INTRODUCTION One spy in the right place is worth twenty thousand men on the battlefield. Napoleon It was a moonlit night over Nazi-occupied Belgium in June 1942. The pilot identified the drop zone near Liège, and gave the signal. His passenger was ‘a little nervous at one stage but jumped immediately on green light’, according to the flight report. John William ‘Willy’ Kruyt, at 64 years old, was the oldest parachute agent of the entire Second World War. The former Dutch Calvinist Minister was ill prepared for his mission. During prior exercises, he would give his real name and forget his cover story. It was hopeless. His handlers considered him ‘too honest to be a spy’. Willy Kruyt risked his life for Stalin. He was part of a group of top secret agents called ‘Pickaxes’ who were sent to Britain from the USSR. From September 1941 to May 1944, Soviet intelligence ‘sub-contracted’ with the British to transport spies to Western Europe. British planes dropped more than twenty Soviet agents by parachute into Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria and Germany. For sixty years, the plan remained top secret. The scheme was part of a larger collaboration between Soviet foreign intelligence (NKVD) and the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Some British and most Soviet files regarding personnel and operations remain closed to this day. Only a handful of experts have studied the available documents, and this study is the first of its kind to attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the collaboration. Nobody would suggest the unusual partnership made a decisive contribution to the Axis defeat. Yet, the documents indicate small successes and serious failures. This study argues that the secret collaboration provided the little-known backdrop for the growing mutual distrust between the Allies. Without understanding the nature of secret ties between the intelligence services, many developments of the postwar period make little sense. Quite possibly, the lessons learned had a greater effect in the postwar period than during the war itself. While being rather inefficient in speeding up the downfall of the Nazi regime, ‘Pickaxe’ constituted the first lesson for Western intelligence officers on Soviet operations, and vice versa. 2 DEALING WITH THE DEVIL For many years, both sides preferred to keep quiet about the wartime relationship. Under strict orders to avoid mentioning the scheme in their memoirs, British officers followed suit to receive publication clearance from the government. For much of the postwar period, official secrecy shrouded ‘Pickaxe’ and similar operations from public view.1 Reminding the public of the intensity of wartime collaboration was deemed inappropriate in the framework of Cold War animosity. The extent of the Anglo-Soviet ‘marriage of convenience’ was kept secret, despite some hints appearing in footnotes or casual remarks. Like ashamed adulterers, London and Moscow chose to sweep the episode under the rug. As if they had been illegitimate offspring, the agents disappeared from view. Soviet historiography refrained from emphasizing the wartime need for British operational support. Consequently, Eastern Bloc governments falsified the biographies of agents, constructing legends instead of telling the truth. The East German Communists celebrated one agent, naming schools, army units and naval vessels after him. According to the official version, he died ‘in the swamps of Byelorussia’ fighting alongside Soviet partisans. In reality, the RAF dropped him over Holland, and the Gestapo shot him in Brussels. Great Britain also had reasons for maintaining silence, considering the operation ‘delicate’. In most cases, the French, the Dutch, or the Belgian governments-in-exile had not been informed that Communist agents would be dropped on their territory. After the war, officials felt embarrassed and alarmed at the prospect of having possibly aided in ‘communizing’ Europe. British counter-intelligence started a large-scale investigation on the whereabouts of the agents. In a striking note of irony, the man heading this investigation was none other than Kim Philby, a Soviet ‘mole’. Moscow also regularly received updates from Anthony Blunt, the Personal Assistant to British counter-espionage chief Guy Liddell. Today, the entire collaboration between NKVD and SOE remains one of the most intriguing ‘blank spots’ of the Second World War. No country has acknowledged the ‘Pickaxe’ agents, a diverse group hailing from France, Holland, Austria, Germany and Italy. The Gestapo captured most of them, tortured them and forced them to participate in radio deception schemes, luring more agents into the Nazi traps. Despite assurances to the contrary, the 1 In his four-volume history, F. H. Hinsley referred to the Anglo-Soviet collaboration only once, very briefly. British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 4, Cambridge: University Press 1990), p. 189. For an overview of SOE historiography, see Mark Seaman, A Glass half full. Some thoughts on the evolution of the study of the Special Operations Executive, in Neville Wylie, The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War. Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946. Studies in Intelligence Series. London, New York: Routledge 2007, p. 27–41. INTRODUCTION 3 Nazis executed them, cremated their bodies and scattered the ashes to leave no trace. There is no memorial commemorating their contribution, their courage and sacrifice. Instead, Soviet and Western intelligence services soon recruited the torturers, disregarding the fate of their own agents. As the Cold War began, the Gestapo men became valuable assets. Lacking an efficient spy network in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and hopelessly behind in counter- intelligence, the British and Americans desperately needed all the information they could get about Soviet operations. The NKVD needed Gestapo officers as well. Moscow wanted to find out who had betrayed their agents, not grasping that glaring professional mistakes by case officers had doomed many agents before they even jumped from the plane. Successful agents returned to the Soviet Union only to be arrested, interrogated and imprisoned, sometimes on the testimony of their Gestapo captors. There are also indications of an anti-Semitic element in the Soviet treason investigations, foreshadowing the anti-cosmopolitan campaign in the postwar Soviet Union. Many of the ‘purged’ agents had a Jewish background. The wartime Anglo-Soviet intelligence collaboration was unique. For the first time in history, the NKVD cooperated with a Western counterpart. Few observers of the intelligence battles of the 1920s and 1930s would have seen this coming. For Moscow, the British Intelligence Service was the source of numerous anti-Soviet schemes. For the British, Soviet agent cells in Europe and Asia represented a shadowy enemy bent on destroying the Empire. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, two ideological adversaries found common ground. In a sudden twist, Great Britain and the Soviet Union faced the same enemy. Originally, Stalin had wanted to wait and observe the Capitalist countries weakening each other. The example of the United States’ role in 1917 possibly influenced his mindset. Staying out of the war as long as possible would conserve and enhance Soviet military and economic power. At the right moment, he might order the rested Red Army to sweep across Europe and play the decisive role and spread revolution across the continent. Instead, he had to witness the German army advancing along the plains of Western Russia, taking hundreds of thousands of prisoners by encircling entire armies. Soviet intelligence had warned him about the Nazi preparations, but Stalin had dismissed this as ‘disinformation’. Relying essentially on one man’s perceptions, the Bolshevik leadership remained hostage to crude conspiracy theories throughout the war. When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, even an experienced official such as former Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov, who had lived in London and was married to a British woman, expected the British Navy to appear on the shore of Leningrad, fulfilling the Bolshevik nightmare of a concerted 4 DEALING WITH THE DEVIL Capitalist attack on the only Socialist state. Instead, Prime Minister Winston Churchill reached out to promise support to the Kremlin and collaborate with the former archenemy. Although few Britons at the time anticipated the recovery of the Red Army, Churchill’s offer of unconditional support came as a welcome surprise to the Kremlin. Stalin recognized the real threat to the Communist regime and was ready to grasp at any straw, even if it came from the most prominent anti-Bolshevik statesman of his generation. For the next four years, London and Moscow relied on each other’s support to defeat the Nazis. They regarded each other, to a varying degree, as Allies in a struggle for survival. Fighting the Nazi menace together became the new priority, leading to unprecedented levels of cooperation, even including the security services. Britain and the USSR shared intelligence and revealed operative secrets to each other. They exchanged ‘gadgets’ such as collapsible motorcycles, manufactured false passports and even ran agents together, attempting to foil German counter-intelligence strategies. Based on recently declassified files, this book explores a little known chapter of the Second World War. It underscores the willingness of the Allies to join forces. For the first time, the activities of officers and agents on this particular ‘invisible