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The London School of Economics and Political Science Explaining Risk-Taking and Risk-Averse Behaviours in Peacemaking: A Prospect Theory Reading of the AKP Leadership’s Behaviour vis-à-vis Cyprus and Armenia Athanasios Manis A thesis submitted to the European Institute of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2015 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 83.253 words. Abstract It is not only war and conflict that can determine the political fate of a leader but also peace- making initiatives. Reversing long-standing national foreign policy choices that perpetuate animosity, friction and lack of diplomatic relations between states can put leaders in a precarious situation given domestic and external reactions. Accordingly, can foreign policy change of that respect be considered as risk-seeking or risk-averse behaviour on the part of leaders? Furthermore, if foreign policy change is considered as risk-seeking behaviour, then why do leaders and decision-makers spearhead and engage actively with these initiatives of peacemaking? This study, the first of its kind in the literature of prospect theory, analyses peacemaking initiatives under conditions of risk and uncertainty by shedding light on the decisions undertaken by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), focusing specifically on its foreign policy choices vis-à-vis Cyprus and Armenia in 2004 and 2009 respectively. In particular, it raises questions as to the extent to which Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s and his inner circle’s decision to promote the resolution of two long-standing diplomatic issues was risky and what induced them to actively engage with the cases at hand. Using prospect theory’s analytical tools, it is argued that the revisionary policies that the AKP leadership, in particular Recep Tayyip Erdogan, introduced and promoted were riskier choices compared to Turkey’s long-standing policies vis-à-vis Cyprus and Armenia. This raises questions as to what induced Erdogan to push for a solution of the Cyprus issue during the Annan negotiations between 2002 and 2004, and the Annan Plan referendum in 2004, despite Turkish Cypriot leader’s, Rauf Denktas’s reactions and his support from the Turkish establishment at the time. Similarly, what induced Erdogan to seek the normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations? This is a particularly puzzling question if one considers that Erdogan’s government signed the Zurich Protocols on 10 October 2009, which provided for the normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations without any reference to the Nagorno- Karabakh issue - the foremost security concern for Azerbaijan and one of Turkey’s main prerequisites for normalising relations with Armenia – but then shortly after reversed the process. Towards that end, I have developed questions concerning the riskiness of these options, the risk propensity of Erdogan himself and the factors that affected this. After a comprehensive empirical analysis on the basis of two new prospect theoretical models (a. prospect theory-diversionary peace theory model, b. prospect theory-external balancing theory model) that provide alternative hypotheses about what induces risk-seeking and risk- averse behaviour in cases of peacemaking through concessions, I argue that the prospect theory-diversionary peace model’s main assumption about the effect of internal threats on decision-makers’ risk propensity is validated. Accordingly, there is a direct causal link between, firstly, the internal strife that took place between the AKP leadership and the Turkish establishment at the time, particularly the Turkish Army; and, secondly, the risk- seeking propensity of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in revising Turkey’s traditional foreign policy. More specifically, Erdogan felt that he was in the domain of losses in terms of his political survivability and that of his government as well as in terms of the prospects for consolidating his power in the sphere of Turkish politics. In order to counterbalance the army’s subversive policies against the AKP and its clout in Turkish politics, he attempted to revise Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus and Armenia. It became clear to him that changing Turkey’s foreign policy in these two cases could, potentially, boost his personal image and that of his government amongst Turkey’s traditional allies, the EU and the US. In the case of Cyprus, EU member states directly connected the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey with its constructive role at the UN-sponsored negotiating table for a final settlement of the long- standing issue. In the case of Armenia, US institutions, particularly the US Congress and to some extent the US administrations had traditionally pressed for the normalisation of Turkey’s relations with Armenia and the opening of the borders. By revising, for the first time, Turkey’s long-standing foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus and Armenia, Erdogan and his government exhibited a risk-seeking behaviour compared to the reproduction of Turkish foreign policy that had traditionally taken place. The AKP leadership’s expectation was to increase its international popularity with Turkey’s traditional allies, the EU and the US, as a means of remedying the internal threat that the Turkish establishment, and particularly the Turkish Army, posed at the time to the survival and consolidation of Erdogan’s government. Parallel to that, the AKP’s revisionary policies were an attempt to discredit the Turkish Army’s international profile among Turkey’s traditional allies for being intransigent, while a potential final solution of the two problems would weaken the powerful domestic narrative that the Army had used to depict itself as Turkey’s guarantor of security against external threats. The frozen conflict on Cyprus and the enmity with Armenia had been important sources of legitimacy for the Turkish Army. Acknowledgments It is said that writing a PhD thesis is a lonely process. Maybe it is a general truth or maybe it applies in a few cases. No research has been conducted on that topic. No one knows. If the first proposition is valid, then I am an outlier. If the second proposition is valid, then I belong to the majority. While I was doing my PhD, I observed that progressing was directly proportional to my debt of gratitude to others. Writing the acknowledgements signifies for me a shy but confident recognition that I would not have been able to complete this thesis without their contribution during different parts of this process. More than being shy, I hate ungratefulness, so please allow me to name the people and the institutions whose assistance was crucial for carrying out this research. An debt of gratitude must first be acknowledged to my supervisors, Professor Şevket Pamuk and Dr. Spyros Economides. I am also very grateful to all my interviewees in Turkey who welcomed me into their homes and offices. They were all very willing to discuss my topic and enrich my research. I am thankful to all of them I would like to also take this opportunity to thank the European Institute and the Hellenic Observatory (LSE) for the scholarships they offered me. I want to thank our amazing PhD administrator, Loukia Vassiliou, who jumps over lakes and mountains to accommodate all PhD students’ requests and queries. I always believed in good luck and in London it has revealed its best face. I have had the chance to meet wonderful people and good friends; Ranj Alaaldin, Tim Vlandas, Yannis Moutsis, Serah Kekec, Yavwaar Islaam, Lisa Sezer, Ulaş Karakoç, Gunes Asik, Alison Johnston, Mariana Chaves, Abel Bojar, Sonja Avlijas, Madalina Dobrescu, Sinem Arslan and Vassilis Paipais, you have been fantastic friends and each one of you knowingly or not kept my moral high during the bumpy road of writing this thesis. I would also like to thank a lot Nichlas Meyer, Nadine El-Enany, Costanza Rodriguez d’Acri, Banu Burns, Giulia Pastorella, Margarita Markoviti, Eva Heims and Lukas Obholzer for being such nice colleagues and good friends. We spend many hours in the European Institute writing our theses side-by-side. I would also like to thank warmly my university teachers at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Bengisu Rona, Gamon McLellan, George Dedes and my university teacher at the Aegean University, Herkul Millas, for all their efforts to build my academic interest in Turkish politics, history and literature. I want also to thank Charis Papadopoulos, Christina Mani, Lina Mani, Lena Kodoyianni and Dimitris Papavasiliou for offering me support and for showing me a good time in Greece. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family, Maria Mani-Chamakou and Evangelos Manis, for their support all these years; most of all, I want to thank my dear and beloved sister, Evangelia Mani, for all her help and support. You have been a great source of inspiration for me. Table of Contents Chapter 1 .............................................................................................................................. 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 The Puzzle, the gap in the Literature and the Prospect Theory arguments...................... 1 1.2 Case Selection: The AKP Leadership’s Policy vis-à-vis Cyprus and Armenia ................. 5 1.3 Primary and Secondary Sources: The Great Importance of US Diplomatic Documents .

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