Fragile Victory: Prospects for the Jokowi Presidency 25 July 2014

Summary

This week saw Joko Widodo officially confirmed as ’s next president. With his humble background and demeanour, popular appeal and reputation for probity, the coming to power of this political superstar has been hailed as a new dawn for the world’s third largest democracy. Yet when he is inaugurated in October, for a range of political and structural reasons Jokowi will be assuming the weakest presidency Indonesia has seen since independence. The consequences for politics and policy in Indonesia over the next 5 years are potentially far-reaching.

After two weeks of processing, the involvement in putting down the Papuan Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU) rebellion produced a ban on travel to this week announced Joko Widodo the US and the UK that is still in place. (‘Jokowi’) and his running mate as the winners of the 9 July Prabowo had what many believed to Indonesian presidential election, with be a better financed campaign and the 53% of the vote. The background is a support of a number of the major media tense six month period during which outlets. Most prominent among these Jokowi, the current Govenor of were Aburizal Bakrie, the Chairman and an Indonesian political superstar, of the political party, who saw his previous lead of 38 percentage controls the tvOne channel, and Surya points in March narrowed to 6 points in Paloh, who owns the Media Indonesia the days before the election. daily newspaper and the TV Metro television network. The former general The stalling in momentum was the conducted a disciplined campaign that signal achievement of his rival, Prabowo made a significant dent in Jokowi’s Subianto, a former general and close support, so much so that on polling ally and one time son-in-law of the day, the results were close enough former President . Prabowo had for both sides to claim victory. His been seen as an outside challenger, a campaign is now preparing to challenge nationalist and representative of the old the KPU’s decision before Indonesia’s guard and Indonesia’s vested interests. constitutional court. One of the legacies from Prabowo’s time in the military is an allegedly chequered Prabowo also built a powerful political record on human rights that has made coalition in the months following the some western stakeholders wary: his April parliamentary elections, which

Page 1 meant that going into polling day on 9 July his is an accentuation of the balkanisation of the coalition controlled 63% of the seats in parliament. legislature over the last two decades. Whether Prabowo’s legal challenge is successful or not, the grouping of parties which currently In terms of space to govern, the popular mandate support him – which he has promised to take into in Indonesia is less significant than the lack of a the next parliament as a “permanent coalition” parliamentary majority. This stems from a number – and the continued backing of Golkar Chairman, of changes instituted after democratisation in Aburizal Bakrie, whose party will play a critical 1998, all of which had the intended purpose of role in the next parliament, mean that he can preventing the rise of another autocrat in the expect to wield significant influence – and cause Suharto mould. The cumulative effect of these major problems – for a Joko presidency. changes means that the power of the president vis-à-vis the legislature is actually relatively All (too few of) the President’s Men modest. The most fundamental is the proportional representation system which makes it virtually When Jokowi takes office in October, as things impossible for a ruling party to command a stand he will become the weakest president majority of seats as a stand-alone government. Indonesia has seen since independence (in structural terms). His vulnerability arises both In addition, the Indonesian constitution cedes only from the marginal nature of his mandate (no limited power to the executive. The president presidential election in Indonesia has ever yielded has the power to propose bills and to veto the such a close result) and from his lack of a working deliberation of a bill, but ultimately the power majority in Parliament. to pass laws rests with Parliament, which also controls the budget. The president has the option Despite a lacklustre tenure as president and an of using ‘emergency regulations’ (a Perppu) which often uncomfortable relationship with Indonesia’s can be implemented immediately but which must parliament, President Yudhoyono managed to still be retroactively approved by Parliament. With secure more than 60% of the popular vote in the only 37% of MPs committed to giving him their 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, whilst his support, passing legislation for a Jokowi presidency coalition won 64% of parliamentary seats in his promises to be a constant and constraining battle. first term and 75% in his second. Unless there is a In practice, Jokowi will either need an effective shift in the current political landscape, Jokowi’s cohabitation with Prabowo (difficult, given how coalition will command the support of only 37% of the election has ended), or to secure the support MPs. This is a stark contrast to SBY’s government of one of the other two large parties who control and even more so to the 95% support commanded over 10% of seats: Golkar or the Democratic Party by President Wahid at the end of the 1990s, and (PD).

If Golkar Prabowo Jokowi Jokowi cannot count on defections: a quirk of 63% 37% the Indonesian political system, designed to maintain party discipline, means that power is PPP, 7% Golkar, 16% overwhelming concentrated in the hands of party PKS, 7% leaders. A law passed in 2002 stipulates that MPs PAN, 9% PDI-P, 19% who violate party rules or switch to other parties PD, 11% automatically lose their seat. This concentrates PKB, 8% the power-broking with Jokowi in the hands of Prabowo, SBY and Bakrie. There are, however, Gerindra, 13% NasDem, 6% reasons why both Bakrie and SBY may find it hard Hanura, 3% to consider moving. Fig 1: Indonesian Parliament, by candidate allegiance Source: Indonesian Election Commission (KPU)

% of Parliamentary seats Wahid Sukarnoputri Yudhoyono Yudhoyono Widodo under the control of... 1999-2001 2001-2004 2004-2009 2009-2014 2014 - ? The ruling party 10% 31% 10% 27% 19% The ruling coalition 95% 83% 64% 76% 37% (?) Parties outside coalition 5% 17% 36% 24% 63% (?)

Fig 2: Support within Parliament, by Indonesian President since democratisation Source: Institute of Developing Economies

Page 2 Some of these are personal and political. Both have the current ban on raw mineral exports, reduce strong ties to the Prabowo camp: Hatta Rajasa, dependence on energy imports, and restrict foreign Prabowo’s running mate, is SBY’s son in law, whilst ownership of Indonesian banks. Much of this has a Bakrie was promised an unprecedented ‘first large element of cross-party support in Indonesia minister’ role in Prabowo’s cabinet. SBY also has a and would have been part of a Prabowo platform poor relationship with , the also. Fiscal reform is a cross-party agenda, power behind the throne of the PDI-P. But rumours although the devil will be in the detail. have also circulated in Jakarta that whereas Prabowo was happy to offer Golkar and PD leaders Nevertheless, the opportunities to drive home the immunity from post-election anti-corruption president’s weakness will be hard to resist. Most drives, Jokowi was less forthcoming. vulnerable may be anything that involves taking on Indonesian vested interests or popular resistance The key question that may determine whether to change. A significant proportion of parties and Golkar shifts its allegiances to Jokowi is whether parliamentarians will have a vested interest in Bakrie, a staunch supporter of Prabowo who undermining any serious economic reforms. Anti- accompanied him to file his complaint against the corruption was one of the key planks on which Joko KPU, can prevent an internal coup. As a party, built his campaign. However, for a president with Golkar has always gravitated towards power: it a fragile popular mandate controlling only 37% of was the party of Suharto and has been a party of parliamentary seats, the majority of which belong every ruling coalition since independence. There to a party which does not owe its loyalty chiefly to is a local saying that in the event of a nuclear him, a wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign looks holocaust, the two things that would survive in difficult. We are unlikely to see a Xi Jinping-style Indonesia are cockroaches and Golkar. Since the purge in Indonesia under a Joko presidency. July 9 elections there have been rumblings inside the party about Bakrie’s apparent willingness to The numbers and experience suggest that a move into opposition. Should he be ousted, Golkar key feature of a Jokowi presidency may be may well take its place in the ruling coalition political paralysis, with a weak executive with under Jokowi. a slim mandate, at the head of an unruly and fragile coalition that is incapable of passing any President and Parliament substantial or controversial legislation. They will face a resentful and united opposition with a If Bakrie ties Golkar into Prabowo’s “permanent disciplined leader who despite defeat at the polls coalition” the outlook for President Jokowi is has built and fought his campaign on the basis of a complicated. With neither the overwhelming promise to protect the interests of his supporters. popular mandate nor majority control of We may also see a splintering of power, with Parliament, Joko may struggle to exercise the same influence more diffusely spread amongst kind of leadership he has shown in Jakarta. Rather prominent parliamentarians and ministers who find than a Modi-style parliamentary juggernaut, Joko themselves able to exercise more power relative to looks more of an Obama. Moreover, Jokowi’s great the presidency than under the SBY administration. asset as a campaigner may be his chief liability Jokowi is clearly a motivated and in many respects as president. Despite his exceptional popularity, transformational political leader. But those Jokowi remains a political outsider without a expecting radical change in Indonesia - at least robust support base of his own. Even his own in the short term – are likely to be disappointed. party, the PDI-P, owes its loyalty not to Jokowi but Pragmatists may want to wait a while before to the party’s leader, former President Megawati heralding a new dawn for Indonesia. who relinquished her own ambitions for a third presidential run in order to accommodate Jokowi’s bid.

To be sure, Jokowi may stand to benefit from the non-ideological character of Indonesian politics. Joko’s policy platform is a mix of the socialist heritage of the PDI-P with economic nationalism, and wide-ranging ambitions on reform, from tax collection, the fuel subsidy, agriculture, to education and the police. Along with a burst of road and port building he will want to maintain

Page 3 This Global Counsel Insight note was written by Ying Staton, Adviser at Global Counsel. To contact the author, please email [email protected]. The views expressed in this note can be attributed to the named authors only.

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