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Iatg 01.40:2015[E] INTERNATIONAL IATG AMMUNITION TECHNICAL 01.40 GUIDELINE Second edition 2015-02-01 Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations IATG 01.40:2015[E] © UN ODA 2015 IATG 01.40:2015(E) 2nd Edition (2015-02-01) Warning The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) are subject to regular review and revision. This document is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. To verify its status, users should consult the UN SaferGuard IATG project through the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website at: www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard. Copyright notice This document is an International Ammunition Technical Guideline and is copyright protected by the United Nations. Neither this document, nor any extract from it, may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, for any other purpose without prior written permission from UNODA, acting on behalf of the United Nations. This document is not to be sold. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY 10017, USA E-mail: [email protected] Tel: +1 917 367 2904 Fax: +1 917 367 1757 UN 2015 – All rights reserved i IATG 01.40:2015(E) 2nd Edition (2015-02-01) Contents Contents .................................................................................................................................................. ii Foreword ................................................................................................................................................ iii Glossary of terms and definitions ........................................................................................................... 1 1 Scope ............................................................................................................................................ 1 2 Informative references .................................................................................................................. 1 3 Terms and definitions ................................................................................................................... 1 4 Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................. 33 Annex A (informative) References ........................................................................................................ 41 ii IATG 01.40:2015(E) 2nd Edition (2015-02-01) Foreword Ageing, unstable and excess ammunition stockpiles pose the dual hazards of illicit proliferation and accidental explosion, which have caused destabilization and humanitarian disaster in all regions of the world. Crucial for adequate stockpile management is the identification of surpluses – that is, the portion of weapons and ammunition that does not constitute an operational need. When surpluses are not recognized, the entirety of the stockpile may continue to be seen as of operational value. Although not used, weapons and ammunition surpluses thus continue to fill warehouses and can thus pose a significant risk to safety and security. Defective stockpile management has been assessed as the norm rather than the exception in many countries. Often it is not only surplus stocks that should be the focus of attention, but the lack of appropriate policy for stockpile management. Governments remain unaware of surpluses; their national stockpiles remain a risk to public safety; and diversion from warehouses feed into crime and armed violence. In 2011, the United Nations developed the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) to ensure that the United Nations as a whole consistently delivers high-quality advice and support in ammunition management. Many stakeholders, including international organizations, non- governmental entities and national authorities, use these guidelines. The IATG, along with other conventional ammunition issues, are managed through the United Nations SaferGuard programme. Taking into account the diversity in capacity of States, three levels of ascending comprehensiveness are offered in the IATG, referred to as “risk-reduction process levels” (RRPLs). These are indicated within each IATG as either LEVEL 1 (basic), LEVEL 2 (intermediate) or LEVEL 3 (advanced). The aim of implementing partners should be to maintain stockpile management processes at RRPL 1 as a minimum. This will often reduce risk significantly. Ongoing and gradual improvements could then be made to the stockpile management infrastructure and processes as staff development improves and further resources become available. These additional actions would equate to RRPLs 2 and 3. The RRPLs are determined by calculating a weighted score of questions about a particular ammunition stockpile. A checklist is available at: https://www.un.org/disarmament/un- saferguard/risk-reduction-process-levels/. The IATG are reviewed on a regular basis to reflect developing ammunition stockpile management norms and practices, and to incorporate changes due to changing international regulations and requirements. The IATG are also available in multiple languages. The latest version of each guideline, together with practical IATG implementation support tools, can be found at https://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/. iii IATG 01.40:2015(E) 2nd Edition (2015-02-01) Glossary of terms and definitions 1 Scope This module of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) compiles the terms and definitions used in all other IATG modules. 2 Informative references A list of informative references is given at Annex A in the form of a bibliography which lists additional documents that contain other useful information on terms and definitions related to the stockpile management of conventional ammunition. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. 3 Terms and definitions The terms and definitions used throughout IATG have been approached from a top down approach as follows: a) ISO terms and definitions have primacy as they have already been agreed by the 140+ participant Member States in the ISO process; b) terms and definitions contained within relevant international treaties and agreements, (i.e. the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW); c) the next level is that terms and definitions used in IMAS,1 IDDRS2 and ISACS3 are used, as again these have been endorsed by the UN; d) the next level is regional terms and definitions (such as NATO AAP-6, Nairobi Guidelines, SEESAC etc); e) by this stage most terms and definitions have been covered, so at this stage appropriate national level terms have been selected; and f) finally, any remaining terms and definitions have been developed by the IATG drafting team. For the purposes of all modules of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines the following terms and definitions shall apply. 3.1 abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for use. 3.2 above ground storage storage in explosive storehouses, with or without earth cover, or in open stacks, at surface level. An accidental event at such a site may result in blast, fire and projections. 1 International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 2 International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). 3 International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). 1 IATG 01.40:2015(E) 2nd Edition (2015-02-01) 3.3 acceptor charge charge of explosive receiving a stimulus from another charge. 3.4 access control a system which enables an authority to control access to areas and resources in a given physical facility. NOTE 1 An access control system, within the field of physical security, is generally seen as the second layer in the security of a physical structure. 3.5 accident an undesired event, which results in harm. 3.6 accounting information management systems and associated operating procedures that are designed to record, numerically monitor, verify, issue and receive ammunition in organisations and stockpiles. 3.7 all up weight (AUW) the AUW is the total weight of the munition, or munitions, including packaging and palletisation. 3.8 ammunition a complete device, (e.g. missile, shell, mine, demolition store etc.) charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition or nuclear, biological or chemical material for use in connection with offence, or defence, or training, or non-operational purposes, including those parts of weapons systems containing explosives. (c.f. munition). 3.9 ammunition accident any incident involving ammunition or explosives that results in, or has potential to result in, death or injury to a person(s) and/or damage to equipment and/or property, military or civilian. 3.10 ammunition container an approved box, cylinder, tin plate liner or receptacle that is designed to contain explosive articles or explosives substances. It normally forms part of an ammunition container assembly. 3.11 ammunition depot an installation devoted primarily to the receipt, storage, issue and maintenance of ammunition. 3.12 ammunition process building (APB) a building or area that contains or is intended to contain one or more of the following activities: maintenance, preparation,
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