WARNINGS 4 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report 4 WARNINGS Timely and accurate warnings may save lives. It is this possibility that has motivated the Commission’s lengthy examination of bushfire warnings issued in February 2009 and of what constitutes effective warnings. This chapter first considers definitional matters relating to warnings and the bushfire information and education that has been available in Victoria. It moves to an overview of the recommendations on warnings from recent inquiries, before considering what constitutes good warnings. The chapter then considers the warnings and information issued in Victoria prior to and on 7 February and the way in which the community received and understood this material. Finally, triggers and signals, sirens, and a telephony-based emergency warning system are considered. BUSHFIRE INFORMATION, WARNINGS AND TRIGGERS 4.1 There is a significant difference between the provision of general information about bushfires and specific warnings to alert the public of a particular threat. Ongoing information provided to the community about bushfires prepares the community and educates them on the appropriate steps to take if a warning is issued. In contrast, a bushfire warning is specific advice about an imminent event. Such a warning should propel the community into action in response to a specific threat — ideally, armed with the information and education that has prepared them to respond. 4.2 The evidence before the Commission has demonstrated that the community depends on (and has come to expect) detailed and high-quality information prior to, during and after bushfires. In addition, the community is entitled to expect to receive timely and accurate bushfire warnings whenever possible, based on the intelligence available to the control agencies (further discussion in Chapter 10). Though they are distinct concepts, the successful provision of information and warnings are inextricably linked. 4.3 In relation to the provision of information about bushfires, the Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Bruce Esplin, made the following comments when asked about the best time for the effective provision of bushfire information: In my judgment … it is in the years, the months and the weeks and even the days before the fire season in this case even starts. This is when the good work is done. That is where people … can do their planning away from the immediate threat of fire and come to a considered decision about what is the best plan for them as individuals, as a family ... I think it is very easy to see a campaign as being something that has effect in one year, but in my judgment, and certainly in my experience, campaigns such as this have a cumulative effect over time and what you do in any one year, it is not a very high chance that it will have a profound effect or a profound risk reduction, it is the impact over time that will make the difference.1 4.4 The success of specific bushfire warnings partly depends on the standard of the information and education provided to the community prior to its issue. In some instances, specific bushfire warnings — and use of ‘triggers’ such as the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) and sirens — will be less effective in the absence of high quality information and education campaigns that increase a community’s preparedness to meet the threat and its understanding of how to respond to a warning. 4.5 It is also clear that on receipt of bushfire warnings, people often seek further information and advice. For example, after receiving a specific bushfire warning, people often want or need further information from sources like 774 ABC Radio, agency websites or the Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL). It emerged during the hearings that on 7 February people were sometimes unable to access the information they needed to respond to the warnings they had received. In other cases, it was clear that in the absence of timely warnings, the public turned to other sources of information for assistance. This placed pressure on the agencies providing that information, and was a source of great frustration and stress for those seeking, but unable to obtain, information and advice. Victoria’s information and warning systems operated under great stress on 7 February. The systems broke down in a number of respects. The question of information is addressed in more detail in Chapter 5. 120 Warnings 4.6 The content of warnings is separate from the mode of disseminating warnings. The content of warnings raises considerations of drafting and construction, while the dissemination of warnings is about the means and modes by which warnings are communicated to the public. This includes existing modes of communication, such as radio broadcasts and web pages, and new and emerging technology, including Twitter and telephony-based warning systems. 4.7 SEWS (further described at paragraph 4.188) and sirens are generally not warnings. Rather, they are triggers, signals alerting the listener to the fact that a warning is to follow. They are a means of attracting attention and prompting the audience to listen carefully for a warning and/or to search out more information. Such triggers and alerts are important, and have a role in the suite of responses that should be available to deal with bushfire threat. BUSHFIRE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION IN VICTORIA 4.8 The publication of information about bushfires and materials designed to educate the Victorian community about bushfire risk has received considerable attention. 4.9 A Fire Communications Taskforce was established in August 2005 by the Department of Justice to undertake a whole of government approach to community education and communication about fires. This Taskforce coordinates communication activities and plans. It has overseen the implementation of a number of flagship projects, and monitors the success of its approaches.2 4.10 The State Government and the Country Fire Authority (CFA) have sponsored a number of high-quality campaigns to deliver key messages to the community about the risk of fire, including campaigns known as Fire Ready Victoria and Living with Fire.3 Those campaigns are explained in publications including: ■■ Fire Ready Victoria Strategy 2004–20074 ■■ Living in the Bush: Bushfire Survival Plan Workbook2nd ed (2008)5 ■■ Fire Safety Victoria 20066 ■■ Living with Fire: Victoria’s Bushfire Strategy 20087 ■■ Living with Fire: A Community Engagement Framework 2008–2012.8 4.11 Information and education programs provided by the State and the work of the Community Fireguard program have been instrumental in delivering messages about bushfire preparedness. These education programs are ongoing, and are an important part of the context in which key messages and advice are delivered in Victoria. It is clear that the CFA and the State have given considerable thought and effort to ensuring that, as far as possible, the community is well educated and prepared about fire risk before it receives any particular bushfire warning. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 4.12 Prior to 7 February 2009 the State Government devoted unprecedented efforts and resources to informing the community about the fire risks Victoria faced (paragraphs 4.81 to 4.92). That campaign clearly had benefits, but it could not, on its own, translate ‘levels of awareness and preparedness’ into universal successful risk minimisation on the day of the fires. Indeed, no campaign will have universal success. All campaigns are dependent for their effectiveness on the quality of information, the modes of dissemination and the willingness and capacity of people to hear, understand and act on the message. As discussed in the Introduction, this is a shared responsibility between government and the people. 4.13 This chapter takes lessons learned on the content and process of warnings presented to the Commission so far and makes recommendations for the next fire season. This report does not analyse the effectiveness of warnings across all the fires. Chapter 1 includes information about initial and critical warnings issued for each fire and Chapter 9 analyses warnings for the Kilmore East fire. Further evidence on warnings will be heard by the Commission in future hearings. 121 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report 4 WARNINGS BUSHFIRE WARNINGS: THE WELL-TRODDEN PATH 4.14 The review and analysis of warnings and their mode of delivery is not new. Successive inquiries, reviews and reports have considered bushfire warnings. Some have focused on warning content and construction, others on delivery systems. 4.15 Some matters highlighted in these reports have received government support and been implemented. Others, in particular the national adoption of standard bushfire warnings and the development of a telephony-based warning system, received insufficient attention in the years after their recommendation. 1984 REPORT ON ASH WEDNESDAY 4.16 The 1984 inquiry into the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires produced a report, On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria.9 That report noted the difference between warnings that simply raise general awareness and specific warnings about particular fires: … fire threat indicators which ushered in the 1982/1983 season served as a serious underscoring of the extreme risk facing authorities and communities alike. Whilst it is difficult to generalise with accuracy, it would appear that these indicators did help to enhance levels of awareness and preparedness. Whether this, in turn,