INTRODUCTION

One spy in the right place is worth twenty thousand men on the battlefield. Napoleon

It was a moonlit night over Nazi-occupied Belgium in June 1942. The pilot identified the drop zone near Liège, and gave the signal. His passenger was ‘a little nervous at one stage but jumped immediately on green light’, according to the flight report. John William ‘Willy’ Kruyt, at 64 years old, was the oldest parachute agent of the entire Second World War. The former Dutch Calvinist Minister was ill prepared for his mission. During prior exercises, he would give his real name and forget his cover story. It was hopeless. His handlers considered him ‘too honest to be a spy’. Willy Kruyt risked his life for Stalin. He was part of a group of top secret agents called ‘Pickaxes’ who were sent to Britain from the USSR. From September 1941 to May 1944, Soviet intelligence ‘sub-contracted’ with the British to transport spies to Western Europe. British planes dropped more than twenty Soviet agents by parachute into Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria and Germany. For sixty years, the plan remained top secret. The scheme was part of a larger collaboration between Soviet foreign intelligence (NKVD) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Some British and most Soviet files regarding personnel and operations remain closed to this day. Only a handful of experts have studied the available documents, and this study is the first of its kind to attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the collaboration. Nobody would suggest the unusual partnership made a decisive contribution to the Axis defeat. Yet, the documents indicate small successes and serious failures. This study argues that the secret collaboration provided the little-known backdrop for the growing mutual distrust between the Allies. Without understanding the nature of secret ties between the intelligence services, many developments of the postwar period make little sense. Quite possibly, the lessons learned had a greater effect in the postwar period than during the war itself. While being rather inefficient in speeding up the downfall of the Nazi regime, ‘Pickaxe’ constituted the first lesson for Western intelligence officers on Soviet operations, and vice versa. 2 DEALING WITH THE DEVIL

For many years, both sides preferred to keep quiet about the wartime relationship. Under strict orders to avoid mentioning the scheme in their memoirs, British officers followed suit to receive publication clearance from the government. For much of the postwar period, official secrecy shrouded ‘Pickaxe’ and similar operations from public view.1 Reminding the public of the intensity of wartime collaboration was deemed inappropriate in the framework of Cold War animosity. The extent of the Anglo-Soviet ‘marriage of convenience’ was kept secret, despite some hints appearing in footnotes or casual remarks. Like ashamed adulterers, London and Moscow chose to sweep the episode under the rug. As if they had been illegitimate offspring, the agents disappeared from view. Soviet historiography refrained from emphasizing the wartime need for British operational support. Consequently, Eastern Bloc governments falsified the biographies of agents, constructing legends instead of telling the truth. The East German Communists celebrated one agent, naming schools, army units and naval vessels after him. According to the official version, he died ‘in the swamps of Byelorussia’ fighting alongside Soviet partisans. In reality, the RAF dropped him over Holland, and the Gestapo shot him in Brussels. Great Britain also had reasons for maintaining silence, considering the operation ‘delicate’. In most cases, the French, the Dutch, or the Belgian governments-in-exile had not been informed that Communist agents would be dropped on their territory. After the war, officials felt embarrassed and alarmed at the prospect of having possibly aided in ‘communizing’ Europe. British counter-intelligence started a large-scale investigation on the whereabouts of the agents. In a striking note of irony, the man heading this investigation was none other than Kim Philby, a Soviet ‘mole’. Moscow also regularly received updates from Anthony Blunt, the Personal Assistant to British counter-espionage chief Guy Liddell. Today, the entire collaboration between NKVD and SOE remains one of the most intriguing ‘blank spots’ of the Second World War. No country has acknowledged the ‘Pickaxe’ agents, a diverse group hailing from France, Holland, Austria, Germany and Italy. The Gestapo captured most of them, tortured them and forced them to participate in radio deception schemes, luring more agents into the Nazi traps. Despite assurances to the contrary, the

1 In his four-volume history, F. H. Hinsley referred to the Anglo-Soviet collaboration only once, very briefly. British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 4, Cambridge: University Press 1990), p. 189. For an overview of SOE historiography, see Mark Seaman, A Glass half full. Some thoughts on the evolution of the study of the Special Operations Executive, in Neville Wylie, The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War. Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946. Studies in Intelligence Series. London, New York: Routledge 2007, p. 27–41. INTRODUCTION 3

Nazis executed them, cremated their bodies and scattered the ashes to leave no trace. There is no memorial commemorating their contribution, their courage and sacrifice. Instead, Soviet and Western intelligence services soon recruited the torturers, disregarding the fate of their own agents. As the Cold War began, the Gestapo men became valuable assets. Lacking an efficient spy network in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and hopelessly behind in counter- intelligence, the British and Americans desperately needed all the information they could get about Soviet operations. The NKVD needed Gestapo officers as well. Moscow wanted to find out who had betrayed their agents, not grasping that glaring professional mistakes by case officers had doomed many agents before they even jumped from the plane. Successful agents returned to the Soviet Union only to be arrested, interrogated and imprisoned, sometimes on the testimony of their Gestapo captors. There are also indications of an anti-Semitic element in the Soviet treason investigations, foreshadowing the anti-cosmopolitan campaign in the postwar Soviet Union. Many of the ‘purged’ agents had a Jewish background. The wartime Anglo-Soviet intelligence collaboration was unique. For the first time in history, the NKVD cooperated with a Western counterpart. Few observers of the intelligence battles of the 1920s and 1930s would have seen this coming. For Moscow, the British Intelligence Service was the source of numerous anti-Soviet schemes. For the British, Soviet agent cells in Europe and Asia represented a shadowy enemy bent on destroying the Empire. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, two ideological adversaries found common ground. In a sudden twist, Great Britain and the Soviet Union faced the same enemy. Originally, Stalin had wanted to wait and observe the Capitalist countries weakening each other. The example of the United States’ role in 1917 possibly influenced his mindset. Staying out of the war as long as possible would conserve and enhance Soviet military and economic power. At the right moment, he might order the rested Red Army to sweep across Europe and play the decisive role and spread revolution across the continent. Instead, he had to witness the German army advancing along the plains of Western Russia, taking hundreds of thousands of prisoners by encircling entire armies. Soviet intelligence had warned him about the Nazi preparations, but Stalin had dismissed this as ‘disinformation’. Relying essentially on one man’s perceptions, the Bolshevik leadership remained hostage to crude conspiracy theories throughout the war. When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, even an experienced official such as former Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov, who had lived in London and was married to a British woman, expected the British Navy to appear on the shore of Leningrad, fulfilling the Bolshevik nightmare of a concerted 4 DEALING WITH THE DEVIL

Capitalist attack on the only Socialist state. Instead, Prime Minister Winston Churchill reached out to promise support to the Kremlin and collaborate with the former archenemy. Although few Britons at the time anticipated the recovery of the Red Army, Churchill’s offer of unconditional support came as a welcome surprise to the Kremlin. Stalin recognized the real threat to the Communist regime and was ready to grasp at any straw, even if it came from the most prominent anti-Bolshevik statesman of his generation. For the next four years, London and Moscow relied on each other’s support to defeat the Nazis. They regarded each other, to a varying degree, as Allies in a struggle for survival. Fighting the Nazi menace together became the new priority, leading to unprecedented levels of cooperation, even including the security services. Britain and the USSR shared intelligence and revealed operative secrets to each other. They exchanged ‘gadgets’ such as collapsible motorcycles, manufactured false passports and even ran agents together, attempting to foil German counter-intelligence strategies. Based on recently declassified files, this book explores a little known chapter of the Second World War. It underscores the willingness of the Allies to join forces. For the first time, the activities of officers and agents on this particular ‘invisible front’ can be examined in detail, facilitated by the release of several personnel files. It is a story of desperate choices, horrible mistakes, enormous courage and ultimate sacrifice at the hands of a brutal enemy. The following pages recount actions of brave men and women who risked their lives to defeat the Nazis, only to be forgotten or be branded traitors in the postwar period. The study aims to shed light on the Anglo-Soviet intelligence collaboration, evaluate its significance and contribution to the Allied war effort and rescue the agents’ story from obscurity. It also touches on the question whether to celebrate the agents as fighters against the Axis or consider them Soviet spies with a separate agenda, an issue that can only be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Knowing more about the intelligence collaboration improves our understanding of the scope of the wartime alliance and also gives us valuable clues in debating the origins of the Cold War. Intelligence officers proved crucial in shaping the outlook of their respective governments, and the critical evaluation of the collaboration contributed to mutual suspicion in the 1940s and 1950s. Shaped by the culture of fear, distrust and intrigue, intelligence services on both sides returned to prewar mindsets and suspected ulterior motives on the part of the other side. Only by evaluating the positive and negative balance sheets can we examine whether these estimates were justified. We can also explore to what degree the recruited Gestapo officers fed Western INTRODUCTION 5 and Soviet suspicion, resuscitating their ideology far beyond the end of their Nazi careers. Few studies have mentioned this astonishing Nazi influence on the outbreak of the Cold War. The files of Gestapo ‘assets’ allow valuable insights into the way they were able to shape the prism of their interrogators. This study suggests that their testimony played a vital role in setting the stage for East-West tensions. Any collaboration between intelligence services, even between Allied countries, is the result of remarkable circumstances. No other governmental institution cultivates a comparable sense of secrecy. Reluctance to share information is built into the institutional culture, confining collaboration to rare cases. For example, in the early 1930s, MI5 and the German political police authorities began to discuss collaboration on jointly combating the Communist menace. In March 1930, German Embassy official von Scherpenberg met with British counter-intelligence officers to initiate the exchange of information on contacts between German and British Communists and Communist front organizations directed by Willy Münzenberg. London was interested in the activities of anti-colonial organizations like the ‘League against Imperialism’. For British officers, Münzenberg was ‘the most dangerous German in existence as regards British Imperial and internal interests’, having become rich from his publications. He was ‘a man of first-rate ability’ and had ‘a finger in every anti-British pie’.2 As far as we know, the turbulent German political scene and the Nazi takeover prevented substantial collaboration. Any discussion of wartime intelligence cooperation must begin with the comparison of the two partners. Unwittingly, Joseph Goebbels played a role in creating a new British intelligence service. To deceive the Allies, the Nazi Propaganda chief ordered Berlin Radio to broadcast mysterious messages to alleged German agents hiding in France. Experts took these messages as an indication of a vast network of undercover sabotage groups, the so-called ‘Fifth Column’. In truth, the messages were completely bogus. No such networks existed. But the thesis conveniently explained the unexpected collapse of the French Army. On 22 July 1940, under the impression of the French defeat, the British War Cabinet approved a memorandum creating the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to ‘coordinate all action by way of subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas’.3 Labour politician Hugh Dalton, head of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, won the first battle to incorporate SOE within

2 KV 4/110. 7 March 1930. 3 Foot, p. 21. Preparation had begun in May 1939 under Prime Minister Chamberlain, who drafted the SOE chapter as one of his last acts in office. Mackenzie, p. 69, Cookridge, p. 1. 6 DEALING WITH THE DEVIL his ministry. He stated that sabotage and subversion would concern ‘trade unionists and Socialists in enemy and enemy-occupied territories, the creation of Fifth Columns, of explosions, chaos and revolution.’4 To foreign secretary Lord Halifax, Dalton argued: ‘We must organize movements in enemy-occupied territory comparable to the Sinn Fein in Ireland, to the Chinese guerillas now operating against Japan…to the organizations the Nazis themselves have developed in almost every country in the world. We must use many different methods, including industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots’.5 The planners elevated subversion to a special position in British strategy. However, the new service faced suspicion from the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Few British agents remained on the Continent as ‘all contacts with occupied territories closed when the last British forces returned to Great Britain in 1940’. There was no ‘stay-behind’ force and no significant agent network. ‘SIS had very few agents left on the Continent’, and SOE had no access to them.6 Starting from scratch, SOE could not count on inter- departmental assistance. Created by cannibalizing from existing ministries and departments, SOE encountered significant distrust from within the intelligence community throughout its six-year existence. By comparison, the NKVD was an institution unlike any other in the 20th century. Established in 1917 as the Cheka and later known as GPU and OGPU, the Soviet political police steadily increased in power and responsibilities. In the 1930s, Stalin himself became the ‘unofficial’ Commissar, frequently micro-managing the Commissariat, sometimes radically by exchanging and executing top officials. The Bolsheviks had been conspirators against the Tsarist regime, and their police arm exemplified that tradition of secrecy and distrust. To act as the ‘sword and shield’ of the Party, the secret police, organized within the People’s Commissariat for Interior Affairs (NKVD), assumed greater powers than any other government branch, ranging from border control to prisons and large infrastructure projects. Under Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov, the NKVD had become the engine of the Stalinist purges. From 1938 on, People’s Commissar Lavrenti Beria, once introduced by Stalin as ‘our Himmler’, could rely on the fear of millions of Soviet citizens as soon as they saw the blue stripes on the NKVD uniforms.

4 Cookridge, p. 3. 5 Foot, p. 18. Cookridge, p. 4. 6 Cookridge, p. 8. INTRODUCTION 7

From the end of 1943, the United States’ Office of Strategic Services (OSS) also collaborated with the NKVD. William ‘Bill’ Donovan visited Moscow in December 1943 and met with the leadership of the NKVD. His offer unsettled the British because they feared the Soviets would prefer to cooperate with the Americans. In the event, the OSS-NKVD collaboration never reached the level of the Anglo-Soviet intelligence relations. First, Donovan insisted on collaborating in the Balkans, an area that the USSR considered part of her own sphere of influence. Secondly, plans to establish an official NKVD station bureau in Washington were vetoed by FBI boss J. Edgar Hoover. Certainly, this did not prevent Soviet intelligence from successfully operating in the United States. But it did limit the official intelligence relationship, probably harming the United States more than the Soviet Union. As many low-level British officers, for example in Tehran, argued, constant contact with the Soviets gave them a much better picture about NKVD operations, structure and communications than attempting to penetrate them by active intelligence means. Moscow’s realization of this danger may have also contributed to Soviet distrust and acted as an argument to end the collaboration. Another factor facilitating Anglo-Soviet willingness to cooperate was the fact that both countries fought for sheer survival, which was not the case for the United States. How far did London and Moscow go to disclose their secret operations, their ‘crown jewels’? Did the officers devote time and resources for elaborate maneuvers in deception games that had little impact on the fighting on the ground? Were they desk warriors who cared little for their agents? How successful were the attempts to infiltrate the enemy and jointly organize sabotage and subversion, according to the agreements? Did they attempt to recruit each other’s agents? Most of the agents were foreign Communists or left-wing refugees in the Soviet Union. Some were convinced Communists. Some simply wanted to get out at any price. Some may have been blackmailed into ‘volunteering’ for a spy mission. They traveled by ship to Britain, through frigid Arctic waters full of German U-boats. One group of NKVD agents aboard the ‘Ocean Voice’ barely survived when the ship was torpedoed and sank. What was the objective of their missions? Did they have a choice? Did they have the tools to survive? Were they aware of the dangers and the short life expectancy of an agent? The newly accessible files on the Anglo-Soviet partnership allow us to find out more about individual agents, a remarkable and diverse group of people. For this study, several have been selected—a father-and-son team of Dutch origin, probably the only such team to drop by parachute during the entire war, and a German Communist who had close relations to the German 8 DEALING WITH THE DEVIL

Communist elite in Moscow. Another remarkable agent, an Indian codenamed ‘Silver’, traveled back and forth between Delhi and Kabul to feed German intelligence with bogus information about nationalist rebels in India, becoming a ‘quintuple’ agent. The NKVD had disclosed the agent to London and proposed running him jointly. Never before did Soviet intelligence run a double agent with another service. For the next three years, the allegedly anti- colonial Moscow helped Britain to defend its Indian ‘jewel’ against the Axis, thwarting Hitler’s plan to carve up the British Empire. In the ‘Mamba’ operation, a group of Red Army soldiers who had been captured by the Germans and pressed into service in France, found themselves in British hands by July 1944. SOE planned to send some of them back to suborn their former comrades. This was supposed to facilitate the Allied military advance in France. These remarkable individuals now put on their third uniform in as many years, serving King George VI after previously swearing allegiance to Stalin and Hitler. In the end, the NKVD objected to the mission, and insisted on the repatriation of the Soviet POWs. They were terrified of being shot on their return. One of them even attempted suicide. Having fought in German uniforms and then trained with the British secret service, they knew perfectly well what their destiny in Soviet hands would be. The surviving documentation allows a rare, fascinating and unvarnished glimpse into the mindset of the regular Red Army soldiers whose survival instincts had been honed through terrible ordeals. Anglo-Soviet collaboration reached the Middle East, demonstrating the global scale of the war. ‘Operation Silver’ and the joint occupation of Iran allowed for closer cooperation than in many other theatres of war. In Tehran, British and Soviet intelligence officers met weekly to discuss security matters. When the ‘Big Three’ held their conference in Tehran in 1943, intelligence officers provided security, leading to the controversial discussions about alleged Nazi assassination attempts during the conference. The Anglo-Soviet relations are only complete if we take into account the third side of the triangle, the Nazi response. German police authorities proved capable of hunting down most parachute agents and ‘turn’ them, organizing deception schemes to lure additional supplies and agents into traps. The radio deception game or ‘Funkspiel’ was the major counter-intelligence innovation of the Second World War. Without mercy or regard for age or gender, the Gestapo used psychological and physical pressure on the captured parachutists. When they were no longer useful, they were executed, in spite of promises to the contrary. A close look at the Gestapo brutality is important to understand the failure of many missions and the high price the agents paid for inadequate INTRODUCTION 9 preparation, betrayal, denunciation and mistakes at headquarters. In Gestapo custody, many agents confessed and the Germans could organize ‘reception committees’. The ‘Pickaxe’ missions have been called ‘kamikaze’ operations. Although agents carried poison pills, and they were under instructions to kill themselves before capture, only two of them actually attempted suicide, and both were quickly revived. Most preferred to take their chance and participate in deception schemes, indicating their disillusionment with Communist ideals and demonstrating man’s never-ending hope for survival. Curiously, the NKVD never realized that agents who went to Nazi territory under duress would become easy prey for the experienced interrogators of the Gestapo. In this regard, the study touches on the extensive literature on the ‘Red Orchestra’. The Gestapo understood this term to mean the entire network of Soviet espionage in occupied Europe. Closer to the point, the term includes the diverse group of anti-Nazi Germans in Berlin around Harro Schulze- Boysen, Arvid Harnack and Adam Kuckhoff who combined resistance activities with supplying information to Moscow. Their martyrdom became an important source for the internal German debate on the definition of resistance and treason and frequently underwent reinterpretations, according to political circumstances in East and West Germany and again after reunification. For the subject of Anglo-Soviet intelligence relations, the ‘Red Orchestra’ is significant for several reasons. First, without an adequate understanding of events, the motivation for Soviet intelligence to begin cooperating with the British must remain unclear. Stalin was reluctant to cooperate with the British Empire, the main Soviet adversary for decades. Throughout the war, he feared that the NKVD spies in England, for example Kim Philby, might be British ‘plants’ to feed him with disinformation. Similar suspicions faced Richard Sorge, the Comintern agent in Tokio who repeatedly warned the USSR in advance of the Nazi invasion. Hampered by ideological blinders, Stalin constantly overestimated the abilities of foreign intelligence services. From 1937 on, Stalin’s purges severely weakened Soviet intelligence networks. Millions of ordinary Soviet citizens were executed, thousands of NKVD officers were similarly ‘repressed’. In addition, the Gestapo counter- intelligence efforts, fueled by the deciphering successes and the ‘turning’ of agents proved to be effective in combating Anglo-Soviet subversive goals. This study suggests that the ‘Red Orchestra’ started out as a Gestapo myth, fueling the imagination of officials and writers ever since. In reality, Soviet intelligence found itself unprepared to operate in enemy territory and suffered catastrophic setbacks. Stalin needed British help to contact isolated and demoralized Soviet cells in Western Europe. 10 DEALING WITH THE DEVIL

After the war, while investigating the results of the cooperation and re- orienting their services to Cold War conditions, Western intelligence services frequently followed the Gestapo definition of a vast Soviet ‘Red Orchestra’ in Western Europe. After all, Gestapo officers constituted their main source of information. What had started in Nazi internal documents proved to be an irresistible Cold War slogan. The postwar CIA study, for example, titled their overview over Soviet foreign intelligence in Europe ‘The Red Orchestra’, and included many operatives completely unconnected with the Berlin group. U.S. intelligence treated Gestapo testimony as fact, finding evidence of a widespread and effective Soviet underground network. Nazi officers skillfully used the opportunity to sell their ‘information’ to protect themselves from prosecution. The collaboration is important for another reason. Both sides learned more about each other in these four years than in the decades before. At least for the British, the insights gained proved invaluable to adapting the intelligence services to the challenges of the early Cold War. For example, MI5 recruited the most successful Gestapo spycatcher, Horst Kopkow, to profit from his knowledge of Soviet intelligence operations. While they also picked the brains of every German intelligence officer they could get hold of, the Soviets counted on the ‘Cambridge Five’ to continue to provide them with British secrets. But the picture of Soviet treatment of Gestapo ‘informers’ remains more shadowy. Western European intelligence services began their study of the Soviet threat with historical studies of NKVD wartime activities. Most began by searching for the whereabouts and contacts of the ‘Pickaxe’ agents. Many sources used for this study have only recently been released, some only in 2008. The National Archives in London continue to add to the data with files from SOE history and intelligence agencies. Most Russian sources are still unavailable. Some isolated documents have surfaced. In one instance, the son of a member of the ‘Red Orchestra’, Hans Coppi, was able to use some NKVD foreign intelligence files from the estate of a Russian historian. Recent Russian studies reveal that Soviet signals intelligence emulated British success in breaking the ‘Enigma’ code, leading to the deciphering of over 50,000 German messages in 1942.7 In addition, according to these revelations, Soviet military intelligence (GRU) received up to thirty German, Japanese and Turkish decoded messages from Bletchley Park through their agent ‘Dolly’.8 But operational details and personnel files of the agents in Moscow are under lock and key, unfortunately. On the other hand, the available documents, for

7 Lota, p. 448. 8 Lota, p. 449. A copy of a GRU report to Stalin is on p. 532–533. INTRODUCTION 11 example the postwar testimony from Gestapo officers, allow an unprecedented view into the selection and training of Soviet agents. Only the release of Soviet documents would enable us to remove the Gestapo filter from these sources. Several seminal studies have laid the foundation for this study. For example, Bradley F. Smith’s books on military intelligence sharing contributed greatly to our understanding. When Smith wrote about ‘shadow warriors’, he could only speculate about the number of NKVD agents introduced by the British.9 Several recent authors have explored the SOE history from a variety of angles. Most have focused on underground activities in Western Europe. Certainly, the last ten years have marked the move from the memoir stage to the scholarly phase. M.R.D. Foot is the leading authority on SOE in France and Western Europe. William Mackenzie’s internal history of SOE has been declassified. Mark Seaman’s collection has firmly established the scholarly study of SOE. Hans Schafranek assembled an entire group, including Barry McLoughlin, to study Austrian agents, a group that was disproportionately represented in the NKVD pool. The official Russian intelligence history is sparse with sources but presents an important contribution. In 2000, the editors of a Russian-language account of George Hill’s memoirs, Vladimir Markovchin and Valerii Avdeev, acknowledged ‘around 20’ NKVD agents dropped by the Royal Air Force in Germany, Austria, France and Holland [no mention was made of Italy], claiming that nearly all of them were arrested by the Gestapo.10 Scholars studying intelligence history always need to be cautious because the institutions involved have a keen interest of writing their own history. Operational files are usually inaccessible, and events and biographies are subject to change with the release of new material. Past practices of selectively publishing documents, letting some records ‘disappear’ in mysterious fires and faking deaths call for increased skepticism. As no outside oversight is allowed, intelligence services remain notoriously murky and inefficient, full of eccentric personalities drawn into a world of conspiracy theories. But the costs are real: Governments place value on information collecting by clandestine means, and this information, whether false or accurate, constitutes a real factor in crucial decisions affecting millions. Most of the agents, however, are the ‘pawns’ of the game, expendable assets, rarely acknowledged, mostly forgotten, sometimes celebrated as legends while the truth is manipulated for political aims. This study hopes to rescue their lives from obscurity, shedding light on some of the most desperate choices faced in the twentieth century.

9 Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 336. 10 Dzh. Hill, Moscow, p. 37.