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Home , Greater Indonesia, Portugal, Portuguese Timor, Ruslan Abdulgani, Timor

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12-1966 Portuguese : An Indonesian Dilemma Donald E. Weatherbee University of South Carolina - Columbia, [email protected]

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Publication Info Published in Asian Survey, Volume 6, Issue 2, 1966, pages 683-695. http://www.ucpressjournals.com/journal.asp?j=as © 1966 by University of California Press

This Article is brought to you by the Political Science, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PORTUGUESETIMOR: AN INDONESIANDILEMMA DONALD E. WEATHERBEE

Out of theclamor and heat of 'sIndonesia's confronta- tionwith the "Old EstablishedForces" emergedan imageof a revolution- ary Indonesian foreignpolicy determinedlyrevisionist and implacably opposedto the maintenanceor extensionof Westernpower and influence in the Afro-Asiansphere. Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution was "actively opposedto, and hittinghard at, all formsof imperialismand whereverthey occur."' Indonesiadid not refrainfrom acts calculatedto upsetthe statusquo in SoutheastAsia, and indeedjustified them in terms of its anti-imperialistideology. Yet, at the same time that Indonesiawas claimingits place in the vanguardof the "New EmergingForces," it acceptedthe tangiblepresence of traditionalimperialism on its own door- step. , the most aggressivelyanti-imperialist political unit in South , is contiguouswith, surrounds, and peacefullycoexists with one of the two anachronisticvestiges of PortugueseAsian -Portu- gueseTimor (the other fragment being, of course,Macao). D. G. E. Hall, surveyingthe impermanenceof Portuguesedominance in Asia, wrote"Yet whenall has been said regardingthe moribundstate of thePortuguese empire at theend of thesixteenth century, the factremains that,like CharlesII, it took an unconscionabletime in dying."2 That it is in factnot dead withinthe territorialarea occupiedby Indonesiais a piquant anomolygiven the ideologicalbias of Indonesianforeign policy. An examinationof PortugueseTimor as a problemfor Indonesian foreign policy withinthe contextof the proclaimedpolicy goals providessome insightsinto the determinants of Indonesia'srevolutionary approach to the ,particularly the relationship between ideology and interest,as wellas illuminatesthe possible futureof Portugueseimperialism in the archi- pelago. PortugueseTimor Timoris theeasternmost of the stringof islandsarching eastwards from to the Banda whichare knowncollectively as the Lesser Sundas (Indonesian:Nusa Tenggara). The entireisland is about 300 mileslong withan averagewidth of 60 miles. consists of the east- ern half of the (approximately5,700 square miles), the coastal enclave of Occussi-Ambenuin westernTimor, and the two of Atauroand Jaco,for a totalarea of 7,383square miles (New -7,836 square miles). The capital and only urban centeris (Dilli, Dilly) 1 Sukarno,Political Manifesto, Independence Day ,Aug. 17, 1959. 2D. G. E. Hall, A Short History of South-East Asia (: Macmillan, 1955), p. 206.

683 684 PORTUGUESE TIMOR located on the northcoast. The entireprovince is oftenreferred to as Timor-Dili. The populationof PortugueseTimor was recordedin the 1960 censusas 517,079,distributed unevenly, with an average densityof 23 per square kilometer.Dili has a populationof about 7,000.Although the 1960 census did not indicatethe racial compositionof the population,such data was includedin the 1950 census,and thereis no reasonto believethat the gen- eral proportionshave greatlychanged. The 1950 figuresare given in Table I. It shouldbe notedthat Timor has the lowestpercentage of - pean inhabitantsof all of the OverseasProvinces of . TABLE I Compositionof PortugueseTimor's Population in 19503 European 568 Mestico (mixed blood) 2,022 Chinese 3,122 Other non-indigenous(Goan, etc.) 212 indigenous-civilizado 1,541 indigenous-ndo-civilizado 434,907 Total 442,378 The distinctionbetween civilizado and ndo-civilizadoin Portuguese "colonial"practice has been important.The termcivilizado denotes those individualswho be countedas being culturallymodern as opposed to traditional.Theoretically, the goal of Portuguesepolicy is to assimilate theindigenous people to thePortuguese way of life.This is euphemistically called achievingdesired levels of economicand social progress.Of the 1950 populationonly 7,471 (1 .8<,) of the total-i.e., all but the ndo-civilizado categoryin Table I-were classifiedas civilizado.Thus, less than 4/10ths of one percentof the indigenouspopulation have been assimilatedafter morethan three centuries of ruleby Portugal.Of thetotal population more than98%- are consideredto be outsideof thelimits of westerncivilization. It was not untilthe firstyears of the 18thcentury that the Portuguese establisheda permanentadministration on Timor.4Portuguese interest in the island,however, dates back to the sixteenthcentury. Timor's sandal- wood was an importanttrade item and the Portuguesesent annual col- lectionmissions to the island. The Dominicanfriars also had established themselvesin the easternLesser Sundas by the middleof the sixteenth

3 These figuresare givenin Document A/AC.109/L.67, 10, 1963, para. 51. 4 The materialon PortugueseTimor is drawn principallyfrom the followingsources: Timor-BackgroundPaper Prepared by the Secretariat,United Nations doc. A/AC.108/ L.13, Dec. 3, 1962; William Burton Sowash, "Colonial Rivalries in Timor," The Far Eastern Quarterly,VII:3 (May, 1948), pp. 227-235; C. R. Boxer, "PortugueseTimor- A Rough Island Story: 1515-1960," History Today, X:5 (May, 1960), pp. 349-355. Since the preparation of this manuscriptwas completed, an Universities Field Staffreport has describedthe Portugueseefforts to modernizeTimor. See Willard A. Hanna, "Reanimated Timor," AUFS, Series, Vol. XIV, Nos. 7, 8 and 9. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE 685 century.In 1962the Dutch East Companyentered the and began to displacethe Portuguese. Competition between the Dutch and the Portu- guesein Timorwas regulatedby a treatyof 1661 thatgave the Dutch the westernpart of the islandand the Portuguesethe eastern.Constant inter- necinewarfare marked the historyof the island. The Dutch mounteda numberof pacificationcampaigns, and by the middleof the eighteenth century,had firmlysecured themselvesin the . The Portuguese, althoughpressed not only by theindigenous wars but by theDutch as well, did not stronglygarrison the island. Their position was tenuous,resting on theability to playone indigenous group off against another. During the NapoleonicWars the Britishoccupied Dutch Timor. The Dutch reoccupationafter the war opened a new periodin the historyof the joint occupanyof the island. Althoughboth countriesrecognized one another'srights, there was a constantirritant over undefinedboundaries. The Dutch wouldhave liked to purchasePortuguese Timor but Portugal was only willingto negotiateboundaries. The long historyof boundary discussionscentered on the questionof the enclavesheld by both powers withinthe other'sterritory. A mixed commissionworking in 1898-99 settledmost of the outstandingissues, and a conventionembodying the borderagreement was signedat the Hague in 1904. However,a further difficultyarose concerningthe easternboundary of the Occussi-Ambenu enclave.This questionwas referredto thePermanent Court of Arbitration, and in 1914 a decisionwas handeddown. From that pointon, the boun- dariesof Timor have not been called into question. The jointinterest of the twopowers in Timor,to the exclusionof third parties,received treaty status in a conventionsigned in in 1893 in whichinter alia Portugaland theNetherlands promised preference to each otherin the eventof the disposal of theirrights in Timor. In the 1904 Hague conventionthe signatoriesagreed not to cede theirrights in Timor to anythird party. PortugueseTimor was firstadministered from and latercame under the jurisdictionof Macao. In 1896, Timorwas separatedfrom Macao and became a separateadministrative unit. It was not until after the final militarypacification campaign in 1913 that civil governmentwas intro- duced. Withpacification came the introductionof commercialagriculture, particularlycoffee, making use of forcedlabor. The Europeanpopulation of PortugueseTimor has alwaysbeen small.For a timethe territory served as a penal .After 1930 an effortwas made to attractPortuguese set- tlersto the island forplantation development, but withoutmuch success. AlthoughPortugal was a neutralin WorldWar II, Timordid not escape the ravagesof the war in the Pacific.It was occupiedin turnby allied, Japaneseand again allied forces,and the modesteconomic progress in the colonywas set back. The Portuguesewere able to reasserttheir sovereignty afterthe war without difficulty. 686 PORTUGUESE TIMOR

By Portugueselaw Timoris an integralpart of the PortugueseRepublic withthe administrative status of an OverseasProvince. Until 1951 Timor, as well as the otherdependencies of Portugal,was a colony.In that year theconstitutional framework of the was changedto incor- poratethe extra-European territories into the state. Nevertheless, according to UnitedNations sources,"The relationshipof . . . Timor to Portugal remainsessentially a colonialone and the inhabitantsof these territories have verylimited participation in the centraland local organsof govern- ment.") As a partial responseto the increasingvolume of foreigncriticism of Portugal's"colonial" policy,the Lisbon authoritieshave in recentyears made an effortto create administrativestructures in the overseasprov- incesmore broadly based thanin thepast and to bringthe indigenous inhab- itantsof overseasPortugal into closer contact with .This was the main thrustof the new OverseasOrganic Law of 1963 and was givenspecific application in thenew Statuteof Timor.6In discussingpolit- ical evolutionin theOverseas , it is necessary,however, to remem- ber that the of the central governmentitself is the important determinantof the directionof change in the non-metropolitanparts of Portugal.Portugal is a corporativerepublic. The state is organizedalong highlycentralized lines with interestrepresentation being a functionof thevarious corporative bodies. The chiefgovernmental officer of PortugueseTimor is the Governor, appointedfrom Lisbon by the Councilof Ministers.7In 1963, forthe first time,a LegislativeCouncil was established.The old appointiveGovern- mentCouncil was retainedas an executiveadvisory body. The new Legis- lative Council has powersgreater than the formerGovernment Council had and sharessome of theauthority of the Governor.Membership on the Councilis obtainedby electionfollowing the Portuguesecorporative pat- tern. Representationis indirect,therefore. After II all inhabitants of Timorwere granted citizenship. This did not carrywith it the rightto a ballot.Suffrage was effectivelyrestricted to the civilizados.As part of its attemptto giveat least thesemblance of greaterparticipation in the polit- ical processto all inhabitantsof the OverseasProvinces, the Portuguese governmentin 1963 promulgateda new electorallaw that theoretically broughtthe ndo-civilizadosinto the electoralmachinery. However, the qualificationsset by thenew law, particularly with respect to propertyand

5 United Nations doc. A/5160,Aug. 15, 1962,para. 46. 6 Estatuto Politico-Administrativo da provincia de Timor (Agencia-Geral do Ultramar,Lisboa, 1963). See also United Nations doc. A/AC.109/L.126,June 9, 1964. 7 The governmentalstructure of PortugueseTimor parallels that of the other smaller Overseas Provinces: Verde Islands, Macao, , Sao Tome and Principe. and have a somewhatdifferent institutional framework. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE 687 tax requirements,are such that the indigenouspeople are still effectively debarred.One UnitedNations appraisal states: Eventhough the Native Statute has been repealed, the right to voteand to participatein theLegislative Councils and in theadministration of theterritories still appears to be relatedto theattainment of a degree of 'socialprogress' which in effectmeans the assimilation of Portuguese cultureand theattainment of a Portugueseway of life.8 Despite thenew governmental look on Timoras a resultof the dictated adjustmentsof theOverseas Organic Law of 1963 and thesubsequent new Statutefor Timor, in termsof controlfrom Lisbon and lack of effective indigenousrepresentation, little has been changed.The United Nations Special Committeeconcerned with Portugueseoverseas territorieshas appraisedthe 1963 reformsin thesewords, "[It] does not make any sub- stantialchanges in the powersof the organsof Portugal'sgovernment to legislatefor territories which have been describedpreviously.",' Unfortu- natelythere does not seem to be any way to ascertainTimorese reaction to Portugal'srule, at leastwithin Timor. In thevarious reports and papers fromUnited Nations sources that treat Timor, one usuallymeets the rather resignedstatement, "No informationconcerning political movements in the territoryis available." 10 The principaleconomic activity of the PortugueseTimorese is sub- sistanceagriculture, chiefly shifting cultivation of maizewith some wet culture.Timor is resourcepoor, and hopes fordevelopment have been ill- founded.The GeneralAssembly of the UnitedNations has been told that, "In the post-warperiod there has been no significantprogress in the eco- nomicdevelopment of Timor."Ad This statementwas made in the middle of Timor's second five-yeardevelopment plan (1959-64). The develop- mentplans, modestly financed (second plan-six milliondollars) have con- centratedon the reconstructionof the of Dili, resourcedevelopment, and transportation.Public servicesin Timor are poorlydeveloped, with the generationof electricity,transportation facilities, and communications beingabsent or inadequateoutside of Dili. Despite a tariff-freemarket, only a smallpart of Timors'trade is with Portugal.The principalexports are coffee,which provides about two-thirds of the value of all exports,copra, and rubber.The largestmarkets are in NorthernEurope. Although the volume of exportshas been steadilyrising, the provinceshows a persistentand sizeable deficitin its tradebalance.

8 United Nations doc. A/AC.109/L.126,June 9, 1964,para. 73 9Ibid., para. 21. 10 For example, United Nations doc. A/AC.109/67,July 10, 1963, para. 58; doc. A/AC.108/L.13,Dec. 3, 1962,para. 35. 11 United Nations doc. A/5160,Aug. 15, 1962,para. 242. 12Table 9 in United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13, Dec. 3, 1962, gives the trade figuresfor the decade 1950-1960. 688 PORTUGUESE TIMOR

The ameliorationof this deficitwould requirenot only increasedinvest- mentin the exportsector of the economybut the developmentof local enterprisesfor import substitution. A word should be said at this point about anotheraspect of Timor's trade,and that is the illegal movementof goods across the borderwith Indonesia.Smuggling has been a recurrenttheme in the Indonesian-Portu- guese relationship.Of course,part of what the authoritiesmight consider illicittrade is a naturaland freeexchange by theindigenous people of Timor to whomartificial international boundaries have littlesignificance. Further- more,it cannotbe deniedthat some businessmen on the Indonesianside of the borderhave showna preferencefor exchangegaining them escudos ratherthan rupiah.13 The factthat economic and socialprogress in Timorhas been so retarded can be attributedto a numberof causes.Not theleast is its physicalisola- tion.Infrequent flights from Darwin and perhapsa dozenships a yearmake it a fairlyremote outpost of empire.A secondfactor has been the absence of a large European settlercommunity. Thirdly, government revenue is limited,affording an ordinarybudget of less than threemillion dollars a year.A finalelement has been the delayedrecognition by the Portuguese governmentthat only with programsaimed at openingup the modern worldto thetraditional population of Timorwill a climatefor development be created.As the presentGovernor of the Provincehas stated,"It is no use in havingtechnical advances and big materialimprovements that the peoplecannot understand and takeadvantage of."> 14 The key to a betterlife for the inhabitants of PortugueseTimor, if they remainPortuguese, is ,and thereby,assimilation. In 1950 the adultilliteracy rate on Timorwas placedbetween 95-99%. What education therewas in thenon-urban areas was in thehands of theCatholic missions. Governmentschools were primarily for the civilizados.As late as 1960, it was estimatedthat primaryschool enrollmentin the Provincewas only about 6%' of the total schoolage population.In February,1964, changes wereintroduced in the educationsystem to make primaryschooling com- pulsoryfor children between the ages of 6 and 12. But, stillless than half of theprimary school age populationis in factin school.Part of theprob- lem is thelack of teachersand schools.There is also a questionof the rel- evancyof curriculaand textbooksprepared primarily for the use of Portu- guese childrenin Portugal.It remainsto be seen whetherPortugal will have theopportunity to provethat its newresolution in Timorwill produce a newsociety.15

1-3See "Remnantsof Empire, II. PortugueseTimor," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXX:11 (Dec. 15, 1960), p. 585. 14 Col. Jose AlbertyCorreia, as reportedby Tillman Durdin in , Dec. 13, 1965. 15 Durdin,ibid. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE 689

PortugueseTimor in IndonesianForeign Policy The continuedpresence of a colonialregime on Timor,notwithstanding Portugueseconstitutional fictions, coexisting with Sukarno's Indonesian and NEFO resolutionsat firstglance could appear to mark Indonesian inconsistencyof purpose.When viewedagainst the backgroundof active policies against Dutch imperialismin West and what, by Indonesiandefinition, was continuedBritish imperalism in , the restraintthat Indonesia has exercisedtoward Portuguese imperialism in Timorseems to be uncharacteristic.Although all of the ingredientsof a courseof actiondirected towards the expulsionof the Portugueseseem to be present,there has notbeen formulatedan officialIndonesian policy spe- cificallydirected to the eliminationof Portugueserule on Timor. This does not implyan absence of Indonesianinterest or lack of con- sciousnessthat a problemfor Indonesian foreign policy might exist. Even beforeIndia had extinguishedGoa's colonialexistence, a move that high- lightedthe egregious presence of the Portuguesein Timor,the Vice Chair- man of Sukarno'sSupreme Advisory Council called on the people of Indo- nesia to "fillyour hearts with hatred not only forPortuguese colonialism, but forall colonialismstill existing on Asianand Africansoil," threateningly adding that Indonesia's"eyes and heart are directedtoward Portuguese Timor and Goa," which,"are still under the power of colonialism."16 Indonesianshave not been indifferentto the supposedplight of the inhab- itantsof PortugueseTimor who, by definition,are "suffering"under alien domination.General Nasution has characterizedthe situationin Portu- guese Timoras one of "enslavement."17 FormerForeign Suban- drio attemptedto use Timor as a hostagein the struggleagainst Portu- guese rulein .Discussing Angola in the IndonesianPeople's Repre- sentativeCongress, he warnedthe Lisbon authoritiesnot to ignorethe attitudesand temperof the Indonesianpeople because,"Indonesia lies so close to one of Portugal'scolonies-Portguese Timor," adding the implied threat,"Do notwait untilthe Indonesianpeople's anger flares up." 18 But the Indonesiangovernment has not stoked this particularrevolutionary fire,and theverbal condemnations of Lisbon'spolicy and hortatoryinjunc- tions against Portuguesecolonialism have not given way to substantive acts to eradicatevestigial Portuguese imperium in SouthernAsia. On the whole,Indonesian relations with Portugal,at least in so far as Timor is concerned,have been correct,if not good. Since the Springof 1965, how- ever, the relationsbetween the two countrieshave been a state of sus-

16 Ruslan Abdulgani,speech at protestrally on Angola, sponsoredby the Afro-Asian People's SolidarityOrganization, , July 12, 1961. 17 As reportedby Antara,Dec. 22, 1962. 18 ,statement to plenarysession of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, July 3, 1961. 690 PORTUGUESE TIMOR

pendedanimation. A Portuguesespokesman has describedrelations between theadjoining territories on Timoras "cordial."19 Incidentsand disputeshave occurredalong the bordersof Timorwhich could have been construedby Jakartaas provocationand a pretextfor a moreaggressive policy if it had so desired.In mid-1962,for instance, the Portuguesegovernment announced that two Indonesiansand one Portu- guesehad beenkilled in whatwere described as purelydomestic border inci- dents.The officialIndonesian ,Antara, on the otherhand, chargedthe Portugueseauthorities with "provokingtrouble by creating tensionsamong the local people," kidnappingIndonesian citizens, incur- sions into Indonesianterritory to steal cattle and goods, and smuggling. More seriousaccusations by Indonesia of Portuguesebatteries firing on coastwiseshipping were vigorously denied by Portugaland were not pur- sued by Indonesia.It is doubtfulthat much more should be read into the sporadicoutbursts along the bordersand the accompanyingtensions than the frictionsinherent in thenature of such a joint occupancy,complicated by thelack ofethnic definition along the frontier. Indonesian governmentofficials in repeated public statementshave recognizedthat Indonesiansovereignty does not encompassPortuguese Timor.Any claim to theterritory has been categoricallyabjured. "We have no claimson PortugueseTimor, nor on NorthBorneo or on any otherter- ritoryoutside of the formerDutch ."20 On the occasionof a visit to Portugalin 1961, Sukarno reportedlyassured Dr. Salazar that Portugueserights on Timorwould be respected.A UnitedNations "back- groundpaper" on Timorsums the matterup as follows: For itspart the government of Indonesiahas declaredthat it maintains friendlyrelations with Portugal and has no claimto PortugueseTimor, whichhas neverbeen part of theDutch East Indiesand thereforeis notof thesame status as WestIrian [West New Guinea].21 But theabsence of a historicallyor legallyviable territorialclaim to Portu- guese Timordoes not rule out the developmentof a politicalclaim based on criteriarelated not to the colonialpast, but to the presentand future. Althoughthe spokesmenof the Indonesiangovernment officially deny territorialambitions with respect to Timor,there is abundantevidence to indicatethat such ambitionsdo exist. Indonesianexpansive nationalism, whichsome mightdefine as imperialism,has been notedby a numberof studentsof Indonesianforeign policy. There is no need to provethat mod- ern Indonesiais seekingto recreatethe 14thcentury empireto demonstratea constantthread of expansionismin the ideology,if not the actionsof the Jakartagovernment. One writerwho has followedclosely Indonesia'srelations with its neighborssums it up as follows:"In Djakarta,

19As reportedby the AustralianBroadcasting Commission, Jan. 19, 1963. 20 Subandrio,as reportedby Antara,Oct. 2, 1962. 21 United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13,Dec. 3, 1962,para. 35. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE 691 however,expansionist goals-known as 'GreaterIndonesia'-do seemto be verynear the surface of today'spolicies." 22 PortugueseTimor is a natural area of expansionist'sinterest. The authorhas spokenwith Indonesians ofvarious political persuasions to whomthe acquisition of Portuguese Timor is seen as part of a territorialrounding out process.Indonesian attitudes towardTimor are not framedin termsof conquest,but ratherthe "recov- ery"of Indonesia irredenta. Anyunofficial "liberation" policy which Jakarta may have had towards PortugueseTimor was one of irresoluteindirection. For instance,the Indo- nesianauthorities would look favorablyon theemergence of politicalmove- mentsostensibly originating in the Portugueseprovince aimed at over- throwingthe colonialrule. With specificreference to North and PortugueseTimor, General Nasution has said: "We supporttheir strug- gles,but do notclaim their territories." 23 If thegoal of the "freedomfight- ers" shouldbe incorporationinto the Indonesianstate, Indonesia would not be unsympathetic.Ruslan Abdulgani,speaking as Ministerof Infor- mation,has been uncontradictedin his statementthat, "Although we are not an expansionistnation we cannotallow people of commonancestry to be persecutedand thrownin prisonmerely because they want to unitewith the fatherlandof theirancestors." 24 Other Indonesianshave been more specific:"If the people of Timortoday or tomorrowstarted a revolution, ... we wouldsupport them.... Afterindependence, if theywanted to stay independent,fine.... If theywant to join Indonesia,we willtalk it over."2" Actual effortsto create the conditionsof an anti-colonialstruggle on Timorhave been tentativeand apparentlyhave arousedlittle enthusiasm. In early1961, an organizationcalled the Bureau of Liberationof theTimor ,located in Jakarta,called on the people of Timor to driveout the Portuguesecolonialists. A United Nations reporton Timor in 1962 notedthe existence of thisBureau (Committee),but statedthat there was no informationconcerning political activity in PortugueseTimor. It was claimedin Spring,1963, that"independence fighters" had set up a United Republicof TimorDilly witha governmentof 12 ministerswho had been secretlyinstalled inside of PortugueseTimor in April. The release con- tainingthis informationwas signedby a personwho styledhimself the "Director General of the Presidiumof the United Republic of Timor Dilly" and was made publicin Jakarta.The reportsaid that the "United Republicof Timor Dilly" was functioningas a nationand appealed for recognitionby othergovernments. The requestedrecognitions were not forthcoming,nor has the "government"of the "republic"availed itselfof

22 BernardK. Gordon, The Dimensionsof Conflictin Southeast Asia (Prentice-Hall/ Spectrum,1966), p. 80. 23 GeneralNasution, speech at rally at Purwokerto,Jan. 22, 1963. 24 As reportedby Radio Republic of Indonesia,Sept. 3, 1963. 25 General Mokoginta in interviewwith Warren Unna, WashingtonPost, May 10, 1963, quoted by BernardK. Gordon,op. cit.,p. 94. 692 PORTUGUESE TIMOR the platformoffered by the UnitedNations Special Committeeconcerned withPortuguese dependent territories. Indonesia, other than offering facil- itiesin Jakartato thepublicists of the Timor"liberation movement," does notappear to have givenit muchsupport. If theUnited Republic of Timor Dilly is in factan autonomouspolitical body, its representativesin Jakarta have been well concealed,not takingpart in the anti-imperialistrallys and programsthat were a featureof life in the Indonesiancapital. That theremay have beeninternal disturbances in PorugueseTimor dur- ing the year 1963 can be inferredfrom sources other than Jakarta. There was a troopbuild-up in PortugueseTimor beginning in the second-halfof 1962. A troopship was sentto Timorwith 1,000 soldierstermed replace- ments,but this forcewas reportedto outnumberthe entirePortuguese garrisonon the island. In January1963, Portugueseofficials said that defenseforces consisted of a fewtroops only. It was not clarifiedwhether this statementcomprehended internal security forces as well as border forces.In May 1963, a memberof the PortugueseArmy staff, Col. Jose AlbertyCorreia, was appointedGovernor of the .In mid-1963, it was reported,but thendenied, that elements of the Portuguesegarrison in Macao werebeing moved to Timor.The defensebudget for Timor was enlargedin 1963, reaching29 millionescudos, a figureequalling half the province'sordinary revenues for 1963. If therewere the beginningsof inl- surrectionit has been contained.No real armed threat to Portuguese authorityin Timor has materialized.The Lisbon authoritiesapparently feelsecure enough in Timor,both in theirdomestc control and theirrela- tionswith Indonesia, to justifycontinued expenditures in the development program,including a newemphasis on tourism. All of the factorsappear to be presentthat would be conduciveto an active Indonesian"liberation" policy. There is ample justificationfor the wrestingof Timor fromPortugal in the frameworkof Indonesia'srevolu- tionaryideology. Timor is even a moreobvious case of imperialismthan Malaysia.The normativelimits on Indonesianstate action are few.Insofar as internationallegal obligationsare concerned,the Indonesianview was succinctlystated by Sukarno:"Colonial rule over another nation, although perhapsformerly agreed in a certaininternational treaty, . . . must be got rid of as quicklyas possible."26 The precedentof Goa and external assistanceto rebelgroups in Africaindicate that any IndonesianTimorese adventurecould be justifiedas defenseagainst the "permanentaggression" of colonialism.In the atmosphereof hostilitytowards Portugal in the African-Asianworld, the destructionof anotherbastion of the imperial- ists wouldreceive general approbation. Furthermore, if this should result in theincorporation of PortugueseTimor into Indonesia, this would receive supportas well.Revealing in thisconnection is a statementby theU.S.S.R.

26 Sukarno,Political Manifesto, Independence Day Address,Aug. 17, 1959. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE 693

thatfor its partit regardedPortuguese Timor as Indonesiannational terri- tory.27 Not onlywould the generalideological and moralclimate in the anti- imperialistsphere be favorable,but the relativepower positions of Portu- gal and Indonesia would not be inhibitingto Indonesia. Militarily,the liberationof Timor,weakly garrisoned in relationto disposableIndonesian forces,and so remotefrom Portugal as well as the Portugueseforces tied down in Africa,would not constitutea problemfor Indonesia. Nor, as experiencehas shown,could Portugalexpect directassistance fromher allies. Consideringall of theabove, we mustconclude that despite aspirations- ideologicaland imperial-Indonesiahas refrainedfrom actively seeking to forceout the Portugueseon the basis of an Indonesiandetermination of interest.That the liberationof PortugueseTimor does not have a high priorityin theranging of Indonesian-Portugueserelations. There had been other,more immediate tasks set forthe policy: first,the "restoration"of West Irian to the foldof the Republic,and thenthe attemptto foil the "neocolonialistplot" of Malaysia. A prematuremove against Portuguese Timor could have been injuriousto Indonesianinterest in termsof the accomplishmentof thesetwo more important tasks. In the West Irian dispute,the Indonesiancase was based on the claim thatWest Irian was an integralpart of the formerNetherlands East Indies and thereforecontinued Dutch possessionwas a deprivationof Indonesian territorialrights. West Irian was a partof Indonesia'scolonial inheritance. Indonesiawent to greatpains duringits diplomaticcampaign against the Dutch to stressthe finitenessof its territorialambitions. In the confronta- tionwith Malaysia, Indonesiaemphasized that territorialaggrandizement was nota goal; thatit had no claim to Sarawakor NorthBorneo. "These are notpart of our territory,"Dr. Subandrioproclaimed, "nor is thereany reasonupon whichsuch a claim mightbe based." 28 An aggressivepolicy towardsPortuguese Timor mighthave destroyedthe credibilityof Indo- nesia's self-denyingposition on territorialexpansion. It would also have increasedthe apprehensionsof Indonesia's neighborsas to the ultimate goalsof Indonesia in SoutheastAsia. One of the uneasyneighbors is .It has watchedthe develop- mentof Indonesianforeign policy withserious concern. The Australians came to themilitary assistance of Malaysia in theconfrontation with Indo- nesia,despite Indonesian threats. One of the calculationswhich Indonesia wouldhave to make in weighingdecisions about PortugueseTimor would be Australianreaction. An aggressivepolicy towardsPortuguese Timor,

27United NationsGeneral Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Committee, 1047th meeting,Nov. 11,1960. 28 Subandrio,Indonesia's Foreign Policy, reprint of articleappearing in specialissue ofLe Monde,May, 1964. 694 PORTUGUESE TIMOR whetherfor territoryor in the serviceof anti-imperialism,would alert Australiato a real or supposeddanger to Australia'srole in theeastern half of New Guinea. It would immediatelyplace in doubt the value of Indo- nesianguarantees of the inviolabilityof the New Guinea border.Doubts are alreadythere, but at thisstage of Indonesiannational development, and in theflux of creatinga newinternational political order in SoutheastAsia, even a suspiciousAustralia fits better into the patternof Indonesianstate interactionsthan an activelyhostile Australia. We suggest,therefore, that althoughgiven the non-interest determinants of Indonesianforeign policy, the liberationof PortugueseTimor was not attemptedbecause it would not have furtheredIndonesia's interests; in fact,it mighthave been in- juriousto interestin thoseareas of Indonesia'sforeign relations that were assignedgreater value. Interest,however, is not immutable. The Futureof Portuguese Timor In a ringingdeclaration, the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations has said: "All peopleshave the rightto self-determination;by virtueof that rightthey freelydetermine their political status and freelypursue theireconomic, social and culturaldevelopment."29 Both the GeneralAs- semblyand the SecurityCouncil have determinedthat Portuguesepolicy in its OverseasProvinces is violativeof thatright. Portugal has been con- demnedand sanctionshave been called for,but Portugalhas not been responsiveto theAfrican-Asian mood. In Timorthe Portugueseclaim that self-determinationby the Timoresebecomes meaningless if thereare out- side (Indonesian)pressures. They can pointto Indonesianattitudes about self-determinationin West Irian forjustification of this.Secondly, to talk of independencehas no relevancein a discussionof Timor's future.It is difficultto imaginethat the territory could live as an independentpolitical unit in the Indonesianarchipelago. , geography, economics, and ethnicaffinities militate against such a development.The Portugueserealize this. Salazar told the PortugueseNational Assemblythat given Timor's positionin the midstof Indonesia,it wouldnot live an independentlife.30 Nor can the Portuguesebe expectedto voluntarilytransfer sovereignty of PortugueseTimor to Indonesia.Such a transferwould be, in theireyes, unjust,not only to Portugalbut to the peoplesof Timor. The persistenceof a Portugueserole on Timoron the surfaceis a func- tionof nationalism,prestige, and a (newlyemergent) sense of mission.In fact,the real heart of Portugueseresistance to any changein thestatus quo in Timoris its relationto the Salazar government'scomplete commitment to the maintenanceof the Portuguesestate intact. The erosionof the Portugueseposition at any one pointwould weaken the entirestructure of

29 GeneralAssembly, Resolution 1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 1960. 30 These questions were raised by Dr. Salazar in his speech to the Portuguese Na- tional Assemblyon June 30, 1961, as quoted in United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13, Dec. 3, 1962,para. 36. DONALD E. WEATHERBEE 695

the overseaspolicy and give ammunitionto the growingnumber of dissi- dentsin MetropolitanPortugal who are not identifiedwith the empire. It is doubtful,however, that Portugal would be able to resistIndonesian pressuresif theywere transformed into an Indonesianpolicy actively work- ing forthe endingof Portugueserule on Timor.Timor is not Angola or Mozombique.There is no greateconomic value to PortugueseTimor. There is no largeEuropean settler community to complicatea transferof sover- eignty.Timor is not defensibleby Portugal.An Indonesianadvance would probablyencounter the same kind of resistancethat the Indian armymet in Goa. What are thepossibilities for the developmentof an Indonesianforward policy?There is no demandfor immediate action against Portuguese Timor. From the vantagepoints of geography,politics, power, and population, Indonesiais not in a comparativesituation. It does not have to pre-empt a positionin Timor.The onlypressures for less restraintemanated from ideology.This was disciplined,bowing to currentinterests that put the questionof Timor into the future.On the otherhand, paradoxicalas it may seem, the changed directionof Indonesian foreignpolicy towards Malaysia, and the emergenceof a new governmentthat mustjustify its authority,heighten the possibilitiesof an Indonesianmove against Timor. The domesticIndonesian political requirements that producedconfronta- tionwith Malaysia have not reallyaltered. The new leadershipmay find Timora usefuldivertissement at somecritical moment in the future.This is admittedlyspeculative. Less speculativeis the assumptionthat when Indonesianideology and interestconverge in a Timor"liberation" policy, thePortuguese will be facedwith the realitiesof powerin theArchipelago. In conclusion,we can say that in a sense PortugueseTimor is a trust territory,the Portugueseholding it in trustfor Indonesia.

DONALD E. WEATHERBEE is Assistant Professor,Department of International Studies,at the Universityof South Carolina.