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CHAPTER SIX

PHILOSOPHY AND

Lecture1

The dichotomy between Jewish (medieval) and the Kab- balah and their academic and scholarly treatment as two mutually exclusive domains has been recently criticized from several quarters. Generally speaking, the historian of the does not write about the history of ( Jewish) philosophy, while his colleague, the stu- dent of philosophy, views the things of the Kabbalah as outside his purview. Critics of this dichotomy argue that this division of labor is artificial, erroneous and misleading. What, they ask, is the between philosophy and Kabbalah? The concern of both is “the other world,” both treat of “spirituality,” and both examine, each in its own way, man’s relation to himself (his soul), to the whole and to the prin- ciple of the whole, “the of all deeds, the Lord of all phenomena.” The Kabbalah is of course , and what these critics really assert is that the distinction between philosophy and mysticism is only one of semantics. For, they argue, although it is true that phi- losophy and mysticism have drawn water from different wells, in the final analysis the distinction between philosophy as such and mysticism as such is no greater than the distinction between any two philosophi- cal schools, and, as we all know, the various philosophical schools and trends take issue with one another on almost everything. This argument is ultimately based on the implied notion that the term “philosophy” itself has no distinct significance, i.e., that there is really nothing which unites everything that is within philosophy and distinguishes it from everything which is without it. These critics are as a rule also moved by another consideration. have had in the past “secret doctrines,” an esoteric teaching. The terms “secret,” “esoteric” and “mystical” would seem to be related, if not identical.

1 [ I was unable to ascertain when or where this lecture was given. Aryeh Motzkin had filed the text of this lecture in his “Unfinished Documents” folder.—ed.] 72 chapter six

Since in recent decades there is constant increase in the number of those who have come to see —the most important medi- eval rationalist—as having had an esoteric teaching, it would seem, then, that he was also a mystic. “The Great Eagle” exemplifies in the flesh the identity between philosophy and mysticism. And if a flame has betaken the cedar that is in Lebanon, what the hyssop that grows out of the wall do?2 In what follows, I shall try to point out the distinguishing charac- teristics of philosophy as well as those which define mysticism, and to show that the gulf which separates them is indeed real. I believe that nothing can be gained from blurring these distinctions, and that the attempt to fuse the two into one can have no salutary consequences. Emphasizing the separation between philosophy and mysticism, even if taken to extreme, is a needful antidote to what I believe to be an increasingly popular, though necessarily erroneous and misguided conception of philosophy and of mysticism alike.

1) The term Kabbalah means literally “that which has been received,” or “that which has been accepted.” And indeed the kabbalist, the mequbbal, receives and accepts not only the commandments and their daily performance, but also, perhaps especially, a transmitted author- ity which is handed down by each generation to its successor. Phi- losophy tout court accepts no authority. There were philosophers who performed—for various —those transmitted religious com- mandments, but an argument which takes the form, “This is a tradi- tion which has been transmitted to us through our master, , who heard his master, , say that he heard, his master Socrates pronounce on . . . ,” just does not exist. The way of the is to attempt to defend his position before what he posits as the most supreme court, the court of . Indeed, the philosopher has one aim, and one aim only: to bring about the rule of reason, upon himself and upon mankind. 2) An essential characteristic of philosophy is that no ceremony or rite of any sort is associated with it. To be sure, the philosopher is always born as a child of a certain community, a certain people, a certain reli- gion. If he should not turn his back on his people or on his fatherland, he will uphold or keep their customary practices. But these are not the

2 [Cf. B. T. Moed Qatan 25b.—ed.]