The Principality of Theodoro (Mangup) and Stephen the Great’s Moldavia: Observations and Hypotheses Ștefan S. Gorovei Among the directions followed by Stephen the Great in his foreign policy, the one historians call “the Black Sea policy” may reserve the most unexpected and unbelievable surprises, the kind that can disturb the adepts of “politi- cal correctness”. Older (from N. Iorga and Gheorghe I. Brătianu) and newer contributions—of the latter, those of historians Șerban Papacostea and Ștefan Andreescu—emphasized the constant interest with which the Moldavian ruler watched the evolutions of the events in the Black Sea, given the intricate network of connexions in the general policy from this part of Europe during the 7–9th decades of the 15th century. An economical interest—some would say—considering the detailed provisions of the trade agreements, the so-called privileges that regulated the flow of goods between Lviv and Cetatea Albă (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi), but also some of the actions of the Moldavian ruler.1 A military interest—others would say—drawn by the military campaigns of a prince who wasn’t, however, “a poet of wars” (N. Iorga’s expression). We cannot deny that there is some truth in both these interpretations. Nevertheless, I do believe that the sources—those still available today—allow a higher interpre- tation of this interest, also implying, in a coherent relationship, other types of information concerning Stephen the Great’s political creation. In order to directly and precisely shape the frame for the current observa- tions, I will refer to Gheorghe I. Brătianu, the historian to whom we owe—in my opinion—the very correlation between the expression Black Sea policy and the name of Stephen the Great. Here’s what Brătianu said, in his lecture of 1941–1942, about the Black Sea Question: “Stephen the Great had a Black Sea policy. This was demonstrated by our historians […]. I do believe that this as- pect played a very important part in the policy of the Moldavian voivode that […] Mr E. Turdeanu rightfully called as a time of crusade. Let us not forget that 1 See, in this way, the clarifying observations presented by Șerban Papacostea, “Începuturile politicii comerciale a Țării Românești și Moldovei (sec. XIV–XVI). Drum și stat,” Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie, 10 (1983), pp. 46–49; Papacostea, “Comerț, alianțe și acțiune militară în politica lui Ștefan cel Mare la începuturile domniei 1457–1462,” Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt. Atlet al credinței creștine, (Putna: Sf. Mănăstire Putna, 2004), pp. 445–454. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004422445_008 Observations and Hypotheses 147 Stephen the Great married Mary of Mangup, who was the sister of the lords of Mangup […] and therefore related through them with the lords of Trebizond; and the wife of Uzun Hasan, Despina, was from the Komnenoi family of Trebizond. She urged her husband to come to the aid of the Christians. This is how, through the Crimea, there was a link between Moldavia, the rulers of Mangup, the Komnenoi of Trebizond and Persia. Here’s the framework of the political system within which Stephen the Great fought during his wars with the Turks […] But more than this, he effectively took part in the fights from the Crimea. At some point, seeing that the lord of Mangup wasn’t integrated into his policy and did not follow his directives, he sent the brother of his wife, Alexander, who killed the other brother who ruled in the Crimea, took over Mangup and was escorted there by a Moldavian contingent. Among the last defenders of Mangup against the Turks were 300 Moldavian soldiers …”.2 A few years later, in the book dedicated to the Black Sea, mentioning the same facts of 1475, the historian presented a definitive conclusion: “il peut donc être question sans aucune exagération de la politique pontique d’Etienne le Grand” (“we can therefore discuss without any exaggeration about Stephen the Great’s Black Sea policy”).3 These general conclusions seem extremely cautious when compared to the categorical opinion presented by A.A. Vasiliev in 1936, referring to “the ambi- tious plans [of Stephen, n.a.] of exercising exceptional influence on Gothia [= the Crimea] and finally perhaps even of taking possession of the Crimean Principality”.4 Subscribing to this opinion (with a more reserved attitude how- ever), Ștefan Andreescu wrote recently: “In the case of Stephen the Great of Moldavia we can discuss without hesitation about an ample Black Sea policy, for he did not only extend his authority towards the shore of the Black Sea, from the Dniester Estuary until the Mouth of the Danube, but he even tried, 2 Gheorghe I. Brătianu, Chestiunea Mării Negre, (Bucharest, 1941), 607–608; Brătianu, Marea Neagră de la origini la cucerirea otomană, ed. Victor Spinei (Iași: Polirom, 1999), pp. 439–440, note 47; underlined by the author. 3 Gheorghe I. Brătianu, La Mer Noire des origines à la conquête ottomane, (Munchen: Societatea Academică Română, 1969), p. 323; Brătianu, Marea Neagră, p. 428. 4 A.A. Vasiliev, The Goths in the Crimea, (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America 1936), p. 244: “… through his marriage to Mary of Mangup, Stephen the Great had ambitious plans of exercising exceptional influence on Gothia and finally perhaps even of taking pos- session of the Crimean Principality” (underlined by the author). See also Alexander Gertsen, Nadezhda Gertsen, “Moldova și principatul Theodoro la 1475,” Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt. Atlet al credinței creștine, (Putna: Sf. Mănăstire Putna, 2004), pp. 145–146..