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Discourse Reform and the People's Republic of China

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Discourse Reform and the People's Republic of China International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程 Discourse Reform and the People’s 治 Republic of China:政 An 大Evaluation of 立 Possibilities and Implications學 论述改革与中华人民共和国：可行性國 ‧ ‧ N 及应用评估 a y t t i i s o r n e a v l i C Un hen gchi ULYSSES Z.Y.(張越) MCGUINNESS Advisor: DAVID J. LORENZO July, 2020 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420 ABSTRACT What are the prospects for changing the People’s Republic of China’s international behavior by facilitating changes to its internal discourse environment? This thesis evaluates the possibilities and implications of inducing changes to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping’s conception of Chinese National Rejuvenation, with a particular aim of discounting the importance of territorial integrity; thereby moderating PRC behavior to transition away from irredentism. The theoretical framework of this study combines Hayden White’s conceptualization of metahistorical narratives, with David E. Apter and Tony Saich’s model for discourse creation and change. Under this framework, I use Taiwan as a single case study to test against one conceptualization of strategic communications, utilized as a vehicle for discourse change. This study is organized into three broad parts with intervening segments. First, this study presents the introduction and theoretical background. Then, this study proceeds to reflect upon contemporary U.S. policy in order to clarify a working set of guidelines and assumptions. The final portion focuses on analyzing the potentials and efficacy of discourse change by using strategic communications directed towards Xi Jinping. The findings of this evaluation suggest that the implementation of strategic communication治, as conceived of by this study, is not likely to result in changes to deeply embedded sentiments政 of territorial大 integrity. Nor, as a consequence, result in profound changes to “National立 Rejuvenation.” These are due to a combination of the limitations of Xi’s power as well as a lack of a cohesive national vision on the part of the United 學 States. Be that as it may, these methods may continue to reinforce short-term deterrence against the PRC’s decision to change 國the regional status-quo. Put together, such methods may afford the United States some degree of flexibility by providing necessary time to coalesce around a national narrative to guide a new grand strategy. ‧ ‧ N a y t t i i s o r n e a v l i Ch Un engchi I DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I began this project envisioning a start to my government service by seeking to make an infinitesimal contribution to US-PRC policy. Over time, however, it grew into a piece reflecting on the nature of US-PRC relations, the interconnection between domestic and foreign politics back home—as within the PRC—but importantly my own slow realization of self-defined purpose. This thesis was born out of numerous discussions with far more capable acquaintances, friends, mentors, and family. For that, I have a deep debt of gratitude for all who have contributed to this process. I want to thank my advisor Professor David J. Lorenzo for humoring my thoughts and frequently lackluster ideas—many of which appeared decent prior to our conversations! Dr. Lorenzo made all of this possible by indulging in my often overly ambitious ideas on discerning the nature of the world and political philosophy. For that, I have a tremendous amount of thanks. I also want to extend thanks my committee chair,治 Professor Hans Tung (童涵浦) for patiently provided invaluable answers and 政expert opinion to 大many a naïve question I have directed his way. His patience, in-spite立 of our conversations usually lasting longer than the allotted time, has been greatly appreciated and has done much to temper my own ignorance on a 學 variety of subjects. Dr. Charles Wu (吳崇涵) also provided much needed direction, in terms of challenging questions and assumptions,國 on top of directing me to certain sources. He also has my thanks. ‧ Fulbright Taiwan, and‧ the Foundation for Scholarly exchange (FSE) staff all have my N sincerest appreciation for making my experience in Taiwan possible. I wish to thank Dr. Randall a y t Nadeau in particular for leadingt Fulbright Taiwan through the unprecedentedi challenge that is i s the COVID-19 pandemic. In additiono , I also want to thank Dr. Williamr Vocke for his generosity and guidance at times when it wasn much needed. e a i v l C n A heartfelt thank you also goes outh toe my fellow Fulbrighti U Student Fellows and classmates. Second Lieutenant Benjamin Dennn andg Captainch Daniel Glockler have the exceptional ability to tease out often abstract, ethereal, and complex thoughts on domestic affairs, the role of the United States, and of Nationalism in shaping our daily perspectives. Their thoughts have undeniably contributed to reflecting upon my own and they have my deep gratitude. I also thank Colonel E. John Gregory and Lieutenant Colonel Jason Halub for their persistent mentorship, instruction, and support. They serve as exceptional role-models for any aspiring Army officer, or leader. I have been fortunate to have benefitted so greatly from their continued support and direction. Lastly, to my family, thank you for imbuing in me the passion to want to change the world. II DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420 TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 1.1: Justifying U.S.-China Competition? ................................................................................................ 1 1.2: Examining Aspects of Competition: Making a Case for the Information Domain ........................... 2 1.3: Clarifying Misconceptions Regarding the Chinese Information Environment .................................. 5 1.4: Taiwan: It’s Importance, the Stakes, and Information’s Role ........................................................... 6 1.5: Thesis Structure ............................................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methodological Approach .......................................................14 2.1: Discourse and Behavior in Rationalist and Constructivist Literature ............................................. 14 2.2: Applications of Discourse in the Policymaking Community ........................................................... 16 2.3: Methods of Discursive Change in the Rationalist Paradigms ......................................................... 20 2.4: Methods of Discursive Change in the Constructivist治 Paradigm ..................................................... 23 政 大 2.5: Historiography and Discourse Analysis立 ........................................................................................... 26 2.6: Theoretical Approach and Methodology ................................................................學 ......................... 30 國 Part II Chapter 3: Appraising U.S. Interests and the End State of Competition‧ with the PRC ................33 3.1: An Overview of Existing‧ U.S. Policy in the Donald J. Trump Administration ............................... 33 N 3.2: The Domestic Factors Shapinga the Foreign Policy Debate ................................y .............................. 38 t t i 3.3: American Interests and the iLIO ................................................................s ........................................ 42 o r n e 3.3.1: What is the LIO? ................................a ................................................................i v ......................... 42 l C n 3.3.2: Historical and Contemporary Americanhe Interestsngc inh thei ULIO ...................................................... 45 3.3.3: Existing Problems of the LIO ...................................................................................................... 49 3.3.4: How Does the PRC Subvert the LIO and American Interests? ................................................... 52 Chapter 4: Xi Jinping’s Worldview and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation ...............59 4.1: The Party Structure and the PRC’s Governance ............................................................................... 59 4.2: Xi’s “National Rejuvenation” and Factors Heightening the Risks of Miscalculation ...................... 66 4.3: Xi Jinping as the Reform Agent ....................................................................................................... 73 Part III Chapter 5: Narrative Categorization and Selection .......................................................................75 5.1: Categorizing National Rejuvenation ................................................................................................. 75 5.2: Political Perspectives and Undercurrents in the PRC ....................................................................... 77 III DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001420 5.2.1. The Liberal Constitutionalist Vision of China ............................................................................. 78 5.2.2. Party Affiliated Dissenters ........................................................................................................... 81 5.3: Alternative Generalized Narratives ................................................................................................. 86 Chapter 6: Delivering the Narrative, Potential Indicators, and Assessment ..................................90 6.1: Narrative
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