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On this field on , 1781, led his army of tough Continentals and backwoods to a brilliant victory over 's larger force of British regulars Morgan and his men were fleeing for their paigned with some distinction in the north. morning, the 16th, the British marched into lives when they marched onto this field on At 24 he found himself commander of the the empty camp and helped themselves to the afternoon of January 16. That morning, British Legion, a mobile striking force of dra- the breakfast rations hurriedly left behind. as the army was cooking breakfast in camp goons and mounted infantry. Coming south The flight of the enemy stirred the raider in on Thicketty Creek, scouts rode in with news with his mentor Cornwallis in early 1780, he that Tarleton had crossed the Pacolet River, took part in the siege and capture of Charles- John Eager Howard of 6 miles south, and was coming up fast. Mor- ton in the spring and the heady British vic- Maryland was as good a field officer as the gan broke camp immediately and ordered tory at Camden in August, and recently he Revolution produced. the army down the road. Their destination: had battled the elusive partisans of Thomas His Continentals were the Cowpens, a frontier pasturing ground Sumter and . Now he was rid- the heart of Morgan's army. on the road to a ford over the Broad River. ing at the head of a detachment of 1100 Morgan was in a precarious position. If he cavalry and infantry, mostly veterans, and his crossed the river, most of his militia would object was to run Morgan down or at least

hound him across the Broad River into the Maryland Historical Society Daniel Morgan, one of hands of the main . the best field tacticians Tarleton. When he discovered Morgan's line of the Revolution, won permanent fame for his Cornwallis, the agressive commander of that of march and heard, moreover, that a "corps generalship at army, had every reason to be confident of the of mountaineers" was approaching, he re- Cowpens. chase. He had dispatched Tarleton with the solved to hang on the rear of the American Legion and some of his best light troops in column and strike at the first chance. At 3 response to a bold move by Nathanael o'clock on the morning of January 17, he Greene, successor to the hapless Horatio ordered his men down the road that Morgan Gates as commander of the American army had taken a day earlier. in the South. When Greene in desperation probably desert him. If Tarleton overtook the divided his tattered army in December 1780 The place where Morgan chose to give battle army on the road or caught it astride the and sent Morgan to operate in western Caro- was an open woods known locally as Han- river, they could all be cut down. To survive, lina, he snatched the strategic initiative from nah's Cowpens. The ground sloped gently Morgan had to fight, and the place to do it Cornwallis and caused him to defer his real toward the south, the direction from which was at the Cowpens, where the terrain objective-the elimination of Greene's army Tarleton would approach. At the far end were offered him some advantages. His troops -until he had removed the threat posed by two low crests, separated by a wide swale. welcomed the decision to stand. They were Morgan ranging free in the backcountry. tired of running. They needed rest and a Morgan knew his opponent, and he deployed meal. That night Morgan went among the Banastre Tarleton his troops in a way that made the most of their troops cheering them up, explaining what fought well in small abilities in the kind of fighting he expected he expected of them, assuring the militia that cavalry actions, but was out matched in the Tarleton to bring on. He had a little over his cavalry would protect them from Tarle- set-piece battle of 900 men, but a third were untested militia ton's saber-swinging dragoons, telling every- Cowpens. likely to break before cavalry or bayonet- one that the "old wagoner" was going to wielding infantry. He needed their firepower, crack his whip over Benny in the morning. but dared not place them in a formal line of An hour before dawn, word came in that battle, as Gates did at Camden, and expect Tarleton was only a few miles away. National Portrait Gallery, them to stand that ground. That was work for regulars. So he devised a plan of battle The two adversaries were an odd contrast. Tarleton started after Morgan in early Jan- exactly matched to his men and the terrain. Morgan was a frontiersman, a teamster by uary. Rain and faulty intelligence slowed his trade, known for his brawling, experienced march, but by the 14th he was across the He formed his troops in three lines straddling atfighting Indians, and something of a genius Enoree and Tyger Rivers and pressing hard the dirt road that curved through the Cow- at leading men in battle. Tarleton was an off- on Morgan's track. Eluding American pens. In the front line he placed 120 sharp- spring of British gentry, schooled at Oxford, pickets, he crossed the Pacolet late the next shooters. Their job: slow the enemy's and at 21 an officer of dragoons. He vol- day, putting him within a few hours of Mor- advance with well-aimed fire, then fall back. unteered for service in America and cam- gan's camp on Thicketty Creek. The next A hundred yards behind the skirmishers he

continued on other Side

American and British cavalry clash in the opening moments of the battle. A painting by Freder----=ick Kimmelmeyer---~~~~==----~==~, 1809. ~==~~~~~ The British advance on Pickens' militia, which yolleys and retires. Wash· Ington blunts the attack of the pursuing dragoons.

put the Carolina and Georgia militia, under Without any pause, Tarleton formed his line Seeing this maneuver, Morgan rode up and Andrew Pickens. Morgan asked them for two of battle: the infantry astride the road; on chose new ground for the Continentals to volleys at a killing distance and then they each flank, 50 dragoons; in reserve, a bri- rally on. Reaching that point, they faced were free to file off the field. About 150 gade of Highlanders and 200 cavalry. It was about and fired point-blank at the closing yards behind Pickens, stretching along the still dark when Tarleton started his men to- redcoats, then plunged into the staggered forward crest, were his crack Continentals ward the American line 400 yards away. As ranks with bayonets. As this was happening, from Maryland and Delaware and veteran the British came within range, the militia de- Washington's cavalry rode again into the militia, about 500 men commanded livered a deadly fire, dropping many officers, swirling fight, while on the British left, by John Eager Howard. To these men, who and broke for the flanks. The dragoons on the Pickens' militia opened a galling fire on the would bear the brunt of the fighting, Morgan British right pursued them a short way until dragoons and Highlanders. British resist- spoke earnestly: don't be alarmed at the re- a fierce charge by Washington's cavalry ance quickly collapsed. A few dragoons treat of the militia, that's part of the plan-fire drove them off, allowing Pickens to re-form rallied to Tarleton, but they could do nothing low and deliberately-don't break-if forced his scattered ranks. effective and followed the Legion cavalry, back, rally on the main crest. In the rear, which never got into the fight, in a pell-mell behind that crest, he stationed the cavalry, The British now surged on to the third line, dash off the field. 120 men under , with and the fighting became pitched. When the orders to protect the militia and be ready to advance faltered, Tarleton ordered up the It was allover in an hour. The British losses ride into the fight. Highlanders, who soon threatened to out- were staggering: 110 dead, over 200 flank the American right. At this point began wounded and 500 captured. Morgan lost Just before dawn the British stumbled onto a confused tangle of events that soon only 12 killed and 60 wounded in a victory the American position. Wanting a better look brought the fighting to a dramatic conclu- as complete as any in the war. Cowpens was at the enemy's lines, Tarleton sent cavalry sion. When Howard ordered his right to fall another link in a chain of British disasters forward to drive in the skirmishers-and lost back and present a new front, the order was in the South that led ultimately to final defeat 15 men to sharp fire. mistaken and the whole line began to retreat. at Yorktown.

uGPO: 1985-461-444/20042 CliHslde, N.C.

E3 Walking tour ~ Historic road

Distances are given in Other trail E3 kilometers, with miles in italics.

O,,-__ ===2g00 Meters

';:.O ~==~1000 Feet N°eD