THE WHITE BOOK ATROCITIES AGAINST HUNGARIANS IN THE AUTUMN OF 1944 (IN TRANSYLVANIA, ROMANIA) RMDSZ (DAHR) KOLOZSVÁR, 1995 by Mária Gál Attila Gajdos Balogh Ferenc Imreh Published originally in Hungarian by the Political Section of the Acting Presidium of the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA (DAHR) Publisher: Barna Bodó Editor: Mária Gál Lector: Gábor Vincze Corrector: Ilona N. Vajas Technical editor: István Balogh Printed by: Écriture Press Printing House Manager in charge: Gyula Kirkósa Technical manager: György Zoltán Vér Original title: Fehér könyv az 1944. öszi magyarellenes atrocitásokról. Foreword 75 years have passed since Trianon, the humiliating and unfair event that has been a trauma for us, Hungarians ever since. Even though we had 22 years at our disposal for analyzing and defining political and social consequences, the next disastrous border adjustment once again driven us to the losers’ side. Since then, the excruciating questions have just multiplied. When was the anti-Hungarian nature of the second universal peace agreement decided upon? What were the places and manners of this fatal agreement, which, although unacceptable to us, seemed to be irrevocable? Some questions can probably never be answered. Devious interests have managed to protect certain archives with non- penetrable walls, or even succeeded in annihilating them. Other vital events have never really been recorded. Lobbying procedures are not the invention of our age... State authorities could easily ban prying into some delicate affairs if special cases – like ours – occurred. There seemed to be no possibility for answering the question of the bloodshed in the autumn 1944 in North Transylvania. The very formulation of the question being, even in a narrow, scientific formulation, declared as hostile to the state, there were no possibilities for arriving at any conclusion, any historical analysis of it. No private answers were allowed either. We experienced the same in 1990, in a better political and social climate, when we tried to bring the truth out into the open. Nevertheless, we continue to fight for our elementary rights. Let it be said once and for all: Transylvania’s Hungarians are neither bloodthirsty, nor xenophobic nor fascist. They are not barbarians. The nature of our “different kind” does not rest in such things. Differences in the tradition of various ethnic communities could easily be bridged, if only the political powers involved did not prevent it. The historical truth should be voiced in matters that were for decades only used for manipulations of government-level nationalism. It has to be said so that we should finally get rid of our awkwardness, our political good manners hammered into us which tied our speaking out laud to a special permission almost as a conditioned reflex. Let our truth be finally told. Should this fact raise arguments from the part of those, who are not at ease with other people’s truth, well, it is only natural. A clarifying argument of the two sides has long been needed. Silent acceptance of never-ending contrition has for seven decades been the condition for us to be recognized as truthful. Yet if our severe judges considered our repentance insufficient, they have offered us an extra load for our own grievances as well. This White Book contains issues banned for 45 years. We have gathered everything we considered as being professionally relevant and within our reach for illustrating a chapter of history that has officially not been exposed yet. The book is a professional shop-work. Its only political implication consists in the decision taken at the Brassó (Brasov) conference of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), by which the organization decided to launch, generate and develop the process of historical explanation. We offer this work to the national and international professional or political public opinion as the first product of this process. Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca), May 1995 Barna Bodó On the Chess-Board of the Great Powers By the time of the birth of national identities, the centuries old Hungarian-Romanian coexistence in Transylvania bore some minor conflicts. Nevertheless there was no relevant discord between the two countries until the 1920 Trianon peace treaty. Delimiting correct ethnical borders and creating national states have been emphasized as primary intention of the Paris peace-makers. Yet, due to its mixed populace, the task of determining state borders on a strict basis of nationality proved to be impossible in East-Central Europe. The appearance of an ethnic minority of some proportions on the territory of one or both of the two countries would have inevitably occurred with the Transylvanian border planning. At the end, the conference, that is the Great Powers, have favored Romania to Hungary. The Trianon verdict could never be accepted either by Hungary, or by Hungarians in Transylvania. Although Hungary lost two thirds of her territory, the rapidly spreading revisionist attempts, later incorporated into state policy, were mainly concentrated primarily upon Transylvania. Between the two world wars this historical province continually bore special importance in Hungarian politics and public opinion. The Hungarian minority in Transylvania managed to conform to the new reality much more easily. After two years of passive expectance for some miracle to happen, Hungarians tried to reorganize their life under the new border circumstances. Confiding in the promises of the Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) agreements1, they were mostly driven by existential needs and were drawing upon the tradition of co-existence in the region. Formerly a state-forming element, minority then, Transylvanian Hungarians rapidly became one of the most active political subjects of post-WWI Romania. Romania found herself in a rather difficult position as well. Having neither democratic traditions nor those of minority nationalities, she could hardly put up with the Peace Treaty requirements. The Transylvanian power succession led to discrimination at governmental policy level, and to local anti- minority atrocities. Local abuse was mainly based on the “eye for an eye” principle. Victimizers claimed to pay back atrocities suffered by Romanians when in minority. Although it had taken several human lives, the power succession by the end of the First World War had by far not been so cruel, so intentional and so “xenophobic” as the ones that came 22 and 26 years later. The spreading of fascist ideology had its well-determined part in the cruelties of the Second World War. Yet the main reason for the atrocities in Transylvania was the fact that the ethnic structure of Transylvania became, or at least seemed to become, an increasingly determinant factor in international politics. With European borders undergoing a process of change2, the main goal of Romanian foreign policy by the end of the thirties and in the beginning of the forties was to preserve the territory earned in Paris. Hungarian foreign policy on the other hand had above all pursued the acquisition – re-acquisition – of territories. Both Germany and the Soviet Union continually exploited the two conflicting interests. Germany – until the end of the war – and the Soviet Union – until the signing of the 1947 peace treaty – had used Transylvania as a trump card against both countries. On August 30, 1940, the Second Vienna Verdict transferred Northern Transylvania to Hungary. The operation constituted the re-acquisition of a 43,000 square kilometers territory for Hungary. Almost half of the two million inhabitants of the region were Romanian, while more than half million Hungarians remained in Southern Transylvania. Neither of the two governments and peoples were content with the situation. As a consequence of the Soviet ultimatum3 of the June 26, 1940, Romania entered the anti-Soviet war on the German side right from its beginning. Hungary had no territorial claims against the Soviet Union. This is how Miklós Kállay, Hungarian prime minister (1942-44), wrote about Hungary’s joining the war in his memoirs: “Actually, the only reason for us to join the war, to send our armies to the Russian front was the fact that the Romanians were already fighting at full power. Our passivity would have affected the benevolence of the Germans and would have endangered Transylvania... The Germans had warned us, saying that a situation of Romanians fighting and Hungarians not would have made it morally impossible for Hitler not to modify his stance in the Transylvanian issue for the benefit of the Romanians.” Writing about Germany’s satellite states4, John Montgomery, US ambassador in Hungary from 1933 to 1941, who, unlike his predecessor Nicholas Roosevelt, sympathized with this remote country, was of opinion that the Hungarian government had no other choice but to join the anti-Soviet war. Public opinion was centered on Transylvania to such an extent, that no Hungarian government dared to oppose it. Irrespective of its political orientation, even at the costs of having the country transformed into a German military base, any Hungarian government would have accepted Hitler’s eventual promise to re-annex Transylvania to Hungary. Between May and June 1941, Chief of Staff Henrik Werth forwarded three petitions to the Hungarian Prime Minister arguing that the fulfillment of revisionist claims depended on Hungary’s entering the war against the Soviet Union.5 Miklós Horthy, Hungary’s head of state of the time, has written the same in his memoirs. As