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China Entering a New Political Economy Cycle.Pdf CHINA ENTERING A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY CYCLE The World According to Xi Jinping Thought Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions December 2017 Citi is one of the world’s largest financial institutions, operating in all major established and emerging markets. Across these world markets, our employees conduct an ongoing multi-disciplinary global conversation – accessing information, analyzing data, developing insights, and formulating advice for our clients. As our premier thought-leadership product, Citi GPS is designed to help our clients navigate the global economy’s most demanding challenges, identify future themes and trends, and help our clients profit in a fast-changing and interconnected world. Citi GPS accesses the best elements of our global conversation and harvests the thought leadership of a wide range of senior professionals across our firm. This is not a research report and does not constitute advice on investments or a solicitation to buy or sell any financial instrument. For more information on Citi GPS, please visit our website at www.citi.com/citigps. Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions December 2017 Li-Gang Liu Johanna Chua Chief Economist for China Head of Asia Pacific Economic and Market Analysis +852-2501-2718 | [email protected] +852-2501-2357 | [email protected] Oscar Choi David Lubin profile Head of China Equity Research Head of Emerging Market Economics +852-2501-2737 | [email protected] +44-20-7986-3302 | [email protected] Xiaowen Jin Jin-Wook Kim Asian Economics Team Asian Economics Team +852-2501-2766 | [email protected] +852-2501-2775 | [email protected] Tracy Xian Liao Michel Nies Commodities Strategist Emerging Markets Economics Team +852-2501-2799 | [email protected] +44-20-7986-3303 | [email protected] Jerry Peng, CFA Xiangrong Yu China Research Team Senior China Economist +852-2501-2462 | [email protected] +852-2501-2754 | [email protected] © 2017 Citigroup December 2017 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions 3 CHINA ENTERING A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY CYCLE The World According to Xi Jinping Thought Kathleen Boyle, CFA With China’s 19th Party Congress now behind us, the primary takeaway is that Global Head & Managing Editor, Citi GPS President Xi Jinping has cemented his role as the most powerful leader in China since President Mao Zedong. This will pave the way for him to extend his term beyond 2022 and put more weight on the economic policies and priorities that he advocates. Given that the ‘China dependence’ of many countries has risen considerably as China has become the largest contributor to global growth (at 40% vs. the U.S. at 16% in 2016), it is important to take a deeper look into the economic policies and initiatives unveiled at the Party Congress. In the report that follows, we outline what was said, examine the implications for Chinese growth based on the policies announced, and also examine the effect of these policies on the rest of the world. Although specific GDP growth targets weren’t mentioned at the Party Congress, the Communist Party of China has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to doubling China’s 2010 GDP and per capita income by 2020, which we estimate would require annual growth of at least 6.3%, which we view as feasible. Economic stability and risk control will continue to be a high priority for China to avoid a hard- landing scenario and maintain a minimum level of acceptable growth no matter the rhetoric. Given the consolidation of political power, we expect more breakthroughs, in industrial upgrading (e.g., Made in China 2025), rural land reforms, second-round urbanization (e.g., the Xiong’an new district, the Yangtze River economic belt, and the Great Bay area), financial reforms and further opening up (e.g., the Belt Road Initiative) as well as environmental protection. We see the accelerated implementation of the ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative leading to China being best-positioned competitively in the communication equipment, advanced railway equipment, aerospace equipment, new energy vehicles and shipbuilding sectors. If the Chinese government is committed to providing significant state resources, even less well-positioned sectors could make rapid inroads. This could create greater competitiveness challenges in other countries who are already significant players in these targeted industries, and hurting countries with a high percentage of their GDP in these targeted industries, particularly countries in Central & Eastern Europe, countries with a large percentage of vehicle production (e.g., Mexico and Germany) and certain Asian countries (i.e., Singapore, Korea, and Thailand). The emphasis on accelerating financial reforms should lead growth in China’s financial markets to the size of U.S. markets by 2025 — a tripling in the size of the bond market to $37.5 trillion, stock market capitalization rising to $31 trillion and banking assets of $68 trillion. In addition, the implementation of the rural vitalization strategy should unlock $20.6 trillion in rural farm wealth. Finally, the new emphasis on environmental issues and top leadership’s determination to solve prominent environmental problems will have an effect on commodities and those countries that export commodities to China. However, combined with the new industrial manufacturing emphasis, there are countries that are both potential winners and losers. © 2017 Citigroup China’s Reform Policies Implications Have Global Spillover SIX PRIMARY THEMES FROM THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 Accelerating Revitalizing Coordinating Reforming Belt and Road Accelerating Industrial the Rural Regional State-Owned Initiative and Financial Upgrading and Sector Development Enterprises and Opening Up Reforms Innovation-Driven and Accelerating Restructuring Development Second-Round SASACs Urbanization SECTORS LIKELY TO RECEIVE THE MOST ATTENTION AND SUPPORT gy Tech er nol En og nufac y otech Ma tur w Bi an d in e d B e g N i c o n M a e v ture T ul e d d c c ater i M r h ia i l olo n w s c hn gy A g e c i q a e A N T u l n n o r e i s e t a d o m r M o f n I © 2017 Citigroup THE WORLD’S DEPENDENCE ON CHINA HAS INCREASED China contributed 1 percentage point to global GDP growth, more than 40% of the total China’s share of goods exported has risen substantially and is now over 20% in 5 countries Taiwan 2014 - 2016 37% Australia 2000 - 2002 32% Chile Korea 26% 25% Peru 21% 19% 12% 6% 6% 7% CHINA’S NEW FOCUS ON ADVANCED MANUFACTURING WILL CREATE CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES WHO ARE ALREADY SIGNIFICANT PLAYERS IN INDUSTRIES TARGETED BY CHINA Region/Country Affected (% of GDP in targeted industries) Central and Eastern Europe Asia SK 40% SG 37% CZ HU 27% 27% BG TW 22% 22% MY KR 15% 14% 6 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions December 2017 Contents China Entering a New Political Economy Cycle 7 “New Era” and Policy Priorities — Growth Still Matters 12 Key Economic Themes 13 Financial Markets Opening Quickens 28 Shifting Towards a New Sequencing Strategy 28 Bond Market Opening Is Instrumental in Accelerating Financial Market Development 28 A More Modest Path for Equity Market Liberalization 29 How Large Could China’s Financial Markets Be in 2025? 30 Implications for Capital Inflows 30 What This Means for the Rest of the World 32 China-Specific Reform Policies that Impact ROW Primary via an Impact on China’s Growth 32 Mapping China-Specific Reforms to the Rest of the World 33 China Reform Policies that Impact ROW that goes beyond its impact on China’s Growth 35 On Global China Dependence 40 Commodities – Low Spare Capacity and High Price Volatility Could be the ‘New Normal’ 44 Chinese Commodities Demand Should Stay Supported and Supply-Side Reforms Might Generate Higher Price Volatility 44 The "War on Pollution" Looms Large 45 Exports of Semi-Processed Manufacturing Goods are Set to Fall 48 China Equities: What Caught Our Eyes 49 New Bottom Lines 49 Innovation and Industrial Upgrade 49 Rural Area and Cities 50 © 2017 Citigroup December 2017 Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions 7 China Entering a New Political Economy Cycle Li-Gang Liu The once-in-five-years pivotal event for China – the 19th Party Congress – is now Chief Economist for China past us and the primary takeaway is that President Xi Jinping has cemented his role as the most powerful leader in China since President Mao Zedong. This will pave Xiangrong Yu the way for him to extend his term beyond 2022 and throw his weight behind the Senior China Economist economic policies and priorities that he advocates. In this report, we dissect the th political appointments and public statements surrounding the 19 Party Congress to Xiaowen Jin assess what the event means economically and politically for China and the rest of Asian Economics Team the world. China’s Greater Centralization of Power Under President Xi President Xi has now secured his status as China’s most powerful leader since President Mao. The most important indication of his increased power is the appointment of five new like-minded members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), none of whom are in their 50s, which would suggest there are no apparent heirs to President Xi, assuming the age-limit rules are upheld (which is likely given the time-honored age-limit rule known as quishang baxia, or “in at 67, out at 68”, was honored with the announcement of the new Central Committee members during the Party Congress). The new Politburo Standing Committee members — Li Zhanshu (67, rank 3), Wang Yang (62, rank 4), Wang Huning (62, rank 5), Zhao Leji (60, rank 6) and Han Zheng (63, rank 7) — were all selected from the group of 25 Politburo members announced at the 18th Party Congress.
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