Europe and the bellicosity of China after it fell under Communist control. In additior,r the United States began work­ ing toward a Japanese peace treaty, with or without Communist cooperation, if'their pro-Western allies would go along. Thus, as the Cold War erupted into a hot war in Korea during the summer of 1950, Japan was changing from a conquered enemy to an informal ally of the United States.

(c) Korea. Prior to the close of World War II, participants in the Cairo Conference, ·of which the United States was a party, promised that Korea would be granted independence "in due course." The country of Korea, at the close of the war, had been placed under Russian and American administration, the Russians occupying the area north of the thirty-eighth parallel, the United States the area south of that line. It was hoped that this arrangement would be temporary; but the Russians set up a Communist regime in the north, while frustrating United States efforts to unify the nation under one government. After the Soviet Union demonstrated it would not allow unification except under a Communist system. the Americans estab� lished a government in the south under President Syngman Rhee. In 1948 and 1949, respectively. the Russians and the Americans withdrew; but the Russians left a strong military government in the north, while the Ameri­ cans had neglected to build a similar strength in the south. On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans crossed the border in bold aggression against the Rhee government. 2. The Korean War. At this moment, as it happened, the Russians were boycotting the Security Council of the United Nations, in protest because Com­ munist China had not been invited to replace the Nationalist Chinese represen­ tative. With American urging, and freed from the possibility of a Soviet veto,

lj Ibid., p. 701.

- 30 - the Security Council met at once, unanimously adopted a resolution branding the North Koreans as aggressors, and called upon the members of the United Nations to "render every assistance in bringing about a restoration of peace." The ultimate burden of supporting the resolution in large measure fell upon the military forces of the United States and those of South Korea.

We shall not describe the actual course of the Korean struggle here, but we shall deal, instead, with its effects upon United States Far Eastern policy.

The Korean armistice agreement concluded in 1953 established boundaries betwe�n the north and south at approximately what they had been before the fighting began. In 1954, the United States and the Re­ public of Korea concluded a Mutual Security Pact which committed the United States to supply long-term economic and military aid. Since then, in addition to this assistance, the United States has continually maintained some 60,000 of its own military forces in South Korea.

Second, some observers conclude that the Korean War revealed the weakness in the doctrine of collective security, as laid down in the United Nations charter. 1/ Though some fourteen other nations collaborated with the United States in the war, 90 percent of the burden was borne by the Americans and South Koreans. Furthermore, the course of events made it clear that, had it not been for Russian absence from the Security Coun­ cil, no United Nations action would have been possible at all.

A third fact of great significance underlined by the struggle was the extreme difficulty of winning a land war on the Continent of Asia. Whether the United States can or should fight such a war was and still is the subject of considerable debate. It is theoretically true that atomic and other weapons might have been used in Korea. But it still remains to be proven whether such a course of action would have brought the Communists to terms under which the country could have been unified.

Fourth, the Korean War resulted in a new commitment to National­ ist China. After the Nationalist collapse on the Mainland, the disposition of the Truman Administration initially, as we have seen, was to wait for the dust to settle. But the outbreak of the Korean conflict changed the course of events. The Truman Administration, at the outset of the fight­ ing declared that it would not permit the Chinese Communist regime to carry out one of its declared intentions, to liberate Taiwan. The United States Seventh Fleet was interposed between Taiwan and the Mainland to prevent not only Chinese Communist invasion but also a Nationalist Chinese assault on Mainland China. This marked the beginning of an American de­ fense commitment in Asia that was revised and expanded by the Eisenhower Administration. The Truman commitment to prevent Chiang Kai-shek's forces

'J:! Perkins, op. cit., p. 118.

- 31 - from attempting a return to the Mainland was lifted and, in 1954, the United· States and the Nationalist Government concluded a Mutual Security Treaty simi­ lar to that between the United States and South Korea. In addition to the continued presence of the Seventh Fleet, the United States supplied large­ scale military and economic assistance to the Nationalist regime. Finally, and most important in view of the current fighting in South Viet Nam, the Korean War led to a more active American interest in the war in Indo-China. In Washington, after the outbreak of fighting in Korea, the Indo-Chinese conflict, involving resistance led by Ho Chi Minh against French efforts to re-establish their rule there, was looked upon as another effort by Communists to expand at the expense of the Free World.

3. The War in Indo-China. After 1950, the United States sup­ plied large-scale military aid to French forces in Indo-China. Even with this equipment, the French were unable to make much headway against the Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi Minh.

In the spring of 1954 the war took a disastrous turn for the French and also touched off a crisis for American policymakers. The Viet Minh trapped some 20,000 French and loyal Vietnamese troops in a remote fortress in Northern Viet Nam called Dien Bien Phu. In desperation the French finally appealed for American military intervention, primarily a massive air strike from carriers, to relieve the besieged fortress. De­ spite some official American support for this course, President Eisenhower finally decided against it because of British opposition and congressional wariness. 1/ Dien Bien Phu eventually fell to the Viet Minh on May 7, 1954, and, as it-turned out, after an international conference had assembled at Geneva. 4. Geneva Conference. On April 26, 1954, the five strongest powers to emerge from World War II--the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Communist China--had met together for the first time, with a number of lesser states, at the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles participated in the discussions on Korea, and after they failed, he withdrew, leaving France and Great Britain as the principal Western nations to deal with the Communist powers on the issue of Indo-China. The Eisenhower Administration, aware of the weakness of the Western position due to the deteriorating French military position in the fighting, withheld approval of the cease-fire terms agreed upon, but announced it would not up­ set them by force.2/ The settlement on Indo-China, consisting of three cease-fire agreements, recognized the independence of the Kingdoms of Laos and Cam­ bodia and divided Viet Nam at the seventeenth parall�l. The land to the north of that line, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, went to Ho Chi Minh' s regime and the territory to the south, the State of Viet Nam, re­ mained under the control of a rival government then under Emperor Bao Dai.

Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams--A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1966, rev. ed.), pp. 227-29.

Ibid., pp. 230-31.

- 32 - French military power was withdrawn from the North immediately and from the South a little later. On balance, the Geneva agreement was a triumph for the Viet Minh and a setback for American prestige. Yet it denied the Communist­ supported Ho Chi Minh the southern part of the Viet Nam peninsula which he might have conquered, and for a while at least brought peace to Southeast Asia. Later, President Eisenhower expressed distaste for the results of the diplomacy at Geneva but said the United States, which had not joined the settlement, accepted it and would make the best ,of a bad bargain. lJ

After the armistice, the State of Viet Nam overcame internal strife, resisted Communist penetration, and with American military and economic aid, amounting to $150 million annually, gained strength. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem replaced Bao Dai and established the Republic of Viet Nam, which the United States quickly recognized.

5. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, alarmed over the situation which the Indo-Chinese crisis had created, worked to bring about a plan to block further Communist gains in Asia. At Manila, on September 6, 1954, he met with the representatives of Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. Although invited, India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia declined to attend the conference, preferring to follow their policy of non-alignment in the Cold War. Only three Asian nations, therefore, participated.

Under Dulles' leadership, the delegates signed an alliance called the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the "Manila Pact." The treaty, more cautiously drawn than the North Atlantic Pact, did not specif­ ically provide for military action; in case of aggression in the area, the signatories agreed to meet the common danger in accordance with their con­ stitutional practices and to "confer in order to agree upon measures for their common defense." 2/

If threats to independence developed from internal, meaning Com­ munist, subversion, the signatories agreed to consult immediately through a council that formed another regional arrangement, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO. Ultimately, the organization established headquarters and a secretariat at Bangkok, the capital of Thailand. The treaty also called for economic cooperation and technical aid among the members. Since the Geneva armistice prevented Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia from joining an alliance, the Manila Pact offered protection to those countries through a separate protocol. SEATO, along with separate bilateral mutual security pacts signed between the United States and a number of other countries in 1954: Korea Nationalist China, Turkey, and Pakistan, was part of a design by Dulles to forge a stronger front against Communist .aggression. A year later, as we indicated in the previous section, the Baghdad Pact represented a similar

1/ De Conde, op. cit., pp. 824-25.

2/ Perkins, op. cit., pp. 124-25.

- 33 - effort in the Middle East. As a result of all these agreements, the United States supplied economic and military assistance to strenghten these allies. Thus, as had been the case earlier in Europe under NATO, the United States found itself heavily committed in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 6. The Southeast Asian Dilemma. Since our' 'present involvement in South Viet Nam has probably played a role toward creating this debate topic, we shall briefly review United States policy in Southeast Asia. The Geneva agreement of 1954 had stipulated that Laos and Cam­ bodia were to be neutral, a status that proved difficult for Laos to main­ tain. With its independence that Kingdom had inherited a large body of resistance fighters, called the Pathet Lao, who had fought the French. This force, which received most of its support from North Viet Nam, re­ fused to join the military establishment of the central government or to disband. This has led to years of civil turmoil, an instability that has proved too perplexing for American policymakers. We shall not relate the entire story of American involvement in Laos here, but only some of its salient characteristics.

Between 1954-61, the United States suppli�d some $300 million to support what it considered the anti-Communist side in Laos. At first, from 1954 to 1958, the United States supported a neutralist government that tried and failed to reach an accord with the Pathet Lao. In 1959 and 1960, the United States then backed conservative· regimes that fought the Pathet Lao. In this period the Soviet Union stepped in with large-scale aid of its own; it airlifted guns and other military supplies to the Pathet Lao. Despite American assistance, the anti-Communist forces made no head- way against the Pathet Lao and Soviet influence was moving further into South­ east Asia. By early 1961, as President Kennedy took office, the anti-Communist fortunes in Laos had deteriorated to a point where some observers believed only outside intervention could save the country from Pathet Lao conquest ..!)

All this posed a dilemma to the United States from which no satisfactory escape seemed possible. Direct American intervention could conceivably trigger a similar response ·from Communist China_and perhaps the Soviet Union; perhaps it would create another Korea. Additionally, French opposition prevented intervention by SEATO. President Kennedy finally resorted to diplomacy, and supported a British plan calling for a cease fire supervised by an international commission. The Soviet Union finally went at along with this proposal and a fourteen nation confer�nce was.convened .. Geneva in May, 1961. A cease-fire arrangement under international supervision was reached at Geneva, but this accord has never really worked from the start. Fighting between the government and the Pathet Lao has continued sporadically to the present day. Pathet Lao forces threatened to_push from their �wo northern Presi­ provinces all the way to the Mekong River bord�r with :hailand_in 1962: dent Kennedy responded by sending Army and Manne contingents into Thailand. Later New Zealand and Australia sent air contingents. Faced with the possibi­ lity of Western intervention in Laos, the Pathet Lao halted military action y De Conde, op. cit., p. 828.

- 34 - and agreed in July, 1962 to a tripartite coalition government for. all Laos, with representation for the pro-Communist neutral and anti-Communist factions. Since 1961, American policy has shifted in Laos; it no longer tried to place the line of containment in Laos. Instead it has sought to use Laos as a buffer against the Communist drive southward and to draw a new defense line in South Viet Nam, but, here also, American policy has had its problems.

Since 1954, the United States had extended economic and military assistance to South Viet Nam. After 1956, when the Diem government refused to permit a referendum sanctioned by the 1954 Geneva accord, the Viet Cong, or Vietnamese Communists, mounted a series of attacks against the Diem gov­ ernment in order to overthrow it. By 1961, the Viet Cong, employing bases in Cambodia and Laos and also receiving assistance from North Viet Nam, seriously threatened the Diem government. The Kennedy Administration de­ cided to increase the American commitment to South Viet Nam. Between 1961 and President Kennedy's death in 1963, United States military and economic assistance expanded, and the United States military mission grew from 600 to 23,000. In addition to aiding the Diem government against Communist infiltration, the United States pressured Diem to adopt a series of polit­ ical, social, and economic reforms in order to win increased popular sup­ port. The Diem government, virtually a family dictatorship, ultimately aroused substantial opposition even among anti-Communist Vietnamese, espe­ cially Buddhist elements, and, finally, before his overthrow and assassination by a military coup on November 1, 1963, also lost the confidence of the U.S.

Since this period, South Viet Nam has experienced a series of coups, partial coups, anti-government demonstrations, and constantly shifting alliances between military and political leaders. Ultimately, all this turbulence may bring real reform and stability to South Viet Nam, but, to this point, it seems to have contributed little toward the war against the Viet Cong. An election in September, 1966 to establish a con­ stituent assembly to write a new constitution brought out 80 percent of the voters, however, showing an impressive amount of government control in areas where Viet Cong terror tactics had been thought to have intimidated the people. Since 1964, United States commitments to the struggle in Viet Nam have constantly expanded. As this is written (September, 1966) > the number of American servicemen in Viet Nam has grown to approximately 320.000. There are indications that this figure will increase. Some re­ cent news stories, allegedly based upon "Pentagon Studies," forecast a long war--probably eight years with current U.S. forces and five years if U.S. troop strength in Viet Nam were raised from the current 320,000 man strength (and a goal of nearly 400,000 already projected) to 750,000 men. 1/ Since 1964, the American military role in Viet Nam has changed from an ad-­ visory role among South Vietnamese forces to an active combat role. Amer­ ican military aircraft have now been used to bomb selected targets in North Viet Nam for over a year.

!/ The Washington Post, August 16, 1966, Section A, p. 14.

- 35 - Our objective in the Viet Nam struggle has been stated several times by President Johnson.I/ The United States seeks a settlement which includes an independent state in South Viet Nam under its own government and not under attack by the Communist North. We have no intention of try­ ing to change or eliminate the Communist North; we would accept a truly neutral world orientation in the South; and, finally, we seek no permanent military base in the South.. We have increased our commitment in Viet Nam in order to convince the Communists that they cannot win their objectives by military means.

On the other side, Ho Chi Minh has stated that the Communists do not recognize the possibility of a South Vietnamese state; that there is only one Vietnamese nation. 2/ They have made it very clear that they mean a nation which ultimately must be governed by the Lao Dong (or Com­ munist) Party of North Viet Nam and its derivative, the National Front for Liberation of South Viet Nam. They have also demanded the withdrawal of all U.S. and other foreign military forces from Viet Nam as a condition for negotiations. . It appears, then, that the major objectives of the two sides allow no room for compromise. As matters stand, neither side has had suf­ ficient success on the political and military battlefield to enforce its views at the conference tabl.e. Viewed in this way, the situation is now at an impasse, unless one side or the other backs down. For either to back down would mean yielding on the main point: whether an independent, non�Communist South Viet Nam can or should exist.

V. Epilogue� In this survey of major American foreign policy developments since World War II, we have seen the major thrust of this policy change from one where we hoped that we could somehow work with the Soviet Union and other nations through the United Nations to a policy of containment. United States commitments, economic and military, reflecting the course of the Cold War, have constantly grown. From an initial concern to help Europe ward off Communist penetration, the United States has constructed a series of bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements that are now almost global in scope.

Since the college debate resolution calls upon the affirmative to re-examine these growing American foreign policy commitments, perhaps it is now time to turn to the resolution itself.

1/ The Washington Post, May 22, 1966, Section E, p. 1. 2/ The Washington Post, May 22, 1966.

- 36 - BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. Power and Diplomacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Boyd, Andrew. United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth. New York: Penguin Books, 1963. Carlton, Willi3:]Il G. The Revolution in American Foreign Policy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1954. Conn, Stetson, and Fairchild, Byron. The Framework of Hemispheric Defense. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960.

De Conde, Alexander. (ed.) Isolation and Security. Durham: Duke University Press, 1957.

Duggan, Laurence. The Americas: The Search for Hemispheric Security. New York: Holt, 1949.

Dulles, John F. War or Peace. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950.

Fifield, Russell H. The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958.

Fischer, Louis. Russia, America, and the World. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.

Fleming, D.F. The Cold War and Its Origins. Garden City, N.Y.: DoubJeday and Company, 1961.

Goold-Adams, Richard. John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962.

Hilsman, Roger, and Good, Robert M. (eds.) Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues and the Instruments. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins1 Univers1ty Press, 1965.

Hyde, L.K., Jr. The United States and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1960.

Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

Leopold, Richard W. The Growth of American Foreign Policy, A History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

- 37 - Lippmann, Walter. "Bygone Notions." Newsweek, v. 68, (August 1,1966).

Lukas, John. A History of the Cold War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1961. Osgood, R.E. NATO: The Entangling Alliance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Rostow, Walter W. The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History. New York: :-Harper and Row, 1960. Seton-Watson, Hugh. Neither War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Postwar World. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960. Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 1960. Westerfield, W.B. The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1963. Zurcher, A.J. The Struggle to Unite Europe. New York: New York University Press, 1958.

- 38 - CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSITION

Introductory Essay

The current national debate resolution opens up the entire scope of American foreign policy questions. Definitive analysis of the whole subject is obviously impossible in a single introductory chapter. But it is important to focus on some of the analytical problems that are likely to arise in the preparation of both affirmative and negative cases. This chapter thus considers in order several of the more important of those prob­ lems: First, the definition of the two central terms, "American foreign pol­ icy commitments" and "substantially reduce" are canvassed, with suggestions of several approaches to each. Second, the chapter offers a brief survey of the major goals of American foreign policy during the twentieth century, and of the forces that have shaped current policies. A third section explores the processes, or machinery, by-which American foreign policy commitments are undertaken--including the role of the several branches of the Federal Govern­ ment (the President, Congress, the State Department, and several other agen­ cies). The chapter then concludes with a consideration of some points of both affirmative and negative strategy. A few preliminary observations may be appropriate, if not comfort­ ing. The resolution is essentially open-ended, in that it does not refer to any particular commitment. The resolution becomes more meaningful for debate when a proposal for reduction of a particular commitment is made. This fea­ ture of the resolution obviously gives the affirmative vast latitude, and broadens the challenge facing the negative. The issue is which (if any) of the existing commitments should be altered, and how much. It may well be, indeed, that some negatives will urge the strengthening or the increasing of of certain commitments, as well as opposing the reduction of others. On the otJ,.er hand, the affirmative may contend that our foreign policy commitments should be reduced to zero.

I. Definition of Terms.

Two key terms are: "foreign policy commitments" (which really in­ cludes two components); and "substantially reduce." Each deserves rather ex­ tensive treatment, for profitable debate requires some understanding about and agreement upon the essential terms. At the same time, it is difficult to de­ fine these very broad terms. It may well be that affirmatives will prefer to begin by outlining the plan, rather than defining the terms as such; they may feel that to define those terms separately would only waste time. On the other side, it will be difficult for any negative to take issue without definitions

- 39 - or until it is aware of the affirmative proposal. Thus, the process of de­ fining the terms in abstraction may be much less appropriate to this resolution than to most. Nevertheless, the definitional alternatives are explored here for reference.

A. "Foreign Policy Commitments."

A dictionary definition of the word "policy" is "any governing principle, plan, or course of action."1/ Another definition is "a settled or definite course or method adopted and followed ...11 2/ It will be noted that the more precise definition contains two features: the course of action must be (1) settled or definite, and it must have been (2) adopted and actually followed. The word ''foreign," of course, is generally defined to mean a place outside the jurisdiction of the country. It should be noted, also, that the debate resolution refers to the foreign policy com­ mitments of "the United States"--not statements by individual legislators, or government officials who are not authorized to commit the United States.

What do we mean by the term "foreign policy," with particular reference to the United States? One expert suggests that "foreign policy is the basis and framework of a nation's relations with other countries." He goes on to point out that the United States foreign policy is made in a democratic government and society. That fact influences "every aspect of the process, method, personnel, speed and its ultimate success." More­ over, the "foreign policy of the United States is not just one policy; it is scores of policies, and each one is the sum of hundreds of individual decisions."3/ This is one limitation or qualification upon any definition. That is, it-seems necessary to define or identify a nation's foreign policy inductively or operationally, by examining current statements of national goals or objectives and the range of present relations with other nations, to determine what the composite policy is at any given moment. A slightly different approach to the "foreign policy" question requires an important distinction: that between "foreign policy" and "for­ eign policies." The latter term (policies} would include rather particular, operational or decisional principles and relations with specific countries.

1/ Webster's New World Dictionary, College Edition.

'!:..! Webster's New International Dictionary. Emphasis added 3/ Andrew H. Bertling, The Making of Foreign Policy (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 1966), p. 1.

- 40 - The former--(foreign policy)--would, by contrast, denote "the complex and changing course that a state follows in relation to other states."!/ A nation that has any dealings with other nations may therefore have both foreign policies and a foreign policy.

Finally, there is the special problem of determining or ascer­ taining foreign policy in the United States. As we have already noted, the foreign policy of the United States may change rather rapidly, or at least its ingredients shift. Moreover, different spokesmen--even of the same political party, or of like views on domestic questions--may take very different views of foreign policy. When the Secretary of State insists, for example,. that it is American policy to support a particular govern­ ment in Latin America"c;"r Southeast Asia, and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee insists with equal vigor that American policy does not warrant such support, which position reflects the policy of the United States? Usually, it is possible to determine which speaker, and therefore which policy, reflects the view of the current administration. Moreover, the resolution deals with the commitments themselves--not with statements as to what our commitments should be.

ls therea differen:e between a foreign policy and a "foreign policy commit­ ment"? Ohe group of experts suggests that "commitments denote specific under­ takings in support of a particular policy.... Thus a policy of aid to free na­ tions is distinguished from commitments to supply designated amounts of mil­ itary and financial assistance within a fixed period of time to a particular state."2/ This definition, therefore, includes several elements: (1) a gen­ eral policy, or goal, or set of national objectives (presumably an important component of the larger term "foreign policy"); (2) a determination to pursue or apply that policy in a particular region or with regard to a particular country; (3) some formal, structural arrangement between the United States and that region or nation by which to implement the policy; (4) the alloca­ tion or appropriation of funds, personnel, or materiel for the carrying out of the formal arrangement; (5) the designation of a program or project to carry out the policy; and (6) the setting of a time limit for commitment. Not all commitments, of course, will involve all these elements. The dip­ lomatic recognition of a foreign government, for example, may involve neither the appropriation of funds (except for the support of the American embassy and staff in the recognized nation) nor a time limit. Generally,

1/ William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington: The Brookings Institu­ tion, 1956), p. 474.

2/ Ibid., p. 473.

- 41 - though, these ingredients will identify the nature and contours of a for­ eign policy commitment.

Not everyone uses the term this way. The distinguished diplo­ matic historian Julius W. Pratt has obse.rved, for example, that the United States is "committed to a policy of leadership in the world coalition against Communist imperialism."Y Such uses of the term, while appropriate for general discussion, may be confusing in a context where "commitment" must carry a special meaning for debaters. Thus we suggest that "commit­ ment" be used as defined above, to denote the operational means by which policies and principles are carried out within a foreign policy framework; the "foreign policy" of the nation would include the commitments as well as the particular policies which they implement.

P·�rhaps it would be helpful to borrow several other definitions from the authors who earlier delineated "commitment." They would distin­ guish that term from several other foreign policy ingredients: (1) "na.,. · tional interest"--"the general and continuing end for which a state acts"; (2) "interests"--"such diverse motivations as the requirements of physical security, the desire for a higher standard of living, and the wish to transmit a political system to some other society "; (3) "principles"--"the enduring modes of behavior or the relatively established guides to action that characterize nations" ; (4) "objectives"--"specific goals designed to secure or111 to support an interest, or a principle, or some combination of the two ; and (5) "policies"--"specific courses of action designed to a­ chieve objectives."2/ These additional terms are not likely to arise in the typical debate,-but serve to identify the context of the term "com­ mitment" with which we began. In practical terms, what are the United States foreign policy commitments today? In Chapter I we surveyed the evolution of a number of foreign policies and programs which are currently in effect. Most of these involve foreign policy commitments, in the sense of "specific undertakings in support of particular policies." The full scope of our commitments would reflect diplomatic relations with some 120 nations on a bilateral, nation-to-nation basis. In addition to these foundations of diplomatic relations, there are thousands of treaties in force which involve some commitment on the part of the United States; the official volume listing such treaties runs to something over 300 pages of rather small type.�

Probably far more important than diplomatic relations and the general run of pilateral treaties are broad commitments of several other types, with which we shall be mainly concerned in this analysis: (1) the y Pratt, op. cit., p. 780. 2/ Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, op. cit., pp. 471-73. U.S. Department of State, Treaties in Force (Washington: U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office, 1966).

- 42 - United Nations and its affiliated agencies and branches, membership in which imposes a variety of commitments for the United States (to be con­ sidered at length in Chapter III); (2) military alliances or defense agree­ ments--both with individual nations on a bilateral basis, and with groups of nations on a regional basis (which will be surveyed extensively in Chapters V and VI ); (3) economic commitments growing out of the American foreign aid and economic assistance programs, both bilateral and multi­ lateral (see Chapter IV); (4) tariff, trade and monetary agreements, both with individual nations and through the multi-nation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which will be considered in Chapter IV). It is these undertakings--some with individual nations and others with groups of na­ tions or multi-national organizations--that impose upon the United States its most significant and most controversial foreign policy commitments. A later section of this chapter will examine the machinery by which such commitments are made,along with some of the factors that determine their strength and duration. For the moment, however, we are concerned only with surveying the full range of the term "commitments."

B. "Substantially Reduce."

"Substantial" is a relative term meaning considerable--worthy of con­ sideration; its operational meaning will obviously dep�nd upon the sort of plan each affirmative selects. Rather than defining this term in the abstract, the affirmative may well prefer to outline its plan early in the debate and offer that as its definition of "substantial reduction." Several possible definitions of the term are available, although not all may be strategically sound or even wholly legitimate.

1. Total Abolition of All Commitments. At least in theory, the affirmative might urge a return to complete isolation--if that ever was the foreign policy of the United States. There is little support for this posi­ tion in any sector of current American opinion, however. The debate is gen­ erally over which commitments should be reduced; foreign policy conserva­ tives would be inclined to keep certain military alliances in force while perhaps .reducing support of, or even withdrawing from, international organ­ izations, while liberals would favor the international organizations (such as the United Nations) and reduce the military commitments. But neither group is likely to urge the reduction of all commitments to the point of their abolition. Thus isolationism, or total reduction, does not seem to afford affirmative debaters a 1 ikely alternative.

2. Renunciation of Certain General Policies. If a foreign pol­ icy commitment is defined as a specific undertaking in support of a partic­ ular policy, then the abandonment of a policy would presumably eliminate the commitments pursuant to it. Thus, if an affirmative can demonstrate that a policy is unsound (e.g., the policy of fighting communism in South­ east Asia), it will probably also succeed in indicting the commitments which support or flow from the policy (e.g., military operations in Viet Nam). Of course, it would not do to confine argument to the policy level, since the resolution speaks in terms of commitments; but the arguments which apply at the policy level should also obtain at the commitment level.

- 43 - The greater in this case would usually include the lesser. Thus if the policy of seeking to promote freer world trade is deemed unsound, it would follow that commitments pursuant to that policy--participation in the Gen­ eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for example, or the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1962--should be reduced or eliminated.

3. Structural Change in or Abolition of Commitments Without Changing Underlying Policies. The policies may be sound, but the partic­ ular means chosen to implement them may nevertheless be unsound. Thus the affirmative may support the policy, but not all the specific commitments. (We shall consider later in this chapter the question whether, under such circumstances, the affirmative should offer alternative means of implement­ ing the policy.) There are obviously many different ways of serving the basic policies of American international relations. Some such changes in means would involve the basic alteration of, or American withdrawal from, the formal or structural machinery which imposes the current commitment. At least where the American commitment is extensive, such changes would ap­ pear to involve "substantial reduction."

4. Reduction of the Amount or Extent of Support Without Altera­ tion of the Structural Commitment. Less drastic than the alteration of the structure of which the commitment is a part is the reduction of the extent of the commitment in material terms. That is, instead of withdraw­ ing from a particular organization, or cancelling a treaty commitment, we might simply cut by 25 percent or 50 percent the funds or the personnel al­ located to the carrying out of the commitment. This alternative raises more serious questions about the meaning of the modifying term "substantial" than the previous alternatives; while "substantial" obviously cannot be defined in the abstract, affirmatives will presumably concentrate on com­ mitments which form significant parts of the American foreign policy and will urge significant changes. But the details of the dispute over what is "substantial" will have to be left to the context in which the issue arises. 5, Gradual Reduction of the American Commitment. Thus far we have been assuming that the reduction would be sudden or immediate. Af­ firmatives might, however, legitimately propose a "phasing out" of exist­ ing commitments. If there are persuasive reasons for continuing certain programs or projects through to completion, and if the arguments favoring the reduction are not imminent, the gradual approach might avoid some of the international repercussions likely to follow a precipitate American withdrawal from a diplomatic commitment to other nations.

6. Transfer of the Commitment From One Channel to Another. In many situations, the United States might continue its support not only of particular policies, but even of particular programs or countries, but shift the means of support. Would such a transfer constitute a "substan­ tial reduction" of the American commitment? In the narrow sense, of course, it would appear to,:fur viewed solely in terms of the particular channel from which support has been withdrawn, a reduction has occurred. But debaters might take a broader pers'pective on the question; the reduction should

- 44 - probably be net rather than gross. Thus, if the policy and the support of the policy persist, a change of fonn or name should not meet the reso­ lution. There may be situations in which an affinnative can not defend such a "transfer" approach (e.g., a change of economic aid from grants to loans). Affinnatives should be prepared to show that any proposed change is a reduction in fact. 7. Reducing the Duration of the Commitment. Another less drastic approach to the resolution involves the time dimension of American commit­ ments. Some commitments are without limit of time; these could be restricted to a specified term of years. Other commitments are for rather long periods of time; the duration of these could perhaps be shortened. Even if, after the end of a given period, the actual extent of American support might be identical to what it would have been under the original commitment, the mere fonnal reduction of the period of time might be said to have affected the commitment itself. This approach may not reap any substantial benefits for the affinnative--except possibly in the case of a perpetual commitment in which the time factor alone can be said to be essential to the strength of the commitment.

These, then, are some possible approaches to the problem of def­ inition. Perhaps an additional comment on the word "substantially" would be helpful. First, debate over the question whether a particular propo- sal is "substantial" may be quite fruitless; what should be debated is not the definitional issue but the far more important substantive questions whether the affinnative's proposal would bring significant benefits, whether there is a significant need for it, and whether its advantages outweigh the detriments. Second, the presence of the word "substantially" in the reso­ lution probably only excludes proposals for trifling reductions that are not worthy of debaters' time, and should not be proposed even in the absence of such a qualifier.

II. The Goals and Determinants of American Foreign Policy. One cannot consider the reduction of American foreign policy com­ mitments without some understanding of why we have our present commitments. Two general matters are included within this heading: First, the general goals of United States foreign policy; and second, the various factors which determine the very existence, the strength, and sometimes the duration, of American foreign policy commitments. In discussing these two areas, we shall continue to assume,arguendo, that there is a single, more or less unified, American foreign policy resting on widely shared premises. We must simply suppress our awareness that even the major spokesmen of the party in power do not always. begin from the same premises, nor reach the same conclusions about any foreign policy question. Bearing in mind that diversity of policy, however, one can proceed to analyze the goals and the determinants fairly realistically.

- 45 - American foreign policy has historically reflected certain themes or guiding principles. Chief among these guiding principles have been (1) isolation (at least in terms of nonintervention in European af­ fairs, through about the time of the First World War); (2) freedom of the seas; (3) the Monroe Doctrine (keeping European powers out of the Western Hemisphere); (4) Pan-Americanism (unity within the Western Hemisphere); (5) the Open Door (access to foreign markets on competitive terms for American businessmen, particularly in China during the early part of the twentieth century); and (6) the peaceful settlement of disputes.1/ Some of these principles have survived well into the present century,-although usually in rather changed form since the emergence of the United States to world leadership. A. Determinants of the Existence, Strength,and Duration of American Foreign Policy Commitments.

Nothing we have considered to this point explains why this nation has the myriad commitments it does have throughout the world. There are many factors involved in the commitment-making process; not all of them, of course, contribute to the formation of any particular commitment. But they are all in the background at any given time, and may help to under­ stand the international commitments in which the United States has become involved. Some appreciation of these policymaking determinants seems es­ sential before considering the reduction of our international commitments. The following list is suggestive rather than comprehensive, but will do as a starter.

1. Geographical Position of the United States. The location of the United States has accounted for at least two obvious types of com­ mitments--those with Canada and Mexico. Probably, if less directly, it also largely explains those with other nations in the Western Hemisphere, for United States leadership in Pan-American solidarity, enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, and other hemispheric policies. The commitments flowing from these factors and policies can rather easily be traced, as will be done in later chapters. But geography has had other less tangible influences: various trade commitments have undoubtedly reflected the location of the United States on world trade routes; the great distance of the United States from the older nations of Europe has permitted a degree of foreign policy independence not possible elsewhere; the position of the United States has required us to look both to the East and to the West, and to develop policies for both regions, if only to protect our two coasts against vastly different threats. These and other particular factors could be attributed to the geography of the United States and its location on the globe. 2. Wealth, Natural Resources, and Industrial Growth. The eco­ nomic aspects of American foreign policy have always figured prominently. The great variety of natural resources, for example, pushed American

±/ Bailey, op. cit., p. 2.

- 46 - industrial development in particular directions. These directions, and· the new dimensions they brought with them, influenced both our trade pat­ terns and the conunercial agreements, consular networks,. and trade and tariff policies designed to protect the conunerce that was made possible by these underlying economic considerations. In Chapter IV we shall con­ sider the economic aspects of American 'foreign policy; for the moment it is enough to note that the determinants of those economic policies have deep roots. 3. The American Government and Political System. Unlike a dictatorship or an autocracy, the United States·Government cannot make foreign policy solely on the basis of international pressures or consid­ erations. The organs of government which are involved in making inter­ national conunitments are quite responsive to domestic pressures. If the general mood of the American electorate is isolationist, or protection­ ist, for example, the conunitments·which are made, or any changes in them, will almost certainly reflect that mood. Specifically, there are a host of pressure groups that seek to influence foreign policymaking, and to some extent succeed. Cross-currents and conflicts often emerge between these pressure groups; sometimes the conflicts are sufficiently strong to prevent the making of any conunitments• .!f

4. Presence of Large Numbers of Ethnic Groups in the American Population. The heterogeneous composition of the American population has a significant, though diffuse, impact upon the making of foreign policy conunitments. Decisions about American entry into both World Wars were greatly complicated by the presence and influence of large groups from a number of warring European countries. American policy toward Great Britain has always had to be conscious of the attitudes of Americans of Irish an­ cestry, as policy in the Middle East must be sensitive to the feelings and international views of Jewish Americans: Here again the cross-pressures are sometimes so strong that policymaking is inunobilized, at least for a time. While the cnannels through which the pressures are felt cannot easily be identified, the pressures are felt in Washington and must be reckoned with as an important.determinant of foreign policy conunitments.2/ 5. American Devotion to the Democratic Form of Government. The American enthusiasm for our own form of government pervades our participa­ tion in world affairs. Our attitudes toward dictatorship, autocracy, colonialism, and other undemocratic forms of government have reflected this devotion through American history. While this nation has frequently supported undemocratic rulers and governments because of overriding needs and interests, the preference for democracy has been strong and persistent. Where we have actually been able to influence another country's choice of the form of government, as in postwar West Germany and Japan, and to a

.!.I See generally Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Pol­ icy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). 2/ Ibid., pp. 183-91.

- 47 - lesser extent in Latin American nations receiving our economic assistance, and most recently in South Viet Nam, we have pushed strongly for democracy and self-determination.!f 6. Close Relationship Between Diplomatic and Military Affairs. Some of the commitments which the United States has assumed since World War II have resulted essentially from military rather than diplomatic pressures and considerations. Sometimes alliances begun for purely mil­ itary purposes have expanded or altered and led to commitments of a non­ military sort. The close proximity, and the continuing pressure of mil­ itary considerations upon foreign policy commitments, can hardly be over­ looked in debating the present topic.y

7. Desire for Reciprocal Commitments. Many foreign policy com­ mitments are undoubtedly made simply in order to obtain a corresponding commitment from some other nation. Tariff agreements, for example, are seldom meaningful unless both nations agree to deal alike with certain products of the other nation. Even in the military sector, although the United States is stronger than most of the nations with which it has de­ fense agreements, there may be a quid pro quo--for example, permission to keep troops, or base planes, or station ships, within the territory of the foreign nation in return for certain protective undertakings on the part of the United States. A large number of the American bilateral treaty commitments are of this sort--postal agreements, treaties concern­ ing fishing rights, extraditional treaties, the international copyright and patent conventions, treaties concerning international air transporta­ tion and landing rights, and myriad others. In such cases the United States enters the commitment primarily because the undertaking is neces­ sary to obtain reciprocal rights, or privileges, or benefits, from one or more foreign nations. 8. The Emergence of the United States to World Leadership After World War II. The emergence of the United States to a position of world power, with incumbent responsibilities of leadership and direction, has been f�lly described in Chapter I. We considered there the variety of commitments which this country has assumed since, and probably largely because of, the demands of postwar leadership. This is not the place to speculate whether those commitments could have been avoided, or whether

Bertling, op. cit., p. 87; Frederick M. Watkins, "Colonialism, Dic­ tatorship, and The American Political Tradition," World Pressures on American Foreign Policy, ed. Marian D. Irish (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 99-117. y Bailey, op. cit., pp. 6-7. Much of the influence of military con­ siderations upon foreign policymaking comes through the National Security Council. See generally H. Field Haviland, et al., The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1960), pp. 162-71.

- 48 - they were the inevitable price of eminence and world leadership. The wisdom of the postwar commitments will be the subject of later chapters in this analysis. 9. American Leadership in the Formation of the United Nations. One corollary of postwar leadership was the particular American respon­ sibility for the formation and founding of the United Nations� Leader­ ship in the organization was not, of course, the inevitable outcome of leadership in its drafting, as the American failure to join Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations clearly suggests. But the fact that the founding of the U.N. occurred in San Francisco, and that the headquarters have always been in greater New York, together with the very prominent role which American statesmen and legislators of both political parties took in the early stages of the United Nations, made a deep American com­ mitment to the new organization almost certain. As we shall see in Chapter III, our commitments to the U.N. and its affiliated agencies are among the most important, and the most controversial,.!/

10. American Development of Atomic and Nuclear Weapons. While it is difficult to speculate what course American postwar foreign policy might have followed .without the development of the atomic bomb and other more recent nuclear weapons, this factor has surely influenced the making of certain commitments. Particularly in the realm of regional military alliances, the American knowledge about, and leadership in the development of nuclear weapons, cannot be overlooked. Although the commitments might otherwise have come about in some form, the particular form is undoubtedly responsive to this factor.

B. Current Goals of American Foreign Policy. After this survey of the determinants of American foreign policy, it is appropriate to focus on the current policies themselves. To set the stage, we might consider the stated policy goals of the United States. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has recently articulated five such goals with­ in which all specific policies and commitments should be able to be sub­ sumed: "l. To deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack or limited war or subversion or guerrilla tactics. "2. To bring about a closer association of the industrialized democracies of Western Europe, North America and Asia--specifically Japan-­ in promoting the prosperity and security of the entire free world. "3. To help the less-developed areas of the world carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence or their pursuit of democracy.

!/ See generally Taylor and Cashman.

- 49 - "4. To assist in t he gradual emergence of a g enuine world com­ munity, based o n cooperation and law, through the e stablishment and d e­ velopment of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank a nd Monetary Fund, and o ther global a nd r egional institutions.

"S. To strive t irelessly to end the arms race and r educe t he risk of war, to narrow the areas of conflict with the Communist bloc, and to continue to spin t he infinity of threads that bind peace t ogether."!/

Several observations s eem appropriate about such a listing of goals: First, they are subject t o change and realignment as conditions change, and as the perception of American interests shifts. Second, there are at any given times actual policies and commitments which are n ot fully harmonious with all the goals, or even with a ny of them--but t hat does not mean t hat t he goals are honored o nly in t he breach. Third, there are other policies a nd commitments r evealing conflict between or among the general policy goals; the current war in Viet Nam, for example, s eeks to d eter ag­ gression and to check the spread of communism and of a form of government which we reject, but it obviously does not contribute either to the reduc­ tion of the arms race, or to minimizing the scope of conflict with the Communist bloc. Finally, it should be apparent that the goals are often stated and accepted i nductively rather than deductively--that is, the United S tates g ets i nto a n international situation, makes c ertain decisions and commitments, and these decisions in turn shape t he goals, or even be­ come the foundation of new goals.

The list of goals we have just considered may be t ied too much to the present. If we were t o s tand back and take a longer look at t he goals, as diplomatic historian Julius Pratt has. done, w e m ight discover a mong the trends in foreign-policy goals some or all of the following (which Pratt enumerates as the American foreign-policy objectivesY: (1) to secure in­ dependence with satisfactory boundaries; (2) to ·extend those boundaries i n the interests of security, navigation and commerce, space for a growing population, and the spread of democracy; (3) to promote and protect t he rights and interests of American citizens in commerce with, and i nves.tments in, foreign. lands; (4) to preserve neutrality a n� p eace; (5) to prevent the powers of Europe from further colonizing in. the Western H emisphere and from interfering i n the affairs of the United S tates and the Amer�cas in general; and (6) at a much higher level of abstract,. to do .good in t he world out of humanitarian desires.2/ Perhaps the best answer is that a full ap­ preciation of American foreign policy commitments· requires e·xa�ination of both the long- and short-range objectives, both the historical sweep a nd the current policies.

y U.S. Department of S tate, Our Foreign Policy, Department of State Publication No. 7542, 1963. y Pratt, op. cit., p. 4.

- so - III. The Machinery of American Foreign Policy: How Commitments are Undertaken. After the discussion of the what and the why of American for­ eign policy commitments, there remains for consideration the how--the process or machinery by which the United States undertakes the commitments we have discussed. Examination of this machinery can best proceed by division into four functional headings: the powers of (1) the President; (2) the State Department and the Diplomatic Machinery; (3) the Congress (chiefly the Senate), and (4) a miscellaneous category of other foreign policymaking or influencing agencies.

A. The President and Foreign Policy Commitments. The foreign policy powers of the American President--drawn partly from the text of the Constitution, and partly from history and experience-­ are varied and impressive. Principally they include the following powers:

1. Nomination of ambassadors, other foreign ministers and en­ voys is up to the President, though nominees must be confirmed by the Senate before they serve. In addition to these important formal appointments, the President can appoint special representatives who do not require Senate con­ firmation--although in fact they may exercise powers almost as significant as those of ambassadors. Such appointments can measurably affect American foreign relations.

2. Direction of military forces falls under the President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces. Formal declaration of war requires congressional action, but the recent experience in Korea, Viet Nam and elsewhere has indicated that the President's de facto control over the military gives him enormous power to commit the United States to combat without direct congressional approval (except in the sense of appropriating the funds necessary to support the troops the President has dispatched). Thus diplomatic historian Thomas A. Bailey observes: "Congress sometimes finds itself compelled to rubber-stamp warlike situa­ tions created by the Executive, who, over the years, has landed troops more than one hundred times on foreign soil without Congressional authorization."!_/

3. Establishment and termination of diplomatic relations is part of the President's power to accord diplomatic recognition to new govern­ ments. Obviously the very act of diplomatic recognition constitutes an im­ portant foreign-policy decision with attendant commitments wherever the new government is controversial; recall, for example, the intense and long-term debate over the diplomatic recognition of the Communist Government of China. President Franklin Roosevelt's recognition of the Russian Soviet Government in 1933, after a delay of sixteen years after the Bolshevik Revolution, re­ flected ·a decision of the utmost diplomatic importance, fraught with implica­ tions for future commitments. Although many acts of diplomatic recognition

!_/ Bailey, op. cit., p. 8.

- 51 - are quite routine and hardly require careful judgment, the basic power is an important one in the executive arsenal. As ·a corollary, the President has the power to sever or terminate diplomatic recognition, as Woodrow Wilson �id in 1917 when he sent the German Ambassador packing by ordering the return of his passports. This step is seldom taken, and ordinarily prefaces a declaration of war.

4. Declaration and explanation of American foreign policy is an important power of the President. Every Chief Executive makes many speeches on foreign policy, answers questions about American policy at press conferences, and the like. While these statements do not involve commitments as such they may lead directly to the making of commitments, or indicate the form which future commitments will take. Since commit­ ments are designed to implement or execute particular policies, the artic­ ulation and formulation of the policies gives the President a powerful voice over the making and shaping of commitments. Thus, concludes one expert, "The Constitution said nothing about the President planning and initiating foreign policies, but it did not exclude him from the field. In the tradition of many generations it is the President who has taken the lead in formulating and carrying out new policies. "Y 5. Direct conduct pf high-level diplomatic negotiations is a part of the presidential foreign relations power in the age of the "summit con­ ference," although without constitutional foundation. During World War II President Roosevelt participated in several such face-to-face negotiations with heads of other states. During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, indeed, about twenty-five heads of foreign governments per year have come to Washington for direct diplomatic discussions with the President; not all these discussions involve vital matters, or result in even informal com­ mitments, but the extent of presidential power exercised through this chan­ nel is considerable and is probably increasing. 6. Indirect influences and negative checks over legislation also give the President certa.in foreign-policy weapons. Al though the major legislative powers concern the treaty-making process (which we shall con­ sider shortly), there are several other presidential functions that are significant: First, the power to veto various legislation affecting for­ eign commitments, such as trade and tariff legislation, immigration bills, and appropriations for various American international operations. Second, the President directly influences legislation by speaking for or against it, publicly or to the Congress, by submitting proposed legislation (in the foreign aid area, for example, the administration strongly influences American economic commitments by the direction and �ontent of its annual proposed aid program). Finally, the President usually consults extensively with congressional leaders before taking major foreign-policy steps. This consultation may even result in informal advance congressional approval, or ratification of executive decisions. For example, following our retali­ atory attacks during the Gulf of Tonkin crises, President Johnson secured y Bertling, op. cit., p. 21.

- 52 - a declaration of congressional approval of "all necessary steps" to repel such attacks and to assist any member of SEATO requesting aid "in defense of its freedom." This was done in August 1964, through a joint resolution. 7. The making of treaties constitutes perhaps the most important formal power of the President over foreign affairs. There is no question that many, perhaps most, treaties constitute or create commitments in the sense we have defined that term. Thus the President's role in the treaty­ making process is important to understand. In order to become effective, a treaty must pass through five stages: (1) negotiation and signing by agents of the governments involved (for example, by the United States Secre­ tary of State and an ambassador of the other country); (2) approval by the legislative branch (that is, in the United States, by a two-thirds majority of the Senate); (3) ratification by the President; (4) exchange of ratifica­ tions by representatives of the participating nations; and (5) proclamation. Although the term is sometimes confused, ratification is not the function of the Senate but of the President; what the Senate does is to approve (or re­ ject, or amend) the treaty. If the Senate approves, then the President may ratify. After the treaty has been approved and ratified by the participating governments, the final step is proclamation (which in the United States is also done by the President), making the treaty effective. Of course, if the Senate attaches to its approval of the treaty conditions which the President finds unacceptable, or if on inquiry they prove unacceptable to the other party or parties, he may then refuse to ratify the treaty and the process will stop there.1/ 8. Negotiation of "executive agreements" may sometimes be em­ ployed by a President. Such agreements have been made without prior ap­ proval of the Congress--although a President will sometimes seek congres­ sional endorsement later. They are not submitted for Senate approval as in the case of a treaty. Shortly before and during World War II, for ex­ ample, President Roosevelt concluded a number of important and controversial executive agreements with heads of other nations. Illustrative were the destroyer-bases agreement of September, 1940, and the agreements with rep­ resentatives of the Danish and Icelandic Governments in Washington by which ·the United States agreed to defend those two nations during the war. At the Yalta conference later in the war, executive agreements were made, which thereafter came under heavy criticism--in part because of their content, but also partly because they were kept secret from the Congress for some time. In all these instances, and others in recent history, the President has not only negotiated directly with other governments, but has actually undertaken commitments with other nations. The question of whether "ex­ ecutive agreements"--without Senate approval or congressional authoriza­ tion--are binding commitments "of the United States" has been the subject of much debate and does not appear to have been settled. For an authori­ tative discussion of this question see "The Constitution of the United States, Analysis and Interpretation," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 433-45.

Y See generally Pratt, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

- 53 - B. The State Department and Foreign Policy Commitments.

The role of the State Department with regard to the making of foreign policy commitments is far less important than that of the Presi­ dent. It is the State Department which is charged with the execution and implementation of many of our commitments, so that it must certainly be included in the survey. The effective power of the Secretary of State depends largely upon the actual degree of delegation entrusted to him by a particular President, and on the extent to which he is included in the President's inner foreign policy councils. Often the secretary will deal directly with representatives of foreign governments as the President's representative, in the negotiation of treaties and other vital and con­ fidential matters.

Below the secretary, there are several undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The assistants have charge of departments or branches organized in terms of subject matter--economic affairs, political affairs, administration, international organization affairs, public affairs, congressional relations, and cultural and educational affairs; and in terms of regions of the world in which the United States has a major interest-­ Europe, Africa, Latin America, Near East and South Asia, and the Far East. In addition, there are other high level officials, in the State Department-­ the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, for example, the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, the Legal Advisor, the Director of Intelligence and Research, and others. These of­ ficers, and their headquarters staffs, complete the roster of the State De­ partment organization in Washington.

State Department personnel represent the United States around the world in numerous capacities. In every nation with which the United States has diplomatic relations, there is either an ambassador or a minister, and a staff drawn from the Foreign Service. The Service today includes something over 9,000 persons. A large embassy requires a sizable staff. The American Embassy in Paris, for example, now has 700 employees (including representa­ tives of twenty-three agencies other than the Foreign Service)--in contrast to the fewer than eighty persons stationed there in 1940.

Although much more could be said about the State Department and the Foreign Service, a brief survey must suffice here. There is vast lit­ erature available for further reading. For the moment it is enough to ob­ serve that the State Department does not usually make foreign policy, ex­ cept in consultation with the President, and therefore does not determine the American commitments throughout the world. An understanding of the State Department is important chiefly because it bears upon the execution and car­ rying out of commitments made by others.

C. Congress and Foreign Policy Commitments. The Congress participates in the making of foreign policy commit­ ments in several important ways:

- 54 - 1. Senate Approval of Treaties. As we have already noted, a formal treaty ( or a convention, which i_s virtually the same thing) re­ quires the approval (or "advice and consent") of two-thirds of the Senate. The Senate may, and occasionally does, reject a treaty--as the Senate re­ fused in 1920 to "advise and consent" to the League of Nations for which President Wilson had worked so hard. When the Senate does refuse to ap­ prove, the only recourse for a President is some less formal device such as the executive agreement. Sometimes the Senate will amend the treaty, or attach conditions to its approval; or it may limit the time period during which the treaty will be effective. In such a case the agreement of the other nation(s) must be obtained before the treaty can be effective. Occasionally, also, the Senate will attach reservations and interpretations to a treaty, which may or may not have to be accepted by the other na­ tion(s) before the treaty becomes binding on the United States, as the Senate determines when it takes its final vote.

2. Legislation or Joint Resolution. Another substitute for the rigorous two-thirds requirement is simple legislation or the passage of a joint resolution of both houses, requiring only a bare majority for pas­ sage. The annexations of Texas and Hawaii, for example, were accomplished through joint resolutions in the face of considerable doubt whether a formal treaty would have passed. Sometimes the Congress will enact such legislation on its own motion. But more often, as in the case of the Foreign Assistance Act which inaugurated the Marshall Plan in 1948, the legislation will be initiated or at least approved and signed by the President.

3. Declaration of War. Although, as we have seen, the President as Commander-in-Chief has initiated certain military engagements without congressional authorization, a formal declaration of war requires action by both houses. Congress is understandably reluctant to take so drastic a s.tep but, as in the days immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, can and will act with great dispatch when it is clear that there is no"al­ ternative to war. After the formal declaration, the conduct of a war gen­ erally requires a number of subsidiary commitments, although the administra­ tion and conduct of the war remain in the White House. 4. Appropriations. Whatever policies the President and the Sec­ retary of State may formulate, few of them can be imple�ented for long with­ out funds. It is the Congress which must provide the funds, usually on an annual basis, even for commitments of long or indefinite duration. There• has been much recent discussion of the proper role of Congress as the pay­ master for foreign relations commitments:

Compelled to seek annual authorizations and ap­ propriations, forced to obligate most of the funds ap­ propriated in a single year, bound by complex limita­ tions placed on the use of funds, many executive offi­ cials feel that the Congress should permit greater flexibility in the administration of foreign policy. Others feel that the executive branch already has

- SS - sufficient freedom. Still others argue that the Congress should control and instruct even more in the future than it has in the past. lJ

5. Investigations. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Viet Nam question in the spring of 1966 underscored the power Congress exercises over foreign relations through the investigative channel. Of course the power to investigate must attach to some other legislative power. But frequently the investigation will go far beyond the immediate needs of a pending bill--as was the_ case when the Viet Nam issue was opened up during discussion of the 1967 foreign aid appropriation. Many committees other than those principally assigned to foreign relations or foreign affairs in­ quire into international commitments--arrned services, immigration, agricul­ ture, commerce, and others are from time to time interested in foreign policy matters. From the investigations of such committees come recommendations that significantly shape the course of international politics. '!:../

D. Other Branches of the Government and Foreign Policy Commitments.

Several other branches or agencies or departments of the United States Government should at least be mentioned at this point, because they either influence or implement foreign policy commitments.

1. United Nations Mission. Under the direction of the Ambassador to the United Nations, who is of Cabinet rank, the American mission conducts important foreign-policy activities. It must act in close liaison with the White House and the State Department, particularly with the Assistant Secre­ tary of State for International Organization Affairs. The American mission includes United States delegates to all those U.N. agencies and affiliates in which the United States participates. The basic foreign-policy commitments, of course, are made in Washington; but a good deal of high-level implementation, and some important foreign-policy statements, take place at the mission in New York. 2. United States Information Agency. A major task, that of inter­ preting American foreign pqlicy to. people in other countrie.s, is entrusted to the U.S. I.A., and its radio-television0 branch, the Voice of America. In addi­ tion to material prepared ft>r:·artd distributed through many media of communica­ tion in dozens of languages,. th.�. Ag�ncy ma:i.ntains a network of libraries in many nations. This branch o.f..-th'e. government, responsible directly to the President, also arranges. -fQ� yarious cultural, educational, and entertainment exchanges with other nations.

3. National Security Council. Coordination of military and diplo­ matic activities is the task of the National Security Council. Its membership consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of

1/ Haviland, op. cit., p. 34.

'!:../ Ibid., pp. 29-31.

- 56 - Defense, and the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Other officials, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, attend as advisers to the Council. The Council is considered a part of the Executive Office of the President, although separately established under a statute passed in 1947. Its purpose is not to make policy recommendations directly, but rather to coordinate policy planning, and "scrutinize departmental proposals and suggest policy alternatives or additions that merit consideration." Y

4. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, created in 1961, represents "the first time in history that a national organization was created for the sole possibility of dimin­ ishing the possibility of war."2/ Headed by a Presidential appointee re­ porting directly to the Secretary of State, the Agency serves as the principal adviser to the President, the State Department and·other executive agencies on a variety of aspects of arms control and disarmament. During its five year history, it has made a number of recommendations in this area.

5. Peace Corps. The Peace Corps, also created in 1961, has become another component of American foreign policy at.the "rice roots" level. Some 15,000 Peace Corps volunteers have served in many countries; about 8,500 are presently in the field. They have worked mainly in the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, ·to promote economic development and lay the base for modern commerce, industry and agriculture. Although, of course, the Peace Corps does not assume or undertake any for­ eign policy commitments, it does constitute a significant part of the implementation because it brings many Americans-into direct contact with citizens in many nations whose good will and confidence are important to the success of American foreign policy.

6. Central Intelligence Agency. Although the declared purpose of the Central Intelligence Agency is to gather information through a net­ work of agents abroad, many people believe that the CIA plays an important formal role in the making of foreign policy. It has been charged, for ex­ ample, that the abortive invasion of the Bay of Pigs in 1962--which can probably be considered a foreign policy commitment--was brought about largely by the work of the CIA in training groups of Cuban refugees. While other decisions had to be made in Washington before the invasion was actually launched, the preliminary work of the CIA may materially have influenced the nature, direction and intensity of the eventual commitment. There have been vigorous debates in Congress over the question of congressional control of the CIA's operations; the premise of these dehates is that the Agency does indeed influence the making and implementation of foreign policy com­ mitments.

Although there are undoubtedly many other agencies and bureaus within the Federal Government that play some part in foreign policy--indeed,

!f Ibid., p. 162. '!:./ Bertling, op. cit., p. 56.

- 57 - virtually every executive department probably does so at some time or other--the survey must stop here. The agencies we have studied here are the principal channels, and bring us back to the proposition with which we began this survey: Most of the foreign policy commitments are made by the President and/or the Congress. In order to prevent actions which may be, inconsistent with American goals and policies, those who are ultimately responsible for the decisions should be able to keep a fairly tight rein on the authority of subordinates to commit the United States. While some incidental obligations may be incurred by officials in the field, the major · commitments are determined and negotiated at the top level. Thus any de­ cisions about substantial reduction of those commitments must concern the deliberative process at the highest level.

IV. Affirmative Strategy: General Considerations and Questions.

After this preliminary survey of the American foreign policy com­ mitments and how they are·made, we conclude the chapter with some observa­ tions on debate strategy. We are not attempting, of course, to outline a debate case for either side, but only to raise some questions that should be considered in the preparation of cases and arguments. We begin by raising some issues that are likely to confront any affirmative team. A. By What Standard� Should American Foreign Policy Be Judged? A necessary first step for any affirmative debater is to consider the criteria by which American foreign policy should be evaluated. Since the affirmative allegation of need for a change--for the reduction of one or more existing commitments--must involve the indictment of some present policy or commitment, the necessary starting point in building a case is to determine what is "good" and what is "bad" about American foreign policy. This is not the place to develop the criteria, beyond suggesting a few approaches. A first source of criteria would be the general statements of American foreign policy goals and objectives found in any standard dip­ lomatic history or foreign relations text, or in testimony and speeches of foreign policy experts and observers who have studied the evolution of Amer­ ican policy. A second approach would be to abstract from speeches and state­ ments made recently by spokesmen for the present United States Government. A third approach would be to compare the American experience with that of other nations--those which are most comparable, like Canada and Britain, perhaps--and to borrow from these other nations a set of criteria for the United States. Finally, any affirmative debater is free to construct his own model of American national interests, from which would flow certain criteria or standards. This approach may be difficult, however, and the process of determining criteria may well withdraw energy from more important tasks. In any case, the formulation or selection of criteria seems an ap­ propriate starting point.

B. What Aspects of American Foreign Policy Warrant Criticism?

Many people have strong views on foreign policy. The liberal observer is inclined to oppose the involvement and war in Viet Nam, or

- 58 - the use of economic aid to support undemocratic governments. The con­ servative observer·, on the other hand, is likely to criticize American involvement in the United Nations and some of its affiliated agencies, or the giving of economic assistance to nations that are non�Hgned, or left­ leaning, in their foreign policies. It should not be d;Lf.ficult, then, to isolate sectors of foreign policy where reduction or alteration of commit­ ments has been proposed. After surveying the whole range of American for­ eign policy, the choice should be made by the affirmative as early as pos­ sible in the planning stages.

C. Is the Policy or the Commitment the Source of the Failure? To return to our definition of terms, you will recall the pro­ posal that commitment should mean "a. specific undertaking in support of a particular policy." The fault in particular areas may lie either with the policy itself, or with the particular commitments undertaken pursuant to the policy. If the fault is with the policy, it would appear that the United States is simply on the wrong track and that no commitments in sup­ port of that policy would work. If, however, it is the commitment that is unsound--for any of several reasons that we shall consider momentarily-­ then the affirmative should carefully consider what other forms of commit­ ment would serve the policy without the attendant disadvantages. This is not to say that in every debate. the affirmative should actually propose alternative commitments--although this may sometimes be appropriate--but only that the affirmative should have thought about alternatives in order to make certain that it has correctly identified the problem;

D. If the Commitment is at Fault, in What Respect? It is here that strategic analysis becomes most critical. If the fault lies with a commitment rather than with the general policy, one of the following formulations should identify the fault:

1. Any commitment at all in a certain area might be un- sound. That is, although the policy of �iding developing nations may be sound, any aid to this particular nation or region, in any form, is incon­ sistent with the best interests of American foreign policy. Consider an example: Although the policy of aiding the country of Xis sound in gen­ eral, and although the people of that nation need American aid and support, we are injuring American interests by aiding the nation so long as General Z is the president. No commitments of any kind should be made to that na­ tion until the gov_ernment changes.

2. While some commitment may be sound, the present form or channel is unsound. It may be, for example, that giving aid to Country X is appropriate both for the United States and for X. But by giving aid directly, on a bilateral basis, we may risk creating tensions with X's neighbor nation Y, or we enter an aid race with Communist nations, or we make it more difficult for General Z to bring about needed domestic re­ forms. Such effects are due not to the mere existence of an American

- 59 - commitment, but only to the structure or form of the commitment--the fact that the assistance is bilateral--and might be remedied by changing the structure, that is by channeling the same amount of aid through some in­ ternational organization, or even by removing some of the conditions which bilateral aid presently carries.

3. The structure of the commitment is sound, but the extent of the commitment is too great. There is an important logical difference be­ tween saying that the commitment is unsound in principle or in form, and saying only that the commitment is of an excessive degree. It may be, for example, that Country X needs and should receive some American economic aid. But it might be shown that the extent of our aid makes the country excessively dependent on the United States and thus postpones or discour­ ages self-help measures that will eventually bring economic independence. Or it may be that excessive American support prevents Country X from turning to other nations that dispense aid, thus making X an American "satellite," or creating unfavorable tensions between X and the United States, preventing the sharing among industrial nations of the costs of X's economic development. There are various arguments, therefore, which go not to the fact, or the structure, but only to the degree or extent of the commitment-.�-

4. The commitment is detrimental only because it diverts Amer­ ican attention or resources from more important problems. Finally, there may be nothing intrinsically wrong with the particular commitment; that is, it becomes a cause for criticism only when judged in context of the whole American foreign policy spectrum. Recently, for example, one re­ porter observed that "a growing number of people [in Washington], both in and out of government, feel Viet Nam is pushing American foreign policy out of balance. They do not question that the war requires immense atten­ tion. But, they say, Washington's fierce pre-occupation with it tends to leave little time and only perfunctory attention for other important issues around the world." 1/ What may be said of American involvement in Viet Nam, even by those who vigorously support the American commitment there in the abstract,suggests a possible line of argument: the commitment is objection­ able not s9 much because of what it does to American interests in the coun­ try or region to which the commitment runs, but rather because of what it prevents, or discourages the United States from doing in other parts of the world, or with other types of programs. An excessive commitment to military aid may, for example, prevent the expansion of technical assis­ tance and development loan programs that in the long run would better serve American interests--though not because there is anything intrinsi­ cally objectionable about military aid.

E. How Would A Change in the Particular Commitment Affect the Whole System of American Foreign Policy? It should be obvious that a reduction in one commitment may have significant repercussions for other aspects of American foreign policy. !f Christian Science Monitor, August 10, 1966, p. 1, col. 5.

- 60 - Thus, in drafting a plan, the affirmative must keep looking at the system as a whole, rather than focusing only on the segment where the reduction is advocated. For example, it may be that objections to substantial reduc­ tions in military aid or commitments to certain nations or regions could be largely offset by increased economic assistance. Unless economy is one of the grounds for the proposed change, there is no reason why such a com­ pensatory adjustment in some other part of the system should not be con­ sidered.

F. What Additional Benefits May Follow From the Proposed Reductions?

In addition to the grounds on which particular commitments are indicted, and their reduction urged, there may be additional advantages which an affirmat1ve could profitably consider. For example, the argu­ ments in favor of curtailing a particular program may derive primarily from diplomatic or military tensions. But the reduction, if effected, might either produce savings for the government, or free funds and per­ sonnel for other programs that might better serve American interests.

G. Are the Proposed Reductions Within the Spirit of the Resolution?

Earlier in this chapter, in discussing the various definitions of "substantially reduced," we posed several plausible approaches which probably would not meet the spirit of the resolution, even if they could be brought within its terms. These included the de minimis case, involving a reduction so slight, or affecting a program so insig'nificantly, that it simply is not worth the time and energy to debate seriously about it. Also of doubtful validity were the "transfer" cases, which would simply perpetuate existing programs under different labels, or slightly different arrangements, but without altering the basic scope of commitments. Propositions which more closely comport with the spirit of the resolution would include: (1) abolition of all commitments; (2) elimina­ tion of certain structural or formal obligations to which the United States is presently committed; (3) substantial reduction of the extent or degree of American support,of, existing channels of commitment; (4) the gradual phasing out of existing major commitments (on the assumption that the reso­ lution does not demand immediate substantial reductions, so long as some­ thing is begun now); and (5) the abandonment of certain foreign policies, presumably causing the termination of commitments in support of those policies. Any of these approaches, and perhaps others, seem to meet the resolution, in that they involve substantial reductions.

V. Negative Strategy: General Considerations and Questions.

The breadth and open-endedness of this resolution appear to per­ mit the negative little advance planning. Because the affirmative can delve into any of numerous areas and find foreign policy commitments of �hich t�e negative may not even be aware--much less be prepared to defend in deta1l--the task of the negative may seem limitless and onerous. With

- 61 - this problem in mind, it may nevertheless be possible for the negative to take certain steps to prepare for, or protect against, the wholly un­ foreseen affirmative_plan. In this concluding section we shall suggest several of those approaches. A. Substantial Reduction of Certain Commitments Might Affect the ·Value and Credibility of American Commitments Generally. The effect which reduction of one commitment would have upon the reliability of American commitments generally would depend, of course, on the corisequences of the reduction, and the way in which the reduction was carried out. Yet, it might be argued generally that a sweeping reduction or withdrawal, or one carried out with insufficient warning or preparation, or provision for alternatives, would make other nations wary of trusting American commitments quite as fully in the future. B. Substantial Reduction Might Cause Retaliation by Other Nations� Foreign policy is not physics, and it cannot be said that there is an equal and opposite reaction for every action. But the history of diplomacy indicates that when one country withdraws from one agreement, another country directly affected by that withdrawal may pull out of some­ thing else-. The net effect of the retaliatory reduction or withdrawal by the foreign nation may, in fact, turn out to outweigh the benefits antici­ pated from the original reduction. C. Substantial· Reduction Might Upset the Delicate Balance of Inter­ national Relations or Introduce Serious Inconsistencies. This point is more difficult to formulate, but it rests on the notion that international relations involves an intricate and delicate balance or network of commitments, which might easily be upset by rather minor changes. Of course some such risks could be alleviated by the sub­ stitution of other commitments in place of the old ones. But then the benefits of the original redli-ction would be somewhat less likely to re-. sult. Here again the foreign policy system must be judged as a whole. D. Substantial Reduction Might Create A Vacuum Into Which Communist Power Could Move. As recent experiences in Southeast Asia and elsewhere have shown, there is always a danger in withdrawing American influence or support· from a particular nation or region--that Communist influence or support may be quickly substituted. Even though the arguments in favor.of American with­ drawal or reduction of commitments may be persuasive by themselves, the final decision cannot be made intelligently without considering the pos­ sible danger of creating·such a diplomatic or power vacuum. 1/

See generally Merle Fainsod ., "The Future of the Communist Bloc and , American Foreign Policy," World Pressures on American Foreign Policy Irish,_ op.· cit., pp-. 79-98.

- 62 - E. Substantial Reduction Might Have Adverse Effects on the American Economy.

If the United States suddenly withdrew all its major military commitments, or terminated the foreign aid program, the effects on the American economy might well be disastrous. Even though the government could save substantial sums in the long run by such reductions, the econ­ omy is sufficiently dependent on them that major reductions should be carried out in careful coordination with domestic economic policy to pre­ vent severe repercussions. Thus the negative would do well to consider the economic implications of any affirmative proposals of large-scale reductions. F. Defense of American Foreign Policy Commitments in the Three Major Areas of Controversy.

While the resolution affords the affi.rmative a vast range of choices, the negative can be fairly certain that most debates will deal in some way with the three most significant areas of American foreign policy commitments: (1) bilateral and regional military pacts; (2) the United Nations and its affiliates; and (3) the economic aid program and other economic commitments. Thus every negative should at least prepare to defend these commitments, or to present alternatives ("repairs") which would meet the major criticisms. Since each of these three commitment­ areas will be the subject of a complete chapter later in this analysis, nothing need be said here about the development of the arguments. The point to be made here is only that any negative can anticipate the affirm­ ative strategy to some extent, even without knowing which of the three major areas (if any) a given affirmative will attack.

G. Defense of Minor American Foreign Policy Commitments.

What will undoubtedly concern many negatives is the "trick" affirmative case. What can be done, for example, to anticipate affirma­ tive proposals to reduce or eliminate American commitments to one or more of the following: the international copyright convention (Berne Conven­ tion); the Warsaw convention limiting recovery of damages resulting from the crash of overseas airliners; the various extradition treaties by which the United States promises to surrender fugitives from foreign justice (with certain exceptions); the internati.onal. atomic energy agree­ ments; the foreign tax treaties designed"to.avoid·or minimize double tax­ ation of income from foreign sources; the p<}stal · money' ·order convention; and dozens of others. No doubt some significa,nt.need can be shown for the reduction of American commitments along some or all of these lines, and certain benefits might result from withdrawal or termination of the commitment. Obviously no negative can be well prepared to defend all these commitments. What then should the negative do in anticipation of such far-ranging affirmative proposals?

Perhaps the soundest approach would be to work with several such minor commitments as models of negative strategy. This would in­ volve several steps: (1) an overview of negative strategy, including a

- 63 - statement of basic negative position regarding the general goals and ob� jectives of American foreign policy, and an argument that particular com­ mitments cannot be judged in isolation from the system or network of which they are a part; (2) a consideration of whether the agreements or conven­ tions considered are really "foreign policy commitments" at all--either because they do not really involve "commitments" for the United'States or because--as seems likely with respect to some of the items.fisted above-­ they are not really part of the United States "foreign policy," even though they do incidentally involve agreements with other nations; (3) consideration whether the proposal would involve a reduction at all, or only a transfer or shift in emphasis (because, for example, the reduction of one commitment would only increase the need to negotiate directly with one or more foreign governments on an ad hoc basis every time the question came up); and finally, (4) even if the proposal does involve a reduction of a commitment, whether that reduction is "substantial" within the spirit of the resolution--that is, whether the change proposed is really important enough to bother debating about.

Thus it should be possible for every negative to work o�t well in advance a rough formula by which to apply these basic questions· to al­ most any affirmative proposal, however novel. Thus, although no negative can possibly be prepared to debate in detail the merits of.every commit­ ment an affirmative might bring up, it can at least avoid the worst con­ sequences of being caught by surprise. And despite the theoretical possi­ bilities of the "trick" affirmative case, it seems likely that most debates will concern one or more of the major foreign policy areas, for it is there that public debate centers today.

- 64 - DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Of what operational and logical significance is the distinc­ tion between "foreign policy" and "foreign policies"?

2. What various approaches are available to identify the for­ eign policy components of a particular nation at a particular time? To what extent do the foreign policy commitments which the nation undertakes provide insights into its foreign policy or policies?

3. How important is it to define "commitments" in a way that has special and generally understood meaning for the current debate res­ olution? Why is it misleading to say, as is commonly said, "the United States is committed to a policy of deterring communism"? How should the statement be phrased so as to permit the use of the term "commitment" in an operational sense? 4. Consider the vast range of treaties which the United States now has with other nations and groups of nations, covering a multitude of subjects. Does each of these treaties involve a "foreign policy commit­ ment"? What criteria could be adopted to help the negative differentiate between those treaties which clearly do impose foreign policy commitments, and those which probably do not, even though they involve international agreements?

5. Would an alteration of the structural or formal aspects of an American commitment involve a "substantial reduction" within the mean­ ing and intent of the resolution? How can the substantiality of the struc­ tural change be determined--as it must be in order to focus the debate on the central terms? 6. Under what circumstances, if any, might a transfer of American c�mmitment from one channel to another--for example, the changing of the channels of foreign aid--constitute a "substantial reduction" in the commitment?

7. Would a "phasing out" case which urged the eventual, but not immediate, substantial reduction of particular American commitments comply with the resolution? Should the eventual reduction in such a case have to be more "substantial" than one which is to be effected immediately? 8. In what sense could the shortening of the duration of a com­ mitment be said to constitute a substantial reduction of the commitment? What application would this approach have to a commitment which has been undertaken without limit of time?

- 65 - 9. In what ways have the United States Constitution, and the durability of the American form of government, determined or influenced the formation of United States foreign policy commitments? In what sit­ uations has the United States actually assumed specific commitments for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad? 10. To what extent does the presence of large ethnic and na­ tional groups in the American population influence foreign policymaking? How realistic is it to assume that the American people, as a whole or through pressure groups, actually determine foreign policy? (In consid­ ering this question, reflect upon the difficulty of bringing direct pop­ ular pressure to bear to alter a commitment which even a majority of the people may dislik.e.)

11. What judgment should be made of particular American foreign policy commitments--of which the military operations in South Viet Nam may be an example--which reflect and promote some of the stated objectives of American policy, but appear to frustrate or reject certain other stated goals? Do such commitments indicate that the goals are necessarily in­ compatible, or that �he government is working at cross purposes? 12. To what extent does the President's power of diplomatic recognition actually empower him to make diplomatic commitments? What additional significance is there to the fact that the President can (and occasionally does) sever or terminate diplomatic relations by withdrawing recognition? 13. In what sense does the President influence or determine the nature and scope of foreign policy commitments simply as spokesman for the administration in the foreign policy area? When the President and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee make contradictory state­ ments about American policy, which (if either) of the two is actually stat­ ing American foreign policy?

14. Is it accurate to say that the use of such devices as the executive agreement and the joint resolution to circumvent the two-thirds requirement on formal treaties is "unconstitutional"? What validity should be given to an executive agreement or a joint resolution as a source of international commitments? Should they be given the same weight and dig­ nity as formal treaties? 15. How can Congress make or affect foreign policy commitments through the exercise 9f its power of legislative investigation?

16. The military branches of the United States Government, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are not usually considered among makers of for­ eign policy commitments; should they be so considered? In what sense do the military organs of government determine foreign policy?

- 66 - 17. Why does the affirmative debater have an obligation to offer or at least develop criteria by which American foreign policy may be eval­ uated? From what sources can reliable and objective criteria be culled? How can the validity of such criteria be determined to the satisfaction of both sides?

18. Why should the affirmative pinpoint the particular respect in which a commitment is at fault? Can it not be said that if an affirma­ tive debater simply indicts a commitment on general grounds, and fails to point out the particular nature of its shortcoming, he has failed to make out a case for a change?

19. Is it possible for negative debaters to formulate any general disadvantages or objections which would apply to many (if not all) affirma­ tive cases? Or is it impossible for the negative to do anything but sit and await the development of the particular affirmative contentions in each de­ bate?

20. What should the negative prepare to do with an affirmative case which proposes American abolition of or withdrawal from several rather insignificant commitments? How, in other words, can the negative force the affirmative to stay within the spirit of the resolution by proposing only substantial reductions in existing commitments?

- 67 - BIBLIOGRAPHY

Almond, Gabriel. The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. American Assembly. The Secretary of State. (ed. by Don K. Price). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960.

Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. Seventh edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964.

Bemis, Samuel F. A Diplomatic History of the United States. Fifth edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

Bertling, Andrew H. Foreign Affairs and You. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962.

Bertling, Andrew H. The Making of Foreign Policy. Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 1966.

Bloomfield, Lin·coln P. The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960.

Cleveland, Harlan (ed.). The Promise of World Tensions. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961.

Elder, R.E. The Policy Machine: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1960.

Frankel, J. The Making of Foreign Policy. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Haviland, H. Field, et al. The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1960. Johnson, Edgar A. (ed.) The Dimensions of Diplomacy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964. Leopold, Richard W. The Growth of American Foreign Policy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Lerche, C.O., Jr., and Said, A.A. Concepts of International Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963.

London, Kurt. The Making of Foreign Policy. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1965. Mason, Edward S. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

- 68 - Mccamy, James L. Conduct of the New Diplomacy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Montgomery, John D. The Politics of Foreign Aid. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Perkins, Dexter. The American Approach to Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Harvard lmiversity Press, 1962. Pratt, Julius W. A History of lmited States Foreign Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964. Plischke, E. Conduct of American Diplomacy. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1963. Rostow, Walt W. View From the Seventh Floor. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Rusk, Dean. The Winds of Freedom. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. Seabury, Paul. Power, Freedom and Diplomacy. New York: Random House, 1963. Snyder, Richard, et al. (eds.) Foreign Policy Decision-Making. New York: Free Press, 1962. Sorensen, Theodore C. Decision Making in the White House. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Wanamaker, Temple. American Foreign Policy Today. New York: Bantam Books, 1964. Wriston, Henry M. Diplomacy in a Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.

- 69 - CHAPTER III

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES REDUCE ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS?

Introductory Essay

At least since 1945, one of the principal sets of American foreign policy commitments involve the international organizations to which we belong. Chiefly these commitments run to the United Nations and its affiliated spe­ cialized agencies. (Another set of commitments to multinational organizations, the regional military alliances, will be considered separately in Chapter V.) There has been considerable discussion in recent years about the wisdom of maintaining the present levels and directions of American support of the U.N. and its affiliates. The demand for complete withdrawal is seldom heard today as it was in the early 19SO's; today the pressures and the solutions are somewhat subtler, but nonetheless basic to American foreign policy planning. In this chapter we shall begin by examining briefly the nature and extent of the American commitment. Consideration will then be given to the various ways in which the United States might substantially reduce its commitments within the meaning of the resolution. The balance of the-chapter will discuss the areas in which controversy about the U.N. has developed: the ability of the organization to maintain world peace; the problem of financing and dis­ tributing among member nations the costs of U.N. operations; other problems created by a burgeoning membership; problems of structure and organization, including the veto power; and special problems arising from the presence at the U.N. of the Soviet Union and several of its satellite nations.

I. United States Participation in the United Nations and Its Affiliates.

The United Nations is a vast and complex agency. Although the heart of the organization is the General Assembly, in which all member nations debate and vote, that branch is only the top of an extensive and variegated structure. At the top level, of course, there is the Security Council and the International Court of Justice which form with the General Assembly, a tripartite array of powers. Subordinate to the General Assembly are a vari­ ety of branches, functional and regional commissions and specialized agencies which carry out the mandate of the General Assembly. Some of these are responsible directly to the General Assembly; others are responsible in­ directly through the Secretariat (the Office of the Secretary General); or through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which is the U.N.'s coordinating agency for a host of developmental, educational, scientific, cultural, relief, and other functions. The United Nations system, in other words comprises a vast network of organizations and institutions which are related in ways that can best be perceived in graphic form (see Chart I) . .!_/

.!_/ See generally Sydney D. Bailey, The United Nations: A Short Political Guide (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 11-21.

- 70 - Chart I

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

IIAICOJJc llllUIIATIOlu.l otui:s COMMODITY TIAOl

{CICT)

" EOUCATK!Ul lllTUIIATIOIIU SCIElfllfJC U.101 ... Ol;AIIIZATIOII ---- DIUCTIEUTIOISHIP CULTURAL Glr.AIIIZATIOII -- -- IIIDllECTIEUTIOIISKIP lt1MUCOJ - - - - - Ill.UCO 1Y AUEOIEIIT

Source: U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1964 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1966), p. 355. From the beginning, the United States has played a critical role in most branches and agencies of the United Nations. In addition to holding a permanent seat on the Security Council, the U.S. has been represented on the other top-level branches of the organization, including the Trusteeship Council, ECOSOC, and the World Court. The United States has had representa­ tives or delegates on most of the other branches and agencies during the twenty-one years of the U.N.•s history.!f Another measure of United States support and involvement in the United Nations is the financial one; American financial support has been substantial and persistent. For fiscal 1965, for example, the United States bore 31.9 percent of the total cost of the entire United Nations operations. The extent of our support of the specialized agencies ranged from the 4.30 percent which we contributed to the work of the Universal Postal Union to the 32.02 percent which we gave to the Food and Agricultural Organization. American contributions to the peacekeeping work of the U.N. Emergency Force amounted to about one-third also--$6.5 million of a total fund of $17.7 million.2/ In monetary terms, then, there can be little doubt about the substantiality of the American commitments, either from the point of view of the United States or of the 120-odd members of the _United Nations, or of its agencies.

It may be appropriate at this point to ask why the United States maintains such a high level of support. Although particular reasons for continued membership and support will be considered later in the chapter, a few general justifications may be in order here. The official position of the State Department is that the U.N. serves American national interests, and foreign policy goals, in three distinct ways: As a place for debate about world questions, and a channel of access to representatives from many other nations; as a place for negotiation, providing maximum opportunity for settlement of pressing international problems; and as a place for action, in the political and peacekeeping fields as well as the areas of economic and social development and assistance to developing nations.3/ Two political scholars have recently outlined another approach ·to United Nations membership and its rationale, starting with the premise that there is no better way to serve the vital functions which the U.N. does serve:

••. every nation which is threatened by nuclear destruction has a vital interest in maintaining an organization which is strong enough to help control that threat. The U.S., therefore, could hard.ly take the initiative in destroying the U.N. unless it had something to put in its place. As we do not, our political and psychological investment is still worth y U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1964 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1966), pp. 295-345.

2/ Ibid., pp. 287-88. 3/ You and the United Nations (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1962), pp. 10-12.

- 72 - protecting ....In a world that tends to be organized more and more along supra-national lines the U.N. can serve as an arbiter and adjuster.!/

Ffnally, an introductory word should be said about the mechanics of U.S. participation in the U.N., because this liaison, like the organiza­ tion itself, is complex. The central coordinating channel is the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization. He handles official relations with the U.S. representative to the United Nations, the head of the United Nations mission (which includes the representatives and delegates to the other branches and agencies in which we participate). Of course there is a good deal of direct communication between the President, the Secretary of State and the U.N. representative, for the latter now enjoys cabinet rank and is obviously a major participant in American foreign policy­ making. The task of coordinating United States policy in these many agencies and branches is inevitably formidable, and is made the more so by the impor­ tance of protocol and formality at the U.N. Thus the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in the State Department serves several distinct functions for the American representatives and the making of U.N. policy: (1) it coordinates the policy views and technical requirements originating in other parts of the State Department, to make certain that U.S. representatives are stating consistent and unified American positions; (2) it develops United States policy on questions that are peculiarly multilateral in nature, which cut across the bilateral functions of other branches of the State Department (particularly the regional desks)--and which no other �ffice handles; and (3) it assembles in one unit the knowledge and experience of the United States in the field of multilateral diplomacy so that the gov­ ernment can most efficiently prepare itself to uphold its interests in international organizations.�

II. Policy Alternatives for the United States: In What Ways Could American Participation in the U.N. oe "Substantially Reduced"?

A necessary part of preparing to debate this aspect of the resolu­ tion is to consider the policy alternatives theoretically open to the United States. The affirmative team must presumably do more than simply indict American commitments to international organizations and urge their substantial reduction; there should be some specific identification of the degree and direction which the reduction should take. Several approaches might be fea­ sible:

1/ Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 98. 2/ Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Look At The National Interest (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960), pp. 255-67.

- 73 - A. Complete Withdrawal From the United Nations and Affiliates.

Fifteen years ago there was serious advocacy of complete American disengagement from international organizations. However, a survey of cur­ rent literature does not indicate that this is a substantial issue today. Nevertheless, complete withdrawal is within the scope of the resolution. B. Withdrawal From Particular Agencies or Branches. An affirmative might well propose that the United States should continue to support the United Nations in principle, and participate in the General Assembly and the Security Council, but withdraw from certain special­ ized agencies or other branches--either because such participation is politi­ cally unwise, or too costly, or for some other reason. This is essentially the Soviet position; the U.S.S.R. and its satellites have participated rather actively in the core institutions of the United Nations system, but have remained generally aloof from the specialized agencies concerned with economic assistance and development, preferring to carry out such activities on a bilateral basis. .!_/

C. Reduction of the Extent of American Support Of and Participation In All United Nations Activities.

Without withdrawing from any particular agencies or branches, the United States might comply with the spirit of the resolution by substantially reducing its level of support of all� or most, of the U.N. programs in which it currently participates. This might be difficult, of course, because to some extent financial support is regulated by international agreement. But the United States has been generous beyond its strict conunitments, and there are other forms of support which are not fixed in this manner but are more flexible. In any event; the resolution would seem to invite consider­ ation of such a reduction of support across the board. D. Attachment of Conditions to Continued United States Participation. It may be possible for the United States effectively to reduce its conunitment to international organizations not by direct withdrawal or reduc­ tion of support, but rather by the attachment of conditions that make contin­ ued American participation more difficult. This is essentially what the United States has done with regard to the International Court of Justice: The Connally Amendment, which accompanied the Senate's ratification of Amer­ ican membership in the World Court, reserved to the United States the power to determine whether a dispute is a "domestic" American matter, and thus beyond the Court's competence. While there would be serious policy

1J Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 83.

- 74 - questions about any extension of the Connally Amendment approach to other forms of American participation,!/ such a formula affords at least another alternative for the affirmative.-

In concluding this survey of alt�rnatives, a word should be said about the meaning of "substantially" in the resolution. Are there some specialized agencies from which the United States could ,withdraw without making a substantial reduction of foreign policy commitments? It can be argued that the debate should be confined to the major American commitments to the United Nations--the basic support of the organization through the General Assembly and the Security Council, and the principal (and contro­ versial) specialized agencies.

III. The Peacekeeping Function of the United Nations.

There has been much uncertainty about the effectiveness of the United Nations as a keeper of world peace. Surely the maintenance of peace was one of the paramount purposes of the organization; it is the very first objective listed in article 1 of the Charter. But the achievements have been controversial and spotty. In announcing his decision not to serve another term as Secretary General, U Thant declared that in the peacekeeping area, "the promise held out by the demonstrated usefulness and success of our exten­ sive operations in recent years has remained unfulfilled because of the con­ tinuing failure to agree on basic principles."2/ One close observer notes that "the inability of the world's majority to-vote peace-keeping measures on a basis of collective responsibility seems a tragic setback for the world organization" in the eyes of many critics.3/ The failure to keep the peace throughout the world is, notes a former AssI"stant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, "one of the most popular" criticisms of the United Nations--but he adds that it is also one of "the least substan.,.. tial."4/ Thus the issue is joined. In this section we shall briefly explore several facets of the problem: first, the applicable Charter provisions and the peacekeeping machinery; second, the essentials of the United Nations record for keeping the peace; and third, some proposals for changes and improvements in the machinery.

Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 243.

The New York Times, September 2, 1966, p. 2, col. 5. John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers: United States-Soviet Interaction at the United Nations (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 179�

� Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 28.

- 75 - A. The Charter and the Machinery.

Since the paramount purpose of the United Nations is to keep the peace, it is not surprising that many sections of the Charter implement that goal. Chapter VI of the· Charter deals with "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" and Chapter VII with "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Chapter VI is concerned with the pro­ cedure by which international disputes of an essentially political nature (as distinguished from those which are cognizable by the World Court) can be brought before the General Assembly or the Security Council--even by a non­ member nation--or by which the Security Council may investigate any such dis­ pute on its own motion. The Council may, after investigation, recommend "ap­ propriate procedures or methods of adjustment"; or if the Council determines that the continuation of the dispute endangers world peace, it may recommend terms of settlement to the parties. The machinery seeks to leave as much of the negotiation and settlement as possible to the parties themselves, but does provide for the participation of the international organization if the parties fail on their own.

The other major chapter of the Charter that is relevant here, Chapter VII, deals with threats to or breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. When such an emergency comes to the attention of the Security Council, the first recourse is to measures short of armed force--such as complete or partial interruption of economic relations, transportation, and the severance of diplomatic relations by member nations. If these measures fail to bring peace, then article 42 empowers the Security Council to take more drastic measures including deployment of air, sea, and land forces "as may be neces- sary to maintain or restore international peace and security." To enable the organization to carry out such operations, article 43 obligates all member nations to make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance, and facilities, "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements." Such agreements are to cover the details of the forces needed, and "shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council" with the member nations from which assistance is sought. The bal- ance of Chapter VII provides in some detail for the command of the forces (through the Military Staff Committee) and other aspects of the machinery for obtaining and mobilizing such forces. The chapter concludes by guaran- teeing to every member nation the right to use defensive measures in self- defense even before the United Nations and the Security Council have acted with regard to the dispute. The forces prescribed were never organized, how- ever, and the Military Staff Committee has been ineffectual.

In summary, then, "peace-keeping by the United Nations involves three different kinds of action: efforts to remove the causes of conflict (prevention); attempts to settle by peaceful means those disputes which are not prevented and which endanger world peace (peaceful settlement); and coercive measures in the event of an immediate threat to peace or act of aggression (enforcerilent)."l/

Sydney D. Bailey, op. cit., p. 53. (This book contains a succinct account of the several peacekeeping functions of the U.N. in Chapter IV,)

- 76 - B. The Record of Peacekeeping.

Entire books have been written about the performance of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in such troublespots as Korea, the Suez, and the Congo.!/ In addition to these major encounters, the United Nations has played or sought to play a peacekeeping role in many lesser conflicts. Fre­ quently the intervention has been successful, at least in the sense that peace was ultimately brought about or restored. In Korea, for example, the United Nations forces which were authorized and sent in in 1952 eventually did bring about negotiation of an armistice; the line negotiated at that time has been maintained by a U.N. force 'stationed in that area. In the Middle East, a number of troublesome clashes between the Arab nations and Israel have been checked or mitigated by the presence of a United Nations Emergency Force. Other important United Nations peacekeeping involvements have been in Kashmir, Korea, the Suez, and the Congo. A very brief description of these encounters and the role of the United Nations may set the stage for analysis.

1. Kashmir. In 1946, India and Pakistan came to blows over a largely religious dispute with political implications in the border region of Kashmir. The Security Council investigated the dispute and made various recom­ mendations designed to bring about peace. A cease-fire verified by a multi­ national U.N. force went into effect in 1949 pursuant to those suggestions, but the proposals for a truce or plebiscite were not carried out by the parties. India has persistently refused to allow a vote on the question of Kashmir's future, and there the matter rests. A request for withdrawal of the U.N. troops was not accepted by the Security Council because of continued uncertainty.

2. Korea. When North Korean troops invaded South Korea in 1950, the United Nations was presented with an entirely different sort of challenge. The problem of reunification of Korea through free elections had been turned over to the U.N. in 1947, but the country remained divided; it was already a matter of U.N. concern at the time of the invasion. When the Soviet Union was absent (and thus unable to exercise its veto), the Security Council passed a series of resolutions declaring that North Korea had committed acts of aggression, calling for a withdrawal of her forces, and requesting assistance of U.N. member nations to repel the attack. This was really a recommendation that members contribute peacekeeping forces on an ad hoc basis, rather than a united great-power peacekeeping mission. But the Korean action was nonetheless "the first use of collective measures againt a breach of the peace" which "amounted to a major diplomatic breakthrough in the attempt to discourage open aggression."Y Although the United States and South Korea bore the major

Y See, e.g., Thomas· M. Franckand John Carey, The Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1963). Fred Greene, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: Holt, Y Rinehart and Winston, 19 64), p. 535.

- 77 - share of the responsibilities, fifteen other nations furnished troops and forty-five nations made some form of contribution. The role of the United Nations was broadened after the large-scale intervention of the Chinese Communists in 1950; but this was made possible by General Assembly resolu­ tions already adopted. When· the Security Council became deadlocked over authorization for further measures, the General Assembly was able to take over the lead, in approving further resolutions condemning the Chinese as aggressors and imposing an arms embargo. No sanctions were imposed, how­ ever (even though under the Charter they could have been) because many mem­ bers believed such action would only escalate the conflict, and might even risk global war. Two observers have concluded of the Korean experience and the U.N. role:

..• The U.N. assumed a key role, therefore, in limiting military action by its executive agent, the U.S. The truce of 1953 stopped the fighting and returned Korea to the approximate status quo ante; the U.N. has since been frustrated by the North Koreans in its efforts to carry out its resolutions to unify Korea by peaceful means,.!/

3. Suez. The Suez crisis of 1956 differed from the foregoing cases in that two of the permanent members of the Security Council--Great Britain and France--were charged with having committed aggression. They believed that their vital national interests were threatened when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal; they held off pending United Nations action until Israel came to open war with Egypt, at which point Great Britain and France launched their own invasion of the region. The exercise of British and French vetoes prevented the Security Council from forcing Israel to withdraw, and the matter passed into the hands of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The General Assembly soon passed an American-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces. Then a major breakthrough occurred when Canada urged the adop­ tion of a resolution empowering the Secretary General to prepare a plan for a United Nations Emergency Force. This proposal succeeded largely because Great Britain and France agreed to stop fighting if the U.N. force would undertake to keep the peace between Israel and Egypt. Egypt then agreed to the entry of United Nations troops on its soil, and the British and French troops were withdrawn; but Israel has never permitted any units of the Emergency Force on its soil, and refused to evacuate the Sinai Penin­ sula until March, 1957. Since that time a United Nations force has re­ mained on patrol on the Egyptian side of the border with Israel. 4. The Congo. Events in the Congo have been so complex and in­ volved that it may be appropriate to borrow an account from a reliable secondary work. One such account follows:

.!/ Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 29.

- 78 - The 1960 Congo crisis posed new major peace- keeping problems for the U.N. Belgium suddenly gave the Congo its freedom in July 1960, and the resultant con­ fusion and lack of established authority led to the col­ lapse of public discipline and open conflict between two rival authorities for control of the government. Belgian military forces which were still in the Congo were used to protect the white inhabitants, and the Government of the Congo asked for U.N. assistance to halt 'Belgian aggres­ sion.' The Secretary-General took the initiative and called a meeting of the Security Council. A resolution sponsored by Tunisia calling for the dispatch of a U.N. force to the area was passed, and its implementation left largely in the hands of Mr. Hammarskjold. A force was quickly assembled which did not contain any elements from the large powers. The Secretary-General was principally concerned with the restoration of internal order as soon as possible in order to avoid any great-power intervention in the dispute. The situation deteriorated when the Katanga region refused entry to the U.N. forces, and the U.N. refused to fight its way in. The Security Council requested the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops, and this was accomplished as a U.N. force of 15,000 to 20,000--composed mostly of African contingents--entered the Congo.

Internal political developments made the job of the U.N. more difficult when Patrice Lumumba, then head of the Congo Government, made arrangements to receive Soviet aid. A coup unseated Lumumba, and his Soviet advisers were ousted from the country. Each major political and mil- itary development in the Congo was followed by increased U.N. involvement in the crisis, eventually going far be- yond the initial intention of restoring law and order to include the maintenance of public services and assistance to the government in fulfilling its administrative tasks. The Secretary-General's job was made more difficult be- cause of the vacillations of the contributing powers, many of which took sides with the contending Congolese factions. The major factor which held the operation together was Hammarskjold's repeated warnings that unless the U.N. handled this problem satisfactorily, the Congo, and thus Africa, would be turned into a major center of struggle in the cold war.

The Security Council finally approved a resolution which empowered the Secretary-General not only to clear the Congo of the foreign mercenaries in the pay of the seces­ sionists but also to end the disorder by fighting back if necessary. This stronger U.N. action was made possible be­ cause of Lumumba's murder, which brought home to the more

- 79 - timid members of the U.N. the necessity for strong decisive action. U.N. forces moved into Katanga and some fighting ensued between the local forces and the U.N. contingent. It was during an attempt to investigate the Katanga situation that Dag Hammarskjold was killed in an airplane crash. The Acting Secretary­ General, U Thant, was given even greater power to re­ solve the problem and restore order when he was author­ ized to use force not just in self-defense or to pre­ vent civil war but to maintain the territorial integ­ rity and independence of the Congo and to help its gov­ ernment restore law and order. It was not .until January 1963, that the threat of Katanga secession was dissipated as a result of U.N. military action against the rebel strongholds ..!f

In these four instances, then, the United Nations did succeed or at least help to bring about peace. In each of them it can be argued that peace would not have come as soon without the participation of the inter­ na!ional organization, or without the exercise of its articular peace­ keeping machinery. It has been said that the U.N. cannot be blamed because the peace was broken. in the first place, or for the conditions that cre­ ated world tensions; "the United Nations is a mirror of the world we live in, and if the reflect;ion is ugly, it is not the mirror which is to blame."2/

Despite these apparent successes, the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations have not been universally acclaimed. Some critics note that the situations just considered are all cases in which extraordinary circumstances permitted a degree of U.N. involvement that cannot be antic­ ipated in the future. For example, the intervention in Korea was made pos­ sible only through the fortuitous Soviet absence from the Security Council-­ for there otherwise would almost certainly have been a Russian veto blocking the path.3/ The U.N. resolution of the Suez crisis would have been much more difficultllad not the two most powerful contending nations--Great Britain and France--agreed voluntarily to the substitution of a United Nations force for their own, and had not Egypt agreed to permit U.N. units on its soil (thus red�cing the significance of the Israeli refusal). In the Congo, much of the progress was made during the early stages because of the fortuitous con­ sensus of the United States and the U.S.S.R.; after that consensus broke down, progress became much more difficult.i.f

.!f Ibid., pp. 30-31.

'!:} Gardner, op. cit., pp. 28-29. � Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 31. i.f Stoessinger, op. cit., pp. 76-84.

- 80 - A second criticism is that the Un�ted Nations has seldom brought complete peace, or resolved all -the divisive issues, even in the conflicts where it must be conceded some measure of success. In Kashmir, two of the three U.N. proposals were never accepted by the contesting parties; thus the truce which was accepted remains a rather flimsy one. In the Suez, it is probable that peace persists only because of ·the twenty­ four hour presence of a United Nations force, still there after a decade. And of the Congo situation, it has been said that "although peace was temporarily restored to the Congo, the larger political question of fac­ tionalism was not resolved. Nor was the role the membership expects the U.N. to play in the continuing struggle.".!/ A third problem with the peacekeeping activities has been their enormous financial cost. Since the financial crisis of the U.N. merits fuller discussion in a section devoted solely to that problem, only brief mention will be made here. The point is that the solvency of the organiza­ tion has been severely strained by several operations of the sort we have described, particularly by the activity in the Congo. There is considerable question whether, unless some completely new approach is found to the finan­ cial problem, the U.N. could undertake another major peacekeeping mission of the Congo type.lf Fourth, the conduct of these several peacekeeping.operations has placed serious strains upon the organization and heightened some of the tensions within. The bitter debates that occur every time a decision must be made whether to enter a dispute--except in the very rare case such as the Congo in which the United States and the Soviet Union share common goals-­ hardly improve diplomatic relations between East and West. Nor do they im­ prove confidence in the U.N.'s other activities; indeed, the tensions created in the General Assembly and Security Council between the great powers may impede the less controversial but no less important work of economic develop­ ment and the like.

Fifth, it has been said that the United Nations peacekeeping model really has never worked as contemplated. The initial hope seems to have been that the great powers would share the bulk of the responsibility for keeping the peace through force. But this simply has not worked out in practice. The Soviet Union has been recalcitrant--whether for political or other reasons-­ even to the point of not paying its share of the Congo assessments; France has been similarly derelict on the Congo finances. In the Suez, great power leadership could hardly be expected when Great Britain and France were marked as the two principal offenders. Thus, in practice, the bulk of the drain and cost have fallen on the United States and on a host of smaller nations, and the degree of shared great-power participation has been rather slight. y Taylor and Cashman, loc. cit. 2/ See generally Norman J. Paddleford, "Financing Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis," International Organization, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 444-62.

- 81 - Sixth, the availability of the United Nations peacekeeping machin­ ery--whether or not it works well-�arguably postpones the voluntary settle­ ment of disputes. In the Suez crisis, Great Britain and France were awaiting further action pending United Nations consideration before the invasion from Israel forced their hands. The crisis in Laos was settled eventually by a Soviet-American agreement concluded entirely outside the United Nations ma­ chinery; perhaps that agreement would have come sooner had the machinery never existed at all. Finally, it is almost too obvious to point out that the United Na­ tions has been unable to solve several major conflicts since its birth. It could do nothing about the Russian invasion of Hungary to crush the revolt of 1956� Presently the United Nations seems helpless to bring about any progress in Viet Nam. In fact, the frustration of the organization in the current crisis seems to have been a major reason for Secretary General U Thant's unexpected decision not to serve another term.I/ Thus it could be said that the U.N. brings peace only when the parties are willing to accede to-its good offices or yield to its seldom superior show of force. In the most difficult situations where a strong international organization is most needed, the U. N. performance has been spotty. Defenders of the United Nations concede that· its record has not been perfect, but insist that "the test of the United Nations is not whether it has solved every problem in the world but whether on balance the world is better off than it would have been if the United Nations had never ex­ isted."2/ They insist that support of the organization should be based not upon its batting average, or its performance in a particular crisis, but upon its overall record of achievement. It is the position of the American State Department, for example, that "a quick glance around the world will suggest how effectively the operations of the United Nations have helped its basic objective--to keep the peace."'# On the particular objections, several answers are offered: Al­ though the financial drain of the Congo has been heavy, and has forced the United Stat�s temporarily to bear a disproportionate share, it has not yet ruined the organization. Indeed, one expert observer of the financial crisis concludes that the financial crisis "is not insuperable. It could quickly be alleviated if this became essential and will be when agreement is reached on the future handling of peacekeeping activities. No irrep­ arable harm has yet been done to the institution. "4/ As for the failure of the U.N. to complete every peacekeeping task, it is noteworthy that the · machinery itself has often prevented recurrences of disorder precisely

!J The New York Times, September 2, 1966, p. 2, col. 5. !f Gardner, op. cit., p. 28. 3/ You and the United Nations, op. cit., p. 12.

� Paddleford, op. cit., pp. 461-62.

- 82 - because there are provisions for patrolling and inspection and supervision after the fighting stops. Moreover, while there may have been fortuitous factors in the major operations to date, and while the U.S. and the small nations have carried more than their share of the load, "the Organization has succeeded in assembling peacekeeping forces or missions on no less than nine occasions."!/ Whatever may be said about the tensions that have erupted from time to tim� inside the organization, most of these tensions would probably have been felt directly--and perhaps even more violently-­ outside the organization had its peacekeeping machinery not existed. Fi­ nally, there is the lesson of history: The League of Nations lacked some of the important peacekeeping sanctions that the U.N. possesses. However difficult it is to know whether the availability arid use of such sanctions would have checked Japan in Manchuria, or Italy in Ethiopia, or Germany at the Rhine, the possibility at least makes a stron� argument for retaining what machinery we do have. Supporters of the U.N. argue that while some changes might be made, and the U.N.'s peacekeeping role has been disappointing, the organization serves important purposes and the United States should not withdraw or substantially reduce its support. C. Proposals For Improving the Peacekeeping of the United Nations.

These problems invite consideration of alternative mechanisms for United Nations peacekeeping. Several of the most notable proposals may be considered here.

1. Permanent Stand-by Force. One expert has recently urged the creation of a modest stand-by force "of the proper sort, trained and equipped for the proper jobs, and in an appropriate condition of readiness and avail­ ability when needed." Consisting of some 25,000 men, the force would be built to fullstrength over a five-year period. It would be subject to the same constitutional safeguards and controls as presently apply to United Na­ tions forces. The value of such a force would be that

... for the first time one could count on the availability and readiness of a reasonable number of trained personnel for peace-keeping assignments at a modest level, on as good a geographic distribution basis as the UN membership itself, and able to get to the trouble spots in the. neces­ sary strength in the necessary time and with logistical support for a suitable period. The trained units would constitute a cadre which could be supplemented as needed. 2/

2. Flexible Call-up System. Despite the advantages of the stand-by approach, other experts prefer a more flexible call-up system for keeping the peace 1n the future. A former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter­ national Organization Affairs explains:

"};) Ibid., p. 461.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, International Military Forces: The Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964). pp. 79-80.

- 83 - U.N. members should earmark military units that they might be prepared to make available on request by the United Nations. Earmarking would be voluntary, and, unlike a standing army, the earmarked units would be financed and controlled by the government concerned prior to their use, and would only be made available to the U.N. for a particular operation with the consent of that government...• The earmarked units should be given the advance training necessary to prepare them for United Nations service,.!/

3. Greater Participation and Readiness by Great Power Forces. Another suggestion, less concrete, is that the troops of the great powers should be more available for U .N. peacekeeping work than they have been to date. "It should not be assumed on the basis of limited experience to date," contends one expert, "that the major military powers should neces­ sarily be excluded from contributing military contingents to peacekeeping forces." He adds that the particular need is for more careful advance plan­ ning, including "the establishment of a planning staff and the assumption of advanced commitments to make properly trained and equipped units avail­ able when needed."2/ Such proposals as these should complement, rather than clash, with the two outlined above. Many other suggestions might be canvassed for the improvement of coordination and performance in the peacekeeping area. The point for the negative is a simple one: While the criticisms levelled at the past record of the United Nations in the area have been many and sometimes rather severe, why not try to imp!ove it? While affirmatives m�y s�ggest that the United Nations should get out of the peacekeeping business, or that the United States should either withdraw from the U.N. or refuse to support its peace­ keeping operations hereafter, the negative·may offer less drastic alternatives. How effective such remedies would prove is, of course, one of the principal questions to be debated.

IV. The Economic Development and Assistance Function of the United Nations.

A second principal area of controversy has been the role of the United Nations in economic development and technical assistance. Although Chapter IV of this analysis will be concerned entirely with the economic foreign policy of the United States, some attention must be given here to the relationship be­ tween American foreign policy and the United Nations as a development channel. Withdrawal from the U.N.'s development and assistance programs--a return to y Gardner, op. cit., p. . 98. 2/ Leland M. Goodrich, "The Maintenance of International Peace and Security," International Organization, Vol. XIX, No. 3, (Summer, 1965), p. 442.

- 84 - bilateralism and reliance on regional organizations--would constitute a substantial change both for the United States and for the nations that receive aid through international channels. A. United States Participation in the Economic Development Work of the United Nations. The United States has played an important role in most development agencies of the United Nations. Some of this work is carried out directly by the development arm of the U.N.--ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council-­ but the greater share is handled through the various specialized agencies affiliated with (rather than subordinate to) the U.N.--The Food and Agricul­ tural Organization, The World Bank, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the International Development Association, and others. The United States has delegates or representatives on each of these agencies. During the last fiscal year for which figures are available, the U.S. contribution ranged from about 4 percent of the budget of the Universal Postal Union to nearly one-third of the budget of the more important and costly specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organiza­ tion, and UNESCO ..!f

The basis of American support of these ·agencies is an act of Congress which empowers the President to make contributions to such interna­ tional organizations "on such terms and conditions as he may determine, in order to further the purpo·ses" of those organizations. But this is merely a general delegation; in some years the Congress has attached a rider to the foreign aid appropriation bill forbidding the President to use this authority during the next fiscal year. It is important throughout the discussion of foreign aid to remember that an authorization of general support for programs and organizations is meaningless without an annual appropriation of funds. Supplemental to this general authorization are specific statutory provisions concerning the various agencies in which the United States has been most deeply involved, such as UNESCO and the World Health Organization.

There are, however, several important limits on the extent of United States support. The statutes require that all contributions to international organizations must have the approval of the State Department, although this is unlikely to be withheld where Congress has appropriated the funds. Another requirement is more onerous: Except in very unusual circumstances (and in the case of certain Latin American organizations), the United States contribu­ tion to international channels may never exceed one-third of the total budget of the organization.· (22 U.S. Code§ 262b.) Moreover, no contribution may be made to the United Nations for any year without a special appropriation for that year. Finally, the provision for making loans to the United Nations provides that the funds shall not be used to relieve other member nations of their obligations to the U.N., and the amounts loaned by the United States may not exceed the total of all funds loaned by other nations for that purpose. (22 U.S. Code§§ 287-g-h.)

.!/ U.S. Participation in the U.N.: 1964 Report, op. cit., p. 287.

- 85 - How important are the international agencies to the United States? Although at times the U.S. has carried over one-half the budget of certain sp�cialized agencies, and has taken a.major role in their development,!/ this country has nevertheless continued to rely very heavily upon bilateral and :egional ch�nne�s. In fiscal year 1965, for example, out of the total American economic aid budget of some $2, 178 million' ':f;or all programs the United Nations and its affiliates received only about $134 million.2i Thus despite strong and continued expressions of support and enthusiasm for the international channels,If it appears, as one observer put it re­ cently, that the United States has not regarded the U.N. agencies as "im­ portant arenas for the instruments· of diplomacy per se," as indicated by the fact that "the U.S. bilateral aid program was so much larger than the total of all U;N. development activities ..• . "if

B. Performance of U.N. Development Activities:· Evaluation of the Record. Some critics feel that the various United States contributions to U.N. programs are unwisely allocated. Their criticisms fall roughly into two categories--those dealing with the loss of American control over funds sent through international channels; and particular indictments of the United Nations and its affiliates.

1. Loss of Control Over Aid Through the United Nations. There are several implications to the obvious proposition that the United States cannot as readily control and direct the funds which it gives to international agencies as those it dispenses bilaterally. Specifically, there are dangers of (1) loss of control over the selection of projects and the administration of funds; (2) loss of ability to protect the U.S. balance of payments; and (3) loss of power to direct and concentrate American aid in accordance with changing American foreign policy objectives. Of course the seriousness of each of these objections varies considerably with the proportion of U.S. aid that goes through international channels; given the presently small share, the control argument is not as telling as if the United States were heavily committed .to the U.N. agencies. On the other hand, U.N ... influence in world affairs is much greater than its rather modest total budget would indicate if compared with the total budgets of its larger members. !/ Jacob Rubin, Your Hundred Billion Dollars (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964), pp. 192-94. y Operations Report: Data As Of June 30, 1965 (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1966), p. 3. See Statement of Secretary Dean Rusk, "The Foreign Assistance Program for 1966," 52 Department of State Bulletin 482, 486 (1965). Nathaniel M. McKitterick, U.S. Diplomacy in the Development Agencies of the United Nations (Washington: National Planning Association, 1965), p. 27.

- 86 - The first aspect of loss of control concerns the conditions and qualifications that are presently placed upon American aid to serve a variety of both political and economic goals. Some such conditions serve domestic American interests. But others are designed to increase the efficiency of the aid funds and to help the recipient nations in ways ,they might not demand of themselves. The loss of the conditioning power when the aid goes through international channels has already been the basis of some· criticism of the Latin American regional programs; one observer ..note's that. "Congress is dis­ turbed by the fact that the arrangement weakens Wash·ington' s ability to require the social and economic reforms that w�re to.be at the heart of the Alliance for Progress."!/ Generally speaking, any U.N.·uses of United States aid funds which tend to-thwart the policies and intentions of the Congress or the President support the critics who wish to reduce 'or suspend American pay­ ments to U.N. aid programs. A recent example has been U.N. aid to Cuba, partially supported by American dollars.

On the other hand, loss of control of this sort may not be wholly undesirable. The international body may actually be in a better position to achieve the ends sought by the U.S. conditions, because conditions are often more palatable coming from an international than a national donor.2/ Second, it is said that there is no real evidence that the U.N. and its affiliates have been notably less efficient in the use of their aid than the United States despite the absence of the particular conditions. This may be because U.N. administration of its aid program is not subjected to the searching audits applied to American aid. Third, many of the conditions imposed by the United States serve domestic ends, and may actually impair the usefulness of the aid to which they are attached--yet could not be abolished by the U.N. so long as the United States retains the legal and political power to impose them. It is for the debater to decide, of course, whether he wishes to argue against those conditions Congress and the President have agreed upon to serve domestic objectives.

The second problem of control concerns the United States balance of international payments. Although the U.S. still enjoys a favorable balance of international trade, other items on the world economic ledger--notably foreign aid and investment--jeopardize the balance. To correct the net effect of the aid program, Congress and AID have imposed various, essentially "buy American" conditions on recent appropriations. Moreover, the U.S. has been shifting increasingly from outright grants to loans partly for this purpose. The sur­ render of funds to international agencies largely forfeits the ability to check this potential drain; thus extensive reliance on the U.N. might pose a serious threat to international exchange positions.3/ y William B. Dickinson, Jr., "Development Aid for Poor Nations," Editorial Research Reports, 1965, Vol. II, p. 578.

� Edward S. Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 47.

� Andrew Shonfield, The Attack on World Poverty (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 174-75.

- 87 - The threat of dollar drain, of course, may not be very serious so long as the multilateral share of.the U.S.'aid_budget remains small. There are, however, indications that a substantial share of American aid appropri­ ations return to American �arkets even when they'.are not tied to American pur­ chases, simply because many. of the goods wMch' dev.elo:ping nations need are best produced in this country. 'Moreover, the,increasing use of loans rather than grants--designed in part to reverse the·payments imbalance--is unaffected by the channels employed. Finally, it may b.e possible to encourage the inter­ national agencies--on behalf of all donors:- -to r�quire recipient nations to purchase goods from the donor nations in rough p.ropqrtio11 to those nations' share of the funds dispersed.!/ But none of these .so'lU:tions fully answers the criticism; the fact remains that the �bility to control the affect of aid expenditures upon the American balance of payments depends largely upon American-imposed controls and restrictions. The third area of concern implicates the difficult but important relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy. As the sharply and rapidly expanded appropriations for Viet Nam in recent months suggest, for­ eign aid is widely used to serve essentially political as well as economic aims. Bilateralism gives the donor nations a flexibility which would be almost wholly lost by using international channels. The American interests in the political direction and concentration of aid funds are such that this degree of control is forfeited with great reluctance.2/

The percentage of the total United States aid budget that is directed and concentrated for political ends seldom exceeds one-quarter. Moreover, it can be argued that the use of multilateral channels should actually be expanded rather than diminished-�at least up to the point where national security interests impinge. And the assumption of flexibility in bilateral programs may be somewhat illusory; one observer comments that "the longer such [bilateral] programs are in existence, the less freedom they allow. There are built-in pressures to extend the program on identical terms to more and more nations."3/ Nor is it clear that the United States Govern­ ment can act faster and more effectively than the international agencies; an aid bill for fiscal 1967 which should have been passed by early summer of 1966 did not get through both Houses until September. Finally, the inclination of the United States to use aid in world trouble spots on an ad hoc basis may be unsound. Dean Edward S. Mason comments that much of such aid is "wasted," and tends to constitute a "bribe" or "blackmail" to gain short-term political favors from small nations.4/ This, of course, is an argument the debater can lJ McKitterick, op. cit., p. 51. 2/ Agency for International Development, Proposed Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1967: Summary Presentation to the Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 7-8.

� Robert E. Asher, "Multilateral Versus Bilateral Aid: An Old Controversy Revisited," International Organization, Vol. XVI, (Autumn, 1962), p. 705.

� Mason, op. cit., p. 33.

- 88 - use in the affirmative side when bilateral aid programs, a far heavier Ameri­ can commitment, are discussed. To the extent that the aid is multilateral instead of bilateral, however, the possibility of such pressure is virtually eliminated. 2. Particular Objections to the United Nations As An Aid Chan­ nel. The objections to the United Nations as an aid channel are microcosmic reflections of general criticisms of the organization to which we shall turn in more detail later in this chapter. One problem, for example, is the membership in the U.N. of Communist nations, and the possibility that some aid can and does go to Communist recipients. One observer notes that "the fact that Communist countries are members in good standing of most U.N. de­ velopment agencies has always been a heavy cross for the State Department to bear in its dealings with the Congress and the public."1/ The grant- ing of aid to Cuba shortly after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion was an embarrassing case in point; but the United States continued its support of the Special Fund despite the incident.

The argument invites several answers, however. First, it is offi­ cial American policy to accept the presence of those Communist nations now members in order to make the U.N. a meaningful world forum. Second, the Communist nations do not have anything approaching a majority on any of the development agencies; indeed, the Soviet Union and its satellites have refused even to join some agencies which have political implications. 2/ Third, even the United States has given limited bilateral aid to at least-two Communist nations--Poland and Yugoslavia--so it cannot be said that American policy is unalterably opposed in principle to such grants.3/ Thus the objections based upon Communist membership and the possibility ot·-=communist receipt of American funds through international channels do not appear dispositive. But it must be conceded that U.N. aid is more likely to find its way to a Communist power the United States does not wish to help than United States aid. More serious are the basic objections to the suitability of the United Nations system as a dispenser of foreign aid. One critic has ex­ pressed serious doubts about the ability of the U.N. to handle a large­ scale development program; "the United Nations as it now stands is not an executive organ which is capable of exercising control over a development program of this magnitude." This author points to a number of structural or functional shortcomings which warrant his pessimistic judgment: (a) "an excess of formal parliamentarianism, with too little of its substance"; (b) the fact that the U.N., or at least the central governing organs, were set up "as deliberative rather than decision-making bodies"; (c) a tendency, as with the Technical Assistance Board, to create an "administrative machin-:­ ery with an incredible number of independent levers ...the essential internal structure of elaborate checks and balances, ensuring the dissipation of large amounts of administrative energy ...together with an enormous multi­ plicity of external controls" which, taken together, "make it possible to y McKitterick, op. cit., p. 36.

'l:.J Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 83.

� You and the United Nations, op. cit., p. 17.

- 89 - guarantee the frustration of any attempt at purposeful direction"; and (d) the United Nations, as a collective entity, is not able "to express a coherent view or to exercise any discriminating choice in the use of funds at its disposal."!/ Even friendly observers have warned, for example, that "to put it bluntly, there is a real danger of the economic and social work of the U.N. coming apart at the seams. The urgent need is not to fragment it further, but to bind it together more effectively."2/- And Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland adds ominously:

The U.N. specialized agencies are too sovereign, too much inclined toward functional particularism, and too little coordinated in rational 'country programs' •... Thus the job of coordinating and integrating the work of these agencies is largely saddled onto the inexper­ ienced, ill-staffed overwhelmed governments of the re­ cipient countries--which means that in many cases it is hardly done at all.� There are two general answers to these criticisms: First, that they are exaggerated, and second, that they are not inherent. Here we shall consider the first approach; in the following section dealing with remedies and improvements, we shall consider the second. .The fact is that, despite the obstacles, the U.N. has carried on an effective and extensive development program in many parts of the world. The criticisms are not fatal, else the achievements would never have come about at all.4/ Many of the problems to wnich the critics have referred are either part of the organization's grow­ ing pains--and are thus likely to disappear with time--or are simply the product of too limited support for its development activities--a condition which could obviously be remedied through stronger support.

Finally, there are several positive benefits of sending aid through the United Nations which should be taken into the balance. It can be argued, for example, that aid received through international channels is politically more acceptable: "Taking aid from an international body is considered to be completely free from any political obligation to any of the great powers. "'H Sen. Fulbright, Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has argued that "so long as our loans remain on a bilateral basis, they will tend to irritate our political relations with borrowing countries .... In my

!f Shonfield, op. cit., pp. 101-05. 2/ Gardner, op. cit.,. p. 136. Harlan Cleveland (ed.), The Promise of World Tensions (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 59.

4/ You and the United Nations, op. cit., pp. 40-47. . -5/ Rubin, op. cit., p. 198 •

- 90 - travels. I have never seen a sign that said 'World Bank Go Home. "'1/ In contrast, the newly independent nations, especially, appear to prefer aid "furnished through international organizations in which these countries participate as full and equal members. "Y

In addition to the political values of multilateral aid, the international organizations may arguably be more effic�e�t in some respects than bilateral programs. This may be so for several reasons: First, because the carrying out of joint programs will tend to eliminate waste, duplication, and cross purposes sometimes encountered today. Second, multilateral aid may produce a more equitable sharing of the total burden of economic development, and thus allay American fears that this country bears a disproportionate share of the development costs. (On the other hand, the contributions of other nations to international organizations have remained rather small; these nations apparently "prefer keeping a tight rein on foreign aid funds to make certain they will be spent on their goods.")3/ Third, there is hope of great­ er efficiency in the gathering of worldwide skills, resources, and experiences in dealing with challenging development problems. Richard Gardner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, has noted that "in many cases, internationally recruited teams of experts are not only less expensive, they provide language skills and experience more relevant to conditions existing in less developed countries than would be available in a team recruited in one aid-giving country alone."4/ Fourth, international organizations enjoy a legal and political ability-to deal comprehensively with regional and trans-national problems in ways that single donor nations simply cannot do.5/ Thus, while there are various arguments that the United Nations and its affiliates may be less efficient than bilateralism, the matter is not one-sided. C. Proposals for Structural Change and Improvement.

Undoubtedly the structure of the United Nations system is less than perfectly adapted for the dispensation of aid. But the question we have postponed to this point--whether the shortcomings are inherent--calls for consideration of possible structural changes and reforms to alleviate conditions. Even the critic most heavily relied upon above has conceded that the design and establishment of the United Nations Special Fund avoided many of the criticisms applicable to other branches and agencies. The Special

U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, Vol. 111, No. 41, pp. 4084-85. (Remarks in the U.S. Senate.) (Hereafter referred to as Fulbright statement.)

Gardner, op. ·cit. , p. 11 7.

Dickinson, op. cit., p. 895.

Gardner, loc. cit. Asher, op. cit., pp. 701-02.

- 91 - Fund is a legally separate entity, which is structurally important. It has a strong and independent chairman. The Fund also embodies the principle that "control over the use of the money to be devoted to pre-investment was to rest entirely in the Special Fund's hands, with the independent agencies of the U.N. acting truly as its agents; on a fee basis for any project that they were employed to undertake." Finally, the Special Fund has been taken largely out of international politics, or at least there has been a strong effort to resist "being caught up in the political aims of the United Na­ tions, and to assert firmly that it was concerned with the objectives of economic development alone.... " 1/ These distinctions begin to suggest some ways of avoiding the most serious structural and functional shortcom­ ings of existing development agencies within the United Nations system. In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.N. as an aid distributing channel, other suggestions have been advanced from time to time. For example, it has been proposed that there should be a single, powerful, U.N. aid director to coordinate all programs in each re­ ceiving country.2/ Better coordination might also be achieved through strengthening the powers and centralizing the tasks of the U.N. resident representatives in each nation where aid funds are spent.3/ Others agree on the need for more careful review of particular programs in terms of the needs and potential of the particular receiving nations.4/ These and many other suggestions have been advanced, and are worthy of consideration if the question of United Nations economic development becomes a major issue in the debate.y

V. The Financial Crisis of the United Nations: Costs of Keeping the Peace.

During the last decade, the United Nations has faced a deepening financial crisis. This has come about because of the two major peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East and the force (ONUC) in the Congo. It is not surprising that these aspects of the U.N.'s activity have been hardest to finance: They are at the same time the most expensive and the most controversial parts of its work. There has been less difficulty securing funds for the administrative costs of the United Nations, and the economic development phases have simply operated commensu­ rate with.the funds provided. But in the peacekeeping area, the funds have not always been provided in time or in sufficient amounts. Indeed, at the beginning of 1965, some 10 percent of the members including two of the y Shonfield, op. cit., pp. 108-09. y Cleveland, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

3/ Gardner, op. cit., p. 138. ii Asher, op. cit., p. 713. y See generally also, Roy Blough, "The Furtherance of Economic Development," International Organization, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), p. 562.

- 92 - permanent Security Council members, France and the Soviet Union, were in arrears on their payments for these purposes . ..Before analyzing the issues raised by the crisis, a few words of background are necessary. The first crisis was precipitated by assessments for the UNEF op­ erations in the Middle East during the mid-1950's. The problem was post­ poned by the creation of a Special Account to finance these operations. But opinion within the U.N. was divided among three positions which were to recur as the division deepened: The Secretary General, supported gen­ erally by the United States, took the position that such peacekeeping costs were expenses of the United Nations which, under article 17 of the Charter, "shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." The Soviet position was that the costs should fall entirely on the countries that had precipitated the crisis--Great Britain, France and Israel. Between these two poles was the view of the Afro-Asian nations, which eventually won majority acceptance, that all nations should pay something, but that the great powers, which enjoyed special perquisites under the Charter, should pick up the major share of the bill. When this formula was adopted by the General Assembly, it was provided that small nations for whom the assessments would create special problems could obtain rebates up to one-half the assess­ ment; the United States pledged voluntary contributions to cover the rebates. Yet this did not solve the problem. There was still the difficulty of col­ lecting even these reduced assessments. The Soviet Union remained the largest debtor, insisting that the UNEF was illegal in the first place, and that in any event the costs of its operations should be borne by the powers directly involved in the fighting. Somehow the organization survived the financial problems of this period: "Although the numerous arrears and defaults had put the United Nations into serious financial straits by 1960, UNEF never threat­ ened the financial structure of the organization itself.".!/

It was the Congo crisis which, in the words of the author just cited, "was to shake this structure to its very foundations." When the large costs of keeping peace in the Congo became apparent in 1960, the earlier positions were again arrayed on the question: The Secretary General insisted that all nations must share the costs under article 17; the Soviet Union contended that the cost should be borne by Belgium, as the responsible colonial power; and the Afro-Asian nations sought some middle ground of accommodation. The General Assembly adopted essentially the same formula that had been used during the most recent stages of UNEF financing. A working group of fifteen members was appointed to consider solutions, but was so deeply divided it could formulate no better approach. Each year as the budget came up for discussion, the battle lines were drawn on the financial issue; although no satisfactory long­ range solution was effected the members agreed to abide by tentative solutions until a better approach could be found. The operation became increasingly dependent on the United States, the only major power making voluntary con­ tributions to the Congo operation. But by the end of 1961, the total arrearage on the Congo force exceeded $80 million, a sum greater than the annual budget; two of the five permanent Security Council members, France and the Soviet Union,

.!_/ Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 93.

- 93 - had declared their intention not to pay, and a third (Nationalist China) had in fact defaulted.

At this point two important developments occurred. First was the decision of the International Court of Justice to the effect that the costs of UNEF and ONUC were to be considered as legally binding obligations on the entire membership. This meant that any nation which defaulted would, under article 19 of the Charter, "have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years." But the article also pro­ vided that the General Assembly could permit such a defaulter to vote "if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member," Since France had by now begun to pay 1 it was ob­ vious that the first nation to suffer or risk the sanction of article 19 would be the Soviet Union, still intransigent about payment. But the mem­ bership, particularly the neutral nations, did not wish a political as well as a financial crisis. Thus several accommodations were effected to avoid the article 19 issue: votes were taken outside the Assembly, and the United States reluctantly agreed on a few occasions to look the other way when critical votes were taken in which the Soviet Union had to participate. But the U.S. hardened its position toward the end of 1964, and sought sup­ port to compel Soviet payment. The U.S. insisted that the sanction of denial of the vote was automatic, and should go into effect at once if the Soviet Union remained in arrears; the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, argued that the decision to suspend a member from voting required a two­ thirds vote (since it was an "important issue" which, under article 18, did require a two-thirds majority in the Assembly).

By the beginning of 1965, several other nations were sufficiently in arrears to join the Soviet Union under the potential ban of article 19. Yet the continued desire to avoid a confrontation was evidenced by the over­ whelming vote against an Albanian demand 'to resume normal voting procedure-- a demand which would surely have brought the crisis to a head. Unable to transact any regular business, the Assembly adjourned early in the spring of 1965 with the financial problem as far from solution as ever. Then, shortly before the opening of a new session in the fall of 1965, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg announced that "the United States regretfully accepted the simple and inescapable fact of life that the majority of the 114 member states was unready to apply article 19." This meant that no showdown would result unless some other nation forced it; it also meant that the United Nations would probably face continued financial difficulties. The other development of consequence was the United Nations bond issue. At the same session at which the World Court opinion was requested, the General Assembly authorized the issuance of $200 ·million in bonds .. Soon the United States Congress, though after bitter debate, authorized the purchase of up to $100 million of the bonds, but only in amounts matching purchases by other nations. In this way some $150 million was raised, and

- 94 - the worst bite of 'the financial crisis was at least deferred.1J The financial crisis growing out of the two expensive peacekeep­ ing operations was therefore avoided and postponed more than it was solved. One immediate consequence of the whole experience appears to be that the United Nations is unlikely "soon again [to] venture into massive peace­ keeping operations against the will of a superpower." Moreover, any future operations "would have to be based on a broader political consensus and to be more modest in scale."2/ Even deeper is the concern that the recent financial crisis is only symptomatic of a deeper fault in the United Na­ tions structure: Refusal to accept majority rule is a further at­ tribute of sovereignty as understood by most members of the U.N. The General Assembly, for example, has been un­ able to compel its members to pay for what they had pre­ viously authorized by a majority vote .... Even the regular budget assessments are not met by all members.3/ To the extent that solutions can be found, and peacekeeping can be financed at all, there is bound to be a somewhat greater emphasis on voluntary con­ tributions; the principle of collective responsibility for which the United States and the Secretary General pressed so hard during the early 1960's has suffered a serious setback.

From the point of view of United States foreign policy, there are several special problems growing out of the financial crisis. On the one hand, the United States clearly carried a disproportionate share of the costs, both through its voluntary contributions to supplement the shaky assessments, and its purchase of half the bonds. As Richard Gardner notes, "the objection to U.N. financing is often not that the cost of the United Nations is too great but that the United States bears too great a share of it."4/ This, of course, is an argument for the affirmative in this year's debate. Meanwhile, the solutions effected made the United Nations and its peacekeeping forces dependent to an unhealthy degree on the United States support: "Such dependence on one superpower was not desirable and, more important, the failure of other states to pay their assessments was reaching alarming proportions."5/ A third difficulty has been the effect of the cr1s1s on Soviet-American relations. On the one hand, the crisis intro­ duced new points of abrasion between the two great powers; as the positions .Y Ibid., pp. 97-102. (This reference gives the circumstances surround­ ing the bond authorization and the American debate.)

'!:f Ibid., p. 109.

� Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 19. � Gardner, op. cit., p. 31. !!.f Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 96.

- 95 - of the two nations on the question of the assessments and the application of article 19 hardened, the General Assembly debate grew more bitter. When the United States circulated a memorandum in the fall of 1964 insisting that the Assembly take some firm position on the Soviet arrearage, the Rus­ sian delegate charged that this constituted a "new and provocative act by the United States."Y Other charges and counter-charges a�companied the debate on the assessments and Soviet responsibility. -Yet.at the same time, the only sanction available to the U.N.--deprival of vote under article 19-­ has been held to be "a very weak sanction for nonpayment." This is so partly because it applies only in the General Assembly; partly because it comes into play only when the arrearage equals or exceeds two full years' assessments; and partly because, as the events of 1964 and 1965 indicated, it can be circumvented if really necessary.2/ Thus, even if the United States had successfully pressed for the application of the article 19 sanc­ tion, it might well have been a hollow victory despite the effort. There is another side to the financial crisis, however. It is highly significant that the issue did not blow up--that the Afro-Asian countries worked so hard to avert crisis and keep the organization together, and that when threatened by the Albanian resolution, the United States and the Soviet Union voted together to postpone or avoid the confrontation. Moreover, the crisis apparently affected only the peacekeeping operations, and did not affect or infect the work of other U.N. agencies, which went on unabated during .the crisis. Eventually a substantial part of the needed funds were subscribed through the bond issue; although the United States bought half the bonds, some sixty-five other nations did purchase about $70 million worth within a rather short time after the initial authoriza­ tion. As a matter of fact, only in the United States was there any serious domestic opposition to the purchase.3/ Further, retiring Secretary General U Thant, in his recent statement, expressed optimism about the current finan­ cial prospect of the U.N.:

•.• while the financial solvency of the organization has not yet been assured, there is no longer the same sense of crisis and anxiety about it. I am still hope­ ful that••• substantial voluntary contributions will be forthcoming which will place the organization on a basis of complete solvency, so that it can face the great tasks ahead with confidence.4/

y Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 20. y John H. Jackson, "The Legal Framework of United Nations Financing: Peacekeeping and Penury," 51 California Law Review 79, 113-14 (1963). Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 102. The New York Times, September 2, 1966, p. 2, col. 5.

- 96 - It is true that the American share of the peacekeeping costs has been disproportionately large. But two factors should be borne in mind. First, as the State Department explains, "the United States has a very big stake in the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations."!/ Indeed, if the U.N. and its peacekeeping machinery did not exist, it is possible that this country would decide to carry the entire cost of some of the oper­ ations which it has shared with other nations. Second, there have been recent steps to reduce the United States share. While this share in the general budget and development programs has been steadily reduced, even the proportion of the peacekeeping budget has declined from 49 percent to 37 percent in the last few years.2/ Finally, it must be remembered that "the United States accounts for-nearly 40 percent of the combined national incomes of U.N. member states and that our standard of living is twice the average of other industrialized countries and some twenty times greater than the average in less developed countries."3/ It may be, then, that the United States commitment to the United Nations will expand in the future, and the desirability of this can be a topic of debate. What solutions are there to avert future financial crises? One possibility, of course, is to impose more stringent sanctions against na­ tions in arrears. But these are unlikely to find favor in the General As­ sembly, where many nations are in danger of arrears; and there is serious doubt whether, over the long haul such sanctions would even be in the best interests of the United States.4/ Another possibility would be a civil suit in the World Court by one or more nations against ·one or more delin­ quent nations for the recovery of the assessments, although nothing ap­ proaching that sort of litigation has yet been tried. Third, there may be other sources of financing that could be developed, such as special taxes or revenues from undersea or Antarctic resources. But there is serious doubt whether the great powers would consent to such proposals, and whether they would be in the interests of the United States.SI Finally, there are many possibilities for creative new methods of fund raising that might be more palatable to the great powers: special scales of assessment, volun­ tarily accepted assessment, and financing by voluntary support even without assessment, all of which deserve to be considered before the project is abandoned.6/ Some of these suggestions appear suitable for use by the affir� mative in our debates, if they could be shown to be capable of reducing the American com�itment which is some 30 to SO percent of the cost of U.N. oper­ ations. For this commitment the U.S. casts less than one percent of the vote in the 120-member General Assembly and has something well under 20 percent of the voting power in the Security Council, where the United States is one of five powers holding a veto but is the only one that has never used it. 1f You and the United Nations, op. cit., p. 51. '!:..! Gardner, loc. cit. � Ibid.

� Jackson, op. cit., pp. 125-26. � Ibid., p. 126.

§.! Paddleford, op. cit., pp. 453-61.

- 97 - VI. 1he Presence of the Soviet Union: General Problems and the Veto. A quite different basis for urging American withdrawal from or re­ duction of support for the United Nations is the presence of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Obviously the concern does not affect the General Assembly, where the Soviet bloc commands only a dozen or so votes out of well over 100 (although many neutral and left-leaning nations often follow the Soviet lead on important votes). Nor, as we have already noted, does the Soviet Union play a very important role in the development agencies of the U.N.; indeed, it does not even belong to some of the most important of these agencies because of their "political" overtones, 1/ 1hus the rub must come, if at all, on two other grounds: 1hat it is politically unwise or immoral to belong to an organization in which the Soviet Union sits, and that the Soviet veto in the Security Council prevents the organization from functioning effectively.

1he first argument is seldom heard. Although "there is a funda­ mental incompatibility at almost every point between traditional Communist doctrine and the principles of the U.N. Charter, "2/ and al though many feel that the Soviet countries have never been able or-willing to accept the full obligations of membership, the position of the American State Department has always been clear on this point. First, "the presence of these Com­ munist countries in the United ·Nations provides us with an opportunity for contact and one more avenue for negotiation." Second, "the United Nations serves in the capacity of a court of last resort to which nations can turn when all other avenues of negotiation and conciliation prove unsuccessful." 1hird, "there is really no way by which the United States could expel any of the Communist nations even if it desired to do so.". Fourth, "it should be remembered that to the men in the Kremlin the United Nations is a headache. 1hey cannot control it; they cannot break it up; and they dare not leave it. "3/ Those advocating Uni_ted States withdrawal from the U. N. because of the Soviet presence would have to deal with these points. It could be answer­ ed, for instance, that ample avenues for negotiation exist outside the U.N., either for routine or "court of last resort" business. As for the third point, expulsion of Red nations is not at issue in the debating resolution; rather it is possible United "States withdraw�l, which might be objected to on the grounds that the field would be left to the Communists. If the fourth point means, in the context of our debate, that the United States ought to stay in the U.N. because it inconveniences the Soviet Union, one would have to judge this method against others available at comparable cost. 1he question of the Soviet veto is much more troublesome. 1he veto power was created by article 27 of the Charter, which provides that each member of the Security Council shall have one vote, and then adds that decisions shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, "including

1J Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., p. 83. 2/ Gardner, op. cit., p. 47. 3/ You and the United Nations, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

- 98 - the concurring votes of the permanent members," except that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. The fact is that the Soviet Union cast 103 of the 109 vetoes recorded by the end of 1965. Seventeen of these ve toes were directly designed to protect Soviet interests in clashes with the United States--for example, four resolutions calling for U.N. action in such confrontations as the Berlin blockade, the Hungarian uprising, and the destruction of a United States.airplane. The Soviet Union twice vetoed the election of Secretaries General favored by the United States; vetoed five measures related to disarmament, and cast six vetoes at var­ ious strategic points during the Congo crisis (after the initial consensus on that operation broke down). Thus, looking only at the actual exercise of the veto, and the issues on which it has been invoked, it would appear that the Soviet Union has been able to block significant U.N. action al­ most at its whim; and that such peacekeeping achievements as have been re­ alized were possible only because the Soviet Union was temporarily absent (Korea), or saw the action initially to be in its self-interest (Suez and the Congo). Otherwise, it would appear that the organization was wholly dependent on Soviet good will to make any progress.

There are, however, several answers to the objection. First, "the actual effect of the.veto power has not proved to be as great a threat to the effective functioning of the UN as it might have been in theory-�partly because the Security Council has tended to narrow rather than expand the scope of the ·veto since the inception of the Charter."!/ Second, a number of vetoes that might have been seriously obstructive have been circumvented or superseded or otherwise mitigated: "nearly 80 per­ cent of the Soviet Union vetoes have been rendered less effective in one way or another and 24 percent have been circumvented by action of the UN itself."2/

Other factors also tend to refute the veto power objection. Many of the Soviet vetoes recorded in the rather alarming total of 103 were essentially repeats of earlier vetoes, and added no new dimension to the conflict. Further, the issues on which the Soviet veto has stuck--that is, has not been circumvented or superseded--have generally concerned neutral nations rather than Soviet allies, and thus are less clearly central to the Soviet-American conflict. Thus, to conclude: "On balance, the evidence suggests that the UN, far from being helpless in the face of the Soviet veto, has responded to the challenge with imagination and flexibility••.• In short, the veto has not been an insurmountable obstacle to the resolu­ tion of international issues."3/

.!/ Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 16. '!J Ibid., pp. 10'-ll. 3/ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

- 99 - The United States initially not only acquiesced,but along with the Soviet Union and Great Britain,"insisted on the right of veto" and would not have "acceded to the United Nations without it. "1/ Moreover, although it is technically correct that the United States has never exer­ cised its veto,

... the fact of the matter is that the United States has not used the veto because it has been able to pro­ tect and promote its national interest in other ways. By obtaining majority votes against resolutions it opposes, the United States has never been forced to cast a veto. The key to this American 'hidden veto' is,of course,the composition of the Security Council.y

Thus while the Soviet Union has far more often formally exercised the veto power than has the United States, the United States has probably much more frequently had its way in the international body. To look only at the formal statistics on the use of the veto may,therefore, be misleading. There is some doubt whether either the existence of the veto power or its recurrent use by an enemy of the United States makes continued membership in the U.N. undesirable. Perhaps it argues for a redefinition or realloca­ tion of the powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council; or tighter limits on the use of the veto; or some formal procedures for cir­ cumventing the veto in special cases--but these are not the questions to be debated here.

In addition to the veto,there are several other areas in which the Soviet Union has made American participation in the United Nations more onerous and unpleasant. A number of agreements that might otherwise have been negotiated through the international organization have been blocked, wholly or partly by Soviet objections. Recently,for example, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg reported the inability of the U.N. to conclude the world's first treaty on space exploration--and blamed the failure on the Soviet demands that the treaty give equal tracking facilities to all nations under all conditions.3/ These impasses are regrettable,to be sure; but the U.N. did not create the impasse,and there is no evidence the treaty would have been concluded any more readily had there been no U.N. Other areas of conflict and collision within the U.N. have included Communist coercion of other nations; constitutional development; the composition and duties of the international civil service; international adjudication; economic and social cooperation; informational activities; financing; and,

!f Ibid.,p. 4. y Ibid. , p . 13.

� The New York Times, September 17,1966, p. 11, col. 4-6.

- 100 - as discussed in the previous section, peacekeeping and disarmament.!/ In short, there are in Soviet U.N. participation frequent evidences-of "the very clear gap between its professed support for 'coexistence' and its hostility to the one almost worldwide body that can, potentially, do most to assure a more stable coexistence in fact."2/ The gap is serious, to be sure. But recently

... there have been some straws in the wind on Soviet policy toward the U.N.--the fact that the Soviet Union invited U Thant to Moscow for the signing of the test ban treaty, that it concurred in the application to large nuclear reactors of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that it has made special efforts at some recent U.N. meetings to avoid polemics and facilitate the orderly disposition of major issues, and that it voted affirmatively in the Security Council on the resolution establishing the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus.� How significant these indicators are of an improved Soviet attitude, only time can tell.

VII. Other Problems of United Nations Membership. A final group of problems or difficulties affecting the wisdom of continued United States membership in the U.N. concerns the general matter of membership. These are essentially dilemmas or conflicts for American foreign policy. First, there is the political conflict surrounding the admission of certain new members. Second, there is the effect which the rapid enlargement of the Afro-Asian bloc has on United States interests; and third, there is the special problem of the admission of Communist China and the continued presence of Nationalist China.

The very process of admitting certain new members to the organ­ ization has created problems and tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Most nations have been admitted without difficulty. But precisely one-half of the Soviet vetoes (fifty-one) were cast with regard to membership matters. Such nations as Italy, Portugal, Jordan, Ireland, Ceylon, South Korea, South Viet Nam, and Japan were vetoed, each several times, by the Soviet Union. Eventually each of them, except South Korea and South Viet Nam was admitted---but the price for the United States was acceptance of the admission of such Communist states as Albania, Bulgaria,

!/ Gardner, op. cit., pp. 48-60. Y Philip E. Mosely, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," Inter­ national Organization, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), p. 674.

� Gardner, op. cit., p. 61.

- 101 - Hungary, and Rumania. Only by making such deals could the membership dead­ lock have been broken--and even at that, only after rather acrimonious ex­ changes between the two great powers.I/ Perhaps, though, the fault lies chiefly with the veto power rather than with the admissions procedure. In any event, most of the controversial nations on both sides have already been admitted, so the problem is not likely to recur so dramatically; future applications for admission are likely to come from nations of Asia and Africa. The second problem is the dilemma created for the United States by the rapid growth of new members from Asia and especially from Africa. The United Nations, and the prospect of nearly universal membership, has played a considerable role in African political development; it has spurred Africa's "explosion into international politics."2/ Apart from the very rapid increase in the size and consequent diversity and complexity of the organization, this has created two problems for the United States: First, the tendency to splinter American allegiance on some issues between our European allies and our newer, sometimes hoped-for rather than guaranteed, Afro-Asian allies. The danger of division has been particularly embarrass­ ing on questions of colonialism and racial discrimination--on which Portugal and Belgium, for example, differ sharply from their former African colo­ nies.3/ Yet there is no evidence either that the African bloc is mono­ lithic--much less that it concurs with the Asian nations on all colonial or racial questions--or that the affected European allies of the United States are deeply disturbed by the balanced position the U.S. has taken on these questions. Moreover, the division is exaggerated; Richard Gardner has com­ piled statistics showing that "in the years 1961-63... the majority of NATO countries voted with the United States on thirty-seven out of forty colon­ ial issues that came to a vote."Y The more serious aspect to the proliferation of membership is the creation of a large bloc of nations that do not always vote with the United States, and whose vote cannot be predicted or counted upon. While it is true that these nations do not always vote in unison among themselves, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), among others, has indicated how great the gulf is separating the United States from these newly independent nations on many questions. In the UNCTAD voting, the United States dissented--often alone--from recommendations unanimously sup­ ported by the new nations.5/ The fact is that today "the big powers can be

y Stoessinger, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

y Herbert J. Spiro, Politics in Africa, Prospects South of the Sahara (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 14. Gardner, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

Ibid., p. 41. United Nations, Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Final Act and Report (Vol. 1, 1964) (New York, 1964), passim.

- 102 - outvoted ...• The new nations have a majority vote if they can be persuaded to hold together..•. "!/ Several solutions at once suggest themselves, but probably have to be rejected: First, there is the possibility of putting the brakes on the growth of membership; but this would be directly con­ trary to U Thant's recently stated "sense of dissatisfaction with the fact that the organization has not yet achieved universality of membership,"2/ a view which presumably widely reflects Afro-Asian sentiment. The other possibility would be some form of weighted voting, but to this there are several obvious objections. For one, it is almost certain that population would have to be weighted heavily in any such formula, which would actually dilute rather than strengthen the voting power of the United States and the Western industrial nations. Second, as the State Department notes, "it is almost inconceivable that any charter amendment which would deprive countries of their prized prerogatives would be acceptable to them."3/ Third, "an arrangement which would tend to concentrate all effective-power in the hands of a smaller number of members would be bound to decrease the world-wide influence of the United Nations."Y Another approach is to consider the objection head-on. Have the newly independent nations in fact consistently voted contrary to American interests, or are they likely to? For one thing, the fervor with which these nations prize their hard-won independence makes them unlikely to ac­ cede consistently to either power bloc. Moreover, the United States policy recognizes and accepts--if it does not actually encourage--such neutrality. Most important, p·ast - experience does not corroborate the fear. On a great number of major issues, the new nations have supported the United States position at least as often as the Soviet position;S/ nor are the two great powers by any means always at odds, as the early stages of the Congo crisis indicated. Thus whatever unsettling prospects the future may hold, it is still possible to conclude that "the U.S. position continues to receive comfortable majorities in the United Nations on important issues,"6/ just as it was possible not so long ago for the late Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to welcome three small new African members with the assurance "that the role of these new members in the United Nations will be constructive."7/

!f Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., pp. 7-8. Y The New York Times, September 2, 1966, p. 2, col. 6-.

� You and the United Nations, op. cit., pp. 16-17. Y Ibid. , p. 17. y Ibid., p. 15. � Ibid.

'!../ U.S. Participation in the UN: 1964 Report, op. cit., p. 114.

- 103 - DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What relevance do the history of American participation in the United Nations, and the location of U.N.headquarters on American soil, have for the issue of American reduction of its commitments to the United Nations · system? 2. Would the case for American withdrawal from the U.N. or the substantial reduction of its support for that organization be affected by the availability of alternative forms of international organizations? What alternatives might in fact be available for the United States if the U.N.were disbanded?

3. Which of the. overriding goals of American foreign policy are most directly served by continued membership in the United Nations? Which, if any, of those goals may be undermined or challenged by American membership? 4. As a strategic matter, would it be more feasible for the United States to think in terms of across the board reduction cif support for all activities of the U.N. or reduction or withdrawal from only certain of the activities and branches? What methods are available for purposes of the debate resolution for testing the "substantiality" of an affirmative proposal for reduction or withdrawal?

5. Is it fair to say that the United Nations has never resolved an international dispute through the .use of force except where the contesting parties were willing to have the U.N. intervene? And is it accurate to say that the U.N. is virtually helpless to intervene militarily in any dispute . unless the Soviet Union acquiesces?

6. How accurate is it to speculate that warring nations may postpone voluntary or self-induced settlement because of the availability of United Nations machinery for settlement? Would they be likely to settle faster if there were no United Nations machinery? 7. In what senses are the major United Nations peacekeeping ex­ peditions--Korea, Kashmir, Suez, and the Congo--fortuitous or atypical in the ways they crone about? How likely would the United Nations be to use the srune procedure in the future?

8. What would have happened to the United Nations effort in the Middle East during the Suez crisis if nei t.her Israel nor Egypt had agreed to permit U.N. units on its soil to patrol the hostile. border? 9. How accurate is it to say that in each of the major disputes in which the U.N. intervened, it left many loose ends; that to the extent · that peace was eventually restored, it had to be done outside rather than through the U.N. machinery?

- 104 - 10. How serious an indictment is it that the United Nations was unable to play any part in resolving the dispute over the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and so far has been virtually powerless in Viet Nam? 11. What arguments would prefer the creation of a pennanent United Nations stand-by force? Which would prefer the more flexible plan for a call-up system? Is the present United Nations very likely to adopt either fonnula for a pennanent peacekeeping machinery? Why or why not?

12. How can it be explained that the United States has continued to rely for economic development and technical assistance almost entirely on bilateral channels despite its strong professions of support for United Nations agencies? Has the Administration been hypocritical in this regard?

13. How telling is the argument that the United States loses control over funds which are dispersed through international aid channels? Is this loss of control, to the extent it does occur, wholly undesirable? What ways might there be of retaining control while relying more exten­ sively.on international channels?

14. How serious are the structural and functional objections to the United Nations as a channel for the distribution of economic aid and technical assistance?

15. How likely is it that better coordination in economic assis­ tance and development programs can be achieved within the present United Nations framework, without making major structural changes in the organi­ zation?

16. To what extent can the United Nations financial crisis be blamed on the Soviet Union? On the United States? Could the General Assembly have avoided the crisis either by taking no action in the Congo, or by some methods of pay-as-you-go financial assessment?

17. How feasible would it be to check the recurrence of a finan­ cial crisis by imposing stricter sanctions upon those nations that remain in arrears on their peacekeeping assessments for any substantial length of time? How useful would the opinion of the World Court be in enforcing such sanctions?

18. Has the United States borne a disproportionate share of the costs of the peacekeeping operations during the last decade? Can this be justified in. any way?

19. How could the United States minimize the dangers and areas of conflict in the United Nations between itself and the Soviet Union (assuming that neither of the two great powers will leave the organization, or relinquish any major points to the other)?

- 105 - 20. What bearing, if any, does the rapid increase in the member­ ship of the Afro-Asian bloc have for the continued American policy objec­ tive of excluding Communist China from the United Nations? Is there any way of predicting how long the United States will be politically able to maintain that position of exclusion?

- 106 - BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asher, Robert E. ''Multilateral Versus Bilateral Aid: An Old Controversy Revisited," Inte�ational Organization, Vol. XVI, (Autumn, 1962), pp. 697-719. Reprinted by the Brookings Institution, Washi_ngton, D.C., as Brookings Reprint No. 66. Bailey� Sydney D. The General Assembly of the United Nations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. The United Nations: A Short Political Guide. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Bloomfield, Lincoln P. International Military Forces. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1964. The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1960.

Boyd, Andrew. United Nations: Piety, Myth and Truth. London: Penguin Books, Ltd. , 1962.

Burns, Arthur L., and Heathcote, Nina. Peace-Keeping by UN Forces: From Suez to the Congo. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Claude, Inis L. Power and International Relations. New York: Random House, 1962.

Swords Into Ploughshares. (Third edition.) New York: Random House, 1964. Cleveland, Harlan. (ed.) The Promise of World Tensions. New York� The Macmillan Company, 1961. Clubb, O. Edmund, and Seligman, Eustace. The International Position of Communist China. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1965.

Cohen, Benjamin V. The United Nations: Constitutional Development, Growth and Possibilities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Dallin, Alexander. The Soviet Union at the United Nations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Eichelberger, Clark M. The United Nations: The First Twenty Years. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Franck, Thomas M., and Carey, John. The Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana · Publications, 1963.

- 107 - Frye, William R. A United Nations Peace Force. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1957. Gardner, Richard N. In Pursuit of World Order. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Goodrich, Leland. Korea: A Study of United States Policy in the United Nations. New York: Harper and Row, 1956.

The United Nations. New York: Crowell, 1959. Gordon, King. UN in the Congo. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International. Peace, 1962.

Gross, Ernest A. The United Nations: Structure for Peace. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1962.

Holcombe, Arthur. (ed.) Strengthening the United Nations: Report of the Co�ission to Study the Organization of Peace. New York: Harper and Row, 1959.

Hovet, Thomas. Africa in the United Nations. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963.

Hovet, Thomas. Bloc Politics in the United Nations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Jackson, John H. "The Legal Framework of United Nations Financing: Peacekeeping and Penury." 51 California Law Review 79 (1963). Lee, Dwight E. "The Genesis of the Veto." International Organization, (February, 1947) ,pp. 33-42. Lefever, Ernest W. The Crisis in the Congo: A UN Force in Action. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965. Mason, Edward S. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1964. McKitterick, Nathaniel M. U.S. Diplomacy ·in the Development Agencies of the United Nations. Washington: National Planning Association, 1965. Munro, Sir Leslie. United Nations: Hope for a Divided World. New York: Holt, 1960. Nicholas, H.G. The United Nations as A Political Institution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

I O Brien, Conor Cruse. To Kat anga and Back. New York : Simon and · Schuster, 1963.

- 108 - Pearson, Lester B. A Critical Evaluation of the United Nations. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1961.

Rosner, Gabriella. The United Nations Emergency Force. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Shuster George N. UNESCO: Assessment and Promise. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1963.

Singer, J. David. Financing International Organizations. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961.

Stevenson, Adlai E. Looking Outward: Years of Crisis at the United Nations. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.

Stoessinger, John G., and Associates. Financing the United Nations System. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964. The United Nations and the Superpowers: United States­ Soviet Interaction at the United Nations. New York: Random House, 1965.

Taylor, George E., and Cashman, Ben. The New United Nations: A Reappraisal of United States Policies. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1965.

Uhl, Alexander. The US and the UN, Partners for Peace. Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1962.

· "The United Nations: Accomplishments and Prospects," A Symposium. International Organization, (Summer, 1965),Vol. XIX, No. 3.

United States Department of State. You and the United Nations. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.

United States Participation in the UN: Report by the President to The Congress for the Year, 1964. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

Wilcox, Francis 0., and Haviland, H. Field. The United States and the United Nations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961. Wright, Quincy. International Law and the United Nations. London: Asia Publishing House, 1960;

- 109 - CHAPTER IV

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE ITS ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS

Introductory Essay

The next area of major controversy about United States foreign policy conunitments is the economic sector. Most of the discussion here will concentrate upon the foreign aid and economic assistance programs, which imposes by_far the most significant conunitments. In considering these conunitments, we shall begin with asurveyo£ the present United States foreign aid program--its components, its extent and direction (in terms of nations and regions which receive American aid), and the machinery by which it is administered .. Then we shall consider four areas of controversy over the American economic aid program: (1) the question whether any long­ range, large-scale economic aid program is desirable, from the vantage points of both donor and donee; (2) the question whether the present, largely bilateral economic aid program of the United States is desirable, or should be substantially reduced; and (3) the particular issue whether the United States .should continue to provide limited amounts of aid to the Conununist countries of Poland and Yugoslavia. Considerations of debate strategy and tactics will recur throughout the chapter.

I. The Foreign Aid Conunitments of the United States.

A. A Survey of Existing American Foreign Aid Programs.

Before ·considering any reductions or criticisms, it is essential to have in view the broad sweep of American foreign aid operations and ex­ penditures. We begin with a·distinction between economic assistance, which is the subject of this chapter, and military aid, which will be considered in the next chapter. Military assistance, generally speaking,' includes those funds allocated for the purchase, development,and maintenance of weapons, the training and equipment of troops, and the direct conduct of military operations; the rest is essentially economic aid. Obviously some items in the economic aid budget may be used for military-related purposes, producing some blurring of the distinction in practice. During the last fiscal year the United States spent about twice as much for economic as for military aid to other nations (not including, of course, any part of the Defense Department's support of American military operations): roughly $2,100 million for economic purposes, and $1,300 million for military assistance. Within the category of economic assistance, there are many different types of expenditures, chiefly the following:

1. Development Loans. A loan differs from a grant in that re­ payment is at least expected by the country that extends it--although in

- 110 - pra'Ctice"nbt all foreign aid loans are repaid in ful 1. In recent years, there has been a steady increase in the share of the aid budget that con­ sists of loans, to the present two-thirds of the total. Typically, the loans are "soft" in that the rates of interest are somewhat lower than those exacted by commercial lending institutions. The terms become "harder" as the loan matures, and higher interest rates are generally imposed on those countries and those projects that are better able to pay. The term of current loans runs about forty years, although earlier repayment is possible if the borrower wishes and can finance it. !f

. Development loans are of two types--project and program loans. ProJect loans are generally made for goods and services for rather specific purposes, while program loans are designed to promote general improvements in the borrowing nation without being tied to particular projects (for ex­ ample, to reform the tax structure or balance the budget). In the fiscal year 1965-66, for example, seventy-seven project loans were made to thirty­ two countries in a total amount of about $500 million. During the same period, seven countries received program loans totalling $700 million. Thus the typical program loan is somewhat larger than the typical project loan. 2. Technical Cooperation Grants. Most technical assistance is still carried out through grants rather than loans, because of the nature of the assisted projects. Education, agricultural development, sanitation, and public administration projects are less able to repay than other types of projects. The bulk of these expenditures go for salaries rather than for materials, although some materials are necessary to facilitate the work of the American technical advisers. During the latest fiscal year there were some 3,300 Americans abroad under such grants. Because of our extensive military and other commitments, a large number of these technicians have been stationed most recently in Viet Nam, although concerned with matters other than the conduct of the war.

3. Supporting Assistance. Supporting assistance is a hybrid category of aid funds, including both grants and loans. It helps the United States to "put out fires" in the world's trouble spots. It may be used to prevent the spread of Communist infiltration, for example, or to help bolster the economy of a war-torn nation; that has been its primary use in Viet Nam during the last ye.ar or two. Even though these funds may be spent for long-range development, they are essentially of an "emergency" nature. 4. Contingency Fund. Another form of emergency aid, which has also been heavily committed to Viet Nam for the recent years, is the con­ tingency fund, which authorizes the President to make transfers during the year without going back to Congress for a specific appropriation. During fiscal l966, Congress created an additional contingency fund of some $89 million especially for Viet Nam. Next year this amount will almost

!f Facts About the Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1967 (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1966), pp. 8-9.

- 111 - certainly be included in the supporting assistance category, so that the contingency fund will be available for other emergencies. 5. Contrib�tions to International Organizations. Although the bulk of American foreign aid goes on a bilateral, country-to-country basis, there are substantial amounts allocated for the support of the United Na­ tions and its affiliated agencies and branches. The United States has been a generous contributor to the International Bank for 'Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and its "soft-loan window," the International Development Association (IDA).. 1/ The bulk of American assistance to Africa and South Asia goes through formally international channels, although the strength of American influence in them creates some doubt about the truly international character. !./

6. Commitments to the Export-Import Bank. The Export-Import Bank is a special branch of the American foreign aid program that deals mainly in "hard loans," at rather high interest rates. These are designed to promote and develop markets for American exports, and are usually made for fairly long terms. Many projects which do not need, or cannot qualify for, the generous loans available from. other channels may still be able to secure financing through the Ex-Im Bank if there is a prospect of enhancing the market for American goods abroad. � 7. Food for Peace. Created by the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, the Food for Peace program is supervised by a special assistant to the President in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture. It seeks to make use of surplus American foodstuffs in several ways: (1) through sales of such goods to friendly nations, the local currencies re­ ceived in payment are kept in the purchasing nations for further develop­ ment programs; (2) through the use of foodstuffs for emergency relief and as the basis of longer-range development programs; and (3) by donating such sur­ plus goods to private American charities which then supervise their shipment and disposition abroad. 4/ The foreign aid appropriation bill for 1967 pro­ poses to supplant Food for Peace by a greatly expanded Food for Freedom pro­ gram; it would include the three functions outlined above but would place greater emphasis on long-range development, relief of malnutrition, and ex­ panding the paying markets for American farm goods. 5/ y International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association, Annual Report 1964-65 (Washington, 1965), pp. 26, 41.

2/ Dickinson, op. cit., p. 894.

3/· Rubin, op. cit., ·pp. 85-86. if Food for Peace (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1963).

Proposed Economic Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1967: Summary Presentation to the Congress, op. cit., pp. 19-30.

- 112 - 8. The Peace Corps. Since its creation in 1961, the Peace Corps has sent some 15,000 volunteers throughout the world to help with many types of development and relief work. They assist in a multitude of ways, including education and advice to foreign governments at various levels, mainly in the developing regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin Amer­ ica. In the total budget of the foreign aid program, the Peace Corps item has been strikingly small. !f

9. The Alliance for Progress. Many of the foregoing forms of assistance have been combined in a single regional assistance and devel­ opment association, the Alliance for Progress which serves Latin America. Although the bulk of the funds for the Alliance comes from Western Hemis­ phere countries other than the United States, the American leadership and financial support are obviously essential to the organization's success. The United States has made contributions chiefly in the form of technical assistance grants and development loans, administered through the Latin American Bureau in the Agency for International Development (in coopera­ tion with the various regional organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization of American States, and the Inter­ American Committee for the Alliance for Progress). For fiscal 1965, the Latin American countries received about two-fifths of the United States' total development loan funds, and about one-quarter of. the technical coop­ eration grants. This regional organization has thus become a keystone of the American foreign economic policy within its short five-year life.� 10. Miscellaneous Programs. In addition to these major compo­ nents, there are other less important programs on which small expenditures are made nearly every year. In the latest fiscal year, for example, the United States spent some $7 million for the support of American schools and hospitals abroad. Other items include American participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency, international cooperation in health and medical research, cultural and technical exchange centers, refugee programs, and others. There may be some doubt whether these items should be included in the foreign aid program at all. But since there is suffi­ cient disagreement even among the experts about what items belong in this category, they are mentioned here. 11. Administrative Expenses. The Agency for International De­ velopment, a branch of the State Department headed by an Administrator, supervises the disposition of most of the foreign aid funds. A small part of the foreign aid budget goes for the administrative expenses--$54.2 million for fiscal year 1966--of that Agency. Administrative costs in other parts of the State Department connected with foreign aid programs aggregate

1/ Fourth Annual Report (Washington: Peace Corps, 1965), pp. 2-5. 2/ The Alliance for Progress... An American Partnership (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1965), pp. 5-9; Facts About the Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit., inside cover.

- 113 - a little over $3 million annually; expenses in other departments (such as Agriculture) are not separately recorded.

B. To What Countries Does American Economic Aid Go?

One way of approaching the distribution of American economic aid is to consider what nations do not receive it: First, there is a group of nations which no longer need our assistance, because they have sufficiently recovered from the effects of World War II; these are mostly nations of ·Western Europe, although recently Taiwan has been added to the list. Second, there are nations which are deemed ineligible for American aid on political grounds, mostly Communist countries (although not all Communist countries are denied all forms of American aid).

There remain about one-half the nations of the world; for fis­ cal 1967, about seventy nations are expected to receive American economic assistance in some form or other. Ninety-two percent of the total will be spent in twenty nations; thus (as has generally been the case in recent years) American aid is relatively concentrated.I/ Specifically, 84 percent of the development loans will go to eight nations; 93 percent of all sup­ porting assistance is allocated to five countries; and three Latin Amer­ ican countries will receive two-thirds of the Alliance for Progress funds. The concentration of aid can also be measured in its regional dimension: The largest share of the development loans (over one-half) goes to the Near-East/South-Asia region; most of the balance of the loan fund goes to Latin America, with only a very small amount to Africa and the Far East. Of the technical cooperation funds, one-third goes to Latin America and another third to Africa; much smaller amounts go to the other regions. Of supporting assistance, the lion's share (three-quarters in fiscal 1965) went to the Far East, where the military pressures were the heaviest; the rest went in about equal amounts to the other three regions. Thus American economic aid funds are concentrated by type and by region, as well as among a rather small number of nations.

In terms of particular countries, the breakdown again is signif­ icant: The ten recipients which stand at the top of the list (India, Brazil, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Turkey, Korea, Chile, Dominican Republic, Laos, and the Regional Office of Central American and Panama Affairs, in that order for fiscal 1965) received three-quarters of all American assistance. The amounts ranged from India's $265 million down to the ROCAP's $43 million. Most parts of the underdeveloped or developing world are represented on the "top ten" list: there are three nations and one subregional organization from Latin America; three nations from the Far East; and three countries from the Middle-East/South-Asia group. Only Africa is not yet represented on the list. Thus the list of largest aid recipients indicates both the

Proposed Economic Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1967: Summary Presentation to the Congress, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

- 114 - geographical diversity and the national concentration of the aid pro­ gram. y

Another way of surveying the allocation of American aid is by types of countries which receive the aid--in terms of their respective stages of development. We have aid commitments to nations at three lev- els: (1) transitional-program countries (about fifteen nations which are well on their way to being self-supporting, and will soon be able to draw capital through private investment and domestic sources); (2) major­ program countries (twenty-five nations which receive the bulk of our as­ sistance, and which have the greatest need for outside funds on generous terms--in some of these nations the United States provides general devel­ opment support for a variety of programs and projects; in others it is confined to limited or qualified support, where the necessary commitments to sound development policies have not yet been made); and (3) limited­ program countries 1(in which American support is confined to specific pro­ grams of a limited amount and/or a short tenn; this category includes the few Communist nations we assist, and several neutral nations we hope to enable to remain independent by our support of particular needed projects).2/

C. How is American Economic Aid Dispensed? To conclude this introductory discussion, a brief description of the aid operation is necessary. The Agency for International Develop­ ment, with its head·quarters in the State Department in Washington, is the c·entral organ of the aid operation. Within the Agency, · there are regional bureaus assigned to the four major regions, and various administrative branches. In each nation receiving substantial American aid, there is an AID mission, with a mission director, to handle all local contacts. Where the programs are small, this work is done through the American Embassy. Of the 15,000 persons working for AID, about 13,000 are stationed overseas. In addition to this staff, AID draws upon the services of experts and ad­ visers in other branches of the government, and employs persons in private industry and academic institutions as needed.

In addition to AID, some mention should be made o( the Alliance for Progress, which handles the bulk of our aid to Latin America. All original contacts are made through a Latin American bureau within AID; the field work is handled largely by the AID missions in each of the Latin American nations. The United States relies heavily for its Latin American aid work upon the machinery of the Inter-American Development Bank, which makes "soft" loans to Latin American applicants (out of funds provided by all member pations). Contributions are also made through the Special Development Assistance Fund of the Organization of American States. Thus,

Y Operations Report: Data as of June 30, 1965, op. cit., p. 7. 2/ The AID Program (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1964), p. 23.

- 115 - while many agencies are involved in various ways, the work. is centrally coordinated. And one of the important features of Latin American id a is that the key decisions, at least in theory, are made by the Alliance, representing all of the member nations, and not simply the interests of the United States.!/

To complete the survey of the American aid program, a brief description of the funding of particular projects and programs seems in order. Suppose a foreign nation wants American support for the construc­ tion of a road or bridge, or for a long-range program of currency reform. The application must be supported by a study of the soundness of the proj­ ect from the technical and economic points of view. The study must be made by a qualified consulting firm, with AID approval, and must include cost and time estimates and other information bearing on the feasibility of the project or program.

According to AID, some of the considerations in evaluating appli­ cations are as follows: The application is then examined by the AID mission in the country from which it comes, to determine the importance of the pro­ ject or program to the whole AID operation for that country. Attention is given to the applicant's ability to carry out the project and to make good use of the facilities once the project is completed .. Then consideration is given to other sources of funds, if any, which may be available. If the local AID mission approves the application, it is then sent on to Washington. There it is subjected to a number of questions, such as: What precautions have been taken to see that funds are not diverted for short-term emergency purposes? How will the particular loan or grant promote the country's long­ term economic development? Will the project or program stimulate the country to take long-range self-help measures? What effects will the grant or loan have on the economy of the United States? In all about forty such questions are raised, according to AID.

Maj or loans then have to be approved by the AID administrator and by the Development Loan Conunittee, which includes representatives of the Treasury Department , the Export-Import Bank, and the State Department. All loans must also be approved by the National Advisory Council on Inter­ national Monetary and Financial Policies for soundness and long-range ef­ fect. When the application has successfully run the gauntlet of these various examiners, and is cleared by all, the funds may be disbursed in accordance with the law governing the aid program. In the final approval, it is quite likely that certain conditions will be attached to the loan or grant ; later in this chapter we shall consider some of these.conditions and their political implications.

D. What Are the General Goals of the American Foreign Aid Program?

After this brief survey of the components of the foreign aid program, a quick review of the goals may be in order. The goals o f the

1/ The Alliance for Progress... An American Partnership, op; cit., pp. 7-8.

- 116 - program can be divided among moral/humanitarian, economic, and political categories. Here we shall simply list them, without attempting to cite authority; the goals enumerated here are fairly widely accepted, and docu­ mentation is easily available for any which raise doubts.

1. Moral or Humanitarian Goals. Many supporters of the Ameri­ can aid program argue that the United States provides aid not for political gain but (in President Kennedy's words) "because it is right." The notion is that the United States, as a wealthy and developed nation, incurs an obligation to help the less-fortunate and less-developed nations. The humanitarian goals of the AID program have been summarized as follows:

a. To avert starvation and death by providing emergency relief after disaster.

b. To relieve, on a longer-range basis, the conditions of hunger, disease, and illiteracy which plague many of the less-developed nations.

c. To stimulate and encourage the spirit of self-help and individual initiative--that is, to help the developing nations primarily to help themselves.

2. Economic Goals. Several objectives of the foreign aid pro­ gram concern the economy of the recipient nations. According to AID, these goals are as follows:

a. To build the foundations for economic development--the infrastructure of which we spoke earlier, that is universally held to be necessary for industrial and commercial development.

b. To raise the standards of living--even slightly in the early years, in the hopes of more substantial increases as the pace of economic and agricultural development quickens.

c. To bring about economic reforms in the systems of land ownership, taxation, budgeting, and other aspects of the recipient nation's economy. d. To stimulate the growth of the private sector and private enterprise in the recipient nation.

e. To promote and expand opportunities for American invest­ ment in developing nations to the extent compatible with the economic in­ terests of those nations.

f. To open up new markets for American goods and expand the trade patterns of the world.

- 117 - 3. Political Goals. Finally, government sources state that a number of the objectives of the American foreign aid program are political or governmental in character: a. To check the spread of communism wherever communism poses a threat to the survival of democratic institutions or friendly governments.

b. To promote internal peace and a stable political order in the recipient nations. c. To permit neutral or uncommitted nations to maintain their independence--from their neighbors, and from both the major power blocs (even though United States policy may contemplate that some such nations will eventually become American allies rather than neutrals).

d. To distribute the burden of economic development more equitably among the Western industrial nations; while the United States presently carries the bulk of the burden, it is a declared policy to en­ courage other nations, especially in Western Europe, to join in.

E. In What Ways Might American Economic Aid Commitments be "Substantially Reduced"?

There should be little question that American aid programs, pro­ jects, and agreements constitute important foreign policy commitments. There is no doubt that critics of the foreign aid program urge that these commitments be reduced in some way or other. The question now before us is what plausible types of reduction might be considered by the affirmative debater. Several such possibilities come to mind. 1. Total Abolition of the Aid Program. There are few who advo­ cate it, but one might at least consider the possibility of completely abolishing the aid program. Or, more plausibly, one could urge spending aid funds only for strictly military purposes, thereby completely termi­ nating the economic aid program. This is the most drastic solution which, however significant the qenefits, would also raise some rather serious ob­ jections, to which we shall turn later in this chapter.

2. Sharp Reduction in the Number of Countries Receiving Aid. Presently some seventy nations receive varying amounts of American economic aid. Although twenty of these nations get over 90 percent of the funds, the point is that we do have commitments in most years in the other fifty as well. There are either AID missions or additional personnel in the em­ bassy of each of those nations. A ceiling on the number of countries that could receive American aid might be set. This might produce economic savings and decrease the possibility of United States involvement in abortive pro­ jects in small nations. It would appear to be a substantial reduction, even if the dollar volume of American aid were not significantly affected.

- 118 - 3. Substantial Reduction or Termination of Aid to International Organizations. The position is sometimes taken that all United States economic aid should be distributed strictly on a bilateral basis, for some of the reasons considered in Chapter III. One form of substantial reduc­ tion would certainly involve elimination of all economic assistance or com­ mitment to the United Nations and its agencies and branches. Since the question has been fully considered in Chapter III, nothing more need be said about it here. 4. Substantial Reduction or Termination of Aid to Particular Countries. Many persons contend that the United States should cease all economic assistance to Communist-bloc nations. The arguments for and against this view will be surveyed later in this chapter. Another related proposal involves the cessation of all assistance to "totalitarian" gov­ ernments of non-Communist nations on the theory that we should not support patently undemocratic rulers. The merits of this position will be explored in Chapters V and VI. Although the amounts of economic assistance involved are not large--unless one considers our principal aid beneficiaries in Southeast Asia to be "totalitarian"--the political significance of giving any aid at all to these nations indicates that the termination of it would probably involve a "substantial reduction."

5. Termination or Substantial Reduction of Particular Programs in All Nations and Regions. One approach to the resolution would involve the reduction or termination of one aspect of the aid program--the making of program loans, for example, or all forms of development loans. But this approach would be a substantial reduction only if the dollar amount of the aid budget were substantially reduced in the net� a mere transfer of a cer­ tain number of millions from loans to grants,� vice versa, does not neces­ sarily involve the kind of reduction which the resolution contemplates.

6. Attachment of Additional Conditions to American Aid Programs. There are presently a considerable number of conditions attached to American economic aid programs. Among the most significant of these are the condi­ tions imposed by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), providing for withdrawal of aid to nations that trade in certain stra­ tegic materials with certain Communist nations. These conditions have been relaxed somewhat since the passage of the Act. They do not presently re­ quire the withdrawal of aid from any friendly nations that would otherwise receive it. If the conditions were tightened up, however--and it can be argued that they should be--then the affected nations would drop off the aid-eligible list unless they ceased the proscribed trade. The same is true of other conditions, such as those designed to promote certain polit­ ical and economic reforms within recipient nations. Here, too, if the conditions were tightened, the flow of aid, and the number of nations re­ ceiving it, would almost certainly diminish. This would seem, therefore, to be one method--indirect, to be sure--of bringing about a "substantial reduction" of American foreign economic aid commitments.

With this general background and consideration of strategy in mind, it is now time to consider the principal issues that might be debated.

- 119 - These are div"ided into three areas: first, questions concerning the soundness of economic aid programs in general, regardless of the identity of the donor or the channels; second, arguments concerning the particular aid programs of the United States (especially concerning its bilateral nature); and third, arguments over the soundness of g1ving American aid to particular recipient nations.

II. Foreign Economic Assistance: The General Issues. Although there was widespread consensus about the value of eco­ nomic aid in helping a war-torn world to recover in the late 1940's there are some major criticisms levelled today at the basic premises of any long­ range economic assistance program. In this section, we shall consider these general issues, before turning to the particular questions that have been raised about the current American foreign aid program. A. Foreign Aid Cannot Possibly Do the Whole Job. Some critics of the principle of large-scale, long-term foreign aid argue that economic development depends essentially upon indigenous factors; where the economy and resources of a nation favor rapid growth, it will come a�out witho� outside assistance, while the lack of these essential ingredients cannot be remedied by any amount of foreign assis­ tance. One factor behind this view is the huge "resource gap" between the capital presently available in underdeveloped nations, and the amount actually needed for substantial economic development. Estimates of this gap range from a rather conservative $3-4 billion per year 1/ to a some­ what higher $20 billion. 2/ Obviously the developed nations�annot fully meet this need without imposing a very heavy drain on their own economies, far heavier than any currently contemplated. Even if the basic resource gap could be temporarily filled, there is an even more serious question whether the income levels and standards of living of the people in the developing nations could be substantially improved. A former Undersecretary of State, a staunch supporter of American . aid programs, noted almost a decade ago that foreign aid "does not even assure that the peoples of the countries aided will share the benefits," in part because undemocratic regimes can sometimes skim the cream off eco­ nomic assistance "at the expense of the consuming and laboring public." �

!/ Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 142. Foreign Aid Through Private Initiative: Report of the Advisory Com­ mittee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1965), p. 2.

� Adolf A. Berle, A Primer of Foreign Relations (New York: Reynald and Company, 1957), p. 303.

- 120 - One economist has recently estimated that it would require over $100 bil­ lion annually just to raise the incomes of the 1.1 billion people of the underdeveloped nations to a modest $200 per year each. 1/ Moreover, not only are the populations of these countries growing rapidly, but the rate of growth is increasing sharply. Thus the indigenous gains in total in­ come "are being nearly offset, and in some cases more than offset, by growth of population. The rate of population growth is in most places enough to absorb the increase in aggregate incomes that will result from normal saving." 2/

These discouraging predictions stem in part from the view that the prerequisites of effective economic development are lacking in some of the less-developed nations. Experts point to the need for such in­ gredients as political stability, a degree of literacy, at least a small group of persons skilled in technical and managerial tasks, and an appre­ ciation of the needs and problems of economic development. Even some who support foreign assistance recognize that "one or more of these four fac­ tors is missing in most of the poor countries." 3/ Moreover, there are serious lacks of natural resources which cannot be remedied without a drastic change in the present patterns of world trade. 4/ The conclusion, therefore, is that even a substantially increased foreign aid program by the developed industrial nations would encounter built-in limits of a per­ vasive sort, and would reap only very limited accomplishments.

The supporters of present aid programs offer several responses: First, they point out that only through economic aid can the obviously necessary "economic infrastructure" ever be provided; the developing na­ tions are seldom able to provide it for themselves, and foreign private investors can be attracted only after the basic elements of economic develop­ ment have been built on an essentially nonprofit basis. 5/Second, they say the critics recognize. one vital need in the developing nations is for certain economic reforms. So far the economic aid programs, and the condi­ tions attached to them, have been a quite effective catalyst for inducing such reforms. The Alliance for Progress, for example, has succeeded in promoting much needed reforms in the tax structures and land-ownership

1/ Testimony of Dr. Melchior Palyi Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 28, 1966 (distributed by the Citizens Foreign Aid Com­ mittee, Washington, D.C.), p. 1. y Edward C. Banfield, American Foreign Aid Doctrines (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1963), p. 7. J. Kenneth Galbraith, "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, 1961, pp. 444-57.

Banfield, op. cit., p. 11.

The AID Program, op. cit., p. 7.

- 121 - systems in certain less-developed Latin American nations. 1/ These changes are deemed essential to progressive long-range economic development; yet they would have been unlikely without the assistance and insistence of the United States. Third, foreign aid has undoubtedly stimulated self-help and self-development in recipient nations. Self-help is increasingly a condition of American assistance; aid must be accompanied, President John­ son has recently reaffirmed, "by a major effort on the part of those who receive it." 2/ Accordingly, AID reported recently that the twenty nations receiving the-largest amounts of American assistance "invest, on the aver­ age, six dollars of their own for every one dollar of U.S. assistance re­ ceived." 3/

Finally, the proponents of foreign aid argue that the critics expect too much of the pre·sent programs in terms of inunediate economic de­ velopment. Two expert observers have pointed out, for example, that

... even at a growth rate of only 1 percent per year the standard of living will double in two gen­ erations and we should .not ignore the importance one generation may attribute to prospects for improvement in the lot of its children, especially in peasant societies. And 1 percent compounded over fifty years performs miracles, especially since, as the process goes on, the percentages will probably grow. ii

Thus the supporters of long-range aid reply that economic assistance will at the very least do some good which would otherwise not be done; that the pace of economic development is likely to quicken with time; and that to expect short-run miracles, as some of the critics seem to, is to demand too much of an aid program.

B. Economic Assistance Programs Harm the Donor Nation. A quite different line of criticism holds that foreign aid pro­ grams are simply more costly than they are worth. Such programs may be financed either out of current tax revenues, or by borrowing from future

!f The Alliance for Progress ... An American Partnership, op. cit., p. 9; Agency for International Development, The Foreign Assistance Program: Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 13.

2/ Message from the President of the United States on Food for Freedom, February 10, 1966, p. 1. (Mimeographed. Available from AID.)

3/ Proposed Economic Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit., p. 49. ii Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key To An Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 21.

- 122 - generations through the national debt. In either event, charges conserva­ tive economist Henry Hazlitt, "foreign aid must put back the donor country's capital development." 1/ Moreover, massive foreign aid poses a threat to an already serious American balance-of-payments problem: although American ex­ ports are still above the import level, other elements in the international payments situation--principally our foreign aid commitments--have created an unfavorable balance of payments. 2/ Thus, it would appear that reduction of the large aid item would help to bring our payments picture back into balance. Then, too, the economic development of assisted nations may build up compet­ itors as well as markets for American business; the net effect upon the Amer­ ican economy may well be adverse. Finally, the very availability of foreign aid funds--either in the form of outright grants or low-interest loans--may effectively .·remove otherwise profitable foreign opportunities for the invest­ ment of American venture capital. That is, foreign borrowers will be disin� clined to seek American capital at commercial interest rates when it is available through government sources at much lower rates. � The defenders of economic aid reply along two lines: First, that the economic effect of aid programs upon the donor nations is greatly exag­ gerated; and second, that even if such programs were harmful to the economy, they are still warranted--if not compelled--by overriding noneconomic consid­ erations. As for the economic effect of the aid program on the balance of payments, the analysis of the critics is said to be superficial and misleading: presently, a very large share of the aid funds froa the United States are "tied" or conditioned upon their expenditure for }&nerican-made goods, so that the net outflow of capital is far less than the gross amount. 4/ Indeed, nearly 90 percent of all aid funds return to the United States in this way. Moreover, by a complex process the funds that go through aid channels are likely to come in large part back to the United States even if they are not expressly conditioned on being spent for American goods.Sf In short, the view of the critics of the effect of a foreign aid program upon the national balance of payments is greatly exaggerated; while a large aid program may not actually benefit the national economy in this sense, it does not hurt nearly as much as might first appear to be the case.

!f Henry Hazlitt, "The Fallacy of Foreign Aid," The Freeman (February, 1966), pp. 44-45.

2/ U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Balance of Payments (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 13-32.

� Hazlitt, op. cit., p. 49. ii Howard S. Piquet, The U.S. Balance of Payments and International Monetary Reserves (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1966), p. 37; Proposed Economic Assistance Programs for. Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit., pp. 14-16.

§.! Walter S. Salant, et al., The United States Balance of Payments in 1968 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963) , p. 161.

- 123 - Even if such a program does injure the donor nation economically, proponents of foreign aid maintain that there are more important values involved. President Kennedy, in his inaugural address, proclaimed that the United States gives aid to less-developed peoples "for whatever period is required--not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right." ·In the same year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee affirmed that "foreign aid is both an unavoid­ able responsibility and a central instrument of our foreign policy. It is dictated by the hard logic of the cold war and by a moral responsibility resulting from poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, feudalism, strife, revolution, chronic instability and life without hope." 1/ Thus, whatever the costs, it appears that the United States, at least, is committed to a substantial foreign aid program for largely noneconomic reasons.

In addition to the general humanitarian goals of a foreign aid program, there are more specific objectives and values of a non-material sort. One of the overriding aims of the American program has been to re­ lieve the effects of disasters, whether of natural or human causation. Such emergency relief has been one of the particular objectives of the Food for Peace program, anµ will continue to guide the Food for Freedom program. 2/ Even the critics concede the legitimacy of this goal, which has been paramount in the American aid program from the beginning. 3/

C. Foreign Aid May Harm the Receiving Nations.

Some of the harshest critics of foreign aid argue that the nation which receives the aid may suffer from large injections of outside funds. Among other effects, there may be political hassles and intrigues touched off by the mere availability of such large new funds. In some nations, "like Iraq in 1959, or Thailand in 1966, such aid given in excess may actually have tended to rob the government that received it of legitimacy. In such cases.aid actually functions as the initiator of political insta­ bility." 4/ Moreover, it may be that the reliance which foreign aid places upon the public or·governmental sector of the receiving nation's economy will stunt the growth of the private sector, and incline the country un­ naturally toward socialism. �

Quoted in John Paton Davies, Jr., Foreign and Other Affairs (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1961), p. 21.

2/ Food for Peace ... Building a Better World (Washington: Age�cy for International Development, 1963), pp. 10-12.

Rubin, op. cit., p. 12. Edmund -Stillman and William Pfaff, Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 217.

5/ Hazlitt, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

- 124 - There may be economic as well as political repercussions for the receiving nation. We have already considered the problems raised by the lack of an economic infrastructure in the least-developed countries. In addition, it has been argued that large injections of foreign assistance may compel politically unrealistic leve'is of private saving as the price of development; 1/ and may produce economic frustrations, instability, and setbacks rather than progress if such aid "raises the level of expectation in a country without affording a steady accompanying rate of increase in actual satisfaction." 2/ That is, if the rate of economic input is too rapid for the system to absorb and digest comfortably, it may have the ef­ fect of a sudden heavy shower when a gradual rain is really needed. Finally, the emphasis on the public sector and the red tape which are almost un­ avoidable in a government-to-government aid program may be wasteful of re­ sources as well as causing political instability. 3/

The answers to these criticisms draw largely from arguments we have already considered: Whatever may be the undesirable collateral ef­ fects of an aid program, even if inevitable, they are likely eventually to be outweighed by the benefits. In most of the nations to which aid goes, complete self-development at this stage would be slow and painful if not impossible; thus transitional instability does not seem too high a price to pay for solid eventual progress. Second, the insistence that economic development should rely upon the private sector may be unrealis­ tic: "In many situations a favorable economic environment for private in­ vestment can be established only after a period of rather heavy capital formation under government auspices." 4/ Third, many of the.criticisms just considered are not inherent in any nation's foreign aid program. If, for example, the problem arises from a too rapid injection of outside cap­ ital, then one of the goals of the program should be gradualism. Greater care in the relations between the donor government and the donee may avoid some of the threats of instability about which the critics are concerned. Finally, an aid-giving nation may simply have to accept the fact that eco­ nomic development does not necessarily encourage stability: "Economic de­ velopment efforts create potential unrest by dislodging convictions and habit patterns which have in the past insured stability." 5/ We must, in other words, not confuse the goals of progress and stability, for in some respects they are incompatible.

y Banfield, o:e. cit., p. 17. y Ibid., p. 15.

3/ Hazlitt, OE· cit., p. 49. 4/ Millikan and Rostow, o:e. cit., pp. 14-15. 5/ Ibid., p. 22.

- 125 - III. American Bilateral Foreign Aid: The Particular Issues. A. Introduction.

In the previous section, we considered arguments which affect the general principle of economic assistance. Most of the criticism of American aid does not focus at that level; rather, the bulk of criticism is directed against the bilateral character of American assistance. Some who indict the program because it is largely bilateral urge that such aid should be discontinued altogether; others urge that it should be rechanneled through international organizations such as the United Nations. The use of such channels may not provide all the answers of course, as some of the arguments considered in Chapter III suggested. In this section we are concerned more with the criticisms as such than with the solutions which those criticisms may call forth. The arguments can be grouped under three general headings: (1) political relations between the United States and the donees; (2) polit­ ical relations between the United States and the Soviet bloc; and (3) the efficiency of the aid itself.

B. Bilateral Aid Creates Tensions Between the United States and the Recipient Nations.

The United States has long since accepted the fact that foreign aid does not always win friends and influence people, particularly in the underdeveloped world. In fact, the giving of aid is sometimes a source of irritation and resentment. Sen. J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Cammittee, has absented that "so long as our loans remain on a bilateral basis, they will tend to irritate our political rela­ tions with borrowing countries. It is a rather embarrassing thing, for both countries, to go to a friend to borrow money." 1/ India's late Prime Minister Nehru once regretted "the mentality of the receiver of the dole and the giver of the dole," adding "that mentality is not good for either party and it makes people rather indolent and waiting for things to happen, for others to do them." 2/ One careful observer of the effects of the American foreign aid program recently remarked that: Asians' resentment at the presence of large self-contained groups of Americans in their midst may result from factors unrelated to the behavior of the technicians themselves. Self-consciousness over being in an 'inferior' position as receivers of advice and funds, an overreaction against the colonial traditions of Western nations... would ac­ count for much of it, quite apart from Communist and traditionalist anti-Western propaganda. �

1/ Fulbright statement, lac. cit.

2/ Quoted in Davies, op. cit., p. 23.

3/ John o: Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 174.

- 126 - \ Two factors are identifiable at the root of such distrust or re­ sentment: first, the fear that continuing dependence on American aid will compromise the neutrality of the receiving nation; and second, direct re­ sentment of the conditions often attached to American aid. On the first point, one expert notes that newly independent nations "are frequently re­ luctant to become too dependent for assistance on the United States and its NATO allies on the one side or the Communist world on the other." 1/ Smouldering hostility of this type recently came to the surface in the­ report of a Latin American advisory council concerning the role of the Alliance for Progress. Although the Alliance has been international or multilateral in theory, the advisors concluded that the organization was in reality a bilateral arrangement under American domination. "The group felt," reported The New York Times, "that the Alliance was relying too much on bilateral arrangements between the United States and individual members." 2/ This hostility also affects relations between present or pros­ pective receivers of American aid, such as India and Pakistan, and Israel and the Arab nations. The New York Times recently observed that American aid seemed to have increased tensions and friction in South Asia: "Inev­ itably, as long as aid was extended on a bilateral basis, certain fric­ tions developed, in part because of Indian and Pakistani dependence on American aid, and in part because of the tendency of the United States to recommend certain internal economic reforms as conditions for aid." 3/ In the Middle East, the problems have been even worse. When an urgent plea came for American aid from the Government of Yemen, an Arab nation, the United States delayed for some months because of fear of political repercussions. There was particular concern that giving aid to the Roy­ alist Government of Yemen would antagonize President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. Thus the difficulty was to find "some way to feed the hungry without offending Arab leaders in the region or causing further diplomatic complications for the United States in the Middle East." if

The other major source of resentment and irritation about Amer­ ican aid is the conditions it often carries. Some conditions only seek to make sure that the aid goes for the purposes for which it is designated; these cause little antagonism. More troublesome, however, are various conditions designed to protect American economic interests or the balance­ of-payments position--requiring, for example, that aid funds be used to purchase only American goods, or that American insurance or American y Gardner, op. cit., p. 117. y April 27, 1966, p. 26, col. 2.

3/ April 13, 1966, p. 11, col. 1. y The New York Times, May 25, 1966, p. 2, cols, 4-5.

- 127 - shipping be used; and conditions designed to achieve a variety of American political and policy aims, such as those which favor the use of private rather than public enterprise, which cut off aid to countries trading in certain materials with Communist nations, which make receipt of aid con­ tingent on political or economic reforms within the donee country, and so on.y

Such conditions are, of course, not imposed without thought and a felt need in terms of American foreign policy or economics. But they do produce resentment, and make the acceptance of American aid more dif­ ficult in some parts of the world. One expert observes that "the United States and other high-income countries are.•. gravely handicapped--in some countries, indeed, we are effectively debarred from participation and in­ fluence in these decisions--by the bilateral groove in which most of our efforts in support of economic development have been caught." The reason for this difficulty, he explains, is that new nations, sensitive about their independence, are "normally... afraid to let a powerful foreign gov­ ernment participate in the consideration of such basic questions" as the conditions often involve. 2/ Moreover, there is a practical problem about the use and enforcement of-such conditions: "The most important fact about American 'strings' is that the various sanctions available to U.S. aid administrators are either too severe or too trivial to be effective. With­ drawing a program or even withholding funds for a period defeats the ob­ ject of the aid, a fact well known to both parties." 3/ Thus the attach­ ment of conditions, however necessary it may seem in terms of domestic interests, may jeopardize the full effectiveness of bilateral American aid. There is a final criticism of bilateral aid in this general area: Bilateral aid commitments seriously impair the flexibility of American for­ eign policy. Once commitments have been made to a particular government for economic development, it may prove very difficult not only to alter or reduce those commitments, but even to change the overall relationship with that government if domestic or diplomatic conditions should change. Sen. Fulbright has argued that "our close identification with particular regimes, through bilateral aid programs, inhibits us from establishing the kind of relations and rapport we need with the successor government." ±f Recently, Sen. Fulbright suggested even more pointedly that "bilateral programs tend to identify us with particular regimes and in a way make us prisoners of small countries." His special concern is that "our Viet Nam intervention started out with a relatively modest aid program." Secretary of State Dean

1/ On conditions, see generally, Mason, op. cit., pp. 41-51.

'!:f Cleveland, op. cit., p. 57. � Montgomery, op. cit., p. 106. ±f Fulbright statement, loc. cit.

- 128 - \

Rusk has responded that our involvement i� Viet Nam had little to do with our aid program, but derives from other foreign policy interests. !f

To these attacks, proponents of American aid programs offer a number of responses. First, and perhaps most obviously, few of these ar­ guments are directed at the substance of the aid program, but only at its fonn. Many of the problems, to the extent they do exist, could be over­ come by greater care in the design 1.and administration of the aid program,by the elimination or relaxation of the most onerous or offensive conditions, and by closer cooperation with recipient nations on a basis of equality. Not enough has yet been done to try to alleviate the basis of the criti­ cisms, in short, to conclude that bilateralism is inherently unworkable even in the most sensitive area . { \ .. The proponents also reply that the critics have exaggerated the problem. Whatever the nature of the conditions attached to Aµierican aid, Dean Edward S. Mason reports that none of these conditions "can be said seriously to impair the. usefulness of aid to recipient countries." y Another.observer adds that: ° •..fears of strings on aid have subsided markedly as the number of nations and agencies in the aid-dispensing business has increased. Re­ ceiving governments that think they are chafing under Western or Eastern restrictions can buy lee­ way by threatening to switch their patronage. More­ over, by drawing on both sources, they can protect themselves from opposition charges of being pro­ Western or pro-Eastern.�

These considerations may help to explain why vigorously neutral nations like the United Arab Republic would accept American aid willingly, despite the attachment of conditions. 4/

If the conditions really are onerous, which seems questionable, proponents of bilateral aid argue that some of them are absolutely neces­ sary. This is clearest, of course, with reg.ard to military aid and the categories of economic aid that serve military-related purposes. Even with assistance which is not quite so sensitive, control is needed through conditions, even though of course "strings attached to the foreign aid purse cannot be drawn as tightly as those tied to domestic appropriations."5/ Without conditions of any kind, there is the danger t·hat American aid "may - !f The New York Times, April 19, 1966, p. 1, col. 6; p. 4, col. 4. y Mason, op. cit., p. 42.

3/ Asher, op. cit., p. 703.

4/ The New York Times, March 20, 1966, p. 22, col. 1.

� Montgomery, op. cit., p. 105.

- 129 - mean that a shaky or corrupt government is bolstered up, or that an in­ adequate and oppressive government economic group increases its take at the expense of the consuming and laboring public." 1/ Thus it may be that conditions are simply unavoidable, whatever the cost to the acceptability of our aid. Supporters of the existing aid programs, with conditions, thus conclude that the criticisms are on the one hand greatly exaggerated, and on the other hand can largely be met without substantially reducing the American economic commitments.

C. Bilateral Aid Intensifies East-West Tensions.

Just as the Cold War involves an arms race, it has also come to involve an aid race. The Russian aid program has partially imitated the American program (although in much smaller amounts) because "the American foreign aid has become an almost inevitable diplomatic tool in today's world." 2/ During the late 1950's, "competition with the Soviet Union soon became a-new and important corollary of American aid," 3/ and that compe­ tition· has abated little since then. . Aid-receiving nations are sometimes able to play the two great powers off against one another, and thus nearly double their aid intake simply because of the competitive element. 4/ Thus, the argument runs, present bilateral aid programs not only widen the sphere of the Cold War, but also increase the sensitivity and the possible reper­ cussions attaching to the acceptance of American aid. There are several arguments on the other side. First, the ob­ jection may have force only if one assumes the purpose of the aid program is to "win the Cold War" or to "win friends," an assumption which may be unsound. Second, the present arrangement not only allows neutral nations to remain neutral by taking aid from both sides, but probably channels a good deal more aid from the developed"""'t'"c>the underdeveloped regions than would be the case without such competition between the great powers. Third, the very presence of the Soviet political competition in the aid field may make it impossible for the United States to withdraw: "To point to the consequences should the United States withdraw and leave the field to the Soviet Union became the most effective single argument for continuing Amer­ ican aid."5/ Finally, the aid competition is only a very small part of the total Cold War conflict, and a relatively constructive one at that; the termination of this competition would be unlikely by itself to promote dramatically better relations between East and West.

y Berle, loc. cit., 2/ Stillman and Pfaff, loc. cit. y Andrew F. Westwood, Foreign Aid In A Foreign Policy Framework (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 60. Asher, op. cit., p. 702. Westwood, op. cit., p. 61.

- 130 - D. The American Bilateral Aid Program Represents Relatively Inefficient Use of Aid Funds.

It · is someUmes said that the efficiency of the American aid dollar could be substantially improved in several respects by talcing it out of the present channels. Several factors offer the poss�bility of such greater efficienC.y: (1) Other channels, especially. :L11t,ernational channers, would provide better coordination and the elimination of cross­ purposes which plague many of the developed nations participating in such programs currently: "A multilateral approach... minimizes the danger of 'development' programs being twisted into instruments of commercial ri- valry among the industrial nations outside the Soviet bloc." 1/ (2) Inter­ national channels would promote a more equitable distribution of the aid burden among the developed nations. Although a considerable number of Western nations do participate to some degree, 2/ the United States still carries the lion's share of the economic development burden. It has been argued that if the United States gave stronger support to international channels, other industrial nations would do likewise; on the other hand, these other nations may in any event "prefer keeping a tight rein on for- eign aid funds to make certain that they will be spent for their goods. "3/ (3) Use of international channels would gather and better distribute a - worldwide pool of skills and resources. The pooling and sharing of eco- nomic aid funds through multilateral channels would be bound to bring about a degree of specialization that is presently impossible. An international organization has access to all the skills and techniques needed for develop­ ment problems. One expert notes that "in many cases, internationally recruit­ ed teams of experts are not only less expensive, they provide language skills and experience more relevant to conditions existing in less developed coun­ tries than would be available in a team recruited in one aid-giving country alone. "4/ ( 4) International organizations and agencies. can deal more effectively with regional problems as such. Multilateral approaches have been shown more effective in dealing with trans-national problems, such as the Indus River Basin development program.SI

There are many arguments against the use of international channels, i.e., in favor of the continued use of bilateral aid commitments and programs.

!f Cleveland, op. cit., p. 58. '!:./ Non-U.S. Aid Programs: Free World--Communist (Washington: Agency for International Development, n.d.), pp. 1-4. Y Dickinson, op. cit. , p. 895. � Gardner, loc. cit.

5/ Asher, op. cit., pp. 701-02.

- 131 - Some of these have to do with the use of any multilateral channels; others concern the United Nations or other particular agencies. Since most of the latter have been considered in Chapter III (arguments for American with­ drawal from the U.N. would be virtually the same as arguments against in­ creasing U.N. aid contributions), we can concentrate here on the more gen­ eral arguments. They fall into sever.al headings:

First, there is the fear of losing American control over funds that go through multilateral channels. One observer suggests that "the unwillingness to use the United Nations as a channel for financial aid is undoubtedly due for the most part to the belief that bilateral aid can better promote a country's foreign policy and to the desire to concentrate aid in particular countries." 1/ Probably most serious would be the loss of power to control the seiect1on and administration of particular projects and programs. Except to the very limited extent that the United States could still influence the policies of an international organization, the kinds of control reflected in the concentration of the current American aid budget, and the conditions attached to American aid, would drop out of the picture. Even in the Alliance for Progress, where American influence is much stronger and more direct than in the truly international organiza­ tions, it is reported that "Congress is disturbed by the fact that the ar­ rangement weakens Washington's ability to require the social and economic reforms that were to be at the heart of the Alliance for Progress." y

A second objection concerns the effect upon the United States balance of payments. The current large aid program is kept from having a very serious adverse effect on our international payments position chiefly through the "buy American" restrictions. If these conditions could no longer be imposed--as they almost certainly could not--then the adverse payments effect would be avoided only to the extent that American aid would eventually find its way back to American markets even without being so tied. Almost certainly the international payments position would suffer somewhat if this present purchasing-control device were lost. A third control that would be lost is the power to concentrate and direct American aid for essen­ tially political purposes--for example, to Southeast Asia at the present time. There are those like Sen. Fulbright who feel that such concentra­ tion is both unwise and illusory. But there is no µoubt that if all Amer� ican aid, including the supporting.assistance and other categories which are widely used for such purposes, were sent through international channels, the loss of such control would be a substantial objection. Finally, the termination or substantial reduction of American bilateral aid might jeopardize the ability of the United States to experi­ ment and innovate, and to develop new programs like the American Peace

1/ Blough, op. cit., p. 578.

2/ Dickinson, loc. d t ..

- 132 - Corps and Point IV. At the same time, though, the specialized international agencies, like the Children's Fund and the World Health Organization, have done their share of trail-blazing. So the net loss in this area may be much less significant than in some of the other areas where American control is at stake.

These objections suggest that the affirmative may wish to re­ tain bilateral control over certain types of American aid--principally military assistance and those categories of economic aid (supporting as­ sistance and the contingency fund) which are used for substantially similar purposes. While a reduction or transfer limited to the other categories of aid would obviously be less "substantial" than the channeling of all American aid through international organizations, the objections to such a less drastic step would be less serious. The major strategic question which remains, of course, is at what point such an affirmative approach ceases to be a "substantial reduction" and becomes a mere "transfer."

IV. American Aid to Communist Countries.

A. Introduction.

There is a special controversy over American aid to Communist na­ tions, especially Poland and Yugoslavia (the only Soviet-bloc nations to receive any significant assistance in recent years). American aid to these countries, which will be briefly described here, should be distinguished from two other related issues about American foreign policy: first, the controversy about aid to dictators and other ·undemocratic regimes, which will be considered in Chapter V; and second, the restrictions imposed by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act) on aid to nations which trade in certain strategic materials with the Communist bloc. 1/ We are concerned here only with American economic aid to the two Communist countries presently affected.

The question whether such countries are to receive aid has been left largely in the President's hands. Aid may be provided to Communist countries under executive discretion if the President finds and reports promptly to Congress (1) that such assistance is vital to the security of the United States; (2) that the recipient country is not controlled by the international Communist conspiracy; or (3) that such assistance will further promote the independence of the recipient country from international commu­ nism. Developments in both Poland and Yugoslavia since the mid-1950's have inclined several Presidents to make the requisite findings and to recommend limited amounts of aid. (In the case of Yugoslavia, 1956 legislation re­ quires certain special findings, including a determination that there has been no change in the Yugoslavian policies which warranted aid in the

!/ The Battle Act Report--1965 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

- 133 - past.)!/ Despite persistent attempts to terminate this presidential authority, the provision has remained in the statute and has been in­ voked sparingly on a year-to-year basis.

B. Aid to Communist Countries and American Foreign Policy Objectives.

It is often argued that giving American aid to Communist coun­ tries, whatever the potential for inducing their independence, is incom­ patible with the basic aims of the American aid program. Former Repre­ seJ!tative Walter H. Judd·, for example, has urged that instead of supporting Communist governments who partially share the hostility of the Soviet Union toward our government, "we can do it better by showing the people behind the Iron Curtain who... are the most dependable allies we have, that America is not going to use her resources to sustain or build up the tyrants who hold them in subjugation." 2/ On the other hand, government spokesmen re­ ply that the argument misconceives the general purpose of the aid program and the particular purpose of assisting such countries:

In assisting Yugoslavia we do not endorse its form of government, nor the philosophy upon which its government is based. Our aid is offered rather because Yugoslavia continues to be independent of Soviet control and has needed assistance to continue its independence...• Our aid to Yugoslavia has helped to bring about the loosening of the bonds upon the once-free nations of Eastern Europe. It has helped to create problems for Communist leaders which they have not been able to resolve. 3/

C. Aid to Comiil.urtist Countries and Their Internal Policies.

One objection to such aid is that it has failed to liberalize, or to "democratize" the internal policies of those nations. Although criti�s concede that following his initial split with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's Tito did liberalize his government and instituted some reforms, recent events--such as the jailing of leading Yugoslav writer Milovan Djilas--· suggest that the momentum for reform has slowed considerably or even re­ versed. 4/ Moreover, it is argued that such liberalization as did occur had nothing to do with American policy or economic aid, and that continued aid affords no lever for continued .liberalization. y See generally Milorad M. Drachkovitch, United States Aid to Yugoslavia and Poland: Analysis of a Controversy (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1963), pp. 3-39.

2/ Ibid., p. vi.

3/ Ibid., p. 18.

4/ Ibid., pp. 42, 65.

- 134 - On the other hand, proponents of such aid argue that travel, conununications, and artistic life generally have become gradually freer in Yugoslavia--whether or not these trends can be attributed to American aid. One reporter observed,. for example, that "Tito has now carried his people so far from the Soviet camp that he could not turn back even if he wanted to--which he plainly does not." 1/ And in the same vein, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., noted that "the Polish and Yugoslav Conununists are openly proud that their Conununism is more free, pragmatic, and humane (i.e., less Conununistic) than Conununism anywhere else. Poland and Yugo­ slavia forced this observer to concede the feasibility of what I had al- ·ways previously supposed to be impossible--liberal Conununism." 2/

D. Aid to Conununist Countries and Their External Policies. On the one hand, critics of aid to these countries argue that no amount of American economic influence has been able to, or is likely to, alter the foreign policies of the recipient nations. Neither has the link between these nations and the Soviet Union significantly weakened since the giving of American aid, nor has the relationship between these nations and the United States significantly improved. In fact, Sen. William Proxmire charges that Titoism has promoted Soviet interests in the neutral nations of Asia and Africa "by inspiring and supporting attitudes in those countries which are detrimental to the basic interests in the West." 3/ Moreover, Sen.· Thomas Dodd notes that while we have aided Yugoslavia, that natio_n "has been spending hundreds of millions of dollars on foreign aid programs of its own, geared to the expansion of neutralist influence in the non-Conununist world••.. In short, through our aid in Yugo­ slavia, we have in effect been underwriting the extension of anti-Western neutralism in the countries of Asia and Africa." 4/

Defenders of such aid reply along two lines: First, they ques­ tion whether aid is misdirected if it fails to bring the foreign policies of recipient nations into line with our.own. Second, they argue that in fact American aid has done some good, at least in the case of Yugoslavia:

Yugoslavia, it is clear, is pursuing an in­ dependent policy. While its foreign policy, in many instances, appears close to Soviet positions, Yugoslav policies are in fact independent and un­ aligned. This is shown by the fact that Yugoslavia

John Fischer, "The Editor's Easy Chair: Point of No Return?... A Puzzled Report From Yugoslavia," Harper's Magazine (July, 1961), p. 13.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Kremlin's Unruly Little Brothers," Harper's Magazine (February, 1960), p. 68. U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962, p. 9134. Ibid., p. 12038.

- 135 - does not give constant and unvarying support to Soviet foreign policy. There are important instances in which the Yugoslavs have opposed Soviet policies. !/

These, then, are the major arguments over the difficult policy question whether the United States should continue its aid to Conununist countries (which means, in practice, to Poland and Yugoslavia). The de­ bate over this issue implicates, of course, the central purposes of the American foreign aid program. The position that one takes on this partic­ ular question--monetarily at least a rather small component of the total aid program--will almost certainly reflect his basic views on the whole program. But there seem� little doubt that the total cessation of all such aid, and the termination of the presidential authority to extend such aid in the future, would indeed constitute a "substantial reduction" in American foreign policy commitments.

Statement of William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, State Department Bulletin, June 17, 1963, p. 949.

- 136 - DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. How important is it, in debating this resolution, to identify the various elements of the American economic aid program? Is it not impor­ tant at least to identify, at the outset, those par:t;;, oJ the economic assis­ tance program the elimination or curtailment of which would represent sub­ stantial reductions in American foreign policy commitments?

2. What does the high degree of concentration of American aid in a rather small number of receiving .countries indicate about the relationship between foreign policy and the economic aid program? What does the strong American preference for bilateral rather than multilateral aid channels indi­ cate about this relationship?

3. To what extent, and in what ways, do the agencies of foreign-. policy making discussed in Chapter II appear to influence the allocation and administration of American economic aid? What agencies other than the State Department, and its Agency for International Development, are directly involved in the aid program?

4. How accurate is it to say that the ultimate goal of the Ameri­ can foreign aid program is to put itself out of business? If this is an accurate statement, what does this indicate about the foreign policy goals which guide and shape the aid program? How successful has the program been so far in achieving this objective? 5. Would a transfer of the bulk of American economic aid from bilateral to multilateral channels (for example, sending most of it through the specialized agencies of the United Nations) represent a substantial reduction of American foreign policy commitments?

6. In what way would the tightening of the conditions attached to American aid funds serve to reduce the extent of the aid program? Could such changes in the conditions thus be said to constitute a reduction of American foreign policy commitments?

7. How sound is the argument that large economic aid programs inJure the economy of the donor country? What attempts has the United States made to check these effects, and how realistic are those steps? Are there any circumstances in which domestic economic conditions would actually be improved by a large economic aid program to other nations?

8. Under what conditions, and for what reasons, may a large foreign aid program injure the economy of the receiving nation? Should that possible injury be any concern of the donor nation, or should the donor simply rely upon the recipient to look out for its own national interests?

- 137 - 9. How relevant is it that economic assistance cannot raise the world standard of living very much or very fast, if indeed at all? Is it fair to judge economic aid on such grounds? How long should one wait before determining the success or failure of a·program of assistance to an under­ developed nation?

10. Would it be sound for an industrial nation to provide economic assistance to less developed nations even if the net economic effect on the donor were adverse? What likelihood is there that economic aid can be made to serve long-range political aims of the industrial nations, without being tied to short-range conditions affecting the internal affairs of the recip­ ient nations?

11. When the giving of any aid to a particular region or pair of nations--Israel and the Arab nations, or India and Pakistan, for example-­ is likely to increase both the tensions between the recipients, and between the recipients and the United States, what policy should the United States follow?

12. To what extent are the tensions and resentments created by certain American aid programs inherent in the whole operation? To what extent, and in what ways, could they be alleviated by certain changes in the design or administration of the program? 13. Why does the United States attach conditions or strings to its economic aid if they create resentment and cause some nations even to reject certain forms of assistance? Can the purposes which the conditions seek to serve be achieved· in other less onerous ways?

14. How significant a factor in the East-West conflict is the aid program of the United States?. Would competition with the Soviet Union, and the possible risk of war, be materially reduced by channeling all United States economic aid through the United Nations? Would other nations be likely to follow if the United States took the lead in that direction?

15. Would aid through international or multilateral channels be likely to be more or less efficient? Or should a nation ideally allocate some aid bilaterally, and some through multilateral channels.

16. What devices or approaches are available to the United States to check or alleviate the possible loss of control that would come through sending the bulk of our economic aid through the United Nations and its affiliates? 17. If an affirmative advocates the termination of some part or all of the present bilateral aid programs, should it go on to propose_so�e specific plan for the use of multilaterial channels--e.g., a new specialized agency within the United Nations to coordinate economic development?

- 138 - 18. Are the issues raised by American aid to Poland and Yugoslavia essentially moral, or political, or economic? What criteria should be applied--perhaps in addition to those which are required by the applicable statute--to determine whether giving aid to such Communist nations serves the United States' national interests?

19. What effect is continued American aid to Poland and Yugoslavia likely to have--if any--upon other nations that receive larger amounts of American assistance? Should this consideration even be relevant?

- 139 - BIBLIOGRAPHY There is a wealth of published material on the subject of American foreign economic policy, and particularly the foreign aid program which we have discussed in this chapter. Perhaps the most critical materials are those we have listed at the end of this bibliography--the primary sources, mostly United States Government publications distributed either by the Government Printing Office or by the Public Information Office of the Agency for International Development. These materials are generally available without charge. The one caveat that should accompany the listing of them is rather obvious: Since these are government statements, they present only the favorable side of the foreign aid controversy. While they are reliable to the extent they are descriptive, some caution should be used in reading the hortatory of judgmental components of the government mate­ rials, bearing in mind that these are designed to state the government's case most favorably.

The balance of the bibliography lists secondary works--books and articles about the foreign aid program, studies of particular aid programs, personal memoirs of participants in the program, and the like. Most of the criticism of the aid program--essential to the construction of any affirma­ tive case--will have to be found in these secondary materials. The fact is that there have been remarkably few full-dress attacks on the aid program in recent years. The criticisms tend to be rather minor, for the critics now largely accept the basic premises. Thus the debater will have to do a good deal of reading before he can develop and present a broad-gauged case against the American foreign aid commitments. It is with an appreciation of that task that we offer a rather extensive list of secondary references.

A. BOOKS Basch, Antonin. Financing Economic Development. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964.

Benham, Frederic C. Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Black, Eugene R. The Diplomacy of Economic Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Cleveland, Harlan (ed.). The Promise of World Tensions. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961. Drachkovitch, Milorad M. United States Aid to Yugoslavia and Poland: Analysis of A Controversy. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1963.

Feis, Herbert. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964.

- 140 - Gardner, Richard N. I� Pursuit of World Order. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Goldwin, Robert A. (ed.) Why Foreign Aid? New York: Rand, McNally & Co., 1963. Kenen, Peter B. Giant Among Nations: Problems of United States Foreign Economic Policy. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960. Krause, Walter. Economic Development. San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1961. Mason, Edward S. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Millikan, Max F. and Blackmer, Donald L. (eds.). The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961. Montgomery, John D. The Politics of Foreign Aid. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Ranis, Gustav (ed.). The United States and the Developing Economies. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1964. Rubin, Jacob A. Your Hundred Billion Dollars: The Complete Story of American Foreign Aid. Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964. Stoessinger, John G. The Might of Nations (rev. ed.). New York: Random House, 1965. Tully, Andrew and Britten, Milton. Where Did Your Money Go? The Foreign Aid Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964. Ward, Barbara. The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962. Westwood, Andrew F. Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966.

B. STUDIES, ARTICLES, AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS Banfield, Edward C. American Foreign Aid Doctrines. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1963. Bell, David E. "The Foreign Aid Program for 1966," Department of State Bulletin. (March 8, 1965), pp. 343-48.

Bell, David E. "A Reply to Opponents of Foreign Aid," New York Times Magazine (September 1, 1963), pp. 9, 36-39. "Focus on Foreign Aid," Intercom (July, 1963), pp. ll;...72, (Published by the Foreign Policy Association).

- 141 - ·Friedman, Milton J. "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives," Yale Review (Summer, 1958), pp. 500-16. Jacobs, Norman, et al. Understanding Foreign Aid. New York: Foreign Policy Association (Headline Series No. 160), 1963.

Morgenthau, Hans. "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review (June, 1962), pp. 301-09. ·

Morley, Lorna and Morley, Felix. The Patchwork History of Foreign Aid. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1961.

Murphy, Charles J. V. "Foreign Aid: Billions in Search of a Good Reason," Fortune (March, 1963), pp. 126-30, 205-06, 209-12.

Peardon, Thomas P. (ed.) "The New Look in Foreign Aid," Proceedings of the Academy of Politi cal Science (January, 1962). New York: Columbia University, 1962. "Report of the Clay Committee on Foreign Aid: A Symposium," Political Science Quarterly (September, 1963), pp. 321-61. Rusk, Dean. "The Foreign Assistance Program for 1966," Department of State Bulletin (April 5, 1965), pp. 482--88.

Spalding, Allan. "Taking a Look at Foreign Aid," American Observer (February 15, 1965), pp. 1, 6, 7. Stanovnik, Janez. "Aid, Trade, and Economic Development: The Changing Political Context," Foreign Affairs (January, 1964), pp. 242-54.

Ward, Barbara. "Foreign Aid Has Succeeded," New York Times Magazine (Ju.ly 12, 1964), pp. 9, 18-19. Zupnick, Elliot. Primer of United States Foreign Economic Policy. New. York: Foreign Policy Association (Headline Series No. 169), February, 1965.

Government Publications:

Agency for International Development. The following publications are available without charge, so long as the supply lasts, from AID, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20523: A.I.D. and U.S. Voluntary Agencies: The Growing Partnership (1963). The AID Program (1964). (A basic description of the operation of the United States foreign assistance program, with particular attention to partfcular regions.)

- 142 - The Alliance for Progress..• An American Partnership (1965).

Food for Peace ••. Building a Better World (1963).

Facts About the Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1967 (1966).

The Foreign Assistance Program: Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965 (1966). (Most recent of a continui_ng series of annual reports.)

Non-U.S. Aid Programs: Free World--Communist (n.d.)

Operations Report: Data as of June 30, 1965 (1966). (Most recent issue of a series of regular reports containing extensive statis­ tical. data and numerous charts describing the AID program.)

Proposed Economic Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1967: Summary Presentation to the Congress (1966). (Available from U.S. Government Printing Office at modest cost.)

Economic Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1967: Summary Presentation to the Congress. (Available in book form by early summer from AID or U.S. Government Printing Office.)

Economic Report of the President. Transmitted to the Congress, January, 1966 (1966), ch. 6. (Available from U.S. Government Printing Office, $1.25.)

Food for Freedom (1966) (Departments of State and Agriculture.) (Available without charge from AID.)

Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 10871. (Available from U.S. Government Printing Office.)

Foreign Assistan·ce and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Available from U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office.)

"The Hand and the Heart of This Country," a Message by President Lyndon Johnson (April, 1964). (Available from U.S. Government Printing Office, 15¢.)

Message from the President of the United States Relative to Foreign Aid (February 1, 1966). (Available without charge from AID.)

Message from the President of the United States on Food for Freedom (February 10, 1966). (Available without charge from AID.)

Message from the President of the United States Relative to International Education and Health Programs (February 2, 1966). (Available without charge from AID.)

- 143 - The Scope and Distribution o f the United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs. Washington: Department of State, 1963. (This is the so-called Clay Committee Report.)

United States Balance of Payments. Washington: Department of Commerce, 1964. (Available from U.S. Government Printing Office, 25¢.)

United States Balance of Payments: Questions and Answers. Department of State Publication No. 7702, 1964. (Available from U.S. Government Printing Office, 15¢.)

- 144 - CHAPTER V

UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMITMENTS

Introductory Essay

In these two final chapters, we shall examine three primary areas of United States foreign policy commitments: (1) our policy in Viet Nam which will be dealt with in the next chapter, (2) those which commit us to defend Western Europe under NATO, and (3) our military assistance program. In our analysis of all three areas, we shall proceed from the premise that an overall American objective is to stop Communist expansion wherever it might occur. What we shall primarily examine is whether the number of American troops serving overseas or whether our military aid program should be substantially reduced. There are some major United States commitments such as those in the Middle East, Korea, and Nationalist China which we have decided not to deal with here extensively except insofar as they are a part of our military assistance program.

Let us now turn to our foreign policy commitments to defend Western Europe.

I. The Defense of Western Europe. In his press conference of February 21, 1966, President de Gaulle declared that NATO, as presently constituted, was no longer satisfactory to France. On March 8, President de Gaulle announced in a note to the United States Government that France would sever her ties with the military organi­ zation of NATO while remaining a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty. In this same note, the French President proclaimed that all NATO and U.S. bases on French soil must either be removed or placed under French command (the United States is now in the process of removing U.S. forces and closing its bases).

President de Gaulle's action was not unanticipated in other NATO capitals. It was his answer to a question raised on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years: Is NATO still necessary to defend Western Europe and, if so, should it remain as it is now constituted? Let us examine two aspects of this proposition: (1) should the military alliance be abandoned, and (2) should the United States continue to maintain its present troop commitments under NATO? A. Should NATO Be Discontinued?

As pointed out above, President de Gaulle says that he intends to have France remain a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty. What he has renounced is the collective defense arrangement (NATO) which was

- 145 - established later. He has suggested that the collective arrangement be replaced by a series of bilateral agreements between the NATO partners. Until now, however, France's NATO partners have not accepted the French President's proposal. Indeed, they have made the necessary arrangements to proceed without France. In this country, there is very little evidence of support for renouncing the North Atlantic Treaty. There is some support for de Gaulle's position. A recent editorial in the Chicago Tribune commented:

If we insist on defending western Europe, a verbal assurance would suffice, and a formal alliance and the presence of American forces would not be needed,.!/

On the other hand, Robert Strausz-Hup�, editor of Orbis, strongly defends the past and continued existence of NATO as follows:

1. The functional effectiveness of NATO as a military alliance can be deducted only from a non­ happening: the Soviets did not attack. An alliance which deters aggression is more effective than one which fights aggression;

2. A Europe without NATO would be a divided and not a united Europe. It would be the divided Europe of 1939 with one difference: it would be weak militarily. Such a Balkanized Europe would invite piecemeal aggression--the very tactics that the Communists have advanced to such a high state of perfection.

3. The idea is rejected which suggests the United States should shift from NATO partnership with Western Europe to collaboration with the Soviet Union. It is difficult to see why the Soviets should collaborate with the United States in any but trivial undertakings. The United States would have lost its European allies; the Soviets will still keep theirs, for the states of Eastern Europe are now free to terminate, of their own accord, the Warsaw Pact. In brief, the Soviet Union would grow relatively stronger, the United States relatively weaker. For a certainty, the liquidation of NATO would reduce the United States bargaining power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.2/

1/ July 24, 1966. y Robert Strausz-Hupe, "The World Without NATO," Orbis (Spring, 1966), pp. 79-90.

- 146 - Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State and a principal architect of NATO, testified before a Senate committee in April, 1966 that NATO, with or without France, must be maintained as a crucial weight in the East-West balance of power.!/ There is not enough power in Europe, he said, to balance the Soviet Union without the United States. He added that the United States is "the only real power in the world with a sense of responsibility. It's too bad, but it is a fact.... We ought not to be a cry baby about it." B. Should the United States Reduce Its Troop Commitment to Europe?

An issue which does have more support in this country than that of abandoning NATO altogether has been the proposal that the United States should reduce its military forces stationed in Europe. This issue was raised in Congress on July 27, 1966 by the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield. Sen. Mansfield advocated that the United States reduce its troops stationed in Europe from the present six divisions to one or two. Since the Mansfield proposal touched off a public debate, let us consider the reasons which have been advanced for and against this proposal. 1. U.S. Troop Reduction Might Ease Tensions With the Soviet Union. One of the reasons which Sen. Mansfield mentioned to support U.S. troop withdrawal was the "diminishing Soviet threat" to Western Europe. A related issue had been raised even earlier in an exchange of letters between Sen. Robert Kennedy (N.Y.) and Secretary of Defense Robert McNarnara.2/ Sen. Kennedy asked the Secretary of Defense if the United States would reduce its NATO force if the Soviets would reduce some of its forces in East Germany. McNamara replied to Kennedy that he did favor such a course in return for reciprocal action on the part of the Soviets.

General Lauris Norstad, who served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from 1956 to 1962, however, disagrees with the views of Robert McNarnara.3/ Norstad argues that Soviet troops could be moved back into Eastern Germany "overnight" while it would be much more difficult to quickly transport American forces across the Atlantic. "Does anyone in his right mind believe that if we cut down our forces in Europe that those forces are going back again?" the former NATO commander asked.

2. One U.S. Division Could Accomplish the Sarne Mission as Six. Those who advocate U.S. troop reduction in Western Europe also argue that a small American force can accomplish the same mission as the much larger number now stationed there. Prior to 1961, the generally agreed upon NATO strategy was primarily that of trip-wire--the smaller number of NATO forces would delay the larger Soviet forces and trigger swift use of American nuclear weapons.

!I Washington Evening Star, May 29, 1966. 'l:.J The Washington Post, June 22, 1966.

� The Washington Post, June 24, 1966.

- 147 - In 1961, the Kennedy Administration revised this strategy by adopting what became known as the posture of flexible response. This meant that con­ ventional forces would initially reply to any Soviet aggression before nuclear weapons might be introduced. It sought to offer alternative choices to a U.S. President faced with war but wishing to avoid a nuclear holocaust. President de Gaulle had no faith in this plan and the recent French with­ drawal has reduced the present NATO forces to twenty-three divisions.I/ The French withdrawal along with the fact that there has not been any NATO force increase (indeed a further reduction) has brought some to the view that NATO still relies upon the trip-wire program to deter Soviet aggression. The Amer­ ican servicemen and their dependents stationed in Europe, a total of nearly one million, are in effect in the position of hostages.2/ A French General is reported to have said, "The same number of Boy Scouts would do almost as well, so far as we are concerned. "3/ It is argued that the main casualty of a large-scale troop withdrawal from NATO would be the flexible response theory about how a war in Western Europe should be fought. A significant reduction in NATO's overall conventional strength would most certainly put an end to all ideas about a conventional defense and restore nuclear retal­ iation to good standing as official U.S. policy. But this too might not be unwelcome.as far as Europe.ans are concerned.if

On the other hand, a Washington Post editorial argues that this is a poor time to consider U.S. force reduction in Europe 5/ because it would tend to lend credence to the de Gaulle thesis that-the United States is not really reliable. A Washington Evening Star editorial contends that U.S. troop reduction would force the abandonment of flexible response. This editorial comments:

It is hard to believe the Kremlin would unleash an aggression which might bring massive nuclear power into play. Yet recent experience indicates that the next war� if there should be such a war, might not be fought with nuclear weapons. They were not used in Korea. They are not being used in Vietnam. And it

Y C. L. Sulzberger "To Have and to Have Not," The New York Times, June 26, 1966.

2/ Crosby S. Noyes, "Europeans View U.S. Troops as Nuclear Hostages," Washington Evening Star, August 4, 1966. y Washington Evening Star, �ugust 4, 1966. y Washington Evening Star, August 4, 1966.

5/ May 21, 1966.

- 148 - is quite conceivable that a new aggression in Europe would be on such a scale and of such a character as to prohibit their use there.!/

3. U.S. Force Reduction Could Offer Advantages Elsewhere. In Sen. Mansfield's speech cited above, he 'suggested certain other advantages that would flow from a U.S. troop reduction in Europe. He criticized what he called the "double standard" under which certain NATO powers had cut their military forces on the theory that the Soviet threat was easing while at the same time had raised the "hue and cry" over the suggestion that the U.S. must trim its Atlantic Alliance obligations. (The British, for instance, have announced that they plan to withdraw some 15,000 to 20,000 from Germany.) Sen. Mansfield suggested that troop reduction could ease U.S. balance-of-payments difficulties (U.S. troop costs in Europe average around $1.5 billion a year) and also free forces which could be employed in Viet Nam.

On the other hand, opponents of NATO �roop reduction argue that the balance-of-payment gains would not balance the harm to U.S. prestige.2/ President de Gaulle obviously would like to banish all American influence from the c9ntinent, and Soviet propaganda appears to aim at the same thing. But any substantial reduction of U.S. forces at this time would run the· risk of stimulating further disruption in NATO, new doubts about the Ameri­ can commitment. It also might tempt the Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact powers to view adventure in Europe. As to whether we can maintain our over:­ all global commitments in view of the war in Viet Nam, Secretary of Defense McNamara argued before a Senate committee that the U.S. was able to maintain its overall power.3/ The Secretary of Defense noted a rise in overall mili­ tary strength from-2.6 million men in December, 1964 to 3.1 million at the end of June, 1966. Mr. McNamara asserted that neither the United States commitment in places other than Viet Nam nor the strategic reserve in the Continental United States was being affected by the Viet Nam conflict. The . manpower drain caused by Viet Nam has been more than compensated by the increase in overali strength in the military establishment. The Viet Nam conflict, of course, has frequently raised the issue of our over commitment there to the detriment of our commitments elsewhere. In any case, we shall consider this issue again in the chapter which follows. Let us now turn to our military assistance program-�a program which presently affects all our military alliances and mutual security pacts except for NATO.

!/ May 2I, 1966.

� The Washington Post, May 21, 1966.

� The New York Times, August 26, 1966.

- 149 - II. United States Military Assistance Program.

A. What is Military Aid?

Military assistance in our foreign aid. covers delivery of defense articles (weapons and other military equipment) and services (training and maintenance), on a sale, lease, grant, or any other basis; financial contri­ butions to multilateral organizations for the construction of defense facil­ ities; financial assistance or expenses incident to U.S. participation in collective defense organizations; and finally detailing anned forces and other Department of Defense personnel to perform services of a non-combat nature. Over the past decade, the United States has distributed more than $20 billion worth of military hardware, ranging from missiles to revolvers, to nearly sixty nations.!/ This year, the Johnson Administration, as indi­ cated earlier, submitted-separate military and economic aid bills to Congress. The Kennedy Administration did this in 1961; however, the House of Representa­ tives again this year refused to pass these separate packages. The money requested in the military aid bill was reduced to approximately $917 million this year as against $1.17 billion last year. Actually, this year's entire military aid budget cannot be accurately esti­ mated because of the war in Viet Nam.2/ The appropriations for Viet Nam have been transferred to a separate budget and are subject to separate 1 egi.slation . Congressional action on the current military aid bill was not complete when this analysis was written. Because of this, we will use the 1965 Senate military aid testimony to break down military aid into its component parts. At the same time, we should keep in mind that the total amount of money proposed this year has been cut substantially; yet we will assume that the sections within the military aid program will remain about the same except that smaller amounts are probably requested in each part of the military aid proposal.

The 1965 military aid program requested $1.17 billion, $1 billion of which was designated the "baseline" program.3/ The money within the baseline program was to provide military assistance-to fifty-four nations. y The Washington Post, September 13, 1965. y Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1966.

� U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agency Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 143. (Hereafter referred to as Senate Appropriation Hearings--1965.)

- 150 - The remaining $170 million was to be used for special combat needs in Viet Nam and Laos--in addition funds also were to be allotted to those countries within the "baseline" program. Eleven key countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc (Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Viet Nam, Laos, the Philippines, and the Republics of China and Korea) were to receive 84 percent of the total "baseline" funds. the Administra­ tion divided the "baseline" program into six categorie� ." 'l'he first five included individual country programs only, and were designated Forward Defense, Alliance For Progress Security, Military Base Rights, Grant Aid Phase-Out, and Free World Orientation. The sixth category was named for its major components: U.S. Forces Support and Military Assistance Pro­ gram Administration. It also included various miscellaneous items not chargeable to individual country programs. 1. Forward Defense Programs. This category includes military assistance allotted to the eleven key countries located around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc.· The Administration points out that these countries receive 84 percent of the "baseline" funds because they supply the bulk of the·manpower required to hold the line against Communist intrusions. Adminis­ tration spokesmen argue that the eleven nations cannot maintain their defense forces without substantial U.S. 'military assistance.I/ None of the forward defense countries is economically capable of supportTng, within its own resources, a modern military establishment. The average per capita gross national product of these eleven countries is $168.55, compared with $3,239 for the United States. And while their per capita gross national product is only one-twentieth of ours, the percentage of the gross national product which they spend for defense is more than 50 percent of ours. Considering the relative burden, it is argued that these nations make substantial efforts to help themselves.

2. Alliance for Progress Security. In this category about 6 per­ cent ($77.3 million) was requested to provide some form of military assistance for eighteen Latin American countries, all of which are U.S. partners in the Organization of American States (OAS). The Administration argues that our country's programs in Latin America are oriented primarily toward internal security--weapons, equipment and training--which would enable those countries to deal more effectively with internal subversion, rather than direct or out­ side aggression.

3. Military Base Rights. In this category about 3 percent ($38.9 million) was allocated to four countries: Spain, Portugal, Libya, and Ethiopia, where we maintain military bases. These funds might be construed as "rent" payments, yet are technically part of our military assistance program. ·It might be argued that these bases are no longer necessary for our security, and, thus the program should be discontinued.

lJ Ibid., p. 145.

- 151 - 4. Grant Aid Phase-Out. This category reflects the continuation of a trend which has already resulted in the tennination of grant aid for the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Gennany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Italy. No new commitments were made to three more economically recovered nations: Norway, Denmark, and Japan. Grant aid to these countries was limited to prior commitments and to a small amount of military training. Three and one-tenth percent ($39 million) was allocated for this program. This phase-out section has some interesting possibilities as part of ·an affinnative plan which might decide to discontinue military assistance in some gradual manner to enable recipient nations to adjust more easily. 5. Free World Orientation. The primary objective of this category is to preclude or minimize Communist-bloc influence. In 1965, eighteen nations were receiving military assistance under this program: eight in Africa and ten scattered throughout the Near East and Asia. This assistance is used to counter possible Communist-bloc influence and assistance. Most of these na­ tions are small and only three receive more than $1 million. One and three­ tenths percent ($16.9 million) of the total baseline funds was requested for this category. 6. U.S. Forces Support and Military Assistance Program Administra­ tion. One hundred eighty-one million dollars was allocated to this category which actually includes several separate programs. About 28 percent of the funds were to be used to provide credit to maximize purchases of military equipment by foreign governments which do not have the means to buy for cash. Funds used here are to be repaid, re-used to finance additional sales, and eventually return to the U.S. Treasury.

Another 49 percent of the funds was used to meet the cost of U.S. participation in NATO and other international military agencies such as SEATO. For the most part this program represents the share that the United States contributes to the operating costs of an organization like NATO. This program, while now a part of military aid, could probably be transferred to the Department of Defense as part of another program.

Finally, there is another program which is not included within the military assistance program, but fs often used in connection with military assistance. This is Supporting Assistance which is administered as part of our economic aid. Some $383 million was requested for this program in 1965, .of which 80 percent was to be spent in Viet Nam, Laos, and Korea.

B. The Affinnative Case--to Substantially Reduce U.S. Military Assistance. 1. Overemphasis on Military Assistance. A constant objection raised during congressional hearings on foreign aid is that expenditures for military assistance to underdeveloped countries should be cut in favor of increased economic assistance. Critics argue that surprisingly large military grants have been made to nations with substandard economies and which are remote from the centers of Communist power. Sen. Wayne Morse (Oregon) has been a long­ time critic of military grants to these countries, especially in Latin America

- 152 - and Africa. .!J He and other Senate critics doubt whether miiitary grants to underdeveloped countries enhance the security of the United States to any notable degree. The following exchange took place in the 1959 Senate hearings: Senator Lausche. What would be your position in the argument that we ought to withdraw all mili­ tary aid ... to all underdeveloped countries where there is no prospect of their being able to help us in a war ... ?

Mr. Satterthwaite (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs). Our position is that we have to make political decisions in those cases .... 2/

If the purpose of this military aid is political, then it could be assumed that the military advantages to the United States are nebulous. Hans J. Morgenthau, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, uses the same argument in relation to our military assistance to Yugoslavia.3/ The purpose of this aid is not so much military as it is political. -It seeks political advantage in exchange for military aid. It obligates the recipient toward the giver. It may be argued that military aid in this instance is really in the nature of a bribe.

What .appears as military aid may also actually be in the nature of prestige aid.4/ Professor Morgenthau argues that the provision of jet fighters and modern weapons for certain underdeveloped countries can per­ form no genuine military function. It may increase the prestige of the recipient nation at home and abroad.

Other critics argue that the military assistance which we extend to nations around the periphery of the Communist-bloc nations does not enhance our security.� Beginning with Greece, and including countries

.!I New York Herald Tribune, April 22, 1966. 2/ Quoted in: Andrew Gyorgy and Hubert.Gibbs (eds.), Problems in Inter­ national Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 131.

U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., March 13, 1962, p. Al888. See also: Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review (June, 1962), pp.301-09. Congressional Record, loc. cit.

5/ ·Brig. General Bonner Fellers, Release: Citizens Foreign Aid Committee, June 8, 1965, pp. 6-7.

- 153 - extending east along the southern·frontier of the Conununist-bloc, thence including the Philippines, Formosa, Japan, and South Korea; the U.S. has given some $14 billion in military aid. Yet none of the�e countries, con­ tiguous to Russia and Red China, it is argued, has a modern war capacity. Despite our assistance to encourage them to resist aggression, in the final analysis, their security either depends on our military power or our entry into such conflicts such as the Korean and Viet Nam wars.

Finally, it might be argued that our NATO allies no ·longer require U.S. military grants. These nations now purchase American mili­ tary equipment.

Since the Administration supports continued military assistance to Latin American and African nations, where admittedly the danger of Communist external aggression is remote, how do they respond to the argu­ ments just advanced? In testimony before the Senate Conunittee on Appropria­ tions in March, 1965, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that our Latin American military assistance programs are oriented toward internal security.!/ Change is a traditional characteristic of Latin Am.erican politics, and in-recent years it has been the military establishment which in many instances has provided the greatest stabilizing factor for orderly change and the continuity for constitutional government. -General Wheeler suggests that there are others, Castro's Cuba, who would gladly offer military assistance to some of these countries to gain opportu­ nities for political infiltration. Sen. Morse, while admitting some danger from internal subversion in Latin America, argues that we have been supply­ ing the wrong kinds of weapons, such as jet planes and tanks.2/ Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara answered this criticism by stating: "The total number of combat aircraft in Latin America is 547. That's less than North Korea. The total number of tanks in Latin America was 974. That's 60 per­ cent as many as Bulgaria."�

To those who charge that the purpose of our military aid to many nations is political or more in the nature of a bribe, Administration spokes­ men point to the Soviet role in the same field. Assuming that we stopped supplying arms to certain nations, this choice would not necessarily affect Soviet policy. They point to the decision made at Casablanca in 1965 by President Nasser's new United Arab Conunand.4/ The Conunand has agreed to increase military arms purchases to $500 million over the next ten years.

1f Senate Appropriation Hearings--1965, op. cit., pp. 149�50. 2/ New York Herald Tribune, April 22, 1966.

3/ New York Herald Tribune, April 22, 1966. 4/ Christian Science Monitor, February 18, 1966.

- 154 - Washington officials estimate that Moscow has already sold $1.3 billion of deliberately underpriced equipment, mostly to Egypt. If we do not supply or sell arms, the Comnrunist powers will.

2. The United States Cannot Ultimately Control How Its Military Assistance is Used. The clash last year between India and Pakistan has been cited as an example of an American dilemma--whether the U.S. can effectively supervise its own military aid. As was indicated earlier, during the past decade the United States has sent some $20 billion worth of military hard­ ware to almost 60 nations. The recipient countries have all vowed, among other conditions, ·to use American weapons only for defensive purposes. Yet, it is argued, several governments, measuring their defense needs by their own yardsticks, have not kept their promises. 1/ And the U.S., though dis­ claiming guilt, has often borne the onus for the ill-advised actions of its allies.

Here is a partial catalogue of such incidents:

(1) American materials delivered to the French under the North Atlantic Treaty were used against Algerian Nationalists, thereby creating the impression in Africa that the U.S. supported French policy; (2) American weapons given to Portugal under NATO accords were used to repres.s Angola insurgents;

(3) In Cyprus, both Greeks and Turks reinforced ·their positions with U.S. equipment--which they undoubtedly will employ if they attack each other;

(4) American tanks rumbling through Latin American capitals have served to overthrow governments painfully nurtured by the United States; (5) American aid weapons supplied to the Chinese Nationalists were surreptitiously shipped to Nationalist guerrillas in North Burma which created a tense ·situation in Southeast Asia in 1953-54;

(6) American-armed South Vietnamese police under the late Presi­ dent Ngo Dinh Diem's regime transported Buddhists and students to jail in American trucks bearing the U.S. handclasp emblem;

(7) In aiding India and Pakistan, the U.S. tacitly acknowledged that military assistance might ignite an explosion. The program to build up Pakistan's armed forces, initiated in 1954, was accompanied by an Amer­ ican assurance to India that the U.S. would take "appropriate action" if American weapons were used against her.2/ American military aid to India, started in 1962., was clearly earmarked for defense against outright Chinese

lf The Washington Post, September 13, 1965. '!:/ The Washington Post, September 13, 1965.

- 155 - aggression. Pakistan's $1.2 billion worth of U.S. military equipment h�s included Patton and Sherman tanks as well as the latest F-104 jet fighters equipped with Sidewinder missiles. India's far more modest allocation, an estimated $80 million, has largely consisted of communications equipment, ammunition, blankets, and weapons for mountain warfare. When the fighting between India and Pakistan began in September, 1965, the U.S. ended all military and economic assistance; tob'oth·countries. Since the truce agreement reached by both countries early-in· 1966, the United States has resumed economic assistance to both countries along with non­ lethal military equipment such as transport equipment. American officials said that the arms embargo had.its effect because both countries were. heavily dependent upon the U.S. for spare.parts.!/ Without these spare parts, both sides could not have continued their�onflict for more _than three months. Not referring specifically to the India-Pakistan war, Sen. Frank Church (Idaho) stated in June, 1965, "I opposed the way that we've institu­ tionalized and globalized our military assistance programs. We should only give aid where the Conununist threat is direct and immediate, as in Korea, Vietnam, or in India when the Co�unists invaded."2/ A Pentagon official, who was not identified in the Washington Post article, replied that Sen. Church's criticism was unrealistic: "Military aid isn't merely providiµg weapons. Troops need training, and there's no time for that when the threat is immediate. There's really no way to control our arms abroad. Our hardware may be misused, but that's a risk we must take." Some observers point out that recent events now prove that Pakistan fears India more than she ever feared Communist China. Knowingly, or not, we armed her to fight India, not communism. So far this year, two events seem to fortify this view.3/ The first was a statement by Pakistan President Ayub that China poses no threat to the subcontinent, unless it is provoked. The second event was the display by Pakistan in March, 1966, of five Chinese tanks and four MIG-17 jets.4/ In addition to obtaining military equipment from Peking, Pakistan is also reported to have received warplanes from Indonesia and to be negotiating for the.purchase of three submarines from France. From the war last year and those events which flowed from it, the Washington Post editorial concluded that our 1954 pact and subsequent support of Pakistan's military establishment was a mistake: "India was lf Christian Science.Monitor, February 18, 1966. 2/ The Washington Post, September 13, 1965.

�- Christian Science Monitor, March 23, 1966. 4/ The Washington Post, March 26, 1966.

- 156 - alienated; and relations with Pakistan itself were built upon a basic misunderstanding, since it was never the intention of the United States to back Rawalpindi against New Delhi. It has been inevitable and indeed desirable that the war should now be followed by the phasing-out of the alliance. "Y

Since 1957, the .United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations have engaged in a series of disarmament negotiations, both at Geneva and through the United Nations in New York. One tangible result was the signing of the Treaty of Moscow which established the present nwclear test ban. Recently, one American official is reported to have said, "Our efforts at disarmament started at the wrong end of the scale. Since World War II, rifles and machine guns have killed more people than our atomic bombs dropped upon Japan. We should be discussing the limitation of conventional weapons in disarmament talks. But so many coun­ tries that want the U.S. and the Soviet Union to disarm refuse to disarm themselves."'!:}

3. American Military Assistance Works at Cross-purpose with Economic Aid. The argument is also frequently advanced that either our foreign aid programs either involve too much spending for military pur­ poses or that the military aid programs themselves undermine our object­ ives in assisting economic recovery within underdeveloped nations. Professor Hans Morgenthau argues that much of our aid for economic develop­ ment appears in the guise of military assistance.3 / This results from the reluctance of Congress to vote large amounts of economic aid in contrast to its readiness to vote for virtually any amount for military purposes. The purposes of aid for economic development are likely to suffer when they are disguised as military assistance. Morgenthau states: "The military con­ text within which such aid is bound to operate, even though its direct administration be in the hands of civilian officials, is likely to deflect such aid from its genuine purposes. More particularly, it strengthens the ever present tendency to subordinate the requirements of aid for economic development to military considerations."

A. Doak Barnett, one of the American China scholars who testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this year, has sug­ gested that our military assistance may encourage such countries as Korea

+I The Washington Post, March 26, 1966. Y The Washington Post, September 13, 1965. �/ Congressional Record, loc. cit.

- 157 - and Nationalist China to concentrate too much on their military problems.!/ If they are urged to concentrate on military problems to an extent which - impairs their ability to cope with their problems of internal development, this course may undermine their domestic stability. Barnett states: "In some countries the emphasis (of U.S. aid) is now heavily weighted toward military support, which creates risks not only of neglecting important problems of economic development but also of creating serious economic difficulties. Large scale American assistance to Asian nations cannot be regarded as a substitute for economic aid, but rather as a factor which calls for even greater efforts in the economic field."Y

Administration spokesmen argue, however, that those countries which receive military aid from the United States could not �upport adequate military forces from their own resources. This argument was presented earlier in this chapter when we described the Forward Defense Programs. It was emphasized that most military assistance and much of our economic assistance also goes to eleven key nations around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Without this assistance, these nations could not sup­ port a modern military establishment.3/ Following the Korean armistice in 1953, the Republic of Korea maintaI"ned a military establishment of some twenty divisions, about the same as the United States did during the same period. Obviously, without substantial American military and economic assistance, the Koreans could not have done this.

It also may be argued that during the 1950's many of our NATO European allies received substantial U.S. military aid which allowed those nati.ons the opportunity to concentrate more of their resources on economic recovery than might have been the case otherwise. Since their economic recovery, these nations no longer receive military aid grants. In Asia, economically-recovered Japan now buys its military equipment from the United States. Even the economy of Nationalist China, which in the past received substantial military aid, has progressed so that it no longer requires U.S. aid. From these examples, the conclusion might be drawn that our military assistance has actually provided the means which enabled many nations to recover. 4. Military Aid is Wasteful. The argument is also advanced that U.S. military aid is the most wasteful practice of Amertcan spending over­ seas. It has been estimated that total military aid has cost the U.S. over $30 billion since 1949 while the total benefits to American security fall far short of this expenditure.4/

!/ A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 141-42. y Ibid., p. 142_. _3/ Senate Appropriation Hearings--1965, op. cit., p. 145. 4/ Rubin, op. cit., p. 147.

- 158 - Despite this cost, American forces must be employed frequently when the actual fighting begins as has been the case in Korea and Viet Nam.

It is also argued that our military aid programs have obscured the real issue which is to assist nations toward economic recovery. On one occasion, President Eisenhower admitted this when he stated: "To maintain America's military strength during the next five years, we shall spend more than $200 billion. This almost unimaginable sum will, together with similar but smaller expenditures by our allies, keep us in a stronger military posture. But these sums, great as they are, cannot produce a single constructive, useful thing for human beings."!/ Sen. Wayne Morse expressed the same argument recently when he stated:- "If we assigned every cent of the $917 million (fiscal 1967) for military aid to educa­ tion instead, we would do more for the people of the world in one year than we will do under 20 years of the current program."2/

As in the case of the entire U.S. foreign aid program, our military aid spending is argued in the context of our balance-of-payments problems. A recent article in The Washington Evening Star quotes Adminis­ tration spokesmen as admitting that our government must trim overseas defense and foreign aid spending to hold down the balance-of-payments deficit.3/ As it stands, countries receiving foreign aid are generally required-to spend 80 percent or more of their grants and loans here, but this official said, aid must be tied even tighter to purchases in the United States. In addition the Administration may try to negotiate agree­ ments with other countries to offset more of the costs of American military operations abroad through increased arms purchases here. By whittling net military and aid outlays around the world, the Administration hopes to compensate for part of the growing dollar drain resulting from the war in Viet Nam. There are some cases in which U.S. military assistance is said to have accomplished few results even though large sums have been spent. Laos is often offered as one example. Between 1954-1960, the United States extended some $300 million, mainly military aid, to Laos. Yet, by 1961, the entire nation was in danger of being overrun by indigenous pro-Communist forces assisted by North Viet Nam. As we know from current news reports from Laos, the future of the neutralist and anti-Communist forces is by no means secure. It is argued that such little anti-Communist stabilization as was reached in Laos was achieved more by diplomacy at the 1962 Geneva Conference than by military means.

}j Ibid., p. 148.

-2/ Press Release from the office of Sen. Wayne Morse, April 1, 1966, p. 2. 3/ April 13, 1966, p. A-18.

- 159 - In 1965, Thailand was singled out as a specific nation where U.S. military assistance was being wasted. According to a report compiled by the General Accounting Office, the chief.congressional investigating agency with broad powers to investigate federal spending, the United States had delivered to Thailand some $9 million in excess military transportation and communication equipment.1/ The same report also said that Thailand over a period of five years,-had received another $5 million "major assemblies and repair parts" over and above what the Thai army needed. The report also charged that the United States had continued to provide. millions of dollars worth of jet planes and other aircraft which Thailand was not able to use effectively. It was estimated that a high percentage of the aircraft, including supporting equipment and spare parts, was delivered by the United States at a cost of $100 million. The report goes on to document other cases of what it regarded as inefficient and wasteful spending. How do Administration spokesmen defend our military aid programs against these charges of waste and inefficiency? Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has put the case for military aid in very blunt terms in the 1964 congressional hearings before the Senate and House Appropriations Commit­ tees.2/ He warns that the United States has a difficult choice. It must either help maintain the indigenous military strength built up in our allies around the rim of the Communist world to resist aggression, or it must revise its whole defense strategy and replace melting allied strength by expanding our own military forces at many times the cost. He said that it makes no sehse whatsoever to spend $50 billion a year on our military forces and to refuse to spend 2 percent of that amount to help where necessary to support allied forces standing side by side with us in the collective defense of the free world.

On almost every occasion since the advent of our military aid pro­ gram, the government has produced a set of figures to prove that each dollar spent for military aid saves many more dollars which it would have had to spend to reach its present defense position.3/ In 1958, the then Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy pointed out: "Since-1950, our allies have spent $5 of their own money on mutual defense for every $1 contributed by the United States. What has this mutual effort produced: a worldwide network of over 250 major land, sea, and air installations outside the United States. Our allies have, also, 34 percent more ground forces than in 1950, 108 percent more combatant vessels, 12.5 percent more conventional aircraft, and 23 times as many jets.4/ In that same year, Vice President Richard Nixon y Los Angeles Times, March 15, 1965. 2/ The New York Times, July 25, 1964.

� Senate AppropriationHearings--1965, lac. cit.

4/ Rubin, OE· cit., p. 139.

- 160 - pointed out that the annual cost of maintaining an American soldier was $3,515 while the cost of other soldiers was far less (French $1,440; Pakistani $484; Greek $424; and Chinese Nationalist $147).

In summary, it is hard to deny that there have not been examples of some waste in our military aid programs, but, nevertheless, Administration spokesmen contend that they are far cheaper than the alternatives to our mil­ itary assistance programs.

C. The Negative Case--U.S. Foreign Aid Programs Should Not be Limited to Nonmilitary Assistance.

In the previous section we presented what really amounted to the affirmative need case and, at the same time, we suggested the lines along which the negative could reply to those arguments. The arguments which we shall offer in this section will be more in the nature of plan objections-­ why the United States should not discontinue military aid. In presenting an affirmative reply to these negative objections, we shall suggest, when­ ever possible, ways in which the affirmative might answer within the context of an affirmative plan.

1. Withdrawing Military Aid Would Undermine the Security of the Free World. This argument is basic to our military aid program and it has been since its inception. Our commitment to the common defense of the free world is embodied in multilateral and bilateral agreements with 42 allied and friendly nations. We can either help our partners help themselves in the development of an agreed military posture which will minimize their need for outside assistance, or we must be prepared, in the event of an emergency, to assume the whole burden ourselves, deploying U.S. forces and accepting the consequences which may result from our direct intervention.

According to Administration spokesmen, there are three options:

(1) We can drastically reduce our military aid to the lasting advantage of communism;

(2) we can raise our own force structure to a higher--and vastly more costly--plateau of strength; (3) or, we can assist friendly nations with the equipment and training required to enable them to carry their fair share of the collective defense burden. .!f

It has also been argued that this choice has been forced upon us by the Communist-bloc nations. Beginning with the Greek civil war immediately following World War II and continuing in Korea and Viet Nam, the Soviet Union and its Chinese Communist ally have encouraged war-by-proxy--wars fought by

.!f Senate Appropriation Hearings--1965, op. cit., p. 143.

- 161 - their Communist allies supplied wherever possible with Communist arms and equipment. Our military assistance has encouraged ou7 allies eithe7 to resist Communist aggression when it occurs or to prevent it from happening at all. Even if we were to discontinue arms shipments where there is the danger that they may be used in local quarrels, such as the Middle East conflict between the Arab states and Israel, many of these nations could or already have turned to the Soviet Union for their weapons.

The affirmative might reply to these arguments along two lines. First, it has already been argued in the previous section that these mili­ tary aid programs have added no real security to the United States. Real protection against Communist aggression is based upon United States nuclear deterrence and American armed forces rather than on the forces of many of the countries which we are supporting.!/ Second, the affirmative might argue that the termination of U.S. military assistance could serve as a basis of negotiation with the Communist bloc. The Soviet Government has frequently indicated that it is anxious to negotiate issues in the inter­ est 0£ easing world tensions. In view of the fact that we are supplying the bulk of our military assistance to some eleven nations on the rim of the Communist world, the Communist bloc might be willing to negotiate an arms reduction in what it might consider offers of a better guarantee to its security.

2. Suspension of U.S. Military Assistance Would Endanger the Internal Security of Many Nations. Administration spokesmen readily admit that many Latin American and African nations receive military aid where there is little threat of any direct Communist aggression. The danger here is indirect aggression or internal subversion.2/ As we indicated earlier in this chapter, General Earle Wheeler emphasized that our mili­ tary assistance programs in Latin America are extremely important.3/ These programs are oriented toward internal security. They are tied to our economic aid programs under the Alliance for Progress. Our economic aid stresses that change is a necessary element in Latin American economic, social, and political progress. While change is a traditional feature of Latin American politics, it has been the military establishments in those countries during recent years which, in many instances, have provided the greatest stabilizing factor for orderly change and the continuity of constitutional government. Sen. Morse, a strong critic of these military aid programs in Latin America, argues that these programs have the opposite effect.4/ He · argues that while the United States is spending large amounts of money

� Release: Citizens Foreign Aid Committee, loc. cit. '!:} Senate Appropriation Hearings--1965, op. cit., pp. 152-53. 3/ Ibid., p. 149. if U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., January 28, 1965, p. 1465.

- 162 - under the Alliance for Progress to promote change, it is the military juntas in Latin America supported by military aid that resist change.

3. Suspending Military Assistance Would Remove an Important U.S. Diplomatic Leverage. It may also be argued that, if the United States suspends military shipments to many of the countries that it now supplies, it might lose important diplomatic leverage in many of these countries. Nations which received the bulk of their military equipment from the United States are heavily dependent upon this country for spare parts. As was indicated earlier in this chapter, some American officials doubt that India and Pakistan could have continued their struggle for more than three months without replacement-parts shipments which the United States suspended shortly after the conflict began.1/ Although Pakistan has now received MIG-17s and tanks from Communist China, the bulk of her military equipment is still of American manufacture.2/ In an earlier crisis, the threat of an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, the same situation existed.3/ In the Cyprus affair, the United States was able to exert strong diplomatic pressure upon both Greece and Turkey. As was the case in the Pakistan-India conflict, both sides would ultimately be dependent upon this country for spare parts to continue any prolonged conflict. If many of these countries now were to diversify their military equipment from other suppliers, the United States might lose much of her diplomatic leverage that she is now able to employ toward seeking peaceful settlements in local or regional conflicts.

The affirmative reply is that, in most of these situations, U.S.· economic aid is as important as our military aid. India, faced with serious problems trying to feed her own people, could hardly ignore the suspension of all American foreign aid, a step which the United States took after the conflict began. It might be concluded that eco­ nomic aid adds just as much to our bargaining position as military aid does. D. The Suspension of Cash Sales of Arms and Other Military Equip­ ment Would Weaken Our Balance-of-Payments Position.

Whether or not the negative would use this argument would depend upon the affirmative case. Assuming that the affirmative used some form of disarmament case (to stop the flow of arms), then the affirmative could not support cash sales of U.S. arms which now amount to about twice that supplied through grants. Between 1961-65, American military sales

}j Christian Science Monitor, February 18, 1966.

'!:../ Christian Science Monitor, March 23, 1966. � Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 1966.

- 163 - to foreign nations have amounted to $9 billion. .!f This year, as was indi­ cated earlier , the Adrninistration,which is seeking ways to improve our balance-of-payments deficit, is continuing to push arms sales rather than grants.2/ Administration spokesmen emphasize the benefits which this country-receives from these sales.

The affirmative might reply to these alleged benefits in two ways. First , the practice of improving our balance-of-payments position through military sales is morally wrong. The economic benefits should be weighed against the destructiveness of modern weapons, along with the risk that we cannot ultimately control the manner in which they may be used. As was indicated earlier, even Defense Department spokesmen admit that our sales of military arms.involve risks. Finally, the affirmative might argue that our military aid had much to do with creating some of the balance-of-payments problems in the first place. During the past decade, the United States has supplied some $20 billion in military hardware abroad and cash sales are probably about one half of this figure.3/ On balance , our military assistance may have contributed more to our balance-of-payments problems than the cash sales might be aple to offset .

.!./ The Washington Post, September 13, 1965. 2/ Washington Evening Star, April 13, 1966.

� The Washington Post, September 13, 1965.

- 164 - DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Why has President de Gaulle removed French military forces from NATO? 2. Why has Senator Mansfield suggested that the United States reduce its troop commitment to Western Europe? Why do others oppose this step? 3. In what ways does NATO plan to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe? 4. In what ways is the war in Viet Nam separate from the Mili­ . tary Assistance Program? 5. Which countries receive the largest amounts of U.S. military aid? Why? 6. What are the six categories within the military assistance baseline program? 7. What is the relationship between cash sales of weapons and U.S. military assistance? 8. Why does Senator Morse criticize our military aid programs in Latin America? How does the Johnson Administration respond? 9. What inherent risks are involved in U.S. military aid? What examples can be cited to prove that our military aid program has been misused? 10. Why do some observers argue that military aid undermines our economic aid programs? 11. In what ways does the military aid program work at cross­ purposes with disarmament efforts? 12. What relationship exists between the U.S. sale of arms and the U.S. balance-of-payments deficits?

- 165 - BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. "Europe: Decision or Drift," Foreign Affairs (January, 1966) , pp. 198-205.

"Adviser to Two Presidents Looks at the Trends in Europe," Full text of a statement by McGeorge Bundy before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. News and World Report (July 4, 1966) , pp. 80-83. Baldwin, D.A. Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy. New York: Frederick A.. Praeger, 1966.

Barnet, Richard J. and Raskin, Marcus G. After Twenty Years: Alter­ natives to the Cold War in Europe. New York: Random House, 1965.

Bloomfield, Lincoln P. The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.

"American Globalism," Survey (January, 1966), pp. 19-29.

,...... "'""". "New Guidelines for the West," The New Leader (March 28, ---19_66), pp. 12-16.

Furniss, Edgar S., Jr. Some Perspectives on American Military Assis­ tance. Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1957 . -----. (ed.) American Military Policy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957.

Graebner, Norman. "The Limits of Foreign Aid," Current History (June, 1966). Hovey, Harold A. united States Military Assistance. A Study of Policies and Practices. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

Janowitz, Morris. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Johnson, Lyndon Baines. "Our View of NATO." Department of State Bulletin (April 11, 1966�, pp. 554-56.

_Kahn, Herman and Pfaff, William. "Our Alternatives in Europe," Foreign Affairs Ouly, 1966), pp. 587-600.

- 166 - Kissinger, Henry A. The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.

Kraft, Joseph. The Grand Design: From Common Market to Grand Design. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

Mason, Edward. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

McNamara, Robert S. "McNamara's New Design for World Peace and Security," U.S. News and World Report (May 30, 1966), pp. 90-95. (Text of Montreal Speech.)

"The Military Assistance Program for 1965," Department of State Bulletin (May 4, 1964), pp. 705-15.

Powell, John Duncan. "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly (June, 1965), pp. 382-92.

Steel, Ronald. The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe. New York: Viking Press, 1964. Tarr, David W. "The American Military Presence Abroad," Orbis (Fall, 1965), pp. 630-54.

Wilcox, F.O., and Haviland, H.F. (eds.) "The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects," International Organization (Summer, 1963).

Wolf, Charles, Jr. Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Wolfers, Arnold. American Defense Policy for 1965. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965.

- 167 - CHAPTER VI

THE SPECIAL CASE OF VIET NAM Introductory Essay

As the United States' troop commitment to the war in Viet Nam has grown, so too have the arguments about that commitment. The Viet Nam debate has even led some to call for a reappr�isal of basic American for­ eign policy goals. Others want the United States to abandon its biparti­ san containment policy of the last twenty years. Even many who support the basic tenets of containment have been critical of our Viet Nam policy. The so-called Viet Nam hearings held early this year before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offer a prime example of this debate. The stated purpose of these hearings was to "amend further the Foreign As­ sistance Act of 1961, as amended" which was to authorize an additional $415 million in foreign economic aid, the bulk of which was slated for Viet Nam. Before the hearings were completed, this nation's involvement in Viet Nam had been laid thoroughly bare--the background, the purposes, the hoped-for future and above all, the dissension surrounding it. This chapter shall present many of these arguments as well as others. In gen­ eral, we shall ask four questions: (1) Can the United States legally justify its involvement in Viet Nam? (2) Is the United States position morally justified? (3) Will United States policy in Viet Nam succeed? (4) If not, how can the United States substantially reduce its commit­ ments? Let us now turn to the legal issue.

L Can the United States Legally Justify Its Position in Viet Nam? Many critics of American policy question whether the United States has a legal right to intervene in Viet Nam.. In this section we shall ex­ amine the major issues in this controversy. A. The United States in Viet Nam and the United Nations Charter.

One legal argument that has been advanced is that the American involvement in Viet Nam is a violation of the United Nations Charter. This position was taken in a memorandum on international law prepared by the Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam.!/ This is a very lengthy document and we shall only attempt to summarize the argument. The

1/ U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., September 23, 1965, pp. 24010-18.

- 168 - Lawyers' Memorandum charges that the U.S. Government is using unilate,ral force against the Vietnamese 'nation in violation of its obligations under the United Nations' Charter. The Lawyers' Memorandum challenges the State Department argument that American action in Viet Nam is sanctioned under the "collective self-defense" rights found in the chart.er under articles 51 and 53. It denies that SEATO (upon which the collective self-defense sanc·­ tion is built) has any legal standing in the United Nations' Charter.

On the other hand, Mr. Eberhard P. Deutsch, Chairman of the Ameri� can Bar Association Committee on Peace and Law Through the United Nations, examines the same issues and concludes that United States action is legally justified in Viet Nam.y Deutsch argues that SEATO does meet the regional defense requirements within the United Nations Charter; thus United States action in Viet Nam conforms to the Charter.

B. Viet Nam and the Geneva Accords.

A second argument offered by the Lawyers' Memorandum and others is that the U.S. position in Viet Nam violates the Geneva accords. They hold that Geneva accords emphasized that the north-south division was solely a means of ending a military conflict and not the creation of any political or territorial boundary. This constitutes a recognition that Viet Nam is a single riation, divided into two zones only for temporary and administra­ tive purposes to await the results of an election that was scheduled for 1956. The pending elections for national reunification were never held because the Diem regime,. with United States approval, refused to partici­ pate. At the same time, American policy insists upon the existence of two separate states, a policy which is not supported by the Geneva accords.

The State Department holds, however, that South Viet Nam was justified in refusing to implement the election provisions of the Geneva accords.2/ First, there is some question whether either the United States or South-Viet Nam are bound by these agreements since neither signed the accords. In refusing to sign the accords, South Viet Nam gave notice of its objections in particular to the election provisions. However, even on the premise that these elections were binding upon South Viet Nam, it is further argued that this still would involve no breach of obligation on the part of South Viet Nam. Between 1954-56, con­ ditions in North Viet Nam were such as to make it impossible for any free and meaningful elections. Communist leaders in North Viet Nam publicly acknowledged that they were using police-state methods. A nationwide elec­ tion under these circumstances would have been·a travesty. No one in the North would have dared to vote except as directed. With a substantial

Eberhard P.,Deutsch, "The Legality of the United States Position in Vietnam," American Bar Association Journal, (May, 1966), pp. 436-42. y Leonard C. Meeker, "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam," Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, pp. 474-89.

- 169 - majority of the Vietnamese people living north of the 17th parallel, such an election would have meant turning the country over to the Communists without regard to the will of the people.

C. SEATO and Viet Nam. During the Viet Nam hearings, Sen. Wayne Morse (Oregon) challenged the assertion by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the United States has a com­ mitment to assist Viet Nam under SEATO. First, Sen. Morse argues that the late Secretary of State Dulles in his presentation of the treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee described the arrangement as one which did not .intend to use American forces on the Asian continent.!/ Secretary Rusk is therefore arguing, says Sen. Morse, for an interpretation of SEATO that is the exact opposite of what Secretary Dulles assured the Senate would be the policy of the United States. Sen. Morse further argues that we are using SEATO not as a collective commitment among interested and affected parties, but as an "American hunting license to do what we choose to do in Vietnam."2/ Apply­ ing the principle of reciprocity to Viet Nam, Sen. Morse contends-that the American obligation under SEATO is self-imposed, without any reciprocal obligation by our treaty partners. In January, 1966, the United States .had over 300,000 men (counting the Seventh Fleet) in the conflict while seven of our SEATO allies had a total of 1,600 ·men in Viet Nam. France and Pakistan had none and will not have any because they refuse to sup­ port our Viet Nam policy. Since we have not even asked. ·for a collective finding of armed aggression among the foreign ministers of the SEATO alliance, Sen. Morse concludes that Secretary Rusk's contention that we have a binding obligatio.n under SEATO is completely unfounded.

On the other hand, Secretary Rusk argues that, in joining SEATO, "The United States took a solemn treaty engagement of far reach­ ing effect."3/ The treaty section on which Secretary Rusk bases his case says: Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area ...would endanger its own peace and security, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accor­ dance with its constitutional processes.

Frank M. Robinson and Earl Kemp (eds.), Report on the U.S. Senate Hearings--The Truth About Vietnam (San Diego, California: Greenleaf Classics, Inc., 1966), pp. 12-13 (Hereafter referred to as The Truth About Vietnam.)

Ibid., p. 15. Baltimore Sun, February 21, 1966, p. A-4.

- 170 - This means, Rusk contends, that "the finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger."

As to the argument that the United States has no cause to respond in Viet Nam because South Viet Nam is not a SEATO member, Secretary Rusk argues that South Viet Nam is a protocol member (listed as an area of pro­ tection within the agreement) and, as such, has a right to call on members of the organization for assistance.

D. Viet Nam and the Tonkin Resolution.

The Johnson Administration also has defended its action in Viet Nam by citing the Tonkin Resolution adopted by both houses of Congress in 1964. This joint congressional resolution followed North Vietnamese attacks against United States destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Sen. John Stennis (Mississippi), an advocate of a strong military establishment and of a readi­ ness to use it, has expressed some doubt about this resolution._!/ He says that "the strained language" of such commitments could lead to new wars, as Viet Nam, without congressional approval, and that "about all that is left for us to do is appropriate money." Even on appropriations, he complained Congress is inadequately informed.

Sen. Stennis told Secretary Rusk that "you stand on mighty thin ice if you stand on the Tonkin Gulf resolution as the basis for the war."

Sen. William Fulbright, who voted for the Tonkin resolution, has recently stated that if he had known at the time (August, 1964) where the Vietnamese conflict was heading, he would not have voted for the resolu­ tion.y Administration spokesmen defend the American action in Viet Nam by citing the wording of the Tonkin resolution itself:

.... That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in­ Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitu­ tion of the United States and the Charter of the

.!/ The New York Times, August 31, 1966. Y Washington Evening Star, August 31, 1966.

- 171 - United Nations and in accordance with its obli­ gations under the Southeast Asia Collective De­ fense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This Resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security.of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolu­ tion of the Congress.!(

This resolution continues in force today. It is argued, therefore, that the Congress has given its approval to the President's actions in Viet Nam, and that these actions do not require a declaration of war.2/

Additionally, it is argued that under a long line of precedents the President has the authority to employ American forces abroad in the absence of any congressional declaration of war.

II. Is the United States Position in Viet Nam Morally Justified7

Critics of United States policy in Viet Nam frequently attack this policy on moral grounds. Sens. Fulbright and Morse have used this line of attack in Senate proceedings. Generally, it is contended that the war has escalated to proportions that will destroy the entire political, economic, and social structure of Viet Nam.. Beyond this, the very nature of the war has led to widespread civilian casualties who ultimately may be the major victims in this struggle.

Sen. Fulbright, in a series of three lectures at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies delivered earlier this

!f Meeker, op. cit., p. 486. 2/ Ibid., p. 489.

- 172 - year, challenged the use of American power in Viet Nam.1/ He believes that Communist China is not an aggressor. He argues that the civil revolt in iet N is deserved, and that the Viet Cong, together with its supporters � � . in Hano1, w111 be· found to be National Communists, not under Peking's discipline. ° From this reading of the facts, Sen. Fulbright thinks that the United States, by using great military force to stop that revolution, is trampling on the country and the people of Viet Nam. Why, he asks, do the South Vietnamese themselves appear to be so shockingly ungrateful at times [as to parade with anti-American slogans]?

The answer, I think, is that fatal impact of the rich and strong on the poor and weak. Dependent on it though the Vietnamese are, our very strength is a reproach to their weakness, our wealth a mock­ ery of their poverty, our success a reminder of their failures.

What they resept is the disruptive effect of our strong culture upon their fragile one, an effect which we can no more avoid than a man can �elp being bigger than a child. What they fear, I think, rightly, is that traditional.Vietnamese society cannot survive the American economic and cultural impact.2/

Sen. Morse employs the same arguments as those of Sen. Fulbright and also expresses the fear that the American intrusion may well spread to all Southeast Asia. He states, "· ..the United States will expand this war beyond Viet Nam until all Southeast Asia is aflame with guerrilla warfare at best and conventional warfare at worst. "3/

Many critics of the Administration's Viet Nam policy think that the the United States is creating more destruction, deaths, more human suffer­ ing than our cause justifies. Professor Hans Morgenthau argues that the Saigon G9vernment which we are supporting is hardly worthy of the name,i/ The great mass of the people in South Viet Nam prefer an end to the war rather than a fight to the finish with the Viet Cong; thus one of our main arguments for assisting the South Vietnamese people falls. y Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1966. y Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1966.

� The Truth About Vietnam, OE, cit., pp. 6-7. y "What Should We Do Now?" Look Magazine (August 9, 1966), p. 24.

- 173 - An Associated Press article by Lewis Gulick quotes Major General James w. Humphreys, Jr., as saying, "Unless there is a very sharp fight the number of civilian casualties exceeds the military ... you cannot separate the civilian from the military in this war. "Y Those who oppose Sens. Fulbright, Morse and others dispute their assumptions on what the Vietnamese think. They also argue that risks or problems of all sorts are bound to exist when a war is fought for a justi­ fiable purpose.

Herman Kahn, Director of the Hudson Institute (a nonprofit organi­ zation in the area of national security and international order), argues that our cause is not inunoral.

Our cause in South Viet Nam is not immoral .... But what would happen were we to let South Viet Nam fall into the hands of the National Liberation Front? It is not likely that a victorious NLF would treat with restraint: the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, the Cath­ olics (each a community of about 1,000,000 human beings); the 500,000 South Vietnamese soldiers; the ·many other groups that have demonstrated they are anti-Communist; the tens of thousands who would probably be labeled enemies of a Communist state. Those who dismiss this likelihood need only look at how the Chinese Communists and the Indonesian Army treated their opponents, and might ask them­ selves if the victorious NLF is likelr- to be more restrained. Nor should the West view with equanim­ ity 15,000,000 people passing behind the Communist Iron Curtain.y

David E. Bell, recent administrator .for the Agency for Interna­ tional Development, was questioned on civilian casualties during the Viet Nam hearings:

Senator Pell: But I would be interested in those figures.

Would you bear with me, too, if one finds that the number of deaths... is larger on the civilian side as a result of our military activities than it is from the Vietcong military activities and assassinations, it would seem to me that the prose­ cution of the war can, from a political viewpoint and in quantitative terms, be hurting us. y "Viet Medical Aid to Increase," Washington Evening Star, January 6, 1966. y Look Magazine, lac. cit.

- 174 - David Bell: Well, first of all, I doubt very much if that is the case.

Secondly, it is quite clear to the villager in Viet Nam that there is a difference between organized campaigns of assassination and inadvertent, accidental casualties. I agree that the person involved is equally dead in either case. But the villagers--and we have plenty of evidence on this from conversations all over the country--the villagers are quite aware that they are in the line of fire because of Vietcong aggression. They have in many cases bitterly opposed the entry of the Vietcong into their villages, and when the Viet­ cong come in they frequently flee.

Many of the refugees are exactly of this kind. The Vietcong have entered their villages and the vil­ lagers have left because they know in the effort to reach and destroy the Vietcong, the village itself will be damaged.

Senator Pell: I would agree with you there is a tremendous difference. One is premeditated; it is like murder and homicide, one is premeditated--and one is not. But I am thinking more particularly of those who are bombed from the air. I am not think­ ing of the land portion.

David Bell: Incidentally, Senator, I am advised by one of my staff who was at the conference reported by Gulick, that General Humphreys' reference was not to war casualties only but to deaths due to illness and disease as well. He referred to the general problem of health of the civilian population in a wartime situation. .!f Finally, Secretary Rusk stated during the Viet Nam hearings:

The heart of the problem in South Vietnam is the effort of North Vietnam to impose its will by force. For that purpose, Hanoi has infiltrated into South Vietnam large quantities of arms and tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army. It is that external aggression, which the north has repeatedly escalated, that is respon­ sible for the presence of U.S. combat forces.2/

.!/ The Truth About Vietnam, op. cit., p. 105. y Ibid., p. 24.

- 175 - III. --·w111 United 'States Policy in Viet Nam Succeed?

In the two previous sections ) we presented arguments as to whether the United States should have become involved in Viet Nam in the first place. There are J however ) arguments which are not based upon moral and legal grounds that raise doubts about.the wisdom of our Viet Nam �olicy. Some critics accept the fact that we are heavily committed ) but doubt that this policy will succeed. It is to these arguments that we now tul'Il:.

Since these arguments frequently examine the objectives of United States policy in Viet Nam, perhaps first we should outline them. As to Viet Nam itself, President Johnson has stated these objectives on s_everal occasions: We seek an independent state in South Viet NamJ under its own government and not under attack by the Communist North. We have no intention.of trying to change or eliminate the Communist Government in the .North; we would accept a truly neutral world orientation in the South; we seek no permanent military base in the South.

Current American military strategy has been sketched by Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance.I/ It is to defeat the hard-core Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military forces J to· do a better job of providing local protection and security, and finally ) if this succeeds ) to press forward with the most impo�tant work of rebuilding the shattered political, economic and social institutions.

American policy objectives in Viet Nam also may be viewed in terms of our global objectives wpich are to contain Russia and Communist China J and to discourage the further spread of communism.

Finally ) it is claimed that the United States military response in Viet Nam is measured to achieve these objectives. This response is designed to convince the other side that they cannot win by force; thus obtaining a negotiated settlement. Let us now turn to the arguments for and against American policy in Viet Nam.

A. Can we Contain Communism in Viet Nam?

During the Viet Nam hearings J in a prep.ared statement, Secretary of State Rusk cited our containment po.licy as his first reason· for our commitment in Viet Nam. Secretary Rusk cited the Truman Doctrine and claimed that this was the policy which we are applying in V1et Nam_.2/ It is on this contention much of the criticism about our Viet Nam policy begins.

!/ The Washington Post J May 22, 1966 J p. E-5. 2/ The Truth About Vietnam, loc. cit.

- 176 - The columnist, Walter Lippmann, complains that it is debatable whether our present diplomatic policy in Southeast Asia will contain Com­ munist China. Lippmann states.

The cardinal difference is that our Chinese containment policy is a unilateral American policy whereas our Stalinist containment policy was shared with and partic!pated in by all the Western allies. It is often said officially that in the Far East today we are repeating what was done so successfully in Europe. If this were what we are doing, there would be an alliance to contain China in which Japan, Russia, India, Pakistan, the United States, Great Britain, and France were aligned in a Far Eastern Marshall Plan and NATO. Instead, owing to the miscalculations and blundering of the Viet­ namese war, we have alienated and indeed neutralized all the great powers of the Asian mainland.

The difference between the two containment policies--in Europe and in the Far East--is the difference between realism and verbalism, between professionalism and amateurism. Our present policy is as if we had set out to contain Stalinist Russia by ignoring the British, the French, the Italians, and the Germans, and had decided to make our stand against communism by the defense of--let us say-­ Bucharest.!f

Joseph C. Harsch, states the same argument differently:

Vietnam is a Western beachhead on the Asian mainland, not a crucial flanking position. The main American defense line in that part of the world lies along the island chains from Alaska through the Japanese and Philippine Islands and Formosa to Australia and New Zealand. Until the Chinese dragon learns to swim or fly, America's main defense line in the Far East is untouched and untouchable by anything that either Communist China or Soviet Russia could bring against it.

The one valid reason for the United States' trying to win in Vietnam is a simple one never used by the proponents. Dean Acheson when Secre­ tary of State liked to talk about "situations of strength." The more such situations our armies ·captured the better he liked it. He thought going

!/ Walter Lippmann, "Confrontation With China," New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 1966.

- 177 - to the Yalu, in the Korean war, was a good thing because it would be a 'situation of strength.'· It was agreed that it was not vital, but useful.

Having Vietnam would be an extra 'situation of strength' for the United States; useful, hardly vital.1/

Sen. Frank Church (Idaho) complains that our Asian strategy is not succeeding. Sen. Church. says� ... moving American forces into European coun­ tries is not at all like sending them into Asia. When our armies remained in Western Europe after World War II, it was to forge a vital link in a collective chain of a defense that had real sub­ stance. We were welcomed by people with whom we shared a common culture and civilization. Most of them, having experienced our kind of freedom, willingly did their part in manning the NATO line drawn against the Soviets.

Unfortunately, we seem to have been mesmerized by the success of our postwar European policies, NATO and the Marshall Plan. With the emergence of Red China in Asia, our diplomats reacted like generals determined to fight the next war the same way they had fought the last. Military alliances were hastily formed to 'contain communism' in Asia, served up with American foreign aid on a global platter, a Marshall Plan writ large. Communist China, we determined, was to be stopped in Asia, as Russia had been in Europe.

But the Gulf that separates Europe from Asia is immense.... * *

With these countries, the United States enjoys no close communion, no cultural, political, economic or ethnic bond. We are an alien in Asia, a susp�ct, rich Western power, the only one that remains after the others have fled.

1/ "Core of the Argument," Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1966.

- 178 - In thes·e circumstances, it is meaningless to talk about military alliances which have raised a 'barrier' against communism around the rim of Asia. If the SEATO and CENTO alliances bar communism, then a sieve bars water and a plateglass window bars light. SEATO has not responded to the communist threat in Vietnam; the United,States takes its stand there practically alone.... .!/

Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, backed the containment strategy and warned against judging the United States war effort in Viet Nam in isolation:

"The question is not whether Viet Nam itself, or indeed South­ east Asia as a whole, is of such political, strategic, or economic impor­ tance as to justify asking our men and women to risk their lives there.

"Rather the question is the worldwide effect of permitting the Communists to breach by force any of the lines that were drawn in the various postwar settlements. The 17th parallel in Viet Nam is just as much a part of those settlements as Checkpoint Charlie, the 38th parallel, or the Northern border of Greece. The principles involved in Viet Nam are no less important and our national interest is just as surely involved."Y

As to whether we should attempt to contain communism in Viet Nam because of the alleged revolutionary nature of the struggle, Herman Kahn argues:

The United States also has a crucial interest in dispelling two illusions that have grown up since World War II: that radical terrorists almost always win; and that radical regimes .can subvert, or inter­ vene in, a neighboring area with little risk. History is replete with examples of how a victory by terrorists in one area powerfully influenced the likelihood and the tactics of subversion in other areas. The invalid­ ity of oversimplified 'domino theories' should not lead us to underestimate the worldwide costs of letting the Vietcong succeed with their resort to violence. In ad­ dition, I am seriously concerned about the political and moral repercussions within the United States were we to 'pull out' of Vietnam.y

.!/ "The Basic Flaw in Our Asian Strategy," The Washington Post, February 20, 1966, p. E-3.

'!:} The Washington Post, January 22, 1966. 3/ Look Magazine, op. cit., p. 29.

- 179 - Sen. Stuart Symington (Missouri) answered Sen. Church's analogy between NATO and SEATO by stating: The Senator's [Senator Church] argument ends on a curious note, for he concludes that even though we succeeded in Europe, we are likely to fail in Asia. The success in Europe that we now take for granted was hardly less evident during the grim winter of 1946-47.

Let us remember that in 1947, the Communist forces were just 20 miles from Athens. The war was halted by sizable injections of American assis­ tance, including military personnel, and later by the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the Soviet orbit leaving the Communists without that secure base.

What happened in Greece yields clear lessons for today's struggle in Vietnam, and the analogy is not destroyed by the fact that, as Senator Church puts it, 'we did not intervene with troops.' Neither did we intervene with troops for the first several years of the Communist attack against Vietnam. Only when the infiltration of Communist military forces from outside became obvious, and beyond the capabil­ ities of the South Vietnamese to resist adequately on their own, did we begin to put American fighting forces into Vietnam.

In Senator Church's op1n1on, the analogy between Europe and Asia, and between Greece and Vietnam, also breaks down on the point that we and the Europeans share a common culture and civilization, including a common experience of freedom. Surely the concept of cultural spheres of influence depends upon who is drawing the lines.

Greece has cultural links with France, England, and the United States, but its ties to the East and South are not insignificant. The Eastern Orthodox Church belongs as much to Russia as to Greece. Con­ versely, Vietnam, after 80 years under French domina­ tion, may have earned some title to a common heritage, with a culture and a way of life that Westerners are quick to appreciate and admire,.!/ y "A Rebuttal of a Rebuttal of Vietnam Policy," The Washington Post, March 13, 1966.

- 180 - B'. Are We Over Committed in Viet Nam?

Much of the argument over Viet Nam concerns the extent of the United States' commitment there. It is to these arguments that we now turn. Earlier in this chapter, we· did touch upon the over. -commitment issue with regard to the power of Congress to declare war. Now we shall examine the practical side of this controversy.

George Kennan, presently a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, but formerly a high policy planner in the State Department and a designer of containment as applied to Europe, claims that Viet Nani is not important enough in the worldwide struggle against communism. During the Viet Nam hearings, Kennan said:

"Viet Nam is not a region of major industrial - military importance. It is difficult to believe that any decisive development of the world situa­ tion is going to be determined in normal times by what happens in that terri­ tory."

"Were it not for the considerations of prestige that arise out of existing involvement, even a situation in which South Viet Nam was controlled exclusively by the Vietcong, while regrettable and no doubt morally unwarrant­ ed, would not present, in my opinion, dangers great enough to justify our direct intervention."

Mr. Kennan believes a Communist regime in South. Viet Nam would follow "a fairly independent political course." He found no reason to expect a Communist Viet Nam would ."function simply as a passive puppet and instrument of Chinese power."!/

Kennan also confesses that he is "a 1i ttle bewildered. I would like to know," Kennan states, "what that commitment really consists of, and how and when it was incurred. What seems involved here is an obligation on our part not only to defend the frontiers of a certain political entity against outside attack, but to assure the internal security of its government in circumstances where that government is unable to assure that security by its own means. Now, any such obligation is one that goes obviously consid­ erably further in its implications than the normal obligations of a military alliance. "Y

Lt. General James M. Gavin (Retired), who had a long and successful military career which ended in 1958 when he was Chief of Army Research and Development, feels that we are oven committed in Viet Nam at the expense of other areas. General Gavin says, "My concern for. Viet Nam first became y The Truth About Vietnam, op. cit., pp. 190-93. y Ibid., p. 193.

- 181 - aroused when I found us cutting back our global commitments in the realm of economics. I began to suspect that the escalation in Southeast Asia would begin to hurt our world strategic commitments. If this has signifi­ cance now it may have tremendous significance in the long run. When we begin to turn back on what we are doing in world affairs through our eco­ nomic endeavors, to support a tactical confrontation that' appears to be escalating at the will of the enemy, we are in a ver}''dangerous position, "Y

In August, 1966, the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee held hear­ ings on our global commitments, pledging us to the defense of over forty nations. Sen. Stennis, the chairman, said the hearings were intended to explore "whether or not we may be over-extended either now or in the future." Sen. Stennis complained about the fact that a relatively small and under­ developed country such as North Viet Nam had been able to tie us down and require a very substantial commitment of our military manpower and resources over many months. "With so many military commitments," he said, "the United. States could not afford to become overly preoccupied with one area of the world. The question in my mind is how we expect to respond if brush fire wars broke out at a number of places at once. "Y

A New York Times editorial contends the real issue over South Viet Nam is not whether we are committed, but whether we are over committed: The overcommitment has come in the Johnson Administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam and send massive American forces into South Viet­ nam to engage in offensive combat. Until recently, the American obligation had been simply to provide economic aid, weapons and advice to a South Viet­ namese Government that was able and willing to defend itself and to make the main effort in so doing.

An even more important issue now is whether this commitment should be further expanded by lifting the American presence from 200,000 to 400,000 or 600,000 troops. That move would not only mean a quantum jump in escalation, but would fundamentally alter the character of the war.� Finally, the fear has been expressed that, in order to win the Vietnamese struggle, the United States will become involved in a war with Communist China. Roger Hilsman, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, made

ij Ibid., p. 129. 2/ Chicago Tribune, August 26, 1966.

� February 20, 1966.

- 182 - such a forecast.I/ Hilsman said, "Communist China and the United States are on a collision course that can only result in a war." Hilsman offered a policy recommendation which he felt would lessen the possibility of a massive war on the Asian mainland. He called for a de-escalation of the war with a warning that "the South Vietnamese must win whatever is won. We cannot let this become an American war."

The debate over whether we are over committed in Viet Nam is one which inevitably involves the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. The Defense Secretary's position is simply this: His is a unique approach to fighting what he now calls a "major war. "2/ He says that it is not necessary to move to emergency measures, at least not as early as in previous wars. The United States has been able to build its armed forces up gradually. The gradual build-up has made it unnecessary to call reserve forces to arms. This approach has one global advantage: the one million reservists remain underdeployed, and ready to jump into action should there be any brush fire wars other than in Viet Nam.

In his testimony before the recent Senate Preparedness Subcommittee hearings, Secretary Rusk declared, "I do not think that we are overcommitted. I think that there is a very great danger in being undercommitted."3/ The danger, Mr. Rusk contended, is that the Soviet Union or Communist China would interpret any failure to make explicit commitments as an invitation to attack. He added that the Korean War might have been a result of the failure to make the United States commitment clear. Some observers argue that it would be disastrous to reduce our commitments to Viet Nam. Henry Kissinger, Professor of Government at Harvard and a consultant to the National Security Council under President Kennedy, states:

••• An American withdrawal under conditions that could plausibly be represented as a Communist victory would be disastrous for these reasons: Within the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet 'revisionism' have focused on the Russian doctrine of peaceful coexistence. A victory by a third-class Communist peasant state over the United States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world. In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries--especially Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand--that have supported our effort. lf The Washington Post, February 2, 1966.

'!:./ Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1966.

� The New York Times, August 31, 1966.

- 183 - The long-term orientation of such countries as India and Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of America's willingness and ability to honor its commitments. 'For example, whether or not India decides to become a.nuclear power depends cru­ cially on its confidence in American support against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields. The stability of areas geographically far removed from Vietnam will be · basically affected by the outcome there. In short, we are no longer fighting in Viet­ nam only for the Vietnamese.· We are also fighting for ourselves and for international stability ..!./

Herman Kahn argues essentially the same as Kissinger when he declares: .•••The first and overwhelming point is that whether or not one agrees with the steps that led to it, our present commitment to oppose force and terror by the National Liberation. Front in South Vietnam is as solemn an engagement as any modern nation has made. I do not believe that commit­ ments must be blindly kept, regardless-of costs; but just as we should be careful about making commitments, we should be very careful about hon­ oring them. Maintaining the credibility of our conunit­ ments is.not just a matter of 'saving face.' Our ability to support world peace and security, parti­ cularly without using excessive force, depends in great measure upon the faith that other nations repose in American commitments. (Germany, Japan, India and Israel, for example, restrain their acti-. vities in obtaining nuclear weapons partly because of American conunitments.) To renege on commitments as serious as those we have made in Southeast· Asia could be a major. step in a disastrous erosion of faith in the United States. If faith in our comlJ\.1-tments became so weak that we would have to give excessive conunitments in order to make them believable--for ex�ple, giving minor states l/ Look Magazine, loc. cit.

- 184 - control over our policy (as the British had to do with Poland in 1939)--then the likelihood of major escalation, such as a war with China, would be dan- gerously increased. .!.f A noted columnist, Howard K. Smith, argues that we must obtain our stated objectives in Viet Nam. He states:

If we should lose and withdraw, or negotiate an empty agreement, every little band of politicians unable to win by consent in Latin America would ac­ quire itself a Cuban adviser and have a go at a 'War of Liberation.' In half the countries of the world, the typical amusement would be going downtown to wreck the American embassy. That nearly happened in the period before we began seriously resisting in Viet Nam. After we began resisting, Ben Bella, Nkrumah, and Sukarno lost power in succession and our embassies became their prosaic selves once again.

Nothing as epic as a decline or collapse of American power in the world would result from failure in Viet Nam. Instead, in the next serious engagement--say in Thailand--an overwrought Ameri­ can opinion would insist on victory at any price. We would put not 300,000 but 3 million troops into combat. 2/

IV. How Can the United States Substantially Reduce Its Commitments to Viet Nam?

In this final section we shall now consider two general proposals which have been advanced to reduce our commitments in Viet Nam. It must not be assumed, however, that all critics of American policy in Viet Nam propose that we should reduce our commitments in Viet Nam. Indeed, other critics have argued for an even greater United States commitment. Because negative debaters are not required to defend the status quo, negative teams may, for reasons of strategy, choose to advocate increasing our military commitment. Thus we shall also consider this argument.

Generally two types of proposals have been suggested to reduce our Viet Nam commitments. Some have suggested that we should simply with­ draw American forces while others support the "enclave" approach suggested by General Gavin. Let us first consider American withdrawal .

.!./ Ibid.

"Price of U.S. Defeat in Viet Nam Too Costly," Washington Evening Star, Y August 29, 1966.

- 185 - A. Withdrawal. ° Some opponents of the war have demanded that the United States should simply pull out of Viet Nam and let the Vietnamese settle wh�t is said to be their own affair. A proposal advocated by poli t:icaL·sci­ entist, Hans Morgenthau, calls for a gradual withdrawal. Morgenthau, as was indicated early in this chapter, proceeds from the premise that the war in Viet Nam is primarily a civil war; that its global significance is remote, and that ultimately it will not only fail to contain communism, but may well open the gates to further Communist expansion.!/ Morgenthau proposes a gradual withdrawal by U.S. forces during which we should over­ see a political solution among the various political factions within South Viet Nam. While Morgenthau acknowledges that the Viet Cong may well take over South Viet Nam, he also visualizes a South Vietnamese Government which would be anxious to maintai.n its independence from North Viet Nam. As for the advantages and disadvantages of the Morgenthau proposal, we have already argued these in the previous section so there is no need to consider them here. B. The Enclave Solution.

The enclave idea was suggested by General Gavin's article in Harper's for February, 1966. As an alternative to the present U.S. policy of mill tary es.calation in Viet Nam, he urges the stopping of our bombing of North Viet Nam, a halt in the escalation of the ground war, withdrawal of American troops to defend a limited number of enclaves along the South Viet Nam coast, and renewed efforts to find a solution through the United Nations or a conference in Geneva. General Gavin believes that bombing North Viet Nam may ultimately·lead to a confrontation with Conununist China. On the controversial subject of the enclaves, he says, "Today we have suf­ ficient forces in Soutn Vietnam to hold several enclaves, where sea and air power can be made fully effective."

Since affirmative debaters are required to propose "substantial reductions" of our commitments, the Gavin proposal.requires more examina­ tion from a debater's po:int of view. At the same time it is impo:rtant to point out that as we tailor this enclave idea, we may read into it some things that were not intended by General Gavin.

First, General Gavin argues that we should use what we have in Viet Nam. The Gavin proposal was made early in 1966 when there were 215,000 Amer­ ican troops in Viet Nam (by September, 1966, this increased to 320,000). Would this be a substantial reduction? Perhaps the affirmative could propose sub­ stantially reducing the number of troops in South Viet Nam (although General

1f Look Magazin�, loc. cit.

- 186 - Gavin did not suggest this). During the Viet Nam hearings, General Gavin further emphasized what he meant by his intended use of American forces by saying, "We must do our best with the forces that we have deployed in Viet­ nam now. Nothing more than that. I did not say withdraw, retreat, go ahead, attack or anything else."}}

What General Gavin, Professor Kennan and others who generally sup­ port this enclave idea perhaps intend is that the presence of American forces in Viet Nam should be used to gain diplomatic leverage vis-�-vis Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. Since they probably do not have the military power to dislodge American forces, they would ultimately be forced to nego­ tiate along more reasonable grounds. In any case, if the war continues, it should be fought by the South Vietnamese forces rather than Americans.

Finally, if General Gavin's enclave proposal is compared to an all­ out American commitment to assist South Viet Nam, it may well constitute a substantial reduction. The Washington Post recently reported on a Pentagon study which indicated that even if 750,000 American troops were employed in Viet Nam, the war could last another five years. The reasons why General Gavin proposed the enclave idea have been presented earlier in this chapter. Briefly summarized, they are: (1) that the U.S. is becoming over cOJIDilitted in Viet Nam at the expense of other vital areas; (2) that the war is being escalated at the will of the enemy and this may ultimately lead to war with Communist China; and (3) this would lead to a large Asian mainland war,involving American forces,that should be avoided.

The Johnson Administration has thus far rejected the enclave pro­ posal.2/ Its rejection had been urged by General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was argued that the existence of these isolated armed positions along the way, like so many obsolete medieval fortresses, would not stop Communist penetration of Southeast Asia. Once the enclave limits are .determined--and that might not be difficult for an aggressive ene­ my--the enemy is free to roam at will in the "sanctuary space" between them. Also, in the process of establishing the enclaves, much territory won at great sacrifice by American forces would be surrendered back to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars.

During the Viet Nam hearings, Secretary Rusk also rejected the Gavin thesis: · "I don't believe, myself, that you can ask our men in uniform just to put themselves into half a dozen or a dozen Guantanamos and then hun­ ker down and let the other side pick the time and the place and the weapons and the buildup of forces, and take them on one enclave at a time." y The Truth About Vietnam, op. cit., p. 130.

'?:) Baltimore Sun, February 2, 1966.

- 187 - C. Escalation. As we indicated earlier, there are some who support our military efforts in Viet Nam, but not the tactics that the United States has employed. Some suggest an across-the-board escalation while others would stress air and naval power rather than increases in t.roop strength. Sen. Russell, for instance, favors escalation across the board-­ to reduce American casualty lists:

"For more than six months now--at every conference I have attended, no matter at what level--! have been vigorously urging that we apply greater force to the regime in North Vietnam. That's the source of all our trouble.

"Long ago, we should have started applying pressure on Hanoi so that those people, like civilized beings, would come to a conference table and settle this thing." Sen. Russell advocated closing th� port of Haiphong, bombing the iron works in Hanoi, the fuel dumps, and "any other resource that they· have that can be utilized to any degree by them to kill American boys." He said, "there are several things that mus.t be done unless we are going to take eight or ten years to win the war. One of them is to blockade the coast completely, so that they can't get any aid from the outside. An­ other is to see that the two railroad lines from China into North Vietnam cannot function on the North Vietnamese side of the border.

"These things should be done.

"Of course, we can probably win the war with the present methods, if we don't care anything about the size of casualty lists or the cost in dollars--and are ready to sp!3nd eight or 10 years doing it.".!./

Former Sen. Barry Goldwater commented in a similar vein:

"We're not exerting our full air power against the enemy, and I don't think that is playing fair with the men who are being drafted and the men who are being sent over to Vietnam ..•• !£ this is going to be the way .we're going to respond to Communist aggression around the world, I think the Communists are going to really get aggressive. We haven't shown, as a country, the determination to get this job done..•. If we're in a war, the best way to get out of it is to win it. And the quickest way to win it is to use the power you have--and we have the power.".Y

..!./ Interview with Sen. Richard B. Russell, U.S. News and World Report, May 2, 1966. 2/ Interview with former Sen. Barry Goldwater, U.S. News and World Report, April 25, 1966.

- 188 - On January 31, 1966, after President Johnson's decision to resume the bombing in North Viet Nam, Sen. Robert F. Kennedy made this statement on the floor of the Senate: "If we regard bombing as the answer to Vietnam we are heading straight for disaster." On the same day ex-Presidents Truman and E.isenhower both backed the Johnson decision to resume the bombing. Mr. Eisenhower said that to have acted otherwise would have "given sanctuary to those responsible for sending guerrilla forces and supplies into South Vietnam."

The British Government announced it "understands and supports" the American decision to resume the bombing. The Foreign Office said it regretted the failure of Hanoi to take advantage of the suspension of bombing by respond­ ing to repeated American offers to negotiate. The French cabinet said February 2 that it "can only regret and disapprove of the resumption of the bombing" of North Vietnam. The raids were "jeopardizing the cause of peace," the cabinet statement said. France once more suggested that the Viet Nam matter be taken up by a reconvened Geneva conference, rather than by the United Nations, where the United States had taken the case on January 31.

On May 22, 1966, Air Force Secretary Harold Brown said President Johnson continued to oppose widening the air war against North Viet Nam by bombing Hanoi, Haiphong or other major cities. He said past air assaults had reduced the flow of men and supplies to the Viet Cong but had not ended it. A step-up might further reduce the flow, Mr. Brown said, but "still would not cut off that infiltration."

He warned that further air escalation "might well carry with it the likelihood of a wider war, and no responsible government can lightly step into such a situation .•.•It doesn't do very much good to win one war and find yourself in a much bigger one, possibly with Communist China."

V. Epilogue.

In this chapter, we have discussed the case of Viet Nam in three areas--legal, moral, and practical. We have examined some of the major reasons why the United States should or should not reduce its commitments.· There are no easy answers to the difficult problem of Viet Nam. Viet Nam has become for all Americans an extremely complex problem and what is presented here perhaps only begins to explore it. Yet it is offered in the hope that it will stimulate the debater to further research.

- 189 - DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Why do some observers contend·that the current U.S. policy in Viet Nam violates the 1954 Geneva accords? How does the State Depart­ ment answer these charges? 2. Why does Senator Morse argue that SEATO should not be used to justify U.S. military in Viet Nam? How does Secretary Rusk reply to this argument?

3. What part has the "Tonkfo Resolution" played in the United States' commitment in Viet Nam? 4. How has Senator Fulbright challenged U.S. position in Viet Nam on moral grounds? How have defenders of U.S. policy replied to these arguments?

5. Why do some observers argue that our action in Soutneast Asia will not contain Communist expansion? Why do others feel that this policy is correct?

6. Why are observers like Professor Kennan and General Gavin concerned about the U.S. military commitment in Viet Nam? Why do others believe that the present commitment is essential to American interests?

7. How does the position of Communist China enter the Viet Nam debate?

8. What are the pros and cons of the following proposals: with­ drawal, enclave, and escalation?

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