Deeply Divided Nation by Farideh Farhi

Farhi Aspenia n. 39-40 ingl 7-05-2008 18:04 Pagina 43

Farideh Farhi Deeply divided nation

With the revolution of 1979, Iran experienced a dramatic transformation of its governance structure. The formal and informal rules and processes that govern the contemporary relationships among Iran’s political elite and between the state and the population reflect the post-revolutionary period of internal competition and discord.

Almost three decades after the revolution, Iran’s political elite continues to be con- flicted over what course the country’s future should take. At the same time, the en- during nature of deep divisions over the role of religion in governing the country’s cul- tural values and aspirations, the direction of its economic and foreign policies, and the extent of popular participation in the political

Farideh Farhi is an independent researcher process suggest a permanency in these forces shap-

and adjunct professor of political science at ing the contours of Iranian politics that can no

the University of Hawaii at Manoa. longer be ignored or simply wished away.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. The Iran that emerges from the political process that was unleashed after the revolution is a country that defies easy characterizations. At one level, a powerful but not necessarily cohesive combi- nation of non-elected clerics and non-clerics command many centers of economic and political power, including key political institutions, parts of the judiciary, a multitude of intelligence operations within the military and security forces, revolutionary foun- dations, and paramilitary organizations. Yet at another level, a type of unpredictable election-based politics unknown to most of the region has begun to shape the country in significant ways, ensuring that competing political actors and institutions remain permanent features of Iranian polity. Farhi Aspenia n. 39-40 ingl 7-05-2008 18:04 Pagina 44

The surprising 1997 election of reformist Mohammad Khatami – running on a plat- form emphasizing the rule of law, the accountability of public officials, and the need for political and institutional reform based on greater involvement of civil society – affirmed the wide support for political reform among a significant segment of the population. This trend was confirmed with the subsequent victories of reform-oriented candidates in the first municipal elections of 1999, in the sixth post-revolutionary parliamentary elections of 2000, and then in the decisive reelection of Khatami in 2001. The strong opposition that the reformist parliament and President Khatami elicited from various centers of power also confirmed the lack of elite consensus over the direction the country should be taking. Non-elective branches of government revealed their continuing strength by blocking legislation and keeping the reform plat- form from being implemented. The unforeseen 2005 election of conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in turn, brought into focus popular concerns over issues related to economic distribution and corruption among the elite ranks. Ahmadinejad’s second place finish in the first round of the election – through an organized and coordinated effort to move people to vote 44 on election day, bully opponents, instigate violence, use media resources, and even commit some election day fraud – also highlighted the existence of a non-transparent network of political players and organizations. Ultimately, in an unprecedented second round, Ahmadinejad, his “efficient government” message, and his social justice, anti-corruption, pro-Islamic, simple way of life garnered a landslide, albeit with only about a third of the eligible votes of over 40 mil- lion people. In conjunction with the way the votes were split in the first round of the election, this number revealed an often neglected fact about Iranian politics: the divided nature of the Iranian electorate.

A DIVIDED ELECTORATE. Analyses of Iran mostly focus either on the fractured nature of the political system or the presumed rift between Iran’s Islamic government and the “people” of Iran. Embedded in these analyses is a highly questionable pre- supposition that the Iranian people operate in an almost herd-like fashion, moving from one direction to another in consort. They are viewed as having moved from being revolutionaries, to martyrs of war, to reformists, to disaffected reformists, to anti- reformists, to people with democratic aspirations, and now to seekers of economic justice. The reality is that the Iranian citizenry, like elsewhere, is a rather differentiated lot, with important criss-crossing splits based on socioeconomic background, cultur- Farhi Aspenia n. 39-40 ingl 7-05-2008 18:04 Pagina 45

al practices, provincial and ethnic ties, and political aspirations. And successful elec- toral campaigns are cognizant of this complexity. Candidates with local ties do well in their own provinces, and candidates with better grassroots organization do better at getting out the vote (and, perhaps not always le- gitimately, at getting out the vote in their own favor). Most importantly, those candidates who are best able to crystallize a program into a simple, clear, and consistent message win.

Given the power of non-elective figures and institutions – the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, and the Expediency Council – of course one can always question the significance of elections in heralding any measurable change in the political system as a whole. But elections in Iran do matter: not necessarily in terms of reshaping the nature or even structure of the political system, but in terms of important changes in political direction, and of the political cadre. They also involve a competition in which the outcome is not pre-determined. As such, the political games are significant; they involve all the machinations, organizational maneuvering, attempts at coalition building, and voter and vote manipulations that are prevalent in every other country with a competitive political system. In the case of Iran (but not only Iran), non-elective institutions – in particular the Guardian Council, which has the power to vet candidates – constantly attempt to ma- Farhi Aspenia n. 39-40 ingl 7-05-2008 18:04 Pagina 46

nipulate election rules. Their aim is to handicap opponents or create obstacles for those candidates which may challenge the system. As such, elections also provide an important space for conversation about the rules of the game; criticism about how elections are conducted ultimately leads to a discussion of how the Islamic Republic is run. These criticisms rarely get anywhere, but elections are important vehicles for their airing. Given this competitive environment, it is a fallacy to treat the Iranian political land- scape as being dominated by a single individual or unified group. This fallacy is something that should be particularly avoided now. No doubt, with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the conservatives (who now call themselves “principlists” – osulgarayan – in Iran) have managed to take over all key institutions of the Islamic Republic, elective or non-elective. But their political cadres were unable to reach an agreement over a single candidate during the 2005 presidential election or over a common slate in the subsequent 2006 municipal elections.

THE LATEST CHAPTER: MORE RIFTS. Divisions continued to persist during 46 the campaign for the March 2008 parliamentary elections. This was despite the fact that the conservatives close to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad entered the election process determined not to repeat the mistakes they had made in the 2006 municipal elections. In that year, individuals aligned with the president (who ran under the banner of the Pleasant Scent of Service Party), rather smug about their man, chose to offer their own slate of candidates, particularly in large cities, and ended up with a relatively weak showing in comparison to other conservative forces or even reformists. To avoid this scenario, a political process was designed to bring together the major legs of Iranian conservatism – including Ahmadinejad supporters as well as the old guards of the Islamic Coalition Party – under the umbrella of the United Principlist Front. The intent was to offer a unified list of candidates throughout the country. Ne- gotiations and haggling over candidates in various cities went on for months, ultimately leading to lists that included conservative candidates who were critical of Ah- madinejad’s economic policies. But as such haggling progressed – especially in Tehran – it gradually became clear that some of the other major conservative players (specifically former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, current Tehran mayor Mohammad Qalibaf, and former head of the Islamic Revolution’s Guard Corps and current secretary of the Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezaie) were still profoundly dissatisfied. Even the attempted intervention of Farhi Aspenia n. 39-40 ingl 7-05-2008 18:04 Pagina 47

the father figure of Iran’s conservative movement, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, to reach a compromise between Ahmadinejad’s forces and others came to naught. Indeed, Ali Larijani ended up deciding to run from the city of Qom instead of Tehran. More importantly, the so-called “pragmatic conservatives” ended up offering their own list of candidates under the banner of Comprehensive Principlist Front. Unofficially, this grouping was brought together in the name of the three key figures mentioned above: clearly, the conservative rift manifested during the previous presidential and then municipal elections was not healed. Rifts persisted among reformists as well. The United Reformist Coalition, which pre- sented its candidates as former president Mohammad Khatami’s “companions”, was able to bring together three major reformist parties: the Islamic Iran’s Participation Front, the Islamic Revolution’s Mujaheddin, and Servants of Construction. Yet this coalition could not heal its rift with the more centrist National Confidence Party, which is associated with the former Majlis speaker and presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi. Although these two reformist wings had many shared candidates throughout the country (including about half in Tehran’s list of thirty), their acrimonious ver- bal bantering in the pre-election period showed that “hyper-fractionalization” is a 47 problem of Iranian politics in general and not merely a conservative one.

MODERATE HOPES. Finally, one important set of players – the ones associated with former president Hashemi Rafsanjani – participated in the election as a force for moderation, but did not do so with full vigor. To be sure, some individuals close to Rafsanjani ran as members of Servants of Construction, under the banner of the Unit- ed Reformist Coalition. But other high visibility members of Rafsanjani’s Moderation and Development Party – such as Iran’s former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani – decided not to run. Motives ran from fear of the personal attacks that would be hurled against them by Ahmadinejad supporters to the possibility that they would not be included in other reformist slates. The weak presence of Rafsanjani supporters (who had been reputed to be forming a third force in Iranian politics, between reformists and conservatives, and in the name of “moderation”) exposed the truth: if there is going to be a challenge to Ahmadine- jad’s policies in the direction of moderation or pragmatism, it has to come from within the conservative ranks, not from outside it. To be more precise, given the extent of reformist disqualification, the issue in these latest elections was not whether reformists or centrists could win, but rather how well Farhi Aspenia n. 39-40 ingl 7-05-2008 18:04 Pagina 48

any critic of President Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and management could do (and, conversely, how badly his supporters would do). The reformists hoped for a stronger minority status (both in terms of numbers and in terms of more influential candidates); the more pragmatic conservatives hoped for a stronger presence in lead- ership positions. The latter group’s goal was to create a working majority in a more ef- fective Majlis, especially as the current one has been criticized for being weak and ineffective vis-à-vis a forceful president. Despite a conservative win, the reformists did better than expected. Divisions within the conservative ranks continue to persist, enhancing the chances that the new Maj- lis can succeed in reigning in Ahmadinejad’s expansionist economic policies and in keeping his erratic management style under control. The results also show that despite the concerted and successful effort to narrow the ideological range of approved candidates, policy disagreements abound, and competition among individuals and groups to gain access to levers of political power remain unabated. Finally, turnout and voting patterns in large cities, which was much lower than the 48 general voter turnout (about 55% throughout Iran), suggest a degree of dissatisfaction that should be of concern to conservatives in light of the 2009 presidential election – even in the unlikely event reformists are able to set aside their differences and enter the elections unified, all rallying around a single appealing candidate. The election process will undoubtedly continue to be manipulated in order to reduce reformist chances and to limit competition to an intra-conservative affair. But this does not suggest a pre-determined outcome: intense elite competition, even within a limited ideological range, remains the hallmark of Iranian politics.