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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ______

The attached transcript, while an accurate recording of evidence given in the course of the hearing day, is not proofread prior to circulation and thus may contain minor errors.

2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION

MELBOURNE

THURSDAY 11 JUNE 2009 (21st day of hearing)

BEFORE:

THE HONOURABLE B. TEAGUE AO - Chairman MR R. MCLEOD AM - Commissioner MS S. PASCOE AM - Commissioner

______CRS WORDWAVE PTY LTD - A MERRILL COMPANY. 4/190 Queen Street, Melbourne. Telephone: 9602 1799 Facsimile: 9642 5185

2652 1 Victoria radio, ABC Central Victoria radio and ABC 11 Gippsland. The Commission will find hopefully 12 conveniently that there are tabs dividing the radio 13 transcripts up accordingly, and will also find that there 14 is an explanation as to how those transcripts have been in 15 effect selected. It is by dint of a search by Media 16 Monitors using a number of key words and there is an 17 explanation set out at the front of the volume that I'm 18 about to hand up. So if we can tender that first of all. 19 CHAIRMAN: Yes, that will be exhibit 79. 20 #EXHIBIT 79 - Volume of transcript from ABC Western Victoria 21 radio, ABC Central Victoria radio and ABC Gippsland. 22 MR CLELLAND: There is one for each of the Commissioners. Now 23 Commissioners, just to give you a sense of what this 24 material looks like, you have already received in evidence 25 annexure 31, I think it is, to Mr Rees's statement which 26 is the, if you like, dump from the CFA website containing 27 the website messages. Now, these transcripts will include 28 both formal urgent threat messages, but if the Commission 29 turns to the very first transcript behind the tab for 30 western Victoria you will see that what is also included 31 is both information and advice and indeed commentary on

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2653 DISCUSSION Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the fires. So in this first material at 1429 or 2.29 as 2 it is recorded on the transcript, you will see that what's 3 introduced by the presenter, Prue Bentley, is that the 4 station will be doing what she describes as a rolling 5 coverage on the Remlaw fire and the Coleraine fire all 6 afternoon, and indeed that's what occurs. Just to give 7 you a flavour, you will see that at page 3 there is an 8 interview then conducted with the incident controller, 9 I believe it is, from Horsham in relation to the Remlaw 10 fire. You will see it is Graham Parkes. He is 11 introduced. Then at page 4 he commences a very detailed 12 description of exactly where the fire is, how it is 13 behaving, the size of it and the expected wind change and 14 the effect that that might have. Basically throughout the 15 afternoon there is, as is stated - just pardon me for a 16 moment. As I say, this was done overnight. There are a 17 couple of glitches, but we are trying to get it right, 18 Commissioners, and we will correct the form of any of 19 these tenders if needs be. In any event, as I suggested, 20 throughout the afternoon there is a constant coverage both 21 in relation to the Horsham fire, the Coleraine fire, and 22 indeed Weerite gets some mention, but certainly not as 23 extensively as Coleraine and Horsham. That's the first 24 volume. 25 The second volume I desire to tender is again the 26 product, as I understand it, of the Media Monitors search 27 on key words, and this is the 3AW transcripts. Again, 28 they have been provided to counsel assisting and the 29 represented parties. There is a folder for each of the 30 Commissioners. I don't need to take you to that, but in 31 the summaries that I'm about to hand up in relation to a

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2654 DISCUSSION Bushfires Royal Commission 1 number of the fires there is some reference to crosses 2 from 3AW. 3 What I am now handing to the Commission - - - 4 CHAIRMAN: Do you want to make that part of 79 as well, the 3AW 5 and the ABC? 6 MR CLELLAND: If the Commission pleases. Indeed I will ask 7 that the summaries form part of the same exhibit. 8 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 9 MR CLELLAND: If these could be treated, Mr Chairman, as notes 10 of Mr Rees in relation to the nominated fires being 11 Coleraine, Horsham, Redesdale, Maiden Gully, Churchill and 12 finally Kilmore East, they are relatively 13 self-explanatory. As I say, they cross-reference to not 14 only the 774 transcripts that have already been received 15 in evidence, but to the regional ABC and indeed 3AW. They 16 also set out the various messages that appeared on the CFA 17 website. They have on the left-hand column some short 18 information about the fires, time of ignition, where they 19 actually travelled and time they were brought under 20 control. 21 Can I hand up three copies to the Commission and 22 we will distribute copies to the other parties. As I say, 23 if they could be described as the notes of Mr Rees, being 24 his summaries. The point of that description is that we 25 don't suggest that it's every reference to the fires on 26 3AW or on the ABC on the day or even on the website, but 27 it represents the best endeavours of Mr Rees. If I can 28 just explain, although the Commission will see that the 29 first document is Kilmore East, I'm not sure really why it 30 has been done in this form, but we will see that the 31 second document is Horsham, the third document is

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2655 DISCUSSION Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Coleraine, the fourth is Churchill, the next one is 2 Redesdale and then the next one is Maiden Gully. The 3 Commissioners might even find it more convenient to take 4 the exhibit apart and rearrange it in a different way. 5 If the Commission pleases, there is also a CD-ROM 6 that should be tendered containing all that information 7 being the actual coverage that is transcribed in each of 8 the folders. So if that could be made as part of the 9 exhibit as well. 10 CHAIRMAN: The two arch lever folders of transcripts and the 12 11 pages of notes and the CD-ROM will form exhibit 79. 12 #EXHIBIT 79 - (Amended) Two arch lever folders of transcripts 13 and 12 pages of notes and the CD-ROM. 14 MR CLELLAND: If the Commission pleases. I undertook 15 yesterday, Mr Chairman, to tender on one CD or one DVD the 16 footage, the TV and DVD footage that we played yesterday 17 in the hearing room. That is on its way up here at the 18 moment. When it arrives I will tender that. 19 Mr Chairman, we think given the focus of this 20 Commission at least at this stage is primarily on 21 information and warnings that were given to the Victorian 22 public during the currency of the fires, and for that 23 reason we submit that this is important material for the 24 Commission to receive, both the original transcripts and 25 indeed the summaries now provided which seek, as was 26 suggested yesterday, Mr Chairman, to draw together both 27 the website warnings and indeed the information on radio. 28 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you. 29 MR RUSH: I just have something to say on that, sir. This is 30 material that was asked for many, many weeks ago. It has 31 been provided as you have seen this morning. Just a quick

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2656 DISCUSSION Bushfires Royal Commission 1 and cursory glance at the summary would suggest it is 2 inaccurate, but obviously we haven't had time to cover it. 3 But I have no objection to the tender, and I understand 4 the point that my learned friend makes through it. But we 5 need to examine it. 6 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 7 MR CLELLAND: If Mr Rush can tell which part he has identified 8 as being inaccurate, we can start to review that and see 9 if we can attend to it. 10 CHAIRMAN: Yes. That can be done I think between you at this 11 stage without trying to sort of move it along in a way 12 that will inhibit the continuing progress of the 13 Commission's work. 14 MR CLELLAND: If the Commission pleases. 15 Bendigo, 31 a major provincial city. Occurred late in the afternoon

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2657 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 compared to the other fires. Burnt in an area of mixed 2 land use, including some old mining country, including 3 some broad acre allotments and was a significant interface 4 fire. Resource capability was depleted initially because 5 of the fact that the Redesdale fire had taken a 6 significant amount of resources, the Redesdale fire being 7 to the east. The fire moved south-easterly, destroyed a 8 large number of houses and one fatality. Then after the 9 wind change, pushed it not a significant amount but away 10 to the north-east and there was some evidence of spotting 11 both short distance to the south-east during the main run 12 of the fire and to the north-east after the wind change. 13 You have described it previously, I think, as the classic 14 interface fire. What was it that created the difficulties 15 in responding?---Initially from a resource point of view 16 the depletion to the east, but also that it was burning in 17 and out of mixed country with small allotments of scrubby 18 forest and lots of cross roads, lots of complexity and 19 very fast moving, difficult for firefighters. We 20 sometimes describe this as guerilla firefighting tactics 21 where you get to the fire where you can, and it moves 22 around on you, and it was a very difficult fire. 23 I think you have stated or expressed the view that this fire 24 had the potential to cause extensive loss of life and 25 houses?---Yes. 26 Given the resource demands, its early containment and 27 minimisation of damage was a significant 28 achievement?---For the time of day, the fact that we had 29 multiple fires, it is a significant achievement. 30 In the result, there was one fatality and a loss of 58 31 dwellings?---Yes.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2658 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 I think, Commissioners, that fatality is referred to in the 2 table annexed to the statement of Inspector O'Halloran. 3 CHAIRMAN: Mr Kane, the evidence was given by his sister. 4 MR CLELLAND: Quite so. Looking at the warnings posted on the 5 CFA website, noting that the fire started according to 6 your inquiries at 1634, the first awareness message was 7 1717 and then an urgent threat message at 2137: I think 8 your original view was before you had reviewed the 9 transcripts of the radio that 2137 could not be regarded 10 as a timely warning in the circumstances?---That's 11 correct. 12 But now can I suggest to you a review of both the ABC 774, 3AW 13 and 91.1 FM reveals a series of warnings, both of a formal 14 kind, but also news updates and indeed commentary on the 15 fire, commencing at 1658, which was a preliminary alert, 16 which is very shortly after the fire started, a 17 preliminary alert for Long Gully, Maiden Gully area in the 18 vicinity of Bracewell Street, and thereafter messages at 19 1710, 1725, 1748, 1733, 1746, 1758, one at 1758 on 91.1, 20 advised the fire was moving in a south-easterly direction 21 crossing Sparrowhawk Road. "People from Golden Square to 22 Kangaroo Flat should be aware of ember attack", and then 23 following warnings at 1804, 1810, 1827, 1841, 1858, 1919, 24 1934, 1924 on 3AW, 1944, 1944 on 91.1 and 744 and 2015, 25 2027 and 2035. Indeed and over the page, 1903, 1916, 1944 26 and through to 2110. Mr Rees, firstly, the suppression 27 effort in relation to that fire by CFA, what's your 28 opinion about that?---As I described, that would have been 29 direct attack opportunistically on the edge of the fire as 30 close as they could get. I'm not sure of the deployment 31 of aircraft on that fire. But it was direct attack and

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2659 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 wherever they could get at it. 2 In relation to the warnings and information provided to the 3 communities that might have been impacted on by that fire, 4 now having reviewed the information provided in particular 5 over ABC, 91.1 and 774, what's your view as to whether CFA 6 met its responsibilities adequately in relation to 7 providing information and warnings?---Given what 8 information they had, there's certainly provision of 9 significant information. 10 It is not part of the summary table, but I want to ask you 11 about the fire in Upper Ferntree Gully at Quarry Road. 12 Commissioners, this is dealt with in the first statement 13 of Mr Rees at page 112 to 113. There is a description 14 there of that fire which is, can I suggest, fairly bland. 15 It tells us that the fire ignited at 1542. It was 16 contained at 1910 and was controlled at 2127. But you 17 have some views about that fire, as I understand it, and 18 what potential it had. Can you just explain those?---If 19 I can ask Mr Corbett just to pan back a bit on the 20 graphic, this fire started middle of the afternoon. At 21 this point in time, understanding that we have got fires, 22 of the East Kilmore fire and the Bunyip fire, we have got 23 a range of fires down around Narre Warren, Harkaway, and 24 this fire probably is the fire of most significant 25 potential on that day that did not develop into a major 26 fire. If we look at that fire, it is at the base of the 27 Dandenongs in Quarry Road. It was on the side of the road 28 and edging into the forest. If you look at that amount of 29 forest that's beyond it and the lay of the land, I believe 30 the fact that this fire was suppressed is an enormous 31 achievement given the deployment depletion that would have

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2660 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 occurred in this part of CFA's area committing to those 2 range of other fires. I have a view that if we had lost 3 that fire and it had gone up the escarpment of the south 4 face and west face of the Dandenongs, I know that we have 5 had a terrible tragedy on 7 February, but the suppression 6 of this fire along with a number of others indicates to me 7 that it could have been far, far worse. I don't think 8 anyone under appreciates the risk in the Dandenong Ranges, 9 but if you just look where that fire was, the topography, 10 the history of fires in that area back to the '60s, to 11 1997 and now, I believe that was not only a significant 12 achievement, but it is testament to CFA and the fellow 13 firefighters, our fellow agencies that we were able to 14 achieve that. I just cannot predict what would have 15 happened if we had lost that fire. 16 Indeed in the notes that have now been exhibited, your notes of 17 what occurred on the day, you actually refer to at 18 paragraph 42 - just pardon me for a moment. 19 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Mr Rees, was urban water available to 20 assist in attacking that fire?---Yes, it would have been 21 along the two main roads. The first road you see with the 22 yellow is the Burwood Highway. Then there is the railway 23 line which you can see, then there is Quarry Road itself 24 and obviously Quarry Road is named after the quarry. And 25 you can see how there is housing all around it, and the 26 real fear, would have got around, in effect around the 27 quarry, into that bit of bush and up the hill, gone. 28 MR CLELLAND: Is there some footage of that, Mr Corbett? 29 (A DVD was played to the Commission.) 30 MR CLELLAND: It is Exhibit 75, the notes of Mr Rees, and at 31 paragraph 42 you say that in addition to that fire,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2661 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Mr Rees, you became concerned about two other fires at the 2 same time, Harkaway and Narre Warren North, and that the 3 CFA was notified that those fires were going through IMS 4 at 1532, 1542 and 1648, the Narre Warren fire is also 5 described as the Lynbrook fire, and you explained that the 6 Ferntree Gully fire posed considerable concern for the 7 reasons you have given here today. But you then said in 8 relation to the Harkaway fire that was also a fire that 9 had enormous potential to develop into a catastrophic 10 event due to the heavy population density in an 11 urban-rural interface environment. Do you adhere to that 12 statement?---Yes, that's correct. 13 You then go on to state that ultimately the successful control 14 of those three fires is testament to the surge capacity 15 within the fire services of Victoria and it was 16 firefighters from Ballarat who were deployed across the 17 state to Gippsland who contributed significantly to 18 putting the Harkaway fire out?---I have had 19 inquiries - that is correct, they also went to Narre 20 Warren area first, then up to Harkaway to assist in 21 putting that fire out. They were actually moving through 22 to go to Gippsland so they were redeployed at that time. 23 Indeed the heavy helicopter that was engaged in the Bunyip fire 24 was redeployed to the Ferntree Gully fire, and I think the 25 helicopter on its way came across the fire at Harkaway and 26 assisted in the control of that fire?---Yes, ultimately it 27 didn't get to the Upper Ferntree Gully fire. 28 And that is just a small snapshot of one corner of Victoria 29 that was burning on 7 February?---Yes, and those fires 30 that we describe of significant potential that didn't 31 develop.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2662 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Can I ask you now to go to the Churchill-Jeeralang fire. The 2 area of that fire is in the vicinity of Morwell in 3 Gippsland?---Yes. 4 Commissioners, the material in Mr Rees's statements that deals 5 with this is at statement 1 page 104 to 5, statement 2 6 paragraphs 76 to 101, and transcript at 144 to 152. Again 7 just quickly, Mr Rees, I'm conscious we are pressed for 8 time, but ignition time 1333, at least that's when it was 9 reported. It burnt out some 24 and a half thousand 10 hectares. The control agency was CFA. 227 appliances 11 were deployed to this fire and some 1250 personnel. Can 12 you again just quickly describe the nature of this fire, 13 for example, as compared to the fires in the western 14 district, and these urban interface fires you have 15 described at both Maiden Gully and in the 16 Dandenongs?---This fire began on the edge of some 17 plantation. It burnt south-easterly deep into the 18 Strzelecki Ranges, which is characterised by forested, 19 both natural and plantation forest of pine and blue gum . 20 The gullies are steep. The mountains themselves are not 21 particularly high. The highest mountain is Mount Tassie, 22 which it burnt almost in a direct line towards. There is 23 some farming and hobby farm type areas on ridge lines and 24 in valley areas. I described it as very ferocious in its 25 progression. It spotted significantly south in the middle 26 of its main run down into the Yarram area and later into 27 the Won Wron area. It was subject to the wind change late 28 in the afternoon and burnt back towards the areas of 29 Callignee, Traralgon South and Koornalla. It threatened 30 those townships and communities, including the more 31 substantial township of Traralgon South which is tucked in

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2663 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 in the Traralgon Creek valley just to the left there. You 2 can see it there, and also posed significant threat 3 through spotting to the power generation at Loy Yang. 4 Which was the relevant ICC for this fire?---ICC was at 5 Traralgon. 6 Who was the control agency?---CFA. 7 As I understand it, and it might be possible for Mr Corbett to 8 show us the areas where this occurred, but there were 11 9 fatalities in this fire, and indeed 247 dwellings or 10 houses were lost. Are you able to show us just where that 11 occurred, Mr Corbett. Can you show us the topography of 12 the area perhaps where the bulk of the houses are lost 13 over on the right. Yes. Mr Rees, what can you tell the 14 Commission about the circumstances in which those 15 fatalities occurred and those houses were lost?---I can't 16 give a detailed answer, but it is very clear that the 17 number of houses that were on ridge lines that you can 18 see, and very significantly a lot of them after the wind 19 change, and also the area when you look at it, the mixed 20 vegetation that was in and around those houses when you 21 look at them. 22 When you gave evidence yesterday, I think I inaccurately 23 suggested to you that there was a similarity between the 24 Murrindindi fire or the fire that hit Marysville and that 25 at Kilmore East. You corrected me and said that in fact 26 the better comparison of fires was between Kilmore East 27 and this fire at Churchill; is that correct?---Yes. 28 What aspects did it have that were similar to the fire at 29 Kilmore East? What characteristics did it have?---Firstly, 30 rapid run, spotting, long distance spotting, moving from 31 forested areas, including natural forest and plantation,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2664 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 into populated areas, mixed habitat - sorry, mixed 2 population demographics of farmers and commuters, so there 3 was a range of significant features there, as compared to 4 the Murrindindi fire, which was quite different. 5 This was a fire where that very long distant spotting was also 6 experienced?---That's right. Our best estimate for 7 spotting is somewhere off the top of the ridge climbing up 8 to Mount Tassie, and down into that Yarram area. 9 In your first statements you provided a short account of the 10 urgent threat messages that were provided on the CFA 11 website. But, having now reviewed the various warnings 12 posted on the CFA website and indeed the warnings and 13 information from CFA and DSE personnel, broadcast on ABC 14 774 and ABC Gippsland, 100.7 FM and 828 AM, you have now 15 provided a much lengthier list of warnings provided in 16 relation to those fires; is that right?---That's correct. 17 It is apparent that from the fire being reported at 1330 there 18 were from 1351 on 774, and then throughout the afternoon a 19 series of alerts, urgent threat messages and indeed 20 commentaries, if I can put it that way, and information 21 being provided about those fires throughout the 22 day?---Yes. 23 I won't take you through those in detail, but having reviewed 24 those what do you say about the adequacy of the warnings 25 and the information that were given to the communities in 26 Gippsland that were potentially impacted by the fire or 27 indeed were impacted by this fire?---There is a 28 significant amount of information above and beyond what's 29 on the website. 30 What do you say in relation to those areas where the houses 31 were lost and the fatalities occurred about the warnings

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2665 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 in relation to those areas?---As best I can tell, we are 2 reviewing those numbers, and not knowing the exact timing 3 of when the fire got there, remembering a lot of it is as 4 best as we can collect, the warnings were, given the 5 circumstances, were reasonable and as good as we could get 6 them. 7 I omitted to ask you in relation to the fire at Upper Ferntree 8 Gully, but also the other fires that you mentioned, 9 firstly, there were no fatalities in the Dandenongs or 10 Harkaway or Lynbrook?---No, there were some houses lost in 11 the latter two. 12 I think one house in the Dandenongs?---I'm not sure of that 13 detail. 14 Again, I won't take you through it in detail, but having 15 reviewed the warnings in relation to those fires, were you 16 satisfied of their adequacy?---At the time - well, from my 17 best review, yes. 18 There was on the 7th a fire that was running, and that is the 19 fire that has become known as the Bunyip fire . That's 20 dealt with at page 94 of Mr Rees's first statement, 21 Commissioners. That in fact had started on 4 February, 22 but breached containment lines at about 3 o'clock on the 23 morning of 7 February; is that right?---That's correct. 24 Ultimately that fire burnt out some 26,500 hectares, did it 25 not?---Yes. 26 There were no fatalities and 24 houses lost?---Yes. 27 I think even a cursory review of the transcript of 774 will 28 reveal that there was a consistent coverage and warnings 29 in relation to that fire throughout the day and indeed the 30 following days?---Yes. 31 The first reference to it will be at we think 5 past 3 in the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2666 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 morning, Commissioners, at about the time it has broken 2 through the containment lines and then thereafter 3 throughout the morning and the day of the 7th there is 4 constant reference to Bunyip, constant updates, and as we 5 suggested there is a number of both warnings on the ABC 6 but also consistent warnings on the CFA website; is that 7 right, Mr Rees?---Yes. 8 Again, are you satisfied with the warnings in relation to that 9 fire?---Yes. 10 I think, Mr Corbett, you might have a sound grab of one of the 11 ABC reporters who was actually on the scene. 12 (A radio report was played to the Commission.) 13 CHAIRMAN: Mr Clelland, I just have a concern as to time. That 14 material has been before us and I have already read it in 15 the transcript. That's why I urge you to move along. 16 MR CLELLAND: Yes. If the Commission pleases. Mr Rees, in 17 addition to the specific fires, it is also apparent, and 18 I won't take you to these in view of the chairman's 19 comments, but can I suggest this: that from at least 20 3 o'clock in the morning on 7 February there were repeated 21 warnings to people to implement their personal bushfire 22 plan, indeed the first one commenced at 5 minutes past 23 midnight on 7 February, and were repeated regularly 24 throughout the night and throughout the following morning. 25 That was as a result, as I understand it, as part of the 26 preparations that you had undertaken for 27 7 February?---Yes. 28 Did that message, that is the "activate your bushfire plan, if 29 your plan is to leave early, if you are planning to leave 30 your property, leave early. If you are planning to stay 31 and defend your property, you should be properly

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2667 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 prepared", that was broadcast as I say through the night 2 and through at least the morning of the following 3 day?---Yes. 4 This Commission, Mr Rees, has focused on information and 5 warnings provided to the community. We have looked at the 6 warnings that were provided at the start of the fire 7 season and during the summer months by the CFA. We have 8 looked at the days leading up to the 7th itself. We have 9 looked at the warnings on the 7th generally, with 10 the exception of Kilmore East, and I'm coming to that, and 11 we have looked at the warnings and information with 12 respect to the other individual fires. Putting Kilmore 13 East to one side, and I realise the Murrindindi fire is a 14 matter which DSE will speak about, but apart from Kilmore 15 East what do you say about the adequacy of the information 16 and warnings given to the Victorian community both during 17 the fire season in the period leading up to the 7th and on 18 the 7th itself?---Given the mechanisms we had in place, 19 the planning that we had put in place, the use of the 20 various sources and resources, I believe our people did 21 the very best they could to provide information and that 22 there was quite significant information provided 23 particularly for those fires in the, I will call them the 24 country areas, on the country radio, quite significant. 25 I have previously talked about, and we have discussed the 26 short comings, the content and all those other factors, 27 but given where we were there was an enormous amount of 28 information both before and during the day. 29 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Mr Rees, could I just make the comment 30 that it seems to me that was a fairly qualified comment 31 which was prefaced by your reference to given the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2668 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 resources that were in place and the systems that were in 2 place, you went on to say your members did the very best 3 they could have done on the day, and I don't think that's 4 so much in question, the real question for us is were the 5 resources that were in place and the systems in place 6 adequate for the event. Now, I'm not asking you to give a 7 definitive answer to that at this point, but I simply make 8 the point that I think that was a fairly qualified 9 response to that question?---Yes. We could argue - we 10 could put the point for a very long time that the language 11 in the messaging could have been better, the way you put 12 the messaging together could have been better, and that's 13 the qualification I wanted to put. Given the systems we 14 had and the processes that we are using, there was an 15 enormous amount of messaging put out there on that day. 16 Prior to the day, I thought we had messaged as strong as 17 we had ever had, and on the day there was a huge volume of 18 messaging. I come back to the point that I made yesterday 19 that the best messaging that I see coming out is the 20 messaging coming from the incident control centre direct 21 on to the local radio, and there's a huge value in that 22 because of that local content and that local information. 23 That doesn't necessarily make it to the web page in that 24 format. So I see that there's a lot more in this than 25 simply producing a web message, recognising the enormous 26 value of web messaging, and the multiple avenues of 27 messaging is very important, I think. 28 MR CLELLAND: Can I just press you about that a bit, Mr Rees. 29 The answer you gave that Commissioner McLeod was referring 30 to was, I suppose, put in qualified terms, but I'm really 31 asking you to objectively say in relation to the fires

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2669 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 that we have looked at, indeed all the fires where CFA was 2 the control agency, and leaving aside Kilmore East for the 3 moment, in your view did CFA meet its obligations to 4 adequately inform the community?---I believe they did. 5 I believe we tried our absolute hardest to do it. 6 It is not just a question of whether you tried your hardest, 7 I'm asking you whether in your objective assessment you 8 succeeded?---I believe we did. I believe we did - the 9 reason I say the best we can is someone will always say to 10 me you could have done better, and I'm a person who 11 naturally just tries and tries and tries to do better. 12 But I believe that we did everything we could to meet our 13 obligation. 14 Having reviewed the transcripts, the radio messages and the CFA 15 website, is there anywhere where you can point to where 16 more information should have been given at a particular 17 time or different information on the 7th?---Not really in 18 respect of the ones we have discussed. 19 Let's turn to Kilmore East again, trying to move through it as 20 speedily as we can, I will lead you on this and if there 21 is an objection to it Mr Rush will take it. Can we divide 22 the Kilmore East fire into three phases. The first phase 23 being that period before it has crossed the Hume 24 Freeway?---Yes. 25 As I understand it between ignition time and it crossing the 26 Hume is approximately two hours?---Yes, the fire started 27 1149 and the estimates are across the Hume at about 1400. 28 The response, the initial response was five brigades. A 29 further response at 1202 and then as you explained 30 yesterday a number of other units deployed including 31 aircraft?---Yes.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2670 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Was it inevitable - sorry, I will withdraw that and put it this 2 way. You have explained I think that what was undertaken 3 in that two hours was direct attack on the 4 fire?---Wherever possible, recognising that it went into 5 some plantation where direct attack wouldn't have been 6 possible. But wherever possible the aim was to try and 7 pinch the fire, contain it and recognising it was a very, 8 I would say slight hope, but the only hope was containing 9 it before it got across the Hume in the open country. 10 Was there a prospect, even if it had not been controlled, that 11 it would nonetheless not cross the Hume?---I would think 12 that the Hume as a fire break probably wouldn't be 13 sufficient on that day. 14 When you got the first IMS report of the fire, this is volume 15 6 of the six volumes that came with the second statement 16 of Mr Rees, Commissioners, which contains the IMS data, 17 when you were informed at 1149 or the initial report of 18 the fire, at that stage did you take the view that it was 19 inevitable that it would cross the Hume?---No, not in the 20 initial report, no. 21 We know that there were awareness messages on the web at 1240, 22 warning of a grass fire three kilometres east of Kilmore 23 near Saunders Road and it was said that it was not 24 currently posing a threat to communities, however the 25 communities of Kilmore East, Wandong and Clonbinane need 26 to be aware of this fire. In your view was that an 27 appropriate warning at that time?---Yes, it was an initial 28 information. 29 And then there were warnings on ABC 774 to residents of Kilmore 30 East, Wandong and Clonbinane. They were being warned to 31 be on alert in relation to that fire?---Yes.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2671 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Again at 1359 an urgent threat message was issued for Wandong, 2 "the fire was spotting into the north of the town, as we 3 speak", that's what the reporter said. So it is fire 4 spots across the Hume and into the top end of Wandong. 5 Then followed the IMS information at 1400 that the fire 6 had crossed the Hume and is impacting on the outskirts of 7 Wandong. Those warnings that came between those two IMS 8 messages, firstly, were you aware of those on the 9 day?---Not of the warnings, no. 10 Having reviewed those, were they appropriate warnings in your 11 view?---I lost track of the ones you were reading out at 12 the time. 13 There was a 13 - there was a 1240 web message reporting the 14 grass fire three kilometres east of Kilmore, and informing 15 communities of Kilmore East, Wandong and Clonbinane of the 16 need to be aware of the fire. That's at 1240, and then at 17 1333 residents of Kilmore East, Wandong and Clonbinane 18 were warned to be on the alert and then an urgent threat 19 message for Wandong indicating that the fire was spotting 20 into the town, across the Hume and into the top end of 21 Wandong, that was broadcast at 1359 on the ABC?---Yes, 22 I can't find that in the record. 23 If you just take my word for it at the moment. If I'm wrong, 24 I will be corrected. But if that was given over the radio 25 at that time, that information before the fire crossed the 26 Hume at 2 o'clock, would you regard those as being 27 appropriate warnings?---Certainly, and in the time and the 28 information available. 29 You have been asked on several occasions by Mr Rush about a 30 line scan that was carried out somewhere between 1230 and 31 1 o'clock. As I understand your evidence, you had not

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2672 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 seen those line scans?---No, I didn't see them on the day. 2 Are they in any sense a predictive map?---They certainly give 3 an outline, and their timing is important in that 4 previously they were referred to as the 1233 line scan. 5 If you think about that, that's not - that wasn't the 6 actual time they were taken. They were actually taken at 7 1246 and 1255 roughly. When I say roughly, over a 8 period - 1246 to 1249 and 1255 to 1258 which is, the 9 second one in particular is half an hour from 1233, it is 10 important for a fire that has only been going from 1149, 11 that's quite a significant gap in timing for the fire 12 size. 13 It would appear that the first map prepared from the line scan 14 was actually at 1340 hours?---Yes. 15 That still showed that the fire was to the west of the Hume 16 Freeway?---Yes. 17 Again, we understand that in the days leading up to the 7th 18 that Yarra Group memorandum that's been referred to was 19 working on a predicted rate of spread of 2.5 kilometres an 20 hour; is that your understanding?---Yes. 21 And as was suggested to you by Mr Rush that was still a very 22 fast rate of spread?---Was fast, and I have said it before 23 it was based on Thursday figures and not the later 24 figures. 25 We have heard that on the morning of the 7th there was at the 26 IECC briefing by the fire behaviouralists the predicted 27 rate of spread of the fires suggested at that briefing was 28 at least for this area 4.4 kilometres per hour?---Yes. 29 The Commission will find that in document (EXP.003.001.0001) at 30 0016. Yet the rate of spread of the Kilmore East fire, 31 when it was to the west of the Hume Freeway, if you accept

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2673 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 from me that it's covered about 4.5 kilometres from point 2 of ignition to the freeway, that distance of 4.5 3 kilometres over about two hours would give a rate of 4 spread of about 1.25 kilometres per hour?---Yes. 5 The second phase of the fire, if I might suggest this, can be 6 regarded as that period between when it crossed the Hume 7 at about 1400 hours and went into the slopes of Mount 8 Disappointment. I'm going to suggest to you that that is 9 a distance of approximately 15 kilometres, but perhaps 10 Mr Corbett can just measure that for us. 14.15 11 kilometres. On the evidence, it would appear, and this is 12 evidence both received by the Commission or in statements 13 collected by Victoria Police as part of the Phoenix 14 Project, the evidence suggests that the fire was at the 15 bottom of Mount Disappointment at about 1530, and there 16 was a caller to 3AW, Alan from Whittlesea, who reports 17 that Mount Disappointment is ablaze at 1545 and witnesses 18 who have provided statements to Victoria Police, a 19 Mr Christodoulou from Upper Plenty and a Ms Jeffreys from 20 Muntz Road - - - 21 MR RUSH: Commissioners, I don't object and I haven't objected 22 to substantial leading, but I do object to leading of 23 evidence that is not before the Commission or likely to be 24 before the Commission or notified to counsel that it is 25 going to be put to the witness. 26 MR CLELLAND: I want to put some material to Mr Rees and I will 27 explain why I'm doing it. We expect that this will be the 28 evidence that is provided to the Commission, and indeed 29 some of this evidence has already been given. For 30 example, Mr Harvey refers to the fires along the bottom of 31 Mount Disappointment at paragraph 25 of his witness

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2674 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 statement (WIT.036.001.0001). There is we would submit in 2 the evidence that has now been tendered, the 3AW 3 transcript, the observations of Alan from Whittlesea 4 reporting that Mount Disappointment is ablaze at 1545, and 5 we have also referred to statements of Mr Christodoulou 6 and Ms Jeffreys, whom we understand are taken by Victoria 7 Police as part of Operation Phoenix or Project Phoenix, 8 who nominate 1545 as being the time the fire reaches the 9 top of Mount Disappointment. The purpose of the exercise 10 is that I want to put to Mr Rees that in this second phase 11 that distance of 14.15 kilometres or thereabouts, what 12 I had rounded off to 15 kilometres, that the fire had 13 taken between an hour and three-quarters and two hours to 14 cover that distance. Now, it may well be that the 15 submission is made against us ultimately that we fail for 16 lack of proof. But the point we want to make here is that 17 the fire has carried that sort of distance at a rate of 18 about seven and a half to eight kilometres per hour before 19 it reaches the top of Mount Disappointment. 20 CHAIRMAN: The difficulty is the way you are going about this, 21 Mr Clelland, is troubling because it is just very time 22 consuming, pulling in things that there is no opportunity 23 to check on, it just means that we have to deal with it 24 potentially another two times so Mr Rush has to check it 25 out. It may well be it is better if you want to produce 26 this in a comprehensive way that you do it differently, 27 and that means inconveniencing Mr Rees somewhat. I'm 28 concerned that we have witnesses who are waiting to give 29 evidence and by you going about it this way what I'm 30 inclined to do to say is I will give you a time and you 31 get through everything you need to get through with

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2675 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Mr Rees, or we will stop now and you will come back when 2 it can be done in a compact, sensible appropriate way. 3 MR CLELLAND: We are trying to be sensible, Mr Chairman. 4 I suppose the difficulty about this is that some of the 5 evidence is before the Commission in a variety of forms, 6 the IMS warnings - sorry, the IMS information received by 7 Mr Rees is in one document, and we have tried to bring 8 that together, there are the warnings that we have tried 9 to bring together in the documents we have now provided to 10 the Commission. The point we are working towards is 11 this - - - 12 CHAIRMAN: I will cut you off by saying how much longer do you 13 expect to be, because if you nominate a reasonable time 14 then that may well be appropriate to accept. 15 MR CLELLAND: Commissioner, if you give me half an hour on this 16 topic of Kilmore East, and then take a short break, and 17 I will review the material and see if we can't reduce it 18 so that we can finish in a reasonable time. 19 CHAIRMAN: When do you expect to finish with Mr Rees doing all 20 the matters that you would want to deal with? Because 21 when you indicated how long you were taking, I hadn't 22 assumed that you were going to take as long as you now 23 have. 24 MR CLELLAND: I understand that. Can I just say this, one of 25 the troubling aspects of this is that Mr Rees has been in 26 the witness box for any number of days, and it couldn't be 27 gainsaid, with respect, that there have been a variety of 28 matters put to him over that time where there has been no 29 opportunity for the state to respond to the issues that 30 have been raised with him, and what has amounted to either 31 express or implied criticism of Mr Rees and the CFA. What

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2676 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 I have tried to do since I commenced at 12.30 yesterday, 2 and then recommenced after the lay witness gave his 3 evidence yesterday afternoon, is try and carefully and 4 rigorously go through the information that was provided to 5 the State of Victoria prior to 7 February and on 6 7 February because we apprehended that that was a matter 7 with which this Commission was concerned that that was the 8 subject matter for the interim report, and it was very 9 important for accurate information to be put before the 10 Commission. What I'm attempting to do now, having dealt 11 with that lead up, the other fires on the 7th and the 12 general warnings on the 7th, which as I say we thought was 13 relevant and indeed crucial, we now come to the issue of 14 the Kilmore East fire. What I am working towards is this, 15 and I can put it succinctly: at the time the fires are on 16 the slopes of Mount Disappointment, Strathewen, some 20 17 kilometres away, and indeed Humevale is not simply seeing 18 evidence of spotting as was first observed by Mr McGahy, 19 but in fact what is described variously by the witnesses 20 at between 4 o'clock and 4.15 or 4.30 as effectively this 21 raining fire in a way that has effectively created new 22 firefronts. They are not just spot fires. This is of a 23 new kind of fire as has been described by Mr Rees. What 24 we want to put is that this fire, or new fires have in a 25 way that is unprecedented, travelled something like 20 26 kilometres, and if this Commission is, with respect, 27 seriously looking at the question of why people may have 28 not been warned, why they found themselves suddenly being 29 impacted by significant fires, not merely spot fires, the 30 explanation lies at least in part in the nature of these 31 fires and the time of their travel. The predictions of

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2677 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 rate of spread of four kilometres, five kilometres or even 2 eight kilometres are vastly underestimated. 3 CHAIRMAN: That is a long answer to my question. How much 4 longer do you want? 5 MR CLELLAND: I will attempt to do that by 11 o'clock, if that 6 suits the convenience of the Commission. 7 CHAIRMAN: But how long do you expect to spend on other 8 matters? What are the other matters, and how long do you 9 expect in dealing with them? 10 MR CLELLAND: All right. 11 CHAIRMAN: Because it may well be that it is more sensible to 12 finish Mr Rees now, to have the material that you would 13 want to get out through him in a somewhat unusual way, and 14 I accept that what you are aiming to do is appropriate and 15 relevant, but it is just the way in which you are doing it 16 which concerns me. 17 MR CLELLAND: I understand the way in which I'm doing it 18 concerns you, Mr Chairman, and I think in part again with 19 the utmost respect to the Commission we find ourselves in 20 this position because we have been in this hearing for 21 many weeks, and there has been an awful lot of evidence 22 that could have been delivered in a far more economical 23 and useable form. 24 CHAIRMAN: The specific questions are how much longer - if you 25 nominate a time how much longer will it be to finish with 26 Mr Rees, is the first question? 27 MR CLELLAND: I was going to suggest, Mr Chairman, that if 28 I take a short period of time and review my notes, 29 I thought that I might be able to do it by 11 o'clock. 30 CHAIRMAN: Finish completely? 31 MR CLELLAND: If that assists the Commission, yes.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2678 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 CHAIRMAN: If that is the position, I have no difficulty in 2 continuing. 3 MR CLELLAND: We can do the balance of it in submissions. 4 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 5 MR CLELLAND: But if you give me 10 minutes now, I will go 6 through this material, see if I can deliver it in a more 7 economical form and we will finish by 11. 8 CHAIRMAN: We will take a 5-minute break, and you can then tell 9 us how much longer you will take to finalise the matters 10 that you want to put to Mr Rees. 11 MR CLELLAND: If the Commission pleases. 12 MR RUSH: Can I just raise one matter, which was the initial 13 objection, sir. The initial objection I made was to the 14 use of two police statements. We have been advised that 15 there is a public interest immunity claimed in relation to 16 the police statements, and when one was used last week we 17 were criticised by the state for using it because we 18 breached a protocol that is understood, because of the 19 ongoing investigations by police, and that was the nature 20 of the objection, to be using that material from police 21 statements, we have to do it very carefully and that's why 22 I raised it and it is not evidence. I understand what my 23 learned friend is trying to do. I haven't objected, but 24 I did want to raise those matters when he is referring to 25 two police statements. 26 CHAIRMAN: It may well be that you can speak to Mr Clelland 27 during the course of a short break. 28 MR CLELLAND: Just before you leave the bench, we had cleared 29 the use that we wanted to make of those statements with 30 the police and got the green light in respect of the PII 31 concerns.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2679 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 MR RUSH: We don't appear to be able to do that. 2 CHAIRMAN: Yes. We will take a short break. 3 (Short adjournment.) 4 CHAIRMAN: Perhaps while we are waiting, Mr Rush, you might 5 give us an indication of what is contemplated what would 6 happen when we have finished Mr Rees. 7 MR RUSH: Yes, sir. I can, but it might be better from 8 Ms Nichols. 9 MS NICHOLS: Mr Chairman, what is contemplated next, there are 10 four witnesses from AFAC. It is intended to call 11 Ms Brown, who is the CEO very briefly first, and with your 12 leave to stand her down, and Ms Brown will explain what 13 AFAC's role is, and how it assists the agencies develop 14 policy. Then to call Mr Gledhill, who is from the 15 Tasmanian Fire Service, and also a director of AFAC. 16 Mr Lawson who is from the County Fire Authority in South 17 Australia, also from AFAC. 18 CHAIRMAN: It is obviously desirable seeing that they are from 19 interstate that we get through those witnesses during the 20 course of the day. 21 MS NICHOLS: Indeed. Then to call Mr Ananiev, a lay witness at 22 2 pm, and hopefully to finish with Mr Gledhill and 23 Mr Lawson in the afternoon. There is one further witness, 24 Mr Seear, it is intended to try and call him in the 25 afternoon too, to recall Ms Brown tomorrow to finish her 26 evidence, and to call the final AFAC witness tomorrow 27 morning. If there is any difficulty with that, Mr Lawson, 28 who is from South Australia, can stay over this evening 29 and be called tomorrow, but we would really like to allow 30 Mr Gledhill to go back to South Australia, if we can. 31 CHAIRMAN: Yes, okay. That gives me an idea. Thank you for

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2680 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 that, Ms Nichols. Yes, Mr Clelland. 2 MR CLELLAND: Thank you for the time, Mr Chairman. 3 CHAIRMAN: Can you give me the indication that I thought you 4 were going to give me on return as to how much longer you 5 expect to be. 6 MR CLELLAND: Yes, about 10 or 15 minutes, Mr Chairman. 7 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you. 8 MR CLELLAND: I should say in explanation of that we think that 9 with the benefit of the review we might be able to put at 10 least the bulk of the remaining matters with Mr Rees in 11 the form of submissions hopefully rather than having him 12 recalled. 13 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you. That's most satisfactory, 14 Mr Clelland. 15 MR CLELLAND: If the Commission pleases. Mr Rees, on the 16 evidence that is currently before the Commission, and 17 indeed that which is contained in statements that have 18 been obtained by Victoria Police, can I suggest to you 19 that it is a fair approximation of the situation to say 20 that the fire has come on to the slopes of Mount 21 Disappointment and is burning out of control between 3.30 22 and 4 o'clock?---Yes, that's right. 23 At or about the same time, according to the evidence of 24 Mr McGahy, Mr David Brown who nominates 4.10 as the time 25 that the paddocks around his house exploded and indeed 26 Ms Keating, the fire tower observer, who nominates 4.05 as 27 having observed a similar phenomena in and around 28 St Andrews and Strathewen, can I suggest to you and ask 29 for your comment that this fire has travelled in no time 30 at all the distance between Mount Disappointment and 31 St Andrews and Strathewen by means of spotting but in a

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2681 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 way which is unprecedented?---I indicated that something 2 very significant has gone on in a fire behaviour context 3 in the rough boundary area that I would suggest is 4 Humevale, Arthurs Creek, St Andrews and south of Kinglake 5 at about this time, and my reason for saying that is that 6 when I look at all of the evidence that has been presented 7 this is not a case of just one or two spots. This is a 8 very significant, heavy spotting, landing of multiple 9 fires, and I tried to think of how I might describe it, 10 very significant, like a cluster bomb impact, where 11 multiple fires are starting, confluence zones in and 12 around that area, and that in effect one of the 13 explanations that I can only conclude from this 14 environment is that at about this period of time there is 15 in effect two fires. There is a fire that is coming over 16 Mount Disappointment, and the heavy spotting that has 17 happened has very rapidly developed into a large 18 collection of fires that started to come together and in 19 fact probably came together over a period of time, down in 20 that bowl area of Strathewen, Arthurs Creek as 21 I described, towards St Andrews. 22 Have you, with the assistance of Mr Corbett, attempted to 23 represent that graphically on the image that is now on the 24 screen and hopefully each of the Commissioners can 25 see?---Yes. The dilemma here is that when you look at the 26 lines they are not prescriptive boundaries, they are 27 simply indicators of actually quite large fires. At the 28 same time this fire is still spotting into a range of 29 areas back further towards the main head, but the evidence 30 appears to me that both due to topography, realising the 31 gullies and the lay of the land there, the fact that

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2682 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 I suspect that's right on that trough line that 2 Mr Tolhurst describes in detail, the fact of the fuels, 3 the fact of the wind in that environment leads me to 4 believe that that area is the next phase of this fire, and 5 it is actually not just a few spots caught up by the head, 6 because when you analyse the time I originally said that 7 I thought the head fire got to Strathewen area about 1840. 8 I think we have got major fire in that area and all the 9 evidence suggests that they aren't little spots, they have 10 actually developed into a major fire. Also, after the 11 event, some days later as part of the Project Phoenix, 12 I had a very, very brief conversation with a police 13 officer who was leading some of the investigation. I was 14 talking to him about this fire and he said, "My 15 preliminary judgment is that there is more than one fire 16 here." In other words, he was talking about the main fire 17 versus the other fire. I kept very quiet about that 18 because of the investigation process. I in fact didn't 19 tell anyone, but it would appear from all of the evidence 20 and listening yesterday and the days before in respect of 21 the people in Kinglake, fires definitely come from the 22 south. 23 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Could I ask just a point of detail, 24 Mr Rees. What's the difference in elevation between the 25 top of Mount Disappointment and the Strathewen township 26 which you described as being in a bowl?---I'm trying to 27 describe that. I don't know the difference precisely. 28 But there would be some difference in elevation?---Yes. 29 So you are sort of describing a phenomena where, you know, the 30 effect of the wind and the associated weather that might 31 be either generated or affected by the fire itself,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2683 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 spotting out over a kind of void, dropping down into a 2 valley below?---All I'm trying to say is I can find no 3 other explanation to the fact of this enormous fire in 4 that area, and it is the sort of spotting that you would 5 normally expect a shorter distance ahead with some big 6 spots landing out the front. It appears to be really, 7 really heavy in that area and - - - 8 Do you wish to make any comment about your understanding of the 9 fuel load on the top of Mount Disappointment, or on Mount 10 Disappointment generally?---No, I'm not expert in the area 11 to be able to - except that we knew that it was heavy. 12 Some of it was unburnt forest. Some of it in some parts 13 was plantation. But the way I see it, there is something 14 very significant going on in this phase of the fire 15 between these two areas, and there is significant fire 16 down in the Strathewen, Arthurs Creek, St Andrews area at 17 a period long before the head of the fire has got there, 18 long before. Then there is the description of the fire 19 further beyond. Mr Tolhurst in his evidence says that the 20 fire has spotted somewhere off the Mount Disappointment 21 area way down into Healesville, Yarra Glen, Steels Creek. 22 I would be hopeful if we could ever get the further 23 research to try and work out exactly what's gone on here 24 because for me it is a very significant fire event 25 happened in the Strathewen area. 26 MR CLELLAND: Did that have implications for Kinglake in your 27 view, Mr Rees?---Yes, I think there is enough evidence to 28 suggest that the fire that has come towards Kinglake has 29 come from at least two directions, from the south, and if 30 you look at the lay of the land again there is a line of 31 in effect north south gullies and ridge lines running up

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2684 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 into the, what gets called - you can see them quite 2 clearly there, and fire has come up into that area in 3 various places. I know that this fire that currently is 4 looking to the left of what gets called the Kinglake 5 Warrandyte Road, got across that road. So there was fire 6 in this area to the right after this period. So there is 7 fire at least right across the southern side of Kinglake 8 long before the head fire has got there. At the same 9 time, if you think back up to the north-west, the head 10 fire is advancing. I was hopeful that the research that 11 would be undertaken by the CRC would deliver some of this. 12 I haven't seen anything to suggest it has yet. But the 13 only reason I'm trying to explain this is I can find no 14 other explanation for the rapid advancement in time of 15 this fire than they have in fact developed into two 16 separate fires. 17 As I have already said, we had predictions of a forward rate of 18 spread of 2.5, 4.4 on the morning of the 7th, the fire 19 behaviouralists on the afternoon of the 7th it seems used 20 a rate of forward spread of between five to six 21 kilometres. If what you are describing is in fact the 22 creation of a new fire or a new firefront in Strathewen or 23 effectively new fires, are you able to offer an opinion as 24 to what the rate of spread or rate of forward spread was 25 of the fire at around about 3.30, 4 o'clock, 4.30 on 26 7 February?---If the main fire had advanced at that rate, 27 you are talking a phenomenal rate of spread of somewhere 28 around 26 kilometres an hour. So the reality is 29 that - there is no records of that happening ever that 30 I understand. 31 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: What is the distance, Mr Rees, from the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2685 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 top of - - -?---Roughly 22 kilometres. 2 From the top of Mount Disappointment to Strathewen?---Yes. 3 MR CLELLAND: That's just been brought up, Commissioner McLeod. 4 It is 21.8 kilometres. 5 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: There has been evidence earlier in the 6 public hearings about spotting in excess of 30 7 kilometres?---Yes. 8 During this fire event?---Yes. That's right. I'm not denying 9 that. What I'm saying is if this was real fire travelling 10 rather than this deluge of spotting, that's the speed it 11 would have to travel. 12 But if it was spotting out of an elevated position at the top 13 of a mountain into a valley below, and there is other 14 evidence to suggest that spotting has been in excess of 30 15 kilometres in some instances, why wouldn't the obvious 16 conclusion be of course that it has spotted out of the top 17 of the mountain, and with the wind and the weather impact 18 of the fire itself pressing it in a continuing forward 19 direction with substantial spotting, which has been also 20 the evidence of a number of the fires that we have seen at 21 this time, why wouldn't that be a fairly obvious 22 conclusion, that it has massively spotted a considerable 23 distance in the direction of Strathewen?---I think you are 24 right. The point I'm simply trying to make is that they 25 have concentrated in that area and become a big separate 26 fire. They have joined together and they have become a 27 big fire in that area. 28 Well, of course. Of course. That's fairly obvious, isn't it? 29 If there is substantial spotting, isn't that a normal 30 characteristic with spotting?---Well, the characteristic 31 of spotting is they spot ahead and the main fire catches

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2686 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 up. This characteristic I'm trying to explain is that 2 they have spotted such a long way ahead they have become a 3 fire of their own, quite separate. 4 But perhaps the elevation and being blown out from the top of 5 the mountain into a valley might explain why there is an 6 apparent, for a time, break between the two fires?---Yes. 7 And that's speculative, but it seems to be fairly obvious as a 8 first position?---Obvious versus speculative. My point of 9 view is all I'm trying to say here is to say that we have 10 had a phenomenon develop of a very, very significant 11 second major fire, for want of a term, or major area of 12 fire. 13 It is a semantic issue whether it is a separate fire or whether 14 it is part of the spotting process from the initial 15 fire?---Yes. 16 The fact is there was a significant progression of the fire 17 ground through whatever process caused that?---Yes. 18 MR CLELLAND: Can I just take up that point with you, Mr Rees. 19 We heard from Mr Brown that prior to the paddock 20 exploding, as he put it, at 4.10, I think it was the 21 Arthurs Creek unit that was up putting out a spot fire in 22 Eagles Nest Road, is the point you are trying to make the 23 distinction a spot in a typical way which might be an 24 ember and is a small fire that one might ordinarily 25 associate with spotting in its conventional sense, as 26 opposed to what is being described by the witnesses as 27 these explosive fires that are immediately joining up and 28 effectively becoming another firefront?---I read into the 29 issue of the first spot that it was typical of what you 30 would normally expect. What I see as happening is that 31 description that Commissioner McLeod is talking about. We

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2687 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 have just this prolific landing of fire in the area that 2 is beyond the ability to not so much to control but beyond 3 ability to conceive in the way that we describe that other 4 spot. It is quite a different impact. 5 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: I think Dr Tolhurst gave evidence to the 6 effect that maybe 10 or 15 minutes is sufficient, if the 7 fuel conditions are right, for a fire to get out of 8 control from initial ignition. Now a spot fire is really 9 an initial ignition?---Yes. 10 And if it lands in an area where there is plenty of dry fuel, 11 one would expect that within 10 or 15 minutes there would 12 be a substantial blaze. If there are a number of spotting 13 incidents occurring at a similar time, it doesn't take too 14 much imagination to understand what that will quickly grow 15 into?---That's right. 16 Is that a fair description?---I'm not astute in that. I am 17 really trying to put the point that the volume of this was 18 enormous in this part of the fire. 19 I understand that. 20 MR CLELLAND: Any of the predictions that you had either 21 received, or that you now understand were made, or indeed 22 your own predictions on that day, did they contemplate 23 that sort of behaviour as the fire came up to the ridge of 24 Mount Disappointment?---We certainly contemplated 25 spotting, but we didn't contemplate it to the volume and 26 that concentration that occurred as a combination of 27 topography, weather, fuel arrangement and the ability for 28 that to come together and progress like it did. 29 The Commission has now been provided, amongst the other 30 material we tendered this morning, with a summary of the 31 web and radio warnings for Kilmore East. I'm also in a

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2688 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 position now to tender the CD of the footage that was 2 played to the Commission yesterday, Mr Chairman. 3 CHAIRMAN: Yes, that will be exhibit 80. 4 MR CLELLAND: It was already given the exhibit number, 5 Mr Chairman, of exhibit 78. 6 CHAIRMAN: Okay. 7 MR CLELLAND: I don't have a strong attachment to 78 - - - 8 CHAIRMAN: I had 79 was the other materials that you had put 9 in. I hadn't realised that in anticipation I had put down 10 78 for that one. That will be 78. 11 MR RUSH: I also ask that the material that is put as the 12 theory of the witness, this map - - - 13 CHAIRMAN: It seems to me that we ought to have the map that is 14 presently on the screen as representational of a position 15 that requires further attention in one way or another. 16 MR RUSH: I would like that tendered, and also the updated STAR 17 Tool, because we have now got houses, as we saw for the 18 Churchill fire and the like. 19 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 20 MR CLELLAND: I think there was an understanding that as the 21 STAR Tool was modified it would be tendered from time to 22 time. 23 CHAIRMAN: Yes. It may well be that we will take this as the 24 second version that we preserve. 25 MR CLELLAND: If we could do that. 26 CHAIRMAN: That will be exhibit 80 then, when it has been 27 converted as appropriate. 28 #EXHIBIT 80 - Maps from Google Earth and updated Star Tool. 29 MR CLELLAND: If the Commission pleases. 30 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 31 MR RUSH: I will circumscribe as well my examination,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2689 REES XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Commissioners. I think I will be 10 to 15 minutes. 2 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 3

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2690 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 not. 2 You were not aware - the information that's been put to you in 3 relation to times of the fire in Strathewen is information 4 that's brought forward in the Royal Commission?---Some of 5 it is, yes. 6 What did you know - when did you know a spot fire had hit 7 Strathewen?---I knew of that spot fire that was reported 8 in IMS during the afternoon. 9 What time?---I'm sorry, Mr Rush, you are asking me to recall my 10 memory. I'm saying that it's actually recorded in IMS as 11 being an IMS event. 12 Can I just ask you something, Mr Rees. You have given evidence 13 this morning and late yesterday afternoon of the warnings 14 and given an overall statement to the Commission when 15 taken to every fire, apart from the Kilmore East fire, you 16 have said the warnings were adequate?---No, I have said to 17 the best of my knowledge and the best efforts that people 18 made, yes. 19 Putting aside we all, as Mr McLeod said to you, accept everyone 20 made their best efforts, were the warnings 21 adequate?---I believe they were, Mr Rush. 22 You have proffered an opinion. We have been and had a look at 23 Callignee. When did Callignee get a warning?---Just give 24 me a moment. 25 MR CLELLAND: Mr Chairman, can I just rise for a moment while 26 that's being done. It is not counsel assisting's 27 intention to blame or find fault with anybody, and that is 28 from the highest levels of management down, we know that 29 because Mr Rush told us that in his opening back in April. 30 The manner in which Mr Rees has been questioned and is now 31 being questioned is not consistent with that. He has been

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2691 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 here for a long time. He is trying to deal with a lot of 2 material. It is clear that the questioning was truncated 3 in relation to Kilmore East. Of course Mr Rush can ask 4 questions of Mr Rees, but there is a manner in which it 5 can be done that is more appropriate than what is being 6 undertaken at the moment. 7 CHAIRMAN: I'm not prepared to interfere at this stage, 8 Mr Clelland. 9 MR CLELLAND: If the chairman pleases. 10 MR RUSH: When did Callignee get a warning?---Reading these 11 notes, 1620 was an alert message for Callignee and 12 Callignee South. 13 When was an urgent threat message that Callignee was going to 14 be threatened by the fire?---At 1553 there is talk on the 15 radio about smoke and ember attack at Callignee, Callignee 16 south and north. 17 Why did the fire go back to Callignee?---The wind change. 18 What warning did Callignee get about a wind change?---I can't 19 say. 20 You can't say? Did it get any warning?---I can't say. I have 21 said that. 22 But you have just been through the warnings with your 23 counsel?---Yes, they got warning that the fire and smoke 24 and ember attack. I can't say to you right here now that 25 someone said on the radio there is a wind change coming. 26 If you can't say that, how can you say that the warnings were 27 adequate or proper?---Because I believe people did the 28 best they can at the time. 29 Do you say the fires, the Kilmore East fire, was 30 unprecedented?---No, I don't say it is unprecedented. 31 I say that there is something very significant happening

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2692 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 in respect of that fire in that area. It is clear that 2 there are unprecedented conditions. 3 It is fair to say, is it not, that on 6 February you 4 anticipated a fire of the nature that burned in East 5 Kilmore?---I anticipated fires - first of all, Mr Rush, we 6 were putting the view that they were unprecedented 7 conditions. Whether a fire behaved in a manner depend on 8 the circumstances at the time and the time of day and the 9 location at which it occurred. To me the fire may well be 10 regarded as unprecedented. There are some people who 11 would argue that it has characteristics of fires that have 12 occurred before. In some respects I would agree to that. 13 In other respects I would say that this fire is doing 14 things of which I, in my experience, have none, and I lead 15 to the experts to give as much advice as possible, 16 realising that I believe not all of the evidence is in at 17 this point in time. 18 In October, when you had the initial press conference that we 19 saw yesterday and on 6 February you at both occasions put 20 forward the idea that we had the potential for a fire that 21 could have been of the consequences that we saw on 22 7 February?---Yes. 23 You say that that was directed both occasions and on other 24 occasions at warning the community?---Yes. 25 And you said in October that the CFA was prepared?---And 26 I believed it was, yes. 27 So we can take it that the preparations matched - over that 28 time matched the expectation of what was to come?---As 29 best as possible, Mr Rush, yes. 30 In relation to the fire you have referred to the Ash Wednesday 31 report and in your statement you have said that you

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2693 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 referred to Ash Wednesday because that was the most 2 recent - it was necessary to do that because people died 3 and because of the nature of the fire?---As I say, certain 4 fires become benchmarks and in some respects they become 5 folklore, and I was trying to leverage off that because 6 I had a real fear that people were - their lifetime 7 experiences weren't fires of that type. The other reason 8 I wanted to go to Ash Wednesday was the multiple fires 9 across the state, that sort of concern. 10 You referred in your statement, and it is part of the tender 11 bundle, of an article by Krusel & Petris, "Study of 12 civilian deaths in 1983 Ash Wednesday fires"?---Yes. 13 Produced for the CFA?---Yes. 14 I want to read just two parts of this report. It is at 15 (TEN.001.001.0117). If you go down to "persons caught 16 under the fire or outside their homes"?---Yes. 17 If you go down to about the sixth line where this is referred 18 to, "The ferocity of the wind change on Ash Wednesday was 19 extreme and caught most people unaware. With the benefit 20 of hindsight it is evident that successful survival 21 strategies require an understanding of the importance of 22 wind change. In fact, of the 47 deaths on Ash Wednesday, 23 46 died from injuries sustained immediately after the wind 24 change." Having regard to what we went through yesterday 25 with the impact of the wind change on fires at Coleraine 26 and Horsham, how was that put into your role in the IECC 27 in relation to the later fires?---I became particularly 28 progressively concerned about the wind change and the 29 acceleration of the wind change on the day. 30 No, my question was how did you put that into effect in 31 relation to your coordination of the subsequent

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2694 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 fires?---I sought to make it known into the areas and to 2 our fire service people the risks in respect of the wind 3 change and the information in respect to the wind change. 4 Why didn't you ensure that it went out in the urgent threat 5 messages and the like?---I sought to process messages out 6 through our people and through the general community 7 information about the wind change. 8 You referred yesterday to the report of Justice Stretton in the 9 1939 fires?---Yes. 10 Ash Wednesday, on the material that's been presented to the 11 Commission having higher forest fire danger indices than 12 the 1939 fire?---Recognising that a lot of that was back 13 engineered. 14 I just want to read a passage, and I will tender the report 15 after I have read it, from the introduction of Justice 16 Stretton: "The speed of the fires was appalling. They 17 leap from mountain peak to mountain peak or far out into 18 the lower country lighting forests six or seven miles in 19 advance of the main fires. Blown by wind of great force 20 they roared as they travelled. Balls of crackling fire 21 sped at a great pace and in advance of the fires consuming 22 with a roaring explosive noise all that they touched. 23 Houses of brick were seen and heard to leap into a roar of 24 flame before the fires had reached them. Some men of 25 science hold the view that the fires were generated and 26 were preceded by inflammable gases which became alight. 27 Great pieces of burning bark were carried by the wind to 28 set in raging flame regions not yet reached by the fires. 29 Such was the force of the wind that in many places 30 hundreds of trees of great size were blown clear of the 31 earth, tonnes of soil were embedded, masses of rock still

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2695 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 adhering to the roots. For mile upon mile the former 2 forest monarchs were laid in confusion, burnt, torn from 3 the earth and piled one upon another as matches strewn by 4 a giant hand." Mr Rees, the fires of 7 February were not 5 unprecedented, were they?---You could argue that case. 6 That's a written description of circumstances. I don't 7 dispute. I wasn't there. I don't think there are too many 8 people alive who were there. I think we could argue for a 9 very long time about the fires being unprecedented. 10 I certainly maintain that the conditions were 11 unprecedented. If you combine the fuel condition, if you 12 combine the population and the positioning of the 13 population in the State of Victoria that is quite 14 different, then the impact of these fires and the way 15 these fires are, we could use the language unprecedented. 16 I'm not prepared to argue one way or the other. I viewed 17 the conditions and everyone who talks to me who has been 18 around for a long while in their lifetime they are 19 unprecedented. 20 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: I think with respect, Mr Rees, one has to 21 make a distinction between the impact of the fires, 22 catastrophic though they were, from the fire behaviour 23 itself?---Yes, I suspect that's reasonable. I'm really 24 saying I don't know anyone who can describe the fuel 25 conditions like they were on this day as being the same 26 any other time. The drought period up to Ash Wednesday is 27 not the same as this. 28 How would you describe the fuel conditions on the day?---The 29 fuel conditions, for me the heatwave really damaged fuel 30 that would never ever have been in that environment like 31 it was. The Ash Wednesday drought in my memory and my

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2696 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 experience was a different sort of drought condition to 2 this drought condition, because it had profound impact on 3 the medium fuels in the forest and in the scrubby areas, 4 unlike the Ash Wednesday conditions. Yet fire behaviour 5 is really up at the top end on each of these three 6 occasions we are talking about anyway, and I think one of 7 the weaknesses we have got here is that we have a fire 8 danger index and descriptors that go to 100 and we are 9 playing around with something beyond there when there 10 really isn't a theoretical proof about whether one is 11 worse than the other. I take very much Mr Rush's words 12 out of Judge Stretton's comments. I have read those many 13 times and thought about them and tried to put them into 14 today's conditions. 15 MR RUSH: I want to take up one more minute out of my 15, but 16 I suggest Justice Stretton has described the fuel 17 conditions pretty well too. "The State of Victoria in the 18 month of January of the year 1939 came towards the end of 19 a long drought which had been aggravated by a severe hot, 20 dry summer season. The rich plains denied their 21 beneficent rains laid bare and baking, and the forests 22 from the foothills to the alpine heights were tinder, the 23 soft carpet of the forest floor was gone, the bone dry 24 litter cracked under foot, dry heat and hot dry winds 25 worked upon a land already dry to suck from it the last 26 least drop of moisture." Conditions again reminiscent of 27 what they were earlier this year?---Yes. 28 For all that's been said about the warnings and fire, what was 29 said, I suggest, on 6 February did not prepare people for 30 the sort of fire that could be anticipated on 31 7 February?---All I can say, Mr Rush, is we did our very,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2697 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 very best. 2 Mr Rees, the final matter I will go to, you will recall your 3 counsel took you to a booklet that was launched in the 4 Sunday Herald-Sun "Living with fire". It is in volume 17, 5 Commissioners, behind tab 5. You will recall it, I think, 6 Mr Rees. It is the one - - -?---Yes, I am familiar - - - 7 It is (WIT.005.001.2274). Have you got it in front of 8 you?---I now have, thank you. 9 You'll see it's "Living with fire" and underneath it "How to 10 save your home. This family did it, so can 11 you"?---I don't know what page you are on. 12 I'm on the front page, the page you have in your hand?---Okay, 13 yes. 14 If one examines this booklet, the aim of it and the direction 15 of it is towards people staying in their homes?---You are 16 asking me right immediately. I take your word for it. 17 I'm really saying it is about preparing your home and 18 regardless of it, whether you plan to leave or go, you 19 still must prepare your home. 20 MR RUSH: Commissioners, can I tender at this stage as 21 previously has been indicated, and this goes for much of 22 the material this morning, but it is the intention, with 23 the Commissioner's leave, that in the next block of 24 hearings to come back and examine each individual fire in 25 considerable detail, and that will also include matters 26 that relate to the Integrated Emergency Coordination 27 Centre. I indicated yesterday that the Commission had 28 summonsed a document which has that title "Review of the 29 Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre functionality". 30 Can I tender now that report. I think there are copies 31 that have been distributed to the parties. It is at

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2698 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 OESC - it is in volume 35 now behind tab 5. It is at 2 (OESC.001.001.0031). I desire to take Mr Rees - - - 3 CHAIRMAN: I tentatively put in that you were going to tender 4 the report of Judge Stretton. 5 MR RUSH: I do. 6 CHAIRMAN: As exhibit 81. So do you want this further report 7 as exhibit 82? 8 MR RUSH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. 9 #EXHIBIT 81 - Royal Commission Report of Judge Stretton. 10 #EXHIBIT 82 - Document entitled "Review of the Integrated 11 Emergency Coordination Centre (iECC) Functionality". 12 MR RUSH: I just want to go to one page of this report which is 13 at (OESC.001.001.0080)?---Can you tell me the page number, 14 Mr Rush. I have a copy. 15 It is page number 48?---Thank you. 16 From the debrief the authors of this report report, "An 17 overwhelming issue raised by personnel interviewed is the 18 need to clarify clearly what is meant as 'integrated'. 19 Most personnel acknowledged that the IECC is currently a 20 venue where DSE, Vic SES and CFA are permanently 21 'co-located' but not yet 'integrated'", and it goes on to 22 define "integration" and states as follows, "Personnel 23 involved in the set up of the centre expressed significant 24 concern about the ability to 'integrate'. Several DSE 25 staff either resigned or left the centre (stated due to 26 the stress of integrating with CFA whilst also 27 coordinating emergencies such as the Cranbourne gas leak) 28 during the start up stages of the IECC. One particular 29 resignation left the IECC Coordinator without back up 30 personnel who were sufficiently trained to manage the IECC 31 on a rotating roster basis during the bushfire emergency.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2699 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 CFA and DSE have rather different corporate cultures and 2 the 'stresses' of coordinating the emergency response have 3 'really highlighted' these differences potentially making 4 the task of achieving desired level of 'integration' 5 processes (or standard operating procedures for the IECC) 6 even harder." And it goes on. Does your evidence in 7 relation to the IECC properly reflect, Mr Rees, what 8 really was the level of so-called integration 9 there?---I think I indicated that this was our first 10 effort, this was a trial year of integration. It was 11 clear that some functions, and it is indicated in this 12 report, were in fact not at fully integrated but as 13 described - - - 14 I'm trying to shorten this, I asked you a direct question, you 15 have given that evidence. I just merely asked you does 16 the evidence you have given, do you say, fairly indicate 17 what really went on?---The evidence I have given or the 18 evidence presented here? 19 The evidence you have given?---Yes, I believe it does, Mr Rush. 20 I did indicate that we were integrated together as much as 21 possible and there were separate activities undertaken 22 because of the nature of it. 23 MR RUSH: Commissioners, there are a great many other matters 24 that will be taken up arising out of this report, but at a 25 later time. I, like my learned friend, would probably 26 like to stay on, but it will be the subject of 27 submissions, anything further the counsel assisting have 28 to say. Sir, can I tender the Schauble report. 29 I neglected to do that on Tuesday, which is at 30 (SUMM.022.002.0297) entitled "Review of effectiveness of 31 information flow to communities and media during fire

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2700 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 incidents". 2 CHAIRMAN: Yes, that will be exhibit 83. 3 #EXHIBIT 83 - Schauble report, entitled "Review of 4 effectiveness of information flow to communities and media 5 during fire incidents". (SUMM.022.002.0297). 6 MR RUSH: Sir, I ask that Mr Rees be excused. 7 CHAIRMAN: For the time being? 8 MR RUSH: For the time being. 9 CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Rees. 10 MR CLELLAND: Just before we leave the topic, by way of 11 balance, can I also refer the Commission to page 3 of the 12 report latterly referred to by Mr Rush. 13 CHAIRMAN: That's the SKM report? 14 MR CLELLAND: The executive summary at page 3 "Overwhelmingly 15 all personnel interviewed stated that the response to the 16 emergencies would have been significantly constrained had 17 the IECC not been available. No personnel interviewed 18 indicated a desire to return to neither the old model of 19 individual emergency coordination centres, nor the need to 20 develop a greenfield, stand alone, all hazards, incidents, 21 all agencies coordination centre as outlined in the 2006 22 feasibility study into a proposed state emergency 23 operation centre", and in our submission, that was the 24 thrust of Mr Rees's evidence, if the Commission pleases. 25 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you, Mr Clelland. Thank you, Mr Rees. 26 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 27 MS NICHOLS: Commissioners, the next witness is Naomi Brown 28 from AFAC. As I indicated, the intention is to call 29 Ms Brown very briefly to explain some formal matters, to 30 have her stood down so that Mr Gledhill's evidence can be 31 heard, and then to recall her at the conclusion of the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2701 REES RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 AFAC witnesses. 2 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you, Ms Nichols. 3

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2702 BROWN XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 bodies?---That's right. 2 Is there a list of those members attached to your 3 statement?---Yes, there is. 4 Briefly, Ms Brown, what's the governance structure of 5 AFAC?---There is what is essentially a board, which is 6 called the committee of management, which has seven 7 directors who are elected from the body of the chiefs of 8 all of the agencies. They have the same responsibilities 9 through ASIC that any company director would have. There 10 is also a council. The council comprises either the 11 Commissioners, the CEOs of all of the member agencies. 12 That meets twice a year, and the committee of management 13 meets every second month. We have a President, Treasurer 14 and Vice-President. 15 What is the function of the council?---The function of the 16 council - originally there was only a council, and that 17 really had the overall governance function. It really 18 became too big and hence the committee of management was 19 formed a few years ago. The council, though, because it 20 has all representation really takes the role of approving 21 I guess major matters from AFAC, including when new 22 positions are formed. 23 What is the relationship between AFAC and the Bushfire 24 Cooperative Research Centre in a formal 25 sense?---Historically it was the AFAC council who really 26 decided that they needed a research arm, and so was 27 successful in gaining the funding for that. The Bushfire 28 CRC is a company in its own right and I as the CEO sit on 29 the board of the Bushfire CRC. So that is really the 30 formal connection between the two. 31 By and large does AFAC carry out - does CRC, rather, carry out

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2703 BROWN XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 research which AFAC, in ways which you will shortly 2 describe, implement that research into developing 3 positions for agencies to further implement into 4 policies?---That's part of the use of the research. But, 5 yes, we certainly do use the research for that, yes. 6 Ms Brown, you say at paragraph 19 of your statement that "the 7 purpose of AFAC is for its members to share information 8 and resources to enable efficiencies and learnings and to 9 collaborate on issues where a collective effort will 10 achieve a better outcome." Is one major aspect of that 11 assisting its members to where possible develop collective 12 positions on key matters to do with relevantly fire 13 safety?---Yes, it is. 14 How are those collective positions developed?---We have a 15 structure of - it is like a committee structure which we 16 actually call groups which is their functional sort of 17 areas. So there are groups that deal with operational 18 matters, with occupational health and safety, and there's 19 one group, for instance, whose primary focus is community 20 safety. So in this particular instance we are talking 21 about here, the group comprises the most senior people 22 from all of the member agencies who actually need to 23 undertake that function, not every member undertakes every 24 function, if you understand what I mean. So what happens 25 is when there is a need for a new position it will either 26 be I guess alerted by a single member agency, there will 27 be an event that happens that needs a response, but in 28 some way there is a decision that we need to do something 29 collectively. That group will I guess bring together 30 their collective expertise, they will collect the 31 research. We have a number of managers within the AFAC

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2704 BROWN XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 office who are experienced practitioners from the 2 industry. They really coordinate and manage this process. 3 It gets to the point where a discussion paper is drawn up. 4 Then there is a period of consultation which often takes a 5 long time. That's because it is a big country and people 6 are often hard to get hold of. So there is an extensive 7 consultation process which may take years, depending on 8 what the issue is. It will eventually go to council for 9 endorsement. If it is endorsed there, it will become an 10 AFAC position. 11 Is it required for an endorsed position that there be unanimity 12 amongst AFAC's members?---There never has been a position 13 where there hasn't been unanimity. That sort of concept 14 hasn't really been tested. So I don't believe that 15 anything would actually become an AFAC position if there 16 was strong opposition to it. There are certainly some 17 members who may have less of an interest in a particular 18 position and so be maybe quite neutral on the matter. But 19 if there was still disagreement I don't believe that we 20 would end up having a position. 21 Are each of AFAC's positions national or are any of them state 22 based?---No, AFAC really only works at a national level. 23 So if we have a position it is national or international 24 with New Zealand. 25 You distinguish in your statement between positions and policy. 26 What's the difference between the two?---AFAC as a body, 27 is, as you have already said, is a not for profit company. 28 It has no legislative power. It is not a government 29 agency. Therefore AFAC doesn't have any power to develop 30 national policy or in particular any policy that would 31 bind any other state, and particularly the government of

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2705 BROWN XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 that state. So collectively the members come together 2 with a position. They will then take it into their state 3 or territory or agency and adopt it. It may become policy 4 for a state at that point. 5 Is one of the implications that the application of the position 6 and its embodiment in policy within states can therefore 7 differ?---The implementation is a matter for the different 8 states and the individual agencies. AFAC has never tried 9 to, nor would it have any success, I would expect, in 10 telling people how to implement things. So there may be 11 variations in the implementation. 12 You indicate that AFAC positions are intended to be for the 13 agencies and not for the public. How does that division 14 work itself out in practice?---Probably until recently it 15 hasn't really been an issue. The positions are written 16 really for senior people within the member agencies. So 17 there is an understanding or an expectation I guess that 18 there is an understanding of sometimes quite complex 19 concepts that are in them. They are not spelt out to a 20 degree that you would expect literature for the community 21 to be spelt out in. So it is really the industry I guess 22 having a conversation with itself, and then it gets picked 23 up and reinterpreted and translated for whatever purposes 24 the agencies need them for. 25 Can I just ask you briefly about the process of consultation 26 that has occurred since the 2009 fires. Was there a 27 process of review that culminated in a conference in 28 November 2008?---Yes. That came about because, and this 29 was particularly in relation to prepare, stay and defend 30 or leave early position, that from the 2005 position 31 through the work of the Bushfire CRC there were a number

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2706 BROWN XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 of research projects going on which were designed to, 2 I guess, give us more information but particularly to 3 validate what's in that position. By 2008 a lot of that 4 work had been completed. So in 2008, in November, there 5 was a workshop which comprised the researchers from the 6 projects plus practitioners from the agencies who came 7 together. It was essentially a knowledge transfer 8 activity from the CRC to the industry so that the findings 9 could be presented, discussed, and that was the beginning 10 of a new conversation about prepare, stay and defend or 11 leave early. 12 Mr Gledhill will address that policy substantively, but just in 13 terms of the process with the leave early, or prepare, 14 stay and defend policy, has there been the creation of 15 four draft discussion papers namely on 9 April, 17 April, 16 29 April and 19 May?---That's correct. 17 So the current draft discussion paper is the one that's 18 attached to Mr Gledhill's statement?---So I understand, 19 yes. 20 Can you just describe briefly the difference between a 21 discussion paper and a position?---Yes, a position is 22 designed to be a pretty pithy sort of document that 23 I would describe as the essence of the discussion and the 24 decisions about how to actually articulate a position that 25 we would have on a certain matter. What we try to do 26 obviously is to have the underpinning evidence and 27 discussion which will lead into that position so that at a 28 later time if you read the position you can go back and 29 see what was the discussion that led to that. So the work 30 that has been going on since November has - I guess you 31 can see, there have been four discussion papers and

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2707 BROWN XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 I think there will be quite a few more, although there 2 probably won't be any more on that until we have some 3 recommendations out of here. But the actual review of any 4 new position, and the position itself is actually called 5 bushfires and community safety, when there is a new 6 revised position it may, for instance, be in 2010, it may 7 not capture everything that's in that discussion paper 8 now. I would say there is a long way to go. 9 As at 7 February the current position was encapsulated in the 10 2005 document; is that right?---That's correct, yes. 11 Finally, under the umbrella of bushfires and community safety, 12 since 7 February have there been created draft discussion 13 papers on warnings?---Yes. 14 Which Ms Edwards will speak about?---That's correct. 15 Bunkers or domestic fire shelters?---Yes. 16 And I believe that's attached to Mr Gledhill's statement. And 17 habitable buildings in bushfire prone areas?---Yes, that 18 one is in very early stages. 19 MS NICHOLS: Thank you. Might Ms Brown be excused for the time 20 being? 21 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 22 MS McLEOD: I just want to make it clear that we are interested 23 in due course in pursuing questions with Ms Brown and 24 other AFAC witnesses, particularly concerning public 25 statements concerning the relevant Australian standards. 26 We understand the Commission is going to be more concerned 27 with those things in the next block of hearings, and so we 28 are quite happy to defer our questions for this time. 29 I just want to reserve our position. 30 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 31 MS McLEOD: Given what has just come from the witness, can

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2708 BROWN XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 I ask that we be provided in the meanwhile with any 2 position paper or discussion paper concerning the 3 amendment of Standard AS 3959. 4 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 5 MS McLEOD: If the Commission pleases. 6 MS NICHOLS: Just to be clear, there is also a request from the 7 state to cross-examine Ms Brown. That in my submission 8 ought to be dealt with when she returns tomorrow. 9 CHAIRMAN: Yes. I understand by the way it has been suggested 10 that the matter proceed, that Ms Brown understands too 11 that we are deferring her rather than excusing her. Thank 12 you. 13 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 14 MR RUSH: Commissioners, I call Mr John Gledhill. 15 Tasmania?---I joined in 1974 in a permanent capacity. 21 Previous to that I had worked casually, summer holiday 22 job. 23 Over the course of time and experience, you have had experience 24 as a bushfire - in the bush firefighter as well as 25 fighting fires in urban areas?---Yes, I commenced 26 grassroots bushfire fighting and progressed through a 27 whole range of firefighting activities into urban areas as 28 well as country. 29 You indicate in your statement that when you commenced bushfire 30 firefighting you had the benefit of on-the-job training 31 from very experienced bushmen. How did that assist? What

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2709 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 does it give you?---I guess it was the old fashioned way, 2 fighting fires without the benefits of modern technology, 3 hand tools and a lot of sweat and tears. 4 I think you were a member of the Rural Fire Brigade at that 5 time and then there was an amalgamation with the State 6 Fire Authority in 1979. Can you indicate, firstly, what 7 amalgamated, what were the two entities and what has been 8 produced?---The Rural Fire Brigades were formed under a 9 board structure, or a board was responsible for the rural 10 areas of the state, and the urban areas of the state had 11 their own brigades under various fire boards, culminating 12 in I guess being brought under the umbrella of the State 13 Fire Authority. It was the will of the government in the 14 late '70s to bring all that together under one authority, 15 and that became the Tasmanian Fire Service in 1979. 16 So as the chief fire officer are you responsible for all forms 17 of firefighting in Tasmania?---I am. 18 Within the firefighting service you have career firefighters 19 and volunteer firefighters in effect under your 20 command?---Yes, I do. 21 Just in relation to numbers, I think you identify 450 staff, of 22 which 300 are career firefighters, and then another 4,600 23 volunteer firefighters with 235 volunteer 24 brigades?---That's correct. 25 There are four full-time brigades, I take it established in the 26 main residential or cities or towns of Tasmania?---That's 27 true, yes. 28 How does that work in the sense of bringing together the urban 29 and the rural, the firefighters?---Well, perhaps a little 30 different to many other places in Australia, our urban 31 firefighters, or the full-time firefighters, are trained

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2710 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 in all forms of firefighting, and are as able in the bush, 2 in a bushfire situation as they are in a building fire. 3 That pretty well extends across the state. Volunteers 4 where they have urban risks are trained in urban 5 firefighting, and also have a capability and experience to 6 be able to deal with bushfires as well. 7 As far as equipment is concerned between the urban and the 8 rural, is the equipment capable of being used in each type 9 of firefighting?---We have equipment that's specifically 10 urban, for specific urban risks, but there is a fair 11 amount of equipment that is multi-purpose, that can be 12 used in either situation. 13 Mr Gledhill, you are here I think in your role as a director of 14 the Australian Fire Authorities Council providing a 15 statement to the Royal Commission. If I can just take you 16 to that. It was a statement that was prepared on 28 May 17 2009 which has in all nine attachments, is that 18 correct?---That's correct. 19 And the contents are true and correct?---They are. 20 MR RUSH: I tender that statement, Commissioners. 21 CHAIRMAN: Yes, that will be exhibit 85. 22 #EXHIBIT 85 - Witness statement of John Bryan Gledhill dated 23 28/11/2009. 24 MR RUSH: Mr Gledhill, your statement points firstly to 25 considerable research, backing or supporting the 26 proposition that the majority of bushfire deaths in 27 Australia, certainly up until 7 February 2009, have been 28 caused as a consequence of people leaving at the last 29 minute?---The majority have been found to be in that 30 circumstance, yes. 31 That has been the basis for the adoption by the Australian Fire

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2711 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Authorities Council of the stay, defend or go early 2 principle?---It was certainly one of the main drivers. 3 If I could ask you to turn to paragraph 15 of your statement, 4 you there refer to, in the third line, an investigation 5 into the 1967 Tasmanian fires which resulted in 62 deaths 6 and the loss of 1300 homes, and that the investigation 7 indicated that about half the people who died whilst 8 escaping their homes would have survived had they 9 remained; their houses were untouched?---That was 10 certainly an observation made by the report into those 11 fires. 12 What sort of numbers are we talking about there, of the 62; was 13 it half the 62 or half of a lesser number and if you can't 14 remember I understand?---I believe it is closer to half, 15 but I haven't got the precise figure. 16 You then refer to the Krusel and Petris paper of 1992 examining 17 the Ash Wednesday fire and also point to that as a paper 18 that backed the last death being associated with last 19 minute evacuation?---That did again say things very 20 similar to what had been found in the 1967 Tasmanian 21 fires. 22 In essence, without going through each and every paper, what 23 you are pointing to is the body of research that existed 24 or exists indicating the danger of last minute 25 evacuation?---Yes, there was a very consistent theme that 26 people put themselves in a great deal - under a great deal 27 of risk in a bushfire situation trying to flee at the last 28 minute. 29 If I can just - I don't think you have it with you, but I think 30 we can bring it up, the Krusel and Petris paper at 31 (TEN.001.001.0110), and ask that we go to 0018. I think

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2712 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 we have the wrong paper. If I can just read to you just 2 one paragraph of it: "Of the 13 victims who had 3 sufficient time to save their lives only one died inside 4 his house. The death illustrates the fact that simply 5 staying inside a house will not guarantee survival. The 6 house survival literature recommends a number of house 7 protection strategies to enhance the likelihood of house 8 surviving a fire, but there is no simple recipe or 9 strategy to guarantee survival." I just wonder in relation 10 to what we sometimes hear of people save houses, houses 11 save people, in the context of where we were here and 12 where we are now, where does that mantra lie?---The first 13 thing I will say is everything that is included in the 14 position on prepare, stay and defend has to focus on 15 prepare. Preparing the house is a fundamental and 16 critical activity. Prepared houses provide an increased 17 level of protection. I don't believe that ever it has 18 been suggested that it is totally fail safe. 19 In that context do you see it as important to identify the 20 potential risks of staying in a house, even a defensible 21 house, or what might be thought to be a defensible 22 house?---People are encouraged to consider all the risks 23 that they face in their specific location. Most agencies, 24 if not all agencies, provide information to assist people 25 in assessing their risks. 26 I will come to it later, but has the Tasmanian Fire Service 27 prepared a DVD that attempts to highlight and concentrate 28 on fire itself and what's involved in fighting a fire from 29 a home?---It has attempted to do that in a DVD, yes. 30 Was there any specific highlight in the DVD that you were 31 trying to educate or communicate in relation to fire?---It

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2713 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 is quite a complex range of issues that are integrated. 2 The DVD attempts to spell out the risks and what 3 preparatory measures need to be taken, whether 4 people - whatever course of action people choose to take, 5 and it emphasises the need for people to make an informed 6 choice and have a plan. 7 In relation to choice, plan and a decision to leave, and if we 8 can just go over the page in this article to the top of 9 the page at 0019 the authors say this: "12 of the Ash 10 Wednesday civilian deaths occurred because the victims did 11 not appear to recognise the real threat to their safety in 12 time to implement an effective survival strategy. This 13 lack of warning was also identified in a survey of 14 residents of Upper Beaconsfield after the Ash Wednesday 15 fires. The survey found respondents had little or no 16 warning or information about where the fire was, the rate 17 at which it was moving and the predicted wind change." 18 From the AFAC perspective, what sort of importance is put 19 on providing information about fire, where the fire is, 20 the rate of spread and the way it is moving, the 21 prediction in relation to where it is moving and in 22 relation to wind change?---The position identifies that 23 agencies should attempt to provide that information. That 24 would be best practice, and I guess it is silent on it, 25 but the difficulties of doing that depend on the situation 26 at hand. 27 You refer in your statement to the Tasmanian Fire Service's 28 stay, defend, go policy, and you have provided us with two 29 documents, the first is, Commissioners, behind attachment 30 3, which I think was produced January 1998 by the 31 Tasmanian Fire Service?---That's correct.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2714 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 If we can just have a quick look, what this was, I take it, the 2 policy and its distribution was where?---It was to 3 essentially both police and fire people. It was produced 4 in 1998 as I guess an internal interdepartmental protocol 5 on how things should be, and it was informed by the 6 current at the time AFAC position. 7 Mr Gledhill, it is signed by yourself, but also the 8 Commissioner of Tasmanian Police, because I take it there 9 is seen to be a joint role during a time of fire crisis 10 between the fire service and the police in relation to 11 management of people and community and the like associated 12 with the fire?---That's certainly true, and this was a way 13 of more formalising arrangements and demonstrating that 14 agreement I guess within each agency. But having a 15 partnership between police and fire on those extreme fire 16 event occasions is, in my view, critically important and 17 we needed to make it very clear where roles started and 18 stopped and how we would integrate and cooperate together. 19 Reading this, there is a role for police in the potential 20 relocation of people where a fire threatens. Can you give 21 us some idea of how that works and how it jointly works 22 with the firefighting authority?---The decision to get 23 people to move, relocate, evacuate, whatever the word you 24 choose to use, really rests with the fire officer, senior 25 fire officer present, but the actual instigating and 26 implementing that direction would be a matter for the 27 police to deal with. Under the Fire Service Act in 28 Tasmania police have powers of evacuation and not fire 29 officers. So this was a way of making the legislation 30 work in a practical sense. 31 Perhaps if we concentrate on the latter policy, which is behind

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2715 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 tab 4 from September 2007, this again is a similar type of 2 document, but making some subtle changes to the overall 3 policy?---Yes, the policy or the position was reviewed and 4 essentially updated, particularly in line with the current 5 AFAC position and the experience we had had in the 6 intervening eight or nine years. 7 Now, if one looks - this is at 0049 behind your statement - at 8 the first two paragraphs of that position paper, or paper, 9 the first paragraph deals with properties that are 10 adequately prepared, able bodied people able to stay and 11 defend; and the second deals with where properties are not 12 adequately prepared for a bushfire, residents should be 13 encouraged to relocate to a safe area. How is that 14 decision between what is adequately prepared and what is 15 not adequately prepared, what is the decision based on and 16 how are people advised of it?---Our recent experience is 17 that we undertake an activity called triage, if time 18 permits, and that is where there is sufficient warning of 19 a fire - to threaten an area and we have actually done 20 that, and that is where properties are classified by fire 21 brigade personnel as defendable, undefendable or 22 defendable with fire brigade assistance. They are marked 23 as such. People who are in undefendable properties are 24 told that they should relocate, and in fact we have gone 25 to the extent of taping off and advising that we wouldn't 26 be providing fire protection to those properties, and 27 that's actually been implemented and undertaken. 28 In relation to the decision making about an adequately prepared 29 property or a not adequately prepared property, when are 30 people advised of that opinion?---As soon as we realise 31 that they are in a threatening position, once we have had

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2716 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 logistically the time to undertake an assessment, and if 2 it is a large area quite clearly that can take a long 3 time, and it is very much dependent on lead times and 4 knowledge of the fire in the first place, but for a sudden 5 impact fire quite clearly there wouldn't be time and it 6 couldn't be undertaken. 7 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Can I just seek a clarification? In 8 relation to the assessment of properties as being 9 undefendable, is that taken by accredited experts in the 10 area or is it a judgment? I'm also interested to know is 11 it taken close to the likelihood of a major fire event or 12 well in advance?---What I was talking about then was very 13 close to the time of impact that would be undertaken. It 14 would be undertaken by fire brigade personnel who were 15 deemed to be appropriately qualified. Now, we know we 16 don't have an accreditation system. I think that is 17 somewhere where we need to go. This triage is a 18 relatively new concept for us. I think it is something 19 that we will be doing more of in the future and 20 accreditation no doubt will need to follow. I am aware of 21 some brigades who actually - volunteer brigades who have 22 assessed their area of responsibility and have gone 23 through that process, discussed with people living in the 24 area as to their circumstances but it has never been 25 formalised. 26 In relation to the defendable nature of a property, could you 27 have a house superbly prepared, but in close proximity to 28 a forest or a plantation and therefore be deemed to be 29 undefendable?---Yes. 30 MR RUSH: If it is decided that the property is not adequately 31 prepared, how do you go about relocating or evacuating

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2717 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 people from the unprepared property?---They would be 2 advised that they should leave and that their property is 3 undefendable, but the choice still remains with them. 4 I think I can conceive of situations where it would 5 be - the risk was so high that it may actually be - an 6 evacuation of the property may be ordered. That would be 7 an unusual circumstance. Wherever possible we try and 8 leave that choice to the householder themselves. 9 Have you ever had a forcible removal?---I believe police have 10 undertaken that on isolated occasions, but it is not a 11 common practice. To do it at any scale is logistically 12 not possible. 13 In relation to the sort of relocation, evacuation that may 14 occur, is that in considerable numbers or is it more 15 isolated than that?---Not normally. I mean, the 16 circumstances I have described, it would be small numbers, 17 not en masse. I guess I can conceive of situations where 18 there may need to be a fairly large movement of people out 19 of an area of risk. 20 You refer in paragraph 1, in the second paragraph under 21 "Number": "The householder considering relocating family 22 members not able to cope, particularly if a high intensity 23 bushfire threatens, anyone leaving do so well in advance 24 of the fire." Do you distinguish between fire and high 25 intensity fire and what do you mean by that?---I guess 26 bushfire comes in a range of severities, and February 9th 27 in Victoria was at one extreme end, but quite clearly 28 there was a continuum from very low intensity fires right 29 through to that extreme event. At the lower end of the 30 scale it is going to be less risky for people than at the 31 higher end quite clearly, but defining those differences

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2718 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 is very, very difficult. 2 So is there advice offered to people by way of warning or 3 communication on any particular day if the fire is 4 considered to be of particularly high intensity?---We 5 would try and encapsulate that in a warning which 6 specifically - or gave that specific information. 7 Can you give us some idea of the sort of information that would 8 be encapsulated in the warning for the sort of day that's 9 featured in paragraph 1?---Off-hand I guess I haven't 10 got - we haven't got a warning that would clearly describe 11 that event. It would probably be made specific to the 12 location explaining that - the direction from which the 13 fire would come, the fact that it maybe very severe, large 14 flame heights and fast moving with spotting. That sort of 15 information may well be provided. At the other end where 16 a fire was not behaving in a severe way, people would be 17 told that there is a fire and that they should be prepared 18 to deal with the fire. It is site and circumstance 19 specific, the warning would be given. 20 Going back to the issue of evacuation, it is one that's taken 21 up in the position paper of 19 May 2009 by the Australian 22 Fire Authorities Council. If we can have 23 (WIT.025.002.0128). It is a discussion paper I am 24 reminded. For some reason this has been reproduced on the 25 system missing two pages, Commissioner. Unfortunately the 26 one I want to go to is missing, being 0128. I think it 27 might be 0129 on the Commissioners' copies. I wonder if 28 we could have that brought up: do you have a copy in front 29 of you? We are looking at the same page. It is after a 30 discussion in relation to mass evacuation where it is 31 said, "It is not the favoured option", and then over the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2719 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 page this is said, "Notwithstanding, it is recognised that 2 there are occasions where selective early relocation of 3 people is appropriate. This may include periods of very 4 high or extreme fire danger. Any such relocation should 5 be planned for and carried out well ahead of the fire. 6 Planned and orderly relocation well ahead of the fire is 7 always preferable to last minute emergency evacuation. 8 There may be other cases where evacuation will be 9 considered by fire authorities in the interests of public 10 safety. The lead fire combat authority is the best place 11 to decide an evacuation should be ordered." The sort of 12 occasions where it is said "selective early relocation of 13 people is appropriate", what are the sort of occasions 14 that are envisaged as you understand it there, 15 Mr Gledhill?---I guess I can give an example from 16 Tasmania, and it is probably a reasonably well known one 17 I expect. Cradle Mountain is a small tourist village, 18 very isolated, essentially made up of tourist 19 accommodation, tourist resorts surrounded by very dense 20 forest, virtually wilderness area and very few people 21 there with a pecuniary interest in property. Typically 22 they would be travellers, tourists, and on very rare 23 occasions because it is normally a very wet forest that 24 area, if fire should threaten with sufficient warning our 25 plans would require the resorts to be closed, 26 accommodation to be vacated, people to be removed from the 27 area. 28 Is that because of the nature of what exists in and around the 29 - I take it it is a resort, not that I have been there, 30 Cradle Mountain, and its lack of defensibility?---Yes, 31 most of the properties there don't have huge amounts of

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2720 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 defendable space. They are very much located in the 2 middle of quite tall, dense forest. Any fire that 3 occurred in that forest under extreme conditions would not 4 be - would just be totally inappropriate for people 5 travelling, the travelling public, tourists, to be in that 6 area if we could possibly avoid it. So in a case like 7 that it is a matter of avoiding the risk and removing 8 people from risk. 9 How are people removed? What is done?---I don't think we have 10 ever done it. We haven't had to do it. We have certainly 11 thought about it I think on one occasion recently. But 12 the resort owners would be advised to close their 13 accommodation and advise guests to go somewhere else. 14 Now, I'm not quite sure how that - what the local plans 15 include, but there is a plan that does cover those 16 contingencies. 17 And I take it what is being directed at in the discussion paper 18 here is that this ought to be looked at in areas where 19 there is that particularly high risk of not being able to 20 defend property because of the circumstances and 21 conditions around the property?---Yes, I don't say that's 22 the only scenario, but it's one that occurs in a number of 23 places in my state, and I can well imagine there are quite 24 a few places around the country where that sort of 25 situation would prevail, but it is not exclusively related 26 to tourist accommodation in wilderness areas. 27 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Mr Rush, can I put an alternate scenario. 28 The Hobart '67 fires where much of the death was with the 29 elderly, would that be another scenario, if it re-emerged, 30 that you might consider even a selective 31 evacuation?---I think we would certainly be suggesting

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2721 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 that. That's very much part of the AFAC position paper, 2 that people who are the elderly, the infirmed, the young, 3 would be advised to not be there, to relocate ahead of the 4 risk arriving. Of course that's not always possible. 5 Given that the fire services can't be expected to know the 6 residents of all homes, what strategies do you have in 7 place for - I take it the policy is basically the very 8 young, the very old and the incapacitated. So how is that 9 communicated to householders?---Our education programs 10 cover that area by trying to get a discussion going with 11 people to consider those issues and ensure that they have 12 preplanned for an event like that. It has to be done on 13 an individual by individual basis. I don't believe that 14 any authority could have a database or be expected to take 15 that responsibility. Very much at the heart of the 16 position is it is about a personal responsibility, perhaps 17 more a shared responsibility, but a responsibility that 18 individuals need to accept themselves. 19 Is there a role for municipalities?---I think local government 20 has a role. I think all aspects of the community. We try 21 with our education to encompass and embrace the idea of 22 partnerships and having - coming at the issue from a whole 23 range of different areas, rather than having one authority 24 responsible, I think we would try and encourage a broader 25 view of the issue and get support from wherever we can get 26 it. 27 MR RUSH: Mr Gledhill, at paragraph 23 of your statement you 28 refer to a fire which hit Hobart, or was in Hobart quite 29 recently and threatened properties, but seven were lost, 30 six undefended, and importantly there was no loss of life. 31 You go on to say that the Tasmanian Fire Service has

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2722 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 engaged a researcher. In pointing to the property and no 2 loss of life, was there anything in particular about the 3 management of that fire that led to that situation that 4 you wanted to enlarge upon?---It was the first occasion, 5 and in fact this occurred I think four days after the 6 signing of the police fire protocol, and my direction to 7 police was that we should where possible, where people 8 were safe, encourage people in helping us save their 9 properties, and that essentially happened, and I believe 10 that was one of the reasons for the low loss of property. 11 The purpose in engaging Wendy Saunders, as you refer to in the 12 paragraph, what was the purpose of her review?---This was 13 the first time that we had really encouraged people to 14 stay and defend their property on a large scale, 15 particularly during a fairly significant fire. We wanted 16 feedback to find out what the community reaction was to 17 ensure that we were sort of going in the right direction. 18 Anecdotally we had very good feedback, but we wanted a 19 more objective assessment of how it had gone. 20 What was the nature of the fire? Was it an urban sort of a fire 21 or was it rural fire? You have been in the hearing room 22 I know, and we have had questions about Coleraine and 23 Horsham, and then gone to the sort of more forest fire of 24 East Kilmore. What was the nature of this fire?---For 25 people that know Hobart, it is surrounded on all sides 26 pretty much by quite dense forest. The fire, this 27 particular fire had originated in a forested area in the 28 foothills of Mount Wellington and had moved very rapidly 29 under quite severe weather conditions into the urban 30 fringe edge, particularly along some ridge lines and down 31 into gullies, which is typical of the urban fringe in

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2723 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Hobart. 2 In that scenario was there time to go about what we have 3 referred to, people going about and saying, not well 4 prepared enough, prepared?---No, the fire had been burning 5 for a number of days and was thought to have been under 6 control, and in the middle afternoon it escaped and took 7 off and very, very rapidly spread through spotting. The 8 fire was leapfrogging ahead of itself creating new fires. 9 There was very little time for giving significant warning 10 for people to relocate. For many people in areas that 11 were serviced by narrow winding roads it would have been 12 extremely dangerous. There was a range of situations. 13 Some people were in the middle of the bush on their own. 14 Others were right on the urban fringe, and it affected the 15 full range, but there was little time. It was a matter of 16 hours rather than - certainly not days. 17 If I can very briefly refer to the report that was made by 18 Ms Saunders, and I just want to go really to the 19 conclusion, which is at 0063 of your witness statement. 20 Perhaps if we have a look at it while it is coming up, 21 this was a paper or a researcher that was asked to 22 specifically look at the communications in relation to 23 what had gone on during the course of the fire, the way it 24 impacted on the community?---Yes. 25 She states: "With respect to the effectiveness of 26 communication, information broadcast by electronic media 27 (television and radio) had a high level of penetration in 28 the communities and was generally rated as quite useful. 29 Fire service pamphlets and advice from local service 30 volunteers, emergency service hotlines had a lower 31 penetration level, but gauged as extremely useful by a

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2724 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 greater percentage of residents. The overwhelming request 2 by residents was for more specific up to date, accurate 3 and local information on the progress, location and 4 severity of the fires. Another concern raised by many 5 residents was for improved communication coordination 6 between emergency services regarding advice given to 7 residents, particularly with respect to evacuation." So 8 I take it that evacuation was still on the agenda and 9 still being considered, but people were waiting or 10 dependent on some form of advice in relation to 11 it?---That's true. In fact it was fairly vague in those 12 days as to under what circumstances evacuation should 13 occur. In fact that vagueness really led to, it was one 14 of the drivers to get an agreement between police and fire 15 as to how things should be. But this was over 10 years 16 ago and it was at the very beginnings of adopting the 17 prepare, stay and defend or leave early position. 18 In relation to what it was like then and what it's like now, 19 how is that - your word "vagueness" been put into a more 20 practical or realistic type of advice to the 21 community?---I think we have come a long way in 10 years. 22 We still have a long way to go. There are many 23 challenges. But certainly disseminating and communicating 24 information is easier now, and very fortunately the 25 worldwide web came along and enabled simultaneous 26 communication to a range of people, media, people in the 27 community. We have used that very heavily and we rely on 28 our website very heavily to transmit up to date 29 information about what's occurring, not just for the 30 householder, but particularly for the media so that the 31 media can more broadly pass the message on.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2725 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Can I ask you in relation to the website that's run by 2 Tasmanian Fire Services, is there a website for the 3 community and a different website for firefighters or is 4 it combined? What is the position?---No, we have a single, 5 and we have had the philosophy of a single website that 6 provides information both internally and externally. We 7 take a view that the community needs the information that 8 we have as much as we need it to help them make informed 9 decisions. 10 So the sort of information as to what's happening with your 11 resources, tankers, personnel, firefighters goes to the 12 brigades as it goes to someone that is coming in on the 13 web?---Look, I guess we try to provide a summary on the 14 web and we try to take the jargon out of it also because 15 we know that that is an issue we have to be very careful 16 in our communication to make it clear to all, but it 17 relies as always on intelligence and intelligence is a 18 problematic area. It is an area of great challenge to 19 gather that real-time information, manipulate it enough to 20 take the jargon out of it and capture it succinctly for 21 ready comprehension on a website, and all that has to 22 happen very quickly. The theory is quite sound, but the 23 practice is as I said problematic. 24 Why has Tasmania concentrated so heavily, it would seem, on the 25 website?---I must say personally I have been a great 26 advocate and supporter, because of the need for 27 simultaneous dissemination to a range of people, and from 28 my experience on those extreme fire event days there is a 29 huge requirement from a range of sources for the same 30 information pretty much at the same time. The website 31 technology now allows that simultaneous access. So it

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2726 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 just seems like the logical place to go. 2 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Mr Rush, can I seek another 3 clarification. In relation to the information that is put 4 on the web, is it at the level of the ICC?---Yes and no. 5 It is informed by our incident control centres. The 6 website is put together, is maintained and updated 7 centrally in our incident coordination centre in Hobart. 8 It relies on being fed from incident management teams for 9 various fires that are occurring. Because of that 10 reliance, we are very much at the mercy of the 11 information. If the information doesn't come, it doesn't 12 go on the website. It is quite simple. As I say, it is 13 still a challenge because at the local level the demand 14 for information is always very high, but there is still 15 I guess a bit of a reluctance to pass it on at times. It 16 doesn't always flow up as quickly as it should. 17 Just to further clarify, does that mean that in effect there is 18 a two stage process, that the incident controller needs to 19 authorise it from the information officer at the local 20 level, and then someone at the state control centre 21 authorises it to go on the web?---The information officer 22 as an IMT would get the necessary sign off, I guess, to 23 send it off. But in practice it just needs to continually 24 flow forward. In practice it doesn't always do that, but 25 it needs to, to a central point where it can be distilled 26 down sufficiently to be able to put it on a website to be 27 meaningful for people who are at risk. 28 Just a further clarification: is this the same as the 29 Western Australian web service where you can have a single 30 data input, or once it comes to the central coordination 31 do you then have to up load it on to a website?---Yes, we

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2727 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 have to up load it. We try and get it in a format that we 2 can virtually cut and paste electronically into the 3 website. This is all fairly new organisationally and we 4 are still struggling with it. We don't have very 5 fortunately too many of those critical days, so we don't 6 get real-time practice too often, fortunately. But it is 7 going to remain a challenge for some time to polish that 8 process to get it to working more seamlessly than it 9 currently does. 10 Just finally, can you see any potential or benefit in having 11 the availability of a system that enables the input of 12 data at the local level to be instantaneously available or 13 would you always want to retain some capacity to authorise 14 it?---No, I think ideally where we need to go is to local 15 input. We have to try to circumvent the time issues that 16 are involved. Things happen and unfold so quickly that it 17 defies the abilities of technology really to keep pace 18 with what is actually happening. The less links in the 19 chain, the faster and hopefully the more accurate too the 20 information that is going forward. 21 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Just on that, Mr Gledhill, would that 22 demand some kind of strengthening of the information 23 function at the incident control level?---I believe so. 24 I think that's an area that needs to be reviewed. The 25 structure is there within ICS AIIMS, but I think the 26 emphasis and the implementation by the practitioners needs 27 review. In my jurisdiction I believe we need to put more 28 emphasis on the importance of the information unit and 29 streamlining the flow of information. As I said, it is 30 still problematic in Tasmania, and I have little doubt 31 that it extends in other places.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2728 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 And in a way that perhaps takes some of the pressure off the 2 incident controller without the incident controller losing 3 authority over the activity?---Yes, I guess that process 4 of sign off within the IMT is something that needs to be 5 streamlined. We still want control, but we want things to 6 happen quickly. We don't want it to bog down in a whole 7 lot of approvals before things are released. There simply 8 is not time in those dynamic fire situations. 9 Would it be too radical to suggest the information officer 10 should have the authority to create the message?---I think 11 all things are possible. I don't think that's necessarily 12 a radical idea. I think we could still do that within the 13 confines of the structure of ICS. ICS is a framework and 14 there is inherent flexibility, and I think this is an area 15 that needs considerable review just in the light of some 16 of the things I have heard that have been put to this 17 Commission. 18 MR RUSH: Just to follow on from there, do you see a specific 19 role within the AIIMS structure for the information 20 officer outside the planning officer?---Look, I don't 21 know. At the moment the structure of AIIMS has the 22 information officer as part of the planning function. 23 There is certainly debate within the industry as to 24 whether that's the appropriate place for it. There a new 25 structure encompassing some of the police needs has an 26 intelligence functional cell, and there is a school of 27 thought that says we need to explore whether or not that 28 can help to provide another alternative way of dealing 29 with the flow of information. 30 What is that structure?---The police incident control system is 31 very, very similar to AIIMS ICS with the exception of, as

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2729 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 I understand it, an intelligence function. And it is 2 conceivable, in my view, and I guess I'm voicing a 3 personal view, not necessarily a view of the industry, 4 that it is conceivable that that intelligence function 5 could house the information officer and provide a way 6 forward. But it needs review. It need as lot of review, 7 a lot of discussion in the light of experience and hard 8 evidence from events that have happened. 9 Mr Gledhill, you refer to the AFAC paper, attachment 7, which 10 was a position paper on community safety and evacuation 11 that considered the words "evacuation" and "relocation" 12 which is to be found at the passage I want to go to, 13 (WIT.025.002.0080). It is page 3 of attachment 7, if that 14 assists. There referred to is self-evacuation and setting 15 out really the position that was raised with you by 16 Commissioner Pascoe; that the recommended principle that 17 people who are not physically or mentally prepared to 18 undertake firefighting activities should move to a safe 19 area ahead of the fire. But it goes on to say this, "This 20 group of people usually includes very young, older people 21 who may no longer be physically agile and sick or immobile 22 people. People who believe they are not capable of 23 enduring the trauma associated with a bushfire 24 situation ...". Now, the use of that word "trauma" 25 requires a person to have an understanding of what the 26 bushfire situation is going to mean to them. How do you 27 get that message across?---I think it is very difficult, 28 but I would expect that most people on watching some of 29 the vision that we have seen in recent days connected with 30 the Black Saturday fires quite clearly portrays people 31 traumatised and I think most people would realise that

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2730 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 bushfire is likely to be very stressful and have that 2 effect. But it is certainly something that most of the 3 literature that I'm aware of in Australia picks up and 4 explains, but one of the problems is that very few people 5 have the opportunity for learning from experience. Quite 6 often their first bushfire may be the only bushfire that 7 they are likely to experience in their life. These events 8 don't come along very often. There are not large 9 opportunities for experiential learning. We have to try 10 and describe it, but I think quite clearly the stresses of 11 a bushfire on people are quite apparent from just news 12 media footage. 13 Again - and we will come to it in a minute, hopefully - the DVD 14 that was produced in Tasmania, was there an emphasis on 15 trying to indicate the sort of issues that you have raised 16 and trauma that is involved in staying to defend your 17 property?---Well, I think our education material on that 18 DVD and other educational material in other jurisdictions 19 around the country I think aims to portray how tough it is 20 going to be. I have never seen anything that doesn't say 21 it is not going to be easy. We have never said that. 22 I don't believe that's been portrayed. If anything, we 23 have tried to emphasise how tough it is going to be; that 24 it will be dark, it will be noisy, they may well be on 25 their own for long periods, it will be hot and smokey. It 26 is the last place that a lot of people would want to be. 27 I think after seeing some of the literature I am sure 28 people would probably make the decision, "I don't want to 29 be there." 30 What you are referring to is really the specifics and the harsh 31 and nitty-gritty of the sort of issues that are faced in

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2731 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 fighting a fire?---If people choose to stay and defend, 2 those are the issues that they may well have to face, and 3 we try to tell it the way it is. 4 I'm just wondering if we can have a look at the start of the 5 first segment of the DVD that was distributed to the 6 Tasmanian community. 7 (A DVD was played to the Commission.) 8 MR RUSH: Commissioners, if we can stop it there. We will 9 tender the whole DVD, but the first part was what 10 I desired to show at this stage in the Royal Commission. 11 Mr Gledhill, what appeared to be a driver behind what was said 12 and what was depicted there was the seriousness of trying 13 to stay and defend your home?---We tried to tell it the 14 way it is and not pull any punches. People need to know 15 that it is going to be tough. Encouraging people to stay 16 and defend their property, it needs to be done after 17 plenty of proper consideration. 18 If I can just turn over the page to 0081, we were talking about 19 evacuation, and this position paper raised the issue of 20 required or directed evacuation that it may be needed 21 because of imminent threat to people, and they are the 22 people who have not undertaken adequate 23 precautions?---There certainly are situations where, if 24 people haven't taken measures, appropriate measures, then 25 they are in very risky situations at times and they should 26 be actively encouraged to not be there. 27 Just considering that issue, one of the attachments that you 28 provided to us was a paper that you prepared. I will just 29 find it. I think it is behind attachment 6 at 0069. It 30 is a paper that you prepared in or about 1998?---1998. 31 If I could ask you to turn to 0070, page 2, under the heading

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2732 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 "The prepare, stay and survive strategy", who was it 2 prepared for, Mr Gledhill?---This particular paper 3 I presented at a conference in America, in the USA, and it 4 was a conference for firefighters on firefighter safety, 5 that was the theme of the conference. I was asked to give 6 a paper because our approach in Australia at that time was 7 deemed to be very, very different from the North American 8 experience. I at that stage had titled it "Prepare, stay 9 and survive" rather than "defend", and it was very much in 10 its early evolutionary phase, development. 11 You in the third paragraph under that heading refer to the 12 necessity of adequate preparation and the fire protection 13 measures, in the third line, to reduce vulnerability to 14 bushfire, including removing, modifying, reducing 15 flammable material, grass, raking up leaves, bark, fine 16 fuel, trees; "even eucalypts can remain as they do not 17 constitute a fire hazard without understory. A defendable 18 space of very low and discontinuous fuel or preferably no 19 fuel needs to be created around buildings" and then you 20 refer to 20 metres and go on to refer to other measures. 21 You say 20 metres. Is there any measure in relation to 22 the space to be created around a house that can be set 23 upon or is it more a matter for the area and the 24 conditions?---It is site specific, particularly to become 25 very accurate. But 20 metres is a rule of thumb, pretty 26 good indicator of the sort of dimensions of the space that 27 needs to be created. But that is likely to vary from 28 place to place, perhaps not vary too much on the lower 29 side, but on steep slopes and in areas of heavy fuel that 30 may need to be extended considerably further. 31 You refer I think to that at the top of the next page, 0071,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2733 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 that the sort of issues that have to be taken into account 2 in relation to deciding issues of house design, 3 maintenance, spaces and gaps allowing wind and embers to 4 lodge et cetera. So, seemingly on what you are saying, it 5 is very much an individual thing rather than something 6 that can be said generically?---Yes, there are obviously 7 principles that underpin it that are generic, but each 8 house needs to be viewed separately and the particular 9 aspects of the siting and the house design and proximity 10 to vegetation, all of those things need to be taken into 11 account when deciding how best to mitigate the bushfire 12 risk. 13 Can I deal with some of the issues raised in attachment 9, the 14 discussion paper of 19 May 2009 at 0121, which is page 10. 15 Again, what is being reiterated there is the necessity of 16 not fleeing at the last minute. But if I can take you 17 down to "Education", you say, "The education of the 18 community should include skilling those who are planning 19 to stay with their homes as a bushfire approaches ... 20 There will be circumstances where their house catches 21 fire. It is no longer a safe option to remain inside the 22 house. Agencies should include information on dealing 23 with these situations in education and training programs." 24 So what you are indicating there is people's houses 25 burning down, but they need to be trained what to do in 26 those circumstances?---AFAC's position paper, the 2005 27 paper, bearing in mind this is a discussion paper, but the 28 current position paper recognises this issue. This paper 29 here, the discussion paper, has expanded on it a little, 30 recognising that it is an area that needs due 31 consideration as part of the overall decision as to

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2734 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 whether people choose to stay or whether they choose to 2 leave early. 3 When you talk about leave early, it is raised at page 14 of 4 the document and this paper indicates, I think what we 5 know and it has been recognised for a long time, that 6 there is significant evidence that that is not well 7 understood?---I think there is an expectation of there 8 being more specific information as to how long prior 9 to - prescribing an actual time. The AFAC position has 10 not been prescriptive. Quite intentionally, it has been 11 very general. It is something that agencies themselves 12 need to describe within their community education 13 materials. 14 In relation to triggers for people to leave early, it appears 15 from the last paragraph on that page that it says in the 16 meantime the use of total fire ban warnings remain a 17 trigger in relation to go early. In the context of eight 18 out of 11 days of total fire ban leading up to 7 February 19 2009 it might be thought that that's a trigger that 20 requires a considerable degree of refinement?---I think 21 very much so. In practical terms it is not going to be 22 taken up by - well, one would believe not going to be 23 taken up by a lot of people; it is not a particularly 24 practical option. But, nevertheless, it is an option that 25 is open. If people want the ultimate safe solution, 26 that's it; not being there, quite clearly. 27 What my question was directed at was total fire ban being the 28 trigger for the policy needs some refinement to make it 29 something that's a little bit more specific and better 30 informed, when you look at it in the context of what is 31 not in recent years at least a particularly unusual event

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2735 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 of having numerous total fire ban days in a row?---That's 2 something that agencies - I don't know whether AFAC will 3 have a view other than there should be a trigger, but 4 I think determining what the trigger is and the trigger 5 that is advertised is very much an agency decision 6 depending on the circumstances that prevail in that 7 particular area. 8 Mr Gledhill, over the page the position paper takes up the view 9 that agencies should encourage householders in properties 10 that are poorly prepared, difficult to defend to leave 11 early when bushfire risk is high. So that's a requirement 12 to, one, be informing people of properties that are 13 difficult to defend, and then the second obvious aspect is 14 getting the message across with high-risk days?---Yes. 15 Can I just pick up a point there. This is very much still 16 a discussion paper. It is not necessarily the view of 17 AFAC at the moment. It may be something that is captured 18 in the next version of the AFAC position on "prepare, stay 19 and defend or go early". 20 If we go over the page to page 16, "Alternative places to 21 shelter". The position paper takes up the aspect or the 22 consideration of people moving to a neighbouring property 23 that may be better prepared as a first step, but then as a 24 second step it is putting back on the table community 25 refuges, certainly back on the table as far as Victoria is 26 concerned?---Yes. In April in our workshop on just 27 revisiting the position there was considerable discussion 28 in that workshop about community shelters. I can say that 29 there was very strong support for taking another very 30 serious look at them. I think it is likely that they will 31 have a place within AFAC's position, but I think I would

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2736 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 be very careful in not suggesting at this stage that we 2 see it as an easy-fix solution generally, but I think in 3 certain circumstances it may well provide an improvement 4 for some people. 5 It is fair to say you are particularly looking at the people 6 who the research has indicated for one reason or another 7 may not comply with the mantra of "go early"?---People 8 that don't want to go the day before every time there is a 9 day of total fire ban, it may be a compromise, without 10 providing the same level of safety but nevertheless a very 11 much increased level of safety to go somewhere that has 12 been pre-determined as a refuge area. 13 Again over the page the issue of domestic bunkers is raised in 14 the paper. As far as the paper is concerned, there is a 15 great deal more research necessary. We are talking about 16 bunkers that may be built into a house or around a house 17 or under a house?---(Witness nods.) 18 The AFAC position is that there is more research 19 necessary?---Well, AFAC at this stage would like research 20 into whether or not they are effective. AFAC has a view 21 that there needs to be a standard to make sure that they 22 are safe places to be for the purposes that they were 23 intended. At this stage we are unaware of any standard 24 anywhere that covers a fire shelter in those situations. 25 More work is needed. There is a certain degree of having 26 an open mind, I think, amongst agencies about that. They 27 may provide an option for people who are already in a 28 situation that is highly at risk, purely as a life-saving 29 mechanism. 30 MR RUSH: I will be about another two or three minutes, but if 31 I could check my notes over lunchtime, Commissioners.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2737 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 CHAIRMAN: Fine. If that is the course that is most 2 appropriate, we will resume at 2. 3 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 4 LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2738 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 UPON RESUMING AT 2.00 PM: 2

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2739 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 that instead of there being the bushfires universally 2 referred to as nothing more than large, they be given when 3 they are potentially life threatening a different title. 4 Do you have any that you choose to use?---We don't. 5 Unfortunately the English language seems to be very 6 deficient in descriptors for fire, bushfire particularly. 7 The word fire storm has been used and probably does better 8 describe the sort of events that occurred on 7 February. 9 But we haven't - AFAC doesn't have a view, I don't have a 10 personal view on how we should proceed, only that I do 11 observe that it is deficient and we perhaps need to get 12 something better. 13 In the September 2007 position you did use the expression "high 14 intensity". Was that because it just seemed like a good 15 idea at the time?---Well, perhaps. They certainly are 16 high intensity fires, but I don't know whether that 17 conveys anything better to the lay person. A high 18 intensity fire means something different to a low 19 intensity fire to me, but I'm not too sure whether people 20 generally would understand what we meant by it. I think 21 it also is found wanting a little. 22 When you were talking in response to a question put to you, you 23 referred this morning to a sudden impact bushfire. Is 24 that something that - - -?---Well, I guess in that event 25 I was describing the fires where there is no warning. It 26 suddenly accelerates from no fire to quite a large fire in 27 very short time, as opposed to one that has been burning 28 for a period of time. I guess to use the Victorian 29 situation, there were a number of fires that were around 30 the day before as opposed to ones that suddenly occurred 31 on the afternoon.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2740 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 You still use the wide variety of language in relation to them. 2 Something like megafire doesn't appeal?---Megafire has 3 been used in recent times, I think it has come from the US 4 to describe those fires that spread across the landscape, 5 landscaped sized fires. I guess Victoria's equivalent of 6 the megafire would have been the alpine fires that have 7 occurred in recent years. Megafire more refers to in the 8 way it has been used in the past, more refers to its 9 spread across the landscape, large in area, but not 10 necessarily large in impact. I mean you can have a high 11 impact fire that affects a lot of people that doesn't 12 cover a lot of area. So I don't know whether that's the 13 way it should go. 14 The high water mark or low water mark is, so far as Hobart is 15 concerned, 1967, how are those referred back to as being 16 not as bad as - - -?---The '67 fires in our context is the 17 benchmark, a little like we heard this morning about Ash 18 Wednesday is a benchmark in Victoria. This recent fire or 19 fires on the Saturday the 7th will be benchmark fires that 20 will be used to try and provide some clarification of 21 size, to give some relativity, I guess. 22 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 23 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Just in a similar vein, Mr Gledhill, for 24 purposes of providing understandable advice to the 25 community, do you think a simple generic phrase like a 26 serious fire burning out of control has more impact or 27 meaning to people because, as you would know, the 28 technical term for a bushfire out of control is that it is 29 going?---(Witness nods.) 30 Now, it is going where. Going to me, even though it is used 31 for a particular purpose in the fire services, it sort of

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2741 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 suggests that it is disappearing, whereas it is generally 2 going in the opposite direction?---Coming. 3 I don't think that term is used so much for public consumption, 4 although it probably appears on the CFA website, for 5 example?---Yes. 6 It just seems to me if the purpose is to give the community a 7 shock, perhaps simple language is best and a serious 8 bushfire burning out of control is in your neighbourhood, 9 most people would understand that?---I support what you 10 are saying. I think simple language is very much the way 11 we should go. I know in my situation in Tasmania we try 12 to do that on our website, avoid jargon and keep it 13 simple. But just having enough superlatives or adjectives 14 to adequately describe the fire when it gets to its 15 extreme end is very difficult. 16 I think my query would be the trouble is there are too many 17 adjectives that don't convey easily a differentiation in 18 meaning?---I expect that's something that we do definitely 19 need to look at. But I think one of the other issues 20 related to that is just human behaviour and how people 21 perceive things. Quite a bit of the Bushfire CRC research 22 has been going in that area. I think it is something that 23 we need to take more account of in the future. I can say 24 that AFAC's position, the 2005 position, has not been well 25 informed by human behaviour research, and I really believe 26 that that's a direction that we need to take a lot more 27 notice of in informing us how to better communicate. 28 MR LIVERMORE: Mr Livermore for the State of Victoria, sir. 29

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2742 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 DR LYON: We filed notice of leave to cross-examine yesterday, 2 Mr Chairman. 3 CHAIRMAN: Okay. I will call upon Mr Livermore first. 4 MR LIVERMORE: I think I might be shorter than Mr Lyon is as 5 well, sir. 6 Mr Gledhill, being prepared if you live in a fire prone area is 7 really all important whether your plan is to leave early 8 or to stay and defend; is that the case?---That's correct. 9 And that's the message that the policy endeavours to get 10 through?---Yes, very much so. 11 Are you familiar with the CFA information and educational 12 material?---Broadly. Only broadly. 13 Your broad acquaintance with that material, does it endeavour 14 to deliver the message that I just indicated?---I believe 15 so. 16 Are you familiar with the Community Fireguard system that 17 operates in Victoria?---Yes. 18 Is there a system similar to that in Tasmania?---Yes and no. 19 There has been. I'm not even too sure of its current 20 status, but when - not long after CFA developed its 21 Community Fireguard program we took it on in a very 22 similar way and have tried to adopt it, with limited 23 success, perhaps I think more to do with resourcing issues 24 and getting appropriate local leadership in places has 25 been problematic. 26 An expert witness has been called before the Royal Commission, 27 a Professor Paton, who described the CFA Community 28 Fireguard program as best practice. Would you agree with 29 that description?---I would agree it is very good 30 practice. Whether it is best I'm not qualified to say. 31 Do you know of any other similar program that is better than

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2743 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 it?---No. 2 Are you familiar with the CFA information and educational 3 material covered by the "Living in the bush" 4 brochure?---Broadly. 5 There are just a couple of parts of that brochure that I would 6 like to refer to in the context of your evidence that it 7 is important to tell it how it is in relation to staying 8 and defending. The first page is at (TEN.001.001.0006), 9 and that appears in volume 19 of the hearing book. It is 10 not up on the screen, but I will read the relevant passage 11 to you, Mr Gledhill. It is headed "Number 1, are you at 12 risk, bushfires in Victoria. Fire is a natural part of 13 the Australian environment. Every summer Victoria has 14 days of extreme fire danger. CFA encourages people who 15 live in bushfire areas to accept and manage the risk 16 around them. Victorians are choosing to live in bushland 17 areas, particularly on the fringes of metropolitan 18 Melbourne or regional centres. Many are now living in 19 high bushfire risk areas. If you live in a bushland 20 setting, you can expect several days each summer on which 21 you, your family and your house may be threatened by fire. 22 Climate change has increased the risk of severe fires in 23 many areas with more high fire risk days than in previous 24 years. CFA will not always be able to protect each 25 individual property threatened by fire. This booklet will 26 help you develop a bushfire survival plan to protect 27 yourself and your property." Then at the bottom part of 28 that page under the heading "Are you prepared" it is said, 29 "It is likely that the first sign of fire in your area 30 will be smoke - or even flames near your property. Do not 31 expect an official warning. You need to be alert, have a

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2744 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 plan and be prepared to act independently on days of high 2 fire risk. If you intend to stay and actively defend your 3 property, you will need to be physically and emotionally 4 prepared and have the right equipment. Defending your 5 home may take many hours of strenuous activity. Are you 6 physically and emotionally able to defend your home? Be 7 aware that bushfire smoke can aggravate respiratory 8 conditions such as asthma and heart conditions. Also, 9 bushfires can be a stressful experience with everyone, 10 including children, being affected before, during or after 11 the event." Then moving to the page that ends in 009 under 12 the heading "What to expect", it reads "If a fire occurs 13 in the local area, residents should expect from the fire 14 spot fires moving ahead of the main fire, lots of smoke 15 and burning embers landing ahead of the fire and for many 16 hours afterwards, making it hard to know where the 17 firefront is, smoke, heat, noise and possibly 18 darkness - bushfires are very loud, threatening and 19 scary." Under the heading "Possible emotional and physical 20 effects" it reads: "Disorientation and confusion from the 21 wind, smoke and heat; difficulty breathing, particularly 22 for people with respiratory conditions; fear about what 23 might happen; thirst and hunger; fatigue and panic. Power 24 could be cut off or will be disrupted by the fire; mains 25 water pressure could fail as other residents and fire 26 trucks access water; telephone lines could be cut by 27 falling trees and mobile coverage can quickly become 28 congested; road travel will be extremely dangerous as 29 visibility will be low, fallen branches and powerlines may 30 block roads and there will be many emergency vehicles on 31 the road. Fire services will be concentrating on the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2745 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 firefight. Do not assume there will be an official 2 warning of the fire and do not expect a fire truck." Do 3 those matters that I have just read to you effectively 4 tell it how it is in relation to staying and defending a 5 property?---Yes. 6 CHAIRMAN: That's the sort of question I think we can do 7 without, Mr Livermore, where you are reading out large 8 slabs and saying does that accord with your view, it 9 doesn't really help the Commission terribly much at all. 10 I don't want to argue it now, I'm just saying that that is 11 a comment I would make. 12 MR LIVERMORE: Well, we sat through the Tasmanian material for 13 some reason, sir, when there is more relevant Victorian 14 material. 15 CHAIRMAN: I don't know that there have been clear attempts to 16 differentiate as being very strongly better or worse. It 17 is substantially the same, unless you draw attention to 18 some matter that was distinctly different and wanting a 19 comment with respect to that. 20 MR LIVERMORE: I don't know why it was played in that case. 21 Then, sir, I assume there was some purpose to it 22 reflecting in a comparison on the Victorian material, and 23 that is why I led that evidence, but I will move on. 24 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 25 MR LIVERMORE: Are you aware of the information contained on 26 the CFA's fire ready website, Mr Gledhill?---No. 27 Are you aware of DVD material that the CFA distribute to people 28 in high fire risk area?---In general terms, yes, but 29 I haven't viewed - I can't recall viewing the DVD that you 30 refer to. 31 The passages that I just read out to you, do you consider that

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2746 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 they contain particularly sound advice, especially in the 2 circumstance of the short, sharp fire or what you 3 described earlier as the sudden impact fire, particularly 4 the sections that warn about not getting an official 5 warning and not getting the assistance of a fire 6 truck?---I think they very adequately describe that 7 situation. 8 They really create the most difficult situation, those short, 9 sharp or sudden impact fires for the application of 10 the prepare, stay and defend or leave early policy, don't 11 they?---Yes, because people have to make very quick 12 decisions. 13 That is why the policy encourages people to think through all 14 the issues even before the fire season starts, to have 15 their plan in place?---Very much so. 16 The CFA, you may be aware of this or may not, it recommends as 17 the trigger for the leave early the announcement of a high 18 fire risk day; are you aware of that as being the CFA's 19 policy?---Yes. 20 But it is also set out in the explanatory material, if you 21 don't use that as a trigger, look for some other sort of 22 trigger, perhaps a fire in the area or something like 23 that?---(Witness nods.) 24 Is that right?---Yes, that's correct. 25 But the whole point of the policy is, and I think your evidence 26 has made this clear, if you don't leave before the fire 27 starts, you are at risk and from then on the content of 28 the policy is just trying to mitigate that risk, is it 29 not?---Yes. 30 Thank you, sir. 31 CHAIRMAN: It is my recollection that your DVD starts off with

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2747 GLEDHILL XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 or close to the start has "Will you survive"?---It poses 2 that question in the outset. 3 That is essentially because you place human life as the most 4 important value?---Very much. 5 DR LYON: Mr Chairman. My name is Lyon. I appear on behalf of 6 the MAV and the 77 councils. 7 CHAIRMAN: Thank you for appropriately introducing yourself, 8 Mr Lyon. 9 DR LYON: Thank you, Mr Chairman. 10

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2748 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 least in terms of discussion from the idea of stay and 2 defend or leave early; it's been moved up the batting 3 order to emphasise to people that leaving early is not 4 something to be toyed with, it is not to be left at the 5 last minute?---Yes, we encourage people to make the 6 necessary considerations and prepare a plan. Now whether 7 that be a written plan or a mental plan, all the same, it 8 needs to be duly considered well before an event occurs. 9 Indeed. One of the - the whole underlying basis is that the 10 decision to leave is so far as is humanly possible, it is 11 an informed choice?---Yes. 12 Taking into account the very sorts of things that you have 13 spoken about in your evidence and that you talk about in 14 your statement, that is things such as the defendability 15 of the property under consideration, your own personal 16 preparedness to fight a fire, to take into account the 17 nature of the fire, the sorts of things that Commissioner 18 McLeod and Mr Chairman were asking about, the type of fire 19 that you are looking at, and as to what safe and realistic 20 alternatives are; they are the sorts of factors that have 21 to be taken into account, aren't they?---Yes. 22 When you are looking at the question of alternatives, there are 23 also a number of factors to take into account, are there 24 not? That is the distance to where it is you propose to 25 travel, the country or terrain through which you have to 26 travel and the position and direction of potential 27 firefronts?---Yes, very much. 28 There must be care taken, shouldn't there, to ensure that by 29 setting up alternatives there is no engendering of a 30 complacency in the execution of individual fire 31 plans?---No. Regardless of what action people need to

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2749 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 take, preparation and planning should proceed everything, 2 proceed any action. 3 Because if for whatever reason, whether it's through poor 4 planning or through neglect or just through surprise or 5 lack of information, if it is the fault of the individual 6 or not the fault of the individual to leave late poses 7 perhaps the most dangerous of the options open?---History 8 has demonstrated that people - many of the people, 9 majority perhaps who have died in bushfires in the past 10 have died in that phase, fleeing at the last minute. It 11 has been found to be highly risky, and so therefore not 12 leaving late has been emphasised in the position. 13 Do you agree then that it follows from that that the idea of 14 having fire refuges, it is essential that it cannot be 15 viewed and it cannot engender the view that there is a 16 safety net, there is a last roll of the dice; do you agree 17 with that?---That's a danger, yes, I agree. 18 It cannot be that refuges should be seen as, "Well, everything 19 else has failed. I'll take my chance"?---That's a risk. 20 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Isn't that what they are, though, a last 21 resort? 22 DR LYON: It very much depends on where they are and how they 23 are positioned, and it depends upon the designation given 24 to them. There are a lot of issues to consider. 25 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: The media gave attention early in the 26 piece to a lady and a lady friend who survived in a wombat 27 hole, which was a refuge of last resort. 28 DR LYON: That's a different question to where I'm going on 29 behalf of the councils. On behalf of the councils the 30 issue will be asked of the councils as posed before the 31 2005 Esplin report, "Should councils be responsible for

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2750 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 commissioning and maintaining designated safety spots?" 2 That's a very different question to luck, circumstance, 3 knowledge or bush craft leading one to safety and 4 survival; am I right about that, Mr Gledhill?---I believe 5 so. 6 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Mr Lyon, can I also phrase it a little 7 differently. We have heard evidence both in this hearing 8 room and we have had submissions and there are other media 9 and other reports of people moving to official and 10 unofficial community refuges. I can mention Yarra Glen 11 and Marysville as two well known examples. But there are 12 other examples where communities organise themselves such 13 as - - - 14 DR LYON: Woods Point. 15 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Yes, indeed, Walhalla and other 16 communities. What is striking is that for some of them 17 there's a level of community organisation and preparation, 18 and we could in fact go to the known example of Ferny 19 Creek where the siren is used to alert people, we have 20 local organisation. What is troubling, I think, is that 21 in some of the examples that have been brought before this 22 Royal Commission where people have panicked and so then 23 the question about a safety net becomes a really critical 24 question, and there seems to be research evidence that 25 despite the best efforts of a community, of the fire 26 services to prepare communities, that they won't always 27 reach the target and indeed even families that have a fire 28 plan to stay and defend will panic at the last moment. 29 I'm not sure whether I should put this to Mr Gledhill, but 30 there is therefore the question about the place of a 31 community refuge when we know that, despite our best

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2751 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 efforts, that is currently a fact of life. 2 DR LYON: Let's not be confused about where this 3 cross-examination is going. It is simply to raise a 4 number of the issues that you as a Commission must 5 ultimately consider in deciding whether or not the 6 question of refuges goes back on the table. The four 7 matters that I will put to Mr Gledhill will be these, 8 there are essentially these four matters: legal 9 obligation. Is there a legal obligation or is it some 10 sort of more amorphous obligation? Secondly, 11 responsibility. Upon whom does the responsibility for the 12 allocation, siting and most significantly the designation 13 of a fire refuge fall? When there is a designation of a 14 fire refuge, there is a representation in effect of 15 safety. You are representing that there is a safe place 16 to go. So the first one is legal obligation. The second 17 is responsibility. On whom does the responsibility fall? 18 Allocation, siting, designation and construction. Who 19 should be involved in that and who should have ultimate 20 control? The third matter is immunity from suit, a very 21 important matter, and Mr Gledhill, if I put the question 22 to him I'm sure would say that that is an important 23 matter, because if there is a designation of safety and 24 things go wrong, then there might be many reasons why. 25 The fourth matter is funding. Who funds this? How is it 26 funded and whose responsibility is it to keep the funding 27 going to maintain the refuges to the very strict standards 28 that are needed so that the designation and the 29 representation of safety can be maintained? 30 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: With respect, I think there is another 31 question that is of particular interest to the Commission

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2752 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 which you haven't mentioned, and that is whether a refuge, 2 the existence of a refuge should be seen as an essential 3 or desirable community facility in a locality where it is 4 generally regarded that habitation is in a bushfire prone 5 area. Is it a desirable community facility that there be 6 such a place? 7 DR LYON: That is a question that has to be tackled not only 8 from the community perspective, but from the fire 9 specialists in the area and their knowledge. It is not 10 simply enough to say that the council that catches your 11 dogs and collects your garbage has the local knowledge and 12 therefore they can say where this should go because they 13 are representatives of the community. This is a very fire 14 specialist question. 15 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Obviously the council would get technical 16 advice. 17 DR LYON: It shouldn't simply come down to technical advice. 18 It should be a sharing of responsibility so that it 19 doesn't become an all care no responsibility provision of 20 technical advice; it becomes, "We are saying this is the 21 case." If there is to be community consultation, then the 22 community has to participate in it. 23 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Perhaps we shouldn't be having the 24 dialogue. It might be best - - - 25 CHAIRMAN: Yes, if you continue with your questions, Mr Lyon. 26 DR LYON: Thank you, sir. If I can just go back to where we 27 were. In relation to where we were going I was saying 28 that in relation to your statement, Mr Gledhill, you 29 referred to the fact that the Miller report in 1984 30 mentioned the need to examine the question of refuges; do 31 you recall making that reference in your statement at

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2753 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 paragraph 16?---Sorry, when you said the Miller 2 report - - - 3 Sorry, the Ash Wednesday report?---Sorry, your question again? 4 You referred to the fact that the Ash Wednesday report found 5 that sheltering in community buildings or houses was a 6 viable option that had saved lives?---Yes. 7 By that reference you were simply putting it on the table that 8 as far back as some 25 years ago the issue of refuges was 9 raised?---(Witness nods.) 10 Has it been handed to you the extracts from the Miller report 11 in relation to pages 81 and 82, 161 and 162?---I don't 12 have those. 13 If the witness could be shown that. In that context do you see 14 that what was said at 81 in paragraph 160 is that 15 "Instances occurred where large numbers of people found 16 communal shelter in large well constructed buildings and 17 survived." It goes on to say "In some cases, people who 18 used their own homes as shelters also survived, though 19 others who did likewise perished." Mr Gledhill, do you 20 acknowledge that one of the great concerns about refuges 21 is that the fear is that they should not become themselves 22 communal death traps?---Any community shelter should meet 23 certain prescribed criteria to make them as safe as they 24 possibly can be. A community refuge I guess in some 25 respects is no different to a resident's house. We 26 encourage residents to make their houses as safe as they 27 can be so that they can provide shelter for people. A 28 community refuge also almost inherently has to be a safe 29 place. It has to be adequately prepared. 30 So far as possible, the travel to that place ought to be as 31 safe as possible?---Well, similar to any other situation

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2754 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 from the AFAC position. People shouldn't leave it too 2 late to travel at the last minute. Last minute travel, 3 whether it be to a refuge or wherever, we know from past 4 experience is risky. Providing a community shelter 5 doesn't negate the travel aspect, and any late travel to a 6 refuge may well be risky. 7 If I can take you to page 162, which is the next couple of 8 pages that are attached. You will see at the very top of 9 page 162 under - where it says, "Recommendation", it says, 10 "There be an examination of" and the first bullet point is 11 "Possible assistance by the state government to local 12 government in the provision or adaptation of buildings 13 which could serve as communal shelters"; do you see 14 that?---Yes, I do. 15 In your statement at paragraph 16 they were the matters that 16 you were referring to?---Yes. 17 The question of refuges, if I can just change topic slightly, 18 do you agree that where there is a designation there is a 19 key requirement that the designated refuge should be as 20 safe as humanly possible?---A refuge should be as safe as 21 possible. 22 And it follows from that it should provide, if I can just go 23 through them quickly, a sufficient barrier from radiant 24 heat, it should provide protection and not burn under 25 ember attack, there has to be some protection from smoke 26 or some guarantee of air quality?---(Witness nods.) 27 It should provide water and it should be to all intents and 28 purposes fire proof, from contact with flames. Are they 29 all requirements?---Yes. 30 You agree that these are significant issues if you are going to 31 design, locate, construct, maintain and designate that as

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2755 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 a fire refuge?---I have had no personal experience in 2 going through this. The discussion within the AFAC 3 context has been very general, but quite clearly there 4 needs to be criteria to - prescribed criteria to ensure 5 safety as far as is reasonable possible. 6 Beyond the construction there are issues of access to the 7 refuge, there's always questions about how many people it 8 should hold; do you agree with that?---Yes. 9 And do you agree that that is in fact a very difficult 10 question, how many it should hold, how many can it fit 11 beyond its designated capacity, when does it become safe, 12 when does it become unsafe, who makes those 13 decisions?---Yes, all considerations. 14 So the question of allocation and construction raise 15 significant issues for consideration, do you 16 agree?---There are many issues to be considered, yes. 17 One of the issues it raises is one of human behaviour, doesn't 18 it?---Human behaviour is the key issue in all of this. 19 I think I mentioned earlier that I believe there needs to 20 be more research into the fire behaviour aspects to ensure 21 that we are catering appropriately for the way people will 22 naturally behave. 23 You have discussed with the Commission the paper of May 2009 24 which is attachment 9 to your statement, the discussion 25 paper of 19 May 2009; do you agree with that?---Yes. 26 It makes clear, does it not, or your statement makes clear, 27 I should say, that at the present time AFAC has no 28 position on fire refuges?---That's correct. 29 Why is that, Mr Gledhill?---Fire refuges have, to my knowledge, 30 not been considered in any great way prior to recent 31 times. I think essentially they were discounted during

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2756 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the evolution of the AFAC position on prepare, stay and 2 defend. At that stage it was felt that emphasis on 3 preparation of home owners in preparing their properties 4 rather than relying on a community refuge was a more 5 appropriate way to go. However, I think since the events 6 of Saturday, 7 February, there is awareness that people 7 did seek in some cases shelters, and for that reason AFAC 8 in a workshop early in April discussed the issue, prepared 9 a paper, revisited the Victorian policy, and at this stage 10 it remains a discussed issue, but AFAC has no final 11 formally endorsed view on it. 12 In the discussion paper which is attachment 9, 13 (WIT.025.002.0126), which is page 16 of attachment 9, 14 there is a section entitled, "Community fire refuges"; is 15 that right?---Yes, I have that. 16 In the third paragraph there, the paragraph that starts "An 17 option that requires new consideration is community fire 18 refuges" does it then say "However the use of community 19 fire refuges and access and travel to them must be 20 considered as part of planning and developing individual 21 bushfire plans", which is the point that we started off 22 with?---There is certainly a strong view that they 23 shouldn't be considered separately. They are part of and 24 they are an option - a potential option, but need to be 25 considered as part of the overall personal planning. 26 And what you said is "and not separately"?---And not 27 separately. We would still - I think all fire agencies 28 would still have the expectation that people undertake the 29 appropriate preparations of their property regardless of 30 whether they seek to use a refuge. 31 In fact does it go on to say in that same paragraph, "Bushfire

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2757 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 plans should not be developed to evacuate to a community 2 fire refuge when a bushfire approaches or is at their 3 house"?---It does say that, yes. 4 In the next paragraph it talks about the use of refuges in "the 5 rare and exceptional circumstances where other fire 6 strategies - fire safety strategies are less 7 effective"?---Yes, it says that. 8 It is in that context that the AFAC discussion is taking 9 place?---Yes. 10 Are you aware of whether any other states have designated fire 11 refuges?---To my knowledge there aren't any other states, 12 but that's limited to my knowledge, which is not complete. 13 You are familiar, are you not, with the OESC paper, the fire 14 refuges policy of 2005?---I have read the paper. 15 That is (WIT.005.001.0568). It was part of attachment 3 to the 16 statement of Mr Esplin which was exhibit 11 in volume 12. 17 I have a copy for the witness. Mr Gledhill, is it your 18 understanding that the primary, or one of the primary 19 concerns of the designation of fire refuges is the 20 potential to adversely impact on the stay and defend or 21 leave early policy?---I guess the AFAC member agencies 22 would have concerns if it adversely affected its - at this 23 stage not been envisaged to be a substitute for the 24 position as it currently exists. But if AFAC endorsed it 25 would be incorporated as a part in some circumstances, 26 I believe. 27 Can I take you to page 4 of the policy, please. This is at 28 0577. Just in terms of the discussion that you raise, you 29 are aware, are you not, that there had been a working 30 party which developed the policy under this policy 31 document; is that right?---Yes.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2758 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 You will see the paragraph. It says "In respect of fire 2 refuges", about two-thirds of the way down the page, "In 3 respect of fire refuges the working party concluded that", 4 and it says "the current designation of public refuges in 5 some parts of the state is untenable and dangerous in the 6 context of very high to extreme bushfires because" and it 7 lists four matters: Performance criteria, distance, 8 population and vegetation; is that right?---That's as it 9 reads, yes. 10 Do you agree that they are all sound reasons expressed at that 11 time to have great concerns about a number of 12 refuges?---I don't specifically understand or know what 13 the Victorian situation was, but the reasons of concern 14 there seem to me to be reasonable concerns, if they were 15 in fact the case. 16 Then can I just take you to one more, and that's just directly 17 above that quotation. The working group party review said 18 "At greatest risk from a bushfire are those who plan to 19 stay, then later decide to flee, either out of the 20 bushfire area or to a safer location that they need to 21 drive to. This means that the distance to a designated 22 fire refuge, further than a short trip by foot, creates a 23 hazard to those fleeing from the bushfire. People run the 24 risk that they may be caught in the open or in their car 25 on their journey to the refuge." That is the view that you 26 have articulated earlier?---Yes. 27 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Mr Lyon, I just want to put a query to 28 Mr Gledhill. When we had the Emergency Services 29 Commissioner into these formal hearings and he was asked 30 to comment on Victoria's suite of policies in relation to 31 bushfires he made the comment that up until midday on

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2759 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 7 February he would have said that Victoria was close to 2 best practice, but from his point of view everything is on 3 the table now. Now, given the admittedly preliminary 4 material that we have relating to the deaths from the 5 bushfires here on 7 February, would in your opinion an 6 issue such as a community shelter be one of those matters 7 also on the table?---I believe so, yes. It needs to be 8 reconsidered, particularly in the light of the 9 circumstances that prevailed here. But it would rely on 10 much more analysis than what has been able to occur to 11 date. 12 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Mr Gledhill, would you agree that if 13 there were to be in a particular locality a refuge it 14 wouldn't necessarily be assumed that everyone would want 15 to seek safety in a refuge, but for some people who 16 perhaps feel inadequately prepared but who haven't chosen 17 to leave early it could represent a fall back position for 18 some of those people to repair to a refuge well before the 19 fire has actually arrived as an alternative to actually 20 leaving the locality, elderly people, infirm people, those 21 who are not physically fit and so on may not feel that to 22 actually remove themselves totally from the locality early 23 is necessarily the best option for them but it could 24 represent an alternate position of relative safety when 25 they don't feel competent or capable of remaining and 26 defending their home as a refuge?---I believe that's a 27 view which I would support pretty closely. I think it is 28 an option. It is not ideal. I don't think we will ever 29 find fail safe strategies. It may be less risky in some 30 circumstances. The difficulty with all of these matters 31 is that they are so site and circumstance specific. It

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2760 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 has to be individualised and it is very hard to generalise 2 and encapsulate everyone. There are going to be 3 circumstances where it is clearly more risky and 4 circumstances where it is clearly less risky than what 5 they would be by staying in a home that's not adequately 6 prepared or where they are not mentally capable. It is a 7 compromise, I guess. 8 Another string in the bow for some people?---Yes. I believe 9 that's the context in which it was considered when we met 10 in April at our workshop. It is open for consideration as 11 an option. 12 DR LYON: Mr Gledhill, if I can just take you to paragraph 69 13 of your statement. You say there "Fire refuges have been 14 used by various communities in the past. My understanding 15 is that their use has discontinued due to concerns over 16 liability." Obviously what you are talking about there is 17 the Victorian position; is that right?---Yes, it was. 18 Are you prepared to say now that there may have been a number 19 of reasons why shelters or refuges were 20 decommissioned?---Look, I don't profess to know all the 21 circumstances. I was made aware that legal liability 22 issues were a reason, but not necessarily the only reason 23 for their demise. 24 Would you agree, for example, that the fire refuges policy 25 document which sets out the policy statement makes it 26 pretty clear that it is considered that refuges impact on 27 the "stay or go" policy, which is the primary strategy for 28 fire management in Victoria?---Potentially they can, 29 particularly if they are taken to be a substitute for 30 adequate preparation. But they could be incorporated 31 reasonably easily into the "leave early", and as mentioned

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2761 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 to limit the dislocation of people when it is happening 2 repeatedly, certain members may feel that's where they 3 would leave early to go to. So it can be incorporated, 4 but I think it has to be taken carefully. 5 Sorry, I just wanted to go back to the question, the issue 6 raised by paragraph 69 where you were talking about the 7 discontinuance of the use of them rather than the move 8 into them. What I was suggesting to you was that if you 9 look at, say, the policy statement at page 10 of the 2005 10 policy, there seems to be a reasonably explicit 11 discouragement of the use of fire refuges on a state wide 12 basis, doesn't there? Page 10. This is 0583, Victorian 13 government policy number 1?---Sorry, your question again? 14 What I'm suggesting to you is that if you look at the statement 15 of policy contained in the policy document that I have 16 just taken you to, government's policy on fire refuges is 17 very clearly an expression of primary strategy for people 18 exposed to bushfire, that is to stay and defend or leave 19 early on days of high fire danger, there is a range of 20 fire safety measures that may be implemented and fire 21 refuges are not standard provision for bushfire safety 22 across Victoria. 23 MR RUSH: I'm going to object, Commissioner. The document 24 stands for what it says. The comment of whether it says 25 it or doesn't say it from Mr Gledhill I would submit would 26 not be of assistance to the Commission. 27 CHAIRMAN: I think that is right, Mr Lyon. 28 DR LYON: I'm happy to move on if the point is made in - - - 29 CHAIRMAN: I think you have made the point through the 30 questioning. The difficulty is what the witness has made 31 clear is he has taken the view that issues need to be

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2762 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 reconsidered even though they may be seen as dead in the 2 light of what has happened and that he doesn't regard 3 himself as the sort of expert who can comment in a way 4 that's likely to materially help the Commission in 5 relation to this issue. 6 DR LYON: That being the case, I will move to the next point 7 and I can indicate I will finish shortly. Mr Gledhill, 8 you heard the exchanges between the Commissioners and 9 myself in which I outlined other sorts of issues that need 10 to be taken into account. Did you hear them?---I heard 11 them. 12 And I raised that there are issues, that is legal obligation 13 for refuges, the issue of funding, the issue of immunity 14 and the issue of responsibility. 15 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Aren't they issues that affect us all 16 just about in every aspect of life, legal responsibility, 17 immunity? I can understand the relevance of those things 18 for much of government business, but it is hard to see the 19 relevance to the issue of refuges per se. 20 DR LYON: Perhaps if I could put some focus on it. If I can do 21 it, sir, through my next question to the witness and then, 22 because I am conscious of the fact that he has to get 23 away, if I haven't answered the Commissioner's question 24 through that, then I will come back to it. 25 In terms of responsibility for issues such as siting, 26 designation, construction or just allocation, you need 27 real input and responsibility from the fire specialist 28 agencies, do you not?---The fire agencies would have a 29 part. It wouldn't be wholly - I wouldn't expect it to be 30 wholly a fire issue. I think there would be a number of 31 parties involved.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2763 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Where designation of safety is to take place, that's another 2 issue in which the fire agencies would have a part?---Yes. 3 If not responsibility?---If not responsibility. 4 That was the point I wanted to make, sir, the need for 5 specialist responsibility here has to be considered. The 6 final proposition is this, Mr Gledhill, does it follow 7 from the issues that we have discussed, that is you and 8 I in this aspect, that you would agree that the issue of 9 refuges is one that needs careful consideration before 10 they are reintroduced?---Yes, there is a lot of devil in 11 the details. That would need very careful consideration 12 and at this stage I can say AFAC has not had an 13 opportunity to go into that sort of detail. 14 Beyond formulating those positions, there has to be very, very 15 many individual issues taken into account; and so far as 16 it can't simply be said that there should be refuges and 17 that's the end of it, there also has to be consideration 18 as to whether an appropriate area, locality, given its 19 population, its terrain, its access and all of those, it 20 has to be considered on an individual by individual basis; 21 would you agree with that?---I believe so, yes. 22 DR LYON: They are the matters. 23 CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Lyon. 24 MS FOX: Thank you, Commissioner. I only have some very short 25 questions for Mr Gledhill. My name is Fox. I appear on 26 behalf of AFAC. 27 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 28 MS FOX: They really just relate briefly to what we are calling 29 the stay or go position. 30 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 31

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2764 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Mr Gledhill you set out in your statements I think in 2 paragraphs 21 through to 27 the evolution of what has been 3 called in this Commission the stay or go position; that's 4 right, isn't it?---That's correct. 5 That position has been periodically reviewed by AFAC from 1996 6 to 1998, 2001, 2005?---Yes, that's right. There have been 7 four versions to date. 8 AFAC considers all relevant research and evidence that may come 9 in from other fires when they are reconsidering or 10 considering that position?---It has done. It has been 11 very much based on evidence rather than just opinion. 12 The AFAC review of the 2005 position in fact commenced more 13 formally back in 2008 at a workshop in 14 November?---I believe so. I wasn't at that workshop. 15 You weren't there?---No. There was a workshop. 16 You were at the follow-up workshop in April 2009?---That's 17 correct. 18 Is it your understanding that the Bushfire CRC had done a great 19 deal of research about the stay or go position, and when 20 that research became available the November workshop was 21 set up in 2008 to have a look at the position?---That's 22 correct, yes. 23 As at February 2007 the 2005 position was the AFAC 24 position?---It was. 25 And it remains so?---It remains unchanged. 26 Mr Rush asked you and you are aware, as I think we all are now, 27 that 113 people died in their homes in this fire or these 28 fires. There is no further evidence or research that we 29 have yet as to what they were doing or whether their homes 30 were prepared or anything of that nature?---Not to my 31 knowledge.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2765 GLEDHILL XXN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 And that is something that obviously AFAC is waiting on?---Yes, 2 AFAC agencies are very keen to find out the circumstances 3 if possible and take those into account at some time in 4 the future in reviewing the position as it currently is. 5 I won't take you through the 2005 position because it is set 6 out, it is attached to your statement and I think everyone 7 would be familiar with it. But just on page 5 of that 8 position under "Prepare" it was AFAC's position, and this 9 is in paragraph 3, "Property should be prepared for 10 bushfire regardless of whether the occupants intend to 11 stay and defend their property or relocate to a place 12 where they feel safer", and that remains the AFAC 13 position?---Very much, yes. 14 That regardless of the ultimate plan, people who live in the 15 bush and in bushfire prone areas must prepare their 16 properties?---Yes. 17 MS FOX: I have nothing further. May Mr Gledhill be excused? 18 Sorry, Mr Rush. 19 MR RUSH: Three questions. 20 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you, Mr Rush. 21

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2766 GLEDHILL RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 building, particularly from the radiant heat shelter and 2 probably ember shelter, because if the embers raining down 3 are heavy enough it becomes a little bit more than 4 unpleasant. I mean clothes start catching alight. 5 Mr Gledhill, properly explained, there is no reason of itself 6 why introduction of a refuge should impact on the "Stay or 7 go" policy?---I don't believe so. I think it can be 8 incorporated. 9 You were asked questions by Commissioner Teague and 10 Commissioner McLeod concerning words in relation to fire. 11 I very quickly want to take you to a document that's been 12 tendered before the Royal Commission, and I won't waste 13 time by having it brought up, but it relates to emergency 14 warnings. It is put out by the Commonwealth called 15 "Choosing your words". In relation to how bad is it 16 expected to be, or putting out words to denote that, in 17 relation to "very high risk" at 0495, I think it has been 18 put in front of you, for a very high risk the words in 19 this document are "extremely destructive which is suited 20 to threats to property and natural disasters, extremely 21 dangerous, suited to threats to people, homes from man 22 made threats and extremely severe, suited to more generic 23 threats." What do you think of those, that 24 terminology?---They seem very reasonable. 25 MR RUSH: I have no matters further. 26 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you, Mr Rush. Thank you very much, 27 Mr Gledhill. 28 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 29 MS RICHARDS: I call Illiya Ananiev. While Mr Ananiev is 30 getting himself settled, the reference number for his 31 statement is (WIT.040.001.0001), and Commissioners, it is

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2767 GLEDHILL RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 to be found in volume 34 behind tab 35. 2

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2768 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 dead end dirt road which probably doesn't do it 2 justice?---That's right. 3 Can we have a look at the map, please, of Wild Dog Creek 4 Road?---By the way, it is a beautiful area. 5 On the screen now we can see a map of a portion of St Andrews 6 and Wild Dog Creek Road starts - could we go back to what 7 we had - at the Heidelberg Kinglake Road. To the left of 8 the screen. If you can move the cursor back down, back 9 down Heidelberg Kinglake road. The balloon with the A in 10 it is the location of your block?---Yes, that's right. 11 CHAIRMAN: Is the Google map wrong?---No, it's correct. 12 It puts you as being Dinsdale Road?---Yes, there was a long 13 episode with the council to get it renamed back to Wild 14 Dog Creek because that's what it originally was. But it 15 is Wild Dog Creek Road. 16 MS RICHARDS: Sometimes known as Dinsdale Road, is that 17 right?---Yes. 18 Mr Ananiev, you live on a 40-acre bush block on that 19 road?---Yes. 20 And Wild Dog Creek Road, also known as Dinsdale Road, is the 21 only way in and out of your block?---That's right. 22 The house on your block is a cedar house?---Yes, can I just add 23 the map shows Dinsdale Road running past my property, but 24 it actually stops where your cursor just was, at there. 25 At that sort of elbow in the road?---The road actually stops 26 there because Dinsdale then travels on to private 27 property. 28 So to the - - -?---That's the end of my block. 29 To the east of your property is private property and it is not 30 passable?---That's right. 31 It is a cedar house?---Yes.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2769 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Can you describe the construction in general terms?---On 2 stumps, cedar, wooden inside, plaster inside. So standard 3 sort of house, with a corrugated roof, corrugated iron 4 roof. 5 What water supply do you have at your house?---We run off 6 tanks. So the catchment - I have catchment tanks beside 7 the house which catch the rainfall off the roof and then 8 I pump to a 20,000-litre tank up the top which is about 9 21 metres above the house so to speak on the rise which 10 gives me pressure back down to the house, almost town 11 pressure through the taps, gravity fed. 12 That is regardless of the electricity supply?---That's right. 13 What electricity supply do you have?---Just the standard coming 14 in from the road, but if it fails we have the - as I said 15 in the statement, we have the generators which on a number 16 of occasions I have to switch off and then switch to run 17 the whole house and shed off our generators. 18 You describe your house as being on a bush block. Can you 19 describe the vegetation surrounding your house?---Yes. If 20 you notice the photo which is on the map on the Google 21 map, my property is basically covered with trees. My 22 problem is that we have a lot of tea-tree which is 23 underneath the canopy of the trees. Directly surrounding 24 the house - - - 25 Would it help if we zoomed in a little closer to your property 26 on the map?---Yes, you could, if you could: so my property 27 is basically the top of the screen, it is very hard to 28 show. The house, as you can see, I have actually got 29 clear around it. So it is about 10 metres around the 30 house which is clear. The rest of it is basically just 31 thick bush. It is difficult to drive through there even

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2770 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 with a 4-wheel Drive. I'm not allowed to make any tracks 2 by the way. I'm not allowed to touch anything on this 3 place. I have had trees which have fallen all over the 4 place over the years. It is basically a smaller version 5 of what happened. It is another bonfire. I'm not allowed 6 to touch it. I would love to just clear up the dead stuff 7 which is underneath it. If you showed the photo, I could 8 show you, probably later, I'm not sure. But the clear 9 area, if I'm running too far, was walked through by the 10 ex-CFA captain of St Andrews station. We had him do a 11 walk through all the houses, and he said that our house is 12 one of the safest ones there for a standard bushfire, but 13 if it was a tree top to tree top, forget it. He said tree 14 top to tree top very rare. So the very first fire we came 15 across which was a number of years ago, we were just 16 running around putting embers out with mops. 17 We will come to your photos in a moment, but you mention in 18 paragraph 3 of your statement that there is an 19 environmental significance overlay over your 20 property?---Yes. 21 Does that affect your ability to remove, clear vegetation 22 around your house?---I'm not allowed to touch anything. 23 If something falls, I'm not allowed to touch it. Fallen 24 trees are not allowed to be touched. Trees on the outside 25 of my property are not allowed to be touched. I had a 26 tree which is three metres away from my kids bedroom at 27 one stage, a nice big one, about 20, 30 metres tall. It 28 was giving me problems. I tried to get through the 29 council, tried to explain to them this is right next to my 30 kids bedroom. I want to remove this thing. It is 31 dangerous. And they said no. I said, okay, what do I do?

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2771 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 You can put it in writing, but writing it will most likely 2 get rejected. So I didn't bother. But - - - 3 Just to be clear, Mr Ananiev, who did you make that request 4 of?---To the Nillumbik shire. 5 Where?---At the council itself. I think they know me by now. 6 If I can move to the question of your understanding of the risk 7 of fire on your property, you mentioned that at some stage 8 a member of the local CFA had given you advice that in a 9 normal bushfire your house would be relatively safe but if 10 it was a fire that reached the tree tops it would not 11 be?---(Witness nods.) 12 At what stage was that?---That was only a few years after we 13 moved in. 14 You say in your statement that you moved in in the year 15 2000?---Yes, roughly. 16 Did you have a fire plan for your house when you first moved in 17 there in 2000?---When we initially, initially walked in we 18 didn't know anything about the bush really, except that we 19 loved it. When we got Ross to walk through for us, that 20 was our first touch with any plans or any thought of what 21 we should do during bushfires. 22 And Ross is the member of the local CFA that you referred to 23 earlier?---He was. He was the captain. He told 24 us - basically he went through our place and said this 25 must be removed. He gave us full advice on what to do at 26 the property. It was the very first time we got any kind 27 of notification of what fire would look like, just by 28 speaking. So he said if you see anything on the ground, 29 double it. That's the flame height. So anything around 30 my - directly around my house would only be a few inches 31 because it is just the grass. But as soon as you get the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2772 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 tea-tree, that could be five, six metres up to 10 metres 2 and then from trees, obviously it just grows from there. 3 So he told us that around the house is, your only problem 4 is to run around with a mop and just put out these 8-inch 5 flames if it starts up. The problem was, being an 6 engineer, and same as my wife, we always look at the 7 risks. The risks for us were the radiant heat, where do 8 we get information. So we started chasing up information. 9 No one could supply it. 10 When you first moved to your home did you have a plan about 11 staying to defend your house or leaving?---Yes, the 12 radiant heat was the problem. So from there we actually 13 made a decision to say, yes, we will have a plan, which is 14 I would stay there. The kids would be taken away to the 15 grandparents's place and if possible, like in my 16 statement, Bianca would come back and help me out. It 17 actually did kick off the fire plan in that fire probably 18 about a year after Ross came through. 19 You mentioned in your statement that there was a fire in 20 2006?---Yes, I'm really bad with years, sorry. 21 You stayed and fought that fire?---Yes. We didn't actually see 22 the flames. We saw some ember. That's about it. It 23 wasn't like flame flame. At our place we could see the 24 Kinglake fire over the hill, over the horizon, and 25 actually after reports and listening to the radio and the 26 internet, at that stage it stopped about 7 kilometres away 27 from us. So I'm not sure whether that was right or wrong, 28 but we could literally see the flames during the night 29 sort of reflecting up off the clouds. 30 And you say in your statement that you stayed and defended your 31 house against that fire, what you saw of it, with buckets

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2773 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 and mops?---Yes, because we weren't expecting anything 2 more than eight inch around the house. 3 After that experience did you change your fire plan?---The 4 radiant heat. Radiant heat - no one could give us 5 information. We went to the CFA, DSE, police, everyone 6 just said we don't keep records, we don't keep records. 7 So we were completely lost. We actually found it on the 8 internet on one site using Google, and now Bing if you use 9 that. Radiant heat, I haven't got the evidence, but it is 10 a four to one ratio. So if it is one metre height in 11 front of you, you will feel it four metres away. That's 12 the basic rule that we understand. As soon as we found 13 that out, our plans changed. We will leave. 14 You also mention in your statement that your house is 15 insured?---Yes. 16 What effect did that have on your decision to be able to leave 17 your house in the event of a fire?---For us, and I can 18 speak about most of our friends, the house is not an 19 issue. Our lives are. If it is insured, okay, insurance 20 will take care of it. We wouldn't stay back, even in our 21 initial plan, we are not staying back to defend the house. 22 It was more, how would you say, some of the items which we 23 wanted, like personal effects, yes, we couldn't get rid of 24 them, hold back on that, that you can't get through on 25 insurance. But the house is just a house. It is really 26 difficult to explain. We wouldn't be fighting and trying 27 to risk our lives for something that can be rebuilt. 28 So your plan was to leave?---Yes. 29 What would your trigger be for leaving?---The trigger was like 30 we had initially, the internet and the police channel with 31 the CFA. But the CFA on the scanner was really - poor

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2774 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 information. Tanker 55 doesn't really mean much to us 2 hearing it over and over again. 3 If we can just look at those two triggers, when you say the 4 internet, what do you mean?---What we do, and we have done 5 it twice now, is we live off the internet, the CFA site. 6 We notice the - which is a real problem - DSE and CFA 7 don't communicate, it seems like they don't. I don't know 8 why they don't. But we would check both sites. CFA would 9 be our first port of call to see whether we were listed. 10 We are usually region 13 so we look up region 13 and see 11 whether there is a fire. Usually, like in this case, we 12 saw Kilmore going. 13 I will come to that in a little while. So looking at the CFA 14 website and also the DSE website, and then you also 15 mention the police and CFA in your scanner?---Yes. 16 Can you explain what you mean by that?---The first fire the 17 police were actually the best source of information. They 18 always are. We would listen to the police and they would 19 say things like, we are setting up roadblocks in such and 20 such a spot, we are shifting from here to here. Some kind 21 of incident happened at some area, best source of 22 information we could ever rely on. 23 You were able to listen into that on your UHF scanner?---On the 24 previous fire. It is illegal, but if it saves your life 25 let's do it. Now they are on the digital site, we are 26 lost. So it is purely the internet. 27 Can I ask you whether you were aware of any fire refuges in 28 your local area?---Yes, we have the St Andrews football 29 field, as far as I understand, that is ours. That is my 30 understanding. The current one for Panton Hill is the 31 primary school. We don't use it as a refuge and safety

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2775 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 and let's all get into bunkers. We more look at it in our 2 area as a place to say, yes, we are aiming to go over that 3 spot rather than running around the countryside not 4 knowing where to go. It was more like a meeting area and 5 make a decision and go from there. 6 You say in paragraph 9 of your statement that you understand 7 that all of the fire refuges in your area were 8 closed?---Yes. 9 On what is that understanding based?---The reason is because 10 everyone was in a panic. I don't think anyone would have 11 been there. 12 If I can take you now to Saturday 7 February this year, 13 Mr Ananiev. Were you aware of the weather forecast for 14 that day?---Yes. 15 How did you become aware of that forecast?---Through the news 16 and the radio. 17 And you understood that it was going to be a day of high fire 18 danger?---(Witness nods.) 19 Where were you on that day?---We were actually in the backyard 20 in the swimming pool. 21 And how did you first become aware that there was a fire in 22 your area?---We were in the swimming pool and then we got 23 showered upon by like sticks, two foot sticks, bark and 24 sticks, solid sticks, which I was surprised about, and 25 then leaves and all the rest. As I said, I foolishly just 26 started picking some of them up for the show and tell for 27 the kids. Really crazy when I think about it now. 28 Were they burning?---No, no. 29 Having seen these - they were burnt, were they, they were 30 blackened?---Yes. 31 Having seen these, did your wife then check on the website of

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2776 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the CFA and the DSE?---Yes. I told her to go and check. 2 Picking them up and then thought, hang on, this might be a 3 bit more than we think about. She went on the website and 4 there she saw Kilmore fire going, and that was about it. 5 We didn't see any other evidence of fire apart from that 6 ember. 7 At about what time was this that your wife checked the 8 website?---I would say roughly 4. I'm not really good 9 with times. 10 That information that there was a fire at Kilmore and that it 11 was going, what did you understand from that?---The way it 12 works with us is we look at the fire report, we see the 13 area, and then we have a look to see whether it is 14 contained, going or grass or whatever the category, but 15 our main concern is to see that it is some sort of fire, 16 and then we actually put in a level of saying how many 17 trucks are on it. If we see two trucks, we don't consider 18 it as a very important fire, important, now everything is 19 important, but if we see like 100 and so trucks on it then 20 we really get busy. 21 From the information that was on the CFA website what did you 22 and your wife understand about the severity of the fire at 23 Kilmore?---We were not concerned. 24 Did you then go and have a further look around your 25 property?---Yes. Then straight after that we actually 26 went back to the pool for a little while and then 27 I thought I better just have a look around. So I went to 28 the front of the house and stayed on the verandah for a 29 few minutes. In the distance, which is in the valley, it 30 was basically going towards where the start of Wild Dog 31 Creek, to the right of there, it was just a plume, thick

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2777 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 plume going straight up into the air which you couldn't 2 see from where the swimming pool was. The roof was sort 3 of covering it. But as soon as you get around the side 4 you could see this thick. So I stood there for a while. 5 The kids were running around. As it - you are going to 6 make me break out. Don't do it again, please. 7 Just take your time and tell us what happened?---I could 8 literally hear like a surf beach. It is a very tiny noise 9 but like a surf beach. I thought, no, this is worse than 10 what the internet was saying and all the rest. Our 11 trigger points were not there. So instead of going from 12 situation management, mainly I, in crisis management, 13 I just said throw the kids in the car, go. My wife didn't 14 understand at that stage either. She actually stayed 15 there trying to warm the engine up, and I said no, go, go. 16 It was that close. 17 And how hard was it for you to make that decision to leave your 18 home at that time?---You are going to make me break out, 19 please. I'm sorry. It keeps hitting me all the time. It 20 is not the fire that gets you. It's the calls, the 21 decisions you have to make and you don't know whether it 22 was the right call or not. 23 And Mr Ananiev, was the safety of your family the paramount 24 consideration for you?---Oh, yes, desperate. Like I said 25 before, I used to try and do everything the right way, 26 council and everything, but I have had it and my kids are 27 more important to me than those silly tea-trees and 28 whatever. When we were driving down that road I thought 29 I made the worst mistake of my life. 30 What did you find when you drove away from your property and 31 you and your wife were in separate cars?---Well, I saw

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2778 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 fires on the right-hand side of us, and so as we were 2 driving out I actually saw the fires. To this day now I'm 3 starting to get confused whether they were as large as 4 I think and so on, but because we were concentrating on 5 the road, but the thing that really gets me is that - is 6 not the fire, it is the fact that I knew we had to get out 7 of there, because our plan was to leave, because if we 8 stayed there we were in the bonfire, this bonfire has been 9 growing for years, and if we are going to stay in this 10 bonfire we are dead. That's what I thought, and I said we 11 have got to get out of here. Our trigger points were in a 12 panic, I admit that, but I really didn't know whether 13 I made the right decision or not, and it irks me today 14 still because I keep thinking it could have been the worst 15 thing that ever happened to me. 16 Mr Ananiev, can you describe to us how you and your family left 17 the property? You were in one car, your wife was in 18 another?---I was in the car behind us. I basically threw 19 the dogs in the back and chased off after my wife. But 20 the cats got away and they are still family members and it 21 was really biting me that I couldn't save them. I thought 22 they are going to get fried. So we got to the end of our 23 road and we turned left and there is the police, police 24 block. I didn't know what to think. Like, where did you 25 come from? Why didn't we know you were here. If I had 26 my scanner frequency, we would have been out of there a 27 long, long time before. 28 Perhaps we can have another look at the map and you can show us 29 where you found the police roadblock as you drove 30 out?---Sorry about that. 31 That's all right, Mr Ananiev. if you can zoom out so we can

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2779 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 see the Heidelberg Kinglake road. Mr Ananiev, can you 2 please describe on that map where you found the police 3 roadblock?---Just before Mittons Bridge. If you come out 4 of Wild Dog Creek Road and then go down Heidelberg, where 5 the C746 sign is. It is exactly where the police were. 6 It was great to see them there. It really was. But would 7 have loved to have known that they were there a long time 8 before we did. 9 Mr Ananiev, where did you go after seeing that roadblock?---We 10 drove through there and we ended up going to St Andrews, 11 where the primary school is, which is way down further. 12 There is St Andrews and the primary school is basically 13 just past - where the St Andrews sign is, where it says 14 St Andrews. We got there and it was fairly hot and I had 15 the dogs in the back. I actually closed the back windows 16 because I thought if we are going to have smoke and so on 17 so the dogs don't get affected, but we stopped at 18 St Andrews primary school and I thought I better give them 19 some water because dogs they dehydrate pretty quick as far 20 as I understand. There are no taps, on the taps 21 themselves, so there was no way of getting water anywhere. 22 So I thought how silly is that. I couldn't get any water. 23 So I thought what am I going to do. We just said get in 24 the car, go to the grandparents' place, so we went to 25 Montmorency. 26 At the time you left your house did you still have a telephone 27 connection?---Yes, we did. 28 You mentioned in your statement that as you were leaving you 29 received a telephone call from a neighbour telling you to 30 leave?---Yes, we were throwing the dogs in the back and 31 the phone rang and Megan was yelling and screaming saying,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2780 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 get out, get out. I said we are already out Megan, and 2 I hung up and just jumped in the car and took off. 3 Did you try to ring 000?---No, there wasn't any time for any of 4 that. 5 You also mentioned in your statement your family was part of a 6 fire tree, a telephone tree in your area. Was that fire 7 tree activated?---It wasn't kicked off at all. 8 Are you able to say why not?---No, no idea. 9 Was the power still on when you left?---Yes. 10 In the day afterwards, when did you return to your 11 property?---I gave you the dates. I can't remember now. 12 But it was a few days after and all the way - like, we 13 heard reports on the radio "do not go back." Police are 14 saying no. But I couldn't hold back. My cats were there. 15 I didn't know what was going on. So we thought we will go 16 over to our friends' place and see what we could see from 17 like the ridge going across the valley to our place. So 18 we went back, but not go through the blocks at that stage. 19 We had a look at our place through binoculars from a 20 couple of kilometres away and all we could see was because 21 my neighbours are basically clear, they are cleared blocks 22 and then ours is on the ridge sort of going out the back. 23 And all we saw was the tree line, which is the part that 24 goes along Wild Dog Creek Road. We didn't know whether 25 our house - whether that tree line was the only thing that 26 was up, not burnt, because the rest of it down the back 27 and all the hills down the back were all black, 28 charcoaled. So we really didn't know if our house was 29 gone or the cats were gone. We really didn't know. 30 There were roadblocks in place at Mittons Bridge and at 31 St Andrews, so you couldn't drive in the way you

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2781 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 left?---They said, no, you are not allowed through. 2 Did you return to your property via a back way?---Yes, I went 3 around the back and through a few short cuts. 4 And one of your concerns was whether your cats had 5 survived?---Yes, as soon as we got there I jumped out and 6 my little black and white tabby, he came running out, mow, 7 mow, and he stayed beside me like a dog. He wouldn't 8 leave. I thought I can grab him and put him in the box 9 and take him home. I couldn't see the other cat. As soon 10 I put the black and white - I don't want to say his name 11 because people will laugh, but as soon as I put him in the 12 box, he just went crazy. He didn't want to be confined, 13 so I had to let him go. But we did leave some food for 14 him and he was all right. He must have had something to 15 talk about, but I don't understand cats. 16 You say that you returned, you and your wife, on Wednesday 17 11 February?---Yes. 18 And there was still an issue with spot fires in the 19 area?---Yes, we didn't realise. We thought it was okay as 20 in safe to be there. So the first, first day it wasn't 21 too bad, but then all of a sudden night time and next 22 following few days it was on for one and all trying to 23 keep these spot fires from belting up. I patrolled the 24 back of my place and there were trees that were going for 25 like a week after. They were basically like flues with 26 flames coming out of them, so you had to keep putting 27 water on them. That was a waste of time, you would have 28 been better off drinking the stuff. Getting burnt around. 29 Why waste the water? 30 How did you and your wife deal with the spot fires around your 31 property?---We are not getting any younger, I realised.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2782 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Going up and down those hills with chainsaws and backpacks 2 and water and everything else, it's a lot of hard work. 3 My hats off to the CFA guys. They really do a good job. 4 Did you receive assistance from the CFA during those days after 5 the fires?---Yes, and I would like to say a big, big thank 6 you to St Andrews CFA because they were great. I thought 7 I was going to die of a heart attack going up and down 8 those bloody hills, anyway, and trying to get through the 9 tea-tree. It is ridiculous. Frankston, for all unknown 10 reason Frankston in St Andrews, marvellous, a truck from 11 Frankston and the guys in Kangaroo Ground, especially 12 George. George, I have to say hello, and from St Andrews 13 I have to say Melissa, you are a darl. 14 In retrospect, would you change your fire plan?---No. We are 15 still definite to leave because we can't clean up our 16 block, we can't do anything to make it safe, the only 17 thing that we can do is get out of there. Can I just add 18 I heard from CFA guys here, great little pamphlet. We 19 asked for that DVD several times even on the internet. 20 Didn't get it shipped out. But even in that statement 21 there you were saying "make your property safe" et cetera. 22 It is only if you can. The councils won't let you. The 23 council won't let you even cut a blade of grass, taking 24 photos, like a guy was out at our place when I was putting 25 the shed up taking digital photos of little sticks, 26 ridiculous. But that's what we have to deal with. So CFA 27 is trying to do the right thing, saying yes, make it safe, 28 but the council won't let you. 29 Mr Ananiev, you have some photographs that you brought?---Yes. 30 Can we have a look at those now?---I just took these a couple 31 of days ago. This is a real concern, especially trees

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2783 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 like this - - - 2 Can you tell us what this is a photograph of, what road we are 3 looking at?---This is Wild Dog Creek Road. If you have a 4 look, our bush is actually growing back. It is beautiful. 5 The people are replanting - - - 6 Mr Ananiev, can you turn around and face me. All of us can see 7 the photograph on the screens that we have in front of us, 8 so just address yourself to us?---I'm thinking I'm 9 lecturing. The tree that you see on the right-hand side 10 there, that is a typical example of what we have got on 11 our road. 12 This is on Wild Dog Creek Road?---Wild Dog Creek Road heading 13 out. 14 We are heading from your property out to Heidelberg Kinglake 15 Road?---That's right. This is where we drove through. 16 The fires on the right-hand side were not there when we 17 drove through. They were on the right-hand side. These 18 are the sort of trees. We get these on the road. It is 19 ridiculous for access. You can even see the bark has been 20 taken off this thing from trucks and cars hitting it all 21 the time. So access in and out, if it was a smokey area, 22 it is dangerous. If we take the next photo, you can see 23 all the way along, like the one that you see in the middle 24 of the screen is on the street again. Can you click on 25 the next one, please. That's the one that was on the 26 middle. Danger, dangerous situation where on Buttermans 27 Track, which is the next street up from us towards 28 St Andrews, they have got bitumen road, the council 29 literally puts bitumen around the trees. I mean access 30 wise it is dangerous. Can we go to the next one. Some of 31 these trees which are so close to the roadside there,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2784 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 during the fires we actually left, one of our neighbours 2 came out five minutes after we did and he 3 somehow - I don't know how he turned around on this thing, 4 but supposedly they couldn't get any further, I'm not sure 5 why, but the reason I took the photo here is because these 6 trees are so close to the road, there is no guarantee that 7 that tree would have fallen on the road which blocks 8 access completely for Wild Dog Creek Road. Anyway, next. 9 That was the other tree. The next one, please. This is a 10 typical backyard for us, the undergrowth. There are the 11 trees. This is actually council area. This is not my 12 area. But you can see all the undergrowth, like the dead 13 trees. It is just fuel, fuel, fuel. It has been building 14 up for years. That in conjunction with the next one, 15 roadside, this is Wild Dog Creek Road along the roadside, 16 it is just fuel, fuel everywhere. We are not allowed to 17 touch that. You are not allowed to touch any of that 18 wood. The next one, please. This is my backyard, and 19 this is my nightmare. Not the trees. That tea-tree. The 20 tea-tree is so dense, like we had to go through there with 21 elbows and chainsaws to try and get into spot fires behind 22 this stuff with the CFA. That stuff there, if you double 23 the height takes the flames directly to the tree tops. 24 I can't touch that. I can't touch any of it. Can you go 25 to the next one, please. There is more of my backyard. 26 It is just full of tea-tree. It is a nightmare and 27 I can't touch it. 28 So we can understand, Mr Ananiev, how far is that tea-tree from 29 your house?---That there would be about 100 metres, if 30 that. 31 I should ask for completeness, what became of your house during

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2785 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the fires?---It actually, we were lucky, lucky, how can 2 you be lucky in this thing? The flames came to about 3 50 metres from the house, and then you can literally see 4 the turn in the black - where it just took off, took out 5 60 per cent of my property, all the trees, bushes and then 6 took off towards Yarra Glen, that way. So it came 7 extremely close. Actually just a little bit further than 8 the door there. 9 MS RICHARDS: Thank you, I have no further questions for you, 10 Mr Ananiev. Do the Commissioners have any questions? 11 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Just one question, do you have any 12 concerns about continuing to live in that 13 environment?---No. I don't want to leave. I really 14 don't. Can I say it, I have been heckled by the greenies 15 saying why don't you leave. I don't. I love that place. 16 That's why I live there. I don't want 40 acres of 17 concrete. All I want to do is make it safe. If you can 18 see this tea-tree and the density of that, we could do 19 that so easily, but you are not allowed to touch any of 20 it. 21 Given the opportunity, what would you do to make it 22 safe?---First thing I would do is actually get in the CFA 23 guys and say what do you think. The guys who actually 24 know the fires. They are the best people to judge. Not a 25 guy that sits behind a counter in a council, definitely 26 not, and say, "Is that dangerous? What do I do to make 27 that safe?" Like Ross did. He did a really good job. 28 MS RICHARDS: I have had an indication from Mr Livermore that 29 he wants to ask some questions. 30 MR LIVERMORE: No questions. 31 WITNESS: Can I just add the categories for fires, extreme and

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2786 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 so. We were just looking for category 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 2 Sorry. 3 MS RICHARDS: This is in relation to the information that you 4 had from the internet?---On the website. 5 Where the information was that that there was fire and it was 6 going?---Yes. 7 Is there a more helpful way that that information could have 8 been presented to you?---All we are looking for is a 9 category 1, 2, 3 or 5, and maybe a colour, red, yellow, 10 green, to mix in with it. Not extreme. You don't have to 11 be, I will look up in the Thesaurus. 12 CHAIRMAN: You were here for the last witness. You heard him 13 say, extremely dangerous, seemed very reasonable to him. 14 It would seem reasonable to you?---For me it would be a 15 category 1. One red. 16 One was the most serious?---Yes. It could be a category one 17 green, which isn't all that. 18 MS RICHARDS: May Mr Ananiev be excused? 19 CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Ananiev?---Many apologies. 20 We very much appreciate it?---Thank you. 21 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 22 MS DOYLE: Commissioners, the final witness today is Mr Seear, 23 who has been patiently waiting. We will be able to 24 complete him within at least the extended hearing time. 25 I understand there is one party who wants to briefly 26 cross-examine. 27 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you. 28 MS DOYLE: I call Simon Anthony Seear. His volume is in 29 statement 34 of the court book and it appears behind tab 30 36. 31

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2787 ANANIEV XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 MS DOYLE: Mr Seear, your full name is Simon Anthony 2 Seear?---That's correct. 3 And you live in Wattle Valley Road, Camberwell?---Yes. 4 Your family also has a home in the town of Walhalla?---That is 5 also correct. 6 With the assistance of lawyers assisting the Commission you 7 have prepared a statement?---Yes. 8 Do you have that with you?---I do. 9 A 64 paragraph statement with a number of 10 attachments?---Correct. 11 And are the contents of that statement true and correct?---Yes, 12 they are. 13 MS DOYLE: I tender that statement. 14 CHAIRMAN: Exhibit 88. 15 #EXHIBIT 88 - Witness statement of Simon Anthony Seear. 16 MS DOYLE: Mr Seear, as you explain in that statement your 17 family lives in Camberwell at the moment, you, your wife 18 and two children, but you have a home in Walhalla. Can 19 you explain your family's connection with Walhalla?---Yes, 20 we are from a long line of descendents from the township 21 of Walhalla that originally probably went to chase the 22 gold at Walhalla, and quite a number of us have remained 23 with a fair interest in the town, and most of us regularly 24 visit the town. In our case we have a small house in the 25 township of Walhalla and previously operated the guest 26 house in Walhalla up until about four years ago. 27 Your family lived in Walhalla until you moved to the city for 28 reasons relating to your children's schooling?---That's 29 correct. 30 These days how often does your family go there, is it an every 31 weekend proposition or something less than

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2788 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 that?---Depending on school, sports and activities, we try 2 and get there most weekends, if we can, maybe two weekends 3 a month. 4 You have a couple of maps attached to your statement, can you 5 go to the first attachment to your statement which appears 6 at (WIT.042.001.0015), so if you just go to the first page 7 of attachment one, Mr Seear?---Yes. 8 And the map will ultimately be brought up on the screen. It is 9 a Google map which just in simple terms shows Walhalla. 10 The towns of Erica and Rawson are also shown there. How 11 long does it take to drive from Walhalla to each of those 12 towns, Rawson and Erica?---To drive from Walhalla to any 13 of those towns is around 15 minutes. 14 And what are the roads like between Walhalla and each of those 15 town, sealed or unsealed?---A combination of sealed and 16 unsealed. It is possible to drive on sealed roads to both 17 Rawson and Erica. It is also quicker to drive on some 18 unsealed roads to Erica, but they are typical windy 19 mountain alpine roads. 20 You also explain in your statement that the town is spread over 21 about 2.8 kilometres. If you just go to the next page, 22 which is witness page 0016, there is a tourist map of 23 Walhalla, the yellow map headed, sites of interest. In 24 your statement you give a detailed description of the use 25 of the Long Tunnel Extended Gold Mine, which we will go to 26 in a moment. But perhaps if you could point out or 27 explain these other points of interest. We have the mine 28 there, which you explain in your statement is used as a 29 fire refuge?---Correct. 30 The Star Hotel is located on the map. What's the main street 31 in the town in relation to this map?---The road you see on

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2789 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the north south axis as per the screen there is Main Road, 2 Walhalla. To the south is towards Erica and to the north 3 is towards the direction of Woods Point and back to 4 Melbourne a very long way. 5 In your statement which as I say we will go to in a moment you 6 refer to people meeting at the Star Hotel. What sort of 7 structure is the Star Hotel?---The Star Hotel, well, 8 I should clear up, there are two. There is the Star Hotel 9 and there is the Walhalla Lodge Hotel. The Walhalla Lodge 10 Hotel is generally a typical country hotel and that is 11 where our designated meeting point is. The Star Hotel is 12 also a timber structure, although well prepared in terms 13 of fire prevention, it has over roof sprinkler systems and 14 a brick north facing wall et cetera as opposed to the 15 Walhalla Lodge Hotel, which is just a small weatherboard 16 structure. 17 Are a number of the buildings in this main centre of the town 18 weatherboard or other timber structures?---The vast 19 majority are small weatherboard dwellings, houses or 20 public buildings, a typical small country town. 21 Your own family's home is located about 800 metres from the 22 Walhalla Lodge Hotel?---That's correct. 23 If you can just explain the population of Walhalla. In your 24 statement at paragraph 6 you say its permanent population 25 is very small, 12 to 20 people?---Yes, it is very 26 difficult. It is 12 to 20 people in terms of permanent 27 residents. That swells to 50, 60 on a weekend where 28 people have got a holiday home or coming back to see 29 relatives, but can also swell to 200, 300 or 400 people or 30 so if you take into account the itinerant campers which it 31 is a fairly significant and popular tourist destination.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2790 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 So the majority of the population on the weekend are 2 campers. 3 In the permanent population there are a small number of 4 children and even they go elsewhere to another country 5 town to school during the week?---Yes, there's no 6 education facilities in Walhalla. There is a school in 7 Rawson, but the majority of secondary education is, decent 8 secondary education is in the Latrobe Valley. 9 You say at paragraph 7 that Walhalla has endured three fires in 10 the last five years which have essentially cut off the 11 town. When was the last of those fires prior to the '09 12 fire?---We have had - the three main fires, apart from 13 7 February this year, the previous fire was known as the 14 Coopers Creek fire. That was a fire that started, 15 I believe it was deliberately lit and ran to Toongabbie 16 very quickly and someone was killed in that fire. Prior 17 to that there was the Moondarra fire. Both of those fires 18 had a duration of some weeks attached to them. So there 19 have been - they were the three major fires in the last 20 five years. 21 You are a registered volunteer with the CFA and you have been a 22 volunteer since 1998?---That's correct. 23 The presence of the CFA at Walhalla, how large is that and do 24 you receive assistance from other neighbouring towns?---We 25 do have a small CFA facility in town which is a fire shed. 26 There is actually on the map that you were referring to 27 earlier, there is two of everything in Walhalla, there is 28 two fire stations, one is a historic fire station which is 29 a museum, and one is the current active fire station, 30 which is on private property and that holds a vehicle 31 which is also a privately funded vehicle, but it is a CFA

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2791 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 endorsed vehicle. 2 So we have the historic fire station on the left of the map, 3 but in handwriting opposite the Star Hotel is the fire 4 station. That second one is the active one, is that 5 right?---That's the actual fire station that's active. 6 You say in your statement that the Walhalla brigade as such is 7 part of the Erica and District Rural Brigade?---We are 8 part as region 9 so we are listed officially as the Erica 9 and District Rural Brigade, but we are remote to some 10 extent but we operate with the Erica brigade. 11 In Walhalla what fire assets are located there?---We have 12 what's generally known as a slip-on, which is a small ute, 13 Toyota Hi-Lux ute with a 400-litre tank and a shed for it, 14 and that's basically it. 15 There are three active members including you?---Correct. 16 The two other active members, as luck would have it, are tour 17 guides at the mine?---That's correct. 18 We will go to that in a moment. Use of pagers in Walhalla, you 19 explain in your statement that you had a pager on 20 7 February and I understand that you wanted to explain 21 that since you completed this statement the number of 22 pagers issued to Walhalla CFA members had altered. Can 23 you just explain that?---Yes, I was concerned for 24 accuracy. We did have three pagers between the three 25 active members in the brigade, and that's been reduced to 26 two on the basis of some form of equipment rationing in 27 region 9. I have one and one of the two mine guides has 28 one. 29 So as at 7 February there was access to three pagers, there is 30 now two?---Correct. 31 Whilst we are speaking of CFA volunteers both your wife and

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2792 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 your father are CFA volunteers?---That's correct. 2 Your father lived through the 1939 fires in Walhalla?---Yes. 3 Did he take shelter or refuge during those fires in the 4 town?---Yes, I guess that's one of the reasons we were 5 pursuing active use of the Long Tunnel Extended Gold Mine. 6 My father sheltered there as a child in the 1939 fires 7 along with the majority of the township. So that gave us 8 some confidence that it was a reasonable venue to consider 9 when we were looking at what we could have as a refuge. 10 You also mention CFA radios in your statement. Can you explain 11 the use that can be made by you as a CFA member of a radio 12 in the town of Walhalla?---Yes, the CFA radio - because we 13 are in such steep sort of undulating country, quite 14 remote, the CFA radio, which transmits on a VHF frequency 15 works in only a very small amount of locations in 16 Walhalla. The community have put some resources and 17 established a UHF radio system which is marginally better 18 and we rely on the UHF radio system mostly. But that also 19 doesn't work in most locations in the valley of Walhalla. 20 However, the pagers do work very well, and that's probably 21 our best form of one way communication to us. 22 And is there some limitation over the areas in the town in 23 which you can get UHF radio communication?---There is, as 24 with mobile phone communication there is only a few 25 positions that Telstra will operate in the town. 26 I want to ask you about refuges. You say in your statement at 27 paragraph 14 that you had been shown a letter referring to 28 designated fire refuges. I will just have a copy of that 29 letter given to you. This letter is in volume 19 of the 30 court book and appears at (TEN.001.001.0269). The 31 important part of the letter appears at page 270. There

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2793 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 is a chart on that page. If you could have a look at the 2 hard copy in front of you, Mr Seear?---Yes. 3 I should have noted at the outset the town of Walhalla falls in 4 the Baw Baw Shire Council, is that right?---Yes. 5 On page 2 of this letter in response to a question about 6 location of refuges it is indicated that the Baw Baw Shire 7 Council has a number of refuges, including Walhalla and 8 then a number of others are listed. We will come back to 9 Walhalla, but you say in your statement that you regard 10 the others listed here like the dam wall at Moondarra and 11 Rawson shopping centre as unsuitable for residents of 12 Walhalla. Why do you say that?---Just the issue of 13 distance. The dam wall, the Moondarra dam wall is at 14 least a half an hour's drive from Walhalla. The Rawson 15 shopping centre is 15 minutes, I guess. The Thomson Dam 16 wall is around 20 minutes. Apart from Noojee, I'm not 17 sure of their locations of the other places listed. 18 Noojee would be a good hour's drive from Walhalla as well. 19 You would be better off driving to Melbourne. 20 Has it recently been brought to your attention that there is a 21 document called the municipal fire prevention plan for 22 Baw Baw which does refer to the Walhalla township as a 23 fire refuge area?---Yes, I have been shown that document. 24 I will just have another copy given to you. This document has 25 been circulated today. There are other copies if parties 26 don't have them. It is just one page in this document 27 which is at (TEN.025.001.0001). It is just page 17 of 28 that document is the only one of relevance today. 29 (TEN.025.001.0017). Mr Seear, I understand you didn't 30 write this document and you are not intimately familiar 31 with it, but at page 17 it says "The Baw Baw shire

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2794 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 currently has the following areas identified as fire 2 refuge areas." It looks very similar to the chart we just 3 went to except that it now says Walhalla township is a 4 refuge. How do you understand that reference there and 5 what do you understand to be the refuge in Walhalla?---The 6 refuge in Walhalla is the Long Tunnel Extended Gold Mine 7 as far as we are concerned. I'm not sure whether this is 8 referring to the cricket ground, Stringers Park, or the 9 Mechanics Institute at one stage was believed to be 10 nominated as a refuge. It is not specific there in that 11 document. The others seem to be specific. They actually 12 feature dam wall, Moondarra, Rawson shopping centre. I'm 13 not sure what they mean, but to us it is the Long Tunnel 14 Extended Gold Mine. 15 You say in your statement at paragraph 18 onwards there is a 16 mine known as the Long Tunnel Extended Gold Mine used as 17 an informal fire refuge. Now wearing its other hat, the 18 mine is a tourist attraction, isn't it?---Correct. 19 When is it open for that purpose ?---It operates - I'm not 20 familiar with exactly the tour hours, but it operates 21 seven days a week, during the day between 10 and 5 o'clock 22 at various times. 23 As you say in paragraph 19, the locals know it well and others 24 have used it in the past. Can you explain the layout of 25 the refuge itself? Is it surrounded by carparks and other 26 tourist facilities?---Yes, it has carparks immediately at 27 the entrance of the mine, it has two further carparks 28 between the mine itself and the entrance and the major 29 access track or road to the mine from the Walhalla Road. 30 It has a further carpark at the mine level itself. 31 I think there is a useful photo at attachment 2,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2795 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 (WIT.042.001.0020). There is a photo with people gathered 2 out the front of the mine in hard hats, page 0020. 3 Obviously that doesn't come from 7 February, but is that a 4 photo of the main entrance to the mine and the area in 5 front?---Yes, that's a good representation of the 6 entrance. 7 When people go into the mine, and I'm not necessarily confining 8 this to 7 February, but when they go into it to use it for 9 the purposes of refuge, what facilities are there to 10 enable people to wait out the firefront?---Well, I guess 11 it is not meant to be the Hilton Hotel to some extent. It 12 is meant to be a refuge for an emergency. The facilities 13 basically are fairly meagre. It is a tunnel, or in mining 14 terms they call it a drive, a straight entrance into a 15 hill. It does happen to have a fairly significant sized 16 chamber, which was a machinery chamber, which is 17 approximately the size of this room we are in here today. 18 It does have water. It does have electricity and 19 lighting, which is supplied by mains. But back up 20 generator as well. So it is certainly more comfortable 21 than being exposed to smoke and fire and radiant heat. 22 Is there anything there that is able to deal with the 23 possibility of smoke entering the mine?---Yes, there is. 24 There is a fairly significant amount of information that 25 we are familiar with that indicates that we wouldn't have 26 an issue with smoke entering the mine, and I guess I saw 27 that occur on 7 February, that really no smoke entered the 28 mine, and information back from the 1939 fires was smoke 29 didn't enter the mine. However, it has got a couple of 30 what would seem like crude precautions, but functional in 31 terms of working from knowledge gained from the '39 fires,

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2796 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 and that is a canvass cover that you can cover the 2 entrance of the mine to stop smoke or to stop convection, 3 I guess of hot air drawing smoke into the mine. Because 4 the mine actually has a ventilation shaft to the surface, 5 if you can imagine this in the base of a hill some couple 6 of hundreds metres up a chimney exiting the hill at the 7 top, there is actually some ducting material that can be 8 pulled down at that point, so if heat and/or smoke or a 9 combination of both entered the mine and that cover wasn't 10 down, it would hit that point, and then convection would 11 take it like a chimney in the house to the surface, 12 leaving a main drive from there or tunnel into the main 13 chamber is still a very significant area with what we 14 believe to be enough breathable air from the people we 15 have asked in the mining industry for a significant amount 16 of time. 17 In relation to this operating as a refuge, have community 18 members in Walhalla had any formal dealings with either 19 the council or the CFA about designating or running or 20 funding the mine?---To my knowledge, no. 21 Have you had any dealings with the mining company, Hercules 22 Mining Company, that actually leases the mine?---Yes, we 23 have. 24 What do the mine operators know about the use of this mine as a 25 refuge and what indications have they given?---The owner 26 of the Hercules Mining Company happens to be a Walhalla 27 resident as well. So he is very familiar with the town 28 and the mine and is encouraging us to use the facility as 29 an emergency refuge. 30 Is there any arrangement that has been made should town folk 31 want to enter the refuge essentially out of hours?---We

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2797 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 have been given permission from Hercules, if it is locked 2 at any time when we need to use it, to don't hesitate in 3 cutting the lock from the main entrance door to the mine. 4 You also explain in your statement that since February 7 one of 5 the other CFA members has prepared a brochure that has 6 formalised, if you like, the practice in relation to the 7 refuge. Can we go to attachment 3 to your statement, 8 (WIT.042.001.0024), and there is a two-page brochure there 9 headed "Walhalla: A relocation plan". I just want to 10 clarify. This has been prepared by an individual; it is 11 not a CFA document?---Correct. 12 It tells the reader what to do in case of a fire in Walhalla 13 for visitors, campers and residents. It suggests that 14 people become familiar with the town map. I think even 15 the map that we have been to this afternoon has been 16 updated since the fire; is that right?---That's correct. 17 It then tells you, "If a bushfire is approaching and the town 18 is under threat, you will hear the siren." Is the siren 19 set or sounded from the fire shed you have referred to 20 before or is it a mobile siren?---No, it is a fixed siren. 21 The siren is located centrally in town. If you refer to 22 the map, it is immediately behind the Long Tunnel Cafe and 23 Restaurant, which is in that general direction of the 24 junctions of those three roads. 25 Even though this flyer was prepared after February 7, was that 26 the practice prior to February 7; the siren would be 27 sounded?---Yes. 28 Who would sound it and in what circumstances?---Generally the 29 CFA or someone who knows where the - there are a number of 30 buttons that would operate it from a couple of locations. 31 It also refers to, "You will see CFA vehicles driving through

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2798 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the town alerting people." By what means did you or other 2 CFA volunteers alert people when using vehicles?---As 3 simple as just sounding the siren on the CFA vehicle 4 simultaneously to the town siren operating so that you 5 could hear it from any location in Walhalla. 6 The next page of the brochure explains where the mine is. We 7 won't go over that. But it then directs the reader to 8 drive or walk up to the top carpark. Is there a reason 9 for nominating that carpark?---In terms of it is the 10 closest part to enter the mine. 11 "Then go through the main gate and a CFA or a Long Tunnel 12 member will record your name and details." Is that a 13 procedure that you have decided upon in order to have a 14 record of who is inside during a fire situation?---Yes. 15 We implemented that prior to the 7 February fire and used 16 that procedure actually on 7 February. 17 Can we return then to the events of February 7. You explain in 18 your statement at paragraph 31 that on 6 February you 19 travelled to Walhalla but your family remained in 20 Melbourne. What was the reason for that?---The main 21 reason for that was the warnings given on the lead-up to 22 that day in terms of the news and the media indicated it 23 was going to be an horrendous day; just the forecast and 24 the wind and knowing the township, we decided that - we 25 had made an early decision with a number of family members 26 in the CFA for a start that we wouldn't all attend the 27 same fires together, but it was seen that it was going to 28 be pretty dangerous so only one of us decided to go. 29 On the Friday afternoon, you say in paragraph 32, you and 30 another volunteer did a doorknock in the town delivering 31 standard CFA pamphlets and the CD. Do you know how many

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2799 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 homes or roughly how many homes you managed to doorknock 2 during that exercise?---Most were unoccupied on a Friday 3 in the early afternoon. Most people who go to Walhalla 4 would come up on the Friday night. But we must have been 5 to 20-odd houses in town and commercial buildings. 6 There's not a lot, you know, a huge amount of buildings to 7 go to and there were only a few buildings that we knew 8 that weren't going to be occupied at all that we didn't 9 bother with. 10 Is that something that anyone in the CFA directed you to do or 11 is it something that you and Rhonda, the other volunteer, 12 determined to do yourselves?---It was actually an 13 initiative by the Erica brigade. I understand the Erica 14 brigade undertook the exercise to do the whole area, 15 Erica, Rawson and Walhalla, which was a good idea. 16 You say in paragraph 32, "I also advised anyone I spoke to if 17 they felt they were not prepared they may wish to consider 18 leaving"?---Correct. 19 Why did you give that advice?---There are a number of residents 20 that are either in an indefendable position, in my opinion 21 and the opinion of the other CFA members, and/or not being 22 in a physical state to be able to undertake the exercise. 23 So a number of people chose to leave on the Friday 24 afternoon and some chose to leave on the Saturday morning. 25 In fact on the Saturday morning you went and visited a number 26 of camp sites and repeated that advice, didn't 27 you?---That's always our main concern, and a number of us 28 did that on the Saturday as well, yes. 29 You say in paragraph 33 that you think about 20 or 30 campers 30 left Walhalla on the Saturday morning, although some 31 stayed behind?---Yes. We can't be exactly sure of the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2800 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 numbers, but it was in that vicinity because it is not a 2 regulated system of camping. It is quite itinerant. 3 If I can take you to when you first saw signs of smoke or fire, 4 you say in paragraph 35 you saw some smoke high up in the 5 sky at some stage and you thought it could be from the 6 Bunyip fire complex, which was over an hour's drive away. 7 That was your initial feel. Later you say you heard on 8 ABC Radio that the Princes Highway at Warragul might be 9 closed. Did that make you form a view about where the 10 closest fire to Walhalla might be and the route it might 11 take to the town?---We did. We thought that if it was 12 from that Bunyip or Bunyip complex fire I think it is 13 referred to and there was a threat of the Princes Highway 14 closing, it gave us a little bit more of an idea of maybe 15 where the location was, which was still a significant 16 distance from us. So it wasn't a major concern. We 17 formed the view at that point that we were just getting 18 smoke that looked quite high up and no embers at that 19 stage from that fire. 20 And you had your pager on during the day?---Yes. 21 And you had formed a view that the fire might pass through or 22 near Erica, so you would hear word from Erica if a fire 23 was coming that way?---The wind direction was definitely 24 from Erica, which is a north, north-west position from 25 where we were. If it was going to be the Bunyip fire 26 travelling at a great rate of knots towards us it would 27 have to pass Erica, Rawson and that district first. So we 28 thought naturally we would be alerted because they would 29 be the first hit. 30 As it turns out, the fire which did approach the town of 31 Walhalla that day was a separate fire that came to be

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2801 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 known as the Thomson fire, and you explain that in 2 paragraph 36. In paragraph 37 you explain that you went 3 down to the Thomson River to see what was happening there. 4 While you were there you heard a broadcast on the ABC. 5 What did you hear while you were there?---I heard a 6 listener that had phoned in the ABC at the time and the 7 listener identified themselves as being from Erica and 8 basically repeated what I could see at that point, that it 9 was black - this was I believe approximately 5 o'clock in 10 the afternoon - raining embers or starting to rain embers 11 and mud, as such. The caller said words to the effect 12 I think, "Hey, it's black. We can't see anything. We're 13 not sure what's going on." So that was the extent of the 14 call. 15 You were about three kilometres drive from the town at this 16 time?---Correct. 17 And, as you say, it had become so dark you needed 18 headlights?---Yes. 19 And you were wearing goggles because of the ash and 20 smoke?---Correct. 21 You decided to return to the town. You have later worked out, 22 haven't you, that the fire must have literally crossed the 23 river behind you while you were there?---I have seen since 24 in the daylight where the fire crossed the river and it 25 wasn't far from where I was at the time but couldn't see 26 it. 27 You say in paragraph 40 you drove back to the town and on the 28 way you could see an orange wall of fire in the distance 29 and you met Michael Proells coming towards you. He is 30 someone who works at the mine, isn't he?---Yes, he is from 31 the Hercules Mining Company, yes.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2802 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 You could both see the fire and you have attached some photos 2 at attachment 4. The first photo is at 3 (WIT.042.001.0027). There are a series of photos there. 4 Do they show what you could see around that time, namely 5 if we just scan through them, an orange sky 6 effectively?---Yes, it is probably worth mentioning that 7 these photos I took around 4 o'clock before heading down 8 towards the Thomson River to have a look at. So 4 o'clock 9 to 4.15. There is a series there of looking north from 10 our house and south from our house. They are not that 11 clear, I notice on screen, but it actually shows smoke 12 quite high up. That was where Colin Sinclair, our other 13 member in the fire brigade, called region 9 to see if 14 there was a fire closer to us that we were unaware of. 15 Region 9 at that stage were unaware of this fire as well, 16 and they indicated that it's most probably the Bunyip 17 Ridge fire. 18 If we go back to the time when you were heading back from the 19 river, you say at paragraph 41 you told Michael Proells to 20 drive south and tell everyone he came across to go to the 21 Walhalla Hotel for a meeting, and he told you he had 22 already started rounding people up. You then drove back 23 to the hotel sounding the siren. How much time had 24 elapsed, do you think, between you hearing the ABC 25 broadcast and you being in the main street sounding the 26 siren?---Five minutes at the most. 27 In paragraph 43 you say on the way you stopped to see Michael 28 Leany, the operator of the other hotel, the Star Hotel, 29 and he effectively said he would stay and defend his 30 property?---That's correct. 31 You then went to the Walhalla Hotel to meet with people there.

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2803 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 You say there were about 30 people there, some children, 2 although they weren't the local children?---That's right. 3 What did you tell people when you got to the meeting at the 4 hotel?---I guess words to the effect that they had an 5 opportunity to survive this if they immediately entered 6 the refuge and followed Michael Proells up to the Long 7 Tunnel Extended Gold Mine. 8 You say in paragraph 45 or you refer to using very direct 9 language, "There was little to discuss. People could see 10 with their own eyes that the town was facing a wall of 11 orange flame. Essentially, the discussion was to the 12 effect that people now had a choice to go straight to the 13 [mine], or die." Was there any panic?---No, I think most 14 people were astounded when they saw the fire, but we did 15 have a number of campers who at that point were attempting 16 to drive out of town and wanted to actually leave town at 17 that point, which we indicated pretty strongly in strong 18 language that they really needed to go underground 19 otherwise they were in huge jeopardy. 20 Only six people as far as you know, you obviously don't 21 necessarily know what everybody was happening, but it 22 seems to you that only six people stayed out of the 23 mine?---Correct. 24 In paragraph 46 you say that some people appeared to have 25 changed their minds. How did you get that feel and what 26 do you think happened in those moments for people to 27 abandon their plans?---I guess as part of the CFA our plan 28 A has always been to leave early or be prepared to stay 29 and defend, and that has been also our policy within the 30 township and us as active CFA members. That is plan A. 31 Plan B was we always had to deal with the campers and all

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2804 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the itinerants in tents. So there was no stay or defend 2 sort of opportunity there, and we knew they were going to 3 always be around us at that point. So the refuge was 4 developed in anticipation for those events as well. But, 5 given the refuge was there, there is no doubt on the night 6 and when people saw what we all saw, and there was a 7 window of opportunity to escape, some chose to take the 8 refuge option than to attempt to stay and defend. 9 In fact those who remained outside who elected to actively 10 defend included the owner of the hotel?---The Star Hotel, 11 yes. 12 Which I think you said had some features which made it a fairly 13 defensible property?---Yes, the siting of the hotel and 14 his water reserves and so forth, sprinkler systems, and 15 his preparedness and the significant asset, they 16 determined that they always activated their plan to stay, 17 which they did, and there were some others that did the 18 same. 19 All the other people went into the mine with the other 20 volunteers and you stayed out and patrolled the streets, 21 essentially?---Correct. 22 At some stage you say in paragraph 49 you tried to contact the 23 region to let them know where you were. You did that, 24 your rationale being that if the town was wiped out you 25 wanted to have left the message that you were all 26 sheltering in the mine?---Yes, our concern was that there 27 could be media reports after the event from the next day 28 onwards that showed everything wiped out, but we just 29 wanted someone to know that everyone was or the vast 30 majority of people were in the mine. 31 You say in paragraph 51 that you recorded the names of everyone

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2805 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 who went in, and that I think is the log that's referred 2 to in the flyer; is that right?---Yes, that's correct. 3 In paragraph 52 you deal with this matter of the six people who 4 didn't go in, the owner of the hotel, who effectively said 5 to you, "I will go down with the ship"; two others who 6 stayed there; one gentleman who indicated he would stay on 7 his verandah with a glass of wine; and another who did not 8 join you. The others went into the mine with Colin 9 Sinclair?---Yes. 10 During the fire you say in paragraph 53 you patrolled the town 11 and during those moments at one stage you and another 12 person moved a bulldozer so that that could be available 13 if that was needed?---Yes, we did. 14 Did you ever get a pager notification about that fire or the 15 risk of approaching fire?---We did, actually. When the 16 fire was discovered at Erica or north of Erica an alert 17 went out and we actually got a page, a page came over, 18 I can't be sure exactly what time, but a page did come 19 over to say that a fire was north of Erica, north of 20 Parkers Corner, actually, which is about a kilometre or so 21 north of Erica. 22 Do you know what time you got that page?---I think we got that 23 page after we discovered it at Walhalla. 24 In the event, the town was saved. The fire narrowly missed the 25 centre of town?---Yes. Look, it was just sheer luck with 26 the wind change. We were in definitely the right position 27 when the wind changed came through and it worked entirely 28 to our favour. 29 In paragraph 55 you say it was as close as a couple of hundred 30 metres from the first buildings in town and it would 31 appear that the wind change effectively saved the

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2806 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 town?---Correct. 2 People stayed in the mine for a few hours?---Through the 3 duration until we could establish what happened, yes, 4 everyone stayed in the mine or in the vicinity of the 5 entrance of the mine and some underground. 6 CFA back-up arrived from Erica at about 7.30 that evening, 7 although you can't be sure of the exact time?---Correct. 8 I think it is at paragraph 59 that you deal with the pager 9 message. You say you got a message at about 6 o'clock 10 regarding the code 1. Is that the same pager message you 11 referred to earlier?---Yes, that's the same. 12 I just want to finish by asking you about the aftermath. As you 13 say in paragraph 60, the town was lucky. You lost no 14 homes and no lives?---(Witness nods.) 15 In paragraph 61 you refer to people seeming to want someone to 16 take control during those moments when you shepherded 17 people to the mine. What's led you to form that view?---A 18 number of people after the event have actually praised the 19 CFA locally for some assertive control and in effect 20 ordering a few people to come to the mine that were in 21 houses and were previously going to just stay in their 22 home, whether they had a defence policy or not, even 23 though we probably have a significant amount of people who 24 were actually well prepared and who were actually going to 25 stay and defend, equally there were a number of people who 26 weren't equally well prepared and hadn't really considered 27 what they would do in a fire. We would knew that that 28 would always be the case, on top of a number of campers 29 who also needed direction, they I guess being probably our 30 major focus because they are not going to have the 31 preparation that you need anyway and they need some form

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2807 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 of corralling and assisting. 2 Did you find in your experience that some people who had 3 previously indicated to you their plan was to stay and 4 defend in the event went into the mine?---There was 5 definitely some people who were well prepared and were 6 prepared to previously stay and defend who, given the 7 opportunity, changed their mind. That's correct. 8 In paragraph 61, the last sentence, you say, "We now want to 9 put up a sign about the use of the mine as a refuge before 10 the next fire season." Have you or any other CFA members 11 made any steps or application towards getting a formal 12 sign like that?---Not myself personally and not to my 13 knowledge, but we would like to try to get a formalised 14 sign to the entrance. 15 Finally, you say in paragraph 63, "I believe some people will 16 now plan not to be in the town when there is a threat of 17 fire." Has that changed from the position as you 18 understood it before 7 February?---I think a number of 19 people have seen the change in conditions there in the 20 last three, four, five years and the fact that we have had 21 three fires now in four or five years. Yes, there's going 22 to be definitely a lot more people who will make a 23 decision not to be there on a total fire ban day. 24 Would your plan A in ideal circumstances continue to be that 25 your children not be in the town on a day like 26 that?---Yes, definitely. 27 MS DOYLE: Thank you. I have no further questions for Mr Seear, 28 but I understand that at least the state has brief 29 cross-examination. They no longer do. If there is anything 30 from the Commission? 31 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: What was the impression of the people who

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2808 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 had not experienced the mine after the event? Were they 2 generally grateful that the opportunity was there and 3 thought that it was a good opportunity to remain in safety 4 until the danger had passed?---Yes, I guess the answer to 5 that question is I was surprised at how many people were 6 appreciative of what actually occurred, both locals and 7 also tourists, as such. There was no doubt that they had 8 no idea what they would do after they physically saw with 9 their own eyes what we all saw. We all had the 10 opportunity of seeing it because we had to travel briefly 11 up to the mine and it was in full view of us before you 12 turn left and go into the mine. So, apart from the fact 13 that it was inconvenient for some, to be told to go 14 underground with dogs and cats and whatever else people 15 dragged in, there was definitely a feeling that at least 16 they were going to survive and at least someone was 17 directing them to do something rather than stand around 18 and wonder what is going to occur to them. 19 How long was the event from start to finish in terms of their 20 confinement in the mine?---Around a couple of hours, 21 I guess. It was interesting. We really lost a bit of 22 track of time because it started at 4 to 4.30, we went 23 into total darkness, and then we didn't really come out of 24 darkness. So time was sort of really lost. But I believe 25 it would be around two to three hours actually that people 26 remained at the mine until we gave them the all clear. 27 Some then took the opportunity to exit town altogether and 28 head back to Melbourne. In fact most of the town in terms 29 of the campers all cleared out at that point. 30 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: The document that was tabled today, 31 Mr Seear, the "Baw Baw shire council municipal fire

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2809 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 prevention plan", how long have you been aware of this 2 document?---Probably three hours. 3 Okay, probably there are no further questions. The issue of 4 the designation of Walhalla as a refuge, it did seem to 5 come as a surprise to you?---Yes, I would be interested in 6 finding where that is, but I'm not familiar with it. 7 I guess we are all volunteers too. So we haven't got a 8 lot of time to make work for ourselves, I suppose. I'm 9 not sure whether there are any other documents around, but 10 I'm not familiar with that one. 11 Just given the size of the population of Walhalla, would it be 12 fair to assume that if there had been consultation on this 13 plan that you would have known about it?---Probably a fair 14 point; yes, I would say so. I may have missed the 15 consultation process if there was one, but I'm certainly 16 unaware of it. The other members in the CFA locally 17 I have spoken to haven't been aware of any other formal 18 procedure. There was in the past, and I'm talking now 19 15 years ago, I believe it was - whether it was formally 20 recognised also I'm not sure. We had a mine immediately 21 to the right of the Long Tunnel Extended Gold Mine; 22 basically that same entrance, but if you walk into the 23 Long Tunnel Gold Mine, from that photograph with the hard 24 hats, you can turn right five metres from there and there 25 is actually another mine called the Renown, which is a 26 dead-end mine. That was the refuge, to my knowledge, for 27 around 10 years prior to some form of decommissioning some 28 time ago. I would imagine at that point in time I would 29 have thought the shire should have been aware of that 30 because it was operating for some time and it had 31 facilities in there such as blankets and first aid kits

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2810 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 and water. I think we did get funding at one point for 2 $1,000, from memory, from somewhere for emergency supplies 3 or solar lighting or something to that effect. But I'm 4 not familiar with that document, and I'm still puzzled 5 that Walhalla is stipulated but it doesn't stipulate where 6 there. I would be interested to see whether it is at the 7 Long Tunnel Extended Gold Mine. 8 CHAIRMAN: Just in that regard, I notice your statement refers 9 to the Hercules Mining Company, but this document refers 10 to the role played by the Walhalla Goldfields Railways 11 Inc. Is that an organisation which is known to 12 you?---Yes, that organisation run the train. There is a 13 tourist train also at the southern end of town that 14 operate between the Thomson River and Walhalla. There is 15 also or has been in the past a board of management that 16 had some control of the mine. That was disbanded, as 17 I understand it, some months ago and I think it has just 18 been recently reformed. It has a very small population, 19 Walhalla, but we do have a significant array of committees 20 and interests because it is in the middle of a national 21 park, Parks Victoria has some jurisdiction, Baw Baw shire 22 has some jurisdiction, DSE and then every committee that 23 people want to form have some sort of say, including the 24 hotel. 25 MS DOYLE: There is just one matter arising from that to note, 26 and that is at page 17 of that plan to which I took 27 Mr Seears does have a photo of what is said to be "refuge 28 area, Rawson shopping centre". If you still have that, 29 Mr Seear, the photo on page 17 shows what appears to be 30 the Rawson shopping centre with a sign, an "R"?---Yes. 31 Is there a sign like that out the front of the Long Tunnel

.CRS-WordWave:MB 11/06/09 2811 SEEAR XN Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Mine?---No, there's not. 2 MS DOYLE: That was just one matter arising. I don't know if 3 anyone has any issues arising in relation to that. If 4 not, may Mr Seears be excused? 5 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr Seears. You are 6 excused. 7 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 8 MS DOYLE: I should clarify the timetable for tomorrow as we 9 have had to move around a number of witnesses and 10 commitments. What we will do tomorrow is start with 11 Mr Lawson from AFAC, as he is the witness who will need to 12 return to South Australia. We will then go to Ms Edwards, 13 another AFAC witness, and then recall Ms Brown, the AFAC 14 witness who was stood down. There is a lay witness at 15 2 pm, Ms Scott. We have moved other witnesses around in 16 order to ensure that we can finish that timetable 17 tomorrow. 18 CHAIRMAN: It is contemplated that the calling of Mr Waller 19 will be postponed? 20 MS DOYLE: It will be postponed. 21 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Yes. We will adjourn now until 9.30 22 tomorrow. 23 ADJOURNED UNTIL FRIDAY, 12 JUNE 2009, AT 9.30 AM 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

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