Npr 4.3: Yugoslavia's Nuclear Legacy
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Report: Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Legacy YUGOSLAVIA’S NUCLEAR LEGACY: SHOULD WE WORRY? by Andrew Koch Andrew Koch is a Senior Research Associate for the Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. ecent problems at a relatively unknown nuclear of Tito’s nuclear program, was established in 1950 in research institute in the former Yugoslavia high- Zagreb, Croatia.3 Subsequent Yugoslav nuclear-related Rlight the myriad of security and environmental research-and-development facilities included: the Insti- concerns associated with nuclear facilities in economi- tute for Application of Nuclear Energy in Agriculture, cally and politically troubled states. A series of articles Veterinary Science, and Forestry in Zemun (1959); the published by the industry journal NuclearFuel have Research Development Center for Thermotechnics and raised safety and nonproliferation concerns about the Nuclear Technology in Sarajevo (1961); the Institute for Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences near Belgrade, Ser- Geological and Mining Investigation and Exploration of bia.1 The articles list Vinca’s problems storing nuclear Nuclear and Other Raw Materials (responsible for ura- waste and providing physical security for its fissile ma- nium exploration); the Energoinvest Research and De- terial, and allege that Yugoslavia had a nuclear weapons velopment Center for Heat and Nuclear Engineering; the program under former President Jozef Broz Tito. Al- International School of Elementary Particle Physics; and though the articles may overstate the nonproliferation the Dr. Drogomir Karajovic Institute of Occupational aspects of the Yugoslav program, they help focus public and Radiological Health in Belgrade.4 Yugoslavia also attention on a potentially serious environmental prob- built several nuclear fuel cycle facilities, culminating in lem. This report seeks to explain the Yugoslav nuclear the completion of the Krsko nuclear power plant in program’s current troubles and to chronicle its past. 1983.5 At the height of its nuclear program, Yugoslavia had an estimated 1,300 to 2,000 engineers and scientists HISTORICAL SUMMARY and 600 to 1,000 technicians working in the nuclear field.6 Yugoslavia’s nuclear program had its origins in the period immediately following the Second World War. Tito’s government is suspected of having attempted The country’s first nuclear research center, the Vinca to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons. As Institute of Nuclear Sciences, was established 12 kilo- early as 1954, Yugoslav scientists were aware of, and meters (km) from Belgrade in 1948. The Jozef Stefan concerned about, Tito’s intentions with regard to nuclear Institute, a nuclear physics research-and-development weapons. Stevan Dedijer, the head of Vinca from 1952 center in Ljubljana, Slovenia, was founded soon after; to 1955, was critical of Tito’s unofficial objectives for construction of the institute was completed in 1954.2 the institute, namely to produce a Yugoslav nuclear The Rudjer Boskovic Institute, the last of three insti- weapon.7 This view was reinforced by a January 23, 1954 tutes and their affiliated laboratories that formed the core report from the U.S. Army attaché in Athens, Greece, The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 123 Report: Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Legacy which explicitly said that, “the Yugoslavs have com- have admitted that they reprocessed plutonium during menced a program to produce atomic weapons.”8 The the 1970s, but said it was “only a few grams for experi- program was allegedly supervised by the Yugoslav Fed- mental purposes.”24 According to Vinca officials, the eral Nuclear Energy Commission, established in 1955 reprocessing program ended in the late 1970s, its equip- under the leadership of Aleksandr Rankovic.9 Rankovic, ment was removed, and all the facilities were placed as Secretary for the Secretariat of Internal Affairs, was under IAEA safeguards.25 There is, however, insufficient also head of the Yugoslav secret police.10 open-source evidence to demonstrate that Yugoslavia was Yugoslav scientists investigated both uranium enrich- able to acquire more than a rudimentary reprocessing ment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. The capability. country’s first nuclear reactor, the RB heavy water zero- Tito’s scientists also worked on uranium enrichment power critical assembly completed in 1958, was built to technology. Vinca’s Laboratory of Physical Chemistry acquire reactor technology if Yugoslavia were to pursue housed a calutron and the Rudjer Boskovic Institute the reprocessing option.11 The reactor burns 80 percent housed a 16 megaelectronvolt (MeV) cyclotron, both of enriched uranium, is under International Atomic Energy which were used to research uranium enrichment using Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and is still in operation. the electromagnetic isotope separation technique.26 Sci- Yugoslavia continued research on heavy water reactor entists at Vinca have also studied uranium enrichment technology, completing in 1959 the 6.5 megawatt ther- using chemical, ion exchange, and laser isotope separa- mal (MWt) heavy water RA research reactor that burns tion methods.27 However, there is little evidence that any 80 percent enriched uranium fuel.12 The Soviet Union of these efforts ever proceeded beyond the research stage. provided the heavy water and enriched uranium fuel for Yugoslavia had research facilities studying the entire 13 both the RA and RB reactors. The fuel was not origi- nuclear fuel cycle. There was a pilot-scale uranium mine nally subject to IAEA safeguards and ownership of it at Zletovska Reka, and a larger one at Zirosky that be- 14 transferred to Yugoslavia upon delivery. The Yugoslavs gan mining in 1968, but was shut down in Jume 1990.28 also conducted research into heavy water production Belgrade also operated the Kalna uranium mine and mill 15 technology at a lab in Vinca’s Chemistry Division. from 1963 to 1966, producing at total of 900 kilograms The nuclear program’s focus changed following an (kg) of uranium dioxide (UO2) and 400 kg of uranium accident at the RB research reactor in 1958 that killed metal.29 The uranium was acquired in preparation for one worker and seriously injured six.16 The Yugoslav enrichment or to fuel the country’s reactors. Vinca’s nuclear program was re-oriented toward light water re- Laboratory for Reactor Materials was created in 1962 actor technology, although efforts to acquire heavy wa- and conducted research on metallic and oxide nuclear ter technology continued.17 Less than two years later, fuel fabrication technology.30 The lab developed the ca- construction of the 250 kilowatt (kW) TRIGA Mark II pability to fabricate uranium oxide fuel elements for the light-water research reactor began at the Jozef Stefan RA research reactor in conjunction with the Atomic Institute.18 The U.S. firm General Atomics provided the Energy Commission of Czechoslovakia.31 Due to turbu- TRIGA reactor with 20 percent enriched uranium fuel lent relations with the Soviet Union, Tito wanted an in- under a nuclear cooperation agreement.19 Although the dependent source of uranium fuel for the RA reactor, fuel was put under IAEA safeguards, ownership of it which was outside Soviet control. 20 transferred to Yugoslavia upon delivery. Although Yugoslavia ratified the Treaty on the Non- In conjunction with the reactor program, Vinca’s De- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, there partment for Spent Fuel Reprocessing was established were indications by Belgrade in the 1970s that the gov- in 1956 to investigate plutonium reprocessing and sepa- ernment had reconsidered the nuclear option. In 1975, ration technology, according to institute documents.21 A an article in the Communist Party newspaper Borba laboratory-scale plutonium reprocessing facility at Vinca, hinted that Yugoslavia might need nuclear weapons for which was reportedly built with Norwegian and Czecho- defensive reasons. The article said that, “today the pos- slovak assistance, operated from 1966 until 1977-78.22 sibility exists—both in the East and in the West—of The facility was equipped with four hot cells and repro- manufacturing nuclear weapons costing a few hundred cessed spent uranium metal fuel from the RA reactor dollars, instead of a few hundred million dollars as in using the Purex process.23 Unnamed officials at Vinca the past. Cheap and easy manufacture of ‘mini-nuclear’ 124 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1997 Report: Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Legacy AUSTRIA HUNGARY Rudjer Boskovic Institute; SLOVENIA 16 MeV cyclotron; Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences; Uranium enrichment research RA 6.5 MW heavy water research reactor; RB heavy water critical assembly; Ljubljana Zagreb Lab-scale plutonium reprocessing facility (closed); CROATIA Uranium enrichment research; Heavy water production research; Uranium fuel fabrication facility Belgrade Jozef Stefan Institute; BOSNIA 250 kW light water research reactor Sarajevo SERBIA MONTENEGRO Adriatic Sea Titograd Skopje MACEDONIA ALBANIA ITALY GREECE Figure 1: Key Former Yugoslav Nuclear Research and Development Sites weapons, capable of destroying entire units or headquar- slavia faced in the civilian nuclear field and because some ters of the aggressor, would have a sobering effect on Yugoslav military officers believed that nuclear weap- anyone contemplating invasion of our country.”32 In an ons would be an effective deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviet interview less than a year later, Colonel-General