JOURNALISTS CAN DO IT III Journalists can do it III Journalists can do it III Publisher: Youth Initiative for Human Rights For the publisher: Maja Micic Authors: Tamara Kaliterna Nemanja Stjepanovic Design: Sanja Polovina Ivan Buncic Printing: Draslar Partner Circulation: 200 December 2012 Copyright @ Youth Initiative for Human Rights www.yihr.org Journalists can do it III Table of contents: Introduction - 5 Negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina - 6 Ownership structure of media in Serbia - 14 The first round - 18 The second round - 37 The third round - 40 The fourth round - 44 The fifth round - 49 The sixth round - 61 The seventh round - 72 The eighth round - 86 Analysis of reports on northern Kosovo Barricades - 95 Journalists can do it III 3 4 Journalists can do it III INTRODUCTION Back in 2004, Youth Initiative for Human Rights started the „Journalists can do it“ project, as a response to poor, un-objective, racist and pent up journalism of media in creating new relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Eight years after that, some changes occurred in the work of media and relations of Kosovo and Serbia. However, reasons for organizing this project again are mostly similar. The publication ”Journalists can do it” contains the analysis of media reporting in Serbia about the Belgrade – Prishtina dialogue and the topics relevant for the relations between the two societies. Analysis of media reporting in Kosovo will be a part of the second edition of the book. The publication is an attempt to provide a clear picture of media reporting, of creating an atmosphere in the public, the reactions of the public, to present the positions of the two sides as well as to present the course of the negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina which have lasted for almost a year. Media reporting in Serbia and Kosovo on “technical negotiations” between Belgrade and Prishtina has been mainly formal – based on the relaying of press releases and statements, without offering any analysis of the current situation and the agreements reached. The result thereof is that citizens know very little about the dialogue and the application of the agreements reached. Little is known about the events in the north Kosovo because Kosovo journalists do not have access to this part of Kosovo and journalists from Serbia often face problems in locating collocutors. Some of the media are still holding on to stereotypes, thus creating the atmosphere of conflict instead of the atmosphere of dialogue. Very little is known about the day-to- day life and the implications that the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations have on the “ordinary people”. The role of media and its influence in every society is of great importance. That is why the question of responsibility of editors, journalists and those who control media must be brought up, especially in the Western Balkans. One of the objectives of „Journalists can do it“ project is to enhance the cooperation between journalists from Kosovo and Serbia, and to improve their objective, unbiased reporting about topics relevant for the two societies. We thank all the journalists who took part in the project and who committed themselves to creating an informal network for standing cooperation and exchange of information in order to make the reporting about events in Kosovo and Serbia as good and as objective as possible. For realising this project, YIHR owes great gratitude to the Embassy of the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. In Belgrade, December 2012. Journalists can do it III 5 NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISHTINA In September 2010, after the United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution1 on Kosovo which Serbia supported, with the help of the European Union (hereinafter EU), both sides were called to a dialogue. The negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina began on 8 March 2011 in Brussels and lasted until 24 February 2012. This was the first contact between the two states since the proclamation of Kosovo’s independance on 17 February 2008. The negotiations were termed as ”technical”2, even though Belgrade attempted to impose political issues, instead of thechnical ones, as anticipated. The mediator of the negotiations was the British diplomat in the EU Robert Francis Cooper. He is currently serving as a Counsellor in the European External Action Service. He is also a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations and an acclaimed publisher on foreign affairs. As a diplomat, he has worked at various British Embassies abroad, notably those in Tokyo and Bonn. He was the UK’s Special Representative in Afghanistan until mid-2002. In 2002 he began to work for the European Union. He assumed the role of Director- General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. In that role, he answered to Javier Solana, the former High Representative of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and had assisted with the implementation of European strategic, security and defence policies. Since 2007 he has also been a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. After the Treaty of Lisbon’s shake up of EU foreign policy structures, and Solana’s replacement by Catherine Ashton, Cooper sat on the steering committee which drew up the proposals for the new European External Action Service (EEAS). Borislav-Borko Stefanovic, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia (MIP) lead the Belgrade side, and Edita Tahiri, Dputy Prime Minister of Kosovo lead the Prishtina side of the negotiations. The ranks of the chiefs of the negotiating teams within their respective state hierarchies are indicative of the significance each of the negotiating sides gave to the process. Edita Tahiri is the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, responsible for foreign policy and national security. Before taking on this role, Tahiri was the Minister of Public Administration. Tahiri studied telecommunications and electronics at the University of Prishtina, graduating in 1980. In 1983 she starthed her post-graduate studies in digital telecommunications at Essex University in Great Britain. Tahiri completed her studies as Master of Public Administration, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. In 2006 and 2007 she studied on a 1 - UN General Assembly Resolution on Kosovo: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ RES/64/298 2 - B92, Jan 21 2011, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=01&dd=21&nav_ category=640&nav_id=487447 6 Journalists can do it III Fulbright Scholarship at Johns Hopkins University - SAIS, completing a PhD in Political Sciences from University of Prishtina. Stefanovic was born in Novi Sad in 1974. He graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Novi Sad University. After the studies, he worked as an apprentice in a law firm. He started working at the Ministry of internal affairs of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2001 and in 2003 went to work at the Serbian Embassy in Washington D.C. as a third secretary, in charge of following the work of the US Congress. He finished his service at the Embassy in 2007 as Deputy Ambassador, a counselling minister, and he was also credited for the creation of the ”Serbian caucus” in the US Congress. In 2007, the Minister of foreign affairs Vuk Jeremic named Stefanovic as the head of his cabinet and the political director of the Ministry. Shortly beforehand, diplomat Mirko Stefanovic, the uncle of Borislav Stefanovic, was given the position of the Secretary of the Minister of foreign affairs. Stefanovic lead the negotiations for the sale of the Oil Industry of Serbia (NIS) to Russia in 2008 as well as the negotiations with Israel on the controversial contract on the lease of the Israeli sattelite, which in 2010 resulted in a significant reduction of Serbia’s debt. He also lead the negotiations on the EU mission for the rule of law (EULEX) in Kosovo. Stefanovic stated for ”Blic” from 30 January 2011 that the ”success of the negotiations“ will be very important for Belgrade, because it will be ”easier” for Serbia to reach its goal of obtaining the status of a candidate and a possible date for the negotiations for joining the EU3. The negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina consisted of three basic subjects: regional cooperation, freedom of movement and the rule of law. The negotiations ended in seven conclusions in the form of agreements. Of those seven conclusions, according to the Government of Kosovo, the Serbian side is implementing only those related to free trade and the freedom of movement, while there are significant obstacles in the implementation of others4. Of the eight rounds of negotiations, half of them were held later than anticipated. The total delay was 228 days. During the first round, held on 8 and 9 of March, economic cooperation was discussed. Other topics discussed during the two deys were telecommunications, air traffic, customs stamps, and land records taken form Kosovo to Serbia in June 1999. During the second round, on 28 March, there were supposed to be talks about electric energy, freedom of movement and the negotiators were supposed to elaborate on the conclusions made during the previous round — the appearance and text of the customs stamp of Kosovo, regulating air traffic and participation of Kosovo in regional 3 - Blic, January 30 2011. http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/232409/Borko-Stefanovic-Zelimo-da-na-Kosovu-- obezbedimo-trajni-mir 4 - Radio Free Europe, August 13 2012. http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/kosovo-ima-li-koristi-od- dijaloga-sa-srbijom/24675542.html Journalists can do it III 7 meetings. However, representatives of the two parties talked about land records, birth, death and wedding records and electricity supplies.