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The Role of Air Power in Twenty-First Century Coercive Diplomacy

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The Role of Air Power in Twenty-First Century Coercive Diplomacy THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY Gretchen Fryar A thesis submitted to the University of New South Wales in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy. School of Humanities and Social Sciences The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy December 2012 THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY DECLARATION ii THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY ABSTRACT Coercive diplomacy as a strategy seeks to prevent crises from escalating into conflict, by using a combination of diplomatic measures and the threat, or if necessary the limited application, of force to change a belligerent’s behaviour. This thesis examines the dynamics of coercive diplomacy and the role of air power as a key instrument of coercion. The international response to the Libyan crisis in 2011 is a contemporary case where air power was employed following unsuccessful diplomatic efforts and non-military methods of coercion. In this instance, the United Nations (UN) declared objective was for Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to end the violence against Libyan civilians, re-affirming his responsibility to protect the population, and subsequently authorising UN member states to protect civilians under threat of attack. When the violence continued, the leaders of the major contributing countries also sought to coerce Colonel Gaddafi to relinquish power. The strategy of coercive diplomacy was largely unsuccessful in the Libyan crisis primarily due to the disproportionate outcome sought—regime change. The combination of diplomacy, sanctions and military force did not result in Gaddafi changing his aggressive behaviour or capitulating, and the air campaign itself did not follow a ‘textbook’ case of coercive diplomacy, as force was applied at the high end of the coercive spectrum from the outset. Indeed, elements of the campaign comprised a limited war. Air power, however, was instrumental in meeting the UN mandate by protecting Libyan civilians from their own government forces. Its application in Libya has reinforced that while military force is likely to remain the coercive option of ‘last resort’, air power has become an attractive option of choice where non-military methods have failed. Air power can be activated quickly, it removes the requirement for a sustained commitment of ‘boots on the ground’, and it can be employed in a precise and discriminate manner. The conduct of the air campaign in Libya illustrated the importance of coalition operations and the risks of an over-reliance on the United States. Most significantly for Australia, it highlighted the challenges that might confront a small air force seeking to employ coercive air power in the future. iii THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My immediate debt of gratitude goes to three of the intellectuals at the Air Power Development Centre (APDC): my academic supervisor Dr Sanu Kainikara for his infinite wisdom, patience and confidence; my military supervisor and Director of the APDC Group Captain (Dr) Mark Hinchcliffe, who inspired me to research the subject of coercive diplomacy and provided constant reassurance along the way; and Group Captain Phil Edwards, who is directly responsible for generating my interest in air power, who took an infinite amount of time to discuss ideas with me, and who demonstrated through both words and by example that you do not need to be at the ‘sharp’ end to be a strategist and air power specialist. These three gentlemen have been an inspiration to me, and I sincerely thank them for their interest in my project and my intellectual development. I would also like to thank the Chief of Air Force Fellow at ADFA, Group Captain (Dr) Callum Brown for his counsel, and my two previous supervisors at the School of Postgraduate Studies, Wing Commanders Peter Reynolds and Mike Warby for their encouragement and support, giving me both the approval and confidence to proceed with the CAF Fellowship. Finally, my thanks go to my husband Glen for understanding and supporting my passion for international relations, (and for building my study!), and my young daughters Claire and Ally, who hopefully in a few years time will finally understand why, for a year, their mum was ‘always on the computer’. iv THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION ii ABSTRACT iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv TABLE OF CONTENTS v LIST OF FIGURES viii LIST OF ACRONYMS ix MAP OF LIBYA x REGIONAL MAP: LIBYA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRIES xi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 A historical perspective 1 1.2 Literature review 4 1.3 Thesis outline 10 CHAPTER 2. THE THEORY OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 2.1 Coercive diplomacy – an oxymoron? 14 2.2 National power and its application 15 2.3 Four C’s: capability, credibility, communication and commitment 19 2.4 1960’s smart power: the Cuban Missile Crisis 20 2.5 Effects in the cognitive domain 24 2.6 Perception and misperception 28 2.7 The notion of rationality 30 2.8 Conclusion 31 CHAPTER 3. TOOLS OF HARD POWER: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND MILITARY FORCE 3.1 Introduction 33 3.2 Economic sanctions 33 3.3 Options for military force 37 3.3.1 Influence and shape 39 3.3.2 Deter 40 3.3.3 Coerce 42 3.3.4 Destroy 46 3.4 Conclusion 46 CHAPTER 4. THE POTENTIAL OF AIR POWER 4.1 Introduction 48 4.2 The modern air power theorists 48 4.3 The advantages of air power 50 4.3.1 Speed of reaction and responsiveness 50 4.3.2 No ‘boots on the ground’ 51 4.3.3 Ability to discriminate 52 4.3.4 Precision 53 4.3.5 Ability to apply proportionate amounts of force 53 v THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 4.3.6 Technological edge 54 4.3.7 Versatility 54 4.3.8 Psychological impact 55 4.4 The coercive potential of air power: gradual escalation 56 4.4.1 Deterrence 57 4.4.2 ISR 57 4.4.3 Force preparation and mobilisation 58 4.4.4 Passive missions 59 4.4.5 Control of the air 59 4.4.6 The establishment of no-fly zones 60 4.4.7 Electronic warfare 61 4.4.8 Strike 62 4.4.9 Post-conflict monitoring 62 4.5 The limitations of air power 63 4.5.1 Impermanence 63 4.5.2 Reliance on accurate intelligence 64 4.5.3 Cost 64 4.5.4 Political challenges 64 4.6 The effective and appropriate use of air power 65 4.7 Conclusion 66 CHAPTER 5. LIBYA 1969-2011: THE GADDAFI YEARS 5.1 Introduction 68 5.2 The political landscape of Libya 69 5.3 The ‘Arab Spring’ 71 5.4 International intervention in Libya 73 CHAPTER 6. AIR POWER OVER LIBYA 6.1 Introduction 78 6.2 The air campaign – Operation Odyssey Dawn 79 6.3 The air campaign – Operation Unified Protector 81 6.4 Concurrent diplomatic efforts 84 6.5 The end for Gaddafi 85 6.6 A military success 85 6.7 A case of mission creep 86 CHAPTER 7. LIBYA 2011: MATCHING THEORY TO PRACTICE 7.1 Introduction 90 7.2 Jakobsen’s framework 91 7.3 Jentleson’s framework 97 7.4 Conclusions 102 CHAPTER 8. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA 8.1 Introduction 104 8.2 Coalition operations 105 8.3 Australia’s relationship with the US 108 vi THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 8.4 Challenges for the RAAF 111 8.4.1 Preparedness 112 8.4.2 Adaptability and flexibility 113 8.4.3 Capacity as well as capability 114 8.4.4 Political dimension 116 8.5 Conclusion 116 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 118 BIBLIOGRAPHY 126 vii THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Triple-order effects 26 Figure 2: Coercive diplomacy and the use of force 39 viii THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY LIST OF ACRONYMS AAR Air to Air Refuelling ADF Australian Defence Force AU African Union AWAC Airborne Warning and Control CAF Chief of Air Force EU European Union EW Electronic Warfare GCC Gulf Cooperation Council HRW Human Rights Watch IADS Integrated Air Defence System ICC International Criminal Court INTERFET International Force in East Timor IRA Irish Republican Army ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System MAD Mutually Assured Destruction NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEBA National Effects Based Approach NEO National Evacuation Operations NFZ No-Fly Zone NTC National Transition Council (Libya) OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference PIIE Peterson Institute for International Economics PLO Palestine Liberation Organization R2P Responsibility to Protect RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAF Royal Air Force ROE Rules of Engagement RUSI Royal United Services Institute SAM Surface to Air Missile UAE United Arab Emirates UAV Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution US United States USAF United States Air Force USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WWII World War II ix THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY MAP OF LIBYA Source: UN Cartographic Section 2012 http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/libya.pdf x THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY REGIONAL MAP: LIBYA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRIES Source: http://www.yourchildlearns.com/online-atlas/africa/images/libya.gif xi THE (AIR) POWER TO COERCE: THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN 21ST CENTURY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The threat of war has always been somewhere underneath international diplomacy.
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