Naypyidaw's Drug Addiction

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Naypyidaw’s drug addiction The wild plant called Na kaw_leh– in Lahu is known as “the The Burma Army’s strategic use of best friend of poppy.” It grows at eleva ons only over 3,000 feet, where poppy can grow. When Lahu farmers see this the drug trade in the Golden Triangle plant, they know the land is suitable for cul va ng poppy. and its impact on the Lahu published in October 2016 by the Lahu Na onal Development Organisa on

Naypyidaw’s drug addiction The Burma Army’s strategic use of the drug trade in the Golden Triangle and its impact on the Lahu The Lahu National Development Organisation

The Lahu National Development Organisation (LNDO) was set up by a group of leading Lahu democracy activists in Chiang Mai, Thailand in March 1997 to promote the welfare and well-being of the Lahu people, including the promotion of alternatives to growing opium.

The objectives of LNDO are: • To promote democracy and human rights in Shan State, with particular attention paid to Lahu. • To promote increased understanding among the Lahu, Akha, En, Palaung, Kachin, Wa, and Shan of human rights, democracy, federalism, community development and health issues. • To develop unity and cooperation among the Lahu and other highlanders from Shan State and to provide opportunities for development of civic leadership skills among local groups.

LNDO has produced the following publications: Unsettling Moves: The Wa forced resettlement program in eastern Shan State (2002), Aftershocks along Burma’s Mekong: Reef-blasing and military-style development in eastern Shan State (2003), Undercurrents: Monitoring development along Burma’s Mekong (Issue 1: 2005, Issue 2: 2006, Issue 3: 2009)

Contact: [email protected]

Cover photo: A “Long jacket” Yellow Lahu from eastern Shan State Contents

Summary ...... 4

Introduction and methodology ...... 7

Findings ...... 8

I. Increasing militarization in eastern Shan State ...... 8 Burma Army expansion ...... 11 Burma Army militia expansion ...... 12 Ethnic armed group expansion ...... 13 II. Link between confl ict and drugs ...... 17 III. Burma Army militia’s reliance on the drug trade ...... 18 Taxing opium harvests ...... 18 Controlling opium sales ...... 19 Box: Collecting commission fees for selling confi scated drugs ...... 19 Cashing in on refi nery investments ...... 20 Securing transport of the fi nished product ...... 20 IV. Kickbacks to the Burma Army and other central government o cials ...... 21 V. Current drug trends – voices from the ground ...... 22 Improved opium yields, no prohibition ...... 22 Growing drug addiction ...... 23 Token crackdowns ...... 25 Life of a poppy grower ...... 26 VI. Past lessons from drug eradication programs ...... 31 Case study: Yellow Lahu decimated by forced resettlement ...... 31

Conclusion and recommendations ...... 36 Summary

With unique access and information The Burma Army militia-controlled from the ground, the Lahu National areas are where most opium in Development Organisation (LNDO) eastern Shan State is being grown, examines in this report how the as shown by maps of the United Burma Army benefi ts directly from Nations O ce of Drugs and Crime the drug trade in eastern Shan State. (UNODC). These areas are also The fi ndings show how confl ict where scores of drug refi neries that and drug production in Burma are produce large amounts of heroin inextricably linked, and that only a and methamphetamines (“yaba”) political resolution of the decades- are located. long ethnic confl ict will enable Burma’s drug crisis to be addressed. The Burma Army militia groups provide security to the drug Despite ceasefi res, the central syndicates operating the refi neries. government’s refusal to cede to In the process they make huge ethnic demands for federalism has profi ts from buying opium from caused a steady military build-up by farmers and selling it to refi nery both the Burma Army and ethnic owners, from joint investments in armed groups in eastern Shan refi neries, and from transporting State. Over the past ten years, the drugs to distributors. These profi ts number of Burma Army troops not only subsidize the upkeep of in seven eastern Shan townships the militia forces, but enable militia has risen from over 10,000 to over leaders to gain substantial personal 14,000. Signifi cantly for the drug wealth. This is a key incentive to trade, this includes a substantial remain loyal to the Burma Army, increase in the number of Burma and to continue their policing duty Army militia troops—from about against ethnic resistance groups. 2,300 to 3,400—who serve the vital purpose of maintaining central Thus, with the ethnic confl ict government control over inaccessible unresolved, and the military mountainous areas. constitutionally outside civilian

control, it is business as usual for government militia leader from the drug trade in eastern Shan Mong Hsat arrested with a large State this year, despite government amount of yaba in March 2016 was announcements to the contrary. The released six months later without Burma Army will never authorize charges. a drug crackdown on their militia while they remain allies in a war Token opium eradication programs of occupation that is far more forced on poor hill farmers have had strategically important than the war absolutely no impact on the trade, on drugs. but have had devastating impacts on local communities. In early 2016, LNDO surveyed 33 opium-growing Lahu villages in For example, a drug eradication four eastern Shan State townships, campaign carried out by the and found that, in contrast with Burma Army between 1999 and the wealth of militia leaders, most 2005 decimated the population villagers remain impoverished, and of a small Lahu sub-group, the rely on opium as a subsistence crop. “Long-jacket” Yellow Lahu. Forced Opium cultivation had increased down from high mountains in since the previous year, reﬁ neries Kengtung and Tachileik, hundreds in militia areas were operating died from malaria in the warmer with impunity, and widespread lower climate. Some have since availability of cheap drugs was returned to their mountain homes, causing an alarming increase while others are still staying in in drug addiction among Lahu resettlement locations, but their communities. numbers have dwindled to only about 1,100, from an original Drug control measures remain population of over 1,800. insubstantial and ine ective. Despite frequent news reports of drug Despite increased public debate seizures this year, only small-time about the drug problem in Burma, dealers have been charged. A there continues to be little mention

5 of its links with the confl ict. The LNDO therefore urges the Burma Army’s reliance on the new NLD government and drug trade in defending the international donors to focus territorial interests of the central their e orts on supporting a government is rarely discussed. political resolution to the confl ict If the confl ict is mentioned, it is as a priority in tackling the drug invariably the ethnic resistance problem in Burma. groups who are singled out for blame for fi nancing their This must involve a federal operations through drugs. settlement that devolves signifi cant powers down to state and sub-state This refusal to face the facts on the levels, thereby addressing demands ground, including by the UNODC for self-determination of respective and international donors, is both ethnic groups. It is also urgent that counter-productive and dangerous. the military be constitutionally brought under civilian control. The increased amounts of aid being poured into the Burmese Only when there is a functioning government to bolster its security federal democratic system, where sector, including for drug control, local leaders rule by popular will only fuel the drug trade— vote rather than by the gun, causing increased misery for can participatory, sustainable communities throughout Burma— drug eradication programs be while the confl ict persists. implemented.

6 Introduction and methodology

When the Lahu National problem, LNDO therefore decided Development Organisation it was time to give input from the (LNDO) was set up in 1997, one ground into the drug policy debate, its main aims was to promote and to give frank analysis of the alternatives to opium growing for drugs-confl ict nexus in eastern Lahu people. However, opium Shan State. growing remains the main source of livelihood for many Lahu During April-June 2016 LNDO farmers, and eastern Shan State— fi eld sta visited 33 opium-growing known as the “Golden Triangle”— villages in four townships of remains a major source of heroin eastern Shan State: and methamphetamines for Burma and the region. Kengtung: 18 villages in 11 tracts Mong Hsat: 6 villages in 2 tracts The current proliferation of drugs Tachileik: 8 villages in 4 tracts in Burma make it clear that drug Mong Phyak: 1 village control e orts are not working. However, there continues to be no LNDO met with village heads, frank discussion of the political pastors, militia members and factors fuelling drug production, farmers in these villages, and asked in particular how the Burma about opium cultivation and drug Army benefi ts from the trade. The production in their areas. LNDO UNODC and political analysts also asked about the confl ict working o cially inside Burma situation, and government drug tend to tiptoe around this fact. The control measures. The results of voices of those on the ground are the research were compiled into also seldom heard in drug policy this report during July-August discussions. 2016.

With new pledges from the NLD- led government to tackle the drug

7 Findings

I. Increasing militarization in eastern Shan State

Despite ceaseﬁ res between the Burma Army and the main ethnic armed groups in eastern Shan State – the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/ SSA)—all sides have continued to militarize.

In 2006, there were about 17,000 armed troops (comprising over 10,000 Burma Army/ militia troops, and over 6,000 ethnic resistance troops) in eight townships of eastern Shan State. Now, there are about 24,000 troops (over 14,000 government troops, and about 10,000 ethnic resistance troops). There has thus been an overall increase of about 7,000 A Lahu mili a member in Mong Kok troops in the area.

8 Armed forces in eastern Shan State in September 2016

Armed groups in 2006 September 2016 eastern Shan State No. of Es mated No. of Es mated (8 townships) ba alions strength ba alions strength Burma Army forces Infantry 41 Ba alions 8,200 49 Ba alions 9,800 Ar llery 3 Ba alions 210 8 Ba alions 640 Tank 1 Ba alion 80 1 Ba alion 80 Regular mili a 61 groups 1,800 84 groups 3,000 Lahu “special 5 groups 100 - - commando” mili a Ex-MTA mili a 2 groups 400 2 groups 400 Border Guard Forces - - 3 Ba alions 210 Sub-total 10,790 14,130 Ethnic armed resistance groups 7 Brigades 7 Brigades Southern UWSA 3,000 4,000 +1 Division +1 Division 3 Ba alions RCSS/SSA 3 Ba alions 200 700 +1 Division NDAA (Mong La) 7 Brigades 3,000 7 Brigades 5,000 Sub-total 6,200 9,700 Overall es mated total 16,990 23,830

9 Burma Army troop increases in seven townships of eastern Shan State, 2006 to September 2016

Troop strength in 2006 Tachileik Mong Mong Mong Kengtung Mong Mong Ton Phyak Yawng Ping Hsat Burma LIB 526, MOC 18, LIB 345, ROC, IB IB 314, LIB 14 MOC, ROC, IB Army 359, 331, LIB 507, 335, 311, 43, LIB 529, 244, IB 49, LIB 65, 277, Ba alions 316, 571, 570, 329, 334 360, 350, 245, 224, 278, 527, 225, LIB 572, Ar l. 221, 330, 528, 539 226, 228, 333 519, 328 387 579 Ar l. Unit 598, 410, Supply Ba 222, Tank Ba , Eng. Ba 6, Field Med Ba 12, 909 Ar l. HQ, BE. GE Burma 11 groups 5 groups + 4 groups 5 groups 22 groups 10 groups 4 groups Army + 2 5 special mili a ex-MTA mili a groups groups groups Increased troop strength in September 2016 New LIB 336, LIB 549, BGF 1008 LIB 332, Ar llery LIB 553, IB 66, LIB Burma Ar l. 227 520, Ar l. 328, Ar l. 554, 579, 486, 133, Army Ba ., BGF (replaces Unit Ba . 580, Ts 330, 741, Ba alions 1009 2 ba s) 222 Ar l. Ba BGF 1007 New 2 groups (5 regular 22 groups 2 groups 2 groups 1 group Burma + 5 special Army mili a mili a become 1 groups big mili a)

10 Burma Army expansion The number of Burma Army Since 2010, the Burma Army battalions in eastern Shan State has also set up 3 Border Guard has increased over ten years from Forces (BGF), mostly comprising 44 to 57, which is an almost former militia members. The tenfold increase since 1988, when BGF have been set up on the there were only six Burma Army Thai border in Mong Ton and battalions in the area. Eight new Tachilek and at the Lao border infantry battalions have been at Mong Yawng (on the Mekong deployed, mostly in the Mong river). Although the original plan Hsat and Mong Ton areas, next of the Burma Army in 2008 was to the UWSA territories. Five new to bring all ethnic armed groups artillery battalions have been set up under their control as BGF, the in Kengtung, Mong Ping, Mong dwindling numbers of the BGF in Ton and Tachilek. The military eastern Shan State show clearly bases in Mong Kok, northeast the failure of this plan. Each BGF of Mong Hsat town, have been battalion is supposed to have 326 fortiﬁ ed, and 20 new helicopter members, but was set up with only pads built there since 2015. about 100 troops each, and now all three BGFs have only about Although the size of an infantry 200 members in total. This is battalion should be about 300, mainly because these BGF have LNDO estimates that there are little opportunity to earn extra on average only about 200 men income for their members, who in each Burma Army battalion, had formerly been able to gain and about 70-80 men in each more beneﬁ ts as militia members. artillery battalion. Based on this, They have therefore become it is estimated that the number disillusioned with their meager of Burma Army troops in seven salary (only about 20,000 kyat— townships of eastern Shan State USD 20—a month, similar to has increased from about 8,400 to Burma Army privates) and have about 10,600 men. left.

11 Burma Army militia expansion Just as the Burma Army has Je Seu Bo had originally formed increased in size, so too has the “special commando” militia its auxiliary militia, who are groups in 2003, on the orders essential for controlling remote of then deputy commander-in- mountainous areas. Militia groups chief General Maung Aye, with have been set up in most village the function of accompanying tracts in these areas, comprising Burma Army troops on military several men from each village in operations. the tract. The militia leaders are appointed by the Burma Army and Another large increase has been in have considerable infl uence, even Mong Ping, where the number of over local village headmen. Most militia groups has increased from of the militia in eastern Shan State 5 to 27. This appears aimed to are Lahu, and have existed for enable the Burma Army to exercise decades. more control over this strategic area, which lies on the route Ten years ago, there were only between the northern UWSA and about 2,300 men in 68 militia southern UWSA territories. groups. Now there are about 3,400 men in 86 militia groups. One Three new militia groups have of the main increases is in Mong been set up in Mong Hsat and Phyak, where the fi ve existing Mong Ton, around UWSA- regular militia have united with controlled areas. In April 2016, fi ve “special commando” militia to militia groups in Mong Hsat were form one large militia. Originally told by the Burma Army Triangle comprising about 250 men, this commander in Kengtung to new combined militia comprises prepare to fi ght the UWSA. about 700 men and is led by Lahu leader Ja Seu Bo. It operates not Two new militia groups were only throughout the hill areas of set up in northern Kengtung Mong Phyak, but also in some township, close to areas controlled parts of Tachileik and Kengtung. by the National Democratic

12 Alliance Army (NDAA – otherwise Ethnic armed group known as the “Mong La” group, expansion comprising mainly Shan and Akha On the side of the armed troops). resistance groups, there have also been signifi cant troop Another two new militia groups increases. The NDAA, which were set up in Ta Ler in Tachileik has had a ceasefi re since 1989, township, to keep control of other has increased from about 3,000 smaller militia in the area. to 5,000 troops over the past ten years. A likely factor behind The two ex-Mong Tai Army this was dissatisfaction over the (MTA) militia groups in Tachileik 2008 constitution, which did not township have remained the same recognize any of the NDAA’s size – about 400 men in total. area of control—formerly Special These militia groups are led by Region 4—as a self-administered former members of the MTA, zone. NDAA controls all of Mong which surrendered in 1996. Due La township, and parts of Mong to economic connections since Yang and Mong Yawng townships, the MTA days, these militia are along the Chinese and Lao wealthier and more powerful than borders. To protect these areas, the regular Lahu militia. They NDAA has been building up its have very close connections to local troop strength, particularly at the Burma Army commanders. borders of Burmese government- controlled territories. One of these militia leaders, Yishe, is very close to ex-President The UWSA have also increased Thein Sein (who was formerly the troop numbers in their southern Triangle Region Commander in region, from about 3,000 to about Kengtung from 1996 to 2001). 4,000, despite their ceasefi re since Even after becoming president, 1989. This southern territory Thein Sein would always arrange has gradually expanded, now a meeting with Yishe when visiting occupying nearly half of Mong Kengtung. Ton township. The new troops have mostly been deployed

13 v

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in 8 townships of Salween River Salween Nam kok ri kok Nam Eastern Shan State

Thailand Burma Army and Lahu Militia UWSA controlled RCSS /SSA controlled NDAA controlled

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14 down from the northern UWSA Self-administered area. The UWSA appear to (3) Kokang zones/divisions in be preparing to resist possible eastern Shan State military pressure from the Burma recognized in the Army, who over the past ten years 2008 cons tu on (map: Myanmar have repeatedly ordered them to Informa on withdraw from southern Shan Management Unit) State to their Self-Administered (4) Wa Division in the north. The area actually controlled by the UWSA in the north is also larger than the area allocated to them under the SHAN 2008 Constitution. (EAST)

The orders for the UWSA to return to the north are a reversal of policy from 1999-2001, when the Burmese regime allowed the UWSA to relocate an estimated 126,000 people from northern to whom were displaced from their southern Shan State (in an alleged homes. “drug eradication” program, but actually to counterbalance the In mid-2015, tensions rose between inﬂ uence of the powerful Mong the Burma Army and the UWSA Tai Army on the southern Shan in Mong Ton, close to the Thai border). The relocation caused border, when some UWSA-linked immense su ering for the forcibly loggers were arrested by Burmese relocated Wa population, about troops. As tension escalated, 4,000 of whom died of malaria UWSA surrounded and threatened and other diseases (as they were to attack Mong Hsat town. The unused to the warmer climate Triangle Commander personally in the south), and also for nearly came to negotiate with the UWSA, 50,000 local Shan, Lahu and Akha but was unable to calm the villagers in the south, thousands of situation. Only after a high level

15 military delegation from Napyidaw territories of Mong Hta and Ho fl ew in to negotiate, was an Murng (west of Mong Hta), a agreement reached, and the battle direct challenge to the UWSA, alert defused. which is based around Mong Hta. The UWSA have therefore been The UWSA’s military build- reinforcing their troops to fortify up in the south is also linked to their control of this area. territorial disputes with the RCSS in the Mong Hta area (in south- In fact, the RCSS was never west Mong Ton township). When granted control by the Burmese the RCSS signed a Union-level government of the Mong Hta ceasefi re with the government area (nor of nearby Ho Murng), in January 2012, the agreement as promised in the ceasefi re allowed them to “set up their agreement. They have therefore headquarters” in the border not expanded into Mong Ton, but have been expanding into Mong Wa forced rese lement in 1999-2001 Ping to the north. Since mid 2015, (from LNDO’s 2002 report Unse ling Moves) the RCSS has moved about 500 troops across the Salween to the Mong Pu Long area of Mong Ping. RCSS has also set up an outpost near Tongta, between Mong Ping and Kengtung, a strategic town on the route used by UWSA troops to travel between their northern and southern territories. The fact that the Burma Army has allowed them to expand into this area appears to be a deliberate “divide-and- rule” tactic to pit them against the UWSA.

16 II. Link between conﬂ ict and drugs

The militarization that is taking The map below compares the place in eastern Shan State is UNODC 2015 opium cultivation costing large amounts of money. map (from UNODC’s Southeast The thousands of existing and new Asia Opium Survey 2015) with a soldiers need to be fed, clothed, map showing the political areas of and armed. While the Burma control in 7 townships of eastern Army is supported by the national Shan State. It can be seen clearly budget, their militia groups have that most of the opium growing to support themselves by running areas (shaded according to opium or taxing local businesses. In these density) are under the control of remote mountainous areas, by far the government and their militia the most lucrative form of business forces. is drugs.

Comparison of UNODC opium density map with areas of poli cal control in eastern Shan State

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river

Mongping Kengtung Mongyawng Mekong River

Mongphyak

Nam sim

riv Laos er Monghsat Tachileik

2016 : Areas under control

ver i

Mongton in 8 townships of Salween River Salween

Nam kok r kok Nam Eastern Shan State

Thailand Burma Army and Lahu Militia UWSA controlled RCSS /SSA controlled NDAA controlled

Sec on of UNODC 2015 opium density map Source: Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015

17 III. Burma Army militia’s reliance on the drug trade

Apart from being given some rifl es their loyalty to the Burma Army. and ammunition when they were The militia do not directly operate set up, the Burma Army militia any drug refi neries, which are groups do not receive any salary organized and controlled by drug or ongoing support from the syndicates (which are mostly government. They are expected Chinese), but by hosting and to generate their own income to providing security for the refi neries, support their members, and to the militia can profi t from the drug keep them armed and stocked up trade in various ways. on ammunition. Taxing opium harvests In some areas, income can be Almost all opium farmers must pay earned from collecting taxes tax on their harvest to their local on logging, mining, or cattle militia. Only in a few villages are smuggling, but the only signifi cant opium taxes now paid to the village source of income available to tract administrators (see later militia in all areas is the drug trade. section).

Even though the drug business—as The taxation rate is usually the well as unauthorized logging and same in each village, and does cattle smuggling—is technically not vary according to the size of “illegal,” a blind eye has been opium ﬁ elds. Each opium growing turned for decades to the militia household must give a lump of raw groups’ involvement in such opium, about the size of a ping- activities, as a necessary security pong ball, as tax (estimated at a arrangement. These activities value of about 30,000 kyat or USD not only subsidize the day to day 30). The opium collected in this expenses of the militia but—in way is combined and then can be particular the drug trade—also sold by the militia to the syndicates earn huge amounts of income for operating the reﬁ neries. militia leaders, thereby ensuring

18 Controlling opium sales Militia groups have control over farmers’ opium sales in their areas. Some militia groups strictly require farmers to sell all raw opium to them. The militia then sell the opium, at a profi t, to operators of drug refi neries in their area, or if there are none, to refi neries in other areas. Out of the over Prime Minister General Thein Sein 80 militia groups, only about 10 examines packs of confi scated drugs in groups have refi neries in their February 2012 Photo by Associated Press areas, but up to 10 refi neries can exist in a single area. Collecting commission Profi ts from selling to refi neries fees for selling are about 1,000 to 2,000 baht confi scated drugs (USD 30-60) per viss of opium Militia can sometimes (one viss = 1.65 kg). With no less gain additional income than 100,000 viss of opium being from selling opium or refi ned at one time, the militia can methamphetamines that make up to 200,000 baht (USD have been confi scated by the 6,000) each time a batch of opium Burma Army. When drugs is refi ned. are confi scated, Burma Army personnel often take the Some militia groups do not insist opportunity to make some that farmers sell only to them, private income from selling but when the farmers make sales, the drugs. However, they the militia demand a fee from the need to rely on the militia to buyer. The fee is usually about sell to the dealers. 1,000 baht (USD 30) per viss of opium. When a militia makes the sale, it can earn about 10% of the income.

19 Cashing in on refi nery assist with the refi ning operations, investments while about 20-30 members will Although the militia groups do be posted at a radius of about half not directly operate any refi neries, a kilometer around the refi nery the syndicates usually ask the to keep guard. Anyone venturing militia guarding their refi neries near the area is killed, and to place an investment in each sometimes tortured. batch of opium refi ned or yaba produced. For example, if the total Securing transport of the investment is about ten million fi nished product baht (USD 300,000), the militia Once refi ned, the drugs need to may be asked to invest about one be transported from refi neries to million baht (USD 30,000). This distributors. The militia groups is to ensure that the militia remain are hired by the syndicates to loyal to the operation, and take carry out this task. The militia every precaution to ensure that no leader receives an overall payment security breaches take place. From depending on the size of the an investment of about one million consignment, while each militia baht, the militia may earn a profi t member carrying the drugs may of about 200,000 baht (USD be paid individually for taking the 6,000). personal risk, particularly if the drugs are being carried on foot. The refi neries are mobile, set up in makeshift buildings in isolated For example, for sending one jungle locations, near water backpack of yaba, containing sources. Refi ning equipment, about 80,000 pills, across the precursor chemicals and gas Thai border, the militia leader stove facilities are brought to the may receive 10,000 baht (USD location and used for the duration 300), while the individual carrier of the refi ning process—not more will receive between 1 or 2 baht than one or two weeks—and per pill, or 80,000 to 160,000 then removed and the refi neries baht (USD 2,300 to 4,600) for are dismantled. Only a handful transporting one backpack of pills. of militia members at a time will

20 IV. Kickbacks to the Burma The cozy relationship between the Army and other central militia, the Burma Army, and the government o cials village administrators (who are almost all members of the military- Although the militia groups are backed Union Solidarity and generally given a free hand to Development Party - USDP) likely deal in drugs, they always remain explains why eastern Shan State vulnerable to the fact that their was where the USDP won one of dealings are “illegal.” This is why its biggest contiguous bloc of seats militia leaders have to regularly in the November 2015 elections. provide pay-o s and gifts to local Burma Army commanders, often USDP wins big in eastern Shan State in 2015 elec on through their junior o cers. “Burma Army sergeants come regularly and ask for costs of this and that,” said a militia member in Tachileik. “It is a constant burden.”

This is also why in some villages, the local village tract administrators (from the General Administration Department - Pyethuhlutdaw (Lower House) GAD) are the ones collecting the results opium tax, instead of the militia, who grant this as a pay-o in exchange for the administrators turning a blind eye to their drug dealings. The administrators are usually inﬂ uential businessmen who have gained their position through links with Burmese military authorities, and have no qualms about making money from Shan State the drug trade. Assembly results

(green = USDP, red = NLD) Source: 2015 elec on result maps, Myanmar Informa on Management Unit V. Current drug trends – No villagers reported any voices from the ground destruction of opium fi elds by authorities or armed groups in Improved opium yields, early 2016. They also said there no prohibition had been no prohibition during The opium growing season the planting season. In Mong Hsat, in eastern Shan State starts in they said that local members of October. In some areas, such the military-backed USDP had as around the Loi Sarm Sao used this as a way of gaining votes mountain range in Kengtung, in the November 2015 elections. where opium growing conditions They had promised farmers that are very good, up to three crops of there would be no crackdowns on poppies are planted: in October, opium growing if they voted for November, and December. The USDP. last crop of opium is harvested in about April. Farmers in all areas The villagers said they had heard surveyed—in Kengtung, Tachileik, about community groups in Mong Hsat and Mong Phyak—in Kachin State destroying the opium early 2016, said they had harvested fi elds, and said they felt sorry to a better yield than the previous hear that fi elds were destroyed year. During the 2014-2015 season just when the opium was about farmers from Mong Hsat said that to be harvested. “Why didn’t they their opium plants seemed to be destroy the plants when they were sickly, and didn’t produce much small?” said an opium farmer from sap. Mong Phyak. “It’s not easy to grow opium. The opium planting time is the same as the rice harvesting time. It’s a lot of work at that time.”

Even though there had been no destruction of opium ﬁ elds in eastern Shan State in 2016, farmers said that they still only dared plant in small ﬁ elds, out

22 of sight, as they knew opium growing was illegal. A farmer from “It is only the buyers Kengtung explained: “Since it is who get rich.” not legal to grow opium, we cannot plant big ﬁ elds in one area. We grow secretly in small patches here dropped to about 600,000 kyat and there. It is only the buyers who (approx USD 500) per viss. get rich.” Growing drug addiction Another opium farmer from Kengtung complained: “We pay “Each year there are more opium taxes every year, but we get no and yaba addicts. Whether in protection.” towns or in the hills – every house, big or small, men, women are Most farmers said they had no addicted. There are more and more choice but to grow opium, as a thieves and robbers. Every house is means of survival. A farmer from afraid of thieves.” (Lahu opium Mong Hsat explained: farmer from Kengtung)

“In our tract, there has been opium In each village visited, LNDO growing for many years. We have witnessed a growing problem of only a few rice ﬁ elds. Every family drug addiction, particularly among grows hill rice, but it is not even young men. Based on informal enough to feed two people for the interviews, LNDO estimates that in whole year. We grow opium to be about 70% of households in these able to buy rice, and to buy other villages there are young men who household necessities.” are addicted. This is an estimated threefold increase from about ten In March 2016, in the Kengtung years ago. area, farmers said they were able to sell raw opium for about 850,000 Most of the addicts smoke opium. kyat (approx USD 700) per viss Some take yaba, but this is more (1 viss = 1.65 kg) of raw opium. costly. The cost of smoking a pipe They said last year the price had of opium is about 20-30 baht

23 (USD 0.60 - 0.85), while the cost as others’ houses. “I locked up of one yaba pill is 30-60 baht our house so that my son wouldn’t (USD 0.85 - 1.7), depending on the steal anything, but he climbed in location and proximity to sources over the wall and stole our dried of production (yaba costs only 30 meat,” complained a woman from baht in Mong Hsat, but 50-60 baht Kengtung. in Kengtung). Very few addicts take heroin. This is partly because There have also been incidents of it is not easily available, and also drug-related violence. In a village because Lahu villagers don’t like in Kengtung this year, a Lahu using injections. youth in his 20s became angry with his father for refusing to give him Villagers say that the reason for money for drugs, and hit him in the increase in addiction is the the back of his neck with a cattle- greater availability of drugs, yoke. The father was killed by the and less community cohesion. blow. In the past, there were stronger cultural and religious norms In April 2016, in Ho Mong village governing communities, but now of Mong Loong tract, Mong Phyak older people complain that the township, a Shan man killed four militia groups are more powerful people, including a woman and than community leaders, and child, using a knife and then a gun, their members actively promote while crazed with yaba. local drugs sales to increase their income. Disturbingly, militia Due to the growing addiction members have even blocked problem, communities have started local addicts from entering drug setting up their own rehabilitation rehabilitation programs, because centres. In 2015, a centre was set they fear a loss of income. up by a local shaman in the animist Lahu village of Pu Ta, in Mong A frequent complaint was that Kok sub-township of Mong Hsat. addicts stole food and other Treatment courses last for one household items in order to pay month, and are provided to 20-30 for drugs, from their own as well addicts at a time. The treatment

24 involves animist rituals, and the addicts are provided with herbal medicine and healthy food. The centre is supported with donations from animist communities in the area. The addicts, both men and women, come voluntarily, and the success rate is said to be high.

Community-run centres Token crackdowns appear to be more sustainable Although there are frequent arrests than government-sponsored of small-time drug dealers by facilities. The Burma Army police, there are seldom arrests of Triangle Regional Commander inﬂ uential businessmen, militia himself formally opened a drug leaders or government o cials rehabilitation centre in March for drug involvement. Unusually, 2016 in the Lahu village of on March 4, 2016, a Lahu militia Pan Pae, in Mong Pat tract of leader, U Aik Htaw, from Mong Kengtung. Police had sent the Kok (in Mong Hsat), was arrested order to nearby villages to send with a large amount of yaba and local opium addicts to the centre weapons in his car, at a checkpoint for treatment, and 53 addicts, in Mong Khun on his way to including 3 women, were admitted. Kengtung. This seemed to indicate The treatment was supposed to last stricter drug enforcement under 28 days, but the centre shut down the incoming NLD government. after only 20 days due to lack of However, ﬁ ve months later, U Aik funds. There have been allegations Htaw was released without being of corruption, and the centre has charged. not reopened.

25 Life of a poppy grower

The following account describes the intricate, labor-intensive process of poppy growing, and highlights the gendered division of labor, whereby women do the hard work to produce opium, but seldom smoke it, and have no role in the selling process. This refl ects practices in today’s Lahu society, where men are regarded as heads of the household and hold all public positions of authority. These attitudes are reinforced by the pervasive power of the militia, who are all men. My village has been growing October, straight after the corn poppies for many generations. My has been harvested, they clear and husband is the headman of the plough the land. If the soil is good, village (in Mong Phyak township). you should be able to get one viss There are 27 households in the of opium from one acre. But you village. All of them grow opium. can never be sure. Usually, we Only two households have don’t get as much as we hope for. paddy fi elds, and they grow only enough rice to feed themselves. We have four acres of hill fi elds. The remaining households grow Every year, we plant two acres hill rice, but not enough to feed of corn, to feed our pigs, and we themselves for the whole year. plant rice on two acres. To grow Each house has two to three head opium, we must clear the land and of cattle. Villagers let their cattle plant the poppies straight after the graze in the jungle, so people need corn is harvested. Ploughing land to fence o their hill fi elds, or to plant opium is di erent from cattle will come and eat the crops, ploughing to plant rice or corn. leading to disputes. You have to dig a series of small furrows horizontally along the We have to start preparing the fi eld, the width and depth of a hoe, poppy fi elds in October. In the starting at the bottom of the fi eld summer months, some villagers and moving upwards. As you clear cut down trees to make new poppy the land, you put the weeds into growing plots, in places they think the furrow, and then cover it up, will be good. After burning to before moving up and doing the clear the land, they plant corn. In same again.

26 It’s really tiring work. When the There is also a tract headman. opium growing time starts, it’s Even though they say they will when rice is being harvested, and do something to stop addiction, it’s when the whole household has I haven’t seen them do anything. the most work. Some farmers are Only if some outsiders who they in such a hurry to plant opium, don’t like come to smoke opium that after harvesting rice, they just in our village, they beat them. Or leave the harvested rice in piles in they fi ne them. the fi elds, and only when they’ve fi nished planting opium, they come In the houses where opium is back and thresh it. smoked, you can see a lot of men coming and going, old and young. My elder daughter is 13, my They give a lot of reasons why they younger daughter is 11 and my son smoke it – they say they’ve been is 9. I cannot a ord to send any of working hard, they have backache, them to school. There’s no school stomachache, coughing, malaria. in the village, and we don’t have My husband also often goes to enough money to send them to smoke, because he gets backache. school. All of them help me with He says it helps the pain go away. my work every day. They work really hard. They say they want to In November, after the rainy be able to buy new clothes for the season, when there begins to be New Year festival. dew in the mornings, you must begin planting poppy. Everybody The children’s father is busy works actively at this time. For with his work for the village, and one acre, you need less than one cannot help with the housework. He is always attending village tract meetings, and doesn’t earn “My daughters and I anything from that. work hard, without rest, to grow opium. There are two houses in the village where opium is always smoked. But it is the men There is a militia in the tract. who do the selling.”

27 condensed milk tin of poppy seeds. According to ancient practice, you If you are not good at sowing, you should plant tubers when the moon need to hire someone who can is waning, and you should plant do it well. It is di cult to sow the fl owering fruit and vegetables when seeds evenly. You need to sow them the moon is waxing. Some people together with a small amount of don’t pay attention to this, and just mustard leaf and coriander seeds. plant when they have the time. It’s natural that if the mustard There doesn’t seem to be much leaf and coriander grow well, the di erence. poppy plants will also grow well. If there is dew, the poppy seed can After two or three weeks, the grow a small root within one night. poppy plant is about a hand’s In one week, the root will grow the length in size. At that time, you length of one fi nger joint. But if it have to weed the whole plot. The rains during this time, the opium whole family needs to work hard plants will all rot and die. Then doing this. Then after about one you have to quickly sow seeds all or two weeks, you need to weed over again. again. When you fi rst weed, you

28 may need to thin out the mustard and coriander plants. The second time, you can pick some of the mustard and coriander leaves, for pickling or eating, and leave some of the plants for eating later. After two months, some poppy plants start to ﬂ ower. When all the poppy plants are in bloom, in di erent colors, this is the most beautiful sight in the world.

After the fl owering, the opium bulb is formed. Three months after scraping till nightfall. While there planting, when the bulb is ripe, it is daylight, you have to keep can be scraped. The scraping tool going quickly scraping the sap, is like a chicken pox needle. You sometimes even without eating the can scrape each pod one or two whole day. It is the most important times on each side, depending on task of all. You have to put all the size. You mustn’t scrape too your e ort into it. After scraping deep. You mustn’t penetrate into one side of a pod, you can scrape the seed pod. again the next day on the other side, one or two times. The whole You start scraping the bulbs early day, you have to keep spitting on in the morning, when there is just your fi ngers, to wipe the sap o enough light to see. If necessary, the utensil. So that you don’t get you can use a torchlight. When intoxicated (from the smell of the the sun comes out, the sap starts to opium and the sap on your fi ngers), appear. (If there is no sun, the sap and to keep your saliva fl owing, will not come out, and the scraped you need to keep eating sugarcane bulbs become useless.) You need jaggery. to scrape o the sap before it falls to the ground, using a specially After scraping o the opium sap, made utensil. You have to continue you need to put it on “Shan”

29 rich people to plant opium (the rest are subsistence farmers). This is unlike the opium traders. Out of every 100 opium traders, about 60 to 70 are sure to become rich.

The wholesale buyers usually come from far away. Sometimes some rich local villagers join with other villagers to sell their opium in another place where they can get a good price. In our village, the local drug users can’t a ord to buy more than one or two ticals of opium.

In our house, and in other houses, women do not sell opium. The opium scales are not like other weighing scales. They are Chinese- (mulberry bark) paper. No other made. Thai headache medicine paper can be used. You put the sap packets are used as weights (for together with dried poppy ﬂ owers small amounts of opium). They and poppy leaves that are picked don’t let women do the weighing in beforehand. Then it is tightly case we make a mistake. packed up into a bundle weighing one or two viss, and tied round My daughters and I work hard, again and again with jute string. without rest, to grow opium. But Then it is ready to be carried. Not it is the men who do the selling. everyone is able to package opium Some women do not even know properly. Some people have to hire how much the opium is sold for. others to do it. Anyhow, if they can get new Most of the opium farmers are clothes for the New Year festival, poor. Out of every hundred opium the whole family, including farmers, only 2 or 3 are hired by daughters and sons, are happy.

30 VI. Past lessons from drug eradication programs

Given the constant insecurity of planting an illegal crop, and also the growing local addiction problem, some farmers said they would welcome assistance to help them grow alternative crops. However, they said there should be no poppy eradication until they had alternative sources of income. “If the government tries to force us to stop growing poppies immediately, we will really su er. We need at least ﬁ ve to ten years to develop alternative livelihoods,” said a farmer from Mong Hsat.

However most farmers did not want to consider planting any other crops apart from opium. “We can’t imagine how we could survive if we didn’t grow opium,” said a farmer from Mong Phyak.

Case study: Yellow Lahu decimated by forced resettlement

The Lahu have bitter experience The “Long-jacket” Yellow Lahu of forced resettlement programs are one of the smallest ethnic in the name of drug eradication. Lahu sub-groups, who live in the One particular Lahu sub-group, high mountain ranges of eastern the “Long-jacket” Yellow Lahu Shan State. The men wear long su ered devastating consequences white jackets—hence their name— from being forced down from their which distinguishes them from the mountaintop homes. “Short-jacket” Yellow Lahu, which have a larger population. They are “We didn’t grow opium to cause called “Gui” by local Shan. problems for anyone. We are not criminals. We are hard-working. The way of life and culture of But we were forbidden from staying the Gui is very di erent from on the high mountains. This other Lahu. They are devout displeased the spirits, and many worshippers of a form of Taoism died.” - Elderly Yellow Lahu and have never joined any militia farmer from Loi Sarm Sao, group. Kengtung.

31 They live at a higher altitude than Gui villages were forced to relocate other Lahu, above 5,000 feet. down from the mountain tops on Opium thrives at this altitude, and which they lived. They scattered in for generations they have relied on di erent directions, moving to stay opium growing. They used to come near existing Lahu communities in down to lowland villages to trade, other areas, but at lower altitudes. and so can speak Shan, but would never spend the night at a lower The result was disastrous. Having altitude as they feared punishment, never lived in mosquito-ridden in the form of sickness, by the areas, they had no resistance to spirits. This actually protected malaria, and in one resettlement them from malaria, as there are no site alone, 70 out of about 100 mosquitoes at high altitudes. villagers from the Na Kha village cluster who had gone to live in According to research by LNDO, Namlonyangkio, east of Kengtung, in 1999, there were about 1,800 died of malaria within two years. Gui in total, mostly living in the nga-ou-su (“ﬁ ve-tract”) area on the Similarly, scores of Gui villagers Loi Sarm Sao mountain range, died who had resettled in Pa Liao- west of Kengtung. Others lived Keng Larb, near the Mekong in mountainous areas of Mong river, and at Mong Phong, east of Phyak, Tachileik and Mong Hsat. Tachileik. They lived in village clusters, often with less than 10 households in In Mong Phong, the famous Shan each village. monk Sao Woon Joom took pity on them and allowed them to settle Due to their remote location, on a hillside location above his they remained largely una ected temple. These Gui converted to by government anti-insurgency Buddhism, believing it would help operations. However, between protect them from further illness 1999 and 2005, they were targeted and misfortune. However, they under the regime’s proclaimed continue to worship their original “War on Drugs.” To prevent them religion together with Buddhism. from growing opium, all of the

32 CHINA C

Kenba Mt Nakha Kengtung Kengtung

Mong khon v Na Inn Nongkya Mt Panglin

Amude Pongkhi

Mongpak Sim River Sim River v v Napong Nalonyangkio Nalintong Loi Sam Sao mt range Nalone Loi Sam Sao mt range Mongpak

Mongyawng Mongyawng Monghpayak Monghpayak A ma

Loi Ama mt range Monglu Loi sum meu Mt Loi Ama mt range Palio

Monglu Loi chang Mt Mekong River Mekong River Monghai LAOS LAOS

Taseng Mt Taseng Monghai Punako Punako

Loi kha yen mt range Tachileik

Loi kha yen mt range Tachileik Mongphon

THAILAND Eastern Shan State THAILAND Eastern Shan State

original Yellow Lahu villages relocated Yellow Lahu villages

Loca on of “Long Jacket” Yellow Lahu Loca on of “Long Jacket” Yellow Lahu villages in 1999 villages in 2016

Finally, some villagers moved back to their original homes on the mountaintops, but many remain dispersed. Today, according to research by LNDO, there are only about 1,100 left of the original Gui population of 1,800 (see tables on following pages).

A Taoist shrine in a “Long Jacket” Yellow Lahu village

33 Popula on and loca on of “Long Jacket” Yellow Lahu villages in 1999

No. Village Houses People Tract Township 1 Keh Ba 4 18 Na Inn Kengtung 2 Mong In 5 21 Nakha Kengtung 3 Nambo 8 25 Mong Khon Kengtung 4 Amude 6 23 Amude Kengtung 5 Lengdok 7 27 Na pong Kengtung 6 Imupa 5 27 Pongkhi Kengtung 7 Namhet 4 21 Na yu Kengtung 8 Loi kye 4 14 Amude Kengtung 9 Nalintong 7 20 Nalintong Kengtung 10 Nakha 1 25 175 Nakha Kengtung 11 Nakha 2 21 156 Nakha Kengtung 12 Nakha 3 16 99 Nakha Kengtung 13 Nahpu 15 103 Nam In Kengtung 14 Namsamsu 1 15 97 Mongpak Kengtung 15 Namsamsu 2 8 39 Mongpak Kengtung 16 Namsamsu 3 13 70 Mongpak Kengtung 17 Kenwolaw 21 142 Mongpak Kengtung 18 NamMoi 3 18 Monghai Mong Phyak 19 U kyi pet 5 18 Monghai Mong Phyak 20 Nahetpu 5 13 Namyon Mong Phyak 21 Kawpeh 21 95 Monglung Mong Phyak 22 Na En 11 47 Monglung Mong Phyak 23 Pamobo 8 51 Monglung Mong Phyak 24 Nakai 11 66 Namlong Mong Phyak 25 Nalonyakio 8 59 Namlong Mong Phyak 26 Taseng 11 47 Taseng Mong Hsat 27 Punako 25 188 Punako Mong Hsat 28 Na 4 27 A ma Mong Hsat 29 Naphu 11 67 Monghai Tachileik 30 Nakhu 8 37 Monghai Tachileik Total 315 1,810

34 Popula on and loca on of “Long Jacket” Yellow Lahu villages in 2016

No. Village Houses People Tract Township 1 Nakha 1 13 49 Nakha Kengtung 2 Nakha 2 17 76 Nakha Kengtung 3 Nakha 3 14 52 Nakha Kengtung 4 Nahpu 11 50 Nam In Kengtung 5 Namsamsu 1 12 45 Mongpak Kengtung 6 Namsamsu 2 8 39 Mongpak Kengtung 7 Namsamsu 3 4 22 Mongpak Kengtung 8 Kenwolaw 13 52 Mongpak Kengtung 9 Patawkye 13 57 Panglin Kengtung 10 Monglu 30 155 Monglung Mong Phyak Nakha 11 Kawpeh 18 62 Monglung Mong Phyak 12 Na En 5 23 Monglung Mong Phyak 13 Pamobo 13 58 Monglung Mong Phyak 14 Nakai 14 66 Namlong Mong Phyak 15 Nalonyakio 13 59 Namlong Mong Phyak 16 Ponako 22 72 Ponako Mong Hsat 17 Na 5 34 A ma Mong Hsat 18 Nawam 8 37 Palio Kenglarb 19 Naphu 18 67 Monghai Tachileik 20 Nakhu 11 44 Monghai Tachileik 21 Mong Phong 11 49 Mongphong Tachileik Es mated 273 1,168

35 Conclusion and recommendations

The current peace process has not These fi ndings have important led to a decrease in militarization implications for drug policy under in eastern Shan State. On the the new NLD-led government. If contrary, despite ceasefi res, troop the NLD seriously wants to tackle strength has increased on all sides, the drug problem in Burma, it in apparent readiness for war. must focus e orts on fi nding a At the same time, government drug political resolution to the confl ict. control measures are not working, This must involve a federal and in some cases have had settlement that devolves signifi cant disastrous humanitarian impacts powers down to state and sub-state on poppy farming communities. levels, thereby addressing demands Interviews on the ground show for self-determination of respective that opium growing remains the ethnic groups. The military must key source of income for hill also be brought under civilian farmers, refi neries of heroin and control. yaba operate with impunity, and widespread availability of cheap Only when there is a functioning drugs is causing a growing problem federal democratic system, where of local addiction. local leaders rule by popular vote rather than by the gun, A signifi cant amount of drugs can participatory, sustainable is being grown and produced in drug eradication programs be government militia controlled implemented. areas, showing that the Burma Army are continuing a decades- To address the current drug crisis long policy of allowing their militia in Burma, LNDO therefore makes to produce drugs as an incentive to the following recommendations: continue their vital strategic task of policing against ethnic resistance forces in remote mountainous areas.

36 To the NLD-led government: To international donors: 1. To immediately begin 1. To suspend all support for political negotiations to bring drug-control programming about a federal settlement carried out by or with to the confl ict and to bring Burmese government the military under civilian security forces until there control. is a negotiated resolution 2. To authorize opium to the confl ict, and federal eradication programs only reform ensuring that regional with the full support and security forces democratically cooperation of opium farmers accountable to their own themselves, when sustainable, communities are in charge of alternative livelihoods are in drug control programming in place. their own areas. 3. To let drug rehabilitation 2. To end all military to military programs be developed and support for the Burma run with the cooperation and Army, as this is taking sides support of local communities. in the confl ict, prolonging militarization and war, and fuelling the drug trade.

37 3 367 x 262 mm