Does Congress Attempt to Control the Federal Watchdog?
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TRUE AUTONOMY OR HIDDEN CONTROL: DOES CONGRESS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL WATCHDOGS? Rebecca J Mac Donald B.S., California State University, Sacramento, 2004 THESIS Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in GOVERNMENT at CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO FALL 2010 © 2010 Rebecca J Mac Donald ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii TRUE AUTONOMY OR HIDDEN CONTROL: DOES CONGRESS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL WATCHDOGS? A Thesis by Rebecca J Mac Donald Approved by: __________________________________, Committee Chair James H. Cox, Ph.D __________________________________, Second Reader Wesley Hussey, Ph.D ____________________________ Date iii Student: Rebecca J Mac Donald I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for the thesis. __________________________, Department Chair ___________________ Bahman Fozouni, Ph.D Date Department of Government iv Abstract of TRUE AUTONOMY OR HIDDEN CONTROL: DOES CONGRESS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL WATCHDOGS? by Rebecca J Mac Donald Academia has argued that Congress has a vested interest in controlling the agencies of the federal government. While most of these agencies are not considered apolitical, the Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) are distinctly required to remain independent and apolitical. However, the Inspectors General (IGs) still operate within a political system and are not immune to political interference. This research looked at whether Congress employs subtle methods for attempting control of the IGs or whether Congress recognizes the importance of autonomous IGs for the public trust and generally resists the temptation to attempt control. The research focused on the testimonial process, OIG appropriations, and the results of interviews of IGs and congressional staff. Results show that attempts at control or influence do occur; the extent of which varies. Control may be attempted through the confirmation process, hearings, appropriations, press, letters, and direct communication. _______________________, Committee Chair James H. Cox, Ph.D _______________________ Date v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have always been amused by lengthy acknowledgements that take up multiple pages in a manuscript, thinking them frivolous. That is, until now. Though this thesis by no means matches the breadth of a complete work, I now understand the need to thank the many sources of assistance and encouragement upon which all work depends. For all the following, and many others who I am unable to mention, I publicly thank and recognize the value you have added to my research. First, for planting the seed of Inspector General independence as a thesis idea and for supporting me throughout this process, Kim Elmore; for granting the permission and funding to conduct my interviews, Mary Kendall; and for taking time out of retirement to provide the best editing job, Sandra Marquiss. Thanks to both my advisors, Dr.‟s James Cox and Wesley Hussey, for humoring me in so many discussions when I waxed passionate about my research, and for spending the hours necessary to make sure my thesis made sense. Without the graciousness of all the IGs and congressional staffers who let me impose on their busy schedules in order to interview them, this thesis would be substantially less effective. And finally, to my husband and partner, Stuart Mac Donald, if not for you there would be no thesis and I would not be half the person I am today. There are always so many more that I could thank and I hope they know they were not forgotten. Many helped me in some aspect of my work, but only I can be held responsible for any errors, misstatements, and other lapses found in this document. I hope you find it as interesting to read as it was for me to research and write. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. vi List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... ix List of Charts ........................................................................................................................... x Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 The Problem .................................................................................................................. 1 Purpose of the Study .................................................................................................... 2 2. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................. 5 Offices of Inspectors General ...................................................................................... 5 3. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ................................................................................... 8 Existing Theoretical Insight ......................................................................................... 8 Public Spiritedness ........................................................................................................ 9 Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy ................................................................ 12 Interest Group Access to Congress ............................................................................ 18 4. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................... 23 Theory and Hypotheses ............................................................................................. 23 5. THE DATA ..................................................................................................................... 29 Data and Analysis ...................................................................................................... 29 6. FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS ....................................................................... 37 Confirmations and Contributions ............................................................................... 37 Appropriations ........................................................................................................... 44 Inspectors General Testimony ................................................................................... 55 Interviews – Inspectors General and Congressional Staff ......................................... 61 7. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 72 Appendix A. Trends and Changes in OIG Appropriations for Sitting IGs ............................ 78 Appendix B. Consent to Participate in Research .................................................................. 89 Appendix C. Interview Questions – Inspectors General ....................................................... 90 vii Appendix D. Interview Questions – Congressional Staff ..................................................... 92 Appendix E. C-SPAN Hearing Data Selected ....................................................................... 94 Appendix F. Congressional Information Service Testimony Data ....................................... 95 Appendix G. Office of Inspector General Webpage and Google Search Testimony Data ... 96 Appendix H. C-SPAN Hearings of Presidentially Appointed IG Testimony ....................... 97 References ........................................................................................................................... 118 viii LIST OF TABLES Page 1. Table 1 Congressional Response to IG Testimony – Evaluation Matrix…………….32 2. Table 2 Political Contributions by IGs Prior to Appointment……………………….38 3. Table 3 Presidentially Appointed IGs and Determination of Political Appointment...40 4. Table 4 Political Influence or Unexplained Variance in IG Appropriations…………45 5. Table 5 Percentage Change in OIG Appropriations Over Time: 1997-2003...............47 6. Table 6 Percentage Change in OIG Appropriations Over Time: 2003-2010...............48 7. Table 7 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Consistent Majority Party………..50 8. Table 8 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Major Transitions Across Parties.. 52 9. Table 9 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Democratic Presidents…………...53 10. Table 10 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Republican President...................54 11. Table 11 Congressional Response to IG Testimony…………………………………57 12. Table 12 Comparison of Frequency of IG Testimonies to Value of OIG Appropriations……………………………………………………….…….60 ix LIST OF CHARTS Page 1. Chart 1 Comparison – No. of Testimonies by IG for Each Data Source………………..31 2. Chart 2 Presidentially Appointed IGs and Appropriations Across Political Parties…….79 3. Chart 3 OIG Appropriations – Office of Personnel Management……………………….81 4. Chart 4 OIG Appropriations – Railroad Retirement Board……………………………..81 5. Chart 5 OIG Appropriations – Nuclear Regulatory Commission……………………….82 6. Chart 6 OIG Appropriations – Department of Energy…………………………………..82 7. Chart 7 OIG Appropriations – Department of the Interior................................................83 8. Chart 8 OIG Appropriations – Department of Justice…………………………………...84 9. Chart 9 OIG Appropriations – Department of Agriculture.…………….…….…….…...84 10. Chart 10 OIG Appropriations – Department