Attacking the Theater Mobile Ballistic Missile Threat
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Attacking the Theater Mobile Ballistic Missile Threat Major David E. Snodgrass A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of The School of Advanced Airpower Studies For Completion of Graduation Requirements School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama June 1993 ___________________________ ___________________________ i Contents Chapter...................................................... Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...................................................... iii ABSTRACT............................................................................... v INTRODUCTION...................................................................... vii Notes .............................................................................................. xiv 1 DESERT STORM.................................................................... 1 Notes.............................................................................................. 9 2 PROLIFERATION................................................................. 11 Notes............................................................................................. 18 3 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE GAMEPLAN............ 21 Notes............................................................................................. 39 4 MISSILE ATTACK OPERATIONS.............................. 43 Notes......................................................................................... 63 5 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................... 67 Notes ........................................................................................... 72 APPENDIX 1: Emergence of the Threat.......................... 73 Notes............................................................................................. 83 APPENDIX 2: The Long Search for a Solution............... 86 Notes............................................................................................. 90 APPENDIX 3: Additional Missile Defense Research..... 92 Notes............................................................................................ 95 GLOSSARY.................................................................... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................. 101 ii Acknowledgments Because the mobile missile problem is still very much an active issue, this paper incorporates current information from a number of sources. I could not have done this without the assistance of many people. I am indeed fortunate that individuals within the Department of Defense (DOD) and several DOD contractors provided essential documentation for this thesis. I likewise appreciate their constructive critiques. The conclusions in this thesis are my own, and I take responsibility for any errors or omissions. First, I want to thank Colonel John Warden, Commandant of the USAF Air Command and Staff College for graciously granting an interview concerning Desert Storm planning. Capt George Conner, USN, Chair of Tactical Analysis, Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. provided valuable information on search theory regarding mobile missiles. The following individuals furnished additional information and insights: Mr Gilbert Kuperman of the Crew Station Integration Branch, Human Engineering Division, Armstrong Aeromedical Research Laboratory and Mr Steven Sawtelle, Program Manager, Automatic Target Recognition, USAF Mission Avionics Division at the Wright Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Lt Col Dave Bostelman, Capt Dave Holmes, and Mr Dick Stalder, Air Force Materiel Command, Aeronautical Systems Center/YXT at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Lt Col Jim Welteroth and Maj Wayne Miller, HQ Air Combat Command/DRT, Langley AFB, Va.; Lt Col Dale Tietz, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)/TND, Washington, D.C.; Lt Col Doug Kupersmith, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Studies and Analysis, The Pentagon; Lt Col Richard Johnston, US Strategic Command/J533, Offutt AFB, Nebr.; Maj Dale Faust, HQ USAF/XORC, The Pentagon; Maj David Neyland, Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)/ASTO, Arlington, Va.; Dr Donald Baucom, Historian for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization iii (BMDO)/DR, Washington, D.C.; Dr Tom Keany of the National War College, Ft McNair, Va.; Dr John F. Guilmartin, Jr., The Ohio State University, Columbus; Capt Mike Reese, Air Force Materiel Command, Space and Missile Systems Center/MGSS, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.; and Lt Colson Brasch, Air Force Materiel Command, Electronic Systems Center/XRS, Hanscom AFB, Mass. Government contractors who provided valuable material include Mr Cecil Braeden, Boeing, Seattle, Wash.; Mr Ronald Pomeroy, Martin Marietta Electronic Systems, Orlando, Fla.; Mr E.J. Simmons, TRW Spacecraft Technology Division, Redondo Beach, Calif.; Mr Brian Morra and Mr Joe Alt, Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, Arlington, Va.; and Mr Paul Hedtke, Hughes Defense Systems, Fullerton, Calif. iv Abstract The United States and its coalition partners achieved a decisive victory over Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Despite the spectacular overall success, the coalition had more trouble than expected neutralizing Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles. Many third world nations, besides Iraq, possess menacing theater ballistic missiles. The trend over the past few years points to continued proliferation of these weapons. This paper reviews the performance of US systems against Iraq’s Scuds during Desert Storm, and examines current US efforts to defeat these potentially destabilizing weapons. Which technologies and systems will be most effective against mobile ballistic missiles? How should the United States implement selected technologies to deal with this challenge? This thesis covers the pros and cons of competing concepts to accomplish missile defense. It evaluates the most promising technical solutions to the mobile ballistic missile threat. On the basis of the extensive amount of time and research effort devoted to the problem, it is safe to say there is no quick, easy, or cheap way to locate, identify, and destroy mobile missiles and their launchers. To defeat the mobile missile threat with a high degree of confidence, the US must field an integrated system of both offensive and defensive weapons. The tasks seem clear: find the target, assign resources, then attack and kill the target. Our operational concepts should flow from these tasks. Obviously the mobile launchers complicate the search problem. Destroying missile factories or known storage facilities is not difficult. The central problem is how to find the missiles once they have deployed to the field. This paper addresses how best to accomplish attack operations against the mobile ballistic missiles before they launch. Offensive weapons, including manned and unmanned platforms, may perform this task. However, it is unreasonable to expect that attack operations can knock out all mobile missiles before launch. Active defense v provides a second layer of defense. It locates, tracks, and shoots down theater ballistic missiles during their boost, mid-course, and terminal phases. Passive defense consists of hardening and dispersal actions to minimize damage from any missiles that manage to penetrate the first two layers of defense. Finally, an effective Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) layer connects the other three layers in a unified whole. The United States Air Force, the Department of Defense (DOD), and government contractors are vigorously pursuing programs to enhance existing capabilities in all these areas. This paper evaluates various proposed solutions for existing deficiencies in attack operations and active defense. vi Introduction The problem of ballistic missiles has existed since the Nazis launched their infamous V-2 rockets at England during the Second World War. For more than 40 years, citizens throughout much of the world have lived with the threat posed by nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The reality of the theater ballistic missile threat came to life during the Persian Gulf War of 1991 when Iraq sent its Scud missiles streaking toward Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Scud caused more problems for the US and its coalition partners than any other weapon in Saddam Hussein’s inventory. The danger seems clear enough. What are we going to do about it? Since President Reagan called for a defense against ballistic missiles in 1983, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, or SDIO, has been searching for solutions. In May 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin changed the focus away from the Cold War threat to more limited, regional threats. He also changed the name of the organization to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Besides BMDO, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) also underwent a recent name change. The Clinton Administration dropped the word “Defense,” and the organization’s new moniker is the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The Army, Navy, Air Force, BMDO, and ARPA are all hunting for solutions to the mobile missile problem. The new top defense priority is Theater Missile Defense (TMD), with National Missile Defense (NMD) as the second priority. This change reflects the realities of the new world order. The danger of third world countries employing so-called theater ballistic missiles has increased. The probability of a nuclear exchange with the Russians is now lower than at any time since the late 1940s,