The Rise of a Merchant Class and the Emergence of Meritocracy in China
WHY THE SONG DYNASTY? THE RISE OF A MERCHANT CLASS AND THE EMERGENCE OF MERITOCRACY IN CHINA Ting CHEN∗ James Kai-sing KUNGy This version, May 2019 Highly Preliminary, Please Do Not Cite. Abstract In the 10th century of Song China (c. 960-1268 AD) on the heels of a commercial revolution, the merchants appealed for their children to be permitted to take the civil exam|the route to officialdom in imperial China. Using a uniquely constructed data set, we show that the variation in commercial tax in 1077 and in the average number of market towns across the 1,185 Song counties has a significantly positive effect on both the number of jinshi holders and the share of these achievers who came from a non-aristocratic background|the two variables we employ to proxy for meritocracy. To deal with endogeneity, we exploit as a natural identi- fier the boundary sharply dividing those Tang counties that effectively paid taxes and those that did not to bear upon the possibly varying commercialization outcomes. Additionally, we exploit the difference in the tax status of counties as an instrumental variable to identify the effects of commercialization on meritocracy. To cope with the growing demand for exam preparations, the merchants established many academies and printed many books|the two pertinent channels of the commercial revolution. Our empirical analysis sheds light on why a representative government failed to form in Song China despite undergoing a commercial revolution and confronting warfare like Europe did, and why meritocracy emerged so much earlier in China. Keywords: Commercial Revolution, Merchant Class, Meritocracy, Civil Exam, Academies/Schools, Printing/Books, Social Mobility, China JEL Classification Nos.: D02, D73, N35, N45, P46 ∗Ting Chen, Department of Economics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Renfrew Road, Hong Kong.
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