Silk Road Diplomacy

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Silk Road Diplomacy [Replace with front cover] Silk Road Diplomacy: SilkDeconstructing Road Beijing’s Diplomacy: toolkit to influence South and Central Asia DeconstructingSamantha Custer, Tanya Sethi, Jonathan Beijing’sA. Solis, Joyce Jiahui Lin, Toolkit to Siddhartha Ghose, Anubhav Gupta, Rodney Knight, and Austin Baehr InfluenceDecember 2019 South and Central Asia Full Manuscript AAIDDATA Research Lab at William & Mary Acknowledgements This report was prepared by Samantha Custer, Tanya Sethi, Jonathan A. Solis, Joyce Jiahui Lin, Siddhartha Ghose, Rodney Knight, and Austin Baehr (AidData, William & Mary), as well as Anubhav Gupta (Asia Society Policy Institute). The findings and conclusions of this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funders, partners, and advisors we thank below. The broader study was conducted in collaboration with Debra Eisenman, Lindsey Ford, and Max Hill (Asia Society Policy Institute), and Bonnie Glaser, Matthew Funaiole and Kelly Flaherty (China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies) who provided invaluable guidance to the research design, report drafting, and logistical support for the case study interviews. The authors also thank our peer reviewers who helped us refine our thinking and prose for the final report, including: Iskander Akylbayev (Kazakhstan Council on International Relations), Samuel Brazys (University College Dublin), Amrita Jash (Center for Landwarfare Studies), Dinusha Panditaratne (Brookings Institution), Tholath Raufuddeen (Maldives National University), Bradley Parks (AidData, William & Mary), Farkhod Tolipov (Bilim Karvoni), Swarnim Waglé (Institute for Integrated Development Studies), and Lailufar Yasmin (Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs). We owe a debt of gratitude to the 216 government officials, civil society and private sector leaders, academics, journalists, and foreign diplomats from 145 organizations or agencies who graciously participated in key informant interviews and answered our questions on the state of Chinese public diplomacy in Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan. Their insights offer a unique perspective on the constraints and opportunities for China to convert its public diplomacy overtures into enhanced influence with foreign leaders and publics. The authors owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the broader team of AidData staff and research assistants who spent countless hours to come alongside the research team in assisting with data collection and project management tasks associated with this publication: Brooke Russell, Katherine Walsh, Molly Charles, Steven Pressendo, Wenyang Pan, Paige Jacobson, Ziyi Fu, Kathrynn Weilacher, Caroline Duckworth, Xiaofan Han, Carlos Holden-Villars, Mengting Lei, Caroline Morin, Wenzhi Pan, Richard Robles, Yunji Shi, Natalie White, Fathia (Fay) Dawodu, Carina Bilger, Raul De La Guardia, Xinyao Wang and Lincoln Zaleski. John Custer, Soren Patterson, and Parker Kim (AidData, William & Mary) were integral to the editing, formatting, layout, and data visualizations which we hope make this publication far more engaging for you to read. This research study was conducted with generous support from the United States Department of State and in partnership with the Asia Society Policy Institute and the China Power Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Citation Custer, S., Sethi, T., Solis, J., Lin, J., Ghose, S., Gupta, A., Knight, R., and A. Baehr. (2019). Silk Road Diplomacy: Deconstructing Beijing’s toolkit to influence South and Central Asia. December 10, 2019. Williamsburg, VA. AidData at William & Mary. Appendix To access the technical appendices for this report, please refer to the electronic version which can be found online at https://aiddata.org/publications/silk-road-diplomacy. Contents 1. Introduction: Quantifying Beijing’s public diplomacy in South and Central Asia 1 1.1 How do we define Beijing’s public diplomacy toolkit and understand its objectives? 1 1.2 How do we quantify Beijing’s public diplomacy inputs and outcomes in South and Central Asia? 2 2. How should we quantify Beijing’s public diplomacy efforts? 4 2.1 What instruments are included in China’s public diplomacy toolkit? 4 2.2 Which public diplomacy instruments does Beijing favor and with whom? 18 2.3 Concluding thoughts 21 3. How do South Asian countries perceive Beijing’s public diplomacy overtures and its influence? 25 3.1 Sri Lanka: Beijing tries to be a go-to economic partner while navigating political backlash 26 3.2 Maldives: Beijing sets its sights on a gateway to the Indian Ocean 29 3.3 Bangladesh: Welcoming Beijing as an infrastructure partner and counter to New Delhi 32 3.4 Nepal: Beijing’s overtures present an alternative to being “India-locked” 35 3.5 Concluding thoughts 38 4. How do Central Asian countries perceive Beijing’s public diplomacy overtures and its influence? 44 4.1 Kazakhstan: Winning friends is critical to Beijing’s westward march 45 4.2 Uzbekistan: Maintaining the “golden middle” as Tashkent balances Beijing with other powers 48 4.3 Concluding thoughts 52 5. Are Beijing’s public diplomacy efforts associated with the outcomes it wishes to achieve? 56 5.1 What motivates how Beijing wields its public diplomacy tools with other countries? 56 5.2 Why do some people and countries perceive Beijing more favorably than others? 60 5.3 Are Beijing’s public diplomacy overtures associated with more favorable foreign policy positions? 61 5.4 Are Beijing’s public diplomacy efforts associated with more favorable trade balances? 63 5.5 Concluding thoughts 64 6. What does the future hold for Beijing's public diplomacy with leaders and citizens in the region? 66 6.1 Key insights on Beijing’s public diplomacy overtures with SCA countries 66 6.2 Implications for countries on the receiving end of Beijing’s overtures 67 6.3 Considerations for Beijing’s strategic competitors in view of its growing influence 68 6.4 Concluding thoughts 69 Figures and Maps Map 1: Chinese Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in SCA countries, 2005-2018 7 Map 2: Sister city agreements between China and SCA countries, as of 2018 9 Figure 1: SCA students in China and recipients of Chinese scholarships 10 Map 3: Visits between Chinese and SCA government officials, 2000-2017 12 Map 4: China’s military diplomacy with SCA countries, 2003-2016 13 Map 5: Media outreach by Chinese senior leaders via SCA media outlets, 2002-2017 15 Map 6: China’s financial diplomacy with SCA countries, 2000-2017 17 Figure 2: Volume and composition of China’s public diplomacy by year, 2002-2017 19 Figure 3: Volume and composition of China’s public diplomacy by country, 2002-2017 20 Boxes Box 1: Quantifying the tools of Chinese public diplomacy 5 Box 2: Alignment in UNGA voting: Ideal points similarity 62 Tables Table 1: Proxy measures for quantitative analysis of China’s public diplomacy, 2002-2017 18 Table 2: Analyzing the determinants of Beijing's public diplomacy allocations 58 Table 3: Drivers of Beijing's public diplomacy in SCA, 2001-2017 58 Table 4: Analyzing public perceptions of favorability and Beijing’s public diplomacy 59 Table 5. Beijing’s public diplomacy and public perceptions, foreign policy alignment, and net exports 59 Table 6: Analyzing UNGA voting patterns and Beijing's public diplomacy 62 Table 7: Analyzing China’s trade balances with SCA and public diplomacy 64 Acronyms AFSA – Astana Financial Services Authority AL – Awami League AMIS – Aid Management Information System ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASPI – Asia Society Policy Institute BIMSTEC – Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation BRI – Belt and Road Initiative BNP – Bangladesh Nationalist Party BSF – Indian Border Security Force CC – Confucius Classroom CCP – Chinese Communist Party CCTV – China Central Television CCWAEC – China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor CGTN – China Global Television Network CI – Confucius Institute CNPC – China National Petroleum Corporation CPEC – China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CRI – China Radio International CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies CSRC – China Securities Regulatory Commission EAP – East Asia and Pacific FDI – Foreign Direct Investment GDP – Gross Domestic Product GWP – Gallup World Poll ICT – Information and communications technology IFI – International finance institutions IMF – International Monetary Fund MDP – Maldivian Democratic Party MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOE – Ministry of Education MoF – Ministry of Finance MOFCOM – Ministry of Commerce NELB – New Eurasian Land Bridge OECD – Organization for economic-cooperation and development PHSC – Protection of Human Subjects Committee PLA – People’s Liberation Army PPM – Progressive Party of the Maldives SAARC – South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SCA – South and central Asia SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization SLFP – Sri Lanka Freedom Party TUFF – Tracking Under-Reported Finance Flows TWAS – World Academy of Sciences UML – Unified Marxist-Leninist UN – United Nations UNGA – United Nations General Assembly XUAR – Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region CHAPTER 1 1. Introduction: Quantifying Beijing’s public diplomacy in South and Central Asia CHAPTER ONE Introduction: Quantifying Beijing’s public diplomacy overtures and influence in South and Central Asia Beijing’s fixation on projecting an attractive vision of scholar John Arquilla (Nye, 2014) puts it, “in today’s itself to the rest of the world is not unique
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